Kulang ug #8 Visayanug #9 ---nagmamahal alfie. Pakisend nlng sa mga naay Soc.leg.

1.G.R. No. L-65680 May 11, 1989

JOSE B. SARMIENTO, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (National Power Corporation), respondents.

Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioner.

The Solicitor General and The Government Corporate Counsel for respondents.

 

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision rendered by the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 2134 on August 25, 1983 which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) denying the petitioner's claim for death benefits as surviving spouse of the late Flordeliza Sarmiento.

The findings of the respondent Commission are as follows:

The record shows that the late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk in May 1974. At the time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. History of the deceased's illness showed that symptoms manifested as early as April 1980 as a small wound over the external auditory canal and mass over the martoid region. Biopsy of the mass revealed cancer known as "differentiated squamous cell carcinoma." The employee sought treatment in various hospitals, namely, Veterans Memorial Hospital, United Doctors Medical Hospital and Makati Medical Center. In March 1981, a soft tissue mass emerged on her left upper cheek as a result of which her lips became deformed and she was unable to close her left eye. She continued treatment and her last treatment at the Capitol Medical Center on July 12, 1 981 was due to her difficulty of swallowing food and her general debility. On August 12, 1981, she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma. She was 40 years old.

Believing that the deceased's fatal illness having been contracted by her during employment was service-connected, appellant herein filed a claim for death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended. On September 9, 1982, the GSIS, through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that parotid carcinoma is "Malignant tumor of the parotid gland (salivary gland)" and that its development was not caused by employment and employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent System's decision of denial, claimant wrote a letter dated October 8, 1982 to the GSIS requesting that the records of the claim be elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation. (At pp. 17-18, Rollo)

On August 25, 1983, the respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS' decision. It found that the deceased's death causation by parotid carcinoma is not compensable because she did not contract nor suffer from the same by reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and epithelial growth.

It may be noted that the petitioner was earlier paid GSIS benefits in the amount of P142,285.03 but the claim for employee's compensation was disallowed.

Hence, the instant petition.

The petitioner, while principally stressing the compensability of the deceased's ailment, attacks the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, the law on employees' compensation which superseded the Labor Code and the of the Workmen's Compensation Act. He alleges that provisions the said law infringes upon the guarantees of promotion of social justice, substantive due process, and equal protection of laws, and also permits unjust discrimination and amounts to class legislation in its enforcement. He prays for the application of the Old Workmen's Compensation Act which provided for a presumption of compensability whenever an ailment supervened during the course of the employment.

We dismiss the petition.

We cannot give serious consideration to the petitioner's attach against the constitutionality of the new law on employee's compensation. It must be noted that the petitioner filed his claim under the provisions of this same law. It was only when his claim was rejected that he now questions the constitutionality of this law on appeal by certiorari.

The Court has recognized the validity of the present law and has granted and rejected claims according to its provisions. We find in it no infringement of the worker's constitutional rights. It is now settled jurisprudence (see Sulit v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 98 SCRA 483; Armena v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 122 SCRA 851; Erese v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 138 SCRA 192; De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation Commission, 142 SCRA 92) that the new law discarded the concepts of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" to restore what the law believes is a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employees' rights to receive reparation for work-connected death or disability.

In the case of De Jesus v. Employees' Compensation, (supra), this Court explained the new scheme of employees' compensation as follows:

The new law establishes a state insurance fired built up by the contributions of employers based on the saries of their employees. The injured worker does not have to litigate his right to compensation. No employer opposes his claim. There is no notice of injury nor requirement of controversion. The sick worker simply files a claim with a new neutral Employees' Compensation Commission which then determines on the basis of the employee's supporting papers and medical evidence whether or not compensation may be paid. The payment of benefits is more prompt. The cost of administration is low. The amount of death benefits has also been doubled.

On the other hand, the employer's duty is only to pay the regular monthly premiums to the scheme. It does not look for insurance companies to meet sudden demands for compensation payments or set up its own funds to meet these contingencies. It does not have to defend itself from spuriously documented or long past claims.

The new law applies the social security principle in the handling of workmen's compensation. The Commission administers and settles claims from a find under its exclusive control. The employer does not intervene in the compensation process and it has no control, as in the past, over payment of benefits. The open ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation. A covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is automatically paid benefits.

Since there is no employer opposing or fighting a claim for compensation, the rules on presumption of compensability and controversion cease to have importance. The lopsided situation of an employer versus one employee, which called for equalization through the various rules and concepts favoring the claimant, is now absent. (At pp. 99-100)

The petitioner's challenge is really against the desirability of the new law. These is no serious attempt to assail it on constitutional grounds.

The wisdom of the present scheme of workmen's compensation is a matter that should be addressed to the President and Congress, not to this Court. Whether or not the former workmen's compensation program with its presumptions, controversions, adversarial procedures, and levels of payment is preferable to the present scheme must be decided by the political departments. The present law was enacted in the belief that it better complies with the mandate on social justice and is more advantageous to the greater number of working men and women. Until Congress and the President decide to improve or amend the law, our duty is to apply it.

Under the present law, a compensable illness means any illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the Employees' Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions (Bonifacio v. Government Service Insurance System, 146 SCRA 276).

Applying the law to the present case, parotid carcinoma or cancer of the salivary glands is not an occupational disease considering the deceased's employment as accounting clerk and later as manager of the budget division. The petitioner must, therefore, prove that his wife's ailment was caused by her employment or that her working conditions increased the risk of her contracting the fatal illness.

The petitioner alleges that as budget manager, the deceased visited regional and field operations and was, naturally, exposed to the elements. According to the petitioner, the deceased's field trips necessitated her to take frequent plane travels which caused deafening and numb sensations in her ears. This, he says, caused her "differentiated carcinoma" which, according to the certificate of Dr. Ariston Bautista, "apparently started on external auditory canal."

We find these allegations as mere conjectures. As with other kinds of cancer, the cause and nature of parotid carcinoma is still not known. A medical authority, however, declares that:

SALIVARY GLANDS —

Painless swelling of the parotid glands is often noted in hepatic cirrhosis in sarcoidis, in mumps, following abdominal surgery, or associated with neoplasm or infections. The common factors may be dehydration and inattention to oral hygiene. The latter promotes the growth of large numbers of bacteria which, in the absence of sufficient salivary flow, ascend from the mouth into the duct of a gland. Another cause of a painful salivary gland is sialolithiasis (salivary duct stone). The submandibular glands

are most commonly affected. Pain and swelling associated with eating are characteristic. Saliva promotes retention of artificial dentures because of its mucin content. Thus, conditions characterized by diminished saliva flow often adversely affect the ease with which dentures may be worn. Calcium phosphate stone tend to form because of a high pH and viscosity of the submandibular gland saliva which has a high mucin content. Stones are removed by manipulation or excision.

Autoimmune sialosis is the Mikulics—Sjogren Syndrome, a unilateral or bilateral enlargement of the parotid and/or submandibular gland, and often the lacrimal glands. Occasionally painful, it is associated with xerostomia (dry mouth) due to impaired saliva formation that is most common in older women. Beriow et al., The Merek Manuel, 14th Edition, pp. 2095-2096).

Another author states the following regarding squamous cell carcinoma:

Moreover, when the salivary gland is almost totally destroyed and replaced by epidermoid cancer it may be difficult or even impossible to ascribe the origin of the growth to salivary gland tissue. Indeed many squamous cell carcinomas, especially of the parotid, may be metastatic lesions that develop in lymph nodes included within the parotid. And it is important to stress that the juxtaparotid and intraparotid lymph nodes are not merely accumulations of lymphoid tissue but nodes with efferent and afferent lymphatics.

Squamous cell carcinomas of the major salivary glands are generally fixed to the skin and the underlying tissues and, in the case of the parotid, are often the cause of facial palsy.

Epidermoid cancers grow swiftly and the clinical course is usually rapid. A few tumours, however, have been present for as long as two years before the patient seeks advice. Some patients remain alive and asymptomatic after radical surgery, but ordinarily the lesions are highly malignant, infiltrating locally and metastasizing to the regional nodes Distant metastasis is seldom a prominent clinical feature. In the case of the submandibular gland the tumor may simulate osteomyelitis of the mandible or an abscess in the gland itself, and if such lesions are incised a chronic sinus is liable to persist until radical treatment is undertaken. (Evans and Cruickshank, Epithelial Tumours of the Salivary Glands, Vol. 1, p. 254)

Given the preceding medical evaluations, we affirm the findings of the public respondents which found no proof that the deceased's working conditions have indeed caused or increased the risk of her contracting her illness.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The decisions of the Government Service Insurance System and the Employees' Compensation Commission denying the claim are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

2. G.R. No. L-35800               July 23, 1987

ROSALINDA PA-AC, for herself and in behalf of the minors, MARCELO, JR., GENOVEVA, DOMINADOR, BONIFACIO and ROSALINDA, all surnamed PA-AC, petitioners, vs.ITOGON-SUYOC MINES, INC., and WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition to review the decision of the defunct Workmen's Compensation Commission in WCU Case No. ROI-388 entitled "Rosalinda Pa-ac v. Itogon Suyoc Mines, Inc." which reversed the decision of Mr. Erudito E. Luna, Workmen's Compensation Section Chief of the Baguio City Sub-Regional Office, and denied the claim for death benefits filed by petitioner Rosalinda Pa-ac.

The factual findings of the Workmen's Compensation Commission are as follows:

The record shows that the deceased, Marcelo Pa-ac worked for the respondent company from 1951 to 1968 or a period of 17 years. He started as a laborer, shovelling sand and gravel in connection with the construction work of the respondent. After two years, Pa-ac was Promoted as a shifter in the mill department as a precipitation man. His primary duty as such was to conduct precipitation color test-The process which lasted for about 15 minutes at a time was repeated every hour, and involved the mixing of chemical solutions. On January 1, 1960, Pa-ac was assigned as sand fin operator and charged with the duty of maintaining the specific gravity of the fed while he makes a record of the readings. He also saw to it that the pump was functioning smoothly. On January 1, 1961, the deceased was assigned as ball mill operator whose duty it was to regulate the ball mill fed by opening and controlling a 48-square inch (8" x 6") fed gate by pushing the fed lips. It was also his work to charge the steel balls by means of an electric machine which starts by pressing a button and to see to it that the machine was running smoothly while he balanced the fed. Three years thereafter, or on June 17, 1964, Pa-ac was reassigned to the precipitation section. On September 1, 1967, he was promoted as mill general capataz whose duty it was to supervise the men working in the mill. As such, he worked seven days a week and received a daily wage of P8.15. He worked in shifts rotated every 15 days. The morning shift was from 7:00 o'clock a.m. to 3:00 o'clock p. m. the afternoon shift was from 3:00 o'clock p. m. to 11:00 o'clock p.m., and the night shift was from 11:00 o'clock p.m. to 7:00 o'clock a.m.

On June 14, 1968, Pa-ac was a guest in a wedding party. Before luncheon consisting of fatty foods was served, Pa-ac joined the other male guests in drinking San Miguel gin and Tanduay rhum. It seems that he had one drink too many because he became talkative and when it was time to leave, he could not walk straight. He had to be supported by Mr. Alexander Olivar, the respondent's safety engineer, to the service pick-up which brought them to the bus terminal. Sensing that Pa-ac was in no condition to work, Olivar advised Pa-ac who was supposed to report for work with the afternoon shift, not to report for duty anymore. From the bus terminal, where the two parted ways, Pa-ac headed home on foot to the Mountaineers's Store, some 500 meters away. At quarter past 2:00 o'clock p.m., that day, two laborers, Basilio Sabado, a crane helper and Camilo Valloyas, a hoistman while on their way to work, came upon Pa-ac sitting alone by the roadside. He was in a state of dizziness and his hands were shaking. Summoning the service pick-up, the two laborers rushed Pa-ac to the respondent's hospital in Sangilo.

When admitted in the hospital, Pa-ac was weak and semi conscious. He was immediately attended to by Dr. Carmen Chunuan. All efforts of the doctor notwithstanding which included medication, stimulant injection, oxygen and cardiac massage, Pa-ac died within two hours from admission. Safety Engineer Olivar volunteered a mouth-to-mouth resuscitation, but this, too, did not help. The cause of death was attributed to myocardial infarction.

