case civ pro

7/28/2019 Case CIV PRo

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[G.R. No. 153951. July 29, 2005]

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, peti tioner, vs. SANAO MARKETING CORPORATION, SPOUSES

AMADO A. SANAO and SOLEDAD F. SANAO and SPOUSES WILLIAM (Willy) F. SANAO and HELEN

SANAO and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.TINGA, J.:

Before the Court is aPetition for Review[1]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, wherein petitioner PhilippineNational Bank (PNB) seeks the review of theDecision[2]rendered by the Court of Appeals Thirteenth Division inC.A. G.R. SP No. 63162. The assailed Decision nullified two orders[3]of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili,Camarines Sur, Branch 32, which respectively granted PNBs petition for issuance of a writ of possession over

seven (7) parcels of land and directed the execution pending appeal of such writ of possession.

The antecedents are as follows:

In July 1997, Sanao Marketing Corporation, the spouses Amado A. Sanao and Soledad F. Sanao and thespouses William (Willy) F. Sanao and Helen Sanao (all respondents herein), as joint and solidary debtors, obtained aloan in the amount of One Hundred Fifty Million Pesos (P150,000,000.00) from PNB secured by a real estatemortgage of several parcels of land situated in the municipalities of Pili, Tigaon and Camaligan, all of Camarines

Sur, and Naga City.[4]The contract expressly provided that the mortgage shall be governed by the provisions of ActNo. 3135, as amended.[5]The pertinent portions of said contract provide that:

. . . .

F. FORECLOSURE, POWER OF ATTORNEY, RECEIVERSHIP

If at any time the Mortgagors fail or refuse to pay the obligation herein secured, or any of the amortization of suchindebtedness when due, or to comply with any of the conditions and stipulations herein agreed, or shall during thetime this mortgage is in force, institute insolvency proceedings or be involuntarily declared insolvent, or shall usethe proceeds of this loan for purposes other than those specified herein, or if the mortgage cannot be recorded in orthe Mortgagors fail to register the same with the corresponding Registry of Deeds, then all the obligations of the

Mortgagors secured by this mortgage and all the amortization thereof shall immediately become due, payable anddefaulted and the Mortgagee may immediately foreclose this mortgage judicially in accordance with the Rules ofCourt, or extrajudicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended, and P.D. 385. For the purpose ofextrajudicial foreclosure, the Mortgagors hereby appoint the Mortgagee their Attorney-in-Fact to sell the propertiesmortgaged under Act No. 3135, as amended, to sign all documents and perform any act requisite and necessary toaccomplish said purpose and to appoint its substitute as Attorney-in-Fact with the same powers as above specified.In case of judicial foreclosure, the Mortgagors hereby consent to the appointment of the Mortgagee or of any of itsemployees as receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the mortgaged properties at once, and to hold possessionof the same and the rents, benefits and profits derived from the mortgaged properties before the sale, less costs andexpenses of the receivership. . . . [6]

For failure of respondents to fully pay the loan upon its maturity, PNB caused the extrajudicial foreclosure ofthe mortgage through a certain Atty. Marvel C. Clavecilla (Atty. Clavecilla), a notary public for and in the City ofNaga. The Notice of Extra-Judicial Foreclosure Sale announced that the sale of 13 titles consisting of 14 parcels of

land located in Camarines Sur and Naga City is scheduled on 22 March 1999 at nine oclock in the morning or soonthereafter, at the entrance of the Municipal Court of Pili, Camarines Sur. This notice was published in the 7, 14 and21 February 1999 issues of the Vox Bikol- a weekly tabloid published every Sunday and circulated in the Bicolregion and continents with Bicol communities.[7]

Thereafter, Atty. Clavecilla executed aProvisional Certificate of Sale[8]dated 26 April 1999 certifying that onthe 22ndday of March 1999, at exactly ten oclock in the morning, he sold at a public auction at the lobby/mainentrance of the Regional Trial Court, Hall of Justice, Naga City the mortgaged properties to PNB for Two Hundred

Thirteen Million One Hundred Sixty-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty- Seven and Fifty Centavos(P213,162,787.50), which amount the latter considered as paymentpro tanto of petitioners loan.[9]ThisProvisionalCertificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur on 3 May 1999 and with the Registryof Deeds of Naga City on 16 June 1999 for the properties respectively covered by their registries.[10]

On 26 April 2000, respondents Amado A. Sanao and Sanao Marketing Corporation filed a complain t[11]with

the RTC of Naga City, Branch 61, against PNB, the Register of Deeds of the City of Naga and the Province ofCamarines Sur, and Atty. Clavecilla, for the court to declare the Provisional Certificate of Sale and the auction andforeclosure proceedingsnull and void.[12]

On 11 August 2000, PNB filed with the RTC of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32, a petition for the issuance of awrit of possession, docketed therein as Spec. Proc. P-1182, over the properties located in Pili that are covered byTransfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21448, 24221, 14133, 15218, 15489, 13856, 15216.[13]

To the petition, respondents Amado A. Sanao and Sanao Marketing Corporation interposed an answer inopposition, with special and affirmative defenses.[14]
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PNB countered with its comments/reply to opposition.[15]

On 24 November 2000, the RTC of Pili issued its first assailed order,[16]granting the writ of possession prayedfor by PNB.

Amado A. Sanao and Sanao Marketing Corporation filed aMotion for Reconsideration w/ Opposition to theMotion for Execution Pending Appeal,[17]which was denied per the second assailed order[18]dated 24 January 2001

of the RTC of Pili.[19]

Respondents then filed aPetition[20]for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before

the Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC of Pili in the issuance of the twoassailed orders. ThePetition likewise prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order which the Court ofAppeals granted on 15 February 2001, enjoining the RTC of Pili and PNB from implementing the challenged orders.

