After the first senatorial elections under the 1987 Constitution, Sanchez, a candidate therein, filed before the COMELEC to conduct a recount of the votes. Allegedly, votes intended for him, which were merely written as “Sanchez”, were considered as stray votes because of the sameness of his last name to that of Gil Sanchez – another candidate who was later disqualified. Sanchez was then running as the 25th in ranking among the candidates (Sanchez vs COMELEC). He filed an urgent petition to re-count or re-appreciate those votes in favor of him. Meanwhile, Rasul and Enrile, ranked 23 rd and 24th respectively intervened and filed before the COMELEC requesting the latter to proclaim them as the duly elected senators elect completing the 24 senators-elect. They moved to dismiss Sanchez’ petition. Rasul’s lead over Enrile is just about 1,910 and there were just 3 municipalities left to be counted (31,000 votes). Enrile’s lead over Sanchez was 73,034 votes. COMELEC then denied Sanchez’ petition. Subsequently, COMELEC declared Rasul as the 23rd senator-elect but there was still a mathematical possibility that Enrile can overtake Rasul. Enrile opposed Rasul’s proclamation as the 23rd senator-elect and he averred that COMELEC should complete the canvassing first before declaring who placed 23rd and 24th respectively (Enrile vs COMELEC and Razul). COMELEC justified Rasul’s proclamation on the ground that since the remaining 3 municipalities is in Muslim Mindanao, and that Rasul is a Muslim, there is a logical presumption that majority of the votes therefrom would be for Rasul. While this was foregoing, COMELEC, by a vote of 5 to 2 reversed its earlier decision in denying Sanchez’ petition and it granted Sanchez’ request for recount and re-appreciation. Enrile then filed a petition against COMELEC and Sanchez (Enrile vs COMELEC and Sanchez). Enrile alleged that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in granting Sanchez’ petition for recount and abused its discretion in refusing to proclaim him (Enrile) on the ground that Sanchez’ petition for recount is not a pre-proclamation controversy which involves issues affecting extrinsic validity, and not intrinsic validity, of the said election returns and that Rasul’s lead over him was only 1,916 votes while his lead over Sanchez was 73,034 votes, with only 31,000 votes remaining to be canvassed in 3 towns, could not offset his lead over Sanchez.ISSUE: Whether Sanchez’ petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the Comelec may be considered a summary pre-proclamation controversy falling within the Comelec’s exclusive jurisdiction (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code) or properly pertains to the realm of election protest falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral Tribunal as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualification of the [Senate's] members.” (Art. VI, Sec. 17, Constitution).HELD: Sanchez’ petition must fail. There is no clear showing that the said stray votes constitute “omission in the election returns of the name of any candidate and/or his corresponding votes” (incomplete election returns). The election returns are in fact complete as the total number of votes that were counted and appreciated as votes in his favor by the

boards of inspectors. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez’ petition must fail. The complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of “Sanchez” votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the COMELEC or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity.‘Canvass proceedings are administrative and summary in nature, and a strong prima facie case backed up by a specific offer of evidence and indication of its nature and importance has to be made out to warrant the reception of evidence aliunde and the presentation of witnesses and the delays necessarily entailed thereby. Otherwise, the paralyzation of canvassing and proclamationproceedings leading to a vacuum in so important and sensitive an office as that of Senator of the Republic could easily be brought about —- this time involving the eight place and next time involving perhaps all the eight places, when it is considered that the position of senator is voted for, nationwide by all the voters of the 66 provinces and 57 cities comprising the Philippines.’

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

SANCHEZ VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS(114 SCRA 454)

FACTS:

The Resolution of the Commission on Elections, dated May 15, 1980, in Pre-Proclamation Case No. 41 entitled Virgilio Sanchez vs. Mayor Armando P. Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Fernando, Pampanga.

In the local elections held on January 30, 1980, Virgilio Sanchez was the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party (NP) for Municipal Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga, while Armando Biliwang was the Kilusang Bagong Lipunan,s (KBL) official candidate for the same position.

