case digests- republic v. maddela, ujano v. republic, llorente v. ca

7/22/2019 Case Digests- Republic v. Maddela, Ujano v. Republic, LLorente v. CA

1/8

Republic vs MaddelaIssa GayasG.R. No. L-21664 March 28, 1969REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE

COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,petitioners, vs.

HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of the Courtof First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, and

MIGUELA TAN SUAT,respondents

G.R. No. L-21665 March 28, 1969

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THECOMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,petitioners,

vs. HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA, as Judge of theCourt of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II and

CHAN PO LAN,respondents.

Nature:Two (2) separate petitions for certiorariandprohibition with preliminary injunction but are decidedjointly because the issues presented proceed from the

same factual background.

Facts:On April 29, 1963 the Court of First Instance of

Quezon (Branch 11), Hon. Manolo L. Maddela presiding,

rendered a decision in its Special Proceeding No.4012.On the same day the same court rendered anothersimilarly worded, decision in its special Proceeding No.4013, this time in favor of Chan Po Lan.

The two cases involve the same petition to havepetitioners declared Filipino citizens. Both petitionerswere legally married to Filipino citizens and during thetrial it has been established to the satisfaction of theCourt that both petitioners have all the qualificationsand none of the disqualifications to become a Filipinocitizen. The Fiscal representing the Solicitor General if hehas any opposition to the petition to which the Fiscalanswered that he has no opposition, neither has he any

evidence to warrant opposition.

Both Po Lan and Tan Suat were declared Filipinocitizens by marriage and the Commissioner of theBureau of Immigration was ordered to cancel thenecessary alien certificate of registration and immigrantcertificate of residence of the petitioner and to issue thecorresponding identification card.

The Solicitor Generalfiled the instant petitionsand on August 10, 1963 the SC issued in each case awrit of preliminary injunction to restrain execution andenforcement of the judgment.

Issue: Whether petitioners should be declared Filipino

citizens

Held: No.

Jurisprudence had already set the question at rest: noperson claiming to be a citizen may get a judicialdeclaration of citizenship.

Under our laws, there can be no action orproceeding for the judicial declaration of thecitizenship of an individual. Courts of justiceexist for the settlement of justiciablecontroversies, which imply a given right, legallydemandable and enforceable, an act or omission

violative of said right, and a remedy, granted orsanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As anincident only of the adjudication of the right ofthe parties to a controversy, the court may pass

upon, and make a pronouncement relative totheir status. Otherwise, such a pronouncementis beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, noaction or proceeding may be instituted for adeclaration to the effect that plaintiff orpetitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate

child, although a finding thereon may be madeas a necessary premise to justify a given reliefavailable only to one enjoying said status. Attimes, the law permits the acquisition of a givenstatus, such as naturalization by judicial decreeBut there is no similar legislation authorizing theinstitution of a judicial proceeding to declare that

a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan vRepublic, L-14159, April 18, 1960).

Burca vs RepublicAnne C. Dela PeaMo Ya Lim YaoJamie BentingananOh Hek HowNadine Abenoja

Board of CommissionerJamic Villar Arbolado

Facts:

On July 12, 1960, Santiago Gatchalian,grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized bythe Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipinocitizen following the citizenship of natural motherMariana Gatchalian. On June 27, 1961, Willian, thentwelve years old, arrives in Manila from Hongkong

together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. Theyhad with them certificate of registration and identityissued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on

a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary offoreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admissionas Filipino citizens.

On July 6, 1961, the board of special inquiryadmitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issuedan identification certificate to William. The boarf ofcommissioners waws directed by the Secretary of Justiceto Review all cases where entry was allowed on theground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen suchincluded the case of William. As a result of the decisionof the board of special inquiry which recommended forthe reversal of the decision of the Board ofCommissioners. Acting commissioner issued an order

affirming the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.