In theirMemorandum,[21]respondents pointed out that the PNB had allegedly failed to submit the applicationfor extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage to the proper clerk of court after payment of the filing fee, in contraventionof Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3 and Administrative Circular No. 3-98. In addition, respondentsaverred that the foreclosure sale was null and void as it was done at the lobby/main entrance of the RTC Hall ofJustice, Naga City and not at the entrance of the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur as published.[22]

PNB, on the other hand, posited that the invoked administrative order is not applicable as extrajudicialproceedings conducted by a notary public, as in the case at bar, do not fall within the contemplation of the

directive.[23]

With regard to the variance of the venues of the auction sale as published in Vox Bikoland as recorded intheProvisional Certificate of Sale, PNB asserted that there was no violation of Act No. 3135 [24]or of the terms ofthe real estate mortgage contract,[25]as the sale of the mortgaged properties located in Camarines Sur were held inNaga City which is well within the territorial jurisdiction of said province.[26]

The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of herein respondents.[27]The Court of Appeals rendered a litany of lapsesthat the notary public committed in the conduct of the foreclosure proceedings which in its estimation hadeffectively undermined the soundness of the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held thattheProvisional Certificate of Sale, upon which the issuance of the writ of possession was based, is fatally infirm,and that consequently, the writ of possession was not validly issued as the procedural requirements for its issuancewere not satisfied.[28]

Thus, the Court of Appeals declared null and void the two assailed orders of the RTC of Pili for having beenissued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[29]

Aggrieved by theDecision, PNB filed the instant petition, arguing in the main that in nullifying the orders ofthe RTC of Pili, the Court of Appeals departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as theissuance of writs of possession is purely ministerial on the part of the trial court.[30]

In their comment,[31]respondents point out that the instant petition should not be given due course as it is notsufficient in form and substance. Respondents proffered the following grounds, thus: (1) there was no special ofattorney or Board Resolution or Secretarys Certificate attached to the petition which could serve as basis for the

petitioners signatory Domitila A. Amon to verify or attest to the truth of the allegations contained therein, inviolation of existing laws and jurisprudence on the matter; (2) petitioners failed to move for a reconsideration of theassailedDecision of the Court of Appeals; (3) petitioners failed to disclose another similar case involving the samelegal issues now pending in the Twelfth Division of the Court of Appeals, docketed as C.A. G.R. CV No. 73718,

which is an appeal from an original petition for issuance of writ of possession filed by the same petitioner before theRTC of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58; (4) petitioner failed to furnish the Twelfth Division of the Court ofAppeals a copy of the petition in C.A. G.R. No. 73718 pending therein, in violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure, which failure could lead to conflicting resolutions, between two divisions of the Court ofAppeals and to the giving of inadequate information to the Supreme Court; and (5) the petition was onlyaccompanied by Annexes A, B, C, D and E, which annexes do not satisfy the requirements laid down in Sections 4and 5 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.[32]

Respondents also reiterate that the PNB in the conduct of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings did notcomply with Administrative Order No. 3 and Administrative Circular No. 3-98, and that the notice of publicationwas not sufficient to justify the execution of theProvisional Certificate of Sale.[33]

Traversing the alleged procedural errors, PNB in its Reply[34]raise the following arguments:

First, Mrs. Domitila A. Amon had authority to sign and verify its petition under Board Resolution No. 15 dated8 October 1997,[35]in line with her authority to prosecute and defend cases for and/or against the bank.[36]

Second, there are exceptions to the general rule that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed beforeelevating a case to a higher court. PNB insists that the Decision of the Court of Appeals is a patent nullity as it runscounter to the provisions of Act No. 3135 and existing jurisprudence stating that Administrative Order No. 3 coversjudicial foreclosures.[37]As such, the filing of a motion for reconsideration prior to elevating the case on certiorarimay be dispensed with.
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Lastly, the case which according to respondents is not mentioned in the certification of non-forum shoppingwas commenced by respondents themselves, not PNB, and that the issues similar to those in the instant case have yetto be raised in respondents appeal to the Court of Appeals . Moreover, the subject matter and the properties involvedin the other case are altogether different.[38]

There is merit in the petition.

A writ of possession is a writ of execution employed to enforce a judgment to recover the possession of land.It commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of it to the person entitled under the judgment.[39]

A writ of possession may be issued under the following instances:[40](1)in land registration proceedings underSection 17 of Act 496;[41](2) in a judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realtyand no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervened; (3) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of a realestate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118;[42]and (4) in execution sales (lastparagraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court).[43]

The present case falls under the third instance. Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118,a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2)after the lapse of the redemption period, without need of a bond .[44]Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by ActNo. 4118, provides:

SECTION 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of FirstInstance of the province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereofduring the redemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period oftwelve months, to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without violating the mortgage orwithout complying with the requirements of this Act. Such petition shall be made under oath and filed in form ofan ex parte motion in the registration or cadastral proceedings if the property is registered, or in special proceedingsin case of property registered under the Mortgage Law or under section one hundred and ninety-four of theAdministrative Code, or of any other real property encumbered with a mortgage duly registered in the office of anyregister of deeds in accordance with any existing law, and in each case the clerk of court shall, upon the filing ofsuch petition, collect the fees specified in paragraph eleven of section one hundred and fourteen of Act NumberedFour hundred and ninety-six, and the court shall, upon approval of the bond, order that a writ of possession issue,addressed to the sheriff of the province in which the property is situated, who shall execute said order immediately.