On February 1, 1980, Sanchez filed with the Commission on Elections a Petition to declare null and void the local elections in San Fernando, Pampanga due to alleged large scale terrorism. On the same day, the COMELEC denied the Petition for lack of merit. Sanchez moved for reconsideration. On February 8, 1980, the COMELEC recalled its Resolution and required Biliwang and the Municipal Board of Canvassers to answer. Hearings were conducted thereafter.

On November 19, 1980, Sanchez filed a petition for Certiorari with this court, docketed as G.R. No. 55513, wherein he seeks a modification of the portion of the COMELEC Resolution of May 15, 1980 refusing to call a special election.

On December 6, 1980, Biliwang instituted, also with this Court, a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 55642, assailing the same COMELEC Resolution and alleging that same body has no power to annul an entire municipal election.

These two Petitions were ordered consolidated and were heard by the court en banc on July 28, 1981.

ISSUES:

Does the COMELEC have the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of post-election terrorism?

Does the COMELEC have the authority to call for a special election?

HELD:

Biliwang Asserts that COMELEC lacks the power to annul elections of municipal officials particularly so because, under Section 190 of the 1978 Election Code, the power to try election contests relative to elective municipal officials is vested in Courts of First Instance.

Be that as it may, it should be recalled that what COMELEC actually rejected were the sham and illegal returns in San Fernando, and that kind of fraud and terrorism perpetrated thereat was sufficient cause for voiding the election as a whole. Besides, COMELEC is empowered

motu proprio to suspend and annul any proclamation as, in fact, it did annul Biliwang’s proclamation.

It may be true that there is no specific provision vesting the COMELEC with authority to annul an election. However, there is no doubt either relative to COMELEC’s extensive powers. Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is tasked with the function to “enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections.” The 1978 Election Code accords it exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest elections.

In other words, in line with the plenitude of its powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must be deemed possessed of authority to annul elections where the will of the voters has been defeated and the purity of elections sullied. It would be unreasonable to state that the COMELEC has a legal duty to perform and at the same time deny it the wherewithal to fulfill that task.

On this issue, the COMELEC opined that it had no power to order the holding of new or special election.

Thus, the COMELEC deemed it imperative “to certify to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa the failure of election in San Fernando, Pampanga, so that remedial legislation may be enacted.

Again, the foregoing Opinions were rendered under the regime of the 1935 Constitution and the former Revised Election Code, whereby there was no constitutional nor statutory precept that empowered the COMELEC to direct a new election after one had already been held. Under Section 8 of that former statute, authority was given to the President to postpone the election upon the recommendation of the COMELEC. And Section 21 (c) of the same law authorized the President to issue a proclamation calling a special election whenever the election for a local office failed to take place on the date fixed by law. In other words, the prerogative to postpone an election or call a special election, was formerly lodged with the President.

As the laws now stand, however, COMELEC has been explicitly vested with the authority to “call for the holding or continuation of the election.”

Clearly, under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, when the election “results in a failure to elect, the COMELEC may call for the “holding or continuation of the election as soon as practicable.” We construe this to include the calling of a special election in the event of a

failure to elect in order to make the COMELEC truly effective in the discharge of its functions. In fact, Section 8 of the 1978 Election Code, supra, specifically allows the COMELEC to call a special election for the purpose of fillinf the vacancy or a newly created position, as the case may be. There should be no reason, therefore, for not allowing it to call a special election when there is a failure to elect.

RULING OF COURT:

WHEREFORE. 1) in G.R. No. 55513, the challenged Resolution of May 15, 1980 is hereby modified, and the Commission on Elections hereby held empowered to call a special election where there has been a failure to elect. That portion which certifies the failure of election in San Fernando, Pampanga, to the President and the Batasang Pambansa for the enactment of remedial measures, is hereby set aside.

2) In G.R. No. 55642, the Petition is hereby denied for lack of merit, and the authority of the Commission on Elections to annul an election hereby upheld.