The record also shows that the deceased was twice married. On September 23, 1945, he married Natividad Saloy according to the rites of the Roman Catholic Church. In July, 1960, after living together as husband and wife for 15 years, Pa-ac and Natividad were. divorced according to the tribal customs of the Mountain Province, In September of the same year, Pa-ac married Rosalinda Palki following the customs of their tribe. Whereas, Pa-ac had no issue with Natividad after years of married life, his second marriage proved fruitful for Rosalinda bore him five children, namely, Marcelo, Jr., Genoveva, Dominador Bonifacio and Rosalinda, all surnamed Pa-ac Rosalinda Palki instituted the instant claim for herself and for her five children. The claim was filed by Rosalinda with the knowledge and tacit consent of Natividad who had chosen to nurse her frustration and disappointment in her hometown of Bauko, Mountain Province." (pp. 33-35, Original Record).

On February 2, 1970, the Chief of the Workmen's Compensation Section, Baguio City Sub-Regional Office, decided in favor of the petitioner. He found the claim to be within the purview of Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Act. No. 3428), as amended, which states that:

Grounds for compensation. — When an employee suffers personal injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment or contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or either aggravated by or the result of the nature of such employment, his employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the person hereinafter specified. The right to compensation as provided in this Act shall not be defeated or impaired on the ground that the death, injury or disease was due to the negligence of a fellow servant or employee, without prejudice to the right of the employer to proceed against the negligent party.

Relying on the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Magalona v. Workmen's Compensation Commission and National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (21 SCRA 1199), he held: "Considering that the work of the deceased involved strain and exposure to the inclemencies of the weather, even when he worked as a capataz the conclusion is inevitable that his employment contributed to the acceleration of his illness. In any event, since the seriousness of his illness occurred while going to work, there is a rebuttable presumption that the same arose out of, or was at least aggravated by his employment. Hence, the claimant is relieved from the burden of proving causation. The burden to overthrow the presumption is laid by the statute on the employee." (Rollo, p. 15).

On these bases, he ordered the respondent to pay the petitioner and her children the sums of P6,000.00 as compensation benefits, P200.00 as burial expenses, P300.00 as attorney's fees, and to the Workmen's Compensation Sub-Regional Office, the sum of P61.00 as administrative costs. (p. 17, Rollo).

On appeal by the respondent to the Workmen's Compensation Commission, the aforementioned decision was reversed. The Commission found that the petitioner failed to establish a preliminary link between the illness and the employment of the deceased. Moreover, it found that "the rebuttable presumption which the Workmen's Compensation Unit Chief invoked in favor of the claimant has been successfully overthrown by the respondent by substantial evidence." (p. 22, Rollo)

Hence, this petition. The petitioner assails the Commission's decision on the grounds that it is contrary to law and existing jurisprudence and that its conclusions are not supported by the evidence on record.

We sustain the Commission's decision.

In the case of Vda. de Cardiente v. Workmen's Compensation Commission (134 SCRA 66, 70), this Court, in construing Section 2 of Act 3428, held that: "... compensable illnesses or diseases are those which are. (1) directly caused by such employment; or (2) either aggravated by the employment, or (3) the result of the nature of such employment."

The records disclose that the deceased died of myocardial infarction. Medical authorities reveal the nature of such illness as follows:

myocardial infact. A region of dead or dying tissue in the muscle of the heart which is the result of an obstruction to the blood circulation, usually by a clot. Schmidt Attorney's Dictionary of Medicine and Word Finder, [19651, p. 531)

Myocardial (mi'o-kar-de-al) pertaining to muscular tissue of the heart.

m. infarction. formation of an infarct in the heart muscle, due to interruption of the blood supply to the area (see also CORONARY OCCLUSION). (Miller and Keane, Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine and Nursing, [1972], p. 618)

Cross-referring to CORONARY OCCLUSION, the same shows:

CORONARY (kor'o-na-'re) encircling in the manner of a crown, a term applied to vessels, ligaments, etc.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Occlusion, the occlusion, or closing off, of a coronary artery. It may occur when the artery is suddenly plugged by a blood clot developing within the vessel (coronary thrombosis), or it may result when mounting fatty deposits in the wall of the vessel finally clog the artery. Coronary occlusion and coronary thrombosis are commonly referred to as a "heart attack" because the situation is usually acute with severe symptoms resulting from damage to the heart muscle (myocardial infarction and subsequent heart failure. (Ibid., p. 231.)

In supporting her claim, the petitioner alleged that the strain involved in the deceased's work caused him to suffer the abovementioned ailment. Reviewing the records of the case, however, we find that no causal relation between the illness and the employment of the deceased has been established.

The duties of the deceased as stated in his job description are light and do not involve strenuous physical exertion. As capataz he merely acted as overseer of the mill. It is not' unreasonable, therefore, to conclude that such duties could not have directly caused the deceased's ailment.

The records also belie the theory of aggravation. They show that the illness was not pre-existing. Prior to his death, the deceased never complained of any symptoms of the disease. He was never admitted and treated in the hospital for the said ailment. The attack was the first time he suffered the ailment and that one time proved fatal.

The petitioner emphasizes the presumption of compensability provided by the law in these cases.1avvphi1 We note, however, that this presumption is rebuttable. The presumption stands unless the employer clearly establishes that the death or ailment was not caused or aggravated by such employment or work. In this case, there is substantial evidence which shows that the deceased's ailment was not traceable to his employment. The respondent presented medical authority and opinions which state that myocardial infarction occurs without relation to ef forts or other discernible clinical event. (Records, p. 123). It also showed that the deceased, prior to his death, had been drinking and eating fatty food.

We agree with the ruling of the Commission that while the Workmen's Compensation Act is a social legislation designed to give relief to the workman who has been the victim of workconnected accident and should be liberally construed in favor of the workman, it cannot be reconstructed to fit particular cases ... ."

In Afable v. Singer Sewing Machine Co. (58 Phil. 39, 42), this Court held:

x x x           x x x          x x x

... It was not the intention of the legislature to make the employer an insurer against all accidental injuries which might happen to an employee while in the course of the employment, but only for such injuries arising from or growing out of the risks peculiar to the nature of the work in the scope of the workman's employment or incidental to such employment, and accidents in which it is possible to trace the injury to some risk or hazard to which the employee is exposed in a special degree by reason of such employment. Risks to which all persons similarly situated are equally exposed and not traceable in some special degree to the particular employment are excluded.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED, and the present petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Injuries…

1. G.R. No. L-26341      November 27, 1968

ILOILO DOCK & ENGINEERING CO., petitioner, vs.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION and IRENEA M. PABLO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children EDWIN, EDGAR and EDNA, all surnamed PABLO, respondents.

Luisito C. Hofilena for petitioner.Villavieja and Villanueva for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.Gualberto C. Opong for respondent Irenea M. Pablo and her minor children.

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal by the Iloilo Dock and Engineering Company (hereinafter referred to as the IDECO) from the decision dated February 28, 1966 of the Workmen's Compensation Commission (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) affirming the decision of the Regional Office VII in Iloilo City, and ordering the IDECO to pay to the widow and children of Teodoro G. Pablo (Irenea M. Pablo and the minors Edwin, Edgar and Edna, all surnamed Pablo) the sum of P4,000, to pay to the widow P89 as reimbursement for burial expenses and P300 as attorney's fees, and to pay to the Commission the amount of P46 as fees pursuant to section 55 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as amended.

At about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 29, 1960, Pablo, who was employed as a mechanic of the IDECO, while walking on his way home, was shot to death in front of, and about 20 meters away from, the main IDECO gate, on a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The slayer, Martin Cordero, was not heard to say anything before or after the killing. The motive for the crime was and still is unknown as Cordero was himself killed before he could be tried for Pablo's death. At the time of the killing, Pablo's companion was Rodolfo Galopez, another employee, who, like Pablo, had finished overtime work at 5:00 p.m. and was going home. From the main IDECO gate to the spot where Pablo was killed, there were four "carinderias" on the left side of the road and two "carinderias" and a residential house on the right side. The entire length of the road is nowhere stated in the record.

According to the IDECO, the Commission erred (1) in holding that Pablo's death occurred in the course of employment and in presuming that it arose out of the employment; (2) in applying the "proximity rule;" and (3) in holding that Pablo's death was an accident within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The principal issue is whether Pablo's death comes within the meaning and intendment of that "deceptively simple and litigiously prolific",1 phrase The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in the course of employment."2 The two components of the coverage formula — "arising out of" and "in the course of employment" — are said to be separate tests which must be independently satisfied;3 however, it should not be forgotten that the basic concept of compensation coverage is unitary, not dual, and is best expressed in the word, "work-connection," because an uncompromising insistence on an independent application of each of the two portions of the test can, in certain cases, exclude clearly work-connected injuries.4 The words "arising out of" refer to the origin or cause of the accident, and are descriptive of its character, while the words "in the course of" refer to the time, place and circumstances under which the accident takes place.5

As a matter of general proposition, an injury or accident is said to arise "in the course of employment" when it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.6

The general rule in workmen's compensation law known as the "going & coming rule," simply stated, is that "in the absence of special circumstances, an employee injured in, going to, or coming from his place of work is excluded from the benefits of workmen's compensation acts."7 This rule, however, admits of four well-recognized exceptions, to wit: (1) where the employee is proceeding to or from his work on the premises of his employer; (2) where the employee is about to enter or about to leave the premises of his employer by way of the exclusive or customary means of ingress and egress; (3) where the employee is charged, while on his way to or from his place of employment or at his home, or during his employment, with some duty or special errand connected with his employment; and (4) where the employer, as an incident of the employment, provides the means of transportation to and from the place of employment.8

We address ourselves particularly to an examination and consideration of the second exception, i.e., injuries sustained off the premises of the employer, but while using a customary means of ingress and egress.

This exception, known as the "proximity rule," was applied in Philippine Fiber Processing Co., Inc. vs. Ampil.9There, the employee, at about 5:15 a.m., while proceeding to his place of work and running to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch fronting the main gate of the employer's factory, as a result of which he died the next day. The sole question was whether or not the accident which caused the employee's death arose out of and in the course of his employment. This Court ruled in favor of the claimant thus:

The very case of Afable vs. Singer Sewing Machine Co. invoked by the petitioner intimated that "we do not of course mean to imply that an employee can never recover for injuries suffered while on his way to or from work. That depends on the nature of his employment." Considering the facts found by the Commission, namely, that the deceased Angel Ariar was not under any shift routine; that his assignment covered the entire working hours of the factory; that the first working hour starts at 6:00 o'clock in the morning; that it takes at least thirty minutes before the machine operates at full speed or load; that the spot where he fell (ditch fronting petitioner's factory or sidewalk of its premises), is immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof. In Salilig vs. Insular Lumber Co., G.R. No. 28951, September 10, 1928, referred to in the Comments on the Workmen's Compensation Commission Act by Morabe and Inton, 1955 edition, compensation was allowed for injury received by a laborer from an accident in going to his place of work, along a path or way owned by his employer and commonly used by the latter's laborers.

In contrast is Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc. vs. Quiroz,10 which concerned injuries sustained by a centrifugal operator. He had reported for work at 9:30 p.m. (March 7, 1958) and was dismissed at 5:30 the following morning. Soon "after he stepped out of the company gate, and while standing about 2-½ meters from it between the shoulder of the highway and a railroad that came from inside the compound and intersected the highway, waiting for a ride home, he was bumped by a jeepney, as a result of which he sustained" injuries. In holding that these injuries were "not produced by an accident "arising out of and in the course of employment," " this Court reasoned thus:

The compensability of an injury suffered by an employee proceeding to or coming from his work depends upon whether or not it is "work-connected." As Chief Justice Kenison of New Hampshire has put it, "the fact that the employee is travelling to or from work on a public highway does not necessarily exclude coverage (Brousseau vs. Blackstone Mills, 130 A 2d 543, 545). Conversely, it is not enough to say that the employee would not have been on the public highway had it not been for his job, since the same can usually be said of the general public (Payne & Dolan vs. Industrial Commission, 46 NE 2d 925). The law, in effect, insures the employee against losses arising from the perils of his work. In other words, the Workmen's Compensation Act covers occupational injuries, which, as such, must have a causative connection with something, not merely in common with the public, but peculiar to the employment. In order to warrant recovery for off-the-premises injuries, it must be shown that there has been a very special danger, some particular risk whichthe employer could have caused or allowed to exist. Hence,

It is significant that practically all successful off-the-premises cases have involved normal route of access to the plant, or an icy sidewalk adjacent to the premises and therefore identified with the premises in the sense that the employer should have removed the ice. (Emphasis ours.)