On August 15, 1990, the Commission onImmigration and Deportatiion ordered the arrest ofWilliam and was released upon posting P 200,000 cashbond. Thus on the 29thof the same month, he filed apetition for certiorari and prohibition before the RTC ofManila. A motion to dismiss was filed but denied.

Issue: Whether or not William Gatchalian is to bedeclared as a Filipino citizen

Held: Yes.
https://www.facebook.com/ISSAgghttps://www.facebook.com/ISSAgghttps://www.facebook.com/ISSAgghttps://www.facebook.com/anne.delapenahttps://www.facebook.com/anne.delapenahttps://www.facebook.com/anne.delapenahttps://www.facebook.com/girlwholivedforeverhttps://www.facebook.com/girlwholivedforeverhttps://www.facebook.com/girlwholivedforeverhttps://www.facebook.com/abenoja.nadinehttps://www.facebook.com/abenoja.nadinehttps://www.facebook.com/abenoja.nadinehttps://www.facebook.com/jamic.arboladohttps://www.facebook.com/jamic.arboladohttps://www.facebook.com/jamic.arboladohttps://www.facebook.com/jamic.arboladohttps://www.facebook.com/abenoja.nadinehttps://www.facebook.com/girlwholivedforeverhttps://www.facebook.com/anne.delapenahttps://www.facebook.com/ISSAgg


2/8

ID.; CONFLICT OF LAWS; FOREIGN LAW PRESUMED THESAME WITH PHILIPPINE LAW ABSENCE OF PROOF TOTHE CONTRARY. In Miciano v. Brimo (50 Phil. 867

[1924]; Lim and Lim v. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil.472; Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46[1915]),this Court held that in the absence of evidenceto the contrary, foreign laws on a particular subject arepresumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. Inthe case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law

relating to marriage, there arises the presumption that itis the same as that of Philippine law.

18. ID.; MARRIAGE; DOCTRINE OF "PROCESSUALPRESUMPTION" APPLIED IN PHILIPPINE LAW. Philippine law, following the lex loci celebrationis,adheres to the rule that a marriage formally valid where

celebrated is valid everywhere. Referring to marriagescontracted abroad, Art. 71 of the Civil Code (now Art. 26of the Family Code) provides that" (a)ll marriagesperformed outside of the Philippines in accordance withthe laws in force in the country where they wereperformed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid inthis country . . ." And any doubt as to the validity of the

matrimonial unity and the extent as to how far thevalidity of such marriage may be extended to theconsequences of the coverture is answered by Art. 220of the Civil Code in this manner: "In case of doubt, allpresumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus,every intendment of law or facts leans toward thevalidity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriagebonds, the legitimacy of children, the community ofproperty during marriage, the authority of parents overtheir children, and the validity of defense for anymember of the family in case of unlawful aggression."(Italics supplied). Bearing in mind the "processualpresumption" enunciated in Miciano and other cases, hewho asserts that the marriage is not valid under our law

bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law.

19. ID.; PROOF OF FILIATION; STATEMENTS ORDECLARATORY REGARDING FAMILY REPUTATION ORTRADITION IN MATTERS OF PEDIGREE; ADMITTED INCASE AT BAR. The lack of proof of Chinese law on thematter cannot be blamed on Santiago Gatchalian muchmore on respondent William Gatchalian who was then atwelve-year old minor. The fact is, as records indicate,Santiago was not pressed by the CitizenshipInvestigation Board to prove the laws of China relatingto marriage, having been content with the testimony ofSantiago that the Marriage Certificate was lost ordestroyed during the Japanese occupation of China.

Neither was Francisco Gatchalians testimony subjectedto the same scrutiny by the Board of Special Inquiry.Nevertheless, the testimonies of Santiago Gatchalianand Francisco Gatchalian before the Philippine consularand immigration authorities regarding their marriages,

birth and relationship to each other are not self-servingbut are admissible in evidence as statements ordeclarations regarding family reputation or tradition inmatters of pedigree (Sec. 34, Rule 130). Furthermore,this salutary rule of evidence finds support insubstantive law. Thus, Art. 267 of the Civil Codeprovides: "Art. 267. In the absence of a record of birth,

authentic document, final judgment or possession of

status, legitimate filiation may be proved by any othermeans allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."(See also Art. 172 of the Family Code).

20. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT THEREOF IN CASE AT BAR. Having declared the assailed marriages as valid,respondent William Gatchalian follows the citizenship ofhis father Francisco, a Filipino, as a legitimate child ofthe latter. Francisco, in turn, is likewise a Filipino beingthe legitimate child of Santiago Gatchalian who (the

latter) is admittedly a Filipino citizen whose Philippinecitizenship was recognized by the Bureau of Immigrationin an order dated July 12, 1960. Finally, respondentWilliam Gatchalian belongs to the class of Filipinocitizens contemplated under Sec. 1, Article IV of theConstitution, which provides: "Section 1. The followingare citizens of the Philippines:" (1) Those who are

citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption ofthis Constitution. . . ." This forecloses any furtherquestion about the Philippine citizenship of respondentWilliam Gatchalian.

NuvalJulie Ann Bedrio

GREGORIO NUVAL, petitioner-appellant,vs. NORBERTO GURAY, ET AL., respondents.

NORBERTO GURAY, appelllee.

Nature of the Case: Appeal from the judgment of CFI ofLa Union, upholding the defense of res judicata anddismissing the quo warranto proceedings againstNorbeto Guray

FACTS:

On May 11, 1928, Nuval filed (in his dual capacity as avoter duly qualified and registered in the election list of

the municipality of Luna and as a duly registeredcandidate) a petition against Guray asking for theexclusion of his name from the election list, not being aqualified voter of said municipality sine he had notresided therein for six months as required by section431 of the said Administrative Code.

CFI Decision: Norberto Guray was a bona fide residentof the municipality of Luna from Janury 1, 1927. As thatorder was not appealable, Guray's name remained in theelection list. In the election on June 5, 1928, Guray waselected as municipal presidentby a plurality of votes,

Nuval obtaining second place.

On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the presentaction of quo warranto asking that Guray be declaredineligible had a legal residence of one year previuos tothe election as required by the Admin Code.

ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the judgment rendered in theCFI is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution andprosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is nowbefore us.

HELD: 1. No. The petition for exclusion was presented

by Nuval in his capacity as qualified voter and as a dulyregistered candidate, against Guray as a registered
https://www.facebook.com/julie.bedriohttps://www.facebook.com/julie.bedriohttps://www.facebook.com/julie.bedriohttps://www.facebook.com/julie.bedrio


3/8

voter. The present proceedings of quo warranto wasintreposed by Nuval as a registered candidate voted forthe office of municipal president of Luna, against Guray,as an elected candidate for the same office. Therefore,

there is no identity of parties in the two cases, since it isnot enough that there be an identity of persons, butthere must be an identity of capacities in which saidpersons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs.Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756,par. 1165.)

In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the objectof the litigation was the conclusion of Guray as a voterfrom the election list, while in the present quo warrantoproceeding, the object of the litigation is his exclusion orexpulsion from the office to which he has been elected.Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object

of the litigation, or the litigious matter.In the petition for exclusion, the cause of action wasthatGuray had no six months' legal residence in themunicipality of Luna to be a qualified voter thereof,while in proceedings of quo warranto, the cause is thatGuray has not the one year's legal residence required forthe eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna.

Neither does there exist, therefore, identity of causes ofaction.For res judicata may exist the ff are necessary: (a)Identity of parties; (b) identity of things; and (c)identity of issues. There is no identity either of parties,or of things or litigious matter, or of issues or causes ofaction, there is no res judicata.2. Whether or not Guray at the time of his election, wasineligible for the office of the residence in saidmunicipality. - He transferred his residence from themunicipality of Luna to that of Balaoan.Up to June 27, 1922, Guray had resided in themunicipality of Luna, his birthplace, where he hadmarried and had held the office of municipal treasurer.