Hassan vs. COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner, Hadji Nor Basher L. Hassan, and private respondent, Mangondaya P.Hassan Buatan were candidates for the Office of the Vice-Mayor while the otherprivate respondents were candidates for councilors in Madalum, Lanao del Sur in thelast regular local elections of May 8, 1995. However, due to threats of violence andterrorism in the area there was failure of elections in six out of twentyfour precincts inMadalum. The ballot boxes were burned and there were threats by unidentifiedpersons in Precinct No. 7-A. In Precinct Nos. 9, 9-A, 10, 13, and 14, elections did nottake place because the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) failed toreport to their respective polling places. Thus, the Monitoring Supervising Team(COMELEC Team) headed by Regional Election Director Virgilio O. Garcillanorecommended to the COMELEC the holding of special elections in said precincts. Thespecial elections were thereby set on May 27, 1995. On said date, however, themembers of the BEI again failed to report for duty in their respective polling places. Inan Order dated May 28, 1995, the COMELEC Team rescheduled the elections in theseprecincts for May 29, 1995 at Liangan Elementary (Arabic) School, which is 15kilometers away from the designated polling places, On May 29, 1995, the membersof the Board did not again report for duty. Hence, the COMELEC Team wasconstrained to appoint police/military personnel to act as substitute members so as topush through with the elections. The herein private respondent filed a petition for herimmediate proclamation, on the other hand the petitioner filed the present case dueto the same ground of terrorism.

Issue

Whether or not failure of election shall be declared.

Ruling 

The court held that there was actually failure of election. The re-scheduling of the special elections from May 27 to May 29, was done in uncommon haste and

 

unreasonably too close for all voters to be notified of the changes, not only as to thedate but as to the designated polling place. We must agree with the dissentingopinion that even in highly urbanized areas, the dissemination of notices poses to bea problem. In the absence of proof that actual notice of the special elections hasreached a great number of voters, we are constrained to consider the May 29elections as invalid. If only to ascertain the will of the people and to prevent that willfrom being muted, it is necessary that a special election be held in view of the failureof elections in Madalum, Lanao del Sur. the Court has ruled that the preconditions fordeclaring a failure of election are: (1) that no voting has been held in any precinct orprecincts because of force majeure, violence or terrorism, and (2) that the votes notcast therein suffice to affect the results of the elections. The concurrence of these two(2) circumstances are required to justify the calling of a special election. However,due to the insufficiency of the information the court was constrained to ascertain thevotes to be counted thereof.

CASE NO.2. RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA and SEVERINO LAJARA were candidates for mayor in Calamba, Laguna, during the 8 May 1995 elections. After obtaining a majority of some 24,000 votes Lajara was proclaimed winner by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. On 15 May 1995 Canicosa filed with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a Petition to Declare Failure of Election and to Declare Null and Void the Canvass and Proclamation because of alleged widespread frauds and anomalies in casting and counting of votes, preparation of election returns, violence, threats, intimidation, vote buying, unregistered voters voting, and delay in the delivery of election documents and paraphernalia from the precincts to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. Canicosa particularly averred that: (a) the names of the registered voters did not appear in the list of voters in their precincts; (b) more than one-half of the legitimate registered voters were not able to vote with strangers voting in their stead; (c) he was credited with less votes than he actually received; (d) control data of the election returns was not filed up in some precincts; (e) ballot boxes brought to the Office of the Municipal Treasurer were unsecured, i.e., without padlocks nor self-locking metal seals; and, (f) there was delay in the delivery of election returns. But the COMELEC en banc dismissed the petition on the ground that the allegations therein did not justify a declaration of failure of election. (Ref. RICARDO "BOY" CANICOSA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL. G.R. No. 120318 December 5, 1997).

QUESTION: 1. Based on the allegations of Canicosa, would you agree that there was a failure of elections? Why? Discuss the propriety of the grounds alleged by him.

