cases digest art. 850 to 888

7/17/2019 Cases Digest Art. 850 to 888

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1 SUCCESSION DIGEST (Article 850 to 888)

ARTICLE 850

AUSTRIA VS. REYES (ART 850)

RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA

and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO

vs. HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First

Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA

CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ

and LUZ CRUZ-SALONGA

G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970

Facts: On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de

Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal

(Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for

probate, ante mortem, of her last will and

testament. The probate was opposed by the

present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo

Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still

others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and

nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however,

dismissed and the probate of the will allowed

after due hearing.

The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was

destined under the will to pass on to the

respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meñez,

Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga,

all of whom had been assumed and declared by

Basilia as her own legally adopted children.

On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her

will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The

respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed

executor without bond by the same court in

accordance with the provisions of the

decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking

attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben

Austria.

Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present

petitioners filed in the same proceedings apetition in intervention for partition alleging in

substance that they are the nearest of kin of

Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto

Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the

decedent in accordance with law, in effect

rendering these respondents mere strangers to

the decedent and without any right to succeed

as heirs.

The uncontested premises are clear. Two

interests are locked in dispute over the bulk of

the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side

are the petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo

Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of

a number of nephews and nieces who are

concededly the nearest surviving blood relativesof the decedent. On the other side are the

respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz,

Benita Cruz-Meñez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz

and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the

will of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom

claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of

legal adoption. At the heart of the controversy is

Basilia's last will — immaculate in its extrinsic

validity since it bears the imprimatur of duly

conducted probate proceedings.

Issue: WON the institution of these 5 adopted

children be invalidated because of the phrase

adopted children which turn out to be a false

cause.

Held: NO.

Before the institution of heirs may be annulled

under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following

requisites must concur: First , the cause for the

institution of heirs must be stated in the

will; second , the cause must be shown to be

false; and third , it must appear from the face of

the will that the testator would not have made

such institution if he had known the falsity of

the cause.

The petitioners would have us imply, from the

use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana"

(compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana"

(legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for

the institution of the respondents was the

testatrix's belief that under the law she could

not do otherwise. If this were indeed what

prompted the testatrix in instituting the

respondents, she did not make it known in herwill. Surely if she was aware that succession to

the legitime takes place by operation of law,

independent of her own wishes, she would not

have found it convenient to name her supposed

compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express

adoption of the rules on legitimes should very

well indicate her complete agreement with that

statutory scheme. But even this, like the




petitioners' own proposition, is highly

speculative of what was in the mind of the

testatrix when she executed her will. One fact

prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's

will does not state in a specific or unequivocal

manner the cause for such institution of heirs.

We cannot annul the same on the basis ofguesswork or uncertain implications.

And even if we should accept the petitioners'

theory that the decedent instituted the

respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because

she believed that the law commanded her to do

so, on the false assumption that her adoption of

these respondents was valid, still such

institution must stand.

Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a

positive injunction to ignore whatever falsecause the testator may have written in his will

for the institution of heirs. Such institution may

be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an

examination of the will, that the testator clearly

would not have made the institution if he had

known the cause for it to be false. Now, would

the late Basilia have caused the revocation of

the institution of heirs if she had known that she

was mistaken in treating these heirs as her

legally adopted children? Or would she have

instituted them nonetheless?

The decedent's will, which alone should provide

the answer, is mute on this point or at best is

vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga

sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang

mana," were borrowed from the language of

the law on succession and were used,

respectively, to describe the class of heirs

instituted and the abstract object of the

inheritance. They offer no absolute indication

that the decedent would have willed her estate

other than the way she did if she had known

that she was not bound by law to make

allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of thefree portion of her estate ( libre disposicion)

which largely favored the respondent Perfecto

Cruz, the latter's children, and the children of

the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible

inclination on her part to give to the

respondents more than what she thought the

law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this

with the relatively small devise of land which the

decedent had left for her blood relatives,

including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta

and Lauro Mozo and the children of the

petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude

the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the

inheritance, then the petitioners and the other

nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulkof the testate by intestacy — a result which

would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent.

At all events, the legality of the adoption of the

respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only

in a separate action brought for that purpose,

and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.

ARTICLE 854

Maloles II v. Phillips

OCTAVIO S. MALOLES II, petitioner, vs. PACITA

DE LOS REYES PHILLIPS, respondent.

[G.R. No. 129505. January 31, 2000]

(Octavio Maloles II is the nephew of testator)

Facts:

In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a

petition for probate of his will. He declared

that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is

naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo

de Santos Foundation, Inc. (ASF). The named

executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The

petition was filed in RTC Makati Branch 61.

Judge Fernando Gorospe of said court

determined that Arturo is of sound mind and

was not acting in duress when he signed his last

will and testament and so Branch 61 allowed

the last will and testament on February 16,

1996.