He was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, LaUnion. The rules of the provincial treasurer require thatmunicipality treasurers live continuously in themunicipality where they perform they official duties. Inorder to qualify, he asked for the cancellation of hisname in the election lists of Luna, alleging as a groundtherefore the following: "On the ground of transfer ofany residence which took place on the 28th day of June,1922. My correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan,La Union". In his cedula certificates for1923 to 1928, hemade it appear that his residence was Balaoan. In 1926,his wife and children went back to live in the town ofLuna in the house of his wife's parents, due to the highcost of living in that municipality. Guray used to go

home to Luna and his children studied in the publicschool of Luna. In January, 1927, he commenced theconstruction of a house of which has not yet beencompleted, and neither be nor his family has lived in it.On February 1, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and

obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on the16th of the same month he filed his resignation bytelegraph, which was accepted on the same day, also bytelegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was alreadyprovided with a cedula by himself as municipal treasurerof Balaoan on January 31, 1928, declaring him residentof said town, he obtained another cedula from the

municipality of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was

dated January 15, 1928, in which it is presented that heresided in the barrio of Victoria, Luna, La Union. OnFebruary 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for andobtained the cancellation of his name in the election list

of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April 14, 1928, heapplied for registration as a voter in Luna, alleging thathe had been residing in said municipality for thirty yearsFor this purpose he made of the cedula certificateantedated.3. Whether or that to the date when he once more

established his residence in the municipality of Luna.It is an established rule that "where a voter abandonshis residence in a state and acquires one in anotherstate, he cannot again vote in the state of his formerresidence until he has qualified by a new period ofresidence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71, par. 28). "The term'residence' as so used is synonymous with'domicile,' which imports not only intention toreside in a fixed place, but also personal presencein that place, coupled with conduct indicative ofsuch intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N. Y. S.,145.)Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence Lunaand acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be

a candidate in Luna, he needed to reacquire residenceinfor the length of time prescribed by the law, and forsuch purpose, he needed not only the intention to do so,but his personal presence in said municipality.A change of residence requires an actual and deliberateabandonment of the former (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71) andone cannot have two legal residences at the same time.Guray abandoned his legal residencce in the municipalityof Luna, transferring it to the municipality of Balaoan byreason and an account of the requirements of the rulesof the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whosejurisdiction is said municipality, exercising his right ofsuffrage in the latter.Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the

Municipality of Balaoan, and began to acquire another inthe municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928, whenhe filed his resignation from the office of municipaltreasurer of Balaoan which he had been holding, andwhich resignation was accepted; and on being electedmunicipal president of Luna in the general elections ofJune 5, 1928, he had not reacquired the legal residencenecessary to be validly elected to said office.SC Decision: Election of Guray as municipal president ofLuna is hereby held to be unlawful and quashed and hehas no right to take possession of said office, petitionerGregorio Nuval being the one legally elected to saidoffice with a right to take possession thereof, havingsecured second place in the election.

RULING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

February 1, 1929

Sec 408 of the Election Law, providing the remedy incase a person not eligible should be elected to aprovincial or municipal office, does not authorize that itbe declared who has been legally elected, thus differingfrom section 479 of the law, which contains such anauthorization, and for the reason, furthermore, thatsection 477 of the said law provides that only those who

have obtained a plurality of votes, and have presented


4/8

their certificates of candidacy may be certified as electedto municipal offices. Elective offices are by naturedifferent from the appointive offices. The occupation ofthe first depends on the will of the elector, while that of

the second depends on the will of the authorityproviding for it.In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled byelection, what is to be determined is the eligibility of thecandidate elect, while in quo warranto proceedingsreferring to offices filled by appointment, what is

determined is the legality of the appointment. In thefirst case when the person elected is ineligible, the courtcannot declare that the candidate occupying the secondplace has been elected, even if he were eligible, sincethe law only authorizes a declaration of election in favorof the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, andhas presented his certificate of candidacy. In the second

case, the court determines who has been legallyappointed and can and ought to declare who is entitledto occupy the office.Judgment is amended, eliminating from the dispositivepart thereof, the holding that Gregorio Nuval is the onewho has been legally elected, so as to read as follows:By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee

Norberto Guray to the office of Municipal president ofLuna, is hereby declared unlawful and quashed and,consequently, that he has no right to take possession ofsaid office, with costs against said respondent.

