CASE: CSC VS ANDAL FACTS:

Herminigildo L. Andal, respondent, holds the position of Security Guard II in the Sandiganbayan. He filed an application to take the Career Service Professional Examination-Computer Assisted Test (CSPE-CAT), was admitted to take the examination, and the result showed that he passed with the rate of 81.03%. However, when Arlene S. Vito who claimed to have been authorized by respondent to secure the results of the examination went to do so, verification and comparison of the pictures attached to the Picture Seat Plan and the identification card of Andal brought by Vito showed dissimilarity in the facial features. Civil Service Commission National Capital Region (CSC-NCR) rendered judgment finding the respondent guilty of dishonesty and imposing upon him the penalty of dismissal from the service. Aggrieved, the respondent appealed, however, it was denied. He then elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA), in which the CA ruled in favor of the respondent. The CSC filed a motion for reconsideration in the CA but was denied. Hence, the present petition for reversal of the decision of the CA. ISSUE: Does the CSC's disciplinary jurisdiction extend to court personnel?HELD: The Court recognizes the CSC's administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. Section 3, Article IX-B of the Constitution declares the CSC as the central personnel agency of the Government shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. But the the CA ruled that the CSC encroached upon the Supreme Courts power of administrative supervision over court personnel. In reversing the CSC resolutions, the CA cited Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which provides that the SC shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. The CA further stated that what the CSC should have done was to refer the administrative case for dishonesty against respondent to the Office of the Court Administrator for appropriate action instead of resolving the case. The CSC's authority and power to hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases are not in dispute. In the present case, it cannot be said that Andal was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC. This notwithstanding, the Court reiterates that it will not and cannot tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary expects the highest standard of integrity from all its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice

is circumscribed with a heavy burden or responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables. The instant petition is DENIED. The Court orders CSC to refer the case of Andal to the Office of the Court Administrator, for the filing of the appropriate administrative case against him.

CASE: PEOPLE VS VILLAPANDO FACTS: During the May 11, 1998 elections, Villapando won as Municipal Mayor of San Vicente Palawan. On July 1, 1998, Villapando designated Orlando M. Tiape (now deceased), who also ran for Municipal Mayor of Kitcharao, Agusan del Norte but lost, as Municipal Administrator of the Municipality of San Vicente, Palawan. On February 4, 2000, Villapando and Tiape were charged and prosecuted for the violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code before the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, wherein Villpando being charged of taking advantage of his official functions, conspiring and confederating with Tiape, in appointing him (Tiape) as Municipal Administrator even without the necessary legal qualifications and with the fact that he lost the mayoralty elections in the Municipality of Kitcharao. But eventually, the case against Tiape was dismissed after his death. Villapando then filed a Manifestation of Intent to File Demurrer to Evidence, and Sandiganbayan found his case with merit and acquitted him of the crime charged against him for the violation of Article 244. The Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division held that there is no violation of Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code should a person suffering from temporary disqualification be appointed so long as the appointee possesses all the qualifications stated in the law. Thus, the current petition. ISSUE: In relation to Sec. 6, Art. IX-B, should "legal disqualification" be construed to include "temporary disqualification"? HELD: There is no basis in law or jurisprudence for the above interpretation of Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division. On the contrary, legal disqualification in Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code simply means disqualification under the law. Clearly, Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991 prohibits losing candidates within one year after such election to be appointed to any office in the government or any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. Villapando's contention and the Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division's interpretation of the term legal disqualification lack cogency. Article 244 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be circumscribed lexically. Legal disqualification cannot be read as excluding temporary disqualification in order to exempt therefrom the legal prohibitions under Section 6, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution and Section 94(b) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Hence, the petition is GRANTED.

