‘cc’ and australian federal police [2014] aicmr 65 (25 ... · ‘cc’ and australian federal...

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‘CC’ and Australian Federal Police [2014] AICmr 65 (25 June 2014)

Decision and reasons for decision of Privacy Commissioner, Timothy Pilgrim

Applicant: ‘CC’

Respondent: Australian Federal Police

Other parties: Clayton Utz

Decision date: 25 June 2014

Application number: MR12/00472

Catchwords: Freedom of Information — Whether giving access would disclose information that would reasonably be regarded as irrelevant to the request — Whether documents subject to legal professional privilege —Whether documents contain commercially valuable information — Whether documents contain personal information — Whether disclosure of personal information would be unreasonable — Whether disclosure would be contrary to the public interest — (CTH) Freedom of Information Act 1982 ss 22, 42, 47(1)(b), 47F

Contents

Summary ........................................................................................................................ 2

Background .................................................................................................................... 2

Decision under review ................................................................................................... 3

Legal professional privilege (s 42) .................................................................................. 3

Findings ...................................................................................................................... 5

Commercially valuable information exemption (s 47(1)(b)) ......................................... 5

Findings ...................................................................................................................... 7

Personal privacy exemption (s 47F) ............................................................................... 7

Findings ...................................................................................................................... 8

Business exemption (s 47G) ........................................................................................... 8

Findings ...................................................................................................................... 9

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The public interest test (s 11A(5)) ................................................................................. 9

Findings .................................................................................................................... 10

Irrelevant matter (s 22) ................................................................................................ 10

Findings .................................................................................................................... 11

Decision ........................................................................................................................ 11

Schedule of documents ............................................................................................... 12

Summary

1. I set aside the access refusal decision of the Australian Federal Police (the AFP) of 25 October 2012, as varied on 9 January 2014, and substitute my decision, under ss 11A(5) and 22 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (the FOI Act), refusing access to some of the documents sought and granting access to others, some modified by deletions.

Background

2. On 6 July 2012, the applicant applied to the Department for access to:

… all information and material held by the AFP relating to the costs, payments and fees pertaining to the use of Clayton Utz with respect to FOI requests submitted in relation to Schapelle Corby (ref: 2010/4442, 2010/2438).

3. The applicant included a list of items within the scope of her request, including all receipts and invoices and limited the scope of her request to between 1 January 2011 and 6 July 2012.

4. On 1 August 2012, the AFP undertook third party consultation with Clayton Utz and advised that it had located documents within the scope of the applicant’s request that originated with Clayton Utz.

5. On 17 August 2012, Clayton Utz wrote to the AFP advising that it objected to disclosure of the information under ss 42 (legal professional privilege), 45 (material obtained in confidence), 47(1)(b) (commercially valuable information) and 47G (business information).1

6. On 21 September 2012, the AFP sought an extension of time from the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) pursuant to s 15AC of the FOI

1 Section 27 of the FOI Act provides for consultation with affected third parties before the

disclosure of documents in response to an FOI application. A third party can contend that a document should be exempt from disclosure under s 47 (trade secrets) or conditionally exempt under s 47G (business) and that disclosure would be contrary to the public interest, before a decision is made on the FOI application. Accordingly, in this IC review, I must consider Clayton Utz’s submissions only in relation to the application of ss 47and 47G, and not in relation to ss 42 or 45. Therefore, I will not be considering Clayton Utz’s claim that the documents are exempt under ss 42 or 45.

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Act. The OAIC granted an extension of time to process the request until 4 October 2012. The AFP did not make a decision by 4 October 2012 and the AFP was deemed to have refused the applicant’s request.

7. On 25 October 2012, the AFP advised the applicant that it had identified 12 documents, comprising 63 pages, falling within the scope of the applicant’s request. The 12 documents were released with exempt or irrelevant material removed. In making its decision, the AFP edited some material it considered to be irrelevant to the scope of the applicant’s request (s 22) and applied exemptions under ss 42, 47(1)(b) and 47F.

8. On 26 October 2012, the applicant sought internal review of the AFP’s decision. On 8 November 2012, the AFP affirmed its original decision.