VellillaSoltan Michael Alisan2nd setUjano Issa

[G.R. No.L-22041. May 19, 1966.]MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, Petitioner-Appellant, v.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,Oppositor-Appellee.

Nature: Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippinecitizenship in a petition filed before the Court of FirstInstance of Ilocos Sur.

Facts:- Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents inMagsingal, Ilocos Sur.

- He is married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he hasone son, Prospero, who is now of legal age.

- 1927- Went to the United States of America in whereafter a residence of more than 20 years he acquired

American citizenship by naturalization.

- November 10, 1960- Returned to the Philippines on towhich he was admitted merely for a temporary stay.

- He owns an agricultural land and a residential housesituated in Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less thanP5,000.00.

- He receives a monthly pension of $115.00 from theSocial Security Administration of the United States ofAmerica.

- He has no record of conviction and it is his intention torenounce his allegiance to the U.S.A.

Court a quo: Denied the petition on the ground that

petitioner did not have the residence required by law sixmonths before he filed his petition for reacquisition ofPhilippine citizenship.

Issue: Whether petitioner should be allowed toreacquire Philippine citizenship

Held: No.

The SC agreed with the lower courts decision.

Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63 provides:

One of the qualifications forreacquiring Philippine citizenshipis that the applicant shall haveresided in the Philippines atleast six months before heapplies for naturalization.

The term "residence" has already beeninterpreted to mean the actual or constructivepermanent home otherwise known as legal residence ordomicile (WilfredoUytengsu v. Republic of the Philippines95 Phil., 890; 50 Off. Gaz., 4781). A place in a countryor state where he lives and stays permanently, and towhich he intends to return after a temporary absence,no matter how long, is his domicile.

In other words, domicile is characterized byanimus manendi. So an alien who has been admittedinto this country as a temporary visitor, either forbusiness or pleasure, or for reasons of health, thoughactually present in this country cannot be said to have

established his domicile here because the period of hisstay is only temporary in nature and must leave whenthe purpose of his coming is accomplished.

In the present case, Petitioner, who is presentlya citizen of the United States of America, was admittedinto this country as a temporary visitor, a status he hasmaintained at the time of the filing of the presentpetition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship andwhich continues up to the present. Such being the case,he has not complied with the specific requirement of lawregarding six months residence before filing his presentpetition.

The word "residence" used therein imports notonly an intention to reside in a fixed place but alsopersonal presence coupled with conduct indicative ofsuch intention (Yen v. Republic, L-18885, January 31,1964; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil., 645).

Indeed, that term cannot refer to the presencein this country of a person who has been admitted onlyon the strength of a permit for temporary residence.

The only way by which petitioner can reacquirehis lost Philippine citizenship is by securing a quota for

permanent residence so that he may come within the
https://www.facebook.com/smalisanhttps://www.facebook.com/smalisanhttps://www.facebook.com/smalisanhttps://www.facebook.com/smalisan


5/8

purview of the residence requirement of CommonwealthAct No. 63.

Caasi - AnneMarcos - JamieJimenez - NadineRecto Jamic

Recto vs Harden

In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]),the Supreme Court considered the absolute divorcebetween the American husband and his American wifeas valid and binding in the Philippines on the theory thattheir status and capacity are governed by their Nationallaw, namely, American law. There is no decision yet ofthe Supreme Court regarding the validity of such adivorce if one of the parties, say an American, is marriedto a Filipino wife, for then two (2) different nationalitieswould be involved.