Shortly after the probate of his will, Dr. De

Santos died on February 26, 1996. Thereafter,

Pacita, as executrix, filed a motion for the

issuance of letters of testamentary with Branch

61. She however withdrew the motion but later

on refilled it with RTC Makati Branch 65.




On April 3, 1996, petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II

filed a motion for intervention claiming that, as

the only child of Alicia de Santos (testators

sister) and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the

sole full-blooded nephew and nearest of kin ofDr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a

creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed

for the reconsideration of the order allowing

the will and the issuance of letters of

administration in his name.

Issue:

WON Maloles II was preterited? NO

Ruling:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one,

some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the

direct line, whether living at the time of the

execution of the will or born after the death of

the testator, shall annul the institution of heir;

but the devises and legacies shall be valid

insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die

before the testator, the institution shall be

effectual, without prejudice to the right of

representation.

Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of

Dr. De Santos, he cannot be considered an

"heir" of the testator. It is a fundamental rule

of testamentary succession that one who has

no compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of

his entire estate by will. Thus, Art. 842 of the

Civil Code provides:

One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose

by will of all his estate or any part of it in favor

of any person having capacity to succeed.

One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of

his estate provided he does not contravene the

provisions of this Code with regard to the

legitimate of said heirs.

Compulsory heirs are limited to the testators -

(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with

respect to their legitimate parents and

ascendants;

(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate

parents and ascendants, with respect to their

legitimate children and descendants;

(3) The widow or widower;

(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural

children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in

Article 287 of the Civil Code.[18]

Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a

compulsory heir who may have been preterited

in the testators will.

G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN v. HON.

INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, VIRGINIA A.

FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON,

Facts:

Nemesio Acain executed a will dated February

17, 1960 in which his brother, herein petitioner

Constantino, along with their other siblings were

instituted as heirs.

In said will, Nemesio provided that his share in

the properties jointly earned with his wife, Rosa

Diongson, shall all be given to his brother

Segundo. In case Segundo pre-deceased

Nemesio, the same shall be given to Segundo’s

children.

Unfortunately, Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio.

Thus, petitioner Constantino, one of the childrenof Segundo, filed a petition for the probate of

the will of the late Nemesio. This was by

respondents Rosa, wife of Nemesio, and

Virginia, a legally adopted daughter of the

spouses on the ground that they were

preterited in the will, among others.




The trial court denied their motion to dismiss

but the unfavorable decision was reversed by

the IAC.

Issue: WON there was preterition.

Ruling:Yes, but only insofar as Virgina, the legally

adopted daughter, is concerned.

Article 854 of the Civil Code provides:

The preterition or omission of one, some, or all

of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,

whether living at the time of the execution of

the will or born after the death of the testator,

shall annul the institution of heir; but the

devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as

they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die

before the testator, the institution shall be

effectual, without prejudice to the right of

representation.

Preterition consists in the omission in the

testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of

them either because they are not mentioned

therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither

instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.

In this case, insofar as the widow is concerned,

Article 854 of the Civil Code may not apply as

she does not ascend or descend from the

testator, although she is a compulsory heir.

Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse is

a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even ifshe is omitted from the inheritance, for she is

not in the direct line.

Insofar as Virginia is concerned, there was

preterition. She has been totally omitted and

preterited in the will of the testator. In fact,

both respondents were deprived of at least their

legitimes. They were not expressly disinherited.

However, in the case of Virginia, being an

adopted child who has the same rights as that of

a legitimate child, she is considered as to be in

the direct line of Nemesio. Hence, this is a clear

case of preterition of the legally adopted child.

What is the effect of preterition?

Pretention annuls the institution of an heir and

annulment throws open to intestate succession

the entire inheritance. The only provisions which

do not result in intestacy are the legacies and

devises made in the will for they should stand

valid and respected, except insofar as the

legitimes are concerned.

In this case, the universal institution of

petitioner together with his brothers and sisters

to the entire inheritance of the testator results

in totally abrogating the will because the

nullification of such institution of universal

heirs-without any other testamentary

disposition in the will-amounts to a declarationthat nothing at all was written.

JLT Agro vs. Balansag

G.R. No. 141882 March 11, 2005

JLT Agro Inc., represented by its Manager Julian

L. Teves, petitioner vs. Antonio Balansag and

Hilaria Cadayday, respondents

Facts:

Don Julian Teves contracted two marriages, firstwith Antonia Baena, and after her death, with

Milagros Donio. He had two children with

Antonia and four children with Milagros.

What is in dispute here is a 954 square meter

parcel of land which was originally registered in

the name of the conjugal partnership of Don

Julian and Antonia under an OCT. When Antonia

died, the land was among properties involved in

an action for partition and damages in a civil

case between the children of Antonia. In that

case, the parties entered into a Compromise

Agreement which embodied the partition of allthe properties of Don Julian.