CASE: NAZARENO VS DUMAGUETE FACTS Petitioners were all bona fide employees of the City Government of Dumaguete. They were appointed to various positions by the City Mayor Filipe Antonio B. Remollo, Jr. some time in June 2001, shortly before the end of his term. On July 2, 2001 the newly elected City Mayor Agustin Perdices announced during a flag ceremony held at the City Hall that he was not recognizing the appointments by former Mayor Remollo, which include the petitioners. Thereafter, City Administrator Dominador Dumalag, Jr. issued a Memorandum dated July 2, 2001 directing Assistant City Treasurer Erlinda Tumongha to "refrain from making any disbursements, particularly payments for salary differential[s]" to those given promotional appointments by former Mayor Remollo. Thus, petitioners filed with the RTC a Petition for Mandamus with Injunction and Damages with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction against respondents City Mayor Perdices and City Officers Dumalag, etc. ISSUE Are petitioners entitled to compensation for services actually rendered by them while the disapproval of their appointment was pending with CSC? HELD While it is true that it is the ministerial duty of the government to pay for the appointees' salaries while the latter's appeal of the disapproval of their appointments by CSC-FO and/or CSC-RO is still pending before the CSC Proper, however, this applies only when the said appointments have been

disapproved on grounds which do not constitute a violation of civil service law. Such is not the case in the instant Petition. Until the Court resolves the Petition in G.R. No. 181559 (issue on whether petitioners' appointments should be disapproved for having been made in violation of CSC Resolution No. 010988 dated 4 June 2001), reversing the disapproval of petitioners appointments or declaring that the disapproval of the same was not on grounds which constitute violation of civil service law, the Court cannot rule in the instant Petition that it is the ministerial duty of the City Government of Dumaguete to pay petitioners' salaries while disapproval of their appointment was pending with CSC. Thus, there is yet no ministerial duty compellable by a writ of mandamus.

ABC VS COMELEC FACTS: Respondent Melanio Mauricio, Jr. filed a petition with the COMELEC for the cancellation of registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC PartyList on the ground that petitioner is a front for a religious organization; hence, it is disqualified to become a party-list group under Section 6 (1) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act. Private respondent contends that ABC is a front for a religious group called the Children of God International, which is more popularly known as Ang Dating Daan. The COMELEC, Second Division dismissed the petition based on substantial grounds, as it found that ABC is not a religious sect, and is, therefore, not disqualified from registration. Private respondent filed

a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Annul Proclamation and Suspend its Effects. The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution partially granting private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to Annul Proclamation and Suspend Its Effects. Issue: Doe the Comelec..blah blah blah RULING: Once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins. The jurisdiction of the HRET over contests relating to the qualifications of a party-list nominee or representative is derived from Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, while the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over petitions for cancellation of registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition is derived from Section 2 (5), Article IX-C of the Constitution. In sum, the COMELEC en banc had jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation of the registration and accreditation of petitioner ABC Party-List for alleged violation of Section 6 (1) of R.A. No. 7941.

CAYETANO VERSUS COMELEC FACTS: Before the Supreme Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Orders issued by public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), through its Second Division, dated August 23, 2010 and September 7, 2010, respectively, and positing the singular issue of whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the protest of private respondent for insufficiency in form and content. The two Orders were issued in relation to the election protest, docketed as EPC No. 2010-44, filed by private respondent Dante O. Tinga against petitioner Maria Laarni Cayetano, alleging that the latter committed

election fraud and irregularities. ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction to review an order or final resolution of a division of the COMELEC? RULING: Plainly, from the foregoing, the Court has no jurisdiction to review an order, whether final or interlocutory, even a final resolution of a division of the COMELEC. Stated otherwise, the Court can only review via certiorari a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC en banc in accordance with Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution. As stated in Soriano, the general rule is that a decision or an order of a COMELEC Division cannot be elevated directly to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari. In short, the final order of the COMELEC (Second Division) denying the affirmative defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before this Court even via a petition for certiorari.

