capital integration, financial markets and the euro
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Capital integration, Financial Markets and the Euro. The Maastricht treaty. A firm commitment to launch the single currency by January 1999 at the latest A list of five criteria for admission to the monetary union A precise specification of central banking institutions - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
© Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration
Capital integration, Financial Marketsand the Euro
© Baldwin&Wyplosz The Economics of European Integration
The Maastricht treaty
• A firm commitment to launch the single
currency by January 1999 at the latest
• A list of five criteria for admission to the
monetary union
• A precise specification of central banking
institutions
• Additional conditions mentioned (e.g. the
excessive deficit procedure)
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The Maastricht convergence criteria
• Inflation– Not to exceed by more than 1.5% the average of the
three lowest rates among EU countries
• Long-term interest rate– Not to exceed by more than 2% the average interest rate
in the three lowest inflation countries
• ERM membership– At least two years in ERM without being forced to
devalue
• Budget deficit– Deficit less than 3% of GDP
• Public debt– Debt less than 60% of GDP
• NB: observed on 1997 performance for decision in 1998
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Interpretation of the convergence criteria: inflation
• Straightforward fear of allowing in unrepentant inflation-prone countries
0.00
5.00
10.00
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
France Italy
Spain Germany
Belgium PortugalGreece average of three lowest + 1.5%
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Interpretation of the convergence criteria: long-term interest rate
• A little bit too easy to bring inflation down in 1997 – artificially or not – and then let go again
• Long interest rates incorporate bond markets expectations of long term inflation
• So criterion requires convincing markets• Problem: self-fulfilling prophecy
– If markets believe admission to euro area, they expect low inflation and long term interest rate is low, which fulfils the admission criterion
– Conversely, if …
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Interpretation of the convergence criteria:
• Same logic as the long-term interest rate: need to convince the exchange markets
• Same aspect of self-fulfilling prophecy
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Interpretation of the convergence criteria: budget deficit and debt (1)
• Historically, all big inflation episodes born out of runaway public deficits and debts
• Hence requirement that house is put in order before admission
• How are the ceilings chosen?– Deficit: the German golden rule– Debt: the 1991 EU average
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Interpretation of the convergence criteria: budget deficit and debt
• Problem No.1: a few years of budgetary discipline do not guarantee long-term discipline– The excessive deficit procedure will look to
that once in euro area, more later
• Problem No.2: articifial ceilings
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The debt and deficit criteria in 1997Maastricht fiscal criteria 1997
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-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Deficit (% GDP)
Pu
bli
c D
ebt
(%G
DP
)
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A tour of the acronyms
• N countries with N National Central Banks (NCBs) that continue operating but with no monetary policy function
• A new central bank at the centre: the European Central Bank (ECB)
• The European System of Central Banks (ESCB): the ECB and all EU NCBs (N=15)
• The Eurosystem: the ECB and the NCBs of euro area member countries (N=12)
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How does the Eurosystem operates?
• Objectives– What it is trying to achieve?
• Instruments– What are the means available?
• Strategy– How is the system formulating its actions?
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The two-pillar strategy
• The monthly Eurosystem’s interest rate decisions (every month) rests on two pillars:
• Economic analysis– Broad review of economic conditions
• Growth, employment, exchange rates, abroad
• Monetary analysis– Evolution of monetary aggregates (M3,
etc.)
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Comparison with other strategies
• The US Fed– Legally required to achieve both price
stability and a high level of employment
– Does not articulate an explicit strategy
• Inflation-targeting central banks (Czech Republic, Poland, Sweden, UK, etc.)– Announce a target (e.g. 2.5% in the UK), a
margin (e.g. ±1%) and a horizon (2-3 years)
– Compare inflation forecast and target, and act accordingly
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Taylor rule interpretation
• Taylor rule
• i = i* + a( - *) + b (y - y*)– Take: = 2%
– i = 4% (2% real, 2% target inflation)
• Choose a and b– a = 2.0, b = 0.8
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A Taylor rule example
Output gap
-2.5-2
-1.5-1
-0.50
0.51
1.52
2.5
Q1-1999 Q1-2000 Q1-2001 Q1-2002 Q1-2003
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Q1-1999 Q1-2000 Q1-2001 Q1-2002 Q1-2003
EONIA Taylor rule
Inflation
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1.5
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2.5
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3.5
Q1-1999 Q1-2000 Q1-2001 Q1-2002 Q1-2003
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Independence and accountability
• Current conventional wisdom is that central banks ought to be independent– Governments tend not to resist to the “printing
press” temptation– The Bundesbank has set an example
• But misbehaving governments are eventually punished by voters
• What about central banks? Independence removes them from such pressure
• A democratic deficit?