On the basis of the Compromise Agreement, the

CFI declared the tract of land known as

Hacienda Medalla Milagrosa as property owned

in common by Don Julian and his 2 children of

the first marriage. The property was to remain

undivided during the lifetime of Don Julian.

Subsequently Julian, Emilio and Antonina

executed a Deed of Assignment and a

Supplemental Deed over Lot 63 in favor of JLT

Agro. JLT Agro relying on the instrument sought

the registration of the subject lot in its name.

Meanwhile, Milagros and her children had

occupied the subject lot after the execution of

the Compromise Agreement, and had entered

into a yearly lease agreement with Spouses

Antonio Balansag and Hilaria Cadayday. They




subsequently bought the property from

Milagros, completely unaware that the same

was already registered under the name of JLT

Agro.

RTC ruled that a direct adjudication of the

properties listed in the Compromise Agreementwas only in favor of Don Julian and his two

children by the first marriage, Josefa and Emilio.

As such, Don Julian was under no impediment to

alienate the subject lot.

CA reversed the RTC’s decision.

Issue:

Whether Don Julian validly transferred

ownership of the lot during his lifetime. NO

Ruling:

Article 854 provides that the preterition or

omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory

heirs in the direct line, whether living at the

time of the execution of the will or born after

the death of the testator, shall annul the

institution of heir; but the devises and legacies

shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

Manresa defines preterition as the omission of

the heir in the will, either by not naming him at

all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc.,

by not instituting him as heir withoutdisinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him

some part of the properties. It is the total

omission of a compulsory heir in the direct line

from inheritance. It consists in the silence of the

testator with regard to a compulsory heir,

omitting him in the testament, either by not

mentioning him at all, or by not giving him

anything in the hereditary property but without

expressly disinheriting him, even if he is

mentioned in the will in the latter case. But

there is no preterition where the testator

allotted to a descendant a share less than the

legitime, since there was no total omission of a

forced heir.

In the case at bar, Don Julian did not execute a

will since what he resorted to was a partition

inter vivos of his properties, as evidenced by

the court approved Compromise Agreement.

Thus, it is premature if not irrelevant to speak of

preterition prior to the death of Don Julian in

the absence of a will depriving a legal heir of his

legitime. Besides, there are other properties

which the heirs from the second marriage could

inherit from Don Julian upon his death. A couple

of provisions in the Compromise Agreement are

indicative of Don Julians desire along this line.

Hence, the total omission from inheritance ofDon Julians heirs from the second marriage, a

requirement for preterition to exist, is hardly

imaginable as it is unfounded.

Despite the debunking of respondents argument

on preterition, still the petition would ultimately

rise or fall on whether there was a valid transfer

effected by Don Julian to petitioner.

JLT Agro’s method of acquiring the OCT was

patently illegal. Instead of presenting the

Supplemental Deed which was its supposed

basis for the transfer of ownership over the

property, it resorted to a proceeding for

reconstitution alleging that the duplicate OCT

was lost. It was so constrained to do because

the Supplemental Deed does not constitute a

deed of conveyance of the registered land in fee

simple in a form sufficient in law, as required by

Section 57 of P.D. No. 1529. The deed provides:

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of

the above premises the ASSIGNOR hereby

transfers, conveys, and assigns unto J.L.T. AGRO,

INC., the above described parcel of land[s] witha fair market value of EIGHTY-FOUR

THOUSAND PESOS (P84,000.00), Philippine

Currency, and which transfer, conveyance and

assignment shall become absolute upon

signing.[54] (Emphasis supplied)

The amount of P84,000.00 adverted to in the

dispositive portion of the instrument does not

represent the consideration for the assignment

made by Don Julian. Rather, it is a mere

statement of the fair market value of all the

nineteen (19) properties enumerated in the

instrument, of which Lot No. 63 is just one, that

were transferred by Don Julian in favor of JLT

Agro. Consequently, their testimony that the

assignment is supported by consideration

cannot prevail over the clear provision to the

contrary in the Supplemental Deed.

Thus, there being no consideration, and the

presence of consideration being one of the




essential requisites of contracts, the contract is

void. The transfer of title in favor of JLT was

invalid.

Neither can the Supplemental Deed qualify as a

donation since being a donation of real

property, its acceptance should have beenembodied in the same deed or in a public

document, which was not done in this case.

DY YIENG SEANGIO, BARBARA D. SEANGIO and

VIRGINIA D. SEANGIO, Petitioners,

vs.

HON. AMOR A. REYES, in her capacity as

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National

Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, Manila,

ALFREDO D. SEANGIO, ALBERTO D. SEANGIO,

ELISA D. SEANGIO-SANTOS, VICTOR D.

SEANGIO, ALFONSO D. SEANGIO, SHIRLEY D.

SEANGIO-LIM, BETTY D. SEANGIO-OBAS and

JAMES D. SEANGIO, Respondents.