CASE: BANAT VS COMELECBanat vs. COMELEC G.R. NO. 177508 DECISION CARPIO, J.: THE CASE

BEFORE THE COURT IS A PETITION FOR PROHIBITION[1] WITH A PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER OR A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION[2] FILED BY PETITIONER BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) PARTY LIST (PETITIONER) ASSAILING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9369 (RA 9369)[3] AND ENJOINING RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) FROM IMPLEMENTING THE STATUTE. RA 9369 is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2231 and House Bill No. 5352 passed by the Senate on 7 December 2006 and the House of Representatives on 19 December 2006. On 23 January 2007, less than four months before the 14 May 2007 local elections, the President signed RA 9369. Two newspapers of general circulation, Malaya and Business Mirror, published RA 9369 on 26 January 2007. RA 9369 thus took effect on 10 February 2007. On 7 May 2007, petitioner, a duly accredited multi-sectoral organization, filed this petition for prohibition alleging that RA 9369 violated Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution.[4] Petitioner also assails the constitutionality of Sections 34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369. According to petitioner, these provisions are of questionable application and doubtful validity for failing to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.

CASE: PARENNO VS COA Facts: Salvador Parreo served in the Armed Forces of the Philippines for 32 years. On 5 January 1982, petitioner retired from the Philippine Constabulary with the rank of 2nd Lieutenant. Petitioner availed, and received payment, of a lump sum pension equivalent to three years pay. In 1985, petitioner started receiving his monthly pension amounting to P13,680. Petitioner migrated to Hawaii and became a naturalized American citizen. The AFP then stopped petitioners monthly pension in accordance with Section 27 of Presidential Decree No. 1638, as

amended by Presidential Decree No. 1650. It provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits terminated upon loss of Filipino citizenship. Petitioner filed a claim before the COA for the continuance of his monthly pension. COA denied petitioners claim for lack of jurisdiction as the resolution of the issue hinges upon the validity of Section 27 of P.D. No. 1638, as amended. COA then referred authority and jurisdiction of the judiciary to rule in the first instance upon the constitutionality of the provision in question. Issue: In resolving money claims, has the COA authority to rule on the constitutionality of a law? Ruling : The jurisdiction of the COA over money claims against the government does not include the power to rule on the constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts. Petitioners money claim essentially involved the constitutionality of Section 27 of PD 1638, as amended.Hence, the COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing petitioners money claim.

Maruhom vs COMELEC Facts: Maruhom challenges in her Petition the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in declaring her registration in Marantao void. She asserts that Section 2, Article IX(c) of the Constitution prohibits the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction or deciding issues involving the right to vote. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8189, or the Voters Registration Act of 1996 (VRA),

confers upon the MTCs and MeTCs original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities. Issue: Is the challenge on Maruhoms registration, an issue on the right to vote and thus, beyond COMELEC jurisdiction? Ruling: The present case is not about her being denied her right to register as a voter, but is all about her making false material representations in her COC, which would warrant the cancellation of the same. The resolutions of the COMELEC en banc merely defeated Maruhoms intent to run for elective office, but it did not deprive her of her right to vote. Although Maruhoms registration in Marantao is void, her registration in Marawi still subsists. She may be barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she may still exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter. It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under Section 78 of the OEC.[21] In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in the COC.\

Matibag vs. Benipayo Facts: Through the COMELEC en banc, the petitioner, Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag, was appointed as the Acting Director IV of the Education and Information Department (EID). President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo then appointed, adinterim, Alfredo L. Benipayo as the COMELEC Chairman and Resurreccion Z.

Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. as COMELEC Commissioners. The three of them through the President renewed their ad-interim appointment twice and thus take oath twice as well. Benipayo, being the COMELE Chairman transferred Matibag in the Law Department, which the latter objected. With the case at bar, petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. But she was denied and so the petitioner then appealed to the COMELEV en banc and while here appeal was pending she likewise filed an instant petitioning the appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason. Issue: Refer to photocopy Ruling: No. Ad-interim appoint is a permanent appointment that is made by the President while the Congress is in recess. Such appointment is not temporary and cannot be revoke nor be forfeited at any time. An adinterim appointee who has qualified and assumed office become at that moment a government employee and therefore part of the civil service. There is no problem of the fact that when the ad-interim appointment is approved by the Commission on Appoint there is no longer any extended reappointment available. Therefore, The phrase without reappointment applies only to one who has been appointed by the President and confirmed by the Commission on appointments, whether or not such completes his term of office. There must be a confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of the previous appointment before the prohibition on reappointment can apply.