9. On 14 November 2012, the applicant sought IC review of this decision under s 54L of the FOI Act.

10. On 9 January 2014, the AFP varied its decision under s 55G of the FOI Act and released additional parts of the 12 documents to the applicant.

Decision under review

11. The decision under review is the decision of the AFP on 25 October 2012 (as varied by its decision on 9 January 2014) to refuse the applicant’s request.

Legal professional privilege (s 42)

12. Section 42 of the FOI Act relevantly provides:

Documents subject to legal professional privilege

(1) A document is an exempt document if it is of such a nature that it would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of legal professional privilege.

(2) A document is not an exempt document because of subsection (1) if the person entitled to claim legal professional privilege in relation to the production of the document in legal proceedings waives that claim.

13. Legal professional privilege (LPP) protects confidential communication between a lawyer and a client from compulsory production.

14. The Australian Information Commissioner has issued Guidelines under s 93A to which regard must be had for the purposes of performing a function, or exercising a power, under the FOI Act. The Guidelines explain that, at common law, determining whether a communication is privileged requires a consideration of the following:

whether there is a legal adviser-client relationship

whether the communication was for the purpose of giving or receiving legal advice or for use in connection with actual or anticipated litigation

whether the advice given is independent

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whether the advice given is confidential.2

15. The AFP applied the LPP exemption to the 12 documents.

16. In its decisions, the AFP said that the invoices contain a description of the legal services provided by Clayton Utz to the AFP. These legal services were provided in connection with the conduct of proceedings before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) commenced by Schapelle Corby against the AFP, in relation to a decision of the AFP regarding an FOI request made by Ms Corby. The AFP said that the legal invoices would also disclose the instructions given by the AFP, as the client, to Clayton Utz, as the legal adviser, in relation to the proceedings.

17. In its decision, the AFP also relied on the decision of Carey v Korda [2012] WASCA 228, which it says upheld claims of LPP over legal invoices on the basis that they could, or might tend to, reveal the nature of confidential communications made for the dominant purpose of giving or receiving legal advice.

18. I have examined unedited copies of the 12 documents. These documents are all invoices for legal services. The AFP has claimed that the hours, value and amount billed, some of the detail of the work undertaken and the names of Clayton Utz employees and AFP officers are exempt under s 42.

19. Clayton Utz was an external legal adviser to the AFP and provided advice to the AFP at the AFP’s request. I am satisfied that Clayton Utz and the AFP had a legal adviser-client relationship.

20. However, I am not satisfied that all of the information the AFP said was exempt under s 42 is exempt under that provision.

21. I note that in Carey v Korda [2012] WASCA 228, the decision relied on by the AFP, the Court of Appeal said, in relation to legal invoices, that:

The privilege is available where the document expressly reveals the privileged communication, or where the content or nature of the privileged communication may be inferred from the document: Commissioner of Australian Federal Police v Propend Finance Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 3; (1997) 188 CLR 501, 569; AWB Ltd v Cole [2006] FCA 571; (2006) 152 FCR 382 [132] - [133].3

22. The Court of Appeal in Carey also said that:

Whether, and to what extent a bill of costs is privileged, will depend upon a consideration of the circumstances in which the claim for privilege occurs, and the nature and details of the entries made in the bill in question.

2 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, Guidelines issued by the Australian

Information Commissioner under s 93A of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 [5.118]. 3 Carey v Korda [2012] WASCA 228 [62].

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An example of potential relevance to this case may be given. If the solicitor in a bill of costs recorded no more than 'to my attending at settlement on X date in the sale of Y property to Z', the entry would not ordinarily be privileged as it would not reveal the content or nature of legal advice sought or given.4

23. Much of the information the AFP decided was exempt under s 42 does not reveal the content or subject matter on which the advice was sought (in any event, it is clear from the scope of the applicant’s request and the AFP’s original decision that the advice Clayton Utz was invoicing the AFP for relates to legal proceedings in relation to FOI requests submitted by or in relation to Schapelle Corby). Rather, it merely discloses simple administrative processes, such as noting receipt of, or replying to, emails, and scheduling of, or attendance at, meetings related to the work the AFP engaged Clayton Utz to perform.