It is true that in Philippine Fiber Processing Co. v. Ampil, G.R. No. L-8130 (June 30, 1956), we held the employer liable for an injury sustained by an employee who, as he was running to his place of work to avoid the rain, slipped and fell into a ditch in front of the factory's main gate and near the same. The ditch was, however, in itself an obvious hazard which, owing to its proximity to the gate, the employer should have taken measures to remove. Thus, thru his inaction, he had contributed, in a special way, to the occurrence of the accident.

In the case at bar, no such special circumstance appears to exist. There is no particular causative connection between the injury sustained by the employee and either his work or his employer. Although, as stated in the decision appealed from, the record does not show that the company "had taken measures to make the waiting place safe for the employees," neither does the record show either that the accident occurred at the usual waiting place of the employees, or that said place was particularly unsafe.

Our Workmen's Compensation Act being essentially American in origin and text, it is not amiss to pay deference to pertinent American jurisprudence. In the precise area of law here involved, we can draw guidance from an affluence of Federal and State precedents.

From Samuel B. Horovitz' Injury and Death under Workmen's Compensation Laws (1944), pp. 159 to 165, we glean the following observations:

Suppose, however, that the injury occurs on the way to work or on the way home from work. Injuries going to or from work have caused many judicial upheavals.

The question here is limited to whether the injuries are "in the course of" and not "out of" the employment. How the injury occurred is not in point. Street risks, whether the employee was walking or driving, and all other similar questions deal with the risk of injury or "out of" the employment. "In the course of" deals mainly with the element of time and space, or "time, place and circumstances."

Thus, if the injury occurred fifteen minutes before working hours and within one hundred feet of the employer's premises, on sidewalks or public roads, the question of "in the course of" the employment is flatly raised.

Some of our states refuse to extend this definition of "in the course of" to include these injuries. Most of the states will protect the employee from the moment his foot or person reaches the employer's premises, whether he arrives early or late. These states find something sacred about the employment premises and define "premises" very broadly, not only to include premises owned by the employer, but also premises leased, hired, supplied or used by him, even private alleyways merely used by the employer. Adjacent private premises are protected by many states, and a few protect the employee even on adjacent public sidewalks and streets. Where a city or any employer owns or controls an island, all its streets are protected premises.

There is no reason in principle why states should not protect employees for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. The Supreme Court of the United States has declared that it will not overturn any state decision that so enlarges the scope of its act. Hence, a deaf worker, trespassing on railroad tracks adjacent to his employer's brick-making premises (but shown by his superintendent the specific short crossing over the track), and killed by a train, was held to be in the course of his employment when hit by an oncoming train fifteen minutes before his day would have begun. So long as causal relation to the employment is discernible, no federal question arises.

The narrow rule that a worker is not in the course of his employment until he crosses the employment threshold is itself subject to many exceptions. Off-premises injuries to or from work, in both liberal and narrow states, are compensable (1) if the employee is on the way to or from work in a vehicle owned or supplied by the employer, whether in a public (e.g., the employer's street car) or private conveyance; (2) if the employee is subject to call at all hours or at the moment of injury; (3) if the employee is travelling for the employer, i.e., travelling workers; (4) if the employer pays for the employee's time from the moment he leaves his home to his return home; (5) if the employee is on his way to do further work at home, even though on a fixed salary; (6) where the employee is required to bring his automobile to his place of business for use there. Other exceptions undoubtedly are equally justified, dependent on their own peculiar circumstances.

Schneider (supra, at p. 117) makes this significant statement:

The proximity rule exception to the general going and coming rule is that an employee is generally considered to be in the course of his employment while coming to or going from his work, when, though off the actual premises of his employer, he is still in close proximity thereto, is proceeding diligently at an appropriate time, by reasonable means, over the natural, practical, customary, convenient and recognized way of ingress, or egress either on land under the control of the employer, or on adjacent property with the express or implied consent of the employer.

On pp. 98 to 99 of 85 ALR, we find the following disquisition:

The compensation acts have been very generally held not to authorize an award in case of an injury or death from a peril which is common to all mankind, or to which the public at large is exposed. 28 R.C. L. 804. And they do not as a general rule cover injuries received while going to or from work on public streets, where the employee has not reached, or has left the employer's premises. The question whether an injury arises out of and in the course of the employment, however, is one dependent upon the facts of each case, and in some cases, where an injury occured while the employee was going to or from work, but was in the street in front of the employer's premises, it has been held compensable.

Thus, in the reported case (Barnett v. Brtiling Cafeteria Co., ante, 85) the injury was held to have arisen out of and in the course of the employment, where the employee slipped on ice on the sidewalk immediately in front of the employer's place of business, while on her way to report for duty, and just before entering by the only entrance to her place of employment. The court here recognized the general rule that, if an employee is injured while going to or from his work to his house, or to or from some point not visited for the discharge of a duty arising out of the employment, or while in the use of a public highway, he does not come within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, but stated that there is an exception to this rule and that the employment is not limited by the actual time when the workman reaches the scene of his labor and begins it, or when he ceases, but includes a reasonable time and opportunity before and after, while he is at or near his place of employment. The court reasoned that in the case at bar, although the employee had not entered the employer's place of business, and the sidewalk was a public highway so much therefore as was in front of the employer's place of business was a necessary adjunct, used in connection with the business, and that the sidewalk was to a limited degree and purpose a part of the employer's premises.

In Industrial Commission v. Barber (1927) 117 Ohio St 373, 159 NE 363, the injury was held to have arisen in the course of the employment where an employee, about five minutes before the hour when he was to go on duty, was struck by an automobile owned and driven by another employee, within a short distance from the employer's plant, which was located at the dead end of a street maintained by the employer from its plant to the intersection with another street, and, although the street was a public one, it led nowhere except to the employer's plant, and all of its employees were obliged to use it in going to and from their work. The court stated that where the conditions under the control of an industrial plant are such that the employee has no option but to pursue a given course with reference to such conditions and environments, the pursuance of such course is an implied obligation of the employer in his contract with such employee, and that when he, for the purpose of entering his employment, has entered into the sphere or zone controlled by his employer and is pursuing a course with reference to which he has no option, he is then not only within the conditions and environments of the plant of his employer, but is then in the course of his employment; and that, when he receives an injury attributable to such conditions and environments, there is a direct causal connection between his employment and his injury, and the injury falls within the class of industrial injuries for which compensation has been provided by the Workmen's Compensation Law.

99 C.J.S., at pp. 807-814, has this to say:

It is laid down as a general rule, known as the "going and coming" rule, that, in the absence of special circumstances, and except in certain unusual circumstances, and where nothing else appears, harm or injury sustained by an employee while going to or from his work is not compensable. Such injury, or accident, is regarded by the weight of authority of many courts as not arising out of his employment, and as not being, or not occurring, in the course thereof.

However, this rule is not inflexible, is not of inevitable application, and is subject to qualifications, and to exceptions which depend on the nature, circumstances, and conditions of the particular employment, the circumstances of the particular case, and the cause of the injury.

Jaynes vs. Potlach Forests11 expresses with enlightening clarity the rationale for extending the scope of "course of employment" to certain "off-premises" injuries:

We are urged here to again recognize and apply the distinction between off-premises injuries which occur on private property and those which occur on public streets and highways. The extension of the course of employment to off-premises injuries is not based upon the principle which would justify a distinction upon the narrow ground of private and public property; it is not sound to say that while an employee is on public highway he is always there as a member of the public and in nowise in the exercise of any right conferred by his contract to employment; nor is it a complete answer to say that while he is on his employer's premises his presence there is by contract right, otherwise he would be a trespasser. The question of whether or not one is a covered employee should not be resolved by the application of the law relating to rights to enter upon lands, or by law of trespass, licensee, invitee or otherwise.

A substantial and fair ground to justify the extension of the course of employment beyond the premises of the employer is to extend its scope to the necessary risks and hazards associated with the employment. These risks may or may not be on the premises of the employer and for this reason there is no justification to distinguish between extended risks on public highways and private pathways. In fact it is at most a distinction without a difference. Under the better reasoned cases the technical status as public or private is obviously of no moment or in any event in and of itself is not conclusive.

Likewise enlightening is the following explanation of the premises rule exceptions:

We have, then a workable explanation of the exception to the premises rule: it is not nearness, or reasonable distance, or even the identifying or surrounding areas with the premises; it is simply that, when a court has satisfied itself that there is a distinct "arising out of" or causal connection between the conditions under which claimant must approach and leave the premises and the occurrence of the injury, it may hold that the course of employment extends as far as those conditions extend. (Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, 1965 ed., vol. 1, pp. 210-211)

We now direct our attention to the cause of the employee's death: assault.

An "assault," although resulting from a deliberate act of the slayer, is considered an "accident" within the meaning of sec. 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, since the word "accident" is intended to indicate that "the act causing the injury shall be casual or unforeseen, an act for which the injured party is not legally responsible."12

In the cases where the assault was proven to have been work-connected, compensation was awarded. In Nava, supra, the helmsman of a boat was engaged in hauling the ship's cable and in coiling the cable partly occupied by a folding bed of one of the passengers. This passenger, upon being asked, declared his ownership of the bed. Nava expressed his intention of pushing it out of the way and proceeded to do so. Angered by this, the passenger exchanged hot words with Nava, and then, with a piece of wood, jabbed Nava at the pit of the stomach. At this point, the passenger's brother ran up to Nava and stabbed him to death. The death was adjudged compensable.

In Bohol Land Transportation Co. vs. Vda. de Mandaguit,13 the truck which Mandaguit was driving collided with a cyclist going in the opposite direction. The latter turned around and immediately pursued the bus. He overtook it a few minutes later when it stopped to take on passengers. The driver then disembarked from the bus to wash his hands at a drugstore nearby. The cyclist followed him there and knifed him to death. We affirmed the grant of compensation upon the finding that the death arose out of and in the course of employment.

In Galicia vs. Dy Pac,14 the employee, Pablo Carla, was asked to work in lieu of another employee who had been suspended from work upon request of his labor union; while Carla was working, the suspended employee asked him to intercede for him, but Carla refused; an altercation resulted; shortly thereafter the suspended employee stabbed Carla to death. The death was held compensable because "the injury sustained by the deceased was caused by an accident arising out of his employment since the evidence is clear that the fight which resulted in the killing of the deceased had its origin or cause in the fact that he was placed in the job previously occupied by the assailant."

In the three cases above-cited, there was evidence as to the motive of the assailant.

In A. P. Santos, Inc. vs. Dabacol,15 the death of an employee-driver who, while driving a cab, was killed by an unidentified passenger, was held compensable by the Commission. However, the question of whether the assault arose out of the employment, was not raised on appeal to this Court.

In Batangas Transportation Company vs. Vda. de Rivera,16 that question was raised. While the employee-driver was driving a bus, a passenger boarded it and sat directly behind the driver. After about thirty minutes, during which the passenger and the driver never so much as exchanged a word, the passenger shot the driver to death and then fled. There was no competent proof as to the cause of the assault, although there were intimations that the incident arose from a personal grudge. The majority decision17 ruled the death compensable. The bases: (1) Once it is proved that the employee died in the course of the employment, the legal presumption, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, is that the claim "comes within the provisions of the compensation law" (sec. 43), in other words, that the incident arose out of the workman's employment. (2) Doubts as to rights to compensation are resolved in favor of the employee and his dependents. (3) The Commissioner's declaration on the work-connection might be binding on the Court. (4) There are employments which increase the risk of assault on the person of the employee and it is in that sense that an injury or harm sustained by the assaulted worker arises out of the employment, because the increased risk to assault supplies the link or connection between the injury and the employment. Among the jobs enumerated as increasing the risk of assault are (a) jobs having to do with keeping the peace or guarding property; (b) jobs having to do with keeping or carrying of money which subject to the employee to the risk of assault because of the increased temptation to robbery; (c) jobs which expose the employee to direct contact with lawless and irresponsible members of the community, like that of a bartender; and (d) work as bus driver, taxi driver or street car conductor.

