carpinteria-summerland fire protection district, ca...jul 27, 2016 · carpinteria-summerland fire...

Standards of Response

Cover and Headquarters

Staffing Adequacy Study

2250 East Bidwell St., Ste #100 Folsom, CA 95630

(916) 458-5100 Fax: (916) 983-2090

Management Consultants Folsom (Sacramento), CA

Carpinteria-Summerland

Fire Protection

District, CA

Volume 3 of 4 –

Community Risk Assessment

July 27, 2016

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Carpinteria-Summerland Fire Protection District—Standards of Response Cover and Headquarters


Volume 3—Community Risk Assessment

Table of Contents page i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

VOLUME 1 of 4 – Executive Summary (separately bound)

VOLUME 2 of 4 – Standards of Response Cover and Headquarters Staffing Adequacy

Study Technical Report (separately bound)

VOLUME 3 of 4 – Community Risk Assessment (this volume)

Volume 3—Community Risk Assessment ...................................................................................1

1.1 Community Risk Assessment .......................................................................... 1

1.2 Risk Assessment Methodology ....................................................................... 1

1.3 Risk Assessment Summary ............................................................................. 4

1.4 Community Demographics .............................................................................. 6

1.5 Growth and Development ............................................................................... 8

1.6 Prior Risk Studies .......................................................................................... 10

1.7 Values at Risk ................................................................................................ 11

1.8 Hazard Identification ..................................................................................... 11

1.9 Risk Assessment Zones ................................................................................. 14

1.10 Probability of Occurrence ............................................................................. 14

1.11 Risk Factors ................................................................................................... 15

1.12 Service Capacity ............................................................................................ 15

1.13 Building Fire Risk ......................................................................................... 15

1.14 Earthquake / Seismic Activity Risk ............................................................... 30

1.15 Flood / Coastal Surge Risk ............................................................................ 39

1.16 Hazardous Materials Risk ............................................................................. 46

1.17 Landslide / Coastal Erosion Risk .................................................................. 50

1.18 Medical Emergency Risk .............................................................................. 54




Table of Contents page ii

1.19 Technical Rescue Risk .................................................................................. 57

1.20 Transportation Risk ....................................................................................... 59

1.21 Tsunami Risk ................................................................................................. 61

1.22 Wildland Fire Risk ........................................................................................ 64

1.23 Risk Mitigation .............................................................................................. 67

Appendix A—Risk Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria Matrices

Appendix B—Tsunami Inundation Maps

Table of Tables

Table 1—Probability of Occurrence Criteria .................................................................................. 2

Table 2—Impact Severity Factor Score Criteria ............................................................................ 2

Table 3—Overall Risk Rating ........................................................................................................ 3

Table 4—Overall Risk Summary by Hazard and Risk Zone .......................................................... 5

Table 5—Risk Summary by Risk Rating Priority .......................................................................... 5

Table 6—City of Carpinteria Demographics .................................................................................. 6

Table 7—Summerland Demographics ............................................................................................ 7

Table 8—Projected Growth – City of Carpinteria .......................................................................... 9

Table 9—Projected Growth – Summerland .................................................................................. 10

Table 10—Santa Barbara County Hazard Ranking ...................................................................... 11

Table 11—Probability of Occurrence Criteria .............................................................................. 15

Table 12—Building Fire Probability/Consequence Matrix .......................................................... 17

Table 13—Building Inventory by Use Classification/Risk Category........................................... 19

Table 14—Building Inventory by Risk Category ......................................................................... 20

Table 15—Building Inventory by Risk Category and Station ...................................................... 21

Table 16—Critical Facilities – Carpinteria-Summerland FPD ..................................................... 23

Table 17—Effective Response Force – Building Fires ................................................................ 29




Table of Contents page iii

Table 18—Building Fire Service Demand ................................................................................... 29

Table 19—Building Fire Risk Analysis Summary ....................................................................... 30

Table 20—Earthquake Risk Analysis Summary .......................................................................... 39

Table 21—Santa Barbara County Watersheds ............................................................................. 41

Table 22—Flood Hazard Area Probabilities................................................................................. 45

Table 23—Flood / Coastal Surge Risk Analysis Summary .......................................................... 46

Table 24—Average Annual Daily Truck Traffic.......................................................................... 48

Table 25—Hazardous Material Risk Service Demand ................................................................. 49

Table 26—Hazardous Material Risk Analysis Summary ............................................................. 50

Table 27—Landslide / Coastal Erosion Risk Analysis ................................................................. 54

Table 28—Medical Emergency Service Demand ......................................................................... 56

Table 29—Medical Emergency Risk Analysis Summary ............................................................ 57

Table 30—Technical Rescue Service Demand ............................................................................. 58

Table 31—Technical Rescue Risk Analysis Summary ................................................................ 58

Table 32— Average Annual Daily Traffic Volume ..................................................................... 59

Table 33—Transportation Risk Service Demand ......................................................................... 60

Table 34—Transportation Risk Analysis Summary ..................................................................... 61

Table 35—Tsunami Risk Analysis ............................................................................................... 63

Table 36—Large Regional Wildland Fire Summary .................................................................... 66

Table 37—Wildland Fire Service Demand................................................................................... 66

Table 38—Wildland Fire Risk Analysis Summary ...................................................................... 67

Table 39—Engine Company Inspections ..................................................................................... 69

Table 40—Engine Company WUI Inspections ............................................................................ 75

Table of Figures

Figure 1—Overall Risk Calculation Flowchart .............................................................................. 3

Figure 2—CFAI Fire and Non-Fire Hazards ................................................................................ 12




Table of Contents page iv

Figure 3—Carpinteria-Summerland FPD Risk Assessment Zones .............................................. 14

Figure 4—Building Fire Progression Timeline ............................................................................ 18

Figure 5—ISO High Fire Flow Sites ............................................................................................ 22

Figure 6—Critical Facilities ......................................................................................................... 26

Figure 7—Population Density ...................................................................................................... 27

Figure 8—Santa Barbara County Earthquake Faults .................................................................... 33

Figure 9—Significant Historic Earthquakes ................................................................................. 34

Figure 10—Ground Shake Potential ............................................................................................. 35

Figure 11—Liquefaction Potential ............................................................................................... 36

Figure 12—Probability of a M > 6.7 Earthquake ......................................................................... 38

Figure 13—Special Flood Hazard Areas ...................................................................................... 43

Figure 14—Hazardous Materials Sites ......................................................................................... 47

Figure 15—Survival Rate vs. Time of Defibrillation ................................................................... 55

Figure 16—Wildland Fire Hazard Severity Zones ....................................................................... 64

Figure 17—Wildland Fuel Treatment Network ............................................................................ 74

VOLUME 4 of 4 – Map Atlas (separately bound)




Volume 3—Community Risk Assessment page 1

VOLUME 3—COMMUNITY RISK ASSESSMENT

1.1 COMMUNITY RISK ASSESSMENT

The third element of the Standards of Coverage (SOC)

process is a community risk assessment or analysis. The

objectives of a community risk assessment are to:

1. Identify the hazards with potential to adversely

impact the community or jurisdiction

2. Identify specific factors likely to influence the impact severity for each identified

hazard

3. Quantify the probability of occurrence for each identified hazard

4. Determine overall risk by hazard

A Hazard is broadly defined as a situation or condition that can cause or contribute to harm.

Hazard examples include fire, medical emergency, vehicle collision, earthquake, flood, etc.

Probability is the likelihood of occurrence of a particular hazard, and Impacts or Consequences

are the adverse effects that a hazard occurrence has on people, property, and/or the community as

a whole. Risk is broadly defined as the probability of hazard occurrence in combination with the

likely severity of resultant impacts, and Risk Vulnerability is a measure of the probability of the

existing deployment model’s ability to protect against or mitigate a specific hazard.

1.2 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

The methodology employed by Citygate to assess and quantify community risk as an integral

element of an SOC study incorporates the following elements:

1. Identification of geographic risk assessment sub-zones (risk zones) appropriate

for the community or jurisdiction

2. Identification of the fire and non-fire natural and human-caused hazards with

potential to adversely impact the community or jurisdiction

3. Determination of probability of future occurrence for each hazard by risk zone

considering historical service demand and the probability of occurrence criteria

described in Table 1. Probability of occurrence percentage is determined by

multiplying the number of historical responses to a particular hazard by the total

number of responses to all hazards over the same time period.

SOC ELEMENT 3 OF 8

COMMUNITY RISK

ASSESSMENT





Table 1—Probability of Occurrence Criteria

Probability Score Description Criteria

1 Very Low Less than 10% probability of occurrence

2 Low 10%-25% probability of occurrence

3 Moderate 26%-75% probability of occurrence

4 High 76%-90% probability of occurrence

5 Very High Greater than 90% probability of occurrence

4. Identification and evaluation of appropriate impact severity factors for each

hazard by risk zone using agency/jurisdiction-specific data and information, and

the impact severity factor score criteria described in Table 2 and in Appendix A.

Table 2—Impact Severity Factor Score Criteria

Risk Factor Score Description

0 Risk factor does not contribute to overall impact severity

1 Risk factor negligibly contributes to increased overall impact severity, or significantly contributes to reducing overall impact severity

2 Risk factor minimally contributes to increased overall impact severity, or contributes moderately to reducing overall impact severity

3 Risk factor moderately contributes to increased overall impact severity

4 Risk factor significantly contributes to increased overall impact severity

5 Risk factor seriously contributes to increased overall impact severity

5. Calculation of overall risk score for each hazard by multiplying the sum of impact

factor scores by the probability of occurrence score for each risk zone.

6. Determination of overall risk rating by risk zone based on overall risk score as

described in Table 3.





Table 3—Overall Risk Rating

Overall Risk SCORE

Overall Risk RATING

0-31 LOW

32-62 MODERATE

63-94 HIGH

95-125 VERY HIGH

Figure 1 illustrates the methodology used to quantify overall risk for each hazard by risk zone.

Figure 1—Overall Risk Calculation Flowchart

Citygate used multiple data sources for this study to understand the risks to be protected in the

Carpinteria-Summerland FPD as follows:

U.S. Census Bureau population data and demographics

Insurance Services Office (ISO) building fire flow and construction data

City of Carpinteria and Santa Barbara County Geographical Information Systems

(GIS) data

City of Carpinteria and Santa Barbara County General Plan and Zoning

information

2011 Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan

(MJHMP).

Probability of Occurrence

Score (Range = 1-5)

Total Impact Factors Score (Range = 0-25)

Overall Risk Score

(Range = 0–125)

Overall Risk

Rating

Low

Moderate

High

Very High

X = =





1.3 RISK ASSESSMENT SUMMARY

Citygate’s evaluation of the various risks likely to adversely impact the Carpinteria-Summerland

Fire Protection District yields the following conclusions:

1. The District has a diverse suburban population density within its core populated

areas, and rural population densities in the outlying areas.

2. The District’s population is projected to grow by a very modest 3.77% over the

next 20 years.

3. The District has a mix of residential, commercial, office, and light industrial

buildings typical of other smaller California coastal communities.

4. The District has varying levels of risk relative to 10 hazards specifically related to

fire district services as follows:

a. Building Fire

b. Earthquake/Seismic Activity

c. Flood / Coastal Surge

d. Hazardous Materials

e. Landslide / Coastal Erosion

f. Medical Emergency

g. Technical Rescue

h. Transportation

i. Tsunami

j. Wildland Fire.





Table 4 summarizes the District’s overall risk by hazard and risk zone.

Table 4—Overall Risk Summary by Hazard and Risk Zone

Hazard

Risk Assessment Zone

1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-1 2-2

Building Fire Low Low Low Low Low Low

Earthquake / Seismic Activity Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate

Flood / Coastal Surge Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Low Moderate

Hazardous Materials Low Low Low Low Low Low

Landslide / Coastal Erosion Low Low Low Low Low Low

Medical Emergency Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Low Low

Technical Rescue Low Low Low Low Low Low

Transportation Low Low Low Low Low Low

Tsunami Low Moderate Low Low Low Low

Wildland Fire Low Low Low High High Moderate

Table 5 summarizes the District’s overall vulnerability by risk rating.

Table 5—Risk Summary by Risk Rating Priority

Hazard

Risk Assessment Zone

1-1 1-2 1-3 1-4 2-1 2-2

Wildland Fire Low Low Low High High Moderate

Earthquake/Seismic Activity Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate

Flood / Coastal Surge Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Low Moderate

Medical Emergency Moderate Moderate Moderate Low Low Low

Tsunami Low Moderate Low Low Low Low

Building Fire Low Low Low Low Low Low

Hazardous Materials Low Low Low Low Low Low

Landslide / Coastal Erosion Low Low Low Low Low Low

Technical Rescue Low Low Low Low Low Low

Transportation Low Low Low Low Low Low





The following sections will describe the risk analysis process and risk factors used to determine

overall risk as shown in Table 4 in more detail.

1.4 COMMUNITY DEMOGRAPHICS

Table 6 summarizes key demographic data for the City of Carpinteria.

Table 6—City of Carpinteria Demographics

Demographic 2000 2014 Percentage /

Percent Change

Population 14,194 13,323 -6.14%

Under 5 Years 890 689 5.17%

5-19 Years 3,142 1,929 14.48%

20-64 Years 8,396 8,455 63.46%

Over 64 Years 1,766 2,250 16.89%

Median Age 35.9 43.6 21.45%

Housing Units 5,464 5,615 2.76%

Owner-Occupied 2,928 2,804 49.94%

Renter-Occupied 2,061 2,278 40.57%

Employment

Labor Force1 7,500 7,700 2.67%

Employment2 6,800 7,300 94.81%

Ethnicity

White 7,266 6,554 49.19%

Hispanic/Latino 6,175 6,002 45.05%

Black/African American 84 28 0.21%

Asian 338 519 3.90%

Other 331 220 1.65%

Birthplace

U.S.-Born 10,691 N/A 75.32%

Foreign-Born 3,686 N/A 25.97%

Education3

High School Graduate 1,732 1,872 19.10%

Undergraduate College Degree 1,704 1,685 17.20%

Graduate/Professional Degree 741 1,205 12.30% 1 October 2015 data - California Employment Development Department

2 Based on estimated 2014 population

3 Age 25 or older

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; California Employment Development Department





Table 7 summarizes key demographic data for Summerland.

Table 7—Summerland Demographics

Demographic 2000 2014 Percentage /

Percent Change

Population 1,545 1,575 1.94%

Under 5 Years 51 140 8.89%

5-19 Years 187 52 3.30%

20-64 Years 1,127 1,176 74.67%

Over 64 Years 180 207 13.14%

Median Age 41.7 48.8 17.03%

Housing Units 823 881 7.05%

Owner-Occupied 362 442 50.17%

Renter-Occupied 325 333 37.80%

Employment

Labor Force1 N/A 800 N/A

Employment2 N/A 800 100.00%

Ethnicity

White 1,303 1,100 69.84%

Hispanic/Latino 115 97 6.16%

Black/African American 7 27 1.71%

Asian 37 225 14.29%

Other 83 126 8.00%

Birthplace

U.S.-Born 1,304 1,338 84.95%

Foreign-Born 189 237 15.05%

Education3

High School Graduate 102 39 3.20%

Undergraduate College Degree 349 522 42.90%

Graduate/Professional Degree 313 123 10.10% 1 October 2015 data - California Employment Development Department

2 Based on estimated 2014 population

3 Age 25 or older

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; California Employment Development Department





1.5 GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT

1.5.1 City of Carpinteria

Overview

The City of Carpinteria encompasses 7.3 square miles; of which 2.6 square miles is land and 4.7

square miles are tidelands. Approximately 42% of land use within the City is residential, with

23% commercial/industrial, and the remainder dedicated to public facilities, parks/open space,

agriculture, and transportation corridors.1

Land Use and Future Development

The City’s General Plan Land Use Element emphasizes preserving the essential character of our

small beach town, its family-oriented residential neighborhoods, its unique visual and natural

resources and its open, rural surroundings while enhancing recreational, cultural, and economic

opportunities for our citizens.2 According to City Manager David Durflinger, the City has

essential reached build out under current land use and zoning policies with no Sphere of

Influence beyond its current jurisdictional boundaries, and city and regional land use policies

discouraging the conversion of agricultural uses. Based on the General Plan and allowable uses

in the undeveloped/underdeveloped areas of the City, any future growth will occur in the

commercial/industrial area along the coastal bluffs on the southeastern edge of the City, with

some additional minor infill/re-use potential throughout the remainder of the City.

The General Plan land use objectives as follows provide the framework for land use policies

guiding future development:

Establish the basis for orderly, well-planned urban development while protecting

coastal resources and providing for greater access and recreational opportunities

for the public.

Protect the natural environment within and surrounding Carpinteria.

Preserve the small beach town character of the built environment of Carpinteria,

encouraging compatible revitalization and avoiding sprawl development at the

City’s edge.

Influence land use decision-making, use, and development patterns in the

unincorporated Carpinteria Valley to be supportive of the California Coastal Act

1 Source: City of Carpinteria General Plan Land Use Element, Table LU-2 (April 2003)

2 Source: City of Carpinteria General Plan, Local Coastal Plan, and Environmental Impact Report (April 2003)





and City objectives to preserve unique coastal resources by establishing open-

field agricultural use as the predominant use in the unincorporated Valley.

Maintain availability of agriculture, coastal-dependent industry and visitor-

serving commercial development including hotels, restaurants, and commercial

recreation uses.

Create flexible land use and zoning standards for general commercial and

industrial parcels that allow opportunities for residential use to expand, as

determined appropriate by the City, in response to changing needs relative to the

jobs/housing balance locally and in the region, and as incentive toward the

development of affordable housing.

Adopt and amend as necessary a Sphere of Influence that serves to establish the

basis for annexation of certain land contiguous to city limits.

Growth Potential

Table 8 summarizes key growth projections for the City of Carpinteria.