Cipriano vs. COMELEC Fact: A petition for certiorari was filed by the petitioner Elan Marie P. Cipriano because COMELEC motu proprio cancelled his certificate of candidacy. COMELEC issued Resolution No. 5363 forfeiting some of the candidates including the petitioners because of the place they were registered as voters were not the place they intended to run. The petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration in the said resolution and argued that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to act on the cacellation of her certificate of candidacy on the first instance because it is the Division of the Commission that has authority to decide election-related cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. Issue: Refer to photocopy. Ruling: COMELEC is clothes with three powers of government, executive or administrative, legislative, and quasi-judicial powers. Examples of the administrative powers are as follows: (1) determine the number and places of poll places; (2) appointment officials for the registration of voters; (3) enforced law to promote the free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible election; (4) and others. It has also direct control and supervision over all personnel in the conduct of election. Legislative authority constitute the power to promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the Commission is required to enforce and administer. While the quisi-judicial power of the commission grants the power to have exclusive jurisdiction over all contest s relating to the election, return and qualification of all the elective candidates.

BANAT vs. COMELEC Facts: The petitioner petition for prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction was filed questioning the constitutionalty of Republic Act No. 9369 and enjoining the COMELEC from implementing the statute. Petitioner filed the petition specifically sections

34, 37, 38, and 43 of RA 9369 to be unconstitutional. Both the petitioner and respondent contend that section 43 which allows the COMELEC to exclusive is a violation of the election laws and alleging the section 43 is unconstitutional. Issue: Refer to photocopy Ruling: The COMELECs exclusive power can be seen in Section 265 of BP 881 which gives the commission to conduct a preliminary investigation and prosecute election offenses and likewise allows the COMELEC to seek help from other prosecuting arms of government. This power to instigate and prosecute election by the COMELEC is not by virtue of the Constitution but rather by BP 881, a legislative enactment. The prompt investigation, prosecution, and disposition of election offenses constitute an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.

Roque vs. COMELEC Facts: COMELEC together with the National Computer Center and other computer wizards believe that national automated election would be successful. A petition for certiorari was filed by petitioners H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et. al. nullifying the respondent COMELCs award to Total Information Management

Corporation and Smartmatic International Corporation. Petitioner contends that the automation contract[is] a violation of the Constitution, it constitutes a wholesale abdication of the poll bodys constitutional mandate for election law enforcement. Petitioner invoke Article 3.3 of the automation contract, which according to them relinquishedsupervision and control of the system to be used of the automated election. Issue: Refer to photocopy Ruling No. The court believes that there is nothing in Article 3.3 of the automation contractsupport the simplistic conclusion of the abdication of control pressed by the petitioner. The article only give Smartmatice in-charge of the technical aspect of the counting and canvassing wares does not to us translate, without more, to ceding control to electoral process to Smartmatic. Furthermore, the RFPputs all prospective bidders on notice of Comelecs intent to automate and to accept bids that would meet several needsunder COMELEC supervision and control, to ensure effective and successful implementation of the project. The Court also emphasized Article 6.7 of the automation contract stating that the entire process of voting, counting, transmission, consolidation and canvassing of votes shall beconducted by COMELECs personnel and officials. Thus the petition was dismissed.

Q QUIROG VS AUMENTADO GR. 163443, November 11, 2008 ISSUE: Is the constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments applicable to appointments made by local chief executives ?RULING: Yes, We, however, hasten to add that the aforementioned ruling does not mean that the raison d etre behind the prohibition against midnight appointments may not be applied to those made by chief executives of local government units, as here. Indeed, the prohibition is precisely designed to discourage, nay, even preclude, losing candidates from issuing appointments merely for partisan purposes thereby depriving the incoming administration of the opportunity to make the corresponding appointments in line with its new policies. Serrana vs Sandiganbayan. GR. 162059, January 22, 2008 ISSUE: Is compensation an essential element of public office? RULING: Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.