It has been said that an employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault. The first kind of employment, the so-called "increased risk" jobs comprehend (1) jobs involving dangerous duties, such as that of guarding the employer's property, that of carrying or keeping money, that where the employee is exposed to lawless or irresponsible members of the public, or that which subjects him to increased or indiscriminate contact with the public, such as the job of a street car conductor or taxi-driver;18 (2) jobs where the employee is placed in a dangerous environment;19 and (3) jobs of employees whose work takes them on the highway. On the other hand, the employment itself may be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault as where a supervisor is assaulted by workmen he has fired, or where the argument was over the performance of work or possession of tools or the like, or where the violence was due to labor disputes.20

In Rivera, supra, the unexplained assault on the employee was considered to have arisen out of the employment because it occurred in the course of employment. This Court relied on the presumption of law that in any proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the claim is presumed to come within the provisions of the Act.21According to this Court, "this statutory presumption was copied from New York." Concerning the corresponding New York provision of law, Larson has this to say:

In a few jurisdictions, notably New York and Massachusetts, a statutory presumption in favor of coverage has figured in unexplained-accident cases. The Massachusetts statute provides:

In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed, or is physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim comes within the provisions of this chapter, that sufficient notice of the injury has been given, and that the injury or death was not occasioned by the wilful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another.

This provision was largely copied from the New York section on presumptions, except that the New York act creates the presumption in all cases, not merely those involving an employee's death or inability to testify.

The sweeping inclusiveness of this language might seem at first glance to mean that the mere making of a claim is also the making of a prima facie case, as long as death or injury is shown to have occurred. The New York and Massachusetts courts have not so interpreted these statutes, however. It seems to be necessary to establish some kind of preliminary link with the employment before the presumption can attach. Otherwise, the claimant widow would have merely to say, "My husband, who was one of your employee, has died, and I therefore claim death benefits," whereupon the affirmative burden would devolve upon the employer to prove that there was no connection between the death and the environment.

It is not yet entirely clear what initial demonstration of employment-connection will give the presumption a foothold. Apparently, the idea is to rule out cases in which claimant can show neither that the injury occurred in the course of employment nor that it arose out of it, as where he contracted a disease but has no evidence to show where he got it. If there is evidence that the injury occurred in the course of employment, the presumption will usually supply the "arising-out-of-employment" factor." Larson's Workmen Compensation Law (1965) vol. 1, pp. 123-124.

We also quote from the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York in Daus vs. Gunderman & Sons:22

The statute is not intended to relieve completely an employee from the burden of showing that accidental injuries suffered by him actually were sustained in the course of his employment. "It is not the law that mere proof of an accident, without other evidence, creates the presumption under section 21 of the Workmen's Compensation Law (Consol. Law, c. 67) that the accident arose out of and in the course of the employment. On the contrary, it has been frequently held, directly and indirectly, that there must be some evidence from which the conclusion can be drawn that the injuries did arise out of and in the course of the employment." Proof of the accident will give rise to the statutory presumption only where some connection appears between the accident and the employment.

Likewise of relevance is the following treatise:

The discussion of the coverage formula, "arising out of and in the course of employment," was opened with the suggestion that, while "course" and "arising" were put under separate headings for convenience, some interplay between the two factors should be observed in the various categories discussed.

A few examples may now be reviewed to show that the two tests, in practice, have not been kept in air-tight compartments, but have to some extent merged into a single concept of

work-connection. One is almost tempted to formulate a sort of quantum theory of work-connection: that a certain minimum quantum of work-connection must be shown, and if the "course" quantity is very small, but the "arising" quantity is large, the quantum will add up to the necessary minimum, as it will also when the "arising" quantity is very small but the "course" quantity is relatively large.

But if both the "course" and "arising" quantities are small, the minimum quantum will not be met.

As an example of the first, a strong "arising" factor but weak "course" factor, one may cite the cases in which recoveries have been allowed off the employment premises, outside business hours, when an employee going to or coming from work is injured by a hazard distinctly traceable to the employment, such as a traffic jam overflowing from the employment premises, or a rock flying through the air from a blast on the premises. Here, by normal course of employment standards, there would be no award, since the employee was not on the premises while coming or going. Yet the unmistakable character of the causal relation of the injury to the employment has been sufficient to make up for the weakness of the "course" factor. Another example of the same kind of balancing-out is seen in the line of cases dealing with injury to travelling men or loggers while sleeping in hotels or bunkhouses. It was shown in the analysis of these cases that, although the "course" factor is on the borderline when the employee is sound asleep at the time of injury, a strong causal relation of the injury to the conditions of employment — as where a fellow-logger runs amok, or a straw falls into the bunkhouse-inmate's throat from the mattress above, or the employee is trapped in a burning hotel — will boost the case over the line to success; while a weak causal connection, as where the salesman merely slips in a hotel bath, coupled with a weak "course" factor due to the absence of any direct service performed for the employer at the time, will under present decisions add up to a quantum of work-connection too small to support an award. It was also shown that when the "course" element is strengthened by the fact that the employee is at all times on call, the range of compensable sources of injury is broader than when the employee, although living on the premises is not on call.

A somewhat similar balancing-out process is seen in the holding that a borderline course-of-employment activity like seeking personal comfort or going to and from work falls short of compensability if the method adopted is unusual, unreasonable and dangerous, while no such restriction applies to the direct performance of the work.

As an example of the reverse situation, a strong "course" element and a weak "arising" element; one may recall the "positional" cases discussed in section 10, as well as the unexplained-fall and other "neutral-cause" cases. Here the course of employment test is satisfied beyond the slightest doubt: the employee is in the midst of performing the active duties of his job. But the causal connection is very weak, since the source of the injury — whether a stray bullet, a wandering lunatic, and unexplained fall or death, or a mistaken assault by a stranger — is not distinctly associated with employment conditions as such, and is tied to the employment only by the argument that the injury would not have occurred to this employee but for the obligation of the employment which placed him in the position to be hurt. Yet, since the "course" element is so strong, awards are becoming increasingly common on these facts.

Incidentally, it may be observed that this "quantum" idea forms a useful yardstick for measuring just how generous a court has become in expanding compensation coverage; for if a court makes an award when a case, by the above standards, is weak both on course of employment and on causal connection, one can conclude that the court is capable of giving

the act a broad construction. Thus, an award was made in Puffin v. General Electric, where the course element was weak (rest period) and the causal element was weak (setting fire to own sweater while smoking). Both factors were likewise very weak in O'Leary v. Brown Pacific-Maxon Inc., where the course of employment consisted of a recreation period interrupted by a rescue of a stranger, and the arising factor consisted of drowning in a channel where decedent was prohibited from going. And, in Martin v. Plaut, the course of employment factor was weak (a cook dressing in the morning) and the causal factor was also weak (an unexplained fall); yet an award was made in New York.

But another New York case shows that the simultaneous weakness of course and arising factors may reach the point where the requisite quantum is not found. In Shultz v. Nation Associates, compensation was denied to an employee who while combing her hair preparatory to going to lunch negligently struck her eye with the comb. Here we see thinness on all fronts: as to course of employment time factor, we have a lunch period; as to the course of employment activity factor, we have care of personal appearance; and as to the causal factor, we have negligence of the employee. Each weakness standing alone — lunch period, care of appearance, negligence — would not be fatal; there are many awards in which one or another of these is present. But when all are present, while an award is not impossible and could be defended on a point by point basis, it cannot be relied upon in most jurisdictions by the prudent lawyer. Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law 1965 ed. Vol. 1, pp. 452.97 to 452.100.

In resume:

1. Workmen's compensation is granted if the injuries result from an accident which arises out of and in the course of employment.

2. Both the "arising" factor and the "course" factor must be present. If one factor is weak and the other is strong, the injury is compensable, but not where both factors are weak. Ultimately, the question is whether the accident is work-connected.

3. In a proceeding for the enforcement of a claim, the same is presumed to come within the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act. But a preliminary link must first be shown to exist between the injury and the employment. Thus if the injury occurred in the course of employment, it is presumed to have arisen out of the employment.

4. The "course" factor applies to time, place and circumstances. This factor is present if the injury takes place within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may be, and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto.

5. The rule is that an injury sustained while the employee goes to or comes from his place of work, is not of the employment.

6. The exception to the rule is an injury sustained off the employee's premises, but while in close proximity thereto and while using a customary means of ingress and egress. The reason for extending the scope of "course of employment" to off-premises injuries is that there is a causal connection between the work and the hazard.

7. An "assault" may be considered an "accident" within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The employment may either increase risk of assault because of its nature or be the subject-matter of a dispute leading to the assault.

From the milestones, we now proceed to take our bearings in the case at bar, having in mind always that no cover-all formula can be spelled out with specificity, that the particular facts and circumstances of each case must be inquired into, and that in any perceptive inquiry, the question as to where the line should be drawn beyond which the liability of the employer cannot continue has been held to be usually one of fact.

We shall first dwell on the question of ownership of the private road where Pablo was killed. In granting compensation, the Commission said that "the road where the deceased was shot was of private ownership, was called the IDECO road, and led straight to the main IDECO gate, thus raising the reasonable assumption that it belonged" to the IDECO. The Commission reasoned out that "even if the ownership of the road were open to question, there was no doubt that its private character was obviously exploited by the respondent for the purpose of its own business to such an extent as to make it to all intents and purposes an extension of its premises," so that the "shooting of the deceased may be considered to have taken place on the premises, and therefore within the employment;" and that "while respondent allowed its name to be used in connection with the private road for the ingress and egress of the employees it did not apparently take the necessary precaution to make it safe for its employees by employing security guards."

But the IDECO denies ownership of the road. In its memorandum filed with the Regional Office, IDECO averred that Pablo's death did not originate from his work as to time, place and circumstances. This, in effect, is a denial of ownership of the road. The decision of the Regional Office does not state that the road belongs to the IDECO. All that it says is that Pablo was shot "barely two minutes after he was dismissed from work and while walking along the IDECO road about twenty (20) meters from the gate." In its "motion for reconsideration and/or review," the IDECO emphasized that "the place where the incident happened was a public road, not less than twenty (20) meters away from the main gate of the compound, and therefore not proximate to or in the immediate vicinity of the place of work." Again, the ownership of the road was implicitly denied. And in its "motion for reconsideration and/or appeal to the Commission en banc," the IDECO alleged outright that the "road where the incident took place, although of private ownership, does not belong to IDECO. There is absolutely no evidence on record that shows IDECO owns the road." If the road were owned by the IDECO, there would have been no question that the assault arose "in the course of employment."23 But if it did indeed own the road, then the IDECO would have fenced it, and place its main gate at the other end of the road where it meets the public highway.

But while the IDECO does not own the private road, it cannot be denied that it was using the same as the principal means of ingress and egress. The private road leads directly to its main gate.24 Its right to use the road must then perforce proceed from either an easement of right of way or a lease. Its right, therefore, is either a legal one or a contractual one. In either case the IDECO should logically and properly be charged with security control of the road. The IDECO owed its employees a safe passage to its premises. In compliance with such duty, the IDECO should have seen to it not only that road was properly paved and did not have holes or ditches, but should also have instituted measures for the proper policing of the immediate area. The point where Pablo was shot was barely twenty meters away from the main IDECO gate, certainly nearer than a stone's throw therefrom. The spot is immediately proximate to the IDECO's premises. Considering this fact, and the further facts that Pablo had just finished overtime work at the time, and was killed barely two minutes after dismissal from work, the Ampil case is squarely applicable here. We may say, as we did in Ampil, that the place where the employee was injured being "immediately proximate to his place of work, the accident in question must be deemed to have occurred within the zone of his employment and therefore arose out of and in the course thereof." Our principal question is whether the injury was sustained in the course of employment. We find that it was, and so conclude that the assault arose out of the employment, even though the said assault is unexplained.

American jurisprudence supports this view.

In Bountiful Brick Company vs. Giles,25 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

Employment includes both only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee to be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached. Probably, as a general rule, employment may be said to begin when the employee reaches the entrance to the employer's premises where the work is to be done; but it is clear that in some cases the rule extends to include adjacent premises used by the employee as a means of ingress and egress with the express or implied consent of the employer.