RECTO V. HARDEN (1959)

Short summary:

Recto was hired by American wife to represent her in RPcase for protection of her interest in the conjugalproperty, vs. American husband, in conjunction with thedivorce proceeding she's going to file in US. They won inTrial Court, but on appeal, American H & W agreed tosettle. Recto now wants to collect fees for services, butas defense, Harden spouses argues that the contract'sobject was unlawful (Divorce not allowed in RP) so it isinvalid, thus, Recto cannot enforce it against them.Court ruled for Recto

Facts:

Mrs. Harden, US Citizen, engaged services of Claro M.Recto, for suitto secure an increase in the amount of support shewas receivingto preserve her rights in the properties of the conjugalpartnershipin contemplation of a divorce suit she's going to fileinthe US.

Compensation for RECTO: 20% of value of her share ofconjugal partnership after liquidation

The contingent fee to which the claimant is entitledunder paragraph 3 of the contract, Exhibit JJJ or 20, is

20% of P1,920,554.85 or the sum of P384,110.97.

Trial Court: Ruled for Mrs. Harden

CA:Upon appeal to CA, Harden Sps. mutually released andforever discharged each other from all actions, debts,duties, and claims to the conjugal partnershipinconsideration of the sum of $1. It was further asserted,in Rectosmanifestation, that the purpose of the saidinstruments, executed by Mr. and Mrs. Harden, was todefeat the claim of the former for attorneys fees,

-Recto filed motion to establish and enforce his charginglien.

-defense: The contract of services of recto is invalid: to

secure a divorce decree in violation of our laws

CAremanded to the court of origin in order to determinethe amount of fees claimed by Attorney Claro M. Rectoin his motion dated February 20, 1952.

After appropriate proceedings, the lower court rendereda decision dated April 30, 1953, adopting substantiallysaid report of the commissioner, but increasing thecontingent fee ofAppellee herein from P369,410.04, thesum recommended in the report, to P384,110.97. Hencethis appeal taken by Mr. and Mrs. Harden.

Objections of Mr. AndMrs Harden

The first question for determination therein is thevalidity of the above-quoted contract of services, whichthe Appellants assail as void, mainly, upon the ground:

(1) that Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal

partnership without her husbands consent;

(2) that Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippinesin effect prohibits contingent fees;

(3) that the contract in question has for itspurpose to secure a decree of divorce, allegedly in

violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of theCivil Code of the Philippines;

(4) that the terms of said contract are harsh,inequitable and oppressive.

SC Decision:

The first objectionhas no foundation in fact, for thecontract in dispute does not seek to bind the conjugalpartnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Hardenmerely bound herself or assumed the personalobligation to pay, by way of contingent fees, 20% ofher share in said partnership. The contract neither gives,nor purports to give, to the Appellee any rightwhatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaidshare.

The amount thereof is simply a basis for thecomputation of said fees.

The second objection is, likewise, untenable.Moreover, it has already been held that contingent feesare not prohibited in the Philippines and are impliedlysanctioned by our Cannons (No. 13) of ProfessionalEthics. (see, also, Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45

Phil., 540, 554.) Such is, likewise, the rule in the UnitedStates

The third objectionis not borne out, either by thelanguage of the contract between them, or by the intentof the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure adivorce, or to facilitate or promote the procurement of a

divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of Mrs.


6/8

Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendencyof a divorce suit she intended to file in the United States.What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden areadmittedly citizens of the United States, their status and

the dissolution thereof are governed pursuant toArticle 9 of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force inthe Philippines at the time of the execution of thecontract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code ofthe Philippines by the laws of the United States, whichsanction divorce. In short, the contract of services,

between Mrs. Harden and herein Appellee, is notcontrary to law, morals, good customs, public order orpublic policy.