Table 8—Projected Growth – City of Carpinteria

Growth Factor 2014 20351

Projected Growth (Units)

Projected Growth

(Percentage)

Population 13,323 13,825 502 3.77%

Housing Units 5,615 6,321 706 12.57%

Commercial/Industrial Development2,3

2,576 2,772 196 7.61% 1 Or at projected build out

2 Thousand square feet (KSF)

3 Initial development figure is for 2003

Source: U.S. Census Bureau; Santa Barbara County Association of Governments (SBCAG)

1.5.2 Summerland

Overview

The Summerland Planning Area3 is located in the southern portion of Santa Barbara County

between the Cities of Santa Barbara and Carpinteria, and includes the unincorporated community

of Summerland. The Planning Area is bordered by Ortega Ridge Road on the west, the

3 County of Santa Barbara, Summerland Community Plan – 2014 Final (May 2014)





Montecito Planning Area on the north, Padaro Lane on the east, and the Pacific Ocean on the

south.4 Most of the Community Plan area is within the Coastal Zone.

Land Use and Future Development

Land use within the Summerland Planning Area is governed by the goals, objectives, and

policies contained in the Santa Barbara County General Plan Land Use Element. Key land use

planning issues within the Coastal Zone in Santa Barbara County include:

Concentrating new development within or in close proximity to existing

developed areas

Land divisions outside of existing developed areas

Service system capacities and availability of resources to serve current and future

land uses

Planned development within designated urban areas.

Growth Potential

Table 9 summarizes potential future development within the Summerland Planning Area.

Table 9—Projected Growth – Summerland

Growth Factor 2013 20351

Projected Growth (Units)

Projected Growth

(Percentage)

Population3,4

1,255 4,865 3,610 287.65%

Housing Units5 638 829 191 29.94%

Commercial Development2 111 130 19 17.12%

1 Or at projected build out

2 1,000 square feet (KSF)

3 Source for 2013 population estimate: US Census Bureau (Summerland CDP)

4 Source for 2035 population estimate: SBCAG Regional Growth Forecast 2010-2040 (Table 7) for

Carpinteria unincorporated area 5 Source: US Census Bureau (2013); Summerland Community Plan - Table 1a (build out)

1.6 PRIOR RISK STUDIES

The federal Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (DMA2000), which amended the Robert T. Stafford

Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), emphasizes the need for state and

local entities to closely coordinate disaster planning and mitigation efforts to reduce the severity





of disaster impacts. In addition to continuing the requirement for a state mitigation plan as a

condition of federal disaster assistance, DMA2000 creates a similar requirement for local entities

and creates incentives for increased coordination and integration of mitigation activities among

local jurisdictions.

The September 2011 Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan

(MJHMP) identifies and prioritizes seven hazards as shown in Table 10.

Table 10—Santa Barbara County Hazard Ranking

Hazard and Ranking Planning Consideration Based on Hazard Level

1 Flooding (including coastal surge) Significant

2 Wildfire Significant

3 Agricultural Pests and Disease Significant

4 Earthquake Significant

5 Landslide / Coastal Erosion Significant

6 Dam Failure Limited

7 Tsunami Limited

Source: Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan – Table 5.3

1.7 VALUES AT RISK

Community values at risk from a hazard occurrence include people and the natural and built

environments. Specific values at risk are identified and discussed in more detail under each

specific hazard.

1.8 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Citygate utilizes prior risk studies where available, the fire and-non-fire hazards as identified by

the Commission on Fire Accreditation International (CFAI), and agency/jurisdiction-specific

data and information to identify the hazards to be evaluated for this study.

The primary hazards identified in the 2011 Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard

Mitigation Plan, as they relate to Carpinteria-Summerland Fire Protection District services,

include:

1. Flooding

2. Wildfire





3. Earthquake

4. Landslide

5. Dam Failure

6. Tsunami

Due to limited risk, dam failure has not been included in this analysis.

Figure 2 summarizes the fire and non-fire hazards as established by CFAI.

Figure 2—CFAI Fire and Non-Fire Hazards

Source: CFAI Standards of Cover (5th Edition)

The following ten hazards were evaluated for this study based on the hazards identified in the

2011 Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan, and the fire and non-

fire hazards identified by CFAI as they relate to the services provided by the Carpinteria-

Summerland Fire Protection District:

1. Building Fire

2. Earthquake/Seismic Activity

3. Flood / Coastal Surge





4. Hazardous Materials

5. Landslide / Coastal Erosion

6. Medical Emergency

7. Technical Rescue

8. Transportation

9. Tsunami

10. Wildland Fire





1.9 RISK ASSESSMENT ZONES

The District’s existing six Fire Management/Demand Zones were utilized as risk assessment

zones for this analysis as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3—Carpinteria-Summerland FPD Risk Assessment Zones

1.10 PROBABILITY OF OCCURRENCE

Probability of occurrence refers to the likely future occurrence of a hazard or risk over a specific

time period. Since the CFAI Agency Accreditation process requires annual review of an

agency’s risk assessment and baseline performance measures, Citygate recommends using the 12

months following completion of an SOC study as an appropriate period for the probability of

occurrence evaluation. Table 11 describes the criteria used in evaluating the probability of future

occurrence for each hazard or risk. Probability of occurrence percentage is determined by





multiplying the number of historical responses to a particular hazard by the total number of

responses to all hazards over the same time period.

Table 11—Probability of Occurrence Criteria

Probability Score Probability of Occurrence Description

1 Very Low Less than 10% probability of occurrence

2 Low 10%-25% probability of occurrence

3 Moderate 26%-75% probability of occurrence

4 High 76%-90% probability of occurrence

5 Very High Greater than 90% probability of occurrence

1.11 RISK FACTORS

Elements to be considered in a community risk assessment include factors that influence service

demand, service capacity, probability of hazard occurrence, and severity of impacts or

consequences of a hazard occurrence relative to life, property, the environment, and overall

community resilience.

In conducting a community risk assessment, Citygate examines prior risk studies, community

demographics including current and projected population, land use, future development

potential, employment, and building occupancy data as available, prior service demand data, and

risk-specific service capacity.

1.12 SERVICE CAPACITY

Service capacity refers to the size of an agency’s daily response force; the size, types, and

condition of its response fleet and any specialized equipment; core and specialized performance

competencies; resource distribution and concentration; availability of automatic and/or mutual

aid; and any other agency-specific factors influencing its ability to meet current and prospective

future service demand relative to the risks to be protected.

1.13 BUILDING FIRE RISK

One of the primary hazards in any community is building fire. Citygate used available data from

the City of Carpinteria, Santa Barbara County, the U.S. Census Bureau, the Insurance Services

Office (ISO), and the Carpinteria-Summerland Fire Protection District to assist in identifying and

quantifying the District’s building fire risk.





1.13.1 Building Risk Categories

CFAI identifies five building risk categories as follows:

Low Risk Occupancies – includes detached garages, storage sheds, outbuildings, and similar

buildings that pose a relatively low risk of harm to humans or the community if damaged or

destroyed by fire.

Moderate Risk Occupancies – includes detached single-family or two-family dwellings, mobile

homes, commercial and industrial buildings less than 10,000 square feet without a high hazard

fire load, aircraft, railroad facilities, and similar buildings where loss of life or property damage

is limited to the single building.

High Risk Occupancies – includes apartment/condominium buildings, commercial and

industrial buildings more than 10,000 square feet without a high hazard fire load, low-occupant

load buildings with high fuel loading or hazardous materials, and similar occupancies with

potential for substantial loss of life or unusual property damage or financial impact.

Special Risk Occupancies – includes single or multiple buildings that require an Effective

Response Force (ERF) greater than what is appropriate for the risk which predominates the

surrounding area such as apartment/condominium complexes more than 25,000 square feet,

Critical Infrastructure/Key Resource (CIKR) facilities, commercial/industrial occupancies with

fire flows greater than 3,500 GPM, vacant/abandoned buildings, buildings with required fire

flow exceeding available water supply, and similar occupancies with high-life hazard or large

fire loss potential.

Maximum Risk Occupancies – includes buildings or facilities with unusually high risk

requiring an ERF involving a significant augmentation of resources and personnel, and where a

fire would pose the potential for a catastrophic event involving large loss of life and/or

significant economic impact to the community.

1.13.2 Building Fire Risk Factors

Table 12 illustrates the probability and consequences for each of the building fire risk categories.

Probability is the likelihood of a fire occurring in a particular occupancy type, and consequences

are the probable adverse impacts that the fire will have on people, property, and the community.





Table 12—Building Fire Probability/Consequence Matrix

Low Consequence High Consequence

Hig

h P

rob

ab

ilit

y

Moderate Risk

(High Probability)

(Low Consequence)

Maximum Risk

(High Probability)

(High Consequence)

Lo

w P

rob

ab

ilit

y

Low Risk

(Low Probability)

(Low Consequence)

High/Special Risk

(Low Probability)

(High Consequence)

Source: CFAI Standards of Cover, 5th Edition

Resource deployment (distribution/concentration), staffing, and response time are three critical

factors influencing favorable outcomes for building fire risk. Figure 4 illustrates the progression

timeline of a building fire, and shows that a response time5 of 7:30 minutes or less is necessary to

stop a building fire before it reaches flashover, which is the point at which the entire room erupts

into fire after all of the combustible objects in that room have reached their ignition temperature.

Human survival in a room after flashover is extremely unlikely.

5 Time interval from time of receipt of 9-1-1 call to initiation of suppression actions





Figure 4—Building Fire Progression Timeline

Source: http://www.firesprinklerassoc.org

Building Inventory

The District has a mix of building occupancies typical of a smaller coastal California city and

surrounding agricultural-based unincorporated areas as summarized in Table 13.

http://www.firesprinklerassoc.org/





Table 13—Building Inventory by Use Classification/Risk Category

Occupancy Classification Station 1 Station 2 Total Risk

Category1

Assembly

A-1 Theater

1 0 1 Maximum

A-2 Bar/Restaurant

47 6 53 High

A-3 Public Assembly

27 5 32 High

A-4 Indoor Sports

1 0 1 Maximum

A-5 Outdoor Activities

2 0 2 High

Business Business/Office 242 18 260 Moderate

Education Schools 17 0 17 High

Factory

F-1 Moderate Risk

23 1 24 High

F-2 Moderate Risk

2 0 2 High

Hazardous

H-1 Explosion Hazard

1 0 1 Special

H-2 Accelerated Burn

9 0 9 Special

H-3 High Hazard

2 0 2 Special

H-4 Health Hazard

8 1 9 Special

H-5 Semi-Conductor

0 0 0 Special

Institutional

I-1 Assisted Living

0 0 0 Special

I-2 Hospital/SNF

0 0 0 Special

I-2.1 Ambulatory

0 0 0 Special

I-3 Restrained

0 0 0 Special

I-4 Day Care

1 0 1 Special





Occupancy Classification Station 1 Station 2 Total Risk

Category1

Mercantile Retail/Wholesale

Store/Market 154 32 186 High

Residential

R-1 Hotel/Motel

8 2 10 High

R-2 Multi-Family

107 30 137 High

R-3 Single Family

N/A N/A N/A Moderate

R-3.1 Group Care ≤ 6

12 1 13 High

R-4 Care Facility > 6

0 0 0 High

Storage

S-1 Moderate Hazard

11 3 14 Moderate

S-2 Low Hazard

2 0 2 Moderate

Utility U

Miscellaneous 68 31 99 Moderate

Total 745 130 875 1 CFAI High, Special, or Maximum risk occupancies

Source: Carpinteria-Summerland FPD

Table 14 further summarizes the District’s building inventory by risk category.

Table 14—Building Inventory by Risk Category

Building Risk Category

Number of Buildings

Moderate1 375

High 476

Special 22

Maximum 2

Total 875 1 Does not include single-family residential

dwellings





Table 15 further summarizes building inventory by risk category and station response area. No

data was available for Group R-3 single-family residential occupancies.

Table 15—Building Inventory by Risk Category and Station

Risk Category Station 1 Station 2 Total

Moderate1 323 52 375

High 399 77 476

Special 21 1 22

Maximum 2 0 2

Total 745 130 875 1 Does not include Group R-3 single-family residential dwellings

High Fire Flow Requirements

One of the factors used by ISO is “Needed Fire Flow” (NFF), which is the amount of water that

would be required, in gallons-per-minute (GPM), if the building were seriously involved in fire.

For the Carpinteria-Summerland Fire Protection District, the ISO database identifies 111

buildings evaluated, of which 52 have a NFF of less than 1,500 GPM, 38 have a NFF of 1,500-

3,000 GPM, 20 have a NFF of 3,000-5,000 GPM, and one has a NFF of more than 5,000 GPM.

All sites with a NFF>=1500 GPM are illustrated in Figure 5.





Figure 5—ISO High Fire Flow Sites

This is a significant amount of firefighting water to deploy, and a major fire at any one of these

buildings would require a significant commitment of trained personnel. Using a generally

accepted figure of 50 GPM per firefighter on large building fires, a fire in a building requiring

1,500 GPM would require 30 firefighters, which is more than the District’s current initial ERF of

20 firefighters for structure fires.

Critical Facilities

Critical facilities are defined as public or private facilities that, because of their function or

uniqueness, are considered essential to a community’s socioeconomic activities and overall

resiliency from adverse events. Critical facilities are generally divided into two categories:

1. Essential Facilities – includes facilities that provide key services essential to

community resiliency such as police stations, fire stations, hospitals, emergency





operations centers, key government offices, schools, key transportation structures,

lifeline utilities, etc.

2. High Potential Loss Facilities – includes facilities that if damaged or destroyed

would result in a significant adverse socioeconomic impact to the community.

The 2011 Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan and the 2012

Carpinteria Annex to the Santa Barbara County MJHMP identfy 70 critical facilities, valued at

nearly $314 million, within the District as identified in Table 16.

Table 16—Critical Facilities – Carpinteria-Summerland FPD

Critical Facility Type1 Value

1 Carpinteria Fire Station 1 Essential Facility $7,150,000

2 Carpinteria Fire Station 2 Essential Facility $4,075,000

3 Carpinteria-Summerland FPD Headquarters Essential Facility $60,000

4 Wastewater Treatment Plant Essential Facility $60,000,000

5 Sewage Pump Station 1 Essential Facility $2,000,000



8 Sewage Pump Station 5 Essential Facility $500,000

9 Sewage Pump Station 6 Essential Facility $400,000


11 Water District Main Office Essential Facility $1,400,000

12 Water District Maintenance Building Essential Facility $2,266,000

13 Headquarters Well Essential Facility $1,500,000

14 Headquarters Filtration Plant Essential Facility $500,000

15 Headquarters Well Control Building Essential Facility $700,000

16 Headquarters Well Enclosure Essential Facility $90,000

17 Lateral 10 Booster Station Essential Facility $10,000

18 Foothill Tank Essential Facility $5,500,000

19 Foothill Tank Control Building Essential Facility $1,500,000

20 El Carro Well Essential Facility $1,500,000

21 El Carro Well Filtration Plant Essential Facility $1,500,000

22 Lyon Well Essential Facility $800,000

23 Smillie Well Essential Facility $400,000






24 High School Well Essential Facility $1,500,000

25 High School Well Treatment Plant Essential Facility $800,000

26 Carpinteria Reservoir Essential Facility N/A

27 Carpinteria Reservoir Control Building Essential Facility N/A

28 Lateral 30 Booster Station Essential Facility $180,000

29 Gobernador Booster Station Essential Facility $58,000

30 Gobernador Reservoir Essential Facility $1,250,000

31 Shepard Mesa Tank Essential Facility $500,000

32 CUSD Offices Essential Facility N/A

33 Carpinteria High School Essential Facility $28,535,898

34 Carpinteria Middle School Essential Facility $14,366,233

35 Aliso Elementary School Essential Facility $6,457,908

36 Canalino Elementary School Essential Facility $10,583,606

37 Rincon/Foothill High School Essential Facility $210,720

38 Carpinteria Children's Project @ Main Essential Facility $4,360,870

39 City Hall (Sheriff's Substation, Maintenance) Essential Facility $4,436,787

40 Bridge #51C-0143 Essential Facility $10,000,000




44 Viola Fields Public Facilities Essential Facility $262,210

45 Cavalli Property Essential Facility $1,320,927

46 Monte Vista Park Public Facilities Essential Facility $59,810

47 Veteran's Memorial Building Essential Facility $1,657,801

48 8th Street Bridge @ Carpinteria Creek Essential Facility $1,000,000

49 Hwy. 101 Interchange @ Ballard Ave. Essential Facility N/A

50 Hwy. 101 Interchange @ Casitas Pass Rd. Essential Facility N/A

51 Hwy. 101 Interchange @ Linden Ave. Essential Facility N/A

52 Hwy. 101 Interchange @ Cramer Place Essential Facility N/A

53 Hwy. 101 Interchange @ Via Real Essential Facility N/A

54 Hwy. 101 Interchange @ Camino Carreta Essential Facility N/A

55 Downtown "T" Business District HPLF $100,000,000






56 Casitas Pass Business District HPLF N/A

57 Eastside Corridor Business Parks HPLF N/A

58 Westside Corridor Business District HPLF N/A

59 Santa Monica Business District HPLF N/A

60 Southern CA Edison Substation Essential Facility N/A

61 Verizon Tower Essential Facility N/A

62 Natural Gas Oderant Station - Pita's Point Essential Facility N/A

63 Natural Gas Oderant (Carpinteria Oil & Gas) Essential Facility N/A

64 Casitas Pier HPLF N/A

65 Union Pacific RR and Amtrak Essential Facility N/A

66 Bailard Residential Property HPLF N/A

67 Carpinteria Valley Museum of History HPLF N/A

68 Carpinteria Public Library Essential Facility N/A

69 PHD Carpinteria Clinic Essential Facility N/A

70 Sansum Clinic - Carpinteria Essential Facility N/A

Total $316,891,770 1 HPLF – High Potential Loss Facility (not an essential service facility)

Source: 2100 Santa Barbara County MJHMP – Table 6.5; City of Carpinteria Annex to Santa Barbara County

MJHMP - Section 10.51





Figure 6 illustrates the locations of the District’s critical facilities.

