cases for crim pro

7/29/2019 Cases for Crim Pro.

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G.R. No. 180010 : July 30, 2010

CENITA M. CARIAGA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES,J.:

In issue in the present petition for review is one of jurisdiction.

By Resolutions of May 28, 2007 and September 27, 2007, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No.29514, " People of the Philippines v. Cenita Cariaga, " dismissed the appeal of Cenita Cariaga(petitioner) for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Petitioner, as the municipal treasurer of Cabatuan, Isabela with a Salary Grade of 24, was chargedbefore the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City in Isabela with three counts of malversation ofpublic funds, defined under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Information in the first case, Criminal Case No. 1293, reads: chanroblesvirtual law library

That on or about the year 1993 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto in the Municipality ofCabatuan, Province of Isabela, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-namedaccused, [C]ENITA M. CARIAGA, a public officer, being the Municipal Treasurerof Cabatuan, Isabela,

and as such is accountable for taxes, fees and monies collected and/or received by her by reason ofher position, acting in relation to her office and taking advantage of the same, did then and there,willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, misappropriate and convert to her personal use the amountof TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE PESOS (P2,785.00) representing the remittance ofthe Municipality of Cabatuan to the Provincial Government of Isabela as the latter's share in the realproperty taxes collected, which amount was not received by the Provincial Government of Isabela, tothe damage and prejudice of the government in the amount aforestated.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1cralaw (underscoring supplied)

The two other Informations in the second and third criminal cases, Nos. 1294 and 1295, contain thesame allegations except the malversed amounts which are P25,627.38 and P20,735.13, respectively.2cralaw

Branch 20 of the Cauayan RTC, by Joint Decision of June 22, 2004,3cralaw convicted petitioner in the threecases, disposing as follows: chanroblesvi rtuallaw library

WHEREFORE, finding the accused CENITA M. CARIAGA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimeof MALVERSATION for which she is charged in the three (3) separate informations and in the absenceof any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences her to suffer:

1. In Crim. Case No. Br.20-1293, an indeterminate penalty of from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAYof PRISION CORRECCIONAL as minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of

PRISION MAYOR as maximum and its accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fineof Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty Five (P2,785.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment incase of insolvency. Cost against the accused.

2. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1294, an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAYof PRISION MAYOR as minimum to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY ofRECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum and to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual specialdisqualification and to pay a fine of Twenty Five Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00)Pesos. She is ordered to indemnify the Provincial Government of Isabela Twenty Five Thousand Six
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Hundred Twenty Seven (P25,627.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.Cost against the accused.

3. In Crim. Case No. Br. 20-1295, an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAYof PRISION MAYOR as minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY ofRECLUSION TEMPORAL as maximum, and to suffer the accessory penalty of perpetual specialdisqualification and a fine of Twenty Thousand Seven Hundred Thirty (P20,730.00) Pesos, withoutsubsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The bailbonds are cancelled. Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner, through counsel, in time filed a Notice of Appeal, stating that he intended to appeal the trialcourt's decision to the Court of Appeals.

By Resolution of May 28, 2007,4cralaw the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack ofjurisdiction, holding that it is the Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereon.Held the appellate court: chanrobles virtuallaw library

Concomitantly, jurisdiction over the offense is vested with the Regional Trial Court considering that

the position of Municipal Treasurer corresponds to a salary grade below 27. Pursuant to Section 4 of[Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249], it is the Sandiganbayan, tothe exclusion of all others, which enjoys appellate jurisdiction over the offense. Evidently,the appeal to this Court of the conviction for malversation of public funds was improperly andimprovidently made. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Resolution of September 27, 2007.5cralaw Hence, thepresent petition for review, petitioner defining the issues as follows:chanroblesv irtuallaw library

I. WHETHER. . ., CONSIDERING THE CLEAR AND GRAVE ERROR COMMITTED BY COUNSEL OF[PETITIONER] AND OTHER EXTRA-ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, THE APPEAL OF. [PETITIONER]WRONGFULLY DIRECTED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT.OR BE ENDORSEDAND TRANSMITTED TO THE SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE THE APPEAL SHALL THEN PROCEED IN DUECOURSE.