24. The AFP also edited the names of Clayton Utz employees and AFP officers and billing information such as its hourly rate under s 42. This information does not contain legal advice and would not reveal the nature or content of the advice provided by Clayton Utz. Further, the information was not communicated for the dominant purpose of giving or receiving legal advice. This information is not exempt from disclosure under s 42.

25. However, I am satisfied that some of the information about the work undertaken by Clayton Utz is sufficiently detailed as to disclose the nature and content of the advice provided by Clayton Utz to the AFP. I am satisfied that this information is exempt from disclosure under s 42.

Findings

26. Documents 1-12 are exempt under s 42(1) because parts of those documents would be privileged from production in legal proceedings on the ground of legal professional privilege. However, edited copies of documents 1-12, with the privileged parts deleted from the ‘details’ column of the invoice, would not be exempt under s 42.

Commercially valuable information exemption (s 47(1)(b))

27. Section 47(1) of the FOI Act provides:

Documents disclosing trade secrets or commercially valuable information (1) A document is an exempt document if its disclosure under this Act would disclose:

… (b) any other information having a commercial value that would be, or could

reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished if the information were disclosed.

28. In relation to s 47, the Guidelines explain:

It is a question of fact whether information has commercial value, and whether disclosure would destroy or diminish that value. The commercial value may relate, for example, to the profitability or viability of a continuing business

4 Carey v Korda [2012] WASCA 228 [64]-[65].

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operation or commercial activity in which an agency or person is involved. The information need not necessarily have ‘exchange value’, in the sense that it can be sold as a trade secret or intellectual property. The following factors may assist in deciding in a particular case whether information has commercial value:

whether the information is known only to the agency or person for whom it has value or, if it is known to others, to what extent that detracts from its intrinsic commercial value

whether the information confers a competitive advantage on the agency or person to whom it relates — for example, if it lowers the cost of production or allows access to markets not available to competitors

whether a genuine ‘arm’s-length’ buyer would be prepared to pay to obtain that information

whether the information is still current or out of date (out of date information may no longer have any value)

whether disclosing the information would reduce the value of a business operation or commercial activity — reflected, perhaps, in a lower share price.5

29. The AFP exempted the hours, value and amount billed and the direct deposit bank details of Clayton Utz in documents 1-12 under s 47(1)(b), but did not claim that the total of each invoice was exempt.

30. The AFP consulted Clayton Utz to seek its views on the release of the information. Clayton Utz objected to the release of the invoices in full because it would disclose Clayton Utz’s fee structure and the rates that Clayton Utz charges its Australian Government clients for the provision of legal services.

31. Clayton Utz also submitted that information about its professional fees is of commercial value to Clayton Utz and could also be of value to its competitors. Clayton Utz further claimed that the value of this information may be destroyed if disclosed to its competitors.

32. The Freedom of Information Commissioner, Dr James Popple, considered the issue of invoices for legal services in Sweeney and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] AICmr 68. In that decision, he observed that:

Given the framework set out in the Legal Services Directions, it must be widely known in the legal community, and more broadly, that the Commonwealth engages counsel and other legal service providers at rates lower than their usual commercial rates. I do not think that revealing the rates for which legal services have been provided to the Commonwealth will have any significant impact on those providers’ standard commercial rates.6

33. Dr Popple went on to find that even if disclosure would reveal the hourly or daily rate charged by counsel (which was not the case in Sweeney and Australian Securities and Investments Commission), the commercial value of

5 Guidelines [5.189] (footnotes omitted).

6 Sweeney and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] AICmr 68 [23].

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that information would not be, or could not reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished by that disclosure.7

34. For the same reasons Dr Popple provided in Sweeney and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] AICmr 68, I do not consider the commercial value of the hourly rate or amount billed would be, or could reasonably be expected to be, destroyed or diminished by its disclosure.

35. I also note that the documents that are the subject of this IC review span the period 1 January 2011 and 6 July 2012. The age of the documents further reduces any impact that their disclosure could have, because much of the information they contain is now out of date.

36. The direct deposit bank details of Clayton Utz does not fall within the scope of the request. As such, I will not consider whether that information is exempt under the Act.

Findings

37. Documents 1-12 are not exempt under s 47.

Personal privacy exemption (s 47F)

38. Section 47F(1) of the FOI Act provides:

Public interest conditional exemption — personal privacy General rule (1) A document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under this Act would involve

the unreasonable disclosure of personal information about any person (including a deceased person).