Borja vs COMELEC [295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, September 3, 1998]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, Succession – Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for

a term ending June 30, 1992.  On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the

death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja.  For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was

again re-elected as Mayor.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative

to the May 11, 1998 elections.  Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor,

sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory  that the latter would have already served as mayor for three

consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private

respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for

reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision.

Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?

Held: No.  Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that  “…the term of office of elective local

officials… …shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. 

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the

continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that  “…

no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.  

Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the

continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected….”

The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.”  The purpose of

this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may

serve.  Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing

the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term

not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right

to serve in the same elective position.  Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three

consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the

same number of times before the disqualification can apply

Borja, Jr. v. Comelec

Action:

Determination of the scope of constitutional provision barring elective officials, with the

exception of barangay officials, from serving more than three consecutive terms.

Facts:

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18,

1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by

operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two

succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of

Pateros relative to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was

also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter

would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and

would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and

declared private respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of

Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision.

Issue:

1. w/n Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor

2. w/n Capco can run again for Mayor in the next election

Held:

1. No. Capco was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found

himself thrust into it by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he

only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of the deceased mayor. A textual

analysis supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, Sec. 8 contemplates service by

local officials for three consecutive full terms as a result of election. It is not enough that an

individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local officials, he must also

have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the

disqualification can apply.

2. Yes. Although he has already first served as mayor by succession, he has not actually

served three full terms in all for the purpose of applying the three-term limit. The three-

term limit shall apply when these 2 conditions concur: (1) the local official concerned has

been elected three consecutive times; and (2) he has fully served three consecutive terms.

Benito v. COMELEC G.R. No. 134913 (Jan 19, 2001)FACTS: Benito and private respondent Pagayawan were 2 of 8 candidates vying for the position ofmunicipal mayor in Calanogas, Lanao del Sur during the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 precinctsclustered in the Sultan Disimban Elementary School were met with violence when some 30 armedmen appeared at the school premises and fired shots into the air. This sowed panic among thevoters and elections officials, causing them to scatter in different directions. It happened beforenoon at the day of election. A spot report reported the incident.Both parties are contending contrary facts. Petitioner alleged that the voting never resumed evenafter the lawless elements left. On the other hand, private respondent alleged that voting

resumedwhen the armed men left around 1 pm in the afternoon. Petitioner is only asking, however, adeclaration of failure of elections on the first three precincts, not with the entire five precincts. Duringthe counting, the ballots from the three precincts were excluded. Nevertheless, the winner was theprivate respondent. And even if the votes from the three excluded precincts were added, privaterespondent still emerged as the winnerPetitioner then filed a petition to declare failure of election and to call a special election. COMELEChowever denied the petition and affirmed the proclamation.HELD: Petition Dismissed.1. Two preconditions must exist before a failure of election may be declared: (1) no voting hasbeen held in any precinct due to force majeure, violence or terrorism; and (2) the votes not casttherein are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of such failure may arise beforeor after the casting of votes or on the day of the election.2. Whether there was a resumption of voting is essentially a question of fact. Such are not proper subjects of inquiry in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.3. Voting in all five precincts resumed after peace and order was re-established in the DisimbanElementary School. There was no objection raised to the count of votes in the said two precinctsduring the counting of votes at the counting center. So why a selective objection to the threeprecincts herein?4. Petitioner equates failure of elections to the low percentage of votes cast vis-à-vis the number of registered voters in the subject election precincts. However, there can be a failure of election in apolitical unit only if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be ascertained. But if it canbe determined, it must be accorded respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws whichrequires that a majority of registered voters must cast their votes. All the law requires is that a winningcandidate must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the actual number of ballotscast.5. The power to throw out or annul an election should be exercised with the utmost care andonly under circumstances which demonstrate beyond doubt either that the disregard of the lawhad been so fundamental or so persistent and continuous that it is impossible to distinguish whatvotes are lawful and what are unlawful, or to arrive at any certain result whatsoever, or that thegreat body of voters have been prevented by violence, intimidation and threats from exercisingtheir franchise.6. SAMBARANI V COMELEC, 438 SCRA 319G.R. No. 160427, September 15, 2004Carpio, J.:Facts: A Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections were held on July 15, 2002 in Lanao del Sur.Sambarani, Miraato, Abubacar, Mascara and Dayondong ran for re-election as punong barangay in their respectivebarangay, namely: Occidental Linuk, Pindolonan Moriatao Sarip, Talub, New Lumbacaingudand Tatayawan South. The COMELEC subsequently issued Resolution No. 5479 which sets the date for specialelections on August 13, 2002, due to failure of elections in eleven barangays including the five barangaysmentioned. On August 14, 2002, Acting Election Officer Esmael Maulay issued a certification that there were nospecial elections held on August 13,2002. The petitioners filed a joint petition for holding of another special election. They also contend that the failure of election was due to the failure of Maulay to followthe directive of Commissioner Sadain to use theARMM’s 2001 computerized voter’s list and voter’s registration records. Since Maulay failed to file a written explanation, the COMELEC moved for the resolution of the case. It directed the DILG to appoint Barangay Captains and Barangay Kagawads in the fivebarangays mentioned in pursuance to RA 7160. The petitioners filed an instant petition to hold another specialelection which the COMELEC subsequently denied on the ground that the 30-day period already lapsed.Issue: 1. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in its decision in denying the petition to hold another special election.2. Whether the DILG can appoint barangay and SK officials as directed by the COMELEC.Held: 1. Yes. The COMELEC’s decision denying thepetition for another special election is void. Section 6 of theOmnibus Election Code which is the basis of theCOMELEC’s denial of the petition is merely directive and not mandatory. Section 45 also provides that in case of postponement or failure of election the COMELEC shall set theelections within thirty days from the cessation of the