Under the above-quoted provision, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale may apply for a writ of possession

during the redemption period by filing an ex parte motion under oath for that purpose in the correspondingregistration or cadastral proceeding in the case of property covered by a Torrens title. Upon the filing of such motionand the approval of the corresponding bond, the law also in express terms directs the court to issue the order for awrit of possession.[45]

A writ of possession may also be issued after consolidation of ownership of the property in the name of thepurchaser. It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property purchased if itis not redeemed during the period of one year after the registration of sale. As such, he is entitled to the possessionof the property and can demand it any time following the consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance ofa new transfer certificate of title. In such a case, the bond required in Section 7 of Act No. 3135 is no longernecessary. Possession of the land then becomes an absolute right of the purchaser as confirmed owner. Upon properapplication and proof of title, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial duty of the court.[46]It washeld, thus:

As the purchaser of the properties in the extra-judicial foreclosure sale, the PNCB is entitled to a writ of possessiontherefore. The law on extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage provides that a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosuresale may take possession of the foreclosed property even before the expiration of the redemption period, provided hefurnishes the necessary bond. Possession of the property may be obtained by filing an ex parte motion with theregional trial court of the province or place where the property is situated. Upon filing of the motion and the requiredbond, it becomes a ministerial duty of the court to order the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of thepurchaser. After the expiration of the one-year period without redemption being effected by the property owner, theright of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes absolute. The basis of this right topossession is the purchasers ownership of the property. Mere filing of an ex parte motion for the issuance of thewrit of possession would suffice, and no bond is required.[47]

Any question regarding the regularity and validity of the sale, as well as the consequent cancellation of thewrit, is to be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act

No. 4118. Such question is not to be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession,since, under the Act, the proceeding is ex parte.[48]

In case it is disputed that there was violation of the mortgage or that the procedural requirements for theforeclosure sale were not followed, Section 8 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, provides, to wit:

SECTION 8. The debtor may, in the proceedings in which possession was requested, but not later than thirty daysafter the purchaser was given possession, petition that the sale be set aside and the writ of possession cancelled,specifying the damages suffered by him, because the mortgage was not violated or the sale was not made in
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accordance with the provisions hereof, and the court shall take cognizance of this petition in accordance with thesummary procedure provided for in section one hundred and twelve of Act Number Four hundred and ninety-six;and if it finds the complaint of the debtor justified, it shall dispose in his favor of all or part of the bond furnished bythe person who obtained possession. Either of the parties may appeal from the order of the judge in accordance withsection fourteen of Act Numbered Four hundred and ninety-six; but the order of possession shall continue in effectduring the pendency of the appeal.

The law is clear that the purchaser must first be placed in possession. If the trial court later finds merit in thepetition to set aside the writ of possession, it shall dispose the bond furnished by the purchaser in favor of themortgagor. Thereafter, either party may appeal from the order of the judge. The rationale for the mandate is to allowthe purchaser to have possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such possession being founded on hisright of ownership.[49]

It has been consistently held that the duty of the trial court to grant a writ of possession is ministerial. Such writissues as a matter of course upon the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the corresponding bond. Thecourt neither exercises its official discretion nor judgment.[50]The judge issuing the order following these expressprovisions of law cannot be charged with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.[51]Ifonly to stress the writs ministerial character, we have, in previous cases, disallowed injunction to prohibit itsissuance, just as we have held that the issuance of the same may not be stayed by a pending action for annulment ofmortgage or the foreclosure itself.[52]

In the case at bar, PNB has sufficiently established its right to the writ of possession. It presented asdocumentary exhibits the contract of real estate mortgage [53]and theProvisional Certificate of Sale[54]on the face ofwhich appears proof of its registration with the Registry of Deeds in Camarines Sur on 3 May 1999. There is also nodispute that the lands were not redeemed within one year from the registration of the Provisional Certificate ofSale. It should follow, therefore, that PNB has acquired an absolute right, as purchaser, to the writ of possession.The RTC of Pili had the ministerial duty to issue that writ, as it did actually, upon mere motion, conformably toSection 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended.[55]

However on certiorari, the Court of Appeals declared null and void the orders of the RTC of Pili granting thewrit of possession and denying respondents motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals exhaustivelydiscussed the reasons for such a declaration, noting the procedural errors of PNB in the conduct of the foreclosureproceedings which allegedly rendered the foreclosure sale and theProvisional Certificate of Sale of doubtfulvalidity.

The Court of Appeals relied on the case ofCometa v. Intermediate Appellate Court[56]in holding that for awrit of possession to be validly issued . in an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, all the procedural requirementsshould be complied with. Any flaw afflicting its stages could affect the validity of its issuance.[57]The Court ofAppeals reproached the RTC of Pili Sur for granting the writ despite the existence of these alleged procedurallapses.

This was erroneous. The judge to whom an application for writ of possession is filed need not look into thevalidity of the mortgage or the manner of its foreclosure. In the issuance of a writ of possession, no discretion is leftto the trial court. Any question regarding the cancellation of the writ or in respect of the validity and regularity of thepublic sale should be determined in a subsequent proceeding as outlined in Section 8 of Act No. 3135.[58]

In fact, the question of the validity of the foreclosure proceedings can be threshed out in Civil Case No. RTC2000-00074, pending before the RTC of Naga City, Branch 61, which was filed by respondents before PNB hadfiled a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. The Court of Appeals should not have ruled on factual issues

on which the RTC of Naga had yet to make any finding. Besides, a review of such factual matters is not proper in apetition forcertiorari.

Having noted the foregoing, the Court dispenses with the need to discuss the soundness of the foreclosureproceedings, the authenticity of theProvisional Certificate of Sale, and the applicability of Supreme CourtAdministrative Order No. 3 and Administrative Circular No. 3-98. A review of the foregoing matters properly lieswithin the jurisdiction of the RTC of Naga City, Branch 61.

It is worthy of note that the pendency of the case for annulment of the foreclosure proceedings is not a bar tothe issuance of the writ of possession.[59]Pending such proceedings whose subject is the validity of the foreclosureproceedings, the purchaser in a foreclosure sale is entitled to the possession of property. Until such time theforeclosure sale is annulled, the issuance of the writ of possession is ministerial on the part of the RTC of Pili.[60]

In addition, the Court ofAppeals reliance on the case ofCometa[61]is misplaced. The cited case involved the

issuance of a writ of possession following an execution sale. The declaration therein that the issuance of said writ isdependent on the valid execution of the procedural stages preceding it does not contemplate writs of possessionavailable in extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgages under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by ActNo. 4118.

Considering that the RTC of Pili issued the writ of possession in compliance with the provisions of Act No.3135, as amended, it cannot be charged with having acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse ofdiscretion. Absent grave abuse of discretion, respondents should have filed an ordinary appeal instead of a petitionfor certiorari. The soundness of the order granting the writ of possession is a matter of judgment with respect to
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which the remedy is ordinary appeal. An error of judgment committed by a court in the exercise of its legitimatejurisdiction is not the same as grave abuse of discretion. Errors of judgment are correctible by appeal, while those

of jurisdiction are reviewable by certiorari.[62]

Palpably, the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted respondents petition for certiorari and

set aside the orders dated 24 November 2000 and 24 January 2001 of the RTC of Pili in Spec. Proc No. P-1182, andalso when it made a determination as to the validity of the foreclosure proceedings in clear violation of Act No.

3135. The contention, therefore, that the Court should not entertain the instant petition until a motion forreconsideration has been filed may not hold water where the proceeding in which the error occurred is a patentnullity. Thus, we hold that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in the instant case.[63]

Anent the other procedural grounds for the denial of the instant petition, suffice it to say that PNBs rejoinder

has sufficiently refuted respondents assertions. We find and so hold that there was substantial compliance with theprocedural requirements of the Court.

Although belatedly filed, the Resolution of the PNB Board amply demonstrates Mrs. Domitila A. Amons

authority to sign and verify the instant petition. PNB likewise was not obligated to disclose the alluded case pendingbefore the Court of Appeals as it was not initiated by the bank and, more importantly, the subject matter and theproperties involved therein are altogether different.[64]It is well to remember at this point that rules of procedure arebut mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application which would result intechnicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.[65]In proper

cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice .[66]And the power of theCourt to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.[67]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. TheDecision of the Court of Appeals dated 11 June 2002in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 63162 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders dated 24 November 2000 and 24 January2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 in Spec. Pro. No. P-1182 directing the issuanceof a writ of possession in favor of PNB are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
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[G.R. No. 138567. March 04, 2005]

DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. SPOUSES WILFREDO GATAL

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us for resolution is the petition for review on certiorari[1]assailing the Decision[2]dated January 18, 1999 ofthe Court of Appeals and its Resolution[3]dated April 27, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47736, Development Bank ofthe Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Raineldo T. Son, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 47, Regional

Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, and Spouses Wilfredo Gatal and Azucena Gatal, respondents.

Records show that sometime in 1993, spouses Wilfredo and Azucena Gatal, respondents, obtained a loanof P1,500,000.00 from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), petitioner. The loan was secured by a realestate mortgage over a commercial lot at No. 3 J.A. Clarin Street, Tagbilaran City, covered by Transfer Certificateof Title No. T-22697 of the Registry of Deeds, same city. For failure of respondents to pay their loan, petitionerforeclosed the mortgage in December 1994. In January 1996, the title of the lot was consolidated in the name ofpetitioner DBP.On October 29, 1996, the property was offered for sale at public auction, but none of the bidders was able to meetthe bid price ceiling.

On November 18, 1996, petitioner offered the property for negotiated sale on condition that the buyer must pay

20% of the selling price as down payment, the balance payable under the terms of the interested buyer.

Respondents then submitted their bid in the amount of P2,160,000.00 and made a deposit equivalent to 10% ofthe bid price. However, another buyer, Jimmy Torrefranca, offered a bid ofP2,300,000.00, or P140,000.00 higherthan respondents bid. Upon learning of Torrefrancas offer, respondents wrote[4]petitioner requesting that they willmatch his bid. But petitioner rejected respondents request because Torrefranca was already declared the preferredbidder.[5]

Aggrieved, respondents, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City a complaint forinjunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.5996. The action sought to (a) declare the sale of the property to Torrefranca void and uphold respondents right ofpre-emption; and (b) maintain thestatus quo between the parties prior to the filing of the suit.

On February 22, 1997, the RTC issued an Order granting respondents application for a preliminary injunction.

Meantime, on August 27, 1997, petitioner filed with the same RTC, Branch 47, a petition for issuance of awrit of possession, docketed as Civil Case No. 6097. On October 31, 1997, the court issued a writ of possession infavor of petitioner.

On November 12, 1997, respondents filed with Branch 47 a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 6097 and amotion to quash the writ of possession on the ground that there is another case (Civil Case No. 5996 for injunction)pending before Branch 4 involving the same parties, the same subject matter and the same legal issues.

On December 18, 1997, Branch 47 issued an Order dismissing Civil Case No. 6097 and recalling its earlierOrder granting the writ of possession on the ground oflitis pendentia.

Petitioner DBP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by Branch 47 in an Order dated February 10,1998.

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition forcertiorari assailing the Orders dated

December 18, 1997 and February 10, 1998 of Branch 47, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 47736. On January 18,1999, the Appellate Court rendered its Decision dismissing the petition, thus upholding the challenged Orders.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in a Resolution dated April 27, 1999.

Hence, the instant petition.

The fundamental issue for our resolution is whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error inholding that the trial court correctly dismissed Civil Case No. 6097 on the ground oflitis pendentia.

The petition is meritorious.

One of the grounds for dismissing an action is when there is litis pendentia as provided under Section 1(e),Rule 16, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, thus:

SECTION 1.Grounds.Within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting aclaim, a motion to dismiss may be made on any of the following grounds:

x x x

(e) That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause;

x x x.
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Forlitis pendentia to lie as a ground for a motion to dismiss, the following requisites must be present: (1) thatthe parties to the action are the same; (2) that there is substantial identity in the causes of action and reliefs sought;and (3) that the result of the first action is determinative of the second in any event and regardless of which party issuccessful.[6]

It is undisputed that both cases involve the same parties and the same property. Civil Case No. 5996 is anaction forinjunction filed by respondents against petitioner DBP. It seeks to declare the sale of the property to

Torrefranca void and to order petitioner DBP to respect respondents right of pre -emption; and maintain thestatusquo between the parties.

Upon the other hand, Civil Case No. 6097 is a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed bypetitioner DBP, being the purchaser of the lot at the public auction.

Clearly, the rights asserted and the reliefs sought by the parties in both cases are not identical. Thus,respondents claim oflitis pendentia is unavailing.

Section 33, Rule 39 of the same Rules provides:

SECTION 33.Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given.If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaseris entitled to a conveyance and possession of the property; x x x.

Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be substituted to and acquire allthe rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to the property as of the time of the levy. The possessionof the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party isactually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.

Corollarily, Section 7 of Act 3135,[7]as amended by Act 4118, reads:

Sec. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance ofthe province or place where the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him possession thereof during theredemption period, furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period of twelve months,to indemnify the debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without complying with the requirements of thisAct. x x x

In Tan Soo Huat vs. Ongwico,[8]we ruled that once a mortgaged estate is extrajudicially sold, and is notredeemed within the reglementary period, no separate and independent action is necessary to obtain possessionof the property. The purchaser at the public auction has only to file a petition for issuance of a writ of

possession pursuant to Section 33 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

To give effect to the right of possession, the purchaser must invoke the aid of the court and ask for a writ orpossession[9]without need of bringing a separate independent suit for this purpose.[10]

Records show that title to the property has been consolidated to petitioner DBP. Thus, its petition for a writ ofpossession is in order.

Obviously, the RTC (Branch 47) erred when it granted respondents motion to dismiss and recalled the writ of

possession it earlier issued. Where, as here, the title is consolidated in the name of the mortgagee, the writ ofpossession becomes a matter of right on the part of the mortgagee, and it is a ministerial duty on the part of the

trial court to issue the same. The pendency of a separate civil suit questioning the validity of the sale of themortgaged property cannot bar the issuance of the writ of possession. The rule equally applies to separate civil suitsquestioning the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure and the validity of the public auction sale.[11]

There being no litis pendentia, the Court of Appeals likewise erred in applying the doctrine of non-interferencebetween courts of equal rank. Under the said doctrine, a trial court has no authority to interfere with theproceedings of a court of equal jurisdiction.[12]When Branch 47 issued the writ of possession, it did notinterfere with the jurisdiction of Branch 4 in the injunction case. It merely exercised its ministerial function of

issuing the writ of possession.

Finally, we do not find merit in respondents contention that petitioner violated the rule against forum

shopping. Forum shopping exists where the elements oflitis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in onecase will amount to res judicata in the other.[13]This situation is not present here.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 18, 1999 andits Resolution dated April 27, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 47736 are REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.
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[G.R. No. 138377. February 28, 2000]

CONCEPCION V. AMAGAN, JOSEFINA V. AMAGAN and DINA V. AMAGAN, petitioners,

vs.TEODORICO T. MARAYAG, respondent.

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the mere filing before the regional trial court(RTC) of another action raising ownership of the property as an issue. As an exception, however, unlawful detaineractions may be suspended even on appeal, on considerations of equity, such as when the demolition of petitioners'house would result from the enforcement of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the February 9, 1999Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 50472,[1]which disposed as follows:

"It is plain to see that this Court, under its Decision, merely nullified the Order of the Respondent,dated November 26, 1996 granting Private Respondents Motion for ExecutionPending Appealand denying Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration [of] its said Order. This Court did not

enjoin the Respondent Court from resolving Petitioners appeal from the Decision of the

Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court, on its merits.

"Petitioners complaint for Quieting of Title and Reconveyance in Civil Case No. 1632 filed [at]the Regional Trial Court does not abate the proceeding in Civil Case No. 1671 (TG) before theRespondent Court (Asset Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 627; FelicidadJavier, et al., versus Hon. Regino T. Veridiano, II, et al., 237 SCRA 565.

"In sum, then, the [im]pugned Orders of the Respondent Court are in accord with case law and

issued in the exercise of its sound discretion.

"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due course and is herebydismissed. No cost.

"SO ORDERED."[2]

Also challenged by petitioners is the April 22, 1999 CA Resolution[3]denying their Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

"x x x. On June 3, 1996, the private respondent filed a complaint against the petitionersfor'unlawful detainer'with the Municipal [Circuit] Trial Court in Silang, Cavite. On September27, 1996, the trial court promulgated a Decision in favor of the private respondent and against thepetitioners, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

'IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds for the plaintiff and againstthe defendants ordering the latter as follows:

1.......To vacate the property of plaintiff located at SanVicente, Silang, Cavite containing an area of 420 squaremeters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 13023 and removetheir house constructed thereon;

2.......To pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount ofP10,000.00 starting from June 1, 1996 until the subjectpremises are fully vacated, as reasonable compensation fortheir continued unlawful use and occupation of the same andanother amount of P50,000.00 as and by way of attorney's feesand other litigation expenses; and
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3.......To pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.'