39. Section 4 of the FOI Act provides that ‘personal information’ has the same meaning as in the Privacy Act 1988. Section 6 of the Privacy Act provides that:

personal information means information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable:

(a) whether the information or opinion is true or not; and

(b) whether the information or opinion is recorded in a material form or not.

40. The Guidelines explain that:

The personal privacy exemption is designed to prevent the unreasonable invasion of third parties’ privacy. The test of ‘unreasonableness’ implies a need to balance the public interest in disclosure of government-held information and the private interest in the privacy of individuals. The test does not however amount to the public interest test of s 11A(5), which follows later in the decision making process. It is possible that the decision maker may need to consider one or more factors twice, once to determine if a projected effect is unreasonable and again when assessing the public interest balance.8

7 Sweeney and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] AICmr 68 [28].

8 Guidelines [6.127] (footnote omitted).

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41. In relation to agency employees, the Guidelines further explain that:

Where public servants’ personal information is included in a document because of their usual duties or responsibilities, it would not be unreasonable to disclose unless special circumstances existed. This is because the information would reveal only that the public servant was performing their public duties.9

42. I have considered the parts of the documents that the AFP decided were exempt under s 47F. This information is the names and positions of the Clayton Utz employees who performed, or were consulted on, the work detailed in the invoices. I have also considered the names of Clayton Utz employees and AFP officers that the AFP decided were subject to legal professional privilege, but which I have found (above at [24]) are not exempt under s 42.

43. The names and positions of the Clayton Utz employees and the names of the AFP officers is personal information. However, with the exception of the names of the Clayton Utz employees, I do not consider the disclosure of this information to be unreasonable.

44. The position of the Clayton Utz employees, on its own, will not reveal the identity of the individual performing that role. It will, however, provide the applicant with information as to the seniority and experience of the employees engaged to perform the work requested by the AFP. I do not consider the disclosure of this information to be unreasonable.

45. I also do not consider it unreasonable to disclose the names of the AFP officers identified on the invoices. The names of the AFP officers were included in the invoices because of their usual duties and responsibilities in the AFP and would reveal only that they were performing their public duties.

Findings

46. The names of the Clayton Utz employees are conditionally exempt under s 47F.

47. The positions of the Clayton Utz employees and the names of the AFP officers is not conditionally exempt under s 47F.

Business exemption (s 47G)

48. Section 47G of the FOI Act relevantly provides:

Public interest conditional exemptions — business

(1) A document is conditionally exempt if its disclosure under this Act would disclose information concerning a person in respect of his or her business or professional affairs or concerning the business, commercial or financial affairs of an organisation or undertaking, in a case in which the disclosure of the information:

(a) would, or could reasonably be expected to, unreasonably affect that person adversely in respect of his or her lawful business or professional

9 Guidelines [6.140] (footnote omitted).

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affairs or that organisation or undertaking in respect of its lawful business, commercial or financial affairs; …

49. Clayton Utz contended that all 12 documents are exempt in full under s 47G. Clayton Utz submitted that the information in the invoices about its fee structure and rates charged concerned its business, commercial and financial affairs and that disclosure of this information would, or could reasonably be expected to, unreasonably affect Clayton Utz in respect of its lawful business, commercial or financial affairs.

50. The parts of the invoices that fall within the scope of the applicant’s FOI request do contain information about the rates Clayton Utz charged to the AFP. However, for the same reasons Dr Popple gave in Sweeney and Australian Securities and Investments Commission10, I do not consider the disclosure of the rates charged by Clayton Utz to the AFP would have any significant impact on Clayton Utz. I am not satisfied that the disclosure of this information would, or could reasonably be expected to, unreasonably affect Clayton Utz in respect of its lawful business, commercial or financial affairs.

51. Further, as I noted above at [35], the age of the documents further reduces any impact that their disclosure could have.