II. WHETHER. . ., IN CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IN A CRIMINAL CASE, NEW TRIALBE GRANTED TO THE PETITIONER TO BE UNDERTAKEN IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN (ALTERNATIVELY INTHE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) SO THAT CRUCIAL EVIDENCE OF PETITIONER.BE ADMITTED.6cralaw

Petitioner, now admitting the procedural error committed by her former counsel, implores the Court torelax the Rules to afford her an opportunity to fully ventilate her appeal on the merits and requests

the Court to endorse and transmit the records of the cases to the Sandiganbayan in the interest ofsubstantial justice.

Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides: chanroblesvi rtuallaw library

SEC. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. x x x.

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to theappropriate court but shall be dismissed outright. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That appellate jurisdiction in this case pertains to the Sandiganbayan is clear. Section 4 of PresidentialDecree No. 1606,7cralaw as amended by Republic Act No. 8249, so directs:8cralaw

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all casesinvolving:chanroblesv irtuallaw library
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x x x

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade'27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officersmentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the properregional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trialcourt, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in BatasPambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original

jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.x x x (emphasis, italics andunderscoring supplied).

Since the appeal involves criminal cases, and the possibility of a person being deprived of liberty dueto a procedural lapse militates against the Court's dispensation of justice, the Court grants petitioner'splea for a relaxation of the Rules.

For rules of procedure must be viewed as tools to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that anyrigid and strict application thereof which results in technicalities tending to frustrate substantial justice

must always be avoided.9cralaw

In Ulep v. People,10cralaw the Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan when it found that:

x x x petitioner's failure to designate the proper forum for her appeal was inadvertent. The omissiondid not appear to be a dilatory tactic on her part. Indeed, petitioner had more to lose had thatbeen the case as her appeal could be dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction - which wasexactly what happened in the CA.

The trial court, on the other hand, was duty bound to forward the records of the case to theproper forum, the Sandiganbayan. It is unfortunate that the RTC judge concerned ordered thepertinent records to be forwarded to the wrong court, to the great prejudice of petitioner. Casesinvolving government employees with a salary grade lower than 27 are fairly common, albeit

regrettably so. The judge was expected to know and should have known the law and the rules ofprocedure.He should have known when appeals are to be taken to the CA and when theyshould be forwarded to the Sandiganbayan. He should have conscientiously and carefullyobserved this responsibility specially in cases such as this where a person's liberty was at stake.(emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The slapdash work of petitioner's former counsel and the trial court's apparent ignorance of the laweffectively conspired to deny petitioner the remedial measures to question her conviction.11cralaw

While the negligence of counsel generally binds the client, the Court has made exceptions thereto,especially in criminal cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of dueprocess of law; when its application will result in outright deprivation of the client's liberty or property;or where the interests of justice so require.12cralaw It can not be gainsaid that the case of petitioner can

fall under any of these exceptions.

Moreover, a more thorough review and appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution and defenseas well as a proper application of the imposable penalties in the present case by the Sandiganbayanwould do well to assuage petitioner that her appeal is decided scrupulously.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29514 are SETASIDE. Let the records of the cases be FORWARDED to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition.
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The Presiding Judge of Branch 20, Henedino P. Eduarte, of the Cauayan City Regional Trial Court iswarned against committing the same procedural error, under pain of administrative sanction.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice, Chairperson

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD*Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, Icertify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the casewas assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice
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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 69334, July 28, 1986]

SERVILLANO ALINSUGAY, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE PERFECTO M.CAGAMPANG, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE DESIGNATE OF BRANCH IX,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BUKIDNON, 10TH JUDICIAL REGION, ESTHERG. CAJES AND RICARDO M. CAJES, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

FERNAN, J.:

The issue raised in this case is whether referral to the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo underPresidential Decree No. 1508, the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, is mandatory evenwhere the failure at conciliation is due to the non-appearance of one party.

On October 19, 1984 petitioner Servillano Alinsugay instituted an action in the Regional Trial

Court of Bukidnon, Malaybalay branch, against respondents Esther G. Cajes and Ricardo M.Cajes for the annulment of title and recovery of possession and ownership of a parcel of

land with an area of 3,068 square meters located in Barangay Dologon, Maramag, Bukidnon[Civil Case No. 1566].

Respondents Cajes filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that: [1] the trial court did not

acquire jurisdiction over the action because the dispute was not brought before thebarangay for amicable settlement in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1508, [2] thecomplaint was premature, and [3] the action was barred by prescription and laches.

Specifically, respondents argued that petitioner did not follow the process of going througha Pangkat in the settlement of his dispute, after mediation before the barangay chairmanhad failed.

In reply, petitioner asserted that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case because of the"certification to file action" issued on July 31, 1983 by the Punong Barangayand attested bythe Barangay Secretary to the effect that respondent Esther Cajes "wilfully failed or refused

to obey summons or to appear for hearing, and therefore the corresponding complaint forthe dispute may now be filed in court/government office".[1]

In an order dated November 13, 1984, respondent Judge Perfecto M. Cagampang, Jr.

dismissed the complaint "without prejudice to the filing of the same after the provisions ofPD 1508 shall have been complied properly as prayed for in the 'Motion to Dismiss' filed bydefendants despite the Opposition filed by plaintiff; and without passing on the merits on

the other grounds alleged in the same 'Motion to Dismiss'".[2]

Assailing the order of dismissal as a patent nullity and having been issued with grave abuseof discretion, petitioner filed the instant special civil action for certiorari.

There is no question that the controversy was referred to the Punong Barangay of Dologon,

Maramag, Bukidnon. It was docketed as Barangay Case No. 26. Summons were served

upon the parties. For one reason or another, respondent Esther Cajes failed to appearbefore the barangay chairman, prompting the latter to issue on July 31, 1983 thecertification to file action for the complainant, herein petitioner Alinsugay. There is no

mention in the records of the reason for Cajes' non-appearance.


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In his memorandum, petitioner Alinsugay contends that the issuance of the certification to

file action by the Punong Barangay, attested by the Barangay Secretary, substantiallycomplies with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1508 and its implementing rules.

On the other hand, respondents Esther Cajes and Ricardo M. Cajes argue that the

certification is premature and therefore null and void. They theorize that under the law, thePunong Barangay should have constituted the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo after he had

failed to bring about a settlement between the contending parties; that the PunongBarangay on his level is bereft of legal authority to issue the questioned certification, and

that what is contemplated by PD No. 1508 is intervention by the Punong Barangay and

members of the Pangkat, otherwise what would prevent a corrupt barangay chairman fromissuing indiscriminate certifications.

We hold for petitioner Alinsugay.

This is a case wherein only one party appears before the Punong Barangay and the other

party fails to do so despite due notice or summons. What should the Punong Barangay do in

such a case?

Rule VI, Section 7 of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules provides:

"SECTION 7. Failure to appear. - The complaint may be dismissed when complainant, afterdue notice, willfully fails or refuses to appear on the date set for mediation, conciliation orarbitration. Such dismissal, as certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary as the case

may be, shall bar the complainant from seeking judicial recourse for the same cause of

action as that dismissed.

"Upon a similar failure of the respondent to appear, any counterclaim he has made that

arises from or is necessarily connected with complainant's action, may be dismissed. Suchdismissal, as certified to by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary, as the case may be, shall barthe respondent from filing such counterclaim in court; and it shall likewise be a sufficient

basis for the issuance of a certification for filing complainant's cause of action in court orwith the proper government agency or office.

"In addition, such wilful failure or refusal to appear may subject the recalcitrant party or

witness to punishment as for contempt of court, i.e., by a fine not exceeding one hundredpesos (P100.00) or imprisonment of not more than one (1) month of both."Thus it is very clear from the Rules that the wilful refusal or failure to appear on the part of

respondent is sufficient basis for the complainant present to be given a certification to file

action. The issuance of a certification to file action means that the complainant may alreadybring his case to the court or other government office for adjudication.