causes for postponement. The elections may be held anytimewithin the thirty day period from the time the cause of the postponement ceased.2. No. The DILG cannot appoint barangay and SK officials due to Section 5 of the RA 9164 which provides for ahold over period where an incumbent officer may remain in office until their successors have already been electedand qualified. Therefore, the petitioners can assume office in a hold-over capacity pending the assumption of asuccessor into office.

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR RALPH G.RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASANFACTS:Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of 2001 were conductedby the COMELEC. Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a special and a regular election must bedistinguished in the documentation as well as in the canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators wereproclaimed from the said election with the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, whovacated a seat in the senate. Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, thedeclaration of the 13thelected senator.Issue: 1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.2Whether or not the petition was moot.3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year TermSenatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were questioning was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was elected and not to determine Honasan’s right in theexercise of his office as Senator proper under a quo warranto.On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is capable of repetitionyet evading review.On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and exercised our discretion togive due course to voters’ suits involving the right of suffrage, considering that the issue raised in this petition islikely to arise againOn the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.The Court held that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election as required under RA6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election. Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that incase of vacancy in the Senate, the special election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular election.The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and COMELEC’sfailure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special election, much less invalidate it.Further, there was No Proof that COMELEC’s Failure to Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed since there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless therehad been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.

The Constitutional Convention of 1971 scheduled an advance plebiscite concerning only the proposal to

lower the voting age from 21 to 18. This was even before the rest of the draft of the Constitution (then

under revision) had been approved. Arturo Tolentino then filed a motion to prohibit such plebiscite.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition will prosper.

HELD: Yes. If the advance plebiscite will be allowed, there will be an improper submission to the people.

Such is not allowed.

The proposed amendments shall be approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election at which the

amendments are submitted to the people for ratification. Election here is singular which meant that the

entire constitution must be submitted for ratification at one plebiscite only. Furthermore, the people were

not given a proper “frame of reference” in arriving at their decision because they had at the time no idea

yet of what the rest of the revised Constitution would ultimately be and therefore would be unable to

assess the proposed amendment in the light of the entire document. This is the “Doctrine of Submission”

which means that all the proposed amendments to the Constitution shall be presented to the people for

the ratification or rejection at the same time, NOT piecemeal.