The above ruling is on all fours with our facts. Two minutes from dismissal and twenty meters from the main IDECO gate are "a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from" the IDECO's premises. The IDECO employees used the private road with its consent, express or implied. Twenty meters on that road from the main gate is in close proximity to the IDECO's premises. It follows that Pablo's death was in the course of employment.

In Carter vs. Lanzetta,26 it was held that "such statutes envision extension of coverage to employees from the time they reach the employer's premises until they depart therefrom and that hours of service include a period when this might be accomplished within a reasonable interval;" and that "under exceptional circumstances, a continuance of the course of employment may be extended by allowing the employee a reasonable time not only to enter or leave the premises but also to surmount certain hazards adjacent thereto."

The private road led directly to the main IDECO gate. From this description, it would appear that the road is a dead-end street. In Singer vs. Rich Marine Sales,27 it was held that, where the employee, while returning to work at the end of the lunch period, fell at the curb of the sidewalk immediately adjacent to the employer's premises and one other located thereon, and the general public used the street only in connection with those premises, and the employer actually stored boats on the sidewalk, the sidewalk was within the precincts of employment. In that case there were even two business establishments on the dead-end street. Here, it is exclusively the IDECO premises which appear to be at the end of the private road.

We find in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation28 a meaningful statement of the obligation of the employer to its employees: "That the employer owes, so to speak, a duty of 'safe passage' to an employee to the point where he can reach the proper arrival or departure from his work seems without question."

We next quote extensively from Kelty vs. Travellers Insurance Company:29

The rule has been repeatedly announced in Texas that an injury received by an employee while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning from the place of employment is not compensable, the rationale of the rule being that in most instances such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risk and hazards to which all members of the travelling public are subject rather than risk and hazards having to do with and originating in the work or business of the employer....

Another exception, however, which is applicable is found in the so-called "access" cases. In these cases a workman who has been injured at a plane intended by the employer for use as a means of ingress or egress to and from the actual place of the employee's work has been held to be in the course of his employment. The courts have said that these access areas are so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises. We shall discuss the principal authorities dealing with this exception to the general rule.

The leading cases in Texas dealing with the "access" exception, and one which we think is controlling of this appeal, is Lumberman's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Behnken, 112 Tex. 103, 246 S.W. 72, 28 A.L.R. 1402. In that case the employee was employed by Hartburg Lumber Company, which company operated and owned a sawmill in Hartburg, Texas, which was a lumber town, consisting solely of the employer's facilities. A railroad track ran through the town and a part of the lumber company's facilities was situated on either side of the right-of-way. A public road ran parallel to the railroad tracks which led to the various buildings on the property of the lumber company. This crossing was used by any member of the public desiring to go to any part of the lumber company facilities. On the day in question the decedent quit work at noon, went home for lunch and while returning to the lumber company plant for the purpose of resuming his employment, was struck and killed by a train at the crossing in question. The insurance company contended (as it does here) that the decedent's death did not originate in the work or business of his employer and that at the time of his fatal injuries he was not in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer. The Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion, reviewed the authorities from other states and especially Latter's Case 238 Mass. 326, 130 N. E. 637, 638, and arrived at the conclusion that the injury and death under such circumstances were compensable under the Texas Act. The court held that the railroad crossing bore so intimate a relation to the lumber company's premises that it could hardly be treated otherwise than as a part of the premises. The Court pointed out that the lumber company had rights in and to the crossing which was used in connection with the lumber company's business, whether by employees or by members of the public. In announcing the "access" doctrine Justice Greenwood said:

Was Behnken engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer when he received the injury causing his death? He was upon the crossing provided as the means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. He encountered the dangers incident to use of the crossing in order that he might perform the duties imposed by his contract of service. Without subjecting himself to such dangers he could not do what was required of him in the conduct of the lumber company's business. He had reached a place provided and used only as an adjunct to that business, and was injured from a risk created by the conditions under which the business was carried on. To hold that he was not acting in furtherance of the affairs or business of the lumber company would be to give a strict interpretation to this remedial statute, which should be liberally construed with a view to accomplish its purpose and to promote justice.

xxx      xxx      xxx

In Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n v. Anderson, Tex. Civ. App., 125 S. W. 2d 674, wr. ref., this court followed the rule announced in Behnken, supra. In that case the employee was killed while crossing the railroad track near his place of employment. In discussing the question of the situs of the injury Justice Looney said:

Its use as a means of ingress to and exit from his place of work not only conduced his safety and convenience, but contributed to the promptness and efficiency with which he was enabled to discharge the duties owing his employer; hence the reason and necessity for his presence upon the railroad track (that portion of the pathway leading over the railroad right of way) when injured, in our opinion, had to do with, originated in and grew out of the work of the employer; and that, the injury received at the time, place and under the circumstances, necessarily was in furtherance of the affairs or business of the employer.

Again, in Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Boecker, Tex. Civ. App. 53 S. W. 2d 327, err. ref., this court had occasion to follow the "access" doctrine. In that case Chief Justice Jones quoted from the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Bountiful Brisk Company, et al. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 48 S. Ct. 221, 72 L. Ed. 507, 66 A. L. R. 1402, as follows:

An employment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. In other words, the employment may begin in point of time before the work is entered upon and in point of space before the place where the work is to be done is reached.

The ruling enunciated above is applicable in the case at bar. That part of the road where Pablo was killed is in very close proximity to the employer's premises. It is an "access area" "so clearly related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises." That portion of the road bears "so intimate a relation" to the company's premises. It is the chief means of entering the IDECO premises, either for the public or for its employees. The IDECO uses it extensively in pursuit of its business. It has rights of passage over the road, either legal, if by virtue of easement, or contractual, if by reason of lease. Pablo was using the road as a means of access to his work solely because he was an employee. For this reason, the IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees. Safe, that is, against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, one of these dangers being assault by third persons. Having failed to take the proper security measures over the said area which it controls, the IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by Pablo resulting in his death.

As therefore stated, the assault on Pablo is unexplained. The murderer was himself killed before he could be brought to trial. It is true there is authority for the statement that before the "proximity" rule may be applied it must first be shown that there is a causal connection between the employment and the hazard which resulted in the injury.30 The following more modern view was expressed in Lewis Wood Preserving Company vs. Jones:31

While some earlier cases seem to indicate that the causative danger must be peculiar to the work and not common to the neighborhood for the injuries to arise out of and in the course of the employment (see Maryland Casualty Co. v. Peek, 36 Ga. App. 557 [137 S.E. 121]; Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 61 Ga. App. 420, 6 S.E. 2d 189), later cases have been somewhat more liberal, saying that, "to be compensable, injuries do not have to arise from something peculiar to the employment." Fidelity & Casualty Co. of N.Y. v. Bardon, 79 Ga. App. 260, 262, 54 S.E. 2d 443, 444. "Where the duties of an employee entail his presence (at a place and a time) the claim for an injury there occurring is not to be barred

because it results from a risk common to all others ... unless it is also common to the general public without regard to such conditions, and independently of place, employment, or pursuit." New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Sumrell, 30 Ga. App. 682, 118 S.E. 786, cited in Globe Indemnity Co. v. MacKendree, 39 Ga. App. 58, 146 S.E. 46, 47; McKiney v. Reynolds & Manley Lumber Co., 79 Ga. App. 826, 829, 54 S.E. 2d 471, 473.

But even without the foregoing pronouncement, the employer should still be held liable in view of our conclusion that that portion of the road where Pablo was killed, because of its proximity, should be considered part of the IDECO's premises. Hence, the injury was in the course of employment, and there automatically arises the presumption — invoked in Rivera — that the injury by assault arose out of the employment, i. e., there is a causal relation between the assault and the employment.

We do say here that the circumstances of time, two minutes after dismissal from overtime work, and space, twenty meters from the employer's main gate, bring Pablo's death within the scope of the course factor. But it may logically be asked: Suppose it were three minutes after and thirty meters from, or five minutes after and fifty meters from, would the "proximity" rule still apply? In answer, we need but quote that portion of the decision in Jean vs. Chrysler Corporation, supra, which answered a question arising from an ingenious hypothetical question put forth by the defendant therein:

We could, of course, say "this is not the case before us" and utilize the old saw, "that which is not before us we do not decide." Instead, we prefer to utilize the considerably older law: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof" (Matthew 1:34), appending, however, this admonition: no statute is static; it must remain constantly viable to meet new challenges placed to it. Recovery in a proper case should not be suppressed because of a conjectural posture which may never arise and which if it does, will be decided in the light of then existing law.

Since the Workmen's Compensation Act is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to workmen, it must be liberally construed to attain the purpose for which it was enacted.32 Liberally construed, sec. 2 of the Act comprehends Pablo's death. The Commission did not err in granting compensation.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner's cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, J., reserves his vote.

2. G.R. No. L-41747 March 31, 1978

ENCARNACION BELARMINO, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, namely, BERNADETTE, ROBERTO, RENE and VILMA, all surnamed BELARMINO, petitioners, vs.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, PACIFIC METALS CORPORATION and DOMINADOR L. CRISTOBAL, et al., respondents.

Alejandro S. Bonifacio for petitioners.

V. A. Miguel for respondent, WCC.

Armando H. Salva and Ricardo S. Inton for private respondents.

 

MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:

Is the death of an employee caused by an assault of a co-employee after working hours at some distance from the premises of the employer compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act?

This is the problem posed in this Petition of Encarnacion Belarmino and her minor children who seek a review of the dismissal of their claim for compensation benefits arising from the death of the late Cirilo Belarmino.

Cirilo Belarmino was employed in 1969 as a capataz in the rolling department of the Pacific Metals Corporation earning P8.00 a day with working hours from 7:00 o'clock in the morning to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, with an hour break for lunch. On October 9, 1969 the close of working hours, more particularly, between 5:00 to 5:20 in the afternoon, Belarmino was shot to death by one of the men working under him by the name of Ponciano Angeles at a place about 75 feet away from the compound of the Pacific Metals Corporation in San Bartolome, Novaliches, Quezon City. 1

As a result of the death of her husband, Encarnacion Belarmino filed on May 26, 1970, her claim with the Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor against Pacific Metals Corporation Copy of this claim was received by the corporation on June 16, 1970, and on June 26 it filed a controversion alleging that it was not the employer of the deceased, but that it was Dominador L. Cristobal who was the contractor of the services of the corporation. The claim was accordingly amended to include Cristobal as party respondent.

A hearing was held during which the claimants adduced evidence to show that Cirilo Belarmino was shot by Ponciano Angeles because of a grudge or conflict resulting from the work of the latter in the factory. The widow of Belarmino testified that her husband had occasion to confide in her that "it was difficult to handle persons" and as a result "he had a misunderstanding with Ponciano Angeles, one of the workers under him in the rolling department." 2

The Acting Reference, Pedro P. Pelaez, dismissed the claim for lack of merit. The case was elevated to the Workmen's Compensation Commission for review and the Commission en banc affirmed the dismissal.

The Workmen's Compensation Commission, now respondent, found and held that the Pacific Metals Corporation was the employer of the deceased and not Dominador L. Cristobal, however, it dismissed the claim for death benefits because the accident which resulted in the death of the employee was not work-connected inasmuch as Cirilo Belarmino had already left his work at 4:00 in the afternoon when he was shot outside the premises of employer-corporation. Respondent Conunission thus stated:

He (referring to Cirilo Belarmino) should be home instead of loitering outside the premises of respondent corporation. Certainly employers should deserve before the law the same consideration as workers and they should not be held responsible for all the accidents that will befall their workers, particularly, when such accidents occur outside of their premises and outside working hours. After all it is settled that the employer is not an insurer against all accidental injuries befalling the employees and as a general rule an employee is not entitled to recover from personal injuries resulting from an accident that befalls him while going to or returning from his place of employment, because such accident does not arise out of and in the course of his employment (Afable, et al. v. Singer Sewing Machine Co., G.R. No. 36858, March 6, 1933). (p. 149, Ibid.)

We set aside the dismissal of petitioners' claim for death benefits finding ample justification for awarding the claim in the light of the Court's decision in Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. (IDECO) v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., 1968, 26 SCRA 102, and Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al., 1969, 27 SCRA 1132.