G.R. Nos. 140371-72 November 27, 2006

During the settlement of the intestate estate of

Segundo Seangio, Dy Yieng, Barbara and

Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the

petition. Their main contention was that

Segundo left a holographic will, dated

September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the

private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause.

They contend that when it is shown that thedeceased has a will, intestate proceedings

should be suspended.

Alberto Seangio and Alfredo moved for the

dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily

on the ground that the document purporting to

be the holographic will of Segundo does not

contain any disposition of the estate of the

deceased and thus does not meet the definition

of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.

According to them, the will only shows an

alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of

his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all

other compulsory heirs were not named nor

instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence,

there is preterition which would result to

intestacy.

Issue 1: Was there a valid disinheritance? Yes

Article 919. The following shall be sufficient

causes for the disinheritance of children and

descendants, legitimate as well as illegitimate:

(1) When a child or descendant has been found

guilty of an attempt against the life of the

testator, his or her spouse, descendants, or

ascendants;

(2) When a child or descendant has accused the

testator of a crime for which the law prescribes

imprisonment for six years or more, if theaccusation has been found groundless;

(3) When a child or descendant has been

convicted of adultery or concubinage with the

spouse of the testator;

(4) When a child or descendant by fraud,

violence, intimidation, or undue influence

causes the testator to make a will or to change

one already made;

(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support

the parents or ascendant who disinherit such

child or descendant;

(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or

deed, by the child or descendant

(7) When a child or descendant leads a

dishonorable or disgraceful life;

(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it

the penalty of civil interdiction.

The holographic will of Segundo explicitly says in

detail the reason why Alfredo was disinherited:

Ako si Segundo Seangio Filipino may asawa

naninirahan sa 465-A Flores St., Ermita, Manila

at nagtatalay ng maiwanag na pag-iisip at

disposisyon ay tahasan at hayagang inaalisan ko

ng lahat at anumang mana ang paganay kong

anak na si Alfredo Seangio dahil siya ay naginglapastangan sa akin at isan beses siya ng sasalita

ng masama harapan ko at mga kapatid niya na si

Virginia Seangio labis kong kinasama ng loob ko

at sasabe rin ni Alfredo sa akin na ako nasa

ibabaw gayon gunit daratin ang araw na ako

nasa ilalim siya at siya nasa ibabaw.

Labis kong ikinasama ng loob ko ang gamit ni

Alfredo ng akin pagalan para makapagutang na

kuarta siya at kanya asawa na si Merna de los

Reyes sa China Bangking Corporation na millon

pesos at hindi ng babayad at hindi ng babayad

ito ay nagdulot sa aking ng malaking kahihiya sa

mga may-ari at stockholders ng China Banking.

At ikinagalit ko pa rin ang pagkuha ni Alfredo at

ng kanyang asawa na mga custome[r] ng Travel

Center of the Philippines na pinagasiwaan ko at

ng anak ko si Virginia.

Dito ako nagalit din kaya gayon ayoko na bilanin

si Alfredo ng anak ko at hayanan kong inaalisan

ng lahat at anoman mana na si Alfredo at si




Alfredo Seangio ay hindi ko siya anak at hindi

siya makoha mana.

Issue 2: Were the formal requisites of a

holographic will present? Yes

Segundo’s document, although it may initially

come across as a mere disinheritance

instrument, conforms to the formalities of aholographic will prescribed by law. It is written,

dated and signed by the hand of Segundo

himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can

be clearly deduced from the terms of the

instrument, and while it does not make an

affirmative disposition of the latter’s property,

the disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an

act of disposition in itself. In other words, the

disinheritance results in the disposition of the

property of the testator Segundo in favor of

those who would succeed in the absence of

Alfredo.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually

prepared by one who is not learned in the law,

as illustrated in the present case, should be

construed more liberally than the ones drawn by

an expert, taking into account the circumstances

surrounding the execution of the instrument

and the intention of the testator.12

In this

regard, the Court is convinced that the

document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng

Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was intended by Segundo to

be his last testamentary act and was executed

by him in accordance with law in the form of a

holographic will. Unless the will isprobated,

13 the disinheritance cannot be given

effect.

Issue 3: Were the compulsory heirs preterited?

No

With regard to the issue on preterition, the

Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the

direct line were not preterited in the will.

Segundo’s last expression to bequeath his estate

to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole

exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not

institute an heir to the exclusion of his other

compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the

name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the

document did not operate to institute her as the

universal heir. Her name was included plainly as

a witness to the altercation between Segundo

and his son, Alfredo.

Heirs of Ureta Sr v Ureta

G.R. No. 165748

Facts:

Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children,

namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia,

Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela,Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and

Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs of

Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonsos

children and their descendants (Heirs of

Alfonso).

Alfonso was financially well-off during his

lifetime. Policronio, the eldest, was the only

child of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling

and instead worked on his fathers lands.

Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four ofhis children, namely, Policronio, Liberato,

Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the house of

Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal

judge, suggested that in order to reduce the

inheritance taxes, their father should make it

appear that he had sold some of his lands to his

children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four

(4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of

land. The Deed of Sale executed in favor of

Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are

the properties in dispute in this case.

Since the sales were only made for taxationpurposes and no monetary consideration was

given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and

enjoy the lands and their produce.

When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972,

Liberato acted as the administrator of his

fathers estate. He was later succeeded by his

sister Prudencia, and then by her daughter,

Carmencita Perlas. Except for a portion of parcel

5, the rest of the parcels transferred to

Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez

Family. These tenants never turned over the

produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his

heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the

administrators of his estate.

Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except

for the said portion of parcel 5, neither

Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of

the subject lands.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/nov2006/gr_140371_2006.html#fnt12











Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial

Partition, which included all the lands that were

covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were

previously executed by Alfonso for taxation

purposes. Conrado, Policronios eldest son,

representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed theDeed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his

co-heirs.

After their fathers death, the Heirs of Policronio

found tax declarations in his name covering the

six parcels of land. They obtained a copy of the

Deed of Sale executed in favor of Policronio. Not

long after the Heirs of Policronio allegedly

learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial

Partition involving Alfonsos estate when it was

published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan

Reporter.

Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to

their late father, and as such, excluded from the

Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of

Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter

with the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts

proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a

Complaint for Declaration of Ownership,

Recovery of Possession, Annulment of

Documents, Partition, and Damages against the

Heirs of Alfonso before the RTC

PETITIONER: Conrado (eldest son of Policroniowho signed in the EJ Partition) claimed that he

did not understand the full significance of his

signature when he signed in behalf of his co-

heirs, as a gratutitous assertion

RESPONDENT: The Heirs of Alfonso were of the

position that the absence of the Heirs of

Policronio in the partition or the lack of

authority of their representative results, at the

very least, in their preterition and not in the

invalidity of the entire deed of partition. Accdg

to them, Conrado, who received Policronios

share, should then fully account for what he had

received to his other co-heirs and be directed to

deliver their share in the inheritance.

RTC: The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was

declared valid by the RTC as all the heirs of

Alfonso were represented and received equal

shares and all the requirements of a valid extra-

judicial partition were met. The RTC considered

Conrados claim that he did not understand the

full significance of his signature when he signed

in behalf of his co-heirs, as a gratutitous

assertion. The RTC was of the view that when he

admitted to have signed all the pages and

personally appeared before the notary public,

he was presumed to have understood theircontents.

CA: annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial

Partition due to the incapacity of one of the

parties to give his consent to the contract. It

held that before Conrado could validly bind his

co-heirs to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, it

was necessary that he be clothed with the

proper authority. Without a special power of

attorney, it was held that Conrado lacked the

legal capactiy to give the consent of his co-heirs,

thus, rendering the Deed of Extra-Judicial

Partition voidable under Article 1390 (1) of the

Civil Code.

Issue: WON there is pretertition? NO

Ruling:

Their posited theory on preterition is no longer

viable. It has already been determined that the

Heirs of Policronio gave their consent to the

Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and they have

not been excluded from it. Nonetheless, even

granting that the Heirs of Policronio were

denied their lawful participation in the partition,

the argument of the Heirs of Alfonso would stillfail.

Preterition has been defined as the total

omission of a compulsory heir from the

inheritance. It consists in the silence of the

testator with regard to a compulsory heir,

omitting him in the testament, either by not

mentioning him at all, or by not giving him

anything in the hereditary property but without

expressly disinheriting him, even if he is

mentioned in the will in the latter case.

Preterition is thus a concept of testamentary

succession and requires a will. In the case at

bench, there is no will involved. Therefore,

preterition cannot apply.

Assuming there was actual preterition, it did not

render the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition

voidable. Citing Article 1104 of the Civil Code,

they aver that a partition made with preterition




of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be

rescinded, but the heirs shall be proportionately

obliged to pay the share of the person

omitted. Thus, the Deed of Extra-Judicial

Partition should not have been annulled by the

CA. Instead, it should have ordered the share of

the heirs omitted to be given to them.

ARTICLE 857 & 863

G.R. Nos. L-27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL

BANK, Administrator of the Testate Estate of

Charles Newton Hodges

vs.

THE HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, PresidingJudge of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo,

Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO

Facts:

Linnie Jane Hodges died in Iloilo City leaving a

will executed on November 22, 1952. This will

was subsequently probated in aforementioned

Special Proceedings No. 1307 of respondent

court on June 28, 1957, with the widower

Charles Newton Hodges being appointed as

Executor, pursuant to the provisions thereof.

Previously, on May 27, 1957, the said widower

(hereafter to be referred to as Hodges) had

been appointed Special Administrator.

In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her

husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie

however also stated in her will that should her

husband later die, said estate shall be turned

over to her brother and sister.