TOLENTINO v. COMELECGR 1488334 (01/21/04)Facts: Pres. GMA, after her succession to the presidency in 2001, nominated Senator Guingona as Vice-President, thus, leaving a vacancy in the Senate. The Senate passed Res. 84 calling on COMELEC to fillthe said vacancy through a special election to be held SIMULTANEOUSLY with the regular electionson May the same year. 12 senators each with a 6-yr term were to be elected. Res. 84 provided that the candidate with the 13thhighest number of votes shall serve for the unexpired term of former Sen.Guingona (3 years). Gregorio Honasan ranked 13thin the polls. COMELEC issued Res. 01-005 provisionally proclaimingthe 12 senators (with 6-yr terms) and the 13thsenator (for the unexpired term). Petitioners (Tolentino and Mojica) filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC, enjoining themfrom the final proclamation the 13thsenator, and prayed for the nullification of Res. 01-005.Issues:1. Procedural: WON petition is actually for quo warrantoito be decided by the SenateElectoral tribunal (and not the SC)2. On the merits: WON the special election was held validly:a. WON Comelec’s failure to give notice as to the time of the special election negate thecalling of said electionb. WON Comelec’s failure to give notice of office to be filled and the manner of 

determining the winner misled votersc. WON separate canvassing and documentation for the special election was requiredHeld:1. No. The petitioner does not seek to determine Honasan’sright in the exercise of his office in theSenate. What the petitioners allege is COMELEC’s failure to comply with certain requirementspertaining to the conduct of the special election. Hence, the court has jurisdiction.2. Yes. Special election was held validly. Hence, petition has no merit.a. No. Sec. 2 of RA 6645 (which was passed to implement art 6, sec. 9 of the constitution),EXPRESSLY PROVIDES that in case of a vacancy in the Senate, the special election shall be heldsimultaneously with the next succeeding regular election. In a special election, the rule is that if a statute expressly provides that an election to fill the vacancy shall be held at the next regularelection, the statute FIXES the date, hence, the election is NOT INVALIDATED by the fact that thebody charged by law with the duty (in this case, COMELEC) failed to do so. (as opposed to if thelaw does not fix the time and place but empowers some authority to fix those, the statutoryprovision on the giving of notice is considered mandatory and failure to do so will make electionvoid)The law then charges the voters with knowledge of the statutory notice and COMELEC’sfailure to give additional notice does not negate the election.b. No. The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to givenotice is whether the lack of notice resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters. Thepetitioners were not able to prove that COMELEC’s failure to give the notice misled a sufficient number of voters as would change the result of the vote.c. No. No such requirements exist. What is mandatory under RA 6645 is for COMELEC to fix thedate if necessary and state the office/s to be voted for. The method adopted by COMELEC merelyimplemented RA No.84 that “the senatorial candidate garnering the 13thhighest number of votesshall serve only for the unexpired term of former Sen. Guingona” (an amendment introduced bySen. Roco)“WHEREFORE, we DIMISS the petition for lack of merit. So ordered.”(Note however, that SC reminded COMELEC to comply strictly with all the requirements under applicable laws relative to the conduct of elections)iA quo warranto proceeding is one that determines the right of a public officer in the exercise of his office

Marquez vs COMELEC GR 112889 (April 18,   1995) Posted on October 3, 2012

GR No. 112889

243 SCRA 538

April 18, 1995

FACTS:

Bienvenido Marquez, a defeated candidate in the Province of Quezon filed a petition for

certiorari praying for the reversal of the COMELEC Resolution which dismissed his petition

for quo warranto against Eduardo Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice.

It is averred that at the time private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy, a criminal

charge against him for ten (10) counts of insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property

was still pending before the Municipal Court of Los Angeles Judicial District, County of Los

Angeles, State of California, U.S.A. A warrant issued by said court for his arrest, it is claimed,

has yet to be served on private respondent on account of his alleged “flight” from that

country.

Petitioner’s subsequent recourse (in G.R. No. 105310) from the COMELEC’s May 8, 1992

resolution was dismissed without prejudice, however, to the filing in due time of a possible

post-election quo warranto proceeding against private respondent.

Before the 11th May 1992 elections, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC for

cancellation of respondent’s CoC on account of the candidate’s disqualification under Sec.

40 (e) of the LGC.

Private respondent was proclaimed Governor-elect of Quezon on 29 May 1992. Forthwith,

petitioner instituted quo warranto proceedings (EPC 92-28) against private respondent

before the COMELEC.

ISSUE:

Whether private respondent who, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy (and

to date), is said to be facing a criminal charge before a foreign court and evading a warrant

for his arrest comes within the term “fugitive from justice” contemplated by Section 40(e) of

the LGC and is, therefore, disqualified from being a candidate for, and thereby ineligible

from holding on to, an elective local office.

HELD:

Section 40(e) of the LGC (RA 7160) provide that a “Fugitive from justice in criminal cases

here and abroad” are “disqualified from running for any elective local position”.

It has been held that construction placed upon law by the officials in charge of its

enforcement deserves great and considerable weight (Atlas Consolidated Mining and

Development Corp. vs. CA, 182 SCRA 166,181). However, when there clearly is no obscurity

and ambiguity in an enabling law, it must merely be made to apply as it is so written. An

administrative rule or regulation can neither expand nor constrict the law but must remain

congruent to it.

The confinement of the term “fugitive from justice” in Article 73 of the Rules and

Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 to refer only to a person “who has been

convicted by final judgment” is an inordinate and undue circumscription of the law.

Unfortunately, the COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not private

respondent is in fact a “fugitive from justice” as such term must be interpreted and applied

in the light of the Court’s opinion. The omission is understandable since the COMELEC

outrightly dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the basis instead of Rule 73 of the

Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Oversight Committee. The Court, not being a trier

of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the COMELEC for a determination of this

unresolved factual matter.

MARQUEZ versus COMELEC (243 SCRA 538)

Facts:Marquez, a candidate for an elective position in Quezon Province during the 1998 elections,

filed a petition praying for the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Rodriguez on the

ground of disqualification under section 40 of the Local Government Code (Section 40.

Disqualification. The following persons are disqualified from running for any local elective

position… (e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad.) Rodriguez

is allegedly criminally charged with insurance fraud or grand theft of personal property in

the United States and that his arrest is yet to be served because of his flight from the country.

The COMELEC dismissed Marquez’s Petition. Rodriguez was proclaimed the Governor-elect of

Quezon.

Issue:Whether or not private respondent, who at the time of the filing of his COC is said to be facing

criminal charges before a foreign court and evading a warrant of arrest comes within the term

“fugitive from justice”.

Held:NO. Although it is provided in Article 73 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local

Government Code of 1991 that for a person to be considered a fugitive from justice, he or she

has to be convicted by final judgment, but such definition is an ordinate and under

circumscription of the law. For the term fugitive from justice includes not only those who after

conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid

prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence, and it may be conceded as

expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term.

EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ vs. COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996Facts: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for brevity) wereprotagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for quo warranto before the COMELEC, alleging that the latter has a pending casein LA, hence, a fugitive from justice and thus disqualified for the elective position. 

Marquez Decision: "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise thosewho, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be soconceded as expressing the general and ordinary connotation of the term In previous case, Whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice" under the definition thus given was not passed upon by theCourt. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with the directive to proceed therewith withdispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision. Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged Rodriguez'candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation that Rodriguez is a "fugitivefrom justice." The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of "fugitive from justice", found Rodriguez to be one. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerge as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election for the position of governor. Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez' proclamation which the COMELEC grantedIssue: Whether petitioner is disqualified to the elective positionHeld: No The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one's flight from a particular jurisdiction.And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of analready instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of conviction.o There is no dispute that his arrival in the Philippines from the US, as per certifications issued by the Bureau of Immigrations, preceded the filing of the felony complaint in the Los Angeles Court To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a "fugitive from justice") areinvolved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal (the Marquez' quo warrantopetition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal although the COMELEC resolved the latter jointly (Marquez'petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in theMARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And we specifically refer to the concept of "fugitive from justice" as defined inthe main opinion in the MARQUEZ Decision which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and theCOMELEC, with their proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize. 