Findings

52. Documents 1-12 are not exempt under s 47G.

The public interest test (s 11A(5))

53. I have found that parts of documents 1-12 are conditionally exempt under s 47F of the FOI Act. Section 11A(5) provides that, if a document is conditionally exempt, it must be disclosed ‘unless (in the circumstances) access to the document at that time would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest’. As the Guidelines explain, ‘[t]he pro-disclosure principle declared in the objects of the FOI Act is given specific effect in the public interest test, as the test is weighted towards disclosure’.11

54. Of the factors favouring disclosure set out in s 11B(3), one is relevant to this IC review: promoting the objects of the FOI Act. The Guidelines also include a non-exhaustive list of further factors that favour disclosure.12 None of those factors are relevant to this IC review.

55. The Guidelines also include a non-exhaustive list of factors against disclosure.13 Of these factors, one is relevant to this IC review: release of the information could reasonably be expected to prejudice the protection of an individual’s right to privacy.

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Above at [32]. 11

Guidelines [6.12]. 12

Guidelines [6.25]. 13

Guidelines [6.29].

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56. In balancing these factors—for and against disclosure—I give the greatest weight in this IC review to the factors against disclosure. In particular, I consider that disclosure of the identities of the Clayton Utz staff involved in the work detailed in the invoices is not necessary to achieve the public interest factors of promoting the objects of the FOI Act. Disclosure of the amounts and aspects of the details of the legal invoices without revealing the identity of the Clayton Utz employees who performed the work is sufficient to achieve this public interest factors.

Findings

57. Giving the applicant access to the documents that are conditionally exempt under s 47F would, on balance, be contrary to the public interest.

Irrelevant matter (s 22)

58. Section 22(1) of the FOI Act relevantly provides:

Access to edited copies with exempt or irrelevant matter deleted

Scope

(1) This section applies if:

(a) an agency or Minister decides: (i) to refuse to give access to an exempt document; or (ii) that to give access to a document would disclose information that

would reasonably be regarded as irrelevant to the request for access; and

(b) it is possible for the agency or Minister to prepare a copy (an edited copy) of the document, modified by deletions, ensuring that: (i) access to the edited copy would be required to be given under s 11A

(access to documents on request); and (ii) the edited copy would not disclose any information that would

reasonably be regarded as irrelevant to the request;…

Section 22(2) requires an agency or a Minister to prepare an edited copy and give the applicant access to it.

59. The AFP edited document 8 (page 43) by deleting information that it decided was not relevant to the applicant’s request.

60. I have examined an unedited copy of page 43. I agree with the AFP that the information edited from page 43 is irrelevant to the applicant’s request. The information edited from page 43 are handwritten notes on an invoice and do not relate to the scope of the applicant’s FOI request.

61. As noted at [36] above, I have found that the direct deposit bank details of Clayton Utz does not fall within the scope of the applicant’s FOI request. As such, this information is also irrelevant to the request.

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Findings

62. The information that the AFP edited from document 8 (page 43) is irrelevant to the applicant’s request.

63. The direct deposit bank details of Clayton Utz is irrelevant to the applicant’s request.

Decision

64. In the column labelled ‘IC review decision’ in the attached schedule of documents, I have indicated for each document whether it:

is not exempt (the applicant should be given access to the document)

is partly exempt (a copy of the document should be provided to the applicant, edited under s 22 so as not to disclose the specified exempt information)

is partly irrelevant (a copy of the document should be provided to the applicant, edited under s 22 so as not to disclose the irrelevant information).

65. Under s 55K of the FOI Act, I set aside the AFP’s decision of 25 October 2012, as varied on 9 January 2014, and decide in substitution for that decision, as per the column labelled ‘IC review decision’ in the schedule.

Timothy Pilgrim Privacy Commissioner

25 June 2014

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Schedule of documents

Page number

AFPS’s description AFP’s decision

IC review decision

Document 1

1 Tax invoice, Details of Professional Services and Details of Disbursements

Not exempt Not exempt


Partly exempt s 42 s 47(1)(b) s 47F

Partly exempt

names of Clayton Utz employees — s 47F



Partly exempt


entry dated 07/05/11 in the ‘Details’ column — s 42



Partly exempt


entries 2, 4, 5, 8, 12 and 14 in the ‘Details’ column — s 42



Partly exempt


entries 2, 4, 10, 11, and 14 in the ‘Details’ column — s 42

6 Tax invoice, Details of Professional Services and Details

Partly exempt s 42

Partly exempt

names of

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of Disbursements s 47(1)(b) s 47F