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Redressing the democratic deficit
• In return for their independence, central banks must be held accountable– To the public– To elected representatives
• Examples– The Bank of England is given an inflation
target by the Chancellor. It is free to decide how to meet the target, but must explain its failures (the “letter”).
– The US Fed must explain its policy to the Congress, which can vote to reduce the Fed’s independence.
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The record so far
• A difficult period– An oil shock in 2000– A worldwide slowdown– September 11– The stock market crash in 2002– Afghanistan, Iraq
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Inflation: missing the objective, a little
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1.5
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2.5
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3.5
Jan.99 Jan.00 Jan.01 Jan.02 Jan.03
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Euro/Dollar Exchange and Interest Rates
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But no seriously asymmetric shocks
Inflation
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2.0
4.0
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8.0
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14.0
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Average Min Max
GDP growth
-5.0
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5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003
Average Min Max
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The potential role of the Euro
Euro area EU USA
Population in 2003 (million) 309 383 291
GDP (€ billion) 7.298 9.458 11.035
Stock market capitalization 2002 (€ billion)
3.000 4.900 8400
Currency used in foreign exchange transactions: average daily turnover 2001 ($ billion)
€
---------
441
£
-------
155
$
-------
1160
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Two different questions
• Will financial markets change and grow?
• Will the euro become an international currency alongside the US dollar?
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What are financial markets doing?
• Borrowing and lending, acting mostly as
intermediaries
– Lending is inherently risky
– Risk is to those who lend to financial
institutions
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Examples of financial institutions
• Banks– Take deposits, i.e. borrow– Make loans
• Bond markets– Deal in standardized large-scale loans– Allow borrowers and lenders to meet
• Stock markets– Deal in shares, i.e. titles to corporate ownership– Allow borrowers and lenders to meet
• Collective funds– Intermediaries who collect funds from private savers
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Dealing with risk
• Every investor wants high returns and no risk
• But she is also willing to give up some return for less risk, or to take more risk for a better return: the basic trade-off
•Markets price risk
•Asset’s risk-return characteristics adjust to meet investors’ willingness
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Risk premium
Risk-adj return
Risk
Risk-free rate
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What financial markets do about risk
• Markets price risk– Asset’s risk-return characteristics adjust to
meet investors’ willingness
• Markets reduce risk via diversification– Pooling toegether assets with negative risk
correlation reduce overall risk– Example:
• Asset R pays € 100 if it rains today
• Asset S pays € 100 if it does not rain today
• Markets can bundle R and S into one riskless asset that pays € 50 everyday
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What makes financial markets special
• Scale economies– Matching needs of borrowers and lenders– Diversification
• Scale economies lead to networks• Risk and asymmetric information
– Borrowers have incentives to conceal the risks that they may impose on lenders
– Lenders are aware and may• Overprice risk• Refuse to lend
• Consequence: financial markets cannot operate freely, they must be regulated
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Effects of the euro on financial markets
• The euro eliminates the currency risk within the area– Should enhance the exploitation of scale
economies• More competition among institutions• Emergence of large institutions (banks, market
exchanges) and less competition• Overall effect?
• If financial markets are more efficient, economic growth should benefit
• Large European institutions may promote the euro as an alternative to the dollar
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Implication for banks: the principles
• In principle, no reason for banks to compete head on throughout the euro area
• In practice, many limits to this scenario– Good to be known by your banker
(information asymmetry)
– Large costs of switching banks
– Importance of wide branch networks
•Banks merge, but mostly within countries
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K2
Capital market integration
MPK
Euros Euros
MPK*
Homecapital
O Foreigncapital
O*
B
C
K1
Capital Flow
Total world capital
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Implication for banks: the early facts
• Banks merge, but mostly within countries– Regulations remain local in spite of
harmonization efforts– Cultural differences– Tax considerations
• Early effect– More concentration and less competition
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Bank concentration on the rise
Market share of five largest banks (%)
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90
Belgