G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS,petitioners,vs.COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR.,respondents.

CASE DIGEST (1):The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On the last day of the 15 days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down inHabulayas vs Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied non-publication in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they can be binding.

HELD:There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.

CASE DIGEST (2):De Roy was the owner of a burnt building. The firewall of said building collapsed on the house of Luis Bernal thereby killing his daughter. Bernal sued De Roy. Bernal won in the trial court. Eventually, De Roy appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. De Roy received a copy of the decision on August 25, 1987. Under the Rules, they have 15 days to file a motion for reconsideration.

On September 9, 1987, the last day for them to file said MFR, De Roys counsel filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled that pursuant to the case ofHabaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon(August 1985),the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.

De Roy assailed the denial as she alleged that her counsel was ignorant of the rule laid down in the Habaluyas Case; that said rule should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette.

ISSUE:Whether or not De Roys contention is correct.HELD:No. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

MARBELLA-BOBIS VS. BOBISGR. No. 138509 July 31, 2000336 SCRA 747

CASE DIGEST (1):PARTIES:Petitioner: IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBISRespondent: ISAGANI D. BOBIS

FACTS:1. October 21, 1985, first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Not annulled, nullified or terminated2. January 25, 1996, second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis3. Third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez4. February 25, 1998, Imelda Bobis filed bigamy5. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license6. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage7. After petitioner sued for bigamy, its just when the respondent filed a declaration of absolute nullity.

ISSUE:Whether or not the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy

HELD:A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Its two essential elements are:(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed

In Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, cannot be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. In the current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner.

Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question

Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy (Landicho v. Relova)

CASE DIGEST (2):

FACTS:1. In October 1985, private respondent Isagani Bobis contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce Javier.2. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.3. An information for bigamy was filed4. Sometime, thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license.5. Respondent then filed a Motion to Suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case.6. The trial court granted the motion to suspend the criminal case.7. Petitioner filed a Motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied.8. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for Bigamy?

HELD:A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimate connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the relocation of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed.

Its two elements are: a) the civil action involves an issue similarly or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented its case.

Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage.

As ruled inLANDICHO VS. RELOVA(22 SCRA 731), he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, the SC held the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question (BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE, 334 SCRA 106). This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage.

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Tax Appeals [G.R. No. L-52306. October 12, 1981]

Facts: During the period pertinent to this case, petitioner Corporation was engaged in the business of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business within the Philippines. For which petitioner paid rentals after withholding income tax of 30%of one-half of the film rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the Commissioner issued General Circular V-334. Pursuant thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld and turned over to the BIR 30% of of the film rentals paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines. The last year that the company withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968. On 27 June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising the tax basis from such amount referring to rents, etc. to gross income. In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter of assessment and demand for deficiency withholding income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The company requested for reconsideration; where the Commissioner did not act upon.

Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71, revoking General Circular V-334, may be retroactively applied.

Held: Rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner have no retroactive application where to so apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein, the prejudice the company of the retroactive application of Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made three years after 1968 for a period of time commencing in 1965. The company was no longer in a position to withhold taxes due from foreign corporations because it had already remitted all film rentals and had no longer control over them when the new circular was issued. Insofar as the enumerated exceptions are concerned, the company does not fall under any of them.

LORENZO VS. POSADAS64 PHIL 353

Facts:On 27 May 1922, Thomas Hanley died in Zamboanga, leaving a will and considerable amount of real and personal properties. Hanleys will provides the following: his money will be given to his nephew, Matthew Hanley, as well as the real estate owned by him. It further provided that the property will only be given ten years after Thomas Hanleys death. Thus, in the testamentary proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga appointed P.J.M. Moore as trustee of the estate. Moore took oath of office on March 10, 1924, and resigned on Feb. 29, 1932. Pablo Lorenzo was appointed in his stead. Juan Posadas, Collector of Internal Revenue, assessed inheritance tax against the estate amounting to P2,057.74 which includes penalty and surcharge. He filed a motion in the testamentary proceedings so that Lorenzo will be ordered to pay the amount due. Lorenzo paid the amount in protest after CFI granted Posadas motion. He claimed that the inheritance tax should have been assessed after 10 years. He asked for a refund but Posadas declined to do so. The latter counterclaimed for the additional amount of P1,191.27 which represents interest due on the tax and which was not included in the original assessment. However, CFI dismissed this counterclaim. It also denied Lorenzos claim for refund against Posadas. Hence, both appealed.

Issue: Whether the estate was delinquent in paying the inheritance tax and therefore liable for the P1,191.27 that Posadas is asking for?Held:Yes. It was delinquent because according to Sec. 1544 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, payment of the inheritance tax shall be made before delivering to each beneficiary his share. This payment should have been made before March 10, 1924, the date when P.J.M. Moore formally assumed the function of trustee.

Although the property was only to be given after 10 years from the death of Hanley, the court considered that delivery to the trustee is delivery tocestui que trust, the beneficiary within the meaning of Sec. 1544 (b).

Even though there was no express mention of the word trust in the will, the court of first instance was correct in appointing a trustee because no particular or technical words are required to create a testamentary trust (69 C.J.,p. 711). The requisites of a valid testamentary trust are: 1) sufficient words to raise a trust, 2) a definite subject, 3) a certain or ascertained object. There is no doubt that Hanley intended to create a trust since he ordered in his will that certain of his properties be kept together undisposed during a fixed period or for a stated purpose.

EMETERIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY May 30, 1961 G.R. No. L-15127Emeterio Cui vs. Arellano UniversityG.R. No. 15172May 30, 1961

FACTS: Before the school year 1948-1949 Emeterio Cui took up preparatory law course in the Arellano University. After Finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of mother of plaintiff, was the dean of college of law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano, having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he has studying law in Defendant University was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the end of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by the plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1, 003.87. After Graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed the transcript of his records in defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The defendant refused until after he paid back the P1, 003.87 which defendant refunded him. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest.

ISSUE: Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship in cash, is valid or not.

HELD: Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools provides that When students are given full or partial scholarship, it is understood that such scholarship are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarship should not be subsequently charged to recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarship should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.

Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. The defendant uses the scholarship as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. The practice of awarding scholarship to attract students and keep them in school is not Good custom nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institution as in Arellano University.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1, 033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing the defendants counterclaim. It is so ordered.

LICHAUCO & COMPANY., PETITIONER, VS. SILVERIO APOSTOL, AS DIRECTOR OF AGRICULTURE, AND RAFAEL CORPUS, AS SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, RESPONDENTS

FACTS: Lichauco & Co. petitioned for the writs of mandamus and injunction against Silverio Apostol and Rafael Corpus allegedly refusing Lichauco & Co to import from Pnom-Pehn, in French Indo-China, a shipment of draft cattle and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum except upon the condition, stated in AO No. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture contending that said cattle shall have been immunized from the rinderpest before embarkation at Pnom-Pehn.

The petitioner asserted that under the first provision to section 1762 of the Administrative Code (amended by Act no. 3052), the petitioner has an absolute and unrestricted right to import Carabao and other draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum from Pnom-Pehn, Indo-China, into the Philippine Islands and that the respondents have no authority to impose upon the petitioner previous said restrictions.

Respondents relied upon section 1770 of the Administrative Code and AO no. 21 of the Bureau of Agriculture in relation with Dept. Order No. 6.

ISSUE: Whether section 1770 has been repealed by implication, in so far as it relates to draft animals and bovine cattle for the manufacture of serum?

HELD: Section 1762 is for the general rule, while section 1770 is for particular contingency and not inconsistent with Section 1762.

Petition does not show sufficient ground for granting the writs of mandamus and injunction.

DISPOSITION: We are of the opinion that the contention of the petitioner is untenable, for the reason that section 1762, as amended, is obviously of a general nature, while section 1770 deals with a particular contingency not made the subject of legislation in section 1762. Section 1770 is therefore not to be considered as inconsistent with section 1762, as amended; on the other hand, it must be treated as a special qualification of section 1762. Of course the two provisions are different, in the sense that if section 1762, as amended, is considered alone, the cattle which the petitioner wishes to bring in can be imported without restriction, while if section 1770 is still in force the cattle, under the conditions stated in the petition, can be brought in only upon compliance with the requirements of Administrative Order No. 21. But this difference between the practical effect of the two provisions does not make then inconsistent in the sense that the earlier provision (sec. 1770) should be deemed repealed by the amendatory Act (3052).

That section 1770 is special, in the sense of dealing with a special contingency not dealt with in section 1762, is readily apparent upon comparing the two provisions. Thus, we find that while section 1762 relates generally to the subject of the bringing of animals into the Island at any time and from any place, section 1770 confers on the Department Head a special power to deal with the situation which arises when a dangerous communicable disease prevails in some defined foreign country, and the provision is intended to operate only so long as that situation continues. Section 1770 is the backbone of the power to enforce animal quarantine in these Islands in the special emergency therein contemplated; and if that section should be obliterated, the administrative authorities here would be powerless to protect the agricultural industry of the Islands from the spread of animal infection originating abroad.

PHIL. ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. VS. TORRES, 212 SCRA 298; G.R. NO. 101279, AUGUST 6,1992Facts: DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the protection for the same.The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers. Pursuant to the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing guidelines on the government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the accreditation of HK recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No. 30, pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for HK.Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.Issue: WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and POEA through an administrative order and circular is valid.

Held: Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. The challenge administrative issuance discloses that the same fall within the administrative and police powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon the respondents.

FLORESCA VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATIONG.R. NO. L-30642 (APRIL 30, 1985)FLORESCA VS. PHILEX MINING CORPORATIONFACTS:Several miners, who, while working at its copper mines underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees working underground. Philex invoked that they can no longer be sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.

ISSUE:Whether or not the heirs of the deceasedhave a right of selection between availing themselves of the workers rightunder the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence orfault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions.

RULING:The court held that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based onignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. Thecase should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However, shouldthe petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made under theWorkmens Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may be decreed in theirfavor.

Martinez v Van Buskirk DigestFacts:

1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding acarromatain Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon owned by the defendant (used for the transportation of fodder and to which two horses are attached), came from the opposite direction, while theircarromata went close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely passing by, the horses ran into thecarromataoccupied by the plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut upon the plaintiffs head.

3. The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and for that purpose the defendants employee tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses since he was thrown upon the ground.

4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such decision.

Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is liable for the negligence of such driver.

NO. Thecocheroof the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not been destructive and which are approved by the society are considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as unreasonable or imprudent.

The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero negligent because of such circumstances.

The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants during that time to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles; and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.