cartesian refutations of spinoza

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Philosophical Review

Cartesian Refutations of SpinozaAuthor(s): Albert G. A. BalzSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 46, No. 5 (Sep., 1937), pp. 461-484Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2180831 .

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Number 5 WholeVolumeXLVI September,1937 Number 275

THEPHILOSOPHICALREVIEWCARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA

IEARLY VIEWS CONCERNINGTHE RELATION OFSPINOZISM TO CARTESIANISMJF hestudent trayfrom he greathighway fphilosophy's is-tory, o wander n its6pllateral yways,hemaybe sure of ad-ventures.Quite possiblyhe will attain,here and there, vantagepoint fromwhich the highway tselfmay be viewed in a newperspective. he highway tself nd the world throughwhich tleads may be glimpsedfrom bypath hat n itself eads nowhere.The relation etween he doctrines f Descartesand Spinoza isa matter f continued e-interpretation.he extremes f opponentinterpretationsan be easily characterized.On the one hand,Spinozism s defined s a revised nd systematized artesianism.On the otherhand,therelation f theformero the attermayberegarded as extrinsicrather than essential; Spinoza, it may beurged, mployedCartesianismnorderto facilitate heexpressionof a radicallydifferenthilosophical ision.These opposedviewsconcerning he relation of the two philosophiesemerged quitepromptly fter Spinoza's works became accessible.The settlementofthequestionwas nota matter fmerely cademic ndhistoricalinterest. t was rather matter f living mportance. he excitingcontroversialssues of the day borrowedweapons from ne or theother hilosophy. he philosophic efense f theologywas at issue.Materialismwas in processof formulation.mpiricismwas com-ing to thecontinent romBritain. f thedoctrines f Descartes andSpinoza wereessentially ne in spirit, heycould be evaluated na singleprocess.But, f similarityf expression,ndto some extent

46i


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462 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.of idea, masked a profounddifferencef meaning, he contro-versial ituationwas doubly omplicated.

The philosophic efense f theology,twas remarkedbove,wasinvolved n theDescartes-Spinoza ssue. The questionof the rela-tion of the later to the earlierphilosophyreceived ntensity ftreatment ecause of controversial ssociations. n the course ofa century n extraordinaryransformationccurred.The Carte-sianphilosophy,na word,becamethe foundations ortherefuta-tion of Spinozism. To demonstrate he incompatibilityf thetwo philosophieswas the first tep. The second,and importantstep,oncethis ncompatibilityad beenestablished,was to employCartesiandoctrine ortherefutation fSpinoza.To insist pontheessentialharmony f the twophilosophies, o emphasize heirkin-ship,was to infectCartesianismwith thehorrorsof Spinozism.In thatmeasureCartesianismwas unavailablefor thepurposesofapologetics.To separatethephilosophieswas, then, henecessarypreliminary.he second step,however, hebasing of the refuta-tionof Spinozismupon Cartesiandoctrine,nitself eflects trans-,formationffected y thepassing of decades.After ll, the earliestreactions o Cartesianismwere notwhollyunliketheearliestreactions o Spinozism.The Cartesianphiloso-phyappeared as thedoctrine f a novateur.Here and there t wassuspected f a secretharmonywithProtestantism. n thewhole,however,Protestant nd Catholictheologians likewere doubtfulof Cartesianism'sutilityfor apologeticalpurposes. In the latercase of Spinoza, the questionof apologetical mploymentcarcelyarose.Occasionally here ppeareda defense f Spinozaagainst hecharge of atheism. n themain,however, he refutation f himbecame a favoriteexercise of piety. The horror aroused bySpinozismis an historical ommonplace.All fearsborn of newideas,whatever heirkindand origin,were concentratedpon it.Those whowerealarmedbyDeismpointed o Spinoza as its chiefproponent. or theself-appointeduardians f society gainstma-terialism nd atheism, Spinozism was recognizedas the chieffortressof theenemy.A striking itof evidence f theemotionalintensitynvolved-and it is perhaps lso evidence f thepower ofSpinozism-is found in the belittling f the enemy'sdoctrine.


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No. 5.] CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 463Gerdilastonishesus by disparaging hephilosophy e is at suchpains to refute.The "absurdities"of this impie novateuraresaidtoshock ommon ense; and Gerdil olemnlysserts hat hereis no philosophywhatever hat does not supplya sufficiencyfprincipleswithwhichto combattheseabsurdities.1Gerdil's statement,hat any philosophywhateverwould serveforthe refutation f Spinozism,renders ll the more interestingtheselection f Cartesianism or the purpose.The significantactis that, n the intervalbetweenthe dissemination f Cartesiandoctrine nd the appearanceof Spinozism,Cartesianism ad be-cometheallyofpiety nd the ntellectualrsenalof theology. hedefenseof Descartesturnsout to be equivalent o therefutationof Spinoza. At the same time,the refutation f Spinoza is theoverthrowf atheism,'nd materialism'.hus theearliernovateurbecomes hebulwark fdefense gainst he ater ndmoredreadedinnovator.Cartesiandoctrine, nce viewed so widelyas a threattoreligious ndtheologicalnterests,rotestantnd Catholic like,had become djustedtotheuses of apologetics.Descartesbecomesthe defender f the faith. n the face of the new adversary heopposition o Descarteswas liquidated.After all, as Gerdil ndi-cates,thedefense gainst nnovationmustdepend eitherupontheScholasticphilosophy r uponDescartes.The enmity etween heSchool and the Cartesians, owever, implifiedhechoice.The netoutcome, n brief,was this: the polemicagainstDeism,material-ism, theism,nd ethicalnaturalism,musttakeCartesianisms itsarsenal,or else therewould be no modern rmamentt all forthepolemic.Cousinhas called attentiono this transformationf the role ofCartesianism.n I755, he writes, he FrenchAcademydiscussedl'espritphilosophique. he essaythatwon the prizeeulogizedDes-cartesbecause of thistwofold erviceto philosophy,he freeingof thought rom heyokeof Aristotle, ndhis service o the cause

1 CardinalGerdil I7i8-i8o2): Receuilde Dissertations ur uelquesprin-cipesde philosophic t de religion, ar le R. P. Gerdil,Barnabite, ro-fesseurde Theologieen la RoyaleUniversite e Turin,de l'Academiedel'Institut e Bologne.A Paris, chez Hugues-DanielChaubert, HerissantImprimeur, DCCLX. The volumecontainsfourDissertations,he fourthof whichbears the title:Sur l'incompatibilitees principlese Descartes&de Spinosa.The references to p. 228.


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464 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL.XLVI.ofChristianity.t is perhapsworthwhiletoquotea few inesfromthe engthyelection ivenbyCousin 2

Disciple de la lumiere, u lieu d'interrogeres morts t les dieux de1'ecole, l ne consultaque les idees claireset distinctes,a natureet1'evidence. ar des meditations rofondes,l tira toutes es sciencesdu chaos, t parun coupde genieplus grand ncore l montraesecoursmutuelqu'elles doivent e prkter; l les enchainatoutesen-semble,es eleva les unessur es autres;et se plagant nsuite urcettehauteur, l marcha,avec toutes les forcesde l'esprithumainainsirassemblees,a la decouverte e ces grandesverites ue d'autresplusheureuxsontvenusenlever pres lui,mais en suivant es sentiers elumiere ue Descartesavoittraces.Ce futdonc e courageet la fierted'un seul esprit qui causerentdans les sciencescette heureuseetmemorablerevolution, ont nous gofitons ujourdhui es avantagesavec une superbe ngratitude.I falloit ux sciences nhomme ui osatconjurer out eulavec songeniecontre es anciens yrans e la raison;qui osat fouler ux piedsces idolesque tantde sieclesavoient dorees.Descartesse trouvoit nferme ans le labyrinth vec tousles autresphilosophes;mais l se fit ui-meme esailes, t l s'envola, rayantinsiune routenouvelle la raison captive.Cousin then asks: "Qui pronongait en I755 ces fortes paroles?fltait-ce n professeur e l'Universitede Paris, devangant t sur-passant son confrereThomas dans son Rloge de Descartes? oubien encore uelqueardentdisciplede l'Oratoire u de Port-Royal?Non: c'est un pere jesuite, e pereAntoineGuenard."Descartes'efforts o placateJesuitoppositionwerenot,after ll, unavailing.To Guenardand to others,Descarteshad becomethedefender fthe faith.It is evident hattheresulting ituationwas intricate. ecauseof the associationof Cartesianismwiththedefenseof theology,twas necessary o insistuponthediversityf the twophilosophies.The pointsof diversitymust be specified.On the otherhand,granted hediversity f doctrine, herefutation f Spinozismbymeans of Cartesianismmustpivotupon thesepointswhichwere,at one andthesame time, iewedas thepointsof greatest iversityand also as fundamentaln theCartesianphilosophy.n thiswaythe essentials f Cartesianism-at any ratethe essentials s com-prehended y thecontroversialists-receiveefinitionythecon-troversial ituation tselfand the controversys reciprocally e-

'V. Cousin,Fragments hil. pour server l'histoire e la phil.,5th.ed.,2nd part,Paris, Didier et Cie., i866,pp.4i8-42I.


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No. 5.] CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 465fined ydeterminationf what ideas in theearlierphilosophy reessential.The refutations f Spinozismby meansofCartesianism,accordingly, eflect hediscoveries ffected ithinCartesianism yapologetic nterests. he pillorying f Spinoza as atheist nd ma-terialistmay or may not be informingwithrespectto the spiritand intentionf Spinozism;but t furnishesnsightntothespecu-lative interests f the age. The Cartesian refutations f Spinozaare highlyrevealing.They expressone way in which Cartesiandoctrine ecame an historicalforce.They indicate,not, perhaps,what Descartes intended o emphasize,but what some of his fol-lowersdiscovered o be vital n his doctrine.

IIGERDIL ON THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE PRINCIPLESOF DESCARTES AND SPINOZAThe worthyGerdil3may be selected, omewhat t random, oillustrate he first tep in the refutation f Spinoza drawnfromCartesiansources-namely,the demonstrationf the incompati-bility' f theprinciples ponsoredbythe one and the other.Gerdilis not unaware of the historyof the Cartesian movement. hesystem, e admits, larmed both thebelieverand the unbeliever.Of thefirstmportances thefact hat thad undermined heoldersupportof apologetics.The "School" had effectedhe reconcilia-tion of philosophy nd dogma. But Cartesianism verthrew heveryprinciples pon whichthis pretended econciliation ad beenbased. From thisan erroneous onclusionhad been drawn,to wit,thatDescarteshimselfwould have none ofthesedogmas.This hadarousedhostilityowardsDescartes, nd Gerdil statesthat wholegroupof "ecrivains icensieux" had proceededto attackhis phi-losophy. nterestinglynough,Gerdil states that this reaction oDescartes was intensified y the belief that the philosophyofSpinoza was the"funeste onsequence" f the Cartesian eaching.In contrastwiththisgroup,Gerdiladmits, here s anotherparty;the atter egarded heCartesianprinciples s inthemselves avora-ble to thecause of religion.But even thissympathetic roup aredisturbedby the conviction hat Spinozismwas somewhatmys-teriously enerated y the Cartesian ystem.Gerdildoes not make

8 Seenote .


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466 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.clearto us the source of this conviction. erhapsthe sympatheticfelt that Descartes had been reckless n his proclamation f thecompetencef reason.Guenard, ntheeulogyof thephilosophicalspiritreferred o above,distinguished wo essential spectsof thephilosophical pirit, he one a complete ndependence f every u-thority ave thatof reason n the orderof philosophy,he otherrespect orfaith n theorderof supernatural ruths; ndGuenard,as Cousinstates, itedCartesianism s the modelof thephilosophi-cal spirit so conceived.4 Complete ndependencen the orderofphilosophy, owever,mightwell lead the spirit f libertinage o aneglect f the truths f faith.The Tractatus Theologico-Politicusis scarcelyto be compared with the Cartesian gesturestowardsdogma and homageto theChurch.The Cartesian ndependencentheorderofphilosophy,tmusthave appearedto some,mightwellhave generated pinozism, nd thusthe Cartesianphilosophy, e-spite ts author'spiety,mayhave ed to atheism. n any case,Gerdilrecognizes a widespread fear that Cartesian principles,despitetheirvalue forthe cause of piety,were also manipulable n theinterests f atheism.5n the circumstances, erdilmustundertaketocalmthe fearsof thosewho suspect hatCartesian eaching eadsto Spinozism and atheism.This is all the more necessary f theapologetical mploymentf Cartesian deas is to be justified. heincompatibilityf the two philosophiesmust be demonstrated.6

Atheism,Gerdil nforms s, whether ncient r modern, lwaysrestsupon threeprinciples. he first s the eternity f movement;the second, the absolute or metaphysical ecessity f existence,whetherof matteror of motion; and the third, he identity fthinkingnd material ubstance. Since he is quite convinced hatSpinozism s atheism,we may dependupon him to discover, ome-how, thesethreeprinciplesn Spinoza's system. o accomplishhispurposehe must, n addition, rove thatthey re not discoverable' Op. Cit. 4i8.' Pp. 157-I6o;p. I98. Gerdil'sdissertation,t should be noted, s directedagainst certain newexamination f Spinozism," he authorof whichhedoes not mention y name.The authorof this examen," owever,s guiltyof thisvery onfoundingf theprinciplesf Spinozismwith hose of Des-cartes. The writerhas not been able to identifywith certainty he worktakenby Gerdil s the objectof his attack. .Preface vi,vii.TPreface II.