In IDECO, a mechanic of the company, while walking on his way home at about 5:02 o'clock in the afternoon of January 19, 1969, was shot to death about 20 meters away from the gate of IDECO, in a private road commonly called the IDECO road. The motive for the crime was unknown. The claim for death benefits of the heirs of the deceased mechanic was granted by the Workmen's Compensation Commission. IDECO appealed claiming that the death of the employee did not arise out of and was not in the course of employment and that it was error for the Commission to apply the so-called "proximity rule". After an exhaustive dissertation by then Justice now Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, on American and Philippine Jurisprudence on the scope of the words "work-connected", "arising out of "in the course of" and "going and coming rule"' the Court affirmed the compensation award notwithstanding the unexplained motive of the assault because the portion where the employee was killed was in very dose proximity to the employer's premises; it was an "access area" 6 "so clearly related to the employee's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the employer's premises," and IDECO was under obligation to keep the place safe for its employees, that is, safe against dangers that the employees might encounter therein, and one of these dangers being assault by third persons, and not having taken the proper security measures over the said area which it controls, IDECO is liable for the injuries suffered by its employee resulting in his death. 3

In Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission , Rosano, a laborer of Luzon Stevedoring had a heated verbal argument with Valdez another stevedore over the possession of a platform used in the loading and unloading of cargoes. After the work of the day was done, Rosano boarded a passenger jeep bound for his home in Tondo and when he got off the jeep near his house he was met and stabbed by Valdez with a knife. Rosano died in the afternoon of that same day November 30, 1964. An award was given by the Workmen's Compensation Commission and on appeal by Luzon Stevedoring, this Court affirmed the award. In the words of Justice J.B.L. Reyes who wrote the decision for the Court as Acting Chief Justice at the time:

For an injury to be compensable, it is not necessary that the cause therefor shall take place within the place of employment. If a workman is acting within the scope of his employment, his protection "in the course of" the employment usually continues, regardless of the place of injury. Thus, in one case, an employee went to the house of the employer across the warehouse where he worked to get a drink of water, that there, while trying to drive away a puppy that he saw eating fish in the employer's kitchen, he was bitten in the hand, as a result of which the later died of hydrophobia. The death of the employee was held compensable, on the ground that his trip to the kitchen was occasioned by the employer's fault in not providing adequate drinking water at the warehouse. In the present case, it cannot be disputed that it is inherent in the stevedoring work for the petitioner that the laborers, like the deceased, stay in the pier and wait for the docking of petitioner's vessels.

Furthermore, jurisprudence is to the effect that injuries sustained by an employee while in the course of his employment, as the result of an assault upon his person by another employee, or by a third person, no question of the injured employee's own culpability being involved, is compensable where, from the evidence presented, a rational mind is able to trace the injury to a cause set in motion by the nature of the employment, or some condition obligation or incident therein, and not by some other agency. (27 SCRA 1138-1139, citing Younger v. Motor Cab Co., 260 N.Y. 396, cited in Horovitz on Workmen's Compensation, page 172; Chua Yeng v. Roma, L-14827, 31 October 1960; Morgan v. Hoage, 63 App. D. C. 355, 72 F. (2d) 727)

In the case now before Us, respondent Commission, mainly premised the denial of the claim on the fact that the death occurred after working hours outside the premises of the corporation, and the alleged absence of any showing that the assault was connected with the work of the deceased.

It is admitted however that the deceased, Cirilo Belarmino, was a capataz, as such was a group leader, and supervisor, who took charge of the workers in the rolling department, and that his assailant was one of the men working under him. 4 The widow of the deceased employee testified that the latter confided to her that he was having difficulty in handling the persons under him and that he had a misunderstanding with one of them by the name of Ponciano Angeles. This testimony of the widow was considered by respondent Commission as self-serving and was disregarded, this notwithstanding the fact that there was no motion on the part of the employer's attorney to strike out said testimony and that as a consequence the same remained part of the record of the case. The Commission indeed committed a gross misappreciation of the evidence considering that there was no proof adduced by respondent corporation to overthrow or rebut the foregoing testimony of the widow. In fact, respondent Dominador Cristobal when asked during the hearing if he knew of any misunderstanding that Ponciano Angeles had in the Pacific Metals Corporation answered: "I do not know, sir." 5 while the other witness, Alejandro Padilla, testified that he was not aware "of any unusual reactions or feelings among the workers on October 9, 1969." 6 As between this lack of knowledge of the witnesses of respondent employer of any misunderstanding between Cirilo Belarmino and Ponciano Angeles and the positive testimony of the widow of Cirilo Belarmino that the latter had difficulties with his men and had a misunderstanding with one of them, the latter must prevail in the face of the incontrovertible happening that Ponciano Angeles assaulted and shot to death his supervisor, Cirilo Belarmino, after their work and while the latter was on his way home at a distance of about 75 feet from the company's compound.

Not only are the "proximity rule" adopted in IDECO, supra, and the "going-to-and-coming-from" rule enunciated in the very recent case of Bael v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 1977, 75 SCRA 181, applicable to the instant situation, but more controlling is the principle laid down in Luzon

Stevedoring that where the cause of the assault is work-connected, the death of an employee is compensable under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 7

Thus, under the particular circumstances of this case, We answer the legal issue posed in this Petition in the affirmative.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We set aside the decision under review, and We order respondent Pacific Metals Corporation to pay the following amounts to:

1) The widow and minor children of the deceased Cirilo Belarmino:

Six Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos as death compensation benefits:

Two Hundred (P200.00) Pesos as burial expenses;

Three Hundred (P300.00) Pesos for attorney's fees for the hearing below, plus another Three Hundred (P300.00) Pesos for attorney's fees for this Petition for Review;

2) The Workmen's Compensation Fund — Sixty-One (P6l.00) Pesos.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

3. G.R. No. 84307 April 17, 1989

CIRIACO HINOGUIN petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (Armed Forces of the Philippines), respondents.

Alexander A. Acain for petitioner.

 

FELICIANO, J.:

This Petition for Review is directed against the Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission ("ECC") in ECC Case No. 3275 (Ciriaco Hinoguin v. Government Service Insurance System [Armed Forces of the Philippines]) which affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") denying petitioner's claim for compensation benefit on account of the death of petitioner's son, Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin

The deceased, Sgt. Hinoguin started his military service in 1974, when he was called to military training by the Philippine Army. He later on enlisted in the Philippine Army as a private first class. At the time of his death on 7 August 1985, he was holding the rank of Sergeant per Special Order P-4200, HPA dated 15 October 1985, in "A" company 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division, PA. The Headquarters of the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija. Sgt. Hinoguin was Detachment Non-Commissioned Officer at Capintalan, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, "A" Company being stationed at Carranglan, Nueva Ecija.

On 1 August 1985, Sgt. Hinoguin and two (2) members of his Detachment, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog, sought permission from Captain Frankie Z. Besas, Commanding Officer of "A" Company to go on overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, "to settle [an] important matter thereat." 1 Captain Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take their issued firearms with them, considering that Aritao was regarded as "a critical place " 2 that is, it had peace and order problems due to the presence of elements of the New People's Army ("NPA!') in or in the vicinity of Aritao.

Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog left Carranglan, Nueva Ecija, about noon on 1 August 1985 and arrived in Aritao, Nueva Viscaya, about 1:30 o'clock P.M. on the same day. 3 They proceeded to the home of Dft. Alibuyog's parents where they had lunch. About 4:00 o'clock P.M., the three (3) soldiers with a fourth man, a civilian and relative of Dft. Alibuyog, had some gin and beer, finishing a bottle of gin and two (2) large bottles of beer. Three hours later, at about 7:00 o'clock P.M., the soldiers left the Alibuyog home to return to their Company Headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, presumably a motor-driven one, Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Dft. Alibuyog occupied the seat behind the driver. Upon reaching the poblacionof Aritao, Dft. Alibuyog dismounted, walked towards and in front of the tricycle cab, holding his M-16 rifle in his right hand, not noticing that the rifle's safety lever was on semi automatic (and not on "safety"). He accidentally touched the trigger, firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin, then still sitting in the cab, in the left lower abdomen. The Sergeant did not apparently realize immediately that he had been hit; he took three (3) steps forward, cried that he had been hit and fell to the ground.

His companions rushed Sgt. Hinoguin to a hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, for treatment. Their Company Commander, Capt. Besas, hurried to the hospital upon being notified of the shooting and there talked with the wounded Sergeant. The latter confirmed to Capt. Besas that he had indeed been accidentally shot by Dft. Alibuyog Sgt. Hinoguin was later moved to the AFP Medical Center in Quezon City and there he died on 7 August 1985. The Death Certificate lists "septic shock" as immediate cause of death, and "generalized septicemia of peritonitis" as antecedent cause, following his sustaining a gunshot wound.

An investigation conducted by H.Q., 14th Infantry Battalion on 11 August 1985 concluded that the shooting of Sgt. Hinoguin was "purely accidental in nature." 4 On 19 November 1985, a "Line of Duty Board of Officers" was convened by H.Q. 14th Infantry Battalion, "to determine Line of Duty Status of [the] late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA, a member of "A" Co., 14IB, 5 ID, PA who died ... due to Gun Shot Wound as a result of an accidental fire (sic) committed by Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog 085-5009 (Inf.) PA ... ." After receiving and deliberating . g on the Investigation Report dated 11 August 1985 together with the sworn statements of witnesses Alibuyog, Clavo and Besas, and after some further questioning of Capt. Besas, the Line of Duty Board reached the following conclusion and recommendation:

Sgt. Hinoguin was then the designated Detachment Commander of Capintalan detachment. On or about 011300H August 1985 Dft. Alibuyog invited Sgt. Hinoguin and Cpl. Clavo to his home to celebrate at Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. They asked permission to go on overnight and to allow them to carry their firearms with them because the place where they were going is critical. They were given such permission verbally by their Commanding Officer. The death of Sgt. Hinoguin was purely accidental as the Investigation Report presented here proved beyond reasonable [doubt] the fact that Dft. Alibuyog had no grudge either [against] Cpl. Clavo or Sgt. Hinoguin

RECOMMENDATION:

The recommendation written by the Chairman and unanimously voted for by the members contain the following:

The Board after a thorough deliberation on presented evidences declares that the Death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin 640407 (Inf.) PA is in Line of Duty.

The Board recommend farther that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin be given. 5 (Emphasis supplied)

Sometime in March 1986, petitioner filed his claim for compensation benefits under P.D. No. 626 (as amended), claiming that the death of his son was work-connected and therefore compensable. This was denied 6 by the GSIS on the ground that petitioner's son was not at his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which Motion was, however, denied by the GSIS. This denial was confirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission ("WCC") in a Decision dated 24 May 1988 which stated that:

[F]rom the recital of the facts therein [we found it] very difficult for us to perceive where the work-connection of the events that led to appellant's son's death lies. Under the law, death resulting from injury is considered compensable if it arises out of and in the course of employment. Definitely, the death of Hinoguin did not arises out of employment.

Clearly, the facts showed that he was not on his place of work nor was he performing official functions. On the contrary, he was on pass and had just came from a merrymaking when accidentally shot by his companion, 7 (Emphasis supplied)

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the death of Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin is compensable under the applicable statute and regulations.

Considering that Sgt. Hinoguin died on 7 August 1985, the applicable law is to be found in Book Four, Title III of the Labor Code, as amended. It may be noted at the outset that under Article 167 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended and Section 4 (b) (1) of Rule I of the Amended (Implementing) Rules on Employees' Compensation, the term "employee" includes a "member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." Rule XIII entitled "Death", of the Amended (Implementing) Rules provides in part as follows:

SECTION 1. Conditions to Entitlement. — (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following conditions are satisfied:

(1) The employee had been duly reported to the System;

(2) He died as a result of injury or sickness; and

(3) The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employee is duly reported for coverage of the System.

xxx xxx xxx

Article 167 (k) of the Labor Code as amended defines a compensable "injury" quite simply as "any harmful change in the human organism from any accident arising out of and in the course of the employment." The Amended (Implementing) Rules have, however, elaborated considerably on the simple and succinct statutory provision. Rule III, Section 1 (a) reads:

SECTION 1. Grounds. (a) For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds:

(1) The employee must have been injured at the place work requires him to be;

(2) The employee must have been performing his official functions; and

(3) If the injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that because the Amended (Implementing) Rules are intended to apply to all kinds of employment, such rules must be read and applied with reasonable flexibility and comprehensiveness. The concept of a "work place" referred to in Ground 1, for instance, cannot

always be literally applied to a soldier on active duty status, as if he were a machine operator or a worker in an assembly line in a factory or a clerk in a particular fixed office. Obviously, a soldier must go where his company is stationed. In the instant case, Aritao, Nueva Viscaya was not, of course, Carranglan, Nueva Ecija. Aritao being approximately 1-1/2 hours away from the latter by public transportation. But Sgt. Hinoguin, Cpl. Clavo and Dft. Alibuyog had permission from their Commanding Officer to proceed to Aritao, and it appears to us that a place which soldiers have secured lawful permission to be at cannot be very different, legally speaking, from a place where they are required to go by their commanding officer. We note that the three (3) soldiers were on an overnight pass which, notably, they did not utilize in full. They were noton vacation leave. Moreover, they were required or authorized to carry their firearms with which presumably they were to defend themselves if NPA elements happened to attack them while en route to and from Aritao or with which to attack and seek to capture such NPA elements as they might encounter. Indeed, if the three (3) soldiers had in fact encountered NPAs while on their way to or from Aritao and been fired upon by them and if Sgt. Hinoguin had been killed by an NPA bullet, we do not believe that respondent GSIS would have had any difficulty in holding the death a compensable one.