To re-define "fugitive from justice" would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink dried in the MARQUEZDecision. To summarize, the term "fugitive from justice" as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person seeking to run for anyelective local petition under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be understood according to the definition given inthe MARQUEZ Decisiono A "fugitive from justice" includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those who,after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. (Emphasis ours.) Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a conviction or atleast, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.o Not being a "fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorialpost RODRIGUEZ vs COMELECG.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996Facts:Eduardo Rodriguez and Bienvenido Marquez were protagonist for the gubernatorialseat in the Province of Quezon. During the 1992 elections, Rodriguez won which wasquestioned by Marquez through aquo warranto petition (EPC 92-28)with theCOMELEC. The protest cited Sec 40 (e) of the LCG as the basis of disqualification.Marquez revealed that a charge was filed against Rodriguez in the US on 12 Nov 1985for fraudulent insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand theft. The petition wasDISMISSED.Upon appeal to the Supreme Court viacertiorari (Marquez vs Rodriguez GR 112889) the court promulgated on 18 Apr 1995 theMARQUEZ decisioneffectively defining theterm “fugitive from justice”:“i n c l u d e s n o t o n l y t h o s e w h o fl e e   a f t e r c o n v i c t i o n t o   a v o i d p u n i s h m e n t b u t l i k e w i s e t h o s e w h o a f t e r b e i n g c h a r g e d , fl e e t o a v o i d   prosecution”.It REMAMDED the case to the COMELEC for its factual determinationWON Rodriguez was in fact a fugitive of justice. Motion for Reconsideration filed byRodriguez and subsequently an Urgent Motion to Admit Additional Argument in supportof such motion was filed to which was attached a certification from the Commission onImmigration showing that Rodriguez left the US on 25 Jun 1985 (prior the chargeagainst him was ever filed).Pending the decision of the Supreme Court on the Motion for Reconsideration, duringthe 1995 elections wherein Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the sameposition. Marquez this time challenged Rodroguez’ candidacy via apetition for disqualification (SPA 95-089)on the same grounds as EPC 92-28, this was filed on 11 April 1995.Subsequently the Motion for Reconsideration of Rodriguez regarding GR 112889 wasDISMISSED. Thereby, the COMELEC promulgated a CONSOLIDATED Resolutiondated 7 May 1995 on EPC 92-28 and SPA 95-089, ruling in favor of Marquez OrderedRodriguez to immediately vacate his position and his certificate of candidacy was

setaside. At any rate Rodriguez emerged victorious in the 8 May 1995 elections and he wasproclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as Governor despite the suspensionfrom the COMELEC in relation to the consolidated resolution promulgated in 7 May1995.This order of suspension of proclamation is the issue of thispetition for certiorari (GR120099)as filed by Rodriquez on 16 May 1995. The decision of the court with regard tothis petition DIRECTED COMELEC to receive and evaluate evidence. After the proper proceeding COMELEC declared Rodriguez NOT a fugitive from justice, theintent toevade is material to the definition of “fugitive from justice” in the Marquez Decision,such intent is ABSENT in Rodriguez’s case evidence has established that Rodriquezarrived in the Philippines long before the criminal charge was instituted in the US. But itfurther stated that it would be more comfortable if the Supreme Court decided on thematter given the conflicting interpretations of the parties as to the definition provided inthe Marquez Decision.Issue:Whether or not, Roodriguez was a “fugitive from justice” as defined in theMarquez Decision, rendering him ineligible to run for office as provided for in Sec 40 (e)of the LGC.Rulings:NO, the element of i n t e n t t o e v a d e  not present in the case of Rodriguez, whichis a compelling factor in the Marquez Decision definition, he cannot be held as a fugitivefrom justice.