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No. 5.] CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 467in the Cartesiansystem.These two tasksonce accomplished,heincompatibilityf thesystemswillhave beendemonstrated.

Of the threeprinciples hathave always defined n atheisticphilosophy,here s one, assertsGerdil,whichconstituteshees-sential"venom"of the Spinozisticsystem.8 ut Cartesianism snot atheistic t all. Not merelywill the Cartesian ystemack thethreeprinciples f atheism-it will comprise he veryantithesisof the venomousprinciple s one of its fundamentaldeas. Thisantithetical rinciplewill indeed form a peculiarlybeneficientpropertyf theCartesian ystem. his specialopposition f prin-ciple will be central n showingthe incompatibilityf the twophilosophies.What are theseopponent rinciples?The venom nSpinozism s thedefinitionf thought r spirit s a mode of mat-ter-in short, he denial of the Cartesiandualismof finite ub-stances.This is indeedsomewhat tartling: he disentanglementof Spinozismand Cartesianisms based upon the body-souldoc-trine.This is a strikingllustrationfthe fact hat, fterDescartes,the pointof departure orapologetics s thematter-spiritualism.In forsaking cholasticism s thereconciliationfphilosophynddogma,Cartesianism,ndmore specificallyhecharacteristicual-ism of Cartesianism, ecomes the basis fora new procedureofreconciliation.Gerdil'sclaim,that Spinoza regards hought r spirit s merelya mode of matter,mayastonishthereader. t was evidently hetask of Gerdil omanipulatehe doctrine f theattributes,houghtand extension.The Spinozisticdoctrine oncerning hought ndextension s attributesmustbe interpretedo as to result n theatheistic rinciple,he venomousprinciple,hatthoughts a modeof matter.Gerdil'sproposal s as follows: Spinoza's teaching on-cerning ubstance annotbe reconciledwithhis doctrine f exten-sion unlesssubstance ndmatter e identified.f this dentificationis necessaryfor Spinozism, hen Spinozism s, of course,a ma-terialism.Moreover, pinozisticmaterialismnits specific eatureswillbe characterizedy tsantithesiso thecharacteristicrinciplesoftheCartesianphilosophy.n contrastwith he atter, pinozism,whateverts verbalexpression,mustreducethought o a modeof

8P. 2I5.


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468 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL.XLVI.extensionor of matter.Spinozisticmaterialisms, of course,anatheism.But theCartesian ystems neither materialism oranatheism.Significantly,t is neither, reciselybecause the systemas such s au fond a matter-spiritualism.In thismanner he ncompatibilityf thetwosystemss specifi-callydefined.Gerdil'sargumentn supportof his contention e-pends upon breakingdown the Spinozisticdistinction etweensubstance nd attribute. pinoza has ascribedto the so-calledat-tribute f Extensioncertain ssentialproperties. ut theseproper-ties are metaphysicallyltimate.Gerdil does not call themtrans-cendental, ut tseems fairto regard hem n thisway.Extension,accordingto Spinoza, is immutable,ndivisible; t is one and in-finite. ut substance lone can possess thesecharacters. hey areindeedproperties f AbsoluteBeing,or, in theological erms, fGod. It follows, ccordingly,hatextension annotbe consistentlydefined s an attributef substance, ut s rather ubstance tself.In Cartesian erms,fwe maytranslateGerdil's hought,xtensionis the constitutivettribute f matter;then,acceptingSpinoza'scharacterizationf extension t its facevalue, we mustconcludethatmatter s the supremerealityof the system.Spinozism ismaterialism.Whatever nthat ystem an be signified y thought'or 'spirit', t least this is true, that the termssignifymodes ofmatter. hought s a derivative f matter.9

It isnoteworthyhatGerdilrepudiates henotion hatSpinozismresultedfromthe reduction f Cartesian finite ubstances o thestatus of attributes f a singlesubstance.Obviously,he must dothisorhe cannotmaintainhis contention f the ncompatibilityfthe systems. He urges that, whateverothers may think,theSpinozisticsystem ould not have been attainedby uniting n asingle substance, n the formof attributes,he two perfectionsthat Descartes kept independentlyeal as the finite ubstances,Thought ndExtension, pirit ndMatter.Whatever hemerits fGerdil'sargument, hismuchcan be read between he lines: theCartesian ntological ualism s, forGerdil s forotherCartesians,notan hypothesis uta truth stablishedwithfinality.The argument s reinforced,ccordingto Gerdil,by the factP. i9i and ff.Gerdil xplains hatSpinoza'satheisms theconsequenceof his threepositions:first,hattherecannotbe twosubstances ifferinginessence; second, hatone substanceannotbe produced yanother;and,third,hat ubstances infinite2,5-2i6).


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No. 5.] CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 469that Descartes maintained he separationof force and matter.Spinoza did not do this. The consequence s thatDescartes canreaffirmhe argument rommotion o a prime mover,while hissuccessor annot.This auxiliary oint ndicates hatGerdilbelievesSpinoza's view of extension o be central o the system.n tech-nical expression,Gerdil'sargument ependsupon theconceptofindependence. his characterof independence, qually for Des-cartesand Spinoza, is themarkof substance.The problem s todeterminewhether he concepts f independencen thetwophi-losophiesare identical.To estimate hevalidity f the claimthatSpinozism s a necessary onsequence f the earlierdoctrine, er-dil urgesthatwe mustexaminethe dea of independencen termsofthevariousmeanings hat xistencemaypossess.Existencemaybe per se, that s, existence n theproper enseof theterm, mply-ing that all modes are determinationsf a single subject.Again,by existencemaybe intended xistence se, implying xistencefrom tself n thesense of independence f a productive ause.10Independence huspossessestwo meanings hatmust not be con-founded.Descartes' definitionf substancepreserves he distinc-tion of meanings.Substanceas thatwhichcan be conceivedbyitselfwithout eferenceo other hings omprises nly the dea ofan existenceproperto the natureof substance. t excludes thenotionof the inherenceof substance n anothersubject. Inde-pendence, s the characterof substance for Descartes, does notconfuse independence subjects inhaesioniswith independenceut a caucsaefficiente-aconfusionof which Leibniz is guilty.11Spinoza's failure o keep apart thesetwomeanings s responsibleforhis errors.

Spinoza,en definissanta substance, . . renferme ans cettenotion,sous les termes quivoquesdont les sens se developpedans les con-sequencesqu'il en tire, 'idee d'une existencenon-seulementropre,maisnecessaire; exclutnon-seulement'inherencee la substance ansun autre sujet,mais aussi la dependence ui convienta un effet arrapport sa cause,& enun mottoute dee de relation ue la substancepeut avoir a quelqueautre choseque ce soit.Spinoza,par unsophismequi ne pouvoitetre que l'effet 'une passionaveugle,conclutqu'unesubstance epeut etreproduite ar uneautre ubstance'. . Une preuvecertaine ue Spinoza,dans sa definition e la substance, achoit, ousdes expressionsmbigues, nsens biendifferente celuide Descartes;c'est qu'apresavoir distingue 'attribut e la substance,l entendpar0P. i67. P. 177.


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470 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.attribut recisemente que Descartes entendoit ar le mot de sub-stance. 12

The finiteubstances f Descartes are genuinely ossessedof themarkof substance,fortheydo not inhere n a subject.They arenot ndependentn the secondsense, mplying on-dependencenan efficientause. Gerdilthinks t is absurd to regardthings sdependentn the sense that they nhere n God as modifications.It would be equally absurd to suppose that souls and corporealthings re independent se.13 These absurdities re characteristicof Spinozism nd followfrom heconfusion f the twomeaningsof independence. rom this it appears that Spinoza, unlikeDes-cartes, s in a predicament.f substancempliesboth heper se andthe a se, thento substancealone can be assigned unity, ndivisi-bility, mmutability,nd infinity.f, further, xtensionpossessthesepredicates-and, according o Gerdil, his s reallySpinoza'sdoctrine, xtension tself s a substance.Withinthe Spinozisticsystem, owever, herecan be but a singlesubstance.The logicalstructuref Spinozism, hen,mplies he dentificationf substanceand extension.All the"funestes onsequences"follow.Spinozismis materialism. pinoza, who said 'God or Substanceor Nature',shouldhavesaid God orSubstance, r NatureorMatter'.The defense of Descartes against the charge of fatheringSpinozismrests, n the end,upon contrastingonceptions f ex-tension.Descartes, Gerdil urges, did not identify pace in thevulgar sense,or body,withextension.For him extensionneces-sarily mplies mpenetrability,ivisibility,nd mobility. xtensionis thus clothedwithproperties ulgarly egardedas belonging obody.'4Descartes' thoughts not thatbodycan be reduced o threedimensions, ut rather hatthesethreedimensions annotobtainwithout nvolvingmpenetrabilitynddivisibility. ence extensionis the essence,the primitive und, f body.According o theCar-tesanview,then, mmutabilitynd indivisibilityre incompatiblewith he dea ofextension.f Spinoza identifies od andextension,and this he mustdo if he accordsto extension heproperties fimmutabilityand indivisibility, t follows that Spinoza is givingextension a meaning radically unlike that of Descartes.'5

Pp. i85-i86. Pp. I77 and ff. 14 P. I88.15"II estdoncvisible ue Spinozaneprend as I'etenduEans ememe ensque Descartes; qu'ilreconnoitu contraireves les partisans uvuide, u'il


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No. 5.] CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 47IFor Gerdil, heatheism f Cartesianism ivotsupontheconceptof matter. here are students f Descartes,Gerdilrecognizes,who

admit thatDescartes was not an atheist,but who fear thathisprinciplesead to atheism. ut Cartesianism, erdilurges,destroysa fundamentalrticleof atheism, hat s, thedenialof a distinctionbetween primemotor nd matter. n supportof his contention,Gerdil inviteshis reader to recall the state in whichDescartesfound la Physique".Toutes les puissances ue les corpsont d'agir les uns sur les autres,toutesleurs qualities ensiblesetoient utantde vertus nnees, ym-pathiques u antipathiques,xpultricesu retentrices,estinies pro-duirechaque effet n particulier. escartes concutque ce pompeuxetalagede qualities ccultesne s'etoit ntroduitans la Physique, u'ala faveurde l'ignorance u mechanism. I vit,ce que Boyleconfirmadepuisparmile experiences,ue la naturene fait ouer en effet uela mechanismdans la production es effets,ui 'onpeut entrevoirnquelque sorteson procede.La simplicitye ses voies le persuadaquece procede devoitetre uniforme.1 ne balanqa donc pas a rejetterles formesubstantiellesaccidentellese l'flcole, a leur ubstituerles affectionsmechaniques,a grosseur, a figure,e mouvement esparticules 'une matierehomogene.Mais apresavoirrejette out 'ap-pareildes formes& des qualities ccultes, l comprit u'il ne pouvoitplus reconnoitreans la matiere ucunevertuactiveproprementite.. . . Ainsi es derniers as de l'analysephysique enoiente reunir uxdernieres onclusions e la synthesemetaphysique,our depouilleramatiere e toutes es proprietesui ne peuvent e deduirede l'etendueimpenetrable; fairepar consequent e la matiereun etrepurementpassif, ncapablede contenir n lui-memee principe u movement.D'oui l'on voit que la necessity 'un premiermoteurdistinguede lamatiere, st commele centreou' vont se reunirtous les principesphysiques metaphysiquese la Philosophie e Descartes.16

The Cartesianprinciple f the divisibilityf matterdestroys heatheism fSpinoza; for t disproves heultimate eality fmaterialsubstance.Gerdil ttemptsoaugment is case bydiscoveringnconsistencyn'y a aucune repugnance admettre ne etendue nfinie,mmobile,ndi-visible;& qu'apresavoir adopteda notionde l'etendue tabliepar les par-tisansde l'espacepur, l y ajofiteuneabsurdity articuliere,ui estde l'ap-pellerune etendue orporelle. insi Spinosane peutetablir a consequencequ'enrenversante principeur lequelDescartes a rejette e vuide,& faitconsister1'essencedu corps dans l'etendue.Descartes n'a sofitenu'im-possibilite u vuide, u'ensofitenantue toute tendue stpar la naturem-penetrable,ivisible,mobile.Spinoza n'etablit a doctrine u'en supposantque l'etenduepeut etreindivisible,mmobile. a doctrinede Spinosa estdonc directmentppose aux principes e Descartes."Pp. I9I-I92.16Pp. 96-I98.


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472 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.withinSpinoza's materialism.He charges that Spinoza admittedtheconceptionfmaterialparticles r corpuscles.But this s hope-lessly nconsistent iththe ndivisibilityf extension. n any case,Spinoza is a materialist, or extension s giventhe attributes fultimate reality. If, however, we overlook the inconsistency,Spinoza is an atomist nd a fatalist.He mustbe includedwithinthegroup of the"New Epicureans"."Nothing s thenmorefittingforthe destruction f the Atheismof Spinoza and of Epicurusthantheprinciples fDescartesconcerninghe essenceof matter."The divisibility f matter verthrows heunity f substance hatforms he basis of Spinoza's edifice.The establishmentf exten-sion as theessence of matter xcludesfrommatter he principlesof movement, nd thisdestroys he atheismof Epicurus.The Cartesian concept of matter nablesDescartes to separatethe finite nd the infinite, r at least the indefinite nd the in-finite. he distinction etween he finitend infiniteubstances,nGerdil's Cartesianism,s fundamental, recisely s the principleof a single substance s basic for Spinozism.The latterdoctrine,were t madeconsistent ndgivenconsistencyfexpression,woulddefinematter-substances the supremereality.What Spinozismdescribes s the "attribute" f thought s, fthe termbe allowedatall, an attribute f matter.Thought s a manifestation f matter,a mode of extension.Gerdil's interpretationf Spinoza presentsthesystems an epiphenomenalism.he Cartesian oncept fmat-ter,distinguishinghe indefinitend the infinite,he moved fromthecreativeprinciple f motion nd continuancen existence, lsoexcludedthought nd spiritfrommatter. he Cartesianprinciples,then, ccording o Gerdil,providea new and ample basis for thedefense f religion nd theology gainstthe threat f materialism,atheism,nd atomism. he destroyer f Scholasticism ecomesthedefender f thefaith. III

THE REFUTATION OF SPINOZA: LAMY'S LE NOUVELATH.ISME RENVERSP2"Gerdil's effort o demonstratehe incompatibilityf Cartesianand Spinozisticdoctrine s, of course,at the same time an at-17Pp. 209-210.' FrangoisLamy,Le nouvelAtheismeRenverse, u Refutation u sis-temede Spinosa,Tiree pour la plu'part, e la connoissance e la naturede


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No. 5.] CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 473tempted efutationf the atter. t will be concededthattheCar-tesian refutations f Spinoza cannotbe regarded s accuratere-flections f his doctrine.They indicate, n the whole, what theirauthorsunderstoods Spinozism.Perhapssuch a statement eedssome qualification.We may suspect,here and there, deliberatemisrepresentationf Spinoza's teaching n orderto facilitate tsrefutation.ven admittinghisqualification,owever, herefuta-tionsmust xpress, ven n thedeliberate istortionsf Spinozisticdoctrine, heposition f thatdoctrinen theintellectualituation.Thus the critics f Spinoza,however ittle hey ellus of Spinoza,tell us a greatdeal concerninghemselves-andof thegroundsoftheir llegiance o Descartes.What thecritic f Spinoza regardedas a successfulrefutation ill expressboth thecritic's onceptionof Spinoza is ruined; for Spinoza, if it mean anything,ssertsrefutationsmply he dentificationfthe philosophywith theism.This, in itself,however,s unimportant.he moresignificantactis the critics'recognitionhatthis atheism s a new atheism.Withthis goes the conviction hat new groundsare necessaryfortherefutationf an atheism hat s new. The effortf Lamy,whichis the effortf a Benedictine, eliberatelyeeks to accomplish tspurposebybending o thispurposephilosophical deas borrowedfromrecent hilosophers.There can be,of course,nothing urprisingnLamy's assertionthat, f Spinoza is not an atheist,he at least does not rise abovethe level of Deism. But after all, Spinoza is an atheist,fortheSpinozisticGod is a universalbeing ndistinguishablerom heto-l'Homme.Par unReligieuxBenedictin e la Congregatione SaintMaur.A Paris,ChezJeande Nully,MDCXCVI. Lamy explains n theAvertissementthat therefutationccording o thegeometricalrderwas written eforethe publication f his Traite de la Connoissance e Soi-Meme,and hisVeritekvidentee la ReligionCreftienne.avingbeenrequested o writerefutationccording o the "common" or usual) method, e issues thisvolumecontainingothforms f refutation.he volumeappearedunderimpressive uspices: tcontains approbations"yMonseigneur e Fenelon,Archeveque, uc de Cambray, yMonseigneur e Sillert,Eve'quede Sois-sons; by Hideux, Curede Saints Innocens;and byM. Coulaw, irecteurde la BibliotequeMazarine.It beginswith a statementf the "Idee duSistemede Spinosa& de la refutationu'on en fait".There followstheFirstTreatise, ontaining refutationccording o "la methodeommune";the Second Treatise,a refutationoncernedwith the possibilityf theIncarnation;nd then heThirdTreatise, "Refutation uivanta methodedes Geometres". he workconcludeswith "Parallel"drawnbetween hereligionnd morality fSpinozawith heChristian,& meme vec a lumierenaturelle".


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474 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.talityof nature, beingwithout iberty, on-providential,sansbutet sansfin, ans choix& sans election".That the consequencesof Spinozismare "funestes,"-thatthe young are beingseducedby the doctrine, ts adherents ncreasing, les Libertins"findingsupport n it-all of this s to be expected.Our interest nLamy'seffortsmust urnuponmore specific onsiderations. he Spinozis-tic philosophy, orour Benedictine,s characteristic f the newage; it suppliesa capital expressionof everything hatcould befoundwrongwith he world. For Lamy thinks hatSpinoza is noisolatedphenomenon. his philosophy s a response o the intel-lectual needs ofmindsand temperamentsn revolt.Let us, there-fore,firstnquireof ourauthor: how and whydid theSpinozisticphilosophy rise? We may then inquire what Lamy takes thisphilosophy o be-the "Idleegenerate u sistemede Spinoza, & deses principales onsequences" s the titleof Section I runs.Fromthispointwe areprepared o appreciate hegeneralplanofLamy'srefutation.Spinoza's doctrine ffects "bouleversement"otmerely n re-ligion and morality, ut even in our conceptions f nature.Thischange,however,s theconsequence f an effortogive a system-atic foundation orthemodernethicalrevolt.What Lamy findsin Spinozismmay be described n one word: Naturalism.Themetaphysics f Spinoza is thegroundforethicalnaturalism:butethicalnaturalism s preciselywhat demandedthe metaphysics.The modernage, at heart,demandsthe overthrow f Christianmorality. he essentialtrait of Christianmorality s its uncom-promising pposition onatural mpulse. t remains, orLamy, anethics frenunciation.he modern evolt eeksa rationalustifica-tionfor ts aversionto Christianmoralitynd for its ethical andpoliticalnaturalism. o accomplish his, ccording o Lamy, phi-losophymustfurnish metaphysical roundfor an anti-Christianmorality nd politics.But it must do more-for it mustprovidean explanation fthe factthat here s a Christianmorality. hris-tianmoralitymustbe explained-by explaining taway.To explainit away, as Lamy regards the effort,here arises a conceptualschemewhichthe Eighteenth entury mployed gain and againin manyvariants.This is accomplished y the doctrinewhich at-tributesherules and laws of Christianmorality o a political nd


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No. 5.] CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 475social plot.Those whopossessedpowerexploited hesuperstitionsand fearsof themasses,developing he Christian ode, in orderto insurethesubjection fmento priestlynd political uthority.This is the thesisof thenaturalists. amyurgesthatthe thesis sunsupportable o longas ordinarydeas concerning od and manand theworldare retained.A set of new ideas is required.Thenaturalisticrevolt,having speciously explained away Christianmoralitynd institutions, ust eek reinforcementya metaphysi-cal foundation. o do this, t must,on thenegative ide,destroythetraditionaldeas of theprovidential overnance f theworld,whichwillmeanatheism, ecessity,nd mechanism nnature.Onthepositive side, itmust define pointof view fromwhichtheequivalenceof right nd good, on theone hand, and the naturalon the other,necessarilyfollows."' In the eyes of Lamy theSpinozistic hilosophy, ith tsspeciousappearanceof compellinglogical rigor, s theoutstanding ffort o provideradicalismwithrationalustification.On thegrounds hatwe must fight irewithfire, herefutationmustopposemetaphysics o metaphysics,eason to reason. It isimportant o notethatLamy recognizes he problem o be meta-physical.The horrible onsequences-in morality,n political ife,in institutionalonflicts-aresymptomatic.he timehas passedwhen anything an be accomplishedby appeal to dogma and tofaith. What needs to 'be accomplished an and mustbe accom-plishedbyreason-"meme avec la lumierenaturelle".What are the principlesof this naturalisticmetaphysics hatmust be overthrown? nd where, f we are to dependupon thenatural ightof reason,are we to findthepointd'appui of thisrefutation? he purposeof therefutations to reinstatewhatthismetaphysicshreatens o destroy. he negation f the ethical ndreligiousconsequencesdepends upon the refutation f themeta-physicsdevisedto support histransvaluation fvalues so charac-teristicfthemodern ge.Now Lamyrecognizes hat heSpinozis-tic teaching is thoroughly onsistent n its rejection of allanthropomorphicaldeas-in itsdesignation f theconceptions fa rewarding nd punishing, providential eity, nd the ethical

" P. 84 and ff.


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476 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.principlescorrelatedtherewith, s anthropomorphic. oreover,Spinoza's Biblical criticism,which deprivesHoly Writ of meta-physical ignificance,s a necessary onsequence f the naturalisticmetaphysics. he traditional onceptions fChristian heology, otto saythe formulationsf its mysteries,o Lamy recognizes,mustnecessarily e forSpinoza a set of symbolicxpressions, ossessingonly an ellipticalvalue. Social serviceabilitys the pragmatic estof theirworth.Thus original in must be reducedby Spinoza tothelevel of fiction. ven good and beautycan have no objectivesignificance.20amy is convinced hat theuse by a Spinozistof aphrase such as 'The Love of God' is preposterous. he traditionallanguageof theology sutterly nfit or heexpression f Spinozis-tic ideas. When Spinoza declares that to admit miracles is toincurthe dangerof Atheism, amy can recordonlyastonishment.It is theparadox of an Atheistwho "gives preservatives gainstAtheism'".2'Lamy's real accusation s that Spinozism,byemploy-ing traditional erbiage, urreptiouslyeeksto make his doctrineappearto be inharmonywithbeliefwhen, n fact, t is wholly n-consistentwith the faith. Spinoza would attribute alues to hisdoctrine hat' t cannotpossess, since thesevalues followonlyiftraditionalexpressions convey the traditionalmeanings asso-ciatedwith them, nd do not followwhen the expressionshaveonly the significance f metaphor,whichtheymusthave in theSpinozisticcontext.The point of this situation s that,forLamy, Spinozism s adoctrinedevised to supportanti-anthropomorphism;he meta-physicalprinciples rovidea foundation f a mechanistic iewofnature; this mechanistic cienceof natureimpliesdeterminism;and accordinglyfree-will nd associated theologicaland ethicalideas become mereprojectionsof humanimpulse ntoobjectivenature. n return,his conclusion eflects ack uponthenatureofman, and results n Spinozisticviews concerningman equally atvariancewithtradition. pinoza's attitude owards the passionsas expressed n his political houghtwouldhave seemedto Lamythoroughlyonsistent.Neitherto praisenor to dispraisethepas-sions,but to understandhem-thisis to takethemnaturalistically.But taken n thisway,humannature ppearsas an incidentnthe

'2 Cf.p. 48, pp. 53-54. 21 Cf.p.39,pp.34-35, 5,59.


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No. 5.] CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 477system f nature. t furnishes o clues to a reality yingbeyond.Moreover,whatever aws of morality his view of man may sug-gest, hese aws can have no value lyingbeyond heir xpediencyna social system. he largerfish evourthe smallerfish y supremenaturalright, nd so withman conceived s an incidentwithin hesystem f nature. With organized society civil rightcomes intobeing. The validity f this right, owever, s circumscribed y thelife of society.The function f religionmustthenbe the inculca-tionofpiety.And the entire ystem f religiousdeas is essentiallya set of symbolsfora merely ocio-political ontent.Withinthecontext f Spinozism, s Lamy thinks, he love of God' is eitheran elaborate symbolforsocial control r it is nothing.Sin' mayhavemeaningwithin given ocialsystem, utnotbeyondt.WhenSpinoza employs uchexpressions s the love ofGod' in his meta-physical ontext, he phrase becomesevasive. ts employment aybe due to deliberate rtifice xpressing lack of courage.EitherSpinoza seeks to deceive, or else he is pathetically ncapableofrecognizing he consequences f his own doctrine.Spinozism s a 'new' atheism. t is a naturalism-buta natural-ismthat s in some sense equallynew.Spinozismreflects moderncontext.What it denies with significance orLamy's defense ofreligion,morality, nd theology, s something lso modern. nbrief,Lamy's zeal is not that of a Scholasticcontending gainstmodernity. n the contrary, e represents issensionwithin hecontext f modernreflection. he refutationf the new atheismmust be providedby a metaphysicshatis equally a productofmodernity. amy's refutation, hen, s a Cartesian refutation.Withintheseconditions, hecrucialpoint n therefutation fSpinozism,ieswithin he natureofman.Lamy affirmshisagainand again. The verytitleof his book assertsthat the refutationis drawn for the greaterpart,fromknowledge f thenature ofman. Knowledgeof manis "l'ecueil du Spinozisme", hereefuponwhich the wave of Spinozism s shattered.22pinoza may asserttheimmortalityf man; but Spinozistic mmortality,hatever tmay be, is at least in no sense an immortality hichpointsback-ward to the natureof man as a clue to reality r forward o theobjective validity and metaphysical mplicationsof morality.