Turning to the question of whether Sgt. Hinoguin was performing official functions at the time he sustained the gunshot wound, it has already been pointed out above that the Line of Duty Board of Officers of the 14th Infantry Battalion Headquarters had already determined that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin had occurred "in line of duty." It may be noted in this connection that a soldier on active duty status is really on 24 hours a day official duty status and is subject to military discipline and military law 24 hours a day. He is subject to call and to the orders of his superior officers at all times, 7 days a week, except, of course, when he is on vacation leave status (which Sgt. Hinoguin was not). 'Thus, we think that the work-connected character of Sgt. Hinoguins injury and death was not effectively precluded by the simple circumstance that he was on an overnight pass to go to the home of Dft. Alibuyog, a soldier under his own command. Sgt. Hinoguin did not effectively cease performing "official functions" because he was granted a pass. While going to a fellow soldier's home for a few hours for a meal and some drinks was not a specific military duty, he was nonetheless in the course of performance of official functions. Indeed, it appears to us that a soldier should be presumed to be on official duty unless he is shown to have clearly and unequivocally put aside that status or condition temporarily by, e.g., going on an approved vacation leave. 8 Even vacation leave may, it should be remembered, be preterminated by superior orders.

More generally, a soldier in the Armed Forces must accept certain risks, for instance, that he will be fired upon by forces hostile to the State or the Government. That is not, of course, the only ask that he is compelled to accept by the very nature of his occupation or profession as a soldier. Most of the persons around him are necessarily also members of the Armed Forces who carry firearms, too. In other words, a soldier must also assume the risk of being accidentally fired upon by his fellow soldiers. This is reasonably regarded as a hazard or risk inherent in his employment as a soldier.

We hold, therefore, that the death of Sgt. Hinoguin that resulted from his being hit by an accidental discharge of the M-16 of Dft. Alibuyog, in the circumstances of this case, arose out of and in the course of his employment as a soldier on active duty status in the Armed Forces of the Philippines and hence compensable.

It may be well to add that what we have written above in respect of performance of official functions of members of the Armed Forces must be understood in the context of the specific purpose at hand, that is, the interpretation and application of the compensation provisions of the Labor Code and applicable related regulations. It is commonplace that those provisions should, to the extent possible, be given the interpretation most likely to effectuate the beneficient and humanitarian purposes infusing the Labor Code.

ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the GSIS taken through its Claim Review Committee dated 20 November 1986 and the Decision dated 24 May 1988 of the Employees' Compensation Commission in ECC Case No. 3275, are hereby REVERSED and the GSIS is hereby DIRECTED to award all applicable benefits in respect of the death of Sgt. Lemick G. Hinoguin, to petitioner. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

4. G.R. No. L-48594 March 16, 1988

GENEROSO ALANO, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, respondent.

 

GUTTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The only issue in this case is whether or not the injury sustained by the deceased Dedicacion de Vera resulting in her death is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

The facts as found by the respondent Employees' Compensation Commission are as follows:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A.M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. She is survived by her four sons and a daughter.

On June 27, 1977, Generoso C. Alano, brother of the deceased, filed the instant claim for income benefit with the GSIS for and in behalf of the decedent's children. The claim was, however, denied on the same date on the ground that the "injury upon which compensation is being claimed is not an employment accident satisfying all the conditions prescribed by law." On July 19, 1977 appellant requested for a reconsideration of the system's decision, but the same was denied and the records of the case were elevated to this Commission for review. (Rollo, p. 12)

The respondent Commission affirmed the decision of the Government Service Insurance System. It stated that Section I (a), Rule III of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation specifically provides that: "For the injury and the resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an employment accident satisfying all the following conditions (1) The employee must have sustained the injury during his working hours; (2) The employee must have been injured at the place where his work requires him to be; and (3) The employee must have been performing his official functions." (Rollo, p. 13)

According to the respondent Commission, the deceased's accident did not meet any of the aforementioned conditions. First, the accident occured at about 7:00 a.m. or thirty minutes before the deceased's working hours. Second, it happened not at her workplace but at the plaza where she usually waits for a ride to her work. Third, she was not then performing her official functions as school principal nor was she on a special errand for the school. The case, therefore, was dismissed.

The petitioner then went to this Court on petition for review on certiorari. He alleges that the deceased's accident has "arisen out of or in the course of her employment."

The respondent Commission reiterates its views and contends that the present provision of law on employment injury is different from that provided in the old Workmen's Compensation Act (Act 3428)

and is "categorical in that the injury must have been sustained at work while at the workplace, or elsewhere while executing an order from the employer." (Rollo, p. 44)

The Government Service Insurance System which received a copy of the Court's resolution requiring the parties to submit their memoranda, however manifests that it does not appear to be a party to the case because it had not been impleaded as a party thereto.

We rule in favor of the petitioner.

This case does not come to us with a novel issue. In the earlier case of Vda. de Torbela v. Employees' Compensation Commission (96 SCRA 260,263,264) which has a similar factual background, this Court held:

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death.

The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

As to the Government Service Insurance System's manifestation, we hold that it is not fatal to this case that it was not impleaded as a party respondent. As early as the case of La O v. Employees' Compensation Commission, (97 SCRA 782) up to Cabanero v. Employees' Compensation Commission (111 SCRA 413) and recently, Clemente v. Government Service Insurance System (G.R. No. L-47521, August 31,1987), this Court has ruled that the Government Service Insurance System is a proper party in employees' compensation cases as the ultimate implementing agency of the Employees' Compensation Commission. We held in the aforecited cases that "the law and the rules refer to the said System in all aspects of employee compensation including enforcement of decisions (Article 182 of Implementing Rules)."

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and the Government Service Insurance System is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) as death benefit and the sum of One Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P1,200.00) as attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.

5. G.R. No. 78617 June 18, 1990

SALVADOR LAZO, petitioner, vs.EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES), respondents.

Oscar P. Paguinto for petitioner.

 

PADILLA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the respondent Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. 2883 which affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim for compensation against the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).

The petitioner, Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate, Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June 1986, the petitioner rendered duty from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the security guard who was to relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.

On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986.

For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that —

It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00 P.M. on June 18, 1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after asking permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter — that of bringing home a sack of rice and that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic) your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at your work place performing your duties when the incident occurred. 1

It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied.

Upon review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter.

Hence, the present recourse.

The petitioner contends that the injuries he sustained due to the vehicular accident on his way home from work should be construed as "arising out of or in the course of employment" and thus, compensable. In support of his prayer for the reversal of the decision, the petitioner cites the case of Pedro Baldebrin vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 2 where the Court awarded compensation to the petitioner therein who figured in an accident on his way home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur. In the accident, petitioner's left eye was hit by a pebble while he was riding on a bus.

Respondents claim that the Baldebrin ruling is a deviation from cases earlier decided and hence, not applicable to the present case.

The Court has carefully considered the petition and the arguments of the parties and finds that the petitioner's submission is meritorious. Liberally interpreting the employees compensation law to give effect to its compassionate spirit as a social legislation 3 in Vda. de Torbela u. ECC, 4 the Court held:

It is a fact that Jose P. Torbela, Sr. died on March 3, 1975 at about 5:45 o'clock in the morning due to injuries sustained by him in a vehicular accident while he was on his way to school from Bacolod City, where he lived, to Hinigaran, Negros Occidental where the school of which he was the principal was located and that at the time of the accident he had in his possession official papers he allegedly worked on in his residence on the eve of his death. The claim is compensable. When an employee is accidentally injured at a point reasonably proximate to the place at work, while he is going to and from his work, such injury is deemed to have arisen out of and in the course of his employment.

Again in Alano v. ECC, 5 it was reiterated:

Dedicacion de Vera, a government employee during her lifetime, worked as principal of Salinap Community School in San Carlos City, Pangasinan. Her tour of duty was from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. On November 29, 1976, at 7:00 A-M., while she was waiting for a ride at Plaza Jaycee in San Carlos City on her way to the school, she was bumped and run over by a speeding Toyota mini-bus which resulted in her instantaneous death. ...

In this case, it is not disputed that the deceased died while going to her place of work. She was at the place where, as the petitioner puts it, her job necessarily required her to be if she was to reach her place of work on time. There was nothing private or personal about the school principal's being at the place of the accident. She was there because her employment required her to be there.

More recently, in Vano vs. GSIS & ECC, 6 this Court, applying the above quoted decisions, enunciated:

Filomeno Vano was a letter carrier of the Bureau of Posts in Tagbilaran City. On July 31, 1983, a Sunday, at around 3:30 p.m. Vano was driving his motorcycle with his son as backrider allegedly on his way to his station in Tagbilaran for his work the following day, Monday. As they were approaching Hinawanan Bridge in Loay, Bohol, the motorcycle skidded, causing its passengers to be thrown overboard. Vano's head hit the bridge's railing which rendered him unconscious. He was taken to the Engelwood Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival due to severe hemorrhage.

We see no reason to deviate from the foregoing rulings. Like the deceased in these two (2) aforementioned cases, it was established that petitioner's husband in the case at bar was on his way to his place of work when he met the accident. His death, therefore, is compensable under the law as an employment accident.

In the above cases, the employees were on their way to work. In the case at bar, petitioner had come from work and was on his way home, just like in the Baldebrin case, where the employee "... figured in an accident when he was ping home from his official station at Pagadian City to his place of residence at Aurora, Zamboanga del Sur ...." 7 Baldebrin, the Court said:

The principal issue is whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and in the course of employment.'(Section 2, Workmen's Compensation Act). InPhilippine Engineer's Syndicate, Inc. vs. Flora S. Martin and Workmen's Compensation Commission,4 SCRA 356, We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be said to have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for which reason his death is compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent, where it does not appear that the truck was running at a great speed.'And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock & Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that '(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the place of its performance. (Emphasis supplied)

In the case at bar, it can be seen that petitioner left his station at the Central Bank several hours after his regular time off, because the reliever did not arrive, and so petitioner was asked to go on overtime. After permission to leave was given, he went home. There is no evidence on record that petitioner deviated from his usual, regular homeward route or that interruptions occurred in the journey.

While the presumption of compensability and theory of aggravation under the Workmen's Compensation Act (under which the Baldebrin case was decided) may have been abandoned under the New Labor Code, 8 it is significant that the liberality of the law in general in favor of the workingman still subsists. As agent charged by the law to implement social justice guaranteed and secured by the Constitution, the Employees Compensation Commission should adopt a liberal attitude in favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work connection to the accident.

This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the compassionate spirit of the law as embodied in Article 4 of the New Labor Code which states that 'all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.'

The policy then is to extend the applicability of the decree (PD 626) to as many employees who can avail of the benefits thereunder. This is in consonance with the avowed policy of the State to give maximum aid and protection to labor. 9

There is no reason, in principle, why employees should not be protected for a reasonable period of time prior to or after working hours and for a reasonable distance before reaching or after leaving the employer's premises. 10

If the Vano ruling awarded compensation to an employee who was on his way from home to his work station one day before an official working day, there is no reason to deny compensation for accidental injury occurring while he is on his way home one hour after he had left his work station.

We are constrained not to consider the defense of the street peril doctrine and instead interpret the law liberally in favor of the employee because the Employees Compensation Act, like the Workmen's Compensation Act, is basically a social legislation designed to afford relief to the working men and women in our society.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be remanded to the ECC and the GSIS for disposition in accordance with this decision.

SO ORDERED.

6. G.R. No. L-14827            October 31, 1960

CHUA YENG, petitioner, vs.MICHAELA ROMA, and her minor children GUADALUPE, PILAR, ROSARIO, CORNELIO and GERARDO,respondents.

Pedro B. Uy Calderon and A. Marigomen for petitioner.D. V. Nacua and J. D. Palma for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Workmen's Compensation Commission, dated September 17, 1958, and its resolution en banc, dated December 4, 1958, awarding compensation for the death of Santos Romeo.

The appeal raises issues facts and of law, but since findings of the fact by the Workmen's Compensation Commission are final, if supported by substantial evidence mission are final, if supported by substantial evidence, (Batangas Transportation Co., vs. Galicano Rivera, et al., supra., p. 175; Laguna Tayabas Bus Co., vs. Consuto, et al., 108 Phil., 62, and since the record shows that such evidence is not wanting, the Court will consider the case on the facts as found by the commission.

Santos Romeo was, on May 16, 1956, working for petitioner as cargador in loading and unloading copra at the former's warehouse at C. Padilla Street, Cebu City. In the morning of that day, after asking permission from his employer, Santos Romeo went to petitioner's house just across the street from the warehouse to get a drink of water, the water pump in the warehouse being out of order and no supply being available. Reaching the kitchen of said house and while he was drinking, he saw a puppy eating some fried fish inside an open cabinet. He tried to drive away the puppy by saying "tse", but as the puppy still continue to eat the fish, Santos made a motion with hand to drive it away, in the course of which his right hand was bitten by said puppy. On June 26, 1958, Santos Romeo died of hydrophobia from the dog bite. It appears that the puppy was not owned by petitioner.

Appellant contends that, under the circumstances narrated, the death of the laborer can not be considered to arise "out of and in course" of his employment.

We find no merit in this contention. The rule is well established that —

Such acts as are reasonably necessary to the health and comfort of an employee while at work, such as satisfaction of his thirst, hunger, or other physical demands, or protecting himself from excessive cold, are nevertheless incidental to the employment, and injuries sustained in the performance of such act are generally held to be compensable as arising out of and in the course of the employment. (58 Am. Jur., sec. 236,p . 742, citing numerous cases.)

That Santos Romeo was in the kitchen of appellant's house and not at his usual place of work does not bring the case out of the operation of the rule previously quoted, for the reason that the laborer was practically driven to that place through the appellant's fault in not providing an adequate supply of drinking water at the warehouse.

Appellant urges that the dog bite was provoked by Santos' trying to take the fish away from the puppy and hence, while he was engaged in an independent activity. We do not regard such act as voluntary deviation from his duties, considering that the act of the deceased was practically an instinctive one, that would naturally be expected from any person in his position. Moreover, it was motivated by a sense of loyalty to his employer, a desire to protect the latter's property, that can not be deemed wholly foreign to the duties of the laborer as such (71 C.J. 675). In fact, it has been held that the act of saving the employee's own property from an apparent danger, is compensable (in re Brightman, 107 N.E. 527, cited in 71 C. J. 670). There, is was said:

the standard to be applied is not that which now, in the light of all that has happened, is seen to have been directly within the line of labor helpful to the master, but that which the ordinary man required to act in such an emergency might do while actuated with a purpose to do his duty.

Compensation has been granted, even if the injury occurred while the order was not performing acts strictly within the scope of his duties, but engaged in an activity either related or incidental to his duties, or doing an act in the interest of his employer. Thus, injury to an employee of a bus firm, occurring outside of assigned territory, in undertaking to retrieve personal belongings of a passenger, was compensable (Vergoza vs. Arnaz Vda. de Cruz, L-7305, December 15, 1953); so was that of a laborer who, trying to alight from a truck to pick up a sack which had fallen, belonging to his employer, was caught between the wheels (Ramos vs. Poblete, 40 Off. Gaz., 3474); likewise, the death of a worker who tried to recover a price of board which had fallen into a molasses tank, and died from the deal fumes therein (Estandarte vs. Phil. Motor Alcohol Corp., G. R. No. 39733, Nov. 1, 1933). In the foregoing, an impelling factor considered by the court was the fact that the employee was acting in the interest of the employer.

To the argument that the employee sustained the injury not from drinking water but from driving away the puppy, suffice it to say that under the circumstances that impelled him to act without opportunity for deliberate reflection, we are not prepared to say that his act was unreasonable or negligent. Driving away a puppy is not so fraught with potent danger as to deter every man possessed of reasonable disposition. As has been said —

. . . he was doing a thing which a man while working may reasonably do—a workman of his sort may reasonably smoke, he may reasonably drop his pipe, and he may reasonably pick it up again. (Ramos vs.Poblete, supra., citing M'Lauchan vs. Anderson, S.C. 529.)

By analogy, the deceased in this case may reasonably get a drink of water to satisfy his thirst; while drinking, he may reasonably see a puppy eating some fried fish belonging to his employer; and he may reasonably be expected to make a motion with his hand to drive said puppy away.

At any rate, the resulting injury is not without causation in the conditions under which deceased was required to perform his work. It appears that there were no adequate and sanitary means of water supply in the place of work; that petitioner's workers used, for drinking purposes, water from a well at the back of the warehouse; that this well was out or order at the time of the incident, so that the deceased had to cross a wide public street to petitioner's house just to get a drink, thereby exposing himself to hazards which may well have been avoided if there were drinking facilities at, or more proximate to, the place of work.

Finally, the Workmen's Compensation Act being a social legislation, and in line with the intent of the law to effect social justice, the provisions thereof should be liberally construed in favor of the workingman (Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc., vs. Dayao, et al., 106 Phil., 525; Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Baens del Rosario, et al., L-13130, October 31, 1959).

Wherefore, the decision and the resolution appealed from are hereby affirmed. Costs against petitioner.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David and Paredes, JJ., concur.

7. G.R. No. L-19742             January 31, 1964

LUZON STEVEDORING CO., INC., petitioner, vs.WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.

C. R. Tiongson, B. L. Rillo and L. V. Simbulan for petitioner.Villavieja and De Leon for respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission.Bonifacio V. Tupaz for respondents Antonio Cordero, et al.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

Antonio Cordero was employed as a sailor on a barge of the Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. receiving a wage of verify P28.00 a week. His duty was to look after the safety of the barge and its cargo especially in the absence of the patron. On September 11, 1956, Cordero, having been requested by the patron to take over, was left alone in charge of the barge. Two days later his lifeless body was found floating in the Pasig river by Det. Labao of the Manila Police Department. A post-mortem examination revealed that he died of asphyxia as a result of submersion in water.

After the incident, Ramon Relente president of the union to which the deceased belonged, reported the matter to the officer in charge of the marine department of the company and asked for financial aid to the family of the deceased, and this request having been denied, he made arrangement for a loan of P250.00 from the company. The company filed a report with the Workmen's Compensation Commission manifesting its desire to controvert the claim if one is filed later.

On March 5, 1957, the deceased's widow filed a formal claim for compensation which was referred to a hearing officer who, after hearing, rendered decision ordering the company to pay to claimant death benefits in the amount of P2,912.00, to reimburse the claimant the amount of P200.00 as burial expenses, to pay attorney's fees in the amount of P218.40, and the sum of P35.00 as fees of the Workmen's Compensation Commission Office.

The company filed a petition for reconsideration based on three grounds: (a) there was no causal connection between Cordero's death and his employment as a sailor; (b) Cordero's death was due to his own negligence; and (c) claimant's right, if will, is already barred by Section 24 of Act 3428, as amended.1äwphï1.ñët

The Workmen's Compensation Commission, on March 12, 1962, affirmed the decision in toto; hence the present petition for review.

It is contended that the claim filed by the deceased's widow is already barred by law because it was filed beyond the 3-month period within which the law requires that it be filed from the death of the deceased. Thus, Antonio Cordero died on September 11, 1956, and under the law the heirs of the deceased had until December 11 of the same year within which to file the claim for death benefits, but the widow filed her claim only on January 31, 1958, which is after a period of more than three months. But Workmen's Compensation Commission did not consider this objection material it appearing that the president of the union to which the deceased belonged had taken immediate steps to inform the management of the incident while he asked that financial aid be extended to the bereaved family even to the extent of making arrangement for loan to cover the burial and other expenses of the family.

Under the facts of this case, we are inclined to agree to this finding of the Workmen's Compensation Commission. Yes, under Section 24 of Act 3428, in order the a claim for compensation may prosper it is necessary that it be made not later than three months after the death of the deceased and that if that is not done the claim may considered of no legal effects, but in this case the facts are such that this requirement may deemed to have been complied with considering that the company cannot claim ignorance of what has actually happened. Thus, it pears that when Antonio Cordero died notice of his death was given by Ramon Relente two or three days thereof to the officer in charge of the marine department of the company. Relente likewise asked the company to extend certain financial aid to the family of the victim and when this was denied he made representations that some loan extended to it to cover the expenses it may have to face as a result of Cordero's death. But all this was denied on the technical ground that the deceased died not in the course of employment or that he is guilty of notorious negligence. We believe that such request for financial aid can be considered as advance filing of claim in contemplation of law for then the company cannot plead surprise the preparation of its defense, this being the only tenable reason for requiring an early filing of the claim on the part of the employee or heirs of the deceased. This is especially so taking into account that under Section 44 of the same Act it is presumed that "the claim comes within the provision of the Act and that sufficient notice thereof was given." This provision should be liberally construed.

The second point raised by petitioner is that Cordero died not in the course of employment, or that his death did not arise out of it, because at the time of his death he was swimming with some companions in the Pasig river and as a consequence he was drowned and his lifeless body was found floating on the surface of the river. Hence, petitioner claims, his heirs are not entitled to the compensation prescribed by law.

As to the nature of the employment of Cordero, the Workmen's Compensation Commission made the following finding:

The nature of the employment of the deceased was like that of the barge of which he was in charge moored at the Pasig river and tied to the seawall. His duty required him to be nailed to his post 24 hours of a day followed by other days. But he was a moving human being and not like a machinery which can be kept sleeping in a little corner of the barge, during the long and monotonous hours of the days and nights of his employment. He had to move and perform the ordinary, functions of a human being like for example, answering the calls of nature, bathing, eating and sleeping. When he took a bath in the water, he performed a daily routine needed by the human body, incidental to, and habitual and usual in the life of a sailor, and any accident occurring to him and due to ordinary and necessary incidents of his employment is well within the sphere of such unusual employment and the employer is liable to pay compensation to the family.

While in the strict sense death caught up with Cordero when he was not in the barge where he is supposed to be for 24 hours watching and taking care of it but swimming with some companions somewhere in the Pasig river near where the barge was moored, it may be said that he died in line of duty for he was then undertaking something that is necessary to his personal need and comfort since the taking of bath is not only habitual in a sailor but necessary to the human body. He went swimming not for pleasure, not for fun, but in answer to the daily need nature, in the same manner as a human being needs to answer other calls, such as eating, sleeping and the like. When these needs are satisfied in the course of employment and something takes place that may cause injury, harm or death to the employee or laborer, it is fair and logical that the happening be considered as one occurring in the course of employment for under the circumstances it cannot be undertaken in any other way. The situation would be different if the mishap occurs in a manner that it may clearly show that the laborer has acted beyond his duty or course of employment. Not so in this case.

Neither can it be contended that in going out with some companions to swim the deceased is guilty of notorious negligence for the reason that if his purpose was to take a bath he could have done it with the aid of a water tank on board the barge. If the deceased were one who does not know how to swim or is not a sailor accustomed to the perils of the water, the argument may have some value but not so in the case of the deceased who undisputable was a swimmer. He must have preferred to take a bath while swimming than by pouring water over his body on board the barge because of his awareness that he was swimmer and for him to swim in a river was merely routine. And if he died in the course thereof it must be due to an event that he has not foreseen. At any rate there is no clear evidence that his death was due to his notorious negligence and not to a cause which he could not have reasonably avoided.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.Bengzon, C.J., concurs in the result.