"The petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Cavite from said Decision, which appealwas docketed as Civil Case No. 1671. On November 26, 1996, the private respondent filed

a 'Motion for Execution Pending Appeal'with the Respondent Court which, on November 26,1996, issued an Order granting said motion, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

'As prayed for by the plaintiff(s), through (their) counsel, and finding thegrounds alleged in their 'Motion for Immediate Exec(u)tion' to be impressedwith merit, the same is hereby GRANTED.

Accordingly, let a writ of execution pending appeal be issued in this case.'

"The Petitioners'Motion for Reconsideration'[of] said Order, was denied by the RespondentCourt per its Order dated February 21, 1997.

"In the interim, the petitioners filed, on December 10, 19[96], a complaint against privaterespondent in the Regional Trial Court for 'Quieting of Title, Reconveyance and Damages,'entitled'Concepcion v. Amagan, et al. versus Teodorico Marayag, Civil Case No. 1682 (TG).'

"The petitioners filed, a 'Petition for Certiorari,'in the Court of Appeals, under Rule 65 of theRules of Court, dated April 28, 1997, against the respondents for the nullification of the aforesaidOrders of the Respondent Court, dated November 26, 1996 and February 21, 1997, in Civil CaseNo. 1671, granting private respondent's 'Motion for Reconsideration'respectively, which Petitionwas entitled 'Concepcion v. Amagan, et al., versus Regional Trial Court, et al., CA-G.R. [SP No.43611].'This Court issued a Resolution granting petitioners' plea for a temporary restraining orderwhich expired on June 25, 1997.

"On July 7, 1997, the private respondent filed, with the Respondent Court, in Civil Case No. 1671

(TG), an 'Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion to Direct Sheriff To Make a Report And/Or Implement Writ ofExecution and Declare the Case Submitted for Decision'with the parties submitting to theRespondent Court their respective 'Memorandum on Appeal.'The next day, July 18, 1997, thisCourt promulgated, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], a Decision in favor of the petitioners and againstthe respondents therein the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

'WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,the Order dated February 21, 1997, allowing execution pending appeal isREVERSED and SET ASIDE.'

On July 11, 1997, the Respondent Court issued an Order granting private respondent's OmnibusMotion,'supra. The private respondent likewise filed aPetition for Review'with the SupremeCourt, from the Decision of this Court in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611] and its Resolution denying

private respondent's 'Motion for Reconsideration'but the Supreme Court, per its Resolution datedNovember 12, 1997, issued a Resolution denying private respondents['] 'Petition for Review.'TheResolution of the Supreme Court became final and executory.

"On December 12, 1997, the private respondent filed with the Respondent Court, in Civil CaseNo. TG-1671, a 'Manifestation and Ex-Parte Motion'praying that the Respondent Court resolvethe case and promulgate its Decision on the merits. However, the petitioners filed an Opposition toprivate respondent's motion, contending that the proceedings before the Respondent Court, in CivilCase No. 1671 (TG), be suspended pending decision, on the merits, of the Regional Trial Court,in Civil Case No. 1682 (Quieting of Title, Reconveyance with Damages). On April 3, 1998, theRespondent Court issued its Order granting private respondent's motion, declaring that the Court,under its Decision, in CA-G.R. [SP No. 43611], merely nullified its Order granting executionpending appeal but did not enjoin the Respondent Court from hearing and resolving Civil Case

No. 16[7]1 on the merits. The petitioners filed a 'Motion for Reconsideration'of the aforesaidOrder of the Respondent Court but the latter issued an Order dated December 14, 1998 denyingpetitioners'Motion for Reconsideration, in this language:

'Anent the Motion for Reconsideration, movants anchored their arguments thatthis Court should restrain itself from further proceeding with the appealed casebecause of the decision, resolution of the Court of Appeals, and resolution of theSupreme Court. It is worthy to note that [what] was brought up with the higherCourts was the Order of the Court allowing the execution pending appeal, the


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said Order was reversed and set aside by the Court of Appeals[;] however, therewas no permanent injunction that has been issued for this Court to stop fromfurther proceeding with the case. The said motion is, therefore, DENIED forlack of merit.'"

The facts of this case may be simply summarized as follows. The MCTC rendered a Decision granting the ejectment

suit filed by respondent against herein petitioners. While an appeal was pending before the RTC, respondent filed aMotion for immediate execution of the MCTC judgment, which was granted. However, the Court of Appeals[4]later

reversed the RTC Order granting the execution pending appeal, a reversal that was subsequently affirmed by theSupreme Court. Meanwhile, petitioners also filed before the RTC a new action for quieting of title involving thesame property.

Petitioners thence claimed that the proceedings in the ejectment appeal should be suspended pending final judgmentin the quieting of title case. The RTC ruled in the negative.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In sustaining the RTC, the CA held in two short paragraphs that its earlier Decision in CA-GR SP No. 43611enjoined only the execution of the judgment pending appeal. Without discussing petitioners' plea for an exception, it

curtly applied the jurisprudential principle that an action for quieting of title would not abate an ejectment suit.

Hence, this Petition.[5]

The Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners submitted for the consideration of the Court the following issues:

"I.......Whether or not the 8 July 1997 Decision and 23 September 1997 Resolution of the Court ofAppeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43611 (Annex I), as affirmed in totoby the Supreme Court, called offand restrained the proceedings in this case;

II. Whether or not the dispositive portion of the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 43611 should bereferred to its body and text.

III. Whether or not the Court of Appeals Decision having been based on Vda. de Legaspi vs.Avendano x x x, is now final and executory as it was upheld by the Supreme Court in toto.

IV. Whether or notLao vs. Court of Appeals [x x x] is applicable to the present case, and

V. Whether or not the Court of Appeals failed to consider and pass judgment on the exceptionalnature of the present case."[6]

In the main, the issue is whether the peculiar circumstances of this case justify the suspension of the ejectmentproceedings on appeal before the RTC, pending the resolution of the action for quieting of title.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue: Suspension of the Ejectment Suit

Unlawful detainer and forcible entry suits under Rule 70 are designed to summarily restore physical possession of apiece of land or building to one who has been illegally or forcibly deprived thereof, without prejudice to thesettlement of the parties' opposing claims ofjuridicalpossession in appropriate proceedings. It has been held thatthese actions "are intended to avoid disruption of public order by those who would take the law in their handspurportedly to enforce their claimed right of possession."[7]In these cases, the issue is pure physical orde

facto possession, and pronouncements made on questions of ownership are provisional in nature.

As a general rule, therefore, a pending civil action involving ownership of the same property does not justify thesuspension of ejectment proceedings. "The underlying reasons for the above ruling were that the actions in theRegional Trial Court did not involve physical orde facto possession, and, on not a few occasions, that the case in theRegional Trial Court was merely a ploy to delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, or that the issues presentedin the former could quite as easily be set up as defenses in the ejectment action and there resolved."[8]
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Only in rare instances is suspension allowed to await the outcome of the pending civil action. One such exceptionis Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao, wherein the Court declared:

"x x x. Where the action, therefore, is one of illegal detainer, as distinguished from one of forcibleentry, and the right of the plaintiff to recover the premises is seriously placed in issue in a properjudicial proceeding, it is more equitable and just and less productive of confusion and disturbance

of physical possession, with all its concomitant inconvenience and expenses. For the Court inwhich the issue of legal possession, whether involving ownership or not, is brought to restrain,should a petition for preliminary injunction be filed with it, the effects of any order or decision inthe unlawful detainer case in order to await the final judgment in the more substantive caseinvolving legal possession or ownership. It is only where there has been forcible entry that as amatter of public policy the right to physical possession should be immediately set at rest in favorof the prior possession regardless of the fact that the other party might ultimately be found to havesuperior claim to the premises involved, thereby to discourage any attempt to recover possessionthru force, strategy or stealth and without resorting to the courts."[9]

From the foregoing, it is clear that the mere existence of a judicial proceeding putting at issue the right of theplaintiff to recover the premises is not enough reason to justify an exception to the general rule. In Salinas v.Navarro,[10]the Court explained that "the exception to the rule in x x x Vda. de Legaspi is based on strong reasons of

equity not found in the present petition. The right of the petitioners is not so seriously placed in issue in theannulment case as to warrant a deviation, on equitable grounds, from the imperative nature of the rule. In the Vda.de Legaspi case, execution of the decision in the ejectment case would also have meant demolition of the premises, afactor not present in this petition."

After a close reading of the peculiar circumstances of the instant case, however, we hold that equitableconsiderations impel an exception to the general rule. In its earlier July 8, 1997 Decision in CA-GR No. 43611-SPwhich has long become final, the Court of Appeals, through Justice Artemio G. Toquero, arrived upon the followingfactual findings which are binding on herein parties:

"Admittedly, petitioners who appealed the judgment in the ejectment case did not file asupersedeas bond. Neither have they been depositing the compensation for their use andoccupation of the property in question as determined by the trial court. Ordinarily, these

circumstances would justify an execution pending appeal. However, there are circumstancesattendant to this case which would render immediate execution injudicious and inequitable.

"ONE. Private respondent Teodorico T. Marayag anchors his action for unlawful detainer on thetheory that petitioners possession of the property in question was by mere tolerance. However, in

answer to his demand letter dated April 13, 1996 (Annex D), petitioners categorically deniedhaving any agreement with him, verbal or written, asserting that they are owners of the premises

we are occupying at 108 J. P. Rizal Street, San Vicente, Silang, Cavite. In other words, it is not

merely physical possession but ownership as well that is involved in this case.

"TWO. In fact, to protect their rights to the premises in question, petitioners filed an action forreconveyance, quieting of title and damages against private respondents, docketed as Civil CaseNo. TG-1682 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Tagaytay City. The issue of ownership is

squarely raised in this action. Undoubtedly, the resolution of this issue will be determinative ofwho is entitled to the possession of the premises in question.

"THREE. The immediate execution of the judgment in the unlawful detainer case will include theremoval of the petitioners house [from] the lot in question.

"To the mind of the Court it is injudicious, nay enequitable, to allow demolition of petitioner'shouse prior to the determination of the question of ownership [of] the lot on which it stands.[11]

Indisputably, the execution of the MCTC Decision would have resulted in the demolition of the house subject of theejectment suit; thus, by parity of reasoning, considerations of equity require the suspension of the ejectmentproceedings. We note that, like Vda. de Legaspi, the respondent's suit is one of unlawful detainer and not of forcibleentry. And most certainly, the ejectment of petitioners would mean a demolition of their house, a matter that is likely

to create the "confusion, disturbance, inconveniences and expenses" mentioned in the said exceptional case.

Necessarily, the affirmance of the MCTC Decision[12]would cause the respondent to go through the whole gamut ofenforcing it by physically removing the petitioners from the premises they claim to have been occupying since 1937.(Respondent is claiming ownership only of the land, not of the house.) Needlessly, the litigants as well as the courtswill be wasting much time and effort by proceeding at a stage wherein the outcome is at best temporary, but theresult of enforcement is permanent, unjust and probably irreparable.
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We should stress that respondent's claim to physical possession is based not on an expired or a violated contract oflease, but allegedly on "mere tolerance." Without in any way prejudging the proceedings for the quieting of title, wedeem it judicious under the present exceptional circumstances to suspend the ejectment case.