22 Cf. pp. 25-32, . 83.


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478 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.Within he naturalisticystem, amy in effectnsists, o onethingpossessesprimacyover another,neither he livingover the non-living, ormanoverthe remainder f the nimateworld.Man maybe the mosthighly volvedof things-but the adjectival phrasehas no valuesignificance.Spinoza, f heis to beoverthrown, ustbe refuted y argumentsdrawnfrom henatureof man.With thiswe again comeuponthecentral fact presentedby the refutations f Spinozism. TheSpinozisticmetaphysics efines henatureof theSpinozisticman.From this definitionf theSpinozisticman flowall those conse-quences, n thecontext f practical ife,thatLamy and otherop-ponentsdescribe s "funestes".Metaphysics, owever, an be re-futedbymetaphysicslone. The Spinozisticmetaphysicalman,soto speak, can be replaced successfully nly by means of an op-ponent metaphysicalman. The opponent conception of man,however,cannot be drawn fromScholasticism-this would notbe fighting irewithfire.The opposition f ideas, to be effectivecontinuously,must itselfbe definedby a commoncontext.Therefutation f Spinoza mustbeginwitha modernmetaphysics hattakes tsdeparture rom henature fman. Lamy must sk: whereis there ucha metaphysics? o his mind, here s but one answer.The Cartesianphilosophymeets therequirements. he Cartesianphilosophy upplies,not merelyn idea of thenature f man,but atrue dea ofhisnature. n the context f Cartesianismwe cometoknowledge f man.Thisphilosophy,ndeed, s foundedupontruthsconcerninghenature f man.Thus,according o Lamy,theref ta-tionof Spinoza depends upon a Cartesian standpoint.More pre-cisely,tdepends ponthe Cartesian ntological ualism.Descartesbecomes the defender of the faith, and can fulfill his destinybecausehe affirms hat Spinozism woulddeny-the real distinc-tionbetween oul andbody.As with Gerdil, o forLamy, the first tep is a demonstrationof thecontrast etween hephilosophies fDescartes and Spinoza.Lamy centers is effortn a disproof f theposition hatCartesian-ismgenerated he atersystem. he exploitation f Cartesian deasas thebasis forrefutations implicit n the Second Treatise,the"Refutation e l'erreurde Spinosa, surla possibility e l'Incarna-tion". t is also implicitn thedocument alled the"Parallele de la


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No. 5.] CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 479Religion& de la Morale de Spinosa,avec la Religion& Morale deJesus-Christ, memeavec la lumierenaturelle".But in a secondparallel the comparisonof the two philosophies s made explicit.The first tage of the disproof of Cartesian responsibility orSpinoza is formed ya reference o the distinction f substances.". . . Toute sa philosophic ne roule que sur la distinction reelle qu'ilmetentre a substanceetendue la substancepensante; & qu'ainsiil admitdans la natureplurality es substances."Lamy adds that:"nous venonsde voir au contraire ue la philosophicde Spinosane roule que sur la confusion u'il fait de ces deux substances,&sur la suppositionextravaganted'une seule substance dans lanature; le corps& l'espritdit-il, e sont que la memechose".23nthis fashion,Lamy interpretshe Spinozisticdictumconcerningone and the same thing,viewed underdifferentttributes. n asummaryof Cartesian doctrine,he enumeratessix principles,peculiarto the former, nd denied severally nd collectively ySpinozism.The centralpoint is the Cartesianprinciple hat thesoul is not a mode of being (une maniered'etre), either f Godor of body, or of any otherthingwhatever.Thus the Cartesianisolationof the soul fromnature, nd its definitions substance,undergoesa remarkable ncrease in importance. he mind-bodydualism was advanced by Cartesians as an irresistible ruth.24Descartes alone has revealed to philosophy othwhat the soul isand what is thenature of matter. n the earlier stages of debatebetweenCartesians and anti-Cartesians, he alleged irresistibletruth ncountered erision.Confronting new enemy,however,the Cartesian offensive gainst atheismmustbe launched fromthebody-mind ualism. The Cartesiansthemselves ad acknowl-edged-with reluctance ere and there-the absorption f theani-mals within he single realmof matter ubstance nd mechanicallaw. Spinozism, s the opponents f Spinoza viewed his doctrine,would complete heengulfingf life withinmatter. he refutationof Spinozism, hen,mustbegin withthe positionthat n its con-ception of man Cartesianism tands in irreconcilable ppositionto thedoctrine f Spinoza. The very meaning f theterm meta-

2 P. 486.24 Cf. "Louis de la Forge and theCritique f Substantial orms,"Phil.Review XLI (November, 932).


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480 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL.XLVI.physics' eflectshis doption f Cartesianism: amy declaresthatmetaphysicss above all the science "qui nous fait connoitre adifferenceu'il y a entre es esprits& les corps,qui nous decouvrece qui se peutconnoitre e la naturede l'ame,& de sonimmortality;de la nature de Dieu, de son Existence,de sa Providence,de saPuissance, etc. etc".25The refutation f Spinoza, as the titleofLamy's FirstTreatise assures us, is accompaniedby pure reason,which finds n knowledge of the nature of man "l'ecueil" ofSpinozism nd the sourceof the dutiesof Christianmorality. hefirst hapter,moreover, s devotedto the"verities, duties whichspringfromthe distinction f spiritand body",to "the jjustesseoftheir nion", nd "to the capacity y which hespiritknows andloves". In the contextof controversy eforeus, Cartesianmeta-physics s definitiven principle.Lamy stands squarely upon his dualisticbasis of Cartesianorigin.Effects, ctions,express the natureof things.With manwe find wowholly pposedseriesof actions.Therefore heremustbe two principles s thesourcesof the dissimilar onsequences. f,now, theseprinciples re substances, nd man is a compositeofsubstances, pinozism s inprinciple efuted.26hereare two sub-stances for the reason thateither an be conceivedwholly nde-pendently f theidea of the other.With this the "whole edifice"of Spinoza is ruined,forSpinozism, f it mean anything,ssertsthe existence f but one substance, nd this mplies he reductionof all phenomena oa common enominator.The dissimilarities evealed n man's compositenatureare irre-ducible. Lamy even derives fromthis irreducibilityn argumentfor the existenceof God. Only an infinitely ise and powerfulbeing could be the authorofman, forsuch an orderof power andwisdom s necessary oeffect heunion, nonebeing, f substancesso opposed.27 hus the Cartesiandualism, ffording first rgu-mentfor heexistence fGod, provides hefoundation pon whichmaybe reinstated he arguments romdesign.The latterhad evi-dentlybecomean object of derision.For Lamy asserts that, de-spite theridicule f his readers,one mayestablish supremewis-dom ruling theworld from the functions f the humanbody.28

2"pp. 5-6. 2' pp. 98, 99.27 Pp. I03-105. ' PP. 93-96.