Figure 6—Critical Facilities





Population Density

The Commission on Fire Accreditation International, in its latest edition of Standards of Cover

(6th

Edition), recommends that population density be considered as a risk factor for all hazard

types. Figure 7 segregates the District’s population densities.

Figure 7—Population Density

Building Density

Building density is another risk factor influencing building fire severity. For residential

buildings, density is expressed in dwelling units per acre (DU/Ac.). For non-residential

buildings, density is expressed as gross floor area ratio (FAR), where 1.0 represents a single-

story building covering 100% of the parcel, 2.0 represents a two-story building covering 100% of

the parcel, etc.





Water Supply

A reliable public water system providing adequate volume, pressure, and flow duration in close

proximity to all buildings is a critical factor influencing a community’s building fire impact

severity.

The Montecito Water District (Summerland area) and the Carpinteria Valley Water District

provide the potable water for District residents and businesses. Several areas of the District have

insufficient fire flow, including:

6600-7000 block of Gobernador Canyon Road

3100 block of Foothill Road

Santa Claus Lane

In addition, although there are no fire hydrants in the following areas of the District, some

properties have stored water fire protection systems with water storage capacity from 2,000-

20,000 gallons with fire department compatible discharge valves.

Properties north of Foothill Road

Properties off Toro Canyon Road

Properties off Hidden Valley Lane

Properties off the Toro/Ladera connector

Buildings with Automatic Fire Sprinkler Systems

Some of the District’s commercial and newer residential buildings are protected by automatic

fire sprinkler systems, although no data was available from the District to quantify these by

specific location or occupancy classification.

Building Fire Service Capacity

The District’s service capacity for building fire risk consists of a minimum daily on-duty

response force of nine personnel staffing two or three apparatus6 from two fire stations. In

addition, the District has automatic aid or mutual aid agreements with adjacent fire agencies, and

is also a signatory to the Santa Barbara County Mutual Aid Agreement. The District’s Effective

Response Force (ERF) for building fires is summarized in Table 17.

6 Depending on staffing level





Table 17—Effective Response Force – Building Fires

Agency Resources Personnel

Carpinteria-Summerland FPD 2 Engines 8

Carpinteria-Summerland FPD Batt. Chief 1

Montecito FPD 1 Engine 4

Ventura County Fire Department 1 Engine 3

City of Santa Barbara 1 Truck 4

Total 6 20

The NFPA7 recommends a minimum ERF of 14-15 personnel for a detached, single-family

dwelling fire, and 27-28 personnel for a multi-family dwelling/apartment fire or commercial

strip-mall fire, all arriving within 10:20 minutes total response time8 at 90% or greater reliability.

1.13.3 Building Fire Risk Service Demand

Over the past three years, there were a total of 25 building fires comprising 0.53% of total

service demand over the same time period as shown in Table 18.

Table 18—Building Fire Service Demand

Station FY

2012/13 FY

2013/14 FY

2014/15 Total

1 3 4 8 15

2 3 2 5 10

Total 6 6 13 25

Percent of Total Service Demand

0.43% 0.41% 0.70% 0.53%

Source: Fire District incident records

7 NFPA 1710 – Standard for the Organization and Deployment of Fire Suppression Operations, Emergency Medical

Operations, and Special Operations to the Public by Career Fire Departments (2016 Edition) 8 Total Response Time = time interval from receipt of 9-1-1 call to arrival of last resource at fire scene





1.13.4 Building Fire Risk Analysis

Table 19 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the District’s building fire risk.

Table 19—Building Fire Risk Analysis Summary

Risk Zone

Probability of

Occurrence

Impact Severity Factors

Risk Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating Population

Density Building Density

High-Risk Occupancies /

Critical Facilities

Water Supply

Service Capacity

1-1 1 3 2 4 1 5 15 15 Low

1-2 1 3 3 4 1 5 16 16 Low

1-3 1 1 1 2 4 5 13 13 Low

1-4 1 0 1 1 4 5 11 11 Low

2-1 1 0 1 1 3 5 10 10 Low

2-2 1 1 2 2 2 4 11 11 Low

As Table 19 illustrates, the District’s building fire risk is Low across all six risk zones, reflecting

a low probability of occurrence with low to moderate impact severity scores for population and

building density, percentage of high-risk occupancies and critical facilities, water supply, and

building fire service capacity. The high service capacity severity factor scores reflect the

District’s inability to provide a minimum Effective Response Force (ERF) of 27 personnel

within a total response time of 10:20 minutes for a multi-family residential, apartment, or

commercial occupancy fire.

1.14 EARTHQUAKE / SEISMIC ACTIVITY RISK9

An earthquake is a sudden, rapid shaking of the ground caused by the breaking and shifting of

rock beneath the earth’s surface or along fault lines. Sometimes the movement is gradual. At

other times, the plates are locked together, unable to release the accumulating energy. When the

accumulated energy grows strong enough, the plates break free causing the ground to shake.

Most earthquakes occur at the boundaries where the plates meet, commonly called faults;

however, some earthquakes occur in the middle of plates.

A fault is a fracture in the earth’s crust along which movement has occurred either suddenly

during earthquakes or slowly during a process called creep. Cumulative displacement may be

9 Reference: 2011 Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdiction Hazard Mitigation Plan (Section 5.6)





tens or even hundreds of miles as movement occurs over geologic time. Although fault lines are

often represented as linear, most fault lines can be very intricate with multiple fractures along

curved, complex paths. Fault displacement episodes are generally small, usually less than several

feet, and are commonly separated by tens, hundreds, or thousands of years. Damage associated

with fault-related ground rupture is normally confined to a fairly narrow band along the trend of

the fault. Structures are often not able to withstand fault rupture and utilities crossing faults are at

risk of damage. Fault displacement involves forces so great that it is generally not feasible

(structurally or economically) to design and build structures to accommodate this rapid

displacement.

Liquefaction is the phenomenon that occurs when ground shaking causes loose, saturated soils to

lose strength and act like viscous fluid. Liquefaction causes two types of ground failure: lateral

spread and loss of bearing strength. Lateral spreads develop on gentle slopes and entails the

sidelong movement of large masses of soil as an underlying layer liquefies. Loss of bearing

strength results when the soil supporting structures liquefies and causes structures to collapse.

The larger the earthquake magnitude, and the longer the duration of strong ground shaking, the

greater the potential there is for liquefaction to occur. The duration of ground shaking is also an

important factor in causing liquefaction to occur.

The effect of an earthquake on the earth’s surface is called the intensity. The intensity scale

consists of a series of certain key responses such as people awakening, movement of furniture,

damage to chimneys, and finally, total destruction. Although numerous intensity scales have

been developed over the last several hundred years to evaluate the effects of earthquakes, the one

currently used in the United States is the Modified Mercalli Intensity (MMI) scale developed in

1931. This scale, composed of 12 increasing levels of intensity that range from imperceptible

shaking to catastrophic destruction, is designated by Roman numerals. It does not have a

mathematical basis; instead it is an arbitrary ranking based on observed effects. The MMI value

assigned to a specific site after an earthquake has a more meaningful measure of severity to the

nonscientist than magnitude because intensity refers to the effects actually experienced at a

particular place. The lower numbers of the intensity scale deal with the manner in which people

feel the earthquake. The higher numbers of the scale are based on observed structural damage.

Most people are familiar with the Richter scale, a method of rating earthquakes based on strength

using an indirect measure of released energy. The Richter scale is logarithmic. Each one-point

increase corresponds to a 10-fold increase in the amplitude of the seismic shock waves and a 32-

fold increase in energy released. An earthquake registering 7.0 on the Richter scale releases over

1,000 times more energy than an earthquake registering 5.0.

Peak ground acceleration (PGA) is a measure of the strength of ground movement. Rapid ground

acceleration results in greater damage to structures. PGA is used to project the risk of damage





from future earthquakes by showing earthquake ground motions that have a specified probability

(10%, 5%, or 2%) of being exceeded in 50 years return period. Therefore, these values are often

used for reference in construction design, and in assessing relative hazards when making

economic and safety decisions. PGA is the measurement system used in the Santa Barbara

County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan.

1.14.1 Earthquake / Seismic Activity Risk Factors

Earthquakes can cause structural damage, injury, and loss of life, as well as damage to

infrastructure networks, such as water, power, gas, communication, and transportation.

Earthquakes may also cause collateral emergencies including dam and levee failures, seiches,

hazardous materials releases, fires, avalanches, and landslides. The degree of damage from an

earthquake depends on many interrelated factors including: magnitude, focal depth, distance

from the causative fault, source mechanism, duration of shaking, high rock accelerations, type of

surface deposits or bedrock, degree of consolidation of surface deposits, presence of high

groundwater, topography, and the design, type, and quality of building construction.

Faults

California is seismically active because it sits on the boundary between two of the earth’s

tectonic plates. Most of the state—everything east of the San Andreas Fault—is on the North

American Plate. The cities of Monterey, Santa Barbara, Los Angeles, and San Diego are on the

Pacific Plate, which is constantly moving northwest past the North American Plate. The relative

rate of movement is about two inches per year. The San Andreas Fault is considered the

boundary between the two plates, although some of the motion is taken up on faults as far away

as central Utah. Active faults have experienced displacement in historic time, suggesting that

future displacement may be expected. Inactive faults show no evidence of movement in recent

geologic time, suggesting that these faults are dormant.

Santa Barbara County is located in the Transverse Range geologic province. Movement of

continental plates is manifest primarily along the San Andreas Fault system. Other faults in the

region include the Big Pine, Mesa, and Santa Ynez faults. In addition, several quaternary faults

exist in the Santa Barbara area, including offshore between Santa Barbara and the Channel

Islands. Quaternary faults are active faults that have been recognized at the surface and which

have evidence of movement in the past 1.6 million years, the duration of the Quaternary Period.

Figure 8 illustrates the location of known faults within Santa Barbara County.





Figure 8—Santa Barbara County Earthquake Faults

Seismic Activity History

A generally accepted axiom among emergency management planners is that earthquakes will

occur where they have occurred previously. Minor earthquakes occur regularly in the County of

Santa Barbara. Strong earthquakes that affected residents and damaged structures occurred in

1806, 1812, 1857, 1902, 1925, 1927, 1978, and 2003. Beginning in March of 1978, and

continuing sporadically through July of 1978, a swarm of small earthquakes, called micro-

earthquakes, occurred underneath the northeastern end of the Santa Barbara Channel. Toward the

end of the micro-earthquake swarm, in July and early August of 1978, an unusually large amount

of oil and tar was reported on local beaches in Santa Barbara. A common occurrence for the

Santa Barbara area, the oil from these natural seeps was considered only a minor nuisance. On

August 13, 1978, an earthquake occurred southwest of the City of Santa Barbara, about 5 miles

beneath the Santa Barbara Channel. The earthquake ruptured to the northwest, focusing its

energy toward Goleta, the most intense ground motion occurring between Turnpike Road and

Winchester Canyon Road, an area that includes the University of California, Santa Barbara. A

strong-motion seismograph on the University of California campus recorded an acceleration of

0.45 times that of gravity. Another seismograph, located at the top of North Hall, recorded an





acceleration of 0.94 times that of gravity. Although this event did not result in any fatalities, 65

people were treated for injuries at local hospitals.

Most historic seismic events in the Santa Barbara region have been centered offshore between

Santa Barbara and the Channel Islands. The estimated magnitudes of the maximum credible

earthquake along the faults in the region range from 5.0 to 7.2, with the San Andreas Fault being

the outlier, with an estimated maximum credible earthquake in the low 8.0 range. Figure 9 shows

the epicenter of significant earthquakes in the Santa Barbara County area from 1568 through

2009.

Figure 9—Significant Historic Earthquakes

Ground Shake Potential

Ground shaking is motion that occurs as a result of energy released during a fault rupture. The

damage or collapse of buildings and other structures caused by ground shaking is among the

most serious seismic hazards. Damage to structures from this vibration, or ground shaking, is





caused by the transmission of earthquake vibrations from the ground to the structure. The

intensity of shaking and its potential impact on buildings is determined by the physical

characteristics of the underlying soil and rock, building materials and construction methods,

earthquake magnitude and location of epicenter, and the character and duration of ground

motion. Much of the County is located on alluvium, which increases the amplitude of the

earthquake wave. Ground motion lasts longer and waves are amplified on loose, water-saturated

materials than on solid rock. As a result, structures located on alluvium typically suffer greater

damage than those located on solid rock. Figure 10 illustrates the District’s high ground shake

potential.

Figure 10—Ground Shake Potential





Liquefaction Potential

Liquefaction is a process whereby soil is temporarily transformed to a fluid form during intense

and prolonged ground shaking. Figure 11 illustrates the areas of the District with high

liquefaction potential.

Figure 11—Liquefaction Potential

Other Earthquake Impact Severity Factors

Other factors influencing the impact severity of an earthquake event include area affected,

percentage of the affected area population sustaining injuries or death, property damage,

percentage of critical facilities/services affected, and long-term community-wide impacts

including adverse economic/employment and essential government services.





1.14.2 Probability of Occurrence

In general, the greater the displacement of geologic units, the greater the number of earthquakes

that have occurred. Although data are insufficient to estimate recurrence intervals for other faults

in Santa Barbara County, total displacements can be found in the Seismic Safety and Safety

Element. These data provide a qualitative basis for comparing earthquake risk of individual

faults.

The 2007 Working Group on California Earthquake Probabilities (WGCEP) has developed a

statewide earthquake-rupture forecast that uses “best available science.” This model, called the

Uniform California Earthquake Rupture Forecast (UCERF), is the product of a collaborative

project of the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the California Geological Survey (CGS) and the

Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC) with the assistance of the California Earthquake

Authority (CEA). Development of this model was tightly coordinated with the USGS National

Seismic Hazard Mapping Program (NSHMP). For this project, the WGCEP has assembled and

analyzed the latest data on the rates of earthquake occurrence from historic and instrumental

data, paleoseismology, slip rates on faults, and deformation rates from GPS and long-term plate-

tectonic models. The resulting model achieves an unprecedented degree of agreement with all the

available data and can be used to calculate future earthquake hazards.

The UCERF map shown in Figure 12 shows the probability of an earthquake greater than

Magnitude 6.7 occurring within the next 30 years.





Figure 12—Probability of a M > 6.7 Earthquake





1.14.3 Earthquake Risk Analysis

Table 20 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the District’s earthquake risk.

Table 20—Earthquake Risk Analysis Summary

Risk Zone

Probability of

Occurrence1


Total Risk

Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating

Percentage of Area

Potentially Affected

Potential Injuries / Fatalities

Potential Property Damage

Percentage of Critical Facilities Affected

Long-Term

Impacts

All 3 5 4 3 3 3 18 54 Moderate 1 Magnitude 6.0 or greater event

Table 20 shows that the District’s earthquake risk is Moderate across the entire District

reflecting a moderate probability of occurrence combined with moderate to high impact severity

factor scores for percentage of area affected, potential injuries/fatalities, potential property

damage, percentage of critical facilities affected, and potential for long-term community-wide

impacts.

1.15 FLOOD / COASTAL SURGE RISK10

Flooding is the rising and overflowing of a body of water onto normally dry land. Floods are

among the costliest natural disasters in terms of human hardship and economic loss nationwide.

Regardless of the type of flood, the cause is often the result of severe weather and excessive

rainfall, either in the immediate flood area or upstream reach.

Riverine flooding occurs when a watercourse exceeds its “bank-full” capacity, and is the most

common type of flood event. Riverine flooding occurs as a result of prolonged rainfall that is

combined with saturated soils from previous rain events, or combined with snowmelt, and is

characterized by high peak flows of moderate duration and by a large volume of runoff. Riverine

flooding occurs in river systems whose tributaries drain large geographic areas and can include

many watersheds and sub-watersheds. The duration of riverine floods varies from a few hours to

many days. Factors that directly affect the amount of flood runoff include the amount, intensity,

and distribution of precipitation; soil moisture content; channel capacity; seasonal variation in

vegetation; snow depth; and water-resistance of the surface due to urbanization. In Santa Barbara

County, riverine flooding can occur anytime during the normal rainfall season from October

10 Reference: 2011 Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdiction Hazard Mitigation Plan, Section 5.3





through April. Flooding is more severe when antecedent rainfall has resulted in saturated ground

conditions.

Flash flooding describes localized flooding involving a large volume of water over a short time

period, generally less than four hours. In contrast to riverine flooding, this type of flood usually

results from a heavy rainfall over a relatively small drainage area. Precipitation of this sort

usually occurs in the spring and summer. Dam failures also result in flash flooding.

Localized storm water flooding problems are often caused by flash flooding, severe weather, or

an unusual amount of rainfall. Flooding from these intense weather events usually occurs in

areas experiencing an increase in runoff from impervious surfaces associated with development

and urbanization as well as inadequate storm drainage systems.

Cloudburst storms, sometimes lasting as long as three hours, occur over Santa Barbara County

anytime from late spring to early fall, and they may occur as an extremely severe sequence

within a general winter rainstorm. Cloudbursts are high-intensity storms that can produce peak

flow equal to or somewhat greater than those of general rainstorms in portions of the study area.

Flooding from cloudbursts is characterized by high peak flow, short duration flood flow, and

small runoff volume.

Coastal Storm Surge occurs when coastal storms make landfall and produce large ocean waves

that sweep across coastlines. Storm surges inundate coastal areas, destroy dunes, and cause

flooding. If a storm surge occurs at the same time as high tide, the water height will be even

greater. Santa Barbara County historically has been vulnerable to storm surge inundation

associated with tropical storms.

1.15.1 Watersheds

Santa Barbara County is divided into five major watersheds: Santa Maria, Cuyama, San Antonio,

Santa Ynez River, and South Coast. The Santa Maria Watershed includes the Cuyama and

Sisquoc watersheds. Table 21 summarizes Santa Barbara County watersheds.