Clayton Utz employees — s 47F

entry 3 in the ‘Details’ column — s 42



Partly exempt


entries 2, 3, 6, 9, 10 and 11 in the ‘Details’ column — s 42



Partly exempt


entries 6, 9 and 16 in the ‘Details’ column — s 42



Partly exempt


first line and entries 1-4, 9, 10, 12 and 15 in the ‘Details’ column — s 42



Partly exempt


entries 2, 5, 6, 12 and 13 in the ‘Details’ column

14

— s 42



Partly exempt


lines 1-5 and entries 1, 3, 6 and 8 in the ‘Details’ column — s 42


Partly exempt s 42 s 47(1)(b)

Not exempt

Document 2

13 Tax invoice and Details of Professional Services




Partly exempt





Partly exempt





Partly exempt


entries 1, 11, 12, 13 and 14 in the ‘Details’ column

15

— s 42



Partly exempt


entries 9 and 11 in the ‘Details’ column — s 42



Partly exempt





Partly exempt





Partly exempt





Partly exempt




Partly exempt

names of Clayton Utz employees —

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s 47F

Document 3

23 Tax Invoice, Details of Professional Services, Details of Disbursements and Remittance Advice.



Partly exempt s 42 s 47(1)(b) 47F

Partly exempt




Not exempt


Partly exempt s 47(1)(b)

Partly irrelevant as per AFP decision

Document 4

27 Tax Invoice, Details of Professional Services and Remittance Advice

Partly exempt s 47F

Partly exempt

name of Clayton Utz employee — s 47F



Partly exempt


entries 15-17 in ‘Details’ column



Partly exempt



Partly exempt s 47(1)(b) 47F

Partly exempt


17

Partly irrelevant

as per AFP decision

Document 5

31 Tax Invoice and Details of Professional Services

Partly exempt s 47F

Partly exempt




Partly exempt


entry 14 in ‘Details’ column



Partly exempt


Document 6


Partly exempt s 47F

Partly exempt name of Clayton Utz employee — s 47F



Partly exempt


entries 5, 7, 9 and 10 in ‘Details’ column



Partly exempt


entries 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9 and 10 in

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‘Details’ column



Partly exempt



Partly exempt s 47(1)(b) s 47F

Partly exempt


Partly irrelevant

as per AFP decision

Document 7


Partly exempt s 47F

Partly exempt




Partly exempt


entries 10, 11, 13 and 17 in ‘Details’ column



Partly exempt




Partly exempt


Partly irrelevant

as per AFP

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decision

Document 8


Partly exempt s 22(1)(a)(ii) s 47F

Partly exempt


Partly Irrelevant

as per AFP decision



Partly exempt




Not exempt



Partly exempt


Partly irrelevant

as per AFP decision

Document 9


Partly exempt s 47F

Partly exempt




Partly exempt




Partly exempt

name of Clayton Utz employee —

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s 47F


Partly exempt s 47(1)(b)

Partly exempt


Partly irrelevant

as per AFP decision

Document 10


Partly exempt s 47F

Partly exempt




Partly exempt




Partly exempt




Partly exempt




Partly exempt


Partly irrelevant

as per AFP decision

Document 11


Partly exempt s 47F

Partly exempt


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Partly exempt


entry 14 in ‘Details’ column



Partly exempt




Partly exempt


Partly irrelevant

as per AFP decision

Document 12


Partly exempt s 47F

Partly exempt




Partly exempt




Partly exempt




Partly exempt


Partly Irrelevant

as per AFP decision

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Review rights

If a party to an IC review is unsatisfied with an IC review decision, they may apply under s 57A of the FOI Act to have the decision reviewed by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. The AAT provides independent merits review of administrative decisions and has power to set aside, vary, or affirm an IC review decision.

An application to the AAT must be made within 28 days of the day on which the applicant is given the IC review decision (s 29(2) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975). An application fee may be payable when lodging an application for review to the AAT. The current application fee is $816, which may be reduced or may not apply in certain circumstances. Further information is available on the AAT’s website (www.aat.gov.au) or by telephoning 1300 366 700.