The last objectionis based upon principles of equity,but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks equity must comewith clean hands (Bastida, et al., vs. DyBuncio& Co., 93

Phil., 195; chan roblesvirtualawlibrary30 C.J.S. 475),and Appellants have not done so, for the circumstancessurrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that theiraforementioned agreements, ostensibly for thesettlement of the differences between husband and wife,were made for the purpose of circumventing ordefeating the rights of herein Appellee, under his above-

quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden.

Summary

Issue: WON RECTO COULD ENFORCE THE AGREEMENTof services ?

Held :Yes

Their marital and personal status, and thedissolution of their marriage are governed by thelaws of the United States which sanction divorce.This is in pursuant to Art. 15 of the Civil Code

The CONTRACT OF SERVICES IS NOT CONTRARYTO LAW, MORALS, GOOD CUSTOMS, PUBLICORDER, OR PUBLIC POLICYThe contract has a lawful object: it is to protectthe interests of Mrs. Harden in the conjugalpartnership during the pendency of a divorce suit

-NOTto secure divorceto facilitate or promote procurement of divorce

Divorce can be granted to the Sps Harden, they beingnationals of country whose laws allow divorce (followingthe nationality principle in determining the status anddissolution of the marriage)

Barnuevo - JulieQuita - SoltanLlorente - Issa

G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000

PAULA T. LLORENTE,petitioner, vs. COURT OFAPPEALS and ALICIA F.

LLORENTE, respondents.

Nature: Appeal from the decision of the Court oAppeals modifying that of the Regional Trial Court,Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City declaringrespondent Alicia F. Llorente, as co-owners of whatever

property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente mayhave acquired during the twenty-five (25) years thatthey lived together as husband and wife.

Facts:The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an

enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from1927 to 1957

Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorenteweremarried in Nabua, Camarines Sur. Before the outbreakof the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the UnitedStates and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua,

Camarines Sur

In 1943,Lorenzo was admitted to United Statescitizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816was issued in his favor by the United States DistrictCourt, Southern District of New York.

Upon the liberation of the Philippines in 1945,Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navyto visit his wife. He discovered that his wife Paula waspregnant and was living in and having an adulterousrelationship with his brother, CeferinoLlorente.

In 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered inthe Office of the Registrar of Nabua asCrisologoLlorente, with the certificate stating that thechild was not legitimate and the line for the fathersname was left blank

In 1946, the couple drew a written agreement tothe effect that:

(1) all the family allowances allotted bythe United States Navy as part ofLorenzos salary and all otherobligations for Paulas dailymaintenance and support would besuspended;(2) they would dissolve their maritalunion in accordance with judicialproceedings;(3) they would make a separateagreement regarding their conjugalproperty acquired during their maritallife; and(4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula

for her adulterous act since shevoluntarily admitted her fault andagreed to separate from Lorenzopeacefully.

November 16, 1951- Lorenzo filed fordivorce with the Superior Court of the State of CaliforniaPaula was represented by counsel, John Riley, andactively participated in the proceedings. The divorce wasgranted on December 1952.


7/8

When Lorenzo returned to the Philippines, he marriedAlicia F. Llorente in Manila. Alicia had no knowledge ofthe first marriage even if they resided in the same townas Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or

cohabitation.

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together ashusband and wife and had three children, Raul, Luz andBeverly, all surnamed Llorente.

Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament where hebequeathed all his property to Alicia and their threechildren.

Lorenzo also filed for the probate and allowance of hislast will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved thatAlicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his

estate.The Trial Court, finding that the will was dulyexecuted, admitted the will to probate. However, deniedthe motion for appointment of Alicia for the reason thatthe testator Lorenzo was still alive.

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could beterminated, Lorenzo died.

Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters ofadministration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Shecontended:

(1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse,(2) that the various property were acquiredduring their marriage,

(3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all hisproperty in favor of Alicia and her children,encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 sharein the conjugal property.

Alicia also filed in the testate proceeding apetition for the issuance of letters testamentary.