Table 21—Santa Barbara County Watersheds

Watershed Location Drainage Area (Square Miles)

Santa Maria Northern Portion of County 1,845

Cuyama Northern Portion of County 1,140

San Antonio Northern Portion of County 165

Santa Ynez River Southern Portion of County 900

South Coast Southern Portion of County 416

Source: 2011 Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdiction Hazard Mitigation Plan, Table 5.6

1.15.2 Drainages

In regions such as Santa Barbara, without extended periods of below-freezing temperatures,

floods usually occur during the season of highest precipitations or during heavy rainfalls after

long dry spells. Due to the Mediterranean climate of Santa Barbara County and the variability of

rainfall, stream flow throughout the County is highly variable and directly impacted from rainfall

with little snowmelt or base flow from headwaters. Most streams in the County are dry during

the summer months and a majority of streams only flow during the winter months. Watercourses

can experience a high amount of sedimentation during wet years and high amounts of vegetative

growth during dry and moderate years.

The drainages in the southern part of the County are characterized by high intensity, short

duration runoff events, due to the relatively short distance from the top of the Santa Ynez

Mountains to the Pacific Ocean. Runoff from high intensity, short duration storm events can

cause inundation of over bank areas, debris in the water that can plug culverts and bridges,

erosion and sloughing of banks, and loss of channel capacity due to sedimentation. The drainages

in the northern part of the County are contained in the upper mountain areas, but broaden out into

level valley floors. The drainages in the northern part of the County are generally characterized

by longer duration and less intense storms than the southern coastal areas.

1.15.3 Reservoirs

There are four major reservoirs located in the County: Lake Cachuma, Twitchell, Gibraltar, and

Jameson Lake. The Cachuma and Twitchell reservoirs are owned by the federal government,

administered by the County Water Resources Division, and operated by local water purveyors.

The Gibraltar Reservoir is owned and operated by the City of Santa Barbara and the Jameson

Reservoir is owned and operated by the Montecito Water District.

Lake Cachuma, Gibraltar Reservoir, and Jameson Lake are located along the Santa Ynez River,

in the South County. Lake Cachuma is the largest reservoir along the Santa Ynez River, with a





drainage area of 421 square miles upstream of the Bradbury Dam. Gibraltar Reservoir has a

drainage area of 214 square miles upstream of Gibraltar Dam and Jameson Lake has a drainage

area of 14 square miles upstream of Juncal Dam.

In the North County, the Twitchell Reservoir is located along the Cuyama River. The Cuyama

River Basin has a drainage area of approximately 1,140 square miles and it is the confluence of

the Cuyama and Sisquoc Rivers that form the Santa Maria River. The Twitchell Reservoir has a

drainage area of 1,135 square miles above Twitchell Dam.

1.15.4 Flood Prone Areas

A floodplain is the area that is inundated during a flood event. It is often physically discernible as

a broad, flat area created by prior floods. The larger the floodplain, the greater the area at risk for

flooding. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), through its National Flood

Insurance Program (NFIP), has created a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) that identifies and

designates Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHA) subject to a 1% chance of inundation in any

given year. This 1% annual chance flood is also referred to as the base flood, or 100-year flood.

Moderate Flood Hazard Areas (MFHA) are identified as those areas between the limits of the

base flood and the 0.2 annual chance (or 500-year) flood. Areas of minimal flood hazard are

those areas outside of the SFHA and higher in elevation than the MFHA. Figure 13 illustrates the

locations of SFHAs within Santa Barbara County.





Figure 13—Special Flood Hazard Areas

1.15.5 Coastal Storm Surge

The areas exposed to coastal storm surge/coastal erosion can be identified using FEMA VE

Zones. FEMA defines Zone VE as an area inundated by 100-year flooding with velocity hazard

(wave action). The DFIRM map above shows the location of Zone VE. It extends from Goleta to

Carpinteria. This portion of the coast is periodically subject to high velocity wave action, as was

experience in January and March of 1983 (Presidential Disaster Declaration). The Base Flood

Elevation (BFE) ranges from six to ten feet along the coastal strip. On the portion of the coastal

strip in the vicinity of the Carpinteria Slough, the V Zone BFE is eight feet. During past flooding

events, County personnel have observed flood elevations of approximately ten to eleven feet

(USGS MSL Datum) in the vicinity of the Carpinteria Slough.





1.15.6 Flood History

Flooding has been a major problem throughout Santa Barbara County’s history. Santa Barbara

County has several hydrologic basins that have different types of flooding problems, including

over bank riverine flooding, flash floods, tidal flooding/tsunamis, and dam failure. The most

common flooding in Santa Barbara is due to riverine flooding and flash flood events.

Between 1862 and the 2010, Santa Barbara experienced 15 significant floods. Eight of these

floods received Presidential Disaster Declarations. Table 5.5 lists these floods, as well as

information concerning the nature of the flooding and the extent of the damages.

1.15.7 Probability of Occurrence

FEMA defines flood risk primarily by a 100-year flood zone, which is applied to those areas

with a 1% chance, on average, of flooding in any given year. Any area that lies within the

FEMA-designated 100-year floodplain is designated as high risk. Any area found in the 500-year

floodplain is designated at low risk. The term “100-year floodplain” however, is misleading. It is

not that a flood that will occur once every 100 years. Rather, it is the flood elevation (or depth)

that has a 1% chance of being equaled or exceeded each year. Thus, the 100-year flood could

occur more than once in a relatively short period of time. In short, the 100-year flood is the flood

that has a 1% chance in any given year of being equaled or exceeded.

FEMA Flood Insurance Maps (FIRMs) are produced to show flooding probability in a manner

that determines the cost of flood insurance. The designated zones represent varying levels of

flood risk. Table 22 describes the different flood hazard areas and their associated probabilities.





Table 22—Flood Hazard Area Probabilities

SFHA Designation Description

1% or Greater Annual Probability of Flooding

A Subject to 100-year flood; base flood elevation undetermined

AE or A1-A30

Both AE and A1-A30 represent areas subject to 100-year flood with base elevation determined

AH Subject to 100-year shallow flooding, usually areas of ponding, with average depth of 1-3 feet; base flood elevation determined

AO Subject to 100-year shallow flooding, usually sheet flow on sloping terrain, with average depth of 1-3 feet; base flood elevation undetermined

V Subject to 100-year flood and additional velocity hazard (wave action); base flood elevation undetermined

VE or V1-V30

Both VE and V1-V30 represent areas subject to 100-year flood and additional velocity hazard (wave action) with base flood elevation determined

0.2% to 1% Annual Probability of Flooding

B or X500

Both B and X500 represent areas between the limits of the 100-year and 500- year flood, or certain areas subject to 100-year flood with average depths less than 1 foot or where the contributing drainage area is less than 1 square mile, or areas protected by levees from the 100-year flood

Less Than 0.2% Annual Probability of Flooding

C or X Both C and X represent areas outside the 500-year flood plain with less than 0.2% annual probability of flooding

Less Than 1% Annual Probability of Flooding

None

Areas outside a "Special Flood Hazard Area" (or 100-year floodplain). Can include areas inundated by 0.2% annual chance flooding; areas inundated by 1% annual chance flooding with average depths of less than 1 foot or with drainage areas less than 1 square mile; areas protected by levees from 1% annual chance flooding; or areas outside the 1% and 0.2% annual chance floodplains

Source: 2011 Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdiction Hazard Mitigation Plan, Section 5.3.4





1.15.8 Flood / Coastal Surge Risk Analysis

Table 23 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the District’s flood risk.

Table 23—Flood / Coastal Surge Risk Analysis Summary

Risk Zone

Probability of Occurrence

1


Total Risk

Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk Rating

Potential Area

Impacted



Percent of Critical

Facilities Affected

Long-Term

Impacts

1-1 3 3 2 3 2 3 13 39 Moderate

1-2 3 5 2 3 3 3 16 48 Moderate

1-3 3 2 2 3 2 3 12 36 Moderate

1-4 3 2 2 2 2 2 10 30 Low

2-1 3 2 2 2 2 2 10 30 Low

2-2 3 3 2 3 3 3 14 42 Moderate

1 Significant flood event within next 12 months

Table 23 shows that the District’s flood / coastal surge risk is Low in risk zones 1-4 and 2-1

reflecting a moderate probability of occurrence combined with low to moderate impact severity

factor scores for area impacted, potential injuries/fatalities, potential property damage,

percentage of critical facilities affected, and potential for long-term community impacts. The

District’s flood / coastal surge risk is Moderate in the remaining risk zones reflecting the higher

impact severity factor scores.

1.16 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS RISK

1.16.1 Hazardous Materials Risk Factors

Hazardous material risk factors include fixed facilities that store, use, or produce hazardous

chemicals, or produce hazardous waste; underground pipeline(s) that transport hazardous

materials; and aircraft, railroad, and vehicle transportation of hazardous materials.

Other hazardous material risk factors include at-risk populations and related demographics,

service capacity, historic service demand, emergency evacuation planning and effectiveness, and

presence and effectiveness of mass emergency notifications system(s).





Fixed Hazardous Material Risk

The District has 63 hazardous materials sites as shown in Figure 14. These sites are determined

either by designation as a hazardous occupancy pursuant to the California Building Code, or

otherwise require a hazardous material operating permit from either the state or county under the

California Accidental Release Program or Santa Barbara County Environmental Health Services

as the Certified Unified Program Agency (CUPA) for Santa Barbara County. CUPA facilities are

permitted and operated under California Health and Safety Code and Fire Code regulations.

There are no airports within 30 miles of the District.

Figure 14—Hazardous Materials Sites

As Figure 14 illustrates, most of the hazardous material sites are located within the City of

Carpinteria.





Transportation-Related Hazardous Material Risk

In addition to the fixed facility hazardous materials risk discussed above, the District also has

transportation-related hazardous material risk as a result of U.S. 101 truck traffic, a Union

Pacific railway with heavy daily cargo traffic, and underground pipelines transporting hazardous

materials. Table 24 summarizes the average annual daily truck traffic for U.S. 101 through the

District.

Table 24—Average Annual Daily Truck Traffic

Route Crossing AADT1

Truck AADT by Axles Pct. Truck AADT by Axles

2 3 4 5+ 2 3 4 5+

U.S. 101 Casitas Pass Rd. 4,725 2,079 378 189 2,079 44.0% 8.00% 4.00% 44.0% 1 Average Annual Daily Trips

Source: California Department of Transportation

In addition to the daily truck traffic counts identified in Table 24, there are approximately 16

train movements per day within or through the District,11

although no data was available to

determine the identity or amount of hazardous commodities transported. There are no

commercial airports within 20 air miles of the District.

At-Risk Populations

Values at risk from a hazardous material release or spill include people and the natural

environment. Persons considered most at-risk from a hazardous materials event include those

who cannot care for themselves or self-evacuate. For the purpose of this analysis, persons under

the age of 5 years or over 65 years of age, and persons who are incarcerated or institutionalized

are considered to be particularly vulnerable.

Emergency Evacuation Planning

Another significant factor influencing hazardous material impact severity is emergency

evacuation planning, mass emergency notification capability, and periodic exercising of the

evacuation plan. The Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office is responsible for all emergency

evacuation planning in the unincorporated areas of the County, as well as initiating any

emergency notifications. The City of Carpentaria’s Emergency Operations Plan12

does not

specify which department has primary responsibility for emergency notifications and

11 Source: U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration

12 City of Carpinteria Emergency Operations Plan (November 2014)





evacuations, however, in Citygate’s experience that is generally the responsibility of the Police

Department or Emergency Management function. In the case of Carpinteria, it is likely the

responsibility of the Police Department since there is no formal emergency management function

within the City to Citygate’s knowledge.

According to Fire District staff, emergency evacuation notifications are made via a reverse 9-1-1

notification system hosted by the Sheriff’s Office. Fire District staff were unaware of any formal

evacuation plan for either the City or County areas of the District, and were also unaware of any

recent tabletop or functional emergency notification or evacuation exercises.

1.16.2 Hazardous Materials Risk Service Capacity

All District response personnel are trained to the Hazardous Materials First Responder

Operational (FRO)13

level. The District also participates in the Santa Barbara County Regional

Hazardous Materials Response Team that operates from Santa Barbara City Fire Department

station 2, approximately 10 miles north of the City of Carpinteria on the west side of U.S. 101.

The Hazardous Materials Response Team is crossed staffed as needed with qualified Hazardous

Materials Technicians or Specialists from the City of Santa Barbara and the Montecito and

Carpinteria-Summerland Fire Protection Districts to mitigate chemical, radiological, or other

hazardous materials spills or releases. The Santa Barbara County Fire Department also operates a

Hazardous Materials Response Team from its Station 31 in the City of Buellton.

1.16.3 Hazardous Material Risk Service Demand

The District responded to 42 hazardous material incidents over the most recent three years,

which represents 0.77% of total service demand over the same time period as shown in Table 25.

Table 25—Hazardous Material Risk Service Demand

Station FY

2012/13 FY

2013/14 FY

2014/15 Total

1 9 7 16 32

2 4 2 4 10

Total 13 9 20 42


0.72% 0.48% 1.11% 0.77%


13 Training standards established by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration pursuant to 29 CFR

1910.120(q).





1.16.4 Hazardous Materials Risk Analysis

Citygate’s analysis of the District’s hazardous material risk is summarized in Table 26.

Table 26—Hazardous Material Risk Analysis Summary

Risk Zone

Probability of

Occurrence


Total Risk

Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating Population

Density

Fixed HazMat

Risk Transported HazMat Risk

Service Capacity

Evacuation Capability

1-1 1 3 1 3 2 4 13 13 Low

1-2 1 3 1 1 2 4 11 11 Low

1-3 1 1 1 3 2 4 11 11 Low

1-4 1 0 1 1 2 4 8 8 Low

2-1 1 0 1 1 2 4 8 8 Low

2-2 1 1 1 3 2 4 11 11 Low

As Table 26 shows, the District’s hazardous material risk is Low across all six risk zones

reflecting a low probability of occurrence, and low to moderate impact severity factor scores for

population density, fixed and transported hazardous material risk, hazardous material risk service

capacity, and emergency evacuation capability.

1.17 LANDSLIDE / COASTAL EROSION RISK14

Landslides and coastal erosion are defined as rock, earth, or debris displacement down a slope.

Types of landslides and coastal erosion include: rock falls, rockslides, deep slope failures,

shallow debris flows, and mud flows. In order for landslides or mass coastal wasting to occur,

the correct geological conditions, which include unstable or weak soil or rock, and topographical

conditions, such as steep slopes, are necessary. Heavy rain often triggers these hazards, as the

water adds extra weight that the soil cannot bear. Over-irrigating has the same affect.

Earthquakes can also affect soil stability, causing enough weakening to favor gravitational

forces.

Both landslides and coastal erosion are influenced by human activity, such as mining and the

construction of buildings, railroads, and highways. The most common cause of a landslide is an

increase in the down slope gravitational stress applied to slope materials, also known as over-

14 Reference: 2011 Santa Barbara County Multi-Jurisdictional Hazard Mitigation Plan Section 5.7





steepening. Over-steepening can be caused by natural processes or by human activities.

Undercutting of a valley wall by stream erosion or of a sea cliff by wave erosion are ways in

which over-steeping may occur naturally.

Another type of soil failure is slope wash, which is the erosion of slopes by surface-water runoff.

The intensity of slope wash is dependent on the discharge and velocity of surface runoff and on

the resistance of surface materials to erosion. Surface runoff and velocity is greatly increased in

urban and suburban areas due to the presence of roads, parking lots, and buildings, which are

impermeable to water and provide relatively smooth surfaces that do not slow down runoff.

Mudflows, another type of soil failure, are defined as flows or rivers of liquid mud down a

hillside. They occur when water accumulates under the ground, usually following long and

heavy rainfalls. Mud forms and flows down slope if there is no ground cover such as brush or

trees to hold the soil in place. Various locations throughout the County are subject to all of these

types of events.

1.17.1 Landslide / Coastal Erosion History

USGS data shows the most costly landslide events in the U.S. occurred in 1980 and affected six

southern California counties, including Santa Barbara County. The type of landslide was mostly

debris flow from heavy rainfall, and caused $800 million in damage.

In the spring of 1995, La Conchita, located at the western border of Ventura County and adjacent

to Santa Barbara County, experienced a landslide that completely destroyed several houses in its

path. A portion of the bank of the Cuyama River collapsed east of Santa Maria in 1998, affecting

half a dozen cars and a tractor-trailer rig on Highway 166, which were caught in the slide.

In 2000, a mud flow displaced a home from its foundation in Sycamore Canyon, which is located

near the border of Santa Barbara and Montecito, and moved it several feet downhill.

In January 2005, a powerful Pacific storm brought heavy rain, snow, flash flooding, high winds,

and landslides to Central and Southern California. During the five-day event, rainfall totals

ranged from 3 to 10 inches over coastal areas with up to 32 inches in the mountains. With such

copious rainfall, flash flooding was a serious problem across Santa Barbara, Ventura, and Los

Angeles counties. In Santa Barbara County, flash flooding and mudslides closed Gibraltar Road

at Mt. Calvary Road, stranding several vehicles, while mudslides inundated three homes in Lake

Casitas. In the mountains, 4-12 feet of snowfall was recorded along with southeast winds

between 30 and 50 MPH with higher gusts. Across the Central Coast and in the Salinas River

Valley, high winds gusting to 65 MPH knocked down numerous trees and power lines. In La

Conchita, a devastating mudslide killed 10 people, destroyed 15 homes, and damaged 12 other

homes. Overall, damage estimates for the entire series of storms that started December 27th

, 2004

and ended on January 11th

, 2005 were easily over $200 million.





Several areas in the County are prone to more frequent rain-induced landslides, resulting in

disruption to transportation and damage to roadways. The most common areas of recent historic

slides in southern Santa Barbara County include:

Palomino Road (1995, 1998)

Gibraltar Road (1995, 1998, 2001, 2003)

Glen Annie Road (1995, 1998, 2001, 2004)

All roads underlain by the Rincon Shale Formation

Refugio Road (1995, 1998, 2001)

Ortega Hill Road (1995, 1998)

Stagecoach Road (Constant, 2003, 2004)

Painted Cave (1995, 1998)

Old San Marcos Road (1995, 1998, currently moving)

Gobernador Canyon (1995, 1998, currently moving)

East Mountain Drive (1995, 1998, 2001)

In addition to these areas where landslide is a common occurrence, several bridges throughout

the County that are known to experience scour during flooding erosion events, including East

Mountain Drive at San Ysidro Creek (Bridge No 51C-0202) with extensive foundation scour,

and Ashley Road at Montecito Creek (Bridge No 51C-0043), also with extensive foundation

scour.

Landslides and landslide-prone sedimentary formations are present throughout the coastal plain

of western Santa Barbara County. Landslides also occur in the granitic mountains of East Santa

Barbara County, although they are less prevalent. Many of these landslides are thought to have

occurred under much wetter climatic conditions than at present. Recent landslides are those with

fresh or sharp geomorphic expressions suggestive of active (ongoing) movement or movement

within the past several decades. Reactivations of existing landslides can be triggered by

disturbances such as heavy rainfall, seismic shaking, and/or grading. Many recent landslides are

thought to be reactivations of ancient landslides.

The location and extent of landslides are extremely difficult to predict consistently for an area

the size of Santa Barbara County. There are locations throughout the County that are prone to

landslide and erosion activity, in addition to areas of known concern listed in the section above.





In 2004, the County’s Hazard Mitigation Plan contractor obtained a digital version of the

Landslide Overview Map of the Conterminous United States from the USGS. Because this data

was created at a nationwide scale and is not suitable for local planning, the contractor refined this

data layer using slope derived from the USGS 30-meter resolution Digital Elevation Model. High

and moderate risk areas within Santa Barbara County were refined by identifying the areas where

the risk of landslide incidence was considered high or moderate by the national data set and

where the slope exceeded 25%. The data from the USGS has not changed since the last Santa

Barbara County Multi-Jurisdiction Hazard Mitigation Plan, and therefore this is still the best

available source that can be used to determine landslide susceptibility and incidence in Santa

Barbara County. This data indicates that the lower elevations of the District have a low landslide

incidence, while the higher elevations have a moderate incidence.

The Seismic Safety and Safety Element of the Santa Barbara County General Plan lists the areas

in Santa Barbara County where there is fairly severe land sliding and associated geologic

formations, including the foothills in the Summerland area. The remainder of the District is

shown as having moderate slope instability.15

1.17.2 Coastal Erosion

FEMA’s National Flood Insurance Program’s VE Zone designates Special Flood Hazard Areas

(SFHAs) along coastlines that are subject to inundation by a 100-year flood event along with the

additional hazards associated with storm waves. The VE Zone also designates areas more

susceptible to coastal erosion. The District’s entire coastline lies within a designated FEMA VE

Zone.16

15 Reference: Santa Barbara County General Plan Seismic Safety and Safety Element (February 2015)

16 Source: Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Flood Insurance Program, Flood Map Service Center





1.17.3 Landslide / Coastal Erosion Risk Analysis

Table 27 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the District’s landslide / coastal erosion risk.

Table 27—Landslide / Coastal Erosion Risk Analysis

Risk Zone

Probability of

Occurrence


Total Risk

Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating

Slope Stability

Zone VE Flood Area



Potential Long-Term

Impacts

1-1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Low

1-2 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 10 Low

1-3 2 0 5 0 0 0 5 10 Low

1-4 2 3 0 3 3 2 11 22 Low

2-1 2 3 0 3 3 2 11 22 Low

2-2 2 2 5 2 2 1 12 24 Low

1.18 MEDICAL EMERGENCY RISK

1.18.1 Medical Emergency Risk Factors

Medical emergency risk in most communities is predominantly a function of population

density, demographics, vehicle traffic, violence, and health insurance coverage. Relative to

population demographics, emergency medical risk tends to be higher among poorer, older, less

educated, and uninsured populations. As would be expected, emergency medical risk is also

higher in communities or segments of communities with higher rates of violence. Emergency

medical risk is also higher in those areas of a community with high vehicle traffic loads,

particularly those areas with high traffic volume travelling at higher speeds.

Emergency medical risk can also be categorized as either a medical emergency resulting from a

health-related condition or event, or traumatic injury. One serious medical emergency is cardiac

arrest or some other emergency where there is an interruption or blockage of oxygen to the brain.

Figure 15 illustrates the reduced survivability of a cardiac arrest victim as time to defibrillation

increases. While early defibrillation is one factor in cardiac arrest survivability, other factors can

influence survivability as well, such as early CPR and pre-hospital Advanced Life Support

(ALS) interventions.





Figure 15—Survival Rate vs. Time of Defibrillation

Source: www.suddencardiacarrest.org

8.1-9.4% of the District’s population is under 10 years of age and 13.1-16.9% is 65 and older. In

addition, 6.9-13.6% of District residents 18 years of age and older are below the federal income

poverty level, and 10.7-14.2% of District residents do not have health insurance coverage.17

Also

contributing to the District’s emergency medical risk is U.S. 101 carrying more than 78,000

vehicles daily, including 7,200 per hour at peak volume.18

1.18.2 Medical Emergency Risk Service Capacity

The District’s service capacity for emergency medical risk consists of a minimum daily on-duty

response force of nine personnel staffing 2-3 apparatus19

from two fire stations. All response

17 Source: U.S. Census Bureau

18 Source: California Department of Transportation: Average Annual Daily Traffic Volumes (AADT) for 2014






personnel are trained to either the Emergency Medical Technician (EMT) level capable of

providing Basic Life Support (BLS) pre-hospital emergency medical care, or Paramedic level

capable of providing Advanced Life Support (ALS) pre-hospital emergency medical services.

All District fire apparatus are staffed with a minimum of one paramedic. American Medical

Response provides ground paramedic ambulance transport services under a countywide

exclusive operating area contract. CalSTAR provides air ambulance services from Santa Maria.

Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital in the City of Santa Barbara and Goleta Valley Cottage Hospital

Goleta provide hospital emergency room services. Santa Barbara Cottage Hospital is also a Level

II Trauma Center.

1.18.3 Medical Emergency Risk Service Demand

The District responded to 3,326 emergency medical incidents over the most recent three years,

which represents 70.3% of total service demand over the same time period as shown in Table 28.

Table 28—Medical Emergency Service Demand

Station FY

2012/13 FY

2013/14 FY

2014/15 Total

1 836 920 1,070 2,826

2 166 164 170 500

Total 1,002 1,084 1,240 3,326


71.73% 73.89% 66.42% 70.30%






1.18.4 Medical Emergency Risk Analysis

Table 29 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the District’s medical emergency risk.

Table 29—Medical Emergency Risk Analysis Summary

Risk Zone

Probability of

Occurrence


Risk Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating Population

Density Demography Vehicle Traffic

Pre-Hospital

EMS Capacity

Hospital Emergency

Care Capacity

1-1 4 3 3 3 1 1 11 44 Moderate

1-2 4 3 3 1 1 1 9 36 Moderate

1-3 4 1 3 3 1 1 9 36 Moderate

1-4 3 0 3 1 2 3 9 27 Low

2-1 3 0 2 1 2 3 8 24 Low

2-2 3 1 2 3 1 1 8 24 Low

As Table 29 illustrates, the District’s medical emergency risk is Moderate in risk zones 1-1, 1-2,

and 1-3, reflecting a high probability of occurrence combined with low to moderate impact

severity factor scores for population density, demographics, vehicle traffic, pre-hospital EMS

capacity and hospital emergency care capacity. The District’s medical emergency risk is Low in

risk zones 1-4, 2-1, and 2-2 reflecting moderate probability of occurrence in combination with

low to moderate impact severity factor scores for population density, demographics, vehicle

traffic, pre-hospital EMS capacity, and hospital emergency care capacity.

1.19 TECHNICAL RESCUE RISK

1.19.1 Technical Rescue Risk Factors

Technical rescue risk factors include active construction projects, structural collapse, confined

spaces such as tanks and underground vaults, bodies of water and rivers or streams, urban

flooding, industrial machinery, transportation collisions, and other factors that may create a need

for technical rescue skills and/or equipment. The District includes approximately 12 miles of

Pacific Ocean coastline, much of which includes popular recreational areas.

1.19.2 Technical Rescue Risk Service Capacity

The Montecito Fire Protection District and the City of Santa Barbara Fire Department jointly

provide regional technical rescue services from Montecito Station #1 and Santa Barbara City

Fire Station #1. These specialized resources are cross-staffed as needed, and are capable of





conducting low-angle and high-angle rope rescue, structural collapse search and rescue, confined

space rescue, and trench rescue. In addition to the regional water rescue team hosted by the

District from Station 1, local California State Parks personnel and City of Carpinteria lifeguards

also provide water rescue services. The District’s regional water rescue capability consists of a

rescue watercraft (RWC) and tow vehicle staffed with qualified rescue swimmers.

1.19.3 Technical Rescue Risk Service Demand

Table 30 summarizes the District’s technical rescue service demand over the previous 3 years,

which represents 0.37% of total service demand over the same period.

Table 30—Technical Rescue Service Demand

Station FY

2012/13 FY

2013/14 FY

2014/15 Total

1 2 2 10 14

2 2 2 2 6

Total 4 4 12 20


0.22% 0.21% 0.67% 0.37%


1.19.4 Technical Rescue Risk Analysis

Table 31 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the District’s technical rescue risk.

Table 31—Technical Rescue Risk Analysis Summary

Risk Zone

Probability of

Occurrence


Risk Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating Construction

Activity

Industrial / Manufacturing

Activity Water Risk

Vehicle Traffic

Service Capacity

1-1 1 1 0 1 3 3 8 8 Low

1-2 1 1 0 5 1 3 10 10 Low

1-3 1 1 2 5 3 3 14 14 Low

1-4 1 1 0 2 1 3 7 7 Low

2-1 1 1 0 2 1 3 7 7 Low

2-2 1 1 0 5 3 3 12 12 Low





As Table 31 illustrates, the District’s technical rescue risk is Low across all six risk zones

reflecting a low probability of occurrence combined with low to high impact severity factor

scores for construction activity, industrial/manufacturing activity, water risk, vehicle traffic, and

technical rescue service capacity.

1.20 TRANSPORTATION RISK

1.20.1 Transportation Risk Factors

Transportation risk factors include motor vehicle, railway, watercraft, and aircraft use in and

through the District.

Primary Transportation Routes

There are approximately 18 miles of interstate and state highways in the District carrying more

than 82,000 vehicles daily with more than 8,000 per hour at peak traffic volume as shown in

Table 32. The District also has approximately 9 miles of Union Pacific railway, and

approximately 200 miles of surface streets.

Table 32— Average Annual Daily Traffic Volume

Route Crossing AADT1

Peak Hour Volume

U.S. 101 Santa Monica Road 78,000 7,200

S.R. 192 Linden Avenue 4,600 1,000

Total 82,600 8,200 1 Average Annual Daily Trips

Source: California Department of Transportation (2014)

Rail Services

Amtrak provides passenger rail services through the District via the Seattle–Los-Angeles

Coast Starlight routes. Union Pacific (UP) tracks carry heavy daily railway cargo traffic

through the District, with approximately 16 daily train movements.20

Airports

The Santa Barbara Airport, located approximately 21 miles north of Carpinteria and eight miles

northwest of downtown Santa Barbara, serves more than 750,000 passengers and one cargo

carrier with approximately 180,000 aircraft operations annually. Due to its distance from the

District, aircraft traffic risk is negligible.

20 Federal Railroad Administration data





1.20.2 Transportation Risk Service Capacity

The District’s service capacity for transportation risk consists of a minimum daily on-duty

response force of nine personnel staffing 2-3 apparatus21

from two strategically located fire

stations. In addition, the District has automatic aid and mutual aid agreements with adjacent fire

agencies, and is also a signatory to the Santa Barbara County Mutual Aid Agreement.

All District response personnel are trained to either the Emergency Medical Technician (EMT)

level capable of providing Basic Life Support (BLS) pre-hospital emergency medical care, or

Paramedic level capable of providing Advanced Life Support (ALS) pre-hospital emergency

medical services. All District fire apparatus are staffed with a minimum of one paramedic.

American Medical Response provides ground paramedic ambulance transport services under a

countywide exclusive operating area contract, and CalSTAR provides air ambulance services

from Santa Maria.

1.20.3 Transportation Risk Service Demand

Over the most recent 3-year period evaluated for this study, the District experienced 236

transportation-related incidents representing 4.31% of total service demand over the same period

as shown in Table 33.

Table 33—Transportation Risk Service Demand

Station FY

2012/13 FY

2013/14 FY

2014/15 Total

1 27 48 101 176

2 17 10 33 60

Total 44 58 134 236


2.43% 3.10% 7.45% 4.31%







1.20.4 Transportation Risk Analysis

Table 34 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the District’s transportation risk.

Table 34—Transportation Risk Analysis Summary

Risk Zone

Probability of

Occurrence

Impact Severity Factors Total Risk

Factors Score

Overall Risk Score

Risk Rating

Population Density

Vehicle Traffic

Railway Traffic

Aircraft Traffic

Service Capacity

1-1 1 3 3 0 0 0 6 6 Low

1-2 1 3 1 2 0 0 6 6 Low

1-3 1 1 3 2 0 1 7 7 Low

1-4 1 0 1 0 0 2 3 3 Low

2-1 1 0 1 0 0 2 3 3 Low

2-2 1 1 3 2 0 0 6 6 Low

Table 34 shows that the District’s transportation risk is Moderate across all six risk zones,

reflecting a low probability of occurrence combined with low to moderate impact severity factor

scores for population density, vehicle traffic, railway and aircraft traffic, and transportation risk

service capacity.

1.21 TSUNAMI RISK

A tsunami is a series of long waves generated in the ocean by a sudden displacement of a large

volume of water. Underwater earthquakes, landslides, volcanic eruptions, meteoric impacts, or

onshore slope failures cause this displacement. Tsunami waves travel at speeds averaging 450 to

600 miles per hour. As a tsunami nears the coastline, its speed diminishes, its wavelength

decreases, and its height increases. Depending on the type of event that creates the tsunami, as

well as the remoteness of the event, the tsunami could reach land within a few minutes or after

several hours. Low-lying areas could experience severe inland inundation of water and

deposition of debris more than 3,000 feet inland.

The Cities of Santa Barbara and Carpinteria are located on or near several offshore geological

faults, the more prominent faults being the Mesa Fault, the Santa Ynez Fault in the mountains,

and the Santa Rosa Fault. There are other unnamed faults in the offshore area of the Channel

Islands. These faults have been active in the past and can subject the entire area to seismic action

at any time.

The relative threat for local tsunamis in California can be considered low due to low frequency

of occurrence. Large, locally-generated tsunamis in California are estimated to occur once every





100 years. Thirteen possible tsunamis have been observed or recorded from local earthquakes

between 1812 and 1988. These tsunami events were poorly documented, and some are very

questionable. There is no doubt that earthquakes occurring along submarine faults off Santa

Barbara could generate large destructive local tsunamis. Internet research provides some

documentation that two tsunamis were generated from two major earthquakes in the Santa

Barbara region in December of 1812. The size of these tsunamis may never be known with

certainty, but there are unconfirmed estimates of 15-foot waves at Gaviota, 30- to 35-foot waves

at Santa Barbara, and waves of 15 feet or more at Ventura. These estimates are found in various

literature and based on anecdotal history only.

Major faults of the San Andreas zone, although capable of strong earthquakes, cannot generate

any significant tsunamis. Only earthquakes in the Transverse Ranges, specifically the seaward

extensions in the Santa Barbara Channel and offshore area from Point Arguello, can generate

local tsunamis of any significance. The reason for this may be that earthquakes occurring in these

regions result in a significant vertical displacement of the crust along these faults. Such tectonic

displacements are necessary for tsunami generation.

1.21.1 Tsunami History

Two separate events, occurring in 1877 and 1896, are listed in the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA’s) online database as having heights of 1.8 and 2.5 feet

waves. However, tsunami heights from historical records are estimated and should not be

regarded as exact. Other recorded tsunamis affecting Santa Barbara during the 20th

century are in

the 0.1- to 1.0-foot range.

On February 27, 2010, a magnitude 8.8 earthquake occurred along the central coast of Chile and

produced a tsunami. For the coast of Southern California, it was one of the largest tsunami

episodes since 1964. In general, tsunami waves between 2-4 feet were reported. Tsunami waves

of around three feet were reported by tide gauges across the Santa Barbara Channel. At Santa

Barbara Pier, significant beach erosion was reported along with displacement of buoys. The

tsunami surge lasted in excess of 20 hours. The most significant damage occurred along the coast

of Ventura County and southern Santa Barbara County. Numerous reports of dock damage were

reported along with beach erosion.

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake occurred off the Pacific coast of Tohoku, Japan.

This earthquake devastated many communities in Japan and caused tsunami effects across the

ocean in Santa Barbara County. The only significant impact to Santa Barbara County was to the

dredging contractor for the harbor. The City harbor operations documented approximately

$1,500 in damages.





1.21.2 Tsunami Impact Zone

The California Department of Conservation provides official tsunami inundation maps based on

research and modeling by the University of Southern California Tsunami Research Center

showing areas that could potentially be inundated in the event of a tsunami. This model is based

on potential earthquake sources and hypothetical extreme undersea, near-shore landslide sources.

The data was mapped by Cal-EMA for the purpose of tsunami evacuation planning.

The modeling data and related maps indicate potential tsunami inundation for portions of the

District’s coastal areas south of U.S. 101, from approximately the intersection of Santa Claus

Lane and Sand Point Road, and generally following the Union Pacific railroad tracks southeast to

the southern end of 4th

Street. The inundation model represents the maximum considered tsunami

run up from a number of extreme, yet realistic, tsunami sources. The tsunami inundation maps

for the District’s service area are included as Appendix B.

1.21.3 Tsunami Risk Analysis

Table 35 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the District’s tsunami risk.

Table 35—Tsunami Risk Analysis

Risk Zone

Probability of

Occurrence


Total Risk

Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating

Tsunami Inundation

Area



Critical Resources Affected

Potential Long-Term

Impacts

1-1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Low

1-2 3 4 4 4 3 4 19 57 Moderate

1-3 3 1 2 1 1 1 6 18 Low

1-4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Low

2-1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Low

2-2 3 1 2 1 1 1 6 18 Low

As Table 35 indicates, the District’s tsunami risk is Low in all risk zones except zone 1-2,

reflecting a low to moderate probability of occurrence in combination with low impact severity

factor scores for percentage of area within a designated tsunami inundation zone, potential

injuries/fatalities, potential property damage, critical facilities affected, and potential long-term

impacts. The District’s tsunami risk is Moderate in risk zone 1-2 reflecting a moderate

probability of occurrence with higher impact severity factor scores.





1.22 WILDLAND FIRE RISK

1.22.1 Fire Hazard Severity Zones

The California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE) designates Moderate,

High, and Very High wildland Fire Hazard Severity Zones (FHSZ) throughout the state based on

analysis of multiple wildland fire hazard factors and modeling of potential wildland fire behavior

for State Responsibility areas (SRA) where CAL FIRE has fiscal responsibility for wildland fire

protection. CAL FIRE also identifies recommended Very High FHSZs for Local Responsibility

Areas (LRA) where a local jurisdiction bears the fiscal responsibility for wildland fire protection,

including cities. Figure 16 illustrates the District’s designated FHSZs.

Figure 16—Wildland Fire Hazard Severity Zones





1.22.2 Wildland Fire Risk Factors

Wildland fire behavior is predominantly influenced by fuel, weather, and topography. Wildland

fuels within the District consist of a mix of annual grasses and weeds, brush, and deciduous and

evergreen trees. Once ignited, wildland fires can burn intensely and contribute to rapid fire

spread under the right fuel, weather and topographic conditions.

Wildland fuel factors influencing fire intensity and spread include fuel type (vegetation species),

height, arrangement, density, and fuel moisture. Weather elements such as temperature, relative

humidity, wind, and lightning also affect wildland fire potential and behavior. High temperatures

and low relative humidity dry out wildland fuels creating a situation where fuel will more readily

ignite and burn more intensely. Wind is the most significant weather factor influencing wildland

fire behavior; higher wind speeds increase fire spread and intensity. The annual wildland fire

season in Santa Barbara County, when wildland fires are most likely to occur due to fuel and

weather conditions, is generally from late spring through fall due to a predominant climate

pattern of low annual rainfall, hot, dry summers, and moderate onshore winds. Wildland fire risk

during drought conditions or offshore wind events is even greater. The District’s topography

north of Highway 192 has a significant influence on wildland fire behavior and spread.

Another significant wildland fire risk factor is water supply immediately available for

suppression in wildland fire prone or high-risk areas.

1.22.3 Wildland Fire History

There have been numerous significant wildland fires in Santa Barbara County over the past

several decades, some of which have burned large areas and caused extensive property damage,

as summarized in Table 36.





Table 36—Large Regional Wildland Fire Summary

Year Fire Name Size

(Acres) Buildings Destroyed

1964 Coyote 65,339 n/a

1964 Polo 600 n/a

1971 Coyote 67,000 n/a

1972 Romero n/a n/a

1977 Sycamore 850 n/a

1979 Eagle Canyon n/a n/a

1985 Wheeler 120,000 n/a

1990 Painted Cave 4,900 641

2001 Correl n/a n/a

2004 Gaviota 7,440 4

2007 Mariposa 176 0

2007 Zaca 240,207 1

2008 Gap 9,443 4

2008 Tea 1,940 210

2009 Jesusita 8,733 159

1.22.4 Wildland Fire Service Demand

Over the most recent 3-year period evaluated by Citygate for this study, there were a total of 17

vegetation-related fires in the District comprising 0.36% of total service demand over the same

time period as shown in Table 37.

Table 37—Wildland Fire Service Demand

Station FY

2012/13 FY

2013/14 FY

2014/15 Total

1 2 1 10 13

2 1 1 2 4

Total 3 2 12 17


0.21% 0.14% 0.64% 0.36%






1.22.5 Wildland Fire Service Capacity

The District’s Response Plan for wildland fires includes two wildland engines and a Chief

Officer. In addition, the Santa Barbara County Fire Department provides contractual wildland

fire protection in the SRA areas of the County for CAL FIRE, and would respond to any reported

wildland fire within the SRA areas of the District. The District also has automatic aid or mutual

aid agreements with adjacent fire agencies, and is a signatory to the Santa Barbara County

Mutual Aid Agreement.

1.22.6 Wildland Fire Risk Analysis

Table 38 summarizes Citygate’s analysis of the District’s wildland fire risk.

Table 38—Wildland Fire Risk Analysis Summary

Risk Zone

Probability of

Occurrence


Risk Factors Score

Overall Risk

Score Risk

Rating Wildland

Fuels Weather Factors Topography

Water Supply

Service Capacity

1-1 2 2 4 2 1 2 11 22 Low

1-2 1 1 4 1 1 2 9 9 Low

1-3 2 2 4 2 2 2 12 24 Low

1-4 3 5 4 5 5 3 22 66 High

2-1 3 5 4 5 5 3 22 66 High

2-2 2 4 4 4 3 2 17 34 Moderate

As Table 38 indicates, the District’s wildland fire risk is Low in zones 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3

reflecting a low probability of occurrence in combination with low to high impact severity factor

scores for wildland fuels, wildland fire weather, topography, water supply and wildland fire

service capacity. The District’s wildland fire risk is Moderate for risk zone 2-2, and High for

risk zones 1-4 and 2-1 reflecting a higher probability of occurrence and/or higher impact severity

factor scores.

1.23 RISK MITIGATION

Hazard or risk mitigation refers to specific actions or measures taken to prevent a hazard from

occurring and/or to minimize the severity of impacts resulting from a hazard occurrence. While

none of the hazards subject to this study can be entirely prevented, measures can be taken to

minimize the consequences or impacts when those hazards do occur.





1.23.1 Existing Hazard Mitigation Measures

As an element of this project, Citygate conducted an evaluation of existing mitigation measures

by hazard as follows:

Building Fire Risk

Over the past several decades, Santa Barbara County has adopted the California State Building

and Fire Codes, with local amendments. These codes establish, among other things, minimum

building construction materials and methods, as well as emergency lighting, exit, and fire alarm

and built-in fire suppression systems for public buildings to minimize the occurrence of fire and

related life safety impacts. In addition, the District has adopted a local amendment to the

California Fire Code requiring a Class “A” fire-resistant roofing assembly and fire sprinklers in

all new and majority remodel construction of all building types. District staff has also developed

pre-incident response plans for critical facilities and target hazards. The District has a relatively

low occurrence of building fires, and has good response capability within a reasonable timeframe

to achieve desired outcome objectives, including automatic mutual aid agreements with

adjoining fire agencies. The District also has a good training program for all hazards within its

response capabilities, and has developed pre-fire plans last updated in 2005, and containing key

building and occupancy information for most business occupancies within the District.

In addition, the District inspects all Group A (Assembly), Group I (Institutional), and Group E

(Education) occupancies annually as required by state law. Businesses that store or use

hazardous materials, or are required to submit a Hazardous Materials Business Plan (HMBP) are

also inspected annually. In July 2012, the District adopted and implemented Standard Operating

Procedure #2-V-1, requiring engine company inspections of certain residential and business

occupancies over the ensuing 36-month period. During that period, shift suppression personnel

completed 544 inspections representing approximately 8% of assigned inspections as shown in

Table 39. The engine company inspection program was suspended in late 2015 pending

appointment of a new permanent Fire Chief. Despite the low percentage of inspections

completed, this program has enhanced the District’s Community Risk Reduction Program efforts

by completing more fire and life safety inspections than could be completed solely by District

Fire Prevention staff.





Table 39—Engine Company Inspections

Fire Mgmt.Zone

Number of Property Parcels

1

Number of Inspections Completed

2

Percentage Completed

1-1 2,348 189 8.05%

1-2 1,539 71 4.61%

1-3 827 9 1.09%

1-4 193 107 55.44%

2-1 274 168 61.31%

2-2 1,518 0 0.00%

Total 6,699 544 8.12% 1 Some parcels vacant; some parcels with only single-family

residence not subject to inspection; some parcels with

multiple occupancies 2 Inspections in Fire Management Zone 1-3 affected by injury

to responsible Company Officer; Community risk reduction

efforts in Fire Management Zone 2-2 were shifted to focus

on fire hydrant issues

Source: Carpinteria-Summerland Fire District

Finding #2:22

Santa Barbara County and the Carpinteria-Summerland Fire

Protection District have adopted current California codes with

local amendments to minimize the occurrence of building fires and

provide for the safety of building occupants.

Finding #3: The District has a good response capability, training program, and

pre-incident planning to reduce the severity of building fires.

Finding #4: The engine company inspection program has enhanced the

District’s Community Risk Reduction efforts.

Earthquake / Seismic Activity Risk

In 1986, the California Legislature determined that buildings providing essential services should

be capable of providing those services to the public following a disaster. Their intent in this

regard was defined in legislation known as the Essential Services Buildings Seismic Safety Act

22 The finding and recommendation numbers in this volume correspond with Volume 2. Finding #1 in Volume 2 is

not related to the risk assessment; thus, the risk assessment findings begin with Finding #2.





of 1986 (ESBSSA),23

and includes requirements that such buildings shall be "designed and

constructed to minimize fire hazards and to resist the forces of earthquakes, gravity and winds."

Citygate’s evaluation of District facilities (see Volume 2) determined that neither of the

District’s two fire station facilities conforms to the seismic safety requirements of the Act. Both

stations do, however, have backup emergency electric power generators.

Finding #5: Neither of the District’s fire station facilities conform to the

seismic safety requirements of essential services buildings as

contained in Chapter 2, Sections 16000-16022 of the California

Health and Safety Code.

Flood / Coastal Surge Risk

Although it would likely respond to a flood or coastal surge incident to reduce the severity of

resultant impacts as capabilities and resources permit, the District does not have jurisdictional

responsibility for floods or coastal surge, and has thus not implemented any mitigation measures

for these hazards.

Hazardous Materials Risk

All District response personnel are trained to the First Responder Operational (FRO) level for

hazardous materials incidents in conformance with Governor’s Office of Emergency Services –

California Specialized Training Institute standards. In addition, a Governor’s Office of

Emergency Services certified Type-1 Hazardous Materials Response Unit/Team is available

from Santa Barbara City Fire Station 2, approximately 10 miles (15 minutes) from Carpinteria.

Finding #6: The District has the appropriate training and response capability to

reduce the impact severity of a hazardous material release or spill.

Landslide / Coastal Erosion Risk

Although it would likely respond to a landslide incident to reduce the severity of resultant

impacts as capabilities and resources permit, the District does not have jurisdictional

responsibility for landslides or coastal erosion, and has thus not implemented any mitigation

measures for these hazards.

23 California Health and Safety Code, Chapter 2, Sections 16000-16022





Tsunami Risk

Although only a relatively small area of the District is considered vulnerable to tsunami

inundation as shown on the maps in Appendix B, the District would likely respond to a tsunami

incident to reduce the severity of resultant impacts as capabilities and resources permit. In

addition, the District has the ability to monitor warnings issued by the National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration’s National Tsunami Warning Center, and to coordinate with the

Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office to initiate early warnings to, and evacuation of, identified

tsunami inundation areas. No mitigation measures have been considered or implemented by the

District for its tsunami risk.

Wildland Fire Risk

The Santa Barbara County Fire Safe Council (FSC) was formed in January of 1997 “to unify

public and private organizations to educate, motivate and coordinate Santa Barbara County

communities to minimize the losses associated with wildfire.” The Fire Safe Council (FSC) is

instrumental in bringing a conglomeration of stakeholders to “the table.” The council sheds light

on many concerns within communities and expose information relating to the effectiveness of

fire safe efforts in the County. Through the Council’s diversity, agencies have been able to

develop pre-fire projects that otherwise may never have developed.

To help protect people and their property from potential catastrophic wildfire, the National Fire

Plan directs funding to be provided for projects designed to reduce the fire risks to communities.

A fundamental step in achieving this goal was the identification of communities that are at high

risk of damage from wildfire. These high-risk communities identified within the wildland-urban

interface (WUI), the area where homes and wildlands intermix, were published in the Federal

Register in 2001. Within Santa Barbara County, the designated at-risk communities include the

City of Carpinteria and the community of Summerland.

In 2003, the federal Healthy Forests Restoration Act was adopted, and established guidelines for

the development of Community Wildfire Protection Plans (CWPP). Also in the early 2000s, the

Santa Barbara County Fire Department, acting as an agent of the California Department of

Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE), re-formatted its Fire Management Plan to conform

with federal CWPP guidelines, and also re-named it the Santa Barbara County Communities

Wildfire Protection Plan (CWPP). The goal of the countywide CWPP is consistent with the goals

and objectives of the California Fire Plan to reduce the total costs and losses from wildfire by

protecting assets at risk through focused pre-fire management prescriptions to increase initial

wildfire response success by:

Creating wildfire protection zones that reduce the risks to citizens and firefighters.





Assessing all wildland areas, not just the State Responsibility Areas. The analysis

will include all wildland service providers - federal, state, local government, and

private, and will identify high risk, high value areas and develop information on

and determine who is responsible, who is responding, and who is paying for

wildland fire emergencies.

Identifying and analyzing key policy issues and develop recommendations for

changes in public policy. Analysis will include alternatives to reduce total costs

and losses by increasing fire protection system effectiveness.

Developing strong fiscal policy focus and monitoring the wildland fire protection

system in fiscal terms. This will include all public and private expenditures and

economic losses.

Translating this analysis into public policy.

In 2002, the Carpinteria-Summerland Fire Protection District took further action to minimize

both the occurrence and severity of impacts from a wildland fire by adopting a comprehensive

CWPP, subsequently updated in 2013, to reduce vegetative fuel loading and related flammability

in heavily vegetated areas of the District by removing and selectively eliminating dead and

decadent vegetation. Overall, the plan combines wildland fire safety education, code

enforcement, and hazardous fuels reduction to reduce the District’s vulnerability to wildland fire.

The plan further establishes four wildland fuel management zones and wildland fuel reduction

priorities and treatment methods including manual, mechanical, biological, and chemical fuel

treatments, as well as pile burning. It also incorporates program priorities as identified by

residents and other interested parties within each fuel management zone.

The CWPP also prioritizes actions to reduce structure ignitability within the WUI through

County land use and development standards and prioritized mitigation measures conforming to

NFPA 1144, Standard for Reducing Structure Ignition Hazards from Wildland Fire. The County

of Santa Barbara has adopted the 2013 edition of the California Building Code, and the District

has also adopted the 2013 California Fire Code with local amendments. These codes provide

significant fire safety mitigations by establishing minimum construction materials and methods,

including ignition-resistant roofing and automatic fire sprinkler system requirements.

Finding #7: The District has adopted an effective Community Wildfire

Protection Plan to reduce its wildland fire risk vulnerability by

modifying and/or selectively eliminating dead and decadent

vegetation thus reducing vegetative fuel loading and related

flammability in heavily vegetated areas of the District.





The District employs a part-time Vegetation Management Officer to manage its WUI risk

reduction program. In recent years, the District has sought and received grant funding for various

fuel reduction priorities including:

Roadside clearance and related maintenance along key WUI access/egress routes

Improvement/extension of the Santa Monica/Rincon fuel break north of Foothill

Road/Casitas Pass Road as illustrated in Figure 17

Carpinteria-Summerland Fire Protection District—Standards of Response Cover and Headquarters Staffing Adequacy Study



Figure 17—Wildland Fuel Treatment Network





In addition to its intensive wildland fuel reduction/modification program, the District has a

defensible space program involving annual inspection of all residential properties within Fire

Management Zones 1-4, 2-1, and 2-2 for conformance with Public Resources Code Section 4291

vegetation clearance standards around buildings. From July 2012 through June 2015, engine

company personnel completed 275 WUI inspections, representing 13.85% of real property

parcels, as shown in Table 40.

Table 40—Engine Company WUI Inspections

Fire Management

Zone

Number of Property Parcels

1

Number of Inspections Completed

2

Percentage Completed

1-4 193 107 55.44%

2-1 274 168 61.31%

2-2 1,518 0 0.00%

Total 1985 275 13.85% 1 Some parcels vacant; some parcels with only single-family residence

not subject to inspection; some parcels with multiple occupancies 2 Inspections in Fire Management Zone 1-3 affected by injury to

responsible Company Officer; Community risk reduction efforts in Fire

Management Zone 2-2 were shifted to focus on fire hydrant issues

Source: Carpinteria-Summerland Fire District

According to District Fire Prevention staff, no accountability has been established to ensure that

inspections are completed in a timely manner, and corrective/enforcement action for non-

compliance is rare, with only one citation issued to date.

Finding #8: The District has taken some steps to educate residents about, and to

enforce state WUI vegetation clearance requirements around

buildings; however, there does not appear to be any accountability

to ensure that these inspections are completed in a timely manner,

and to enforce and correct non-compliance.

In 2007, the District developed wildland pre-attack plans for the WUI areas of the District that

include populations and buildings at risk, travel routes, and response requirements and

assignments.





Finding #9: The District has developed wildland pre-attack plans for the WUI

areas of the District to include populations and buildings at risk,

travel routes, and response requirements and assignments.

1.23.2 Additional Recommended Mitigation Measures

Following analysis of the ten hazards relating to District services, and evaluation of existing

mitigation measures and efforts as cited above, Citygate identified and evaluated additional

mitigation measures to further reduce the District’s risk vulnerability by hazard.