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No. 5.] CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 48IWith due attention o his dual nature,then,man need not passbeyond hatnature n order to establish he existence f God,i.e.,of God in the sense in whichSpinoza would rejecttheconceptionas anthropomorphic.e pense,donc je suis, is no more evidentthatJesuis, doncil y a un Dieu infinimentage.29 t is quite un-necessary o burden the reader withthe detailsof Lamy's argu-ments. t is sufficientonotethatman's natureprovides hesourceof two sets of arguments:the one, the argumentsfromdesigndrawnfromman'sbody; theother, hearguments rom henativeethical ndowmentf the soul. From theveryduality f man'sna-ture n infinitelyiseand powerful uthor s demonstrated.ponthis foundation hebody serves to reinstate hearguments romdesign, and the soul to give an objectivereality o those ethicalideas that,forSpinozisticnaturalismaccordingtoLamy) cannotbe more thanprojections f social experience.Moreover, hesuperiorityf thesoul to thebody sobviousfromthefact thatthesoul is capable of thoughtwhile thebodyis not.Fromthis tfollows hathuman xperiencemustreveal wo sets ofvalues,theonesuperior o theother.The soul's immortality,hichfollowsfrom ts indivisibilitynd immaterialityf substance, x-tendsthevalues of the soul from he finite o the nfinitephere.30With this,the whole of Christianmorality, gainst which thenaturalists nd free-thinkersre secretly n revolt, s of course,reinstated. he spiritof this morality, s Lamy has made clear,is renunciatory; hustheCartesiandualism has servedto providea metaphysical asis foran other-worldly orality. he deprecia-tion of senseas a source of knowledge, ccording o theCartesiandoctrine, ecomes n Lamy's hands an auxiliaryof thismorality.Reflection pon the nature of man, upon the conditionsof theunion of soul and body, reinforces he anti-naturalisticoint ofview.Man is notnaturallywithoutdutiesand without aw.3' Thedoctrine f innate deas is thustransformednto a doctrine f anoriginal thical ndowment. orrespondingly,hedoctrine hatthesensesare thesource of unclear nd indistinctdeas takes an ethi-cal turn.The union of soul and body subjectsthe former o theimpactof ideas fromsense aroused withinthe soul upon the

29P. io6. ' FirstTreatise, h.iii,pp. 171ff.8 P. i43 and ff.


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482 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW [VOL. XLVI.occasionof theperceptual rocess.The sense-ideas, owever,haveverybad effects pon the soul, turningt towardsearthly hings.In thiswaythecorruptionf humannaturemaybe explained;thesoul is thus"disadvantageously" ituatedwith respect o theper-formancefits chiefduties.Just s theobscurityf thesense-idea,as a knowledgefunction,annot be dispelledbut is incurable, nthesamemanner ense-experienceannotbe expurgated.As Lamystatesthematter, ur indispensable utiesare to flee from ense-objects and sense-experience. he soul and the bodydefine woutterly issimilar ets of values: the first, orn of the soul, ex-pressestheimmortalityf itsnature; the second,the interests fthe body and this life, for the sake of which Spinoza wroteametaphysics. artesianism, otScholasticism,tseems, s an other-worldlyphilosophy!The Refutation f Spinoza, so far, has proceeded ccording othe"Methodecommune"-it is a treatiseforthe generality. heRefutation n the Third Treatiseproceedsaccordingto the geo-metricalmethod, nd is the esotericdoctrine.The thirdtreatiseis aimed solelyat the first ook of theEthics,forwith the over-throw f thisthewholestructure f Spinozism s destroyed. amyproposed o conducthis enterpriseyaccepting,n themain, Spi-noza s axiomsand definitions.he definitionsf substance,mode,and attribute,re adopted,butnot thatof God. Lamy's own ax-ioms begin withthis, hat a reality,a verite, a bonte' u la per-fection& Unite are propertiesnseparablefromBeing.These arecalled transcendent ecause theyare necessarilyfound in every-thing hat s trulyBeing. Significantly,amy's second axiom as-sertsthatthoughts nobler thanextension.32 e seeks to estab-lish that the idea of substancenecessarily ncludesthe idea ofBeing.The very dea of attributenvolves henotionof substance,and therefore annotbe conceivedby itself. This purpose, ofcourse, is to maintainthat, fromattributeswhich can be con-ceived ndependentlyf other ttributes, e must nfer he exist-ence of diverse substances.Thus against Spinoza his refuta-tion must maintain heexistenceof several,and not of one sub-stance; or, whatfor himamounts o thesamething,he musturgethat ndependencef attributemplies ubstances s diverse s the

' Pp. 26-263.


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No. 5.1 CARTESIAN REFUTATIONS OF SPINOZA 483attributes.Withthishe establishes heCartesiandualismof sub-stances s thecentralprinciple ponwhich hegeometrical efuta-tionof Spinozismmustbe based.33At thesametimehe deniesthatthoughtnd extension re equally ttributesf God. For theessen-tial attribute f God is thought,while extensionconstitutesbeingdistinguished romGod, and excludedfrom heessenceofGod.3'So muchaccomplished,herefollowfor Lamy thepropositionswhichrestore heworldofextensions a creation fGod,freedomrather hannecessity orGod,and the existence f thinkingub-stance,man, reallydistinguished romGod and outside of hisessence. Cousin, examiningtwo obscure documentsconcerningthe relation f Cartesianism nd Spinozism,reachesthisconclu-sion.Mais onpeutdire ujourd'huioutea veriti: e n'estpas telou telprincipeartesien,'est 'espritmeme u dix-septiemeiecle, ui, presavoirproduite cartesianisme,'est-a-diren spiritualismeussi udi-cieuxque sublime,'entrainaitn meme emps ers a double rreurdu spinozismet du jansenisme.e dix-septiemeiecleesten effetcommembude l'ideede la toute-puissanceivine t du neant escreatures.I inclineanereconnaitreu'un eulacteur eritableur ascene e ce monde,neseule ause, n seuletre, ieu.La' est 'unitede la philosophice ce grand iecle, omme'uniti e la philosophicdusiecle uivantstdans 'affaiblissemente 'idee e Dieu, tdansunsentimentutre es forces e l'hommeuiaboutit unesorte 'apo-theose e l'humanite.95If Cousin's characterizationf the inner tendency f the Seven-teenthCentury e accepted, he mportancef theCartesiandual-ism in the Refutationof Spinoza may be reaffirmed.escartes'own distinction etween nfinitend finite ubstancewas shaky.Deny its validity, nd it could be argued thatSpinozism s gen-erated-or three pinozisms, ccording othemannernwhich he

results re interpreted.pinozism s a spiritualism; s a material-ism; or as a doctrine n whichthought nd extension,definedas attributes,would be merelyattributes f substance.In anycase, as Gerdil ndLamy wouldviewsucha result,tmightmplythe nothingness f the creature.A conclusionof thisorder,forthe Cardinalandthe Benedictine riest, ouldscarcely e tolerable.9Pp. 299-306. 34Pp. 3I9, 329."Op. cit. 295.


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484 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEWThe Cartesian dualism of finite ubstances-that is, a conceptof substancepermitting distinction etween nfinite nd finitesubstance-was of critical ignificanceorthe controversialnter-est of Lamy and Gerdil. f the Spinozistic ingle-substanceoc-trine could be construed s a materialism, efutationmightbefacilitated.n the finalanalysis, however, t was of greater m-portance o maintain real distinctionetweenGod and creature.The Cartesiandualism alone, as Gerdil and Lamy implicitly eel,will provideforthe realityof man,the realityof nature,whilepreventing oth the absorption f man in physicalnature and inGod, and finally reventinghe dentificationf God withnature'ssubstance. f Scholasticismbe regardedas overthrown,henontheCartesianbasis alone, Lamy evidently elieves, an atheismbeavoidedand the revoltagainst Christianmorality e defeated.

ALBERT G. A. BALZTHE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA

cartesian refutations of spinoza

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