Without terminating the testate proceedings, thetrial court gave due course to Paulas petition andsuch order was published in the newspaper BicolStar.

Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals

ruling:

The divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorenteis void and inapplicable in the Philippines therefore themarriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunatois likewisevoid. The petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance ofletters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is notentitled to receive any share from the estate even if the

will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzohaving gained the status of paramour.

On the other hand, the petition of Paula Titular Llorenteis meritorious. The court declared her entitled as

conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of theirconjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir,Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of theestate and then one-third should go to the illegitimatechildren with Alicia.

Paula Llorentewas also appointed legal administrator of

the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente.

Alicia filed a motion for reconsideration which wasdenied by the Trial Court and her appeal with the CAwas also denied. However, the CA modified the TCsdecision declaring that Alicia is co-owner of whateveproperties she and the deceased may have acquiredduring the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: (As identified by the SC) Who are entitled toinherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

(Pertinent to our lesson) Is the foreign divorcegranted to Lorenzo Llorente valid?

Held: The SC did not agree with the decision of the

Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the triacourt.

Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente becamean American citizen long before and at the time of: (1)

his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3)execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established,admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidentsare necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:Art. 15. Laws relating to familyrights and duties, or to the status,condition and legal capacity ofpersons are binding uponcitizens of the Philippines,even though living abroad.

Art. 16. Real property as well aspersonal property is subject tothe law of the country where it issituated.

However, intestate andtestamentary succession, bothwith respect to the order ofsuccession and to the amount ofsuccessional rights and to theintrinsic validity of testamentaryprovisions,shall be regulatedby the national law of the

person whose succession is

under consideration, whatevermay be the nature of theproperty and regardless of thecountry wherein said propertymay be found.

While the substance of the foreign law was pleadedthe Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. TheCourt of Appeals and the trial court called to the forethe renvoidoctrine, where the case was referred backto the law of the decedents domicile, in this casePhilippine law.


8/8

The SC noted that while the trial court stated thatthe law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in thesame breath it made the categorical, albeit equallyunproven statement that American law follows the

domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies whendetermining the validity of Lorenzos will.

First, there is no such thing as one Americanlaw. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of theCivil Code cannot possibly apply to general American

law. Each State of the union has its own law applicableto its citizens and in force only within the State.

Second, there is no showing that the applicationof the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by NewYork State law.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals held that

the will was intrinsically invalid since it containeddispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courtsopinion was a mereparamour.

The hasty application of Philippine law and thecomplete disregard of the will, already probated as dulyexecuted in accordance with the formalities of Philippine

law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual andlegal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

The SC cited various cases (Van Dorn v. Romillo,

Jr.,Quita v. Court of Appeals,Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera)wherein it was held that owing to the nationalityprinciple embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, onlyPhilippine nationals are covered by the policy againstabsolute divorces, the same being considered contraryto our concept of public policy and morality. Aliens mayobtain divorces abroad, provided they are validaccording to their national law. Divorce and its legal

effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view ofthe nationality principle in our civil law on the status ofpersons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision ofthe Court of Appeals must be reversed.The divorceobtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paulawas valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matterof comity.

However, the effects of this divorce (as to thesuccession to the estate of the decedent) are matters

best left to the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:Art. 17. The forms and

solemnitiesof contracts,wills, and other publicinstruments shall begoverned by the laws of thecountry in which they areexecuted.

When the acts referred to areexecuted before thediplomatic or consular

officials of the Republic of thePhilippines in a foreigncountry, the solemnitiesestablished by Philippine laws

shall be observed in theirexecution. (underscoringours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his propertyto his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown

in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate hiswishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by ourlaws on family rights and duties, status, condition andlegal capacity.

As a guide, the trial court should note thatwhatever public policy or good customs may be involved

in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend toextend the same to the succession of foreignnationals. Congress specifically left the amount ofsuccessional rights to the decedent's national law.

case digests- republic v. maddela, ujano v. republic, llorente v. ca

Documents