Building Fire Risk

To further mitigate its building fire risk vulnerability, the District should consider updating its

pre-fire plans for all commercial, high-risk, critical facility, and other target hazard occupancies

at least very five years. The District should also consider re-implementing its engine company

inspection program, or alternatively hiring additional fire prevention staff, to conduct fire and

life safety inspections of all commercial, high-risk, critical facility, and other target hazard

occupancies on at least a three-year cycle.

Recommendation #1: The District should continue updating its pre-fire plans

for commercial, high-risk, critical facility, and other

target hazard occupancies at least once every five years.

Recommendation #2: The District should consider re-implementing its engine

company inspection program, or alternatively hiring

additional fire prevention staff, to conduct fire and life

safety inspections of all commercial, high-risk, critical

facility, and other target hazard occupancies on at least a

three-year cycle.

Earthquake / Seismic Activity Risk

To further mitigate its earthquake / seismic activity risk vulnerability, the District should

consider upgrading its fire station facilities to conform to the seismic safety requirements for

essential services buildings as contained in Chapter 2, Sections 16000-16022 of the California

Health and Safety Code.





Recommendation #3: Absent complete facility replacement(s), the District

should consider upgrading its fire station facilities to

conform to the seismic safety requirements of essential

services buildings as contained in Chapter 2, Sections

16000-16022 of the California Health and Safety Code.

Flood / Coastal Surge Risk

To further mitigate its flood / coastal surge risk vulnerability, the District should consider

collaborating with the City of Carpinteria and the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s Office to

develop a local evacuation/shelter-in-place plan specific to District residents and businesses; and

also consider enhancing the existing countywide Reverse 9-1-1 emergency notification capability

with a local mass emergency notification capability, such as Reverse 9-1-1, Nixle,24

low power

AM radio station, HEARO home alert radio, Facebook, and/or Twitter. These recommendations

also apply to reduce the District’s hazardous material, tsunami, and wildland fire risk

vulnerability.

Recommendation #4: The District should consider collaborating with the City

of Carpinteria and the Santa Barbara County Sheriff’s

Office to develop a local evacuation/shelter-in-place

plan specific to District residents and businesses.

Hazardous Materials Risk

To further mitigate its hazardous materials vulnerability, the District should consider, in addition

to Recommendations #4 and 5 listed above, conducting a tabletop or functional hazardous

material release/spill exercise with the Santa Barbara regional Hazardous Materials Response

Team at least bi-annually.

Recommendation #5: The District should conduct a tabletop or functional

hazardous material release/spill exercise with the Santa

Barbara regional Hazardous Materials Response Team

at least bi-annually.

24 Nixle is a privately held U.S. corporation that offers free and paid mobile notification services for local police

departments, county emergency management offices, municipal governments, and their agencies.





Wildland Fire Risk

To further mitigate its wildland fire risk vulnerability, the District should maintain existing

vegetation reduction/modification projects to ensure sustained long-term effectiveness;

aggressively seek additional landowner agreements for vegetation removal/modification projects,

especially in those areas of the District adjacent to the native chaparral fuel beds; aggressively

seek additional neighborhood vegetation removal/reduction projects that will effectively reduce

wildland fire intensity/spread potential; and aggressively seek additional funding sources to

support District CWPP priorities, goals, and objectives.

Recommendation #6: Maintain existing vegetation reduction/modification

projects to ensure sustained long-term effectiveness.

Recommendation #7: Aggressively seek additional landowner agreements for

vegetation removal/modification projects, especially in

those areas of the District adjacent to the native

chaparral fuel beds.

Recommendation #8: Aggressively seek additional neighborhood vegetation

removal/reduction projects that will effectively reduce

wildland fire intensity/spread potential.

Recommendation #9: Aggressively seek additional funding sources to support

District CWPP priorities, goals, and objectives.

Appendix A—Risk Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria Matrices

APPENDIX A

RISK IMPACT SEVERITY FACTOR EVALUATION

CRITERIA MATRICES

Appendix A—Risk Impact Severity Factor Evaluation Criteria Matrices page 1

Risk Analysis Scoring Guideline – Building Fire

Impact Severity Factor Score Scoring Criteria

Population Density

0 Average population density less than 500 per square mile

1 Average population density less than 1,000 per square mile




5 Average population density greater than 10,000 per square mile

Building Density

0 Average residential building density less than 1 DU1/acre; average non-residential FAR

2 less than .10


2 less than .25


2 less than .50


2 less than .75


2 less than 1.0

5 Average residential building density more than 30 DU1/acre; average non-residential FAR2 1.0 or higher

High-Risk Occupancies / Critical Facilities

0 No high-risk occupancies3 or critical facilities

1 Less than 1% of all buildings are high-risk occupancies3 or critical facilities




5 More than 5% of all buildings are high-risk occupancies3 or critical facilities

Water Supply

0 More than 95% of building risk has Needed Fire Flow4 (NFF) available within 300 ft.





5 Less than 75% of building risk has Needed Fire Flow4 (NFF) available within 1000 ft.

Building Fire Service Capacity

0 ERF5 for more than 95% of building risk, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available within 8:00 min. travel time @ 90%

1 ERF5 for more than 95% of buildings, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available within 9:00 min. travel time @ 90%

2 ERF5 for more than 90% of buildings, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available within 10:00 min. travel time @ 90%

3 ERF5 for more than 80% of buildings available within 12:00 min. travel time @ 90%

4 ERF5 for more than 75% of buildings available within 15:00 min. travel time @ 80%

5 ERF5 for more than 75% of buildings NOT available within 15:00 min. travel time @ 80%

1 Dwelling unit (DU)

2 Gross Floor Area Ratio (FAR)

3 CFAI high, special, or maximum occupancy risk category

4 Needed Fire Flow as determined by the Insurance Services Office (ISO) and/or local regulation or policy

5 Effective Response Force (ERF) = Minimum 28 personnel for single-family dwelling; 28 personnel for multi-family dwelling/apartment/commercial; 38 personnel for high-rise


Risk Analysis Scoring Guideline – Wildland Fire

Impact Severity Factor Score Scoring Guidelines

Wildland Fuels

0 No wildland fire hazard fuels risk1 within 1 mile of at least 90% of exposed values at risk

2

1 No wildland fire hazard fuels risk1 within 1/2 mile ft. of at least 90% of exposed values at risk

2

2 No wildland fire hazard fuels risk1 within ¼ mile of at least 75% of exposed values at risk

2

3 No wildland fire hazard fuels risk1 within 1000 ft. of at least 75% of exposed values at risk

2

4 No wildland fire hazard fuels risk1 within 500 ft. of at least 50% of exposed values at risk

2

5 Wildland fire hazard fuels risk1 present

within 500 ft. of 50% or more of exposed values at risk

2

Weather Factors

0 Multiple high fire weather factors3 occur concurrently not more than 15 days per year on average



3 Very high fire weather factors4 occur concurrently fewer than 30 days per year on average

4 Very high fire weather factors4 occur concurrently fewer than 45 days per year on average

5 Very high fire weather factors4 occur concurrently more than 45 days per year on average

Topography

0 Average slope less than 5%; no topographic features5 present within 1/2 mile of ≥90% of exposed values at risk

2


2


2


2

4 Average slope less than10%; no topographic features5 present within 1/8 mile of ≥75% of exposed values at risk

32

5 Average slope greater than 10% and/or topographic features5 present within 1/8 mile of >25% of exposed values at risk

2

Water Supply

0 Public water supply greater than 1000 GPM within 500 ft. of at least 90% of exposed values at risk2




4 Public or private water supply greater than 500 GPM within 1000 ft. of at least 75% of exposed values at risk2

5 Public or private water supply less than 500 GPM; or greater than 1000 ft. from 25% or more of exposed values at risk2

Wildland Fire Service Capacity

0 ERF6 for all wildland fire risk, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available within 15:00 minutes total response time @ 90%

1 ERF

6 for at least 90% of wildland fire risk, meeting minimum recommended annual training, available within 15:00 minutes total response

time @ 90%

2 ERF


time @ 90%

3 ERF


time @ 90%

4 ERF6 for at least 50% of wildland fire risk available within 30:00 minutes total response time @ 90%

5 ERF6 not available for 50% or more of wildland fire risk, or available with total response time greater than 30:00 min. @ 90%

1 State or locally designated moderate, high, or very high wildland fire hazard risk zones

2 Values at risk includes occupied buildings, critical Infrastructure/key resources (CIKR), and vulnerable populations

3 High Fire Weather Factors include temperature >90

o F.; relative humidity <25%, wind >5 mph

4 Very High Fire Weather Factors include temperature >95

o F.; relative humidity <15%, wind >10 mph

5 Includes box canyon, chimney, ridge, saddle

6 Effective Response Force (ERF) = minimum of 3 wildland fire engines and 13 personnel


Risk Analysis Scoring Guideline – EMS Risk


Population Density







Population Demographics

0 Less than 5% of population under age 10, over age 65, or below federal poverty level; more than 95% have health insurance





5 More than 40% of population under age 10, over age 65, or below federal poverty level; more than 95% have health insurance

Vehicle Traffic

0 No freeway or highway traffic; no high-speed arterial traffic; no seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog

1 Single two-lane rural highway; minimal high-speed arterial traffic; no seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog

2 Multiple two-lane rural highways; moderate high-speed arterial traffic; no seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog

3 Single multiple-lane freeway; significant high-speed arterial traffic; minimal seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog

4 Multiple multiple-lane freeways; moderate high-speed arterial traffic; moderate seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog

5 Multiple multiple-lane freeways; heavy high-speed arterial traffic; significant seasonal snow, ice, or dense fog

Pre-Hospital EMS Service Capacity

0 ALS1 services available within 6:00 min. total response time

3 @ 90%


3 @ 90%


3 @ 90%

3 ALS1 or BLS

2 services available within 12:00 min. total response time

3 @ 90%

4 ALS1 or

BLS

2 services available within 15:00 min. total response time

3 @ 90%

5 ALS1 or

BLS

2 services not available, or not available within 15:00 min. total response time

3 @ 90%

Hospital Emergency Care Capacity

0 Primary ER within 10 min. travel time @ 90%; secondary ER within 20 min. travel @ 90%; trauma center within 30 min. travel @ 90%

1 Primary ER within 15 min. travel @ 90%; secondary ER within 30 min. travel @ 90%; trauma center within 40 min. travel @ 90%




5 Primary ER not within 25 min. travel @ 90%; secondary ER not within 45 min. travel @ 90%; trauma center not within 60 min. travel @ 90%

1 Advanced Life Support (ALS)

2 Basic Life Support (BLS)

3 Response Time - time from receipt of 9-1-1 call to arrival of initial resource with EMS capability


Risk Analysis Scoring Guideline – Hazardous Material Risk


Population Density







Fixed Hazardous Material Risk

0 Less than 1% of occupancies require hazardous material operating permit or Hazardous Material Business Plan

1 Less than 2.5% of occupancies require hazardous material operating permit or Hazardous Material Business Plan


3 Less than 7.5% of occupancies require hazardous material operating permit or Hazardous Material Business Plan


5 More than 10% of occupancies require hazardous material operating permit or Hazardous Material Business Plan

Transportation-Related Hazardous Material Risk

0 Less than 100 AADT1 truck traffic; no railway freight traffic; no air cargo traffic

1 Less than 1,000 AADT1 truck traffic; less than 3 daily freight train movements; less than 10 tons annual air cargo




5 More than 50,000 AADT1 truck traffic; more than 50 daily freight train movements; more than 500 tons annual air cargo

Hazardous Material Risk Service Capacity

0 Type-I HazMat Team available within 15 min. @ 90%; all response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2

1 Type-I HazMat Team available within 30 min. @ 90%; all response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2

2 Type-II HazMat Team available within 30 min. @ 90%; all response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2

3 Type-II HazMat Team available within 45 min. @ 90%; more than 75% of response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2

4 Type-III HazMat Team available within 60 min. @ 80%; more than 50% of response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2

5 Type-III HazMat Team not available within 60 min. @ 80%; less than 50% of response personnel trained to HazMat FRO2

Evacuation Capability

0 Evacuation plan adopted and functionally exercised at least every 12 months; multiple EMNS

3 able to effectively notify more than 90% of

residents/businesses within 15 mins.; EMNS tested at least every 12 months

1 Evacuation plan adopted and functionally exercised at least every 18 months; EMNS

3 able to effectively notify more than 75% of

residents/businesses within 15 mins.; EMNS tested at least every 18 months

2 Evacuation plan adopted and evaluated at least every 18 months; EMNS

3 able to effectively notify more than 75% of residents/businesses

within 30 mins.; EMNS tested at least every 24 months

3 Evacuation plan evaluated at least every 24 months; EMNS

3 able to effectively notify more than 50% of residents/businesses within 30

mins.; EMNS tested at least every 24 months

4 Evacuation plan not evaluated; EMNS3 unable to effectively notify at least 50% of residents/businesses within 30 mins. and/or not tested

5 No evacuation plan and/or no EMNS available 1 Average Annual Daily Traffic count (AADT)

2 First Responder Operational (FRO)

3 Emergency Mass Notification System (EMNS)


Risk Analysis Scoring Guideline – Technical Rescue


Construction Activity

0 No significant construction activity other than occasional single-family dwelling, remodel, etc.

1 Some light new construction activity

2 Moderate light residential/commercial/infrastructure construction activity

3 Some heavy residential/commercial/industrial/infrastructure construction activity

4 Moderate heavy residential/commercial/industrial/infrastructure/high-rise construction activity

5 Significant heavy commercial/industrial/infrastructure/high-rise construction activity

Industrial/Manufacturing Activity

0 No industrial/manufacturing activity

1 Some light industrial/manufacturing activity

2 Moderate light industrial/manufacturing activity

3 Some heavy industrial/manufacturing activity

4 Moderate heavy industrial/manufacturing activity

5 Significant heavy industrial/manufacturing activity

Water Risk

0 No water rescue risk

1 Minimal water rescue risk; one or more small bodies of non-swift water; minimal recreation activity

2 Minor water rescue risk; one or more small bodies of non-swift water; minor recreation activity

3 Moderate water rescue risk; one or more bodies of non-swift water; moderate recreation activity

4 High water rescue risk; one or more bodies of swift water; high recreation activity

5 Very high water rescue risk; multiple swift waterways; coastal waterfront; very high recreation activity

Vehicle Traffic







Technical Rescue Service Capacity

0 Type-1 (Heavy) USAR Team / Type-1 swiftwater/flood S&R Team available within 30 min. @ 90%

1 Type-1 (Heavy) USAR Company / Type-1 swiftwater/flood S&R Team available within 45 min. @ 90%

2 Type-2 (Medium) USAR Company / Type-2 swiftwater/flood S&R Team available within 60 min. @ 90%

3 Type-3 (Light) USAR Company / Type-3 swiftwater/flood S&R Team available within 75 min. @ 90%

4 Type-4 (Basic) USAR Company / Type-4 swiftwater/flood S&R Team available within 90 min. @ 90%

5 Technical Rescue capability / swiftwater/flood S&R capability not available within 90 min. @ 90%


Risk Analysis Scoring Guideline – Transportation Risk


Population Density







Vehicle Traffic







Railway Traffic

0 No railway passenger or freight services

1 Average of less than 10 daily train movements




5 Average of more than 250 daily train movements

Aircraft Traffic

0 No passenger, cargo, or military aircraft operations

1 No commercial passenger or cargo aircraft operations; less than 5,000 general aviation flights annually

2 Less than 500,000 passengers; less than 50,000 general aviation flights; less than 5,000 annual cargo tons

3 Less than 1 million passengers; less than 100,000 general aviation flights; less than 10,000 annual cargo tons

4 Less than 5 million passengers; less than 250,000 general aviation flights; less than 20,000 annual cargo tons

5 More than 5 million passengers; more than 250,000 general aviation flights; more than 20,000 annual cargo tons

Transportation Risk Service Capacity

0 ALS available within 6 min. @ 90%; technical rescue available within 30 min. @ 90%



3 ALS or BLS available within 12 min. @ 90%; technical rescue available within 60 min. @ 90%

4 ALS or BLS available within 15 min. @ 90%; technical rescue available within 75 min. @ 90%

5 ALS or BLS not available within 15 min. @ 90%; technical rescue not available within 75 min. @ 90%


Risk Analysis Scoring Guideline – Earthquake Risk


Potential Area Affected

0 None of area likely affected

1 Minimal area likely affected

2 Some area likely affected

3 Moderate area likely affected

4 Significant area likely affected

5 Most or all of area likely affected


0 No injuries or fatalities likely

1 Only minor injuries likely; no fatalities

2 Few injuries likely; no fatalities expected

3 Some injuries and/or fatalities likely

4 Moderate injuries and/or fatalities likely

5 Major injuries and/or fatalities likely


0 No property damage likely

1 Minimal property damage likely

2 Some property damage likely

3 Moderate property damage likely

4 Significant property damage likely

5 Major property damage likely

Critical Facilities / Key Resources Affected

0 No impacts to critical facilities / key resources likely

1 Minimal impacts to critical facilities / key resources likely

2 Some impacts to critical facilities / key resources likely

3 Moderate impacts to critical facilities / key resources likely

4 Significant impacts to critical facilities / key resources likely

5 Major impacts to critical facilities / key resources likely

Mid-Term / Long-Term Community Impacts

0 No likely mid-term and/or long-term impacts affecting community resilience

1 Likely minimal mid-term and/or long-term impacts affecting community resilience

2 Likely Moderate mid-term and/or long-term impacts affecting community resilience

3 Likely Significant mid-term and/or long-term impacts affecting community resilience

4 Likely Major mid-term and/or long-term impacts affecting community resilience

5 Likely catastrophic mid-term and/or long-term impacts affecting community resilience


Risk Analysis Scoring Guideline – Flood Risk


Potential Area Affected

0 None of area likely affected

1 Minimal area likely affected

2 Some area likely affected

3 Moderate area likely affected

4 Significant area likely affected

5 Most or all of area likely affected






























Risk Analysis Scoring Guideline – Landslide / Coastal Erosion Risk


Slope Stability

0 No slope instability identified

1 Minimal area with low slope instability

2 Some area with moderate slope instability

3 Significant area with moderate slope instability

4 Moderate area with high slope instability

5 Significant area with high slope instability

Zone VE Flood Area

0 No coastline area within Zone VE

1 Less than 5% of coastline within Zone VE


3 Less than 25%% of coastline within Zone VE


5 More than 50% of coastline within Zone VE























Risk Analysis Scoring Guideline – Tsunami Risk


Tsunami Inundation Area

0 None of area lies within a designated tsunami inundation zone

1 Less than 5% of area lies within a designated tsunami inundation zone




5 More than 50% of area lies within a designated tsunami inundation zone





























Appendix B—Tsunami Inundation Maps

APPENDIX B

TSUNAMI INUNDATION MAPS

119°30'0"W

119°30'0"W

119°37'30"W

119°37'30"W

34°30'0"N 34°30'0"N

34°22'30"N 34°22'30"N

119°30'0"W

119°30'0"W

119°37'30"W

119°37'30"W

34°30'0"N 34°30'0"N

34°22'30"N 34°22'30"N

TSUNAMI INUNDATION MAPFOR EMERGENCY PLANNING

0.5 0 0.5 10.25

Miles

SCALE 1:24,000

1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000500

Feet

0.5 0 0.5 10.25

Kilometers

HILDRETH PEAK QUADRANGLE

WH

ITE

LED

GE

PEA

K Q

UA

DR

AN

GLE

SAN

TA B

AR

BA

RA

QU

AD

GR

AN

GLE

Initial tsunami modeling was performed by the University of Southern California (USC) Tsunami Research Center funded through the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) by the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. The tsunami modeling process utilized the MOST (Method of Splitting Tsunamis) computational program (Version 0), which allows for wave evolution over a variable bathymetry and topography used for the inundation mapping (Titov and Gonzalez, 1997; Titov and Synolakis, 1998). The bathymetric/topographic data that were used in the tsunami models consist of a series of nested grids. Near-shore grids with a 3 arc-second (75- to 90-meters) resolution or higher, were adjusted to “Mean High Water” sea-level conditions, representing a conservative sea level for the intended use of the tsunami modeling and mapping.