The Suspension of Proceedings Even Duri ng Appeal

One final point. In Vda. de Legaspi, the Court held that "if circumstances should so require, the proceedings in theejectment case may be suspended in whatever stage it may be found." This statement is unequivocally clear; itincludes even the appellate stage.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the appealed DecisionREVERSED and SETASIDE. The RegionalTrial Court of Cavite isDIRECTED to suspend further action in Civil Case No. 1671 until Civil Case No. 1682 isconcluded. No costs.

SO ORDERED.


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Roberts appended to her complaint copies of the April 13, 1982 Deed of Absolute Sale, the April 15, 1982 Contractof Lease, and TCT No. 114478.

In his Answer with counterclaim, Papio alleged the following:

He executed the April 13, 1982 deed of absolute sale and the contract of lease. Roberts, his cousin who is a resident

of California, United States of America (USA), arrived in the Philippines and offered to redeem the property.Believing that she had made the offer for the purpose of retaining his ownership over the property, he accepted. Shethen remitted P59,000.00 to the mortgagor for his account, after which the mortgagee cancelled the real estate

mortgage. However, he was alarmed when the plaintiff had a deed of absolute sale over the property prepared(for P83,000.00 as consideration) and asked him to sign the same. She also demanded that the defendant turn over

the owners duplicate of TCT No. S-44980. The defendant was in a quandary. He then believed that if he signed thedeed of absolute sale, Roberts would acquire ownership over the property. He asked her to allow him to redeem orreacquire the property at any time for a reasonable amount.18When Roberts agreed, Papio signed the deed ofabsolute sale.

Pursuant to the right to redeem/repurchase given him by Roberts, Papio purchased the property for P250,000.00. In

July 1985, since Roberts was by then already in the USA, he remitted to her authorized representative, PerlitaVentura, the amount of P150,000.00 as partial payment for the property.19On June 16, 1986, she again

remittedP100,000.00, through Ventura. Both payments were evidenced by receipts signed by Ventura.20

Roberts

then declared that she would execute a deed of absolute sale and surrender the title to the property. However,Ventura had apparently misappropriated P39,000.00 out of the P250,000.00 that she had received; Roberts then

demanded that she pay the amount misappropriated before executing the deed of absolute sale. Thus, the sole reasonwhy Roberts refused to abide by her promise was the failure of her authorized representative to remit the full amountof P250,000.00. Despite Papios demands, Roberts refused to execute a deed ofabsolute sale. Accordingly,

defendant posited that plaintiff had no cause of action to demand payment of rental and eject him from the property.

Papio appended to his Answer the following: (1) the letter dated July 18, 1986 of Perlita Ventura to the plaintiffwherein the former admitted having used the money of the plaintiff to defray the plane fares of Perlitas parents to

the USA, and pleaded that she be allowed to repay the amount within one year; (b) the letter of Eugene Roberts(plaintiffs husband) to Perlita Ventura dated July 25, 1986 where he accused Ventura of stealing the money ofplaintiff Amelia (thus preventing the latter from paying her loan on her house and effect the cancellation of the

mortgage), and demanded that she deposit the balance;21

and (c) plaintiffs letter to defendant Papio dated July 25,1986 requesting the latter to convince Ventura to remit the balance of P39,000.00 so that the plaintiff could transfer

the title of the property to the defendant.22

Papio asserted that the letters of Roberts and her husband are in themselves admissions or declarations againstinterest, hence, admissible to prove that he had reacquired the property although the title was still in her possession.

In her Affidavit and Position Paper,23Roberts averred that she had paid the real estate taxes on the property after shehad purchased it; Papios initial right to occupy the property was terminated when the original lease period expired;

and his continued possession was only by mere tolerance. She further alleged that the Deed of Sale states on its facethat the conveyance of the property was absolute and unconditional. She also claimed that any right to repurchasethe property must appear in a public document pursuant to Article 1358, Paragraph 1, of the Civil Code of thePhililppines.24Since no such document exists, defendants supposed real interest over the property could not be

enforced without violating the Statute of Frauds.25

She stressed that her Torrens title to the property was an "absoluteand indefeasible evidence of her ownership of the property which is binding and conclusive upon the whole world."

Roberts admitted that she demanded P39,000.00 from the defendant in her letter dated July 25, 1986. However, she

averred that the amount represented his back rentals on the property.26She declared that she neither authorizedVentura to sell the property nor to receive the purchase price therefor. She merely authorized her to receive therentals from defendant and to deposit them in her account. She did not know that Ventura had received P250,000.00

from Papio in July 1985 and on June 16, 1986, and had signed receipts therefor. It was only on February 11, 1998that she became aware of the receipts when she received defendant Papios letter to which were appended the saidreceipts. She and her husband offered to sell the property to the defendant in 1984 for US$15,000.00 on a "take it orleave it" basis when they arrived in the Philippines in May 1984.27However, defendant refused to accept the offer.The spouses then offered to sell the property anew on December 20, 1997, for P670,000.00 inclusive of back

rentals.28However, defendant offered to settle his account with the spouses.29Again, the offer came on January 11,

1998, but it was rejected. The defendant insisted that he had already purchased the property in July 1985for P250,000.00.

Roberts insisted that Papios claim of the right to repurchase the prop erty, as well as his claim of payment therefor,is belied by his own letter in which he offered to settle plaintiffs claim for back rentals. Even assuming that the

purchase price of the property had been paid through Ventura, Papio did not adduce any proof to show that Venturahad been authorized to sell the property or to accept any payment thereon. Any payment to Ventura could have nobinding effect on her since she was not privy to the transaction; if at all, such agreement would be binding only onPapio and Ventura.
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