Section 4[b] of PD No. 1508 likewise provides that if the Punong Barangay fails in hismediation efforts within fifteen [15] days from the first meeting of the parties, he shall

forthwith set the date for the constitution of the Pangkat. However, such referral to thePangkat is mandatory only in those cases where both parties have submitted themselves to

the Lupon for conciliation and conciliation has failed.

In instances where one party fails to appear for no justifiable reason, convening the Pangkat

as a necessary second step will serve no useful purpose. It will accomplish nothing in viewof a party's unwillingness, as reflected in his unjustified absence, to settle the disputeoutside the regular courts. In that case, the only feasible alternative for the Lupon is to

issue the certification allowing complainant to bring the controversy to court.


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It is evident that the respondents have not come to court with clean hands. The desired

conciliation at the barangay level failed to materialize due to their non-appearance. Theyshould not be subsequently allowed to frustrate petitioner's cause of action by invoking that

situation which they themselves created.

Respondent Judge Cagampang, Jr. acted arbitrarily and with grave abuse of discretion indismissing petitioner's complaint. Petitioner has complied with the condition precedent set

forth in Presidential Decree No. 1508. The issuance of the certification to file action iswarranted by the Rules in view of respondent's unexplained refusal to appear.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent Judge Cagampang, Jr. dated November 13, 1984 isset aside and a new one is entered directing the Regional Trial Court of Bukidnon,

Malaybalay branch to proceed with the hearing on the merits of Civil Case No. 1566.

Case remanded. Costs against the respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.


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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 117005. June 19, 1997]

CARLITO D. CORPUZ, peti t ioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS (SIXTEENTH DIVISION) and JUANITO ALVARADO,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner Carlito Corpuz questions the decision of the Court of Appealsi[1] affirming

the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 10, dismissing the petition forreview in Civil Case No. 92-62869.

Corpuz filed an action for unlawful detainer against private respondent JuanitoAlvarado with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6, docketed as Civil CaseNo. 138532, for recovery of possession of the room being occupied by the latter, whichCorpuz' children allegedly needed for their own use.

Alvarado and Corpuz were two of the tenants of a certain Lorenzo Barredo who, inMay 1988, decided to sell his property to the tenants. Due to economic difficulties,however, Alvarado and the other lessees executed an "Affidavit of Waiver" grantingBarredo the right to sell his house to any person who can afford to purchase the same.

Consequently, Barredo sold his house to Corpuz for P37,500.00. As a result of the sale,a tenancy relationship was established between Corpuz and Alvarado.

In October 1991, Corpuz sent a written notice to Alvarado demanding that hevacate the room which he was occupying because the children of Corpuz needed it fortheir own use. Alvarado refused to vacate the room as demanded, prompting Corpuz toseek his ejectment.

In his answer, Alvarado raised two major defenses, to wit: (1) the alleged "Affidavitof Waiver" executed between him and Barredo was a forgery; and (2) the dispute wasnot referred to the Lupong Tagapayapa.

Finding the defenses of Alvarado to be without merit, the MTC of Manila handeddown on August 11, 1992 a decision ordering Alvarado to vacate the room. ii[2]

Feeling aggrieved, Alvarado appealed to the RTC. On March 11, 1993, said courtrendered its decisioniii[3] which, in effect, reversed the MTC's decision on the ground thatthe purported sale between Corpuz and Barredo was the subject of a controversypending before the National Housing Authority (NHA) which must be resolved first bysaid agency. It also concluded that the "Affidavit of Waiver" executed by Alvarado andBarredo was a forgery. Consequently, it ordered the dismissal of the case for unlawful


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detainer, and ruled that Alvarado cannot be legally expelled from the subject premises.

His motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied for lack of meritby the RTCiv[4] on July 16, 1993, Corpuz elevated his case to the Court of Appeals. Theappellate court, however, found no reversible error in the assailed judgment andaffirmed the same in its entirety in its assailed decision dated July 14, 1994. v[5] A

subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals inits resolution dated September 1, 1994.vi[6] Hence, this petition.

The main issues presented in this petition is whether Corpuz' unlawful detainer suitfiled before the MTC against Alvarado should be suspended until the resolution of thecase lodged in the NHA impugning the sale of said property, and whether the "Affidavitof Waiver" between Corpuz and Barredo was authentic. Corpuz maintains that the mereassertion challenging his ownership over the said property is not a sufficient ground todivest the MTC of its exclusive jurisdiction.vii[7]

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is elementary that the MTC has exclusive jurisdiction over ejectment cases.viii[8]

Asthe law now stands, the only issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainercases is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possessionde facto.ix[9]

In the recent case of Refugia v. Court of Appeals, x[10] however, we ruled that:

"In the case of De la Santa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., this Court, in making adistinction between the reception of evidence and the resolution of the issue ofownership, held that the inferior court may look into the evidence of title or ownershipand possession de jure insofar as said evidence would indicate or determine the natureof possession. It cannot, however, resolve the issue of ownership, that is, by declaringwho among the parties is the true and lawful owner of the subject property, because

the resolution of said issue would effect an adjudication on ownership which is notsanctioned in the summary action for unlawful detainer. With this as a premise andtaking into consideration the amendment introduced by Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, itmay be suggested that inferior courts are now conditionally vested with adjudicatorypower over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in an ejectment suit."

Consequently, since the present petition involves the issue of possessionintertwined with the issue of ownership (i.e., the controversy pending in the NHA), thedoctrinal pronouncement in Refugia is applicable.

Parenthetically speaking, the issue raised in this petition is far from novel. Theprevailing doctrine is that suits or actions for the annulment of sale, title or document do

not abate any ejectment action respecting the same property.xi[11]

In Wilmor Auto Supply Construction Company Corporations, et al. v. Court of

Appeals,xii[12] Justice (now Chief Justice) Andres Narvasa outlined the following casesinvolving the annulment of the title or document over the property which should not beconsidered in the abatement of an ejectment suit, to wit:

"Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document affecting propertyoperate to abate ejectment actions respecting the same property (Salinas v. Navarro


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[annulment of deed of sale with assumption of mortgage and/or to declare the same anequitable mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. RTC [annulment of sale andtitle], 154 SCRA 153 [1987]; Caparros v. CA [annulment of title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989];Dante v. Sison [annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA 517; Galgala v. BenguetConsolidated, Inc. [annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288 [1989]."

Clearly, the underlying reason for the above rulings is for the defendant not to triflewith the ejectment suit, which is summary in nature, by the simple expedient ofasserting ownership thereon. Thus, the controversy pending before the NHA for theannulment of the Deed of Sale and assailing the authenticity of the "Affidavit of JointWaiver" cannot deter the MTC from taking cognizance of the ejectment suit merely forthe purpose of determining who has a better possessory right among the parties.

It may be stressed that Alvarado is not without remedy. We have ruled that ajudgment rendered in an ejectment case shall not bar an action between the sameparties respecting title to the land or building nor shall it be conclusive as to the factstherein found in a case between the same parties upon a different cause of actioninvolving possession.xiii[13]

Furthermore, Alvarado raises the issue in the instant petition that the ejectment suitwas not referred to the Lupon Tagapayapa as required by Presidential Decree No.1508.

We are not persuaded. This defense was only stated in a single general shortsentence in Alvarado's answer. We have held in Dui v. Court of Appealsxiv[14] that failureof a party to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with the Barangayconciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that defense. A perusal of Alvarado'sanswer reveals that no reason or explanation was given to support his allegation, whichis deemed a mere general averment.

In any event, the proceeding outlined in P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirementand non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower court hadalready acquired over the subject matter and the parties therein.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision dated July14, 1994, of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, andthe judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Manila, Branch 6, in Civil Case No.138532-CV dated August 11, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.


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