A suite of tsunami source events was selected for modeling, representing realistic local and distant earthquakes and hypothetical extreme undersea, near-shore landslides (Table 1). Local tsunami sources that were considered include offshore reverse-thrust faults, restraining bends on strike-slip fault zones and large submarine landslides capable of significant seafloor displacement and tsunami generation. Distant tsunami sources that were considered include great subduction zone events that are known to have occurred historically (1960 Chile and 1964 Alaska earthquakes) and others which can occur around the Pacific Ocean “Ring of Fire.”

In order to enhance the result from the 75- to 90-meter inundation grid data, a method was developed utilizing higher-resolution digital topographic data (3- to 10-meters resolution) that better defines the location of the maximum inundation line (U.S. Geological Survey, 1993; Intermap, 2003; NOAA, 2004). The location of the enhanced inundation line was determined by using digital imagery and terrain data on a GIS platform with consideration given to historic inundation information (Lander, et al., 1993). This information was verified, where possible, by field work coordinated with local county personnel.

The accuracy of the inundation line shown on these maps is subject to limitations in the accuracy and completeness of available terrain and tsunami source information, and the current understanding of tsunami generation and propagation phenomena as expressed in the models. Thus, although an attempt has been made to identify a credible upper bound to inundation at any location along the coastline, it remains possible that actual inundation could be greater in a major tsunami event.

This map does not represent inundation from a single scenario event. It was created by combining inundation results for an ensemble of source events affecting a given region (Table 1). For this reason, all of the inundation region in a particular area will not likely be inundated during a single tsunami event.

Tsunami Inundation Line


MAP EXPLANATION

The California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA), the University of Southern California (USC), and the California Geological Survey (CGS) make no representation or warranties regarding the accuracy of this inundation map nor the data from which the map was derived. Neither the State of California nor USC shall be liable under any circumstances for any direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages with respect to any claim by any user or any third party on account of or arising from the use of this map.

Topographic base maps prepared by U.S. Geological Survey as part of the 7.5-minute Quadrangle Map Series (originally 1:24,000 scale). Tsunami inundation line boundaries may reflect updated digital orthophotographic and topographic data that can differ significantly from contours shown on the base map.

METHOD OF PREPARATION

MAP BASE

DISCLAIMER

SURF

OCEANO

SACATE

GOLETA

NIPOMO

ORCUTT

CUYAMA

GAVIOTA

CASMALIA

LOMPOC

FOX MTN

SISQUOC

SOLVANG

TAJIG

UAS

BALD MTN

PEAK MTN

POINT SAL

MARICOPA

ZACA LAKE

LOS OLIVOS

PITAS POINT

SANTA YNEZ

GUADALUPE

ZACA CREEK

LOS ALAMOS

SANTA M

ARIA

CARPINTERIA

BIG PIN

E MTN

NEW CUYAMA

HUASNA PEAK

CUYAMA PEAK

WELLS RANCH

CALIENTE MTN

LOMPOC HILLS

FIGUEROA M

TN

BATES CANYON

MADULCE PEAK

LAKE CACHUMA

ELKHORN HILLS

HILDRETH PEAK

FOXEN CANYON

MANZANITA M

TN

TWITCHELL DAM

SANTA BARBARA

TAYLOR C

ANYON

SAN RAFAEL M

TN

POINT ARGUELLO

HURRICANE DECK

CHIMNEY CANYON

SANTA ROSA HILLS

SAN MARCOS PASS

MIRANDA PINE MTN

WHITE LEDGE PEAK

POINT CONCEPTION

OLD MAN M

OUNTAIN

BALLINGER CANYON

TEPUSQUET CANYON

SALISBURY POTRERO

LITTLE PINE MOUNTA

IN

DOS PUEBLOS CANYON

RANCHO NUEVO C

REEK

TRANQUILLON MOUNTA

IN

State of CaliforniaCounty of Santa Barbara

California Emergency Management AgencyCalifornia Geological SurveyUniversity of Southern California

Tsunami Inundation Map for Emergency PlanningCarpinteria Quadrangle

State of California ~ County of Santa BarbaraCARPINTERIA QUADRANGLE

January 31, 2009

PURPOSE OF THIS MAP

Table 1: Tsunami sources modeled for the Santa Barbara County coastline.

Areas of Inundation Map Coverage and Sources Used

Sources (M = moment magnitude used in modeled event)

Lompoc Santa

Barbara

Santa Barbara –Ventura

Anacapa-Dume Fault X

Channel Island Thrust Fault X X

Goleta Offshore Landslide #1 X X


Local Sources

1927 Point Arguello Earthquake (M7.3) X

Central Aleutians Subduction Zone#1 (M8.9) X X

Central Aleutians Subduction Zone#2 (M8.9) X

Central Aleutians Subduction Zone#3 (M9.2) X X X

Chile North Subduction Zone (M9.4) X X X

1960 Chile Earthquake (M9.3) X X

1964 Alaska Earthquake (M9.2) X X

Cascadia Subduction Zone #2 (M9.2) X

Japan Subduction Zone #2 (M8.8) X

Kuril Islands Subduction Zone #2 (M8.8) X


Distant Sources


References:

Intermap Technologies, Inc., 2003, Intermap product handbook and quick start guide: Intermap NEXTmap document on 5-meter resolution data, 112 p.

Lander, J.F., Lockridge, P.A., and Kozuch, M.J., 1993, Tsunamis Affecting the West Coast of the United States 1806-1992: National Geophysical Data Center Key to Geophysical Record Documentation No. 29, NOAA, NESDIS, NGDC, 242 p.

National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration (NOAA), 2004, Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (IfSAR) Digital Elevation Models from GeoSAR platform (EarthData): 3-meter resolution data.

Titov, V.V., and Gonzalez, F.I., 1997, Implementation and Testing of the Method of Tsunami Splitting (MOST): NOAA Technical Memorandum ERL PMEL – 112, 11 p.

Titov, V.V., and Synolakis, C.E., 1998, Numerical modeling of tidal wave runup: Journal of Waterways, Port, Coastal and Ocean Engineering, ASCE, 124 (4), pp 157-171.

U.S. Geological Survey, 1993, Digital Elevation Models: National Mapping Program, Technical Instructions, Data Users Guide 5, 48 p.

This tsunami inundation map was prepared to assist cities and counties in identifying their tsunami hazard. It is intended for local jurisdictional, coastal evacuation planning uses only. This map, and the information presented herein, is not a legal document and does not meet disclosure requirements for real estate transactions nor for any other regulatory purpose.

The inundation map has been compiled with best currently available scientific information. The inundation line represents the maximum considered tsunami runup from a number of extreme, yet realistic, tsunami sources. Tsunamis are rare events; due to a lack of known occurrences in the historical record, this map includes no information about the probability of any tsunami affecting any area within a specific period of time.

Please refer to the following websites for additional information on the construction and/or intended use of the tsunami inundation map:

State of California Emergency Management Agency, Earthquake and Tsunami Program:http://www.oes.ca.gov/WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/Content/B1EC51BA215931768825741F005E8D80?OpenDocument

University of Southern California – Tsunami Research Center:http://www.usc.edu/dept/tsunamis/2005/index.php

State of California Geological Survey Tsunami Information: http://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/geologic_hazards/Tsunami/index.htm

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency Center for Tsunami Research (MOST model):http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/time/background/models.html

119°22'30"W

119°22'30"W

119°30'0"W

119°30'0"W

34°22'30"N 34°22'30"N

119°22'30"W

119°22'30"W

119°30'0"W

119°30'0"W

34°22'30"N 34°22'30"N

TSUNAMI INUNDATION MAPFOR EMERGENCY PLANNING

0.5 0 0.5 10.25

Miles

SCALE 1:24,000

1,000 0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000500

Feet

0.5 0 0.5 10.25

Kilometers

State of CaliforniaCounty of Santa Barbara

Initial tsunami modeling was performed by the University of Southern California (USC) Tsunami Research Center funded through the California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA) by the National Tsunami Hazard Mitigation Program. The tsunami modeling process utilized the MOST (Method of Splitting Tsunamis) computational program (Version 0), which allows for wave evolution over a variable bathymetry and topography used for the inundation mapping (Titov and Gonzalez, 1997; Titov and Synolakis, 1998). The bathymetric/topographic data that were used in the tsunami models consist of a series of nested grids. Near-shore grids with a 3 arc-second (75- to 90-meters) resolution or higher, were adjusted to “Mean High Water” sea-level conditions, representing a conservative sea level for the intended use of the tsunami modeling and mapping.

A suite of tsunami source events was selected for modeling, representing realistic local and distant earthquakes and hypothetical extreme undersea, near-shore landslides (Table 1). Local tsunami sources that were considered include offshore reverse-thrust faults, restraining bends on strike-slip fault zones and large submarine landslides capable of significant seafloor displacement and tsunami generation. Distant tsunami sources that were considered include great subduction zone events that are known to have occurred historically (1960 Chile and 1964 Alaska earthquakes) and others which can occur around the Pacific Ocean “Ring of Fire.”

In order to enhance the result from the 75- to 90-meter inundation grid data, a method was developed utilizing higher-resolution digital topographic data (3- to 10-meters resolution) that better defines the location of the maximum inundation line (U.S. Geological Survey, 1993; Intermap, 2003; NOAA, 2004). The location of the enhanced inundation line was determined by using digital imagery and terrain data on a GIS platform with consideration given to historic inundation information (Lander, et al., 1993). This information was verified, where possible, by field work coordinated with local county personnel.

The accuracy of the inundation line shown on these maps is subject to limitations in the accuracy and completeness of available terrain and tsunami source information, and the current understanding of tsunami generation and propagation phenomena as expressed in the models. Thus, although an attempt has been made to identify a credible upper bound to inundation at any location along the coastline, it remains possible that actual inundation could be greater in a major tsunami event.

This map does not represent inundation from a single scenario event. It was created by combining inundation results for an ensemble of source events affecting a given region (Table 1). For this reason, all of the inundation region in a particular area will not likely be inundated during a single tsunami event.

Tsunami Inundation Line


MAP EXPLANATIONMETHOD OF PREPARATION

SURF

OCEANO

SACATE

GOLETA

NIPOMO

ORCUTT

CUYAMA

GAVIOTA

CASMALIA

LOMPOC

FOX MTN

SISQUOC

SOLVANG

TAJIG

UAS

BALD MTN

PEAK MTN

POINT SAL

MARICOPA

ZACA LAKE

LOS OLIVOS

PITAS POINT

SANTA YNEZ

GUADALUPE

ZACA CREEK

LOS ALAMOS

SANTA M

ARIA

CARPINTERIA

BIG PIN

E MTN

NEW CUYAMA

HUASNA PEAK

CUYAMA PEAK

WELLS RANCH

CALIENTE MTN

LOMPOC HILLS

FIGUEROA M

TN

BATES CANYON

MADULCE PEAK

LAKE CACHUMA

ELKHORN HILLS

HILDRETH PEAK

FOXEN CANYON

MANZANITA M

TN

TWITCHELL DAM

SANTA BARBARA

TAYLOR C

ANYON

SAN RAFAEL M

TN

POINT ARGUELLO

HURRICANE DECK

CHIMNEY CANYON

SANTA ROSA HILLS

SAN MARCOS PASS

MIRANDA PINE MTN

WHITE LEDGE PEAK

POINT CONCEPTION

OLD MAN M

OUNTAIN

BALLINGER CANYON

TEPUSQUET CANYON

SALISBURY POTRERO

LITTLE PINE MOUNTA

IN

DOS PUEBLOS CANYON

RANCHO NUEVO C

REEK

TRANQUILLON MOUNTA

IN

References:

Intermap Technologies, Inc., 2003, Intermap product handbook and quick start guide: Intermap NEXTmap document on 5-meter resolution data, 112 p.

Lander, J.F., Lockridge, P.A., and Kozuch, M.J., 1993, Tsunamis Affecting the West Coast of the United States 1806-1992: National Geophysical Data Center Key to Geophysical Record Documentation No. 29, NOAA, NESDIS, NGDC, 242 p.

National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration (NOAA), 2004, Interferometric Synthetic Aperture Radar (IfSAR) Digital Elevation Models from GeoSAR platform (EarthData): 3-meter resolution data.

Titov, V.V., and Gonzalez, F.I., 1997, Implementation and Testing of the Method of Tsunami Splitting (MOST): NOAA Technical Memorandum ERL PMEL – 112, 11 p.

Titov, V.V., and Synolakis, C.E., 1998, Numerical modeling of tidal wave runup: Journal of Waterways, Port, Coastal and Ocean Engineering, ASCE, 124 (4), pp 157-171.

U.S. Geological Survey, 1993, Digital Elevation Models: National Mapping Program, Technical Instructions, Data Users Guide 5, 48 p.

California Emergency Management AgencyCalifornia Geological SurveyUniversity of Southern California

Tsunami Inundation Map for Emergency PlanningWhite Ledge Peak Quadrangle

State of California ~ County of Santa Barbara

MAT

ILIJ

A Q

UA

DR

AN

GLE

CA

RPI

NTE

RIA

QU

AD

GR

AN

GLE

PITAS POINT QUADRANGLE

WHITE LEDGE PEAK QUADRANGLE

January 31, 2009This tsunami inundation map was prepared to assist cities and counties in identifying their tsunami hazard. It is intended for local jurisdictional, coastal evacuation planning uses only. This map, and the information presented herein, is not a legal document and does not meet disclosure requirements for real estate transactions nor for any other regulatory purpose.

The inundation map has been compiled with best currently available scientific information. The inundation line represents the maximum considered tsunami runup from a number of extreme, yet realistic, tsunami sources. Tsunamis are rare events; due to a lack of known occurrences in the historical record, this map includes no information about the probability of any tsunami affecting any area within a specific period of time.

Please refer to the following websites for additional information on the construction and/or intended use of the tsunami inundation map:

State of California Emergency Management Agency, Earthquake and Tsunami Program:http://www.oes.ca.gov/WebPage/oeswebsite.nsf/Content/B1EC51BA215931768825741F005E8D80?OpenDocument

University of Southern California – Tsunami Research Center:http://www.usc.edu/dept/tsunamis/2005/index.php

State of California Geological Survey Tsunami Information: http://www.conservation.ca.gov/cgs/geologic_hazards/Tsunami/index.htm

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Agency Center for Tsunami Research (MOST model):http://nctr.pmel.noaa.gov/time/background/models.html

The California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA), the University of Southern California (USC), and the California Geological Survey (CGS) make no representation or warranties regarding the accuracy of this inundation map nor the data from which the map was derived. Neither the State of California nor USC shall be liable under any circumstances for any direct, indirect, special, incidental or consequential damages with respect to any claim by any user or any third party on account of or arising from the use of this map.

Topographic base maps prepared by U.S. Geological Survey as part of the 7.5-minute Quadrangle Map Series (originally 1:24,000 scale). Tsunami inundation line boundaries may reflect updated digital orthophotographic and topographic data that can differ significantly from contours shown on the base map.

PURPOSE OF THIS MAP

MAP BASE

DISCLAIMER

Table 1: Tsunami sources modeled for the Santa Barbara County coastline.

Areas of Inundation Map Coverage and Sources Used

Sources (M = moment magnitude used in modeled event)

Lompoc Santa

Barbara

Santa Barbara –Ventura

Anacapa-Dume Fault X

Channel Island Thrust Fault X X



Local Sources

1927 Point Arguello Earthquake (M7.3) X

Central Aleutians Subduction Zone#1 (M8.9) X X

Central Aleutians Subduction Zone#2 (M8.9) X

Central Aleutians Subduction Zone#3 (M9.2) X X X

Chile North Subduction Zone (M9.4) X X X

1960 Chile Earthquake (M9.3) X X

1964 Alaska Earthquake (M9.2) X X

Cascadia Subduction Zone #2 (M9.2) X

Japan Subduction Zone #2 (M8.8) X



Distant Sources


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