In December 1962, Charles died (it appears he

was also domiciled here). Atty. Leon Gellada, the

lawyer of Charles filed a motion before the

probate court (there was an ongoing probate onthe will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina

Magno may be appointed as the administratrix

of the estate. Magno was the trusted employee

of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty.

Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a

will but the same was in an iron trunk in Charles’

office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have

Magno appointed as administratrix. Judge

Venicio Escolin approved the motion.

Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new

petition for probate was filed for the said will.

Since said will basically covers the same estate,

Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate

opposed the said petition. Eventually, theprobate of Charles’ will was granted. Eventually

still, the Philippine Commercial and Industrial

Bank was appointed as administrator. But

Magno refused to turn over the estate.

Magno contended that in her will, Linnie wanted

Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s

brother and sister and since that is her will, the

same must be respected. Magno also contended

that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death

(an alien testator); that under Article 16 of the

Civil Code, successional rights are governed by

Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law,

Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the

presence of legitimes (Charles’ share in the

estate).

It s PCIB's contention that, viewed as a

substitution, the testamentary disposition in

favor of Mrs. Hodges' brothers and sisters may

not be given effect.

Issue: WON there was substitution in the will of

Mrs. Hodges. - NO

Ruling:

Mrs. Hodges' will provides neither for a simple

or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the

Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution

under Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar

substitution therein because there is no

provision for either (1) predecease of the

testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or

(3) incapacity of the latter to accept the

inheritance, as required by Article 859; and

neither is there a fideicommissary substitution

therein because no obligation is imposed

thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or

any part thereof for anyone else. But from these

premises, it is not correct to jump to the

conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary

dispositions in question are therefore

inoperative and invalid.

The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact

that it views the said disposition exclusively in




the light of substitutions covered by the Civil

Code section on that subject, (Section 3, Chapter

2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that

substitution occurs only when another heir is

appointed in a will "so that he may enter into

inheritance in default of the heir originally

instituted," (Article 857, id.) and, in the presentcase, no such possible default is contemplated.

The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not

substitutes for Hodges because, under her will,

they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot,

would not or may not inherit, but what he

would not dispose of from his inheritance;

rather, therefore, they are also heirs instituted

simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however,

to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar

as Hodges was concerned and correspondingly

suspensive with reference to his brothers and

sisters-in-law.

It is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto

Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned

and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir

with absolute dominion over them only during

his lifetime, which means that while he could

completely and absolutely dispose of any

portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than

himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa,

and all his rights to what might remain upon his

death would cease entirely upon the occurrence

of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his

brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance,although vested already upon the death of Mrs.

Hodges, would automatically become operative

upon the occurrence of the death of Hodges in

the event of actual existence of any remainder

of her estate then.

ARTICLES 859, 863 & 882

[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA[2]

COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS,

respondents.

Facts:

In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and

Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge

Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein

petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as

a devisee of a parcel of land of the Bacolod

Cadastre. The codicil was duly probated and

admitted before the then Court of First Instance

of Negros Occidental.

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was

survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny

(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida.

On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela

y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint, against

the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge

Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subject

Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the

defendant-heirs violated the conditions of the

Codicil, in that:

1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine

National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in

disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to

sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near

descendants and sister of the testatrix.

2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their

obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs of

sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs

domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria Marlena

Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985

up to the filing of the complaint as mandated by

the Codicil, despite repeated demands for

compliance.

3. The banks failed to comply with the 6thparagraph of the Codicil which provided that in

case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the

property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee shall

likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs

of sugar per crop year to herein private

respondent.

On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came

out with a decision, dismissing the complaint.

On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the

Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the

trial court ordering defendants-appellees, as

heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title,

together with its fruits and interests, to the

estate of Aleja Belleza.

Issue: WON there was provision in the codicil as

to the substitution of the testatrix’s relatives

should Rabadilla predecease the testatrix,

incapacitated, or renounced the inheritance.

(Art. 859) - NONE




WON there is fideicommissary substitution. (Art.

863) - NONE

Ruling:

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes

the inheritance in default of the first heir byreason of incapacity, predecease or

renunciation.[14] In the case under

consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil

do not provide that should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla

default due to predecease, incapacity or

renunciation, the testatrix's near descendants

would substitute him. What the Codicil provides

is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not

fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the

property referred to shall be seized and turned

over to the testatrix's near descendants.

Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution

here and on this point, petitioner is correct. In a

fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is

strictly mandated to preserve the property and

to transmit the same later to the second heir. In

the case under consideration, the instituted heir

is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate

the property provided the negotiation is with

the near descendants or the sister of the

testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a

fideicommissary substitution is lacking; the

obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir

the preservation of the property and itstransmission to the second heir. "Without this

obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the

testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary

substitution."

Also, the near descendants' right to inherit from

the testatrix is not definite. The property will

only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or

his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part

of the usufruct to private respondent.

Another important element of a

fideicommissary substitution is also missing

here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the

fideicommissary to whom the property is

transmitted must not be beyond one degree

from the first heir or the fiduciary. A

fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if

the first heir is not related by first degree to the

second heir. In the case under scrutiny, the near

descendants are not at all related to the

instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.

The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the

institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject

Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and

therefore, Article 882 of the New Civil Code isthe provision of law in point. Articles 882 and

883 of the New Civil Code provide:

Art. 882. The statement of the object of the

institution or the application of the property left

by the testator, or the charge imposed on him,

shall not be considered as a condition unless it

appears that such was his intention.

That which has been left in this manner may be

claimed at once provided that the instituted heir

or his heirs give security for compliance with the

wishes of the testator and for the return of

anything he or they may receive, together with

its fruits and interests, if he or they should

disregard this obligation.

Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an

institution referred to in the preceding article

cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by

the testator, it shall be complied with in a

manner most analogous to and in conformity

with his wishes.

The institution of an heir in the mannerprescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the

law of succession as an institucion sub modo or

a modal institution. In a modal institution, the

testator states (1) the object of the institution,

(2) the purpose or application of the property

left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by

the testator upon the heir. A "mode" imposes an

obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does

not affect the efficacy of his rights to the

succession. On the other hand, in a conditional

testamentary disposition, the condition must

happen or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be

entitled to succeed the testator. The condition

suspends but does not obligate; and the mode

obligates but does not suspend. To some extent,

it is similar to a resolutory condition.

From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon,

it can be gleaned unerringly that the testatrix

intended that subject property be inherited by

Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly worded

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/113725.htm#_ftn14

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/june2000/113725.htm#_ftn14




that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the

said instituted heir and his successors-in-interest

to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the

herein private respondent, Marlena Coscolluela

Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter.

However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge

Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of hisinstitution as a devisee, dependent on the

performance of the said obligation. It is clear,

though, that should the obligation be not

complied with, the property shall be turned over

to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner

of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under

subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature

because it imposes a charge upon the

instituted heir without, however, affecting the

efficacy of such institution.

Then too, since testamentary dispositions are

generally acts of liberality, an obligation

imposed upon the heir should not be considered

a condition unless it clearly appears from the

Will itself that such was the intention of the

testator. In case of doubt, the institution should

be considered as modal and not conditional.

ARTICLE 863

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ,

MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, vs.

MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.,

oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO RAMIREZ,

Facts:

Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in

Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his

widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted

to probate by the Court of First Instance ofManila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa

Palacios was appointed administratrix of the

estate.

On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted

a project of partition as follows: the property of

the deceased is to be divided into two parts.

One part shall go to the widow “en

plenodominio” in satisfaction of her legitime;

the other part or “free portion” shall go to Jorge

and Roberto Ramirez “en nudapropriedad.”

Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion

is charged with the widow‟s usufruct and the

remaining two-third (2/3) with a usufruct in

favor of Wanda.

-APPEAL for the partitioning of testate estate of

Jose Eugenio Ramirez (a Filipino national, died in

Spain on December 11, 1964) among principal

beneficiaries:

Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez

-widow

-French who lives in Paris

-received ½ (as spouse) and usufructuary rights

over 1/3 of the free portion

Roberto and Jorge Ramirez

-two grandnephews

-lives in Malate

-received the ½ (free portion)

Wanda de Wrobleski

-companion

-Austrian who lives in Spain

-received usufructuary rights of 2/3 of the free

portion

-vulgar substitution in favor of Juan Pablo

Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez

-Maria Luisa Palacios -administratix

Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed because:

a. vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda wrtwidow’s usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo

Jankowski and Horacio Ramirez, wrt to Wanda’s

usufruct is INVALID because first heirs (Marcelle

and Wanda) survived the testator

b. fideicommissary substitutions are INVALID

because first heirs not related to the second

heirs or substitutes within the first degree as

provided in Art 863 CC

c. grant of usufruct of real property in favor of

an alien, Wanda, violated Art XIII Sec 5

d. proposed partition of the testator’’s interest

in the Santa Cruz Building between widow and

appellants violates testators express will to give

this property to them

Issue: WON there was valid substitution.

Rule:

Vulgar substitutions are valid because dying

before the testator is not the only case where a

vulgar substitution can be made. Also, according




to Art 859 CC, cases also include refusal or

incapacity to accept inheritance therefore it is

VALID.

BUT fideicommissary substitutions are VOID

because Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace

Ramirez are not related to Wande and accordingto Art 863 CC, it validates a fideicommissary

substitution provided that such substitution

does not go beyond one degreefrom the heir

originally instituted. Another is that there is no

absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit

the usufructuary to the substitutes and in fact

the apellee agrees that the testator contradicts

the establishment of the fideicommissary

substitution when he permits the properties be

subject to usufruct to be sold upon mutual

agreement ofthe usufructuaries and naked

owners.

ARTICLE 888

Francisco v. Francisco-Alfonso

REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL,

petitioners, vs. AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO,

respondent .

[G.R. No. 138774. March 8, 2001]

Facts:

Respondent Aida Francisco-Alfonso (hereafterAida) is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio

Francisco and Cirila de la Cruz, who are now

both deceased. Petitioners, on the other hand,

are daughters of the late Gregorio Francisco

with his common law wife Julia Mendoza, with

whom he begot seven (7) children.

Gregorio Francisco (hereafter Gregorio) owned

two parcels of residential land, situated in

Barangay Lolomboy, Bocaue, Bulacan, covered

by TCT Nos. T-32740 and T-117160. When

Gregorio was confined in a hospital in 1990, he

confided to his daughter Aida that thecertificates of title of his property were in the

possession of Regina Francisco and Zenaida

Pascual.

After Gregorio died on July 20, 1990, Aida

inquired about the certificates of title from her

half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio

had sold the land to them on August 15, 1983 .

After verification, Aida learned that there was

indeed a deed of absolute sale in favor of Regina

Francisco and Zenaida Pascual. Thus, on August

15, 1983, Gregorio executed a Kasulatan sa

Ganap na Bilihan, whereby for P25,000.00, he

sold the two parcels of land to Regina Francisco

and Zenaida Pascual. By virtue of the sale, the

Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued TCT No. T-59.585 to Regina Francisco and TCT T-59.586 to

Zenaida Pascual

On April 1, 1991, Aida filed with the Regional

Trial Court, Bulacan a complaint against

petitioners for annulment of sale with

damages.[5] She alleged that the signature of

her late father, Gregorio Francisco, on the

Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan dated August 15,

1983, was a forgery.

In their joint answer to the complaint,

petitioners denied the alleged forgery or

simulation of the deed of sale. After due

proceedings, on July 21, 1994, the trial court

rendered a decision dismissing the complaint.

CA reversed the TC’s decision.

Issue:

WON a legitimate daughter be deprived of her

share in the estate of her deceased father by a

simulated contract transferring the property of

her father to his illegitimate children? NO

Ruling:

(Just in case ma’am will ask about the sale)

First: The kasulatan was simulated. There was

no consideration for the contract of sale.Felicitas de la Cruz, a family friend of the

Franciscos, testified that Zenaida Pascual and

Regina Francisco did not have any source of

income in 1983, when they bought the property,

until the time when Felicitas testified in 1991.

As proof of income, however, Zenaida Pascual

testified that she was engaged in operating a

canteen, working as cashier in Mayon Night Club

as well as buying and selling RTW (Ready to

Wear) items in August of 1983 and prior

thereto.

Zenaida alleged that she paid her father the

amount of P10,000.00. She did not withdraw

money from her bank account at the Rural Bank

of Meycauayan, Bulacan, to pay for the

property. She had personal savings other than

those deposited in the bank. Her gross earnings

from the RTW for three years was P9,000.00,

and she earned P50.00 a night at the club.

Regina Francisco, on the other hand, was a

market vendor, selling nilugaw , earning a net




income of P300.00 a day in 1983. She bought

the property from the deceased for

P15,000.00.[17] She had no other source of

income.

We find it incredible that engaging in buy and

sell could raise the amount of P10,000.00, or

that earnings in selling goto could save enoughto pay P15,000.00, in cash for the land.

The testimonies of petitioners were incredible

considering their inconsistent statements as to

whether there was consideration for the sale

and also as to whether the property was bought

below or above its supposed market value. They

could not even present a single witness to the

kasulatan that would prove receipt of the

purchase price.

Since there was no cause or consideration for

the sale, the same was a simulation and hence,

null and void.

(More important part)

Second: Even if the kasulatan was not

simulated, it still violated the Civil Code

provisions insofar as the transaction affected

respondents legitime. The sale was executed in

1983, when the applicable law was the Civil

Code, not the Family Code.

Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to

transfer the property to his illegitimate

daughters at the expense of his legitimate

daughter. The sale was executed to prevent

respondent Alfonso from claiming her legitime

and rightful share in said property. Before hisdeath, Gregorio had a change of heart and

informed his daughter about the titles to the

property.

According to Article 888, Civil Code:

The legitime of legitimate children and

descendants consists of one-half of the

hereditary estate of the father and of the

mother.

The latter may freely dispose of the remaining

half subject to the rights of illegitimate children

and of the surviving spouse as hereinafter

provided.

Gregorio Francisco did not own any other

property. If indeed the parcels of land involved

were the only property left by their father, the

sale in fact would deprive respondent of her

share in her fathers estate. By law, she is

entitled to half of the estate of her father as his

only legitimate child.

The legal heirs of the late Gregorio Francisco

must be determined in proper testate or

intestate proceedings for settlement of the

estate. His compulsory heir cannot be deprived

of her share in the estate save by disinheritance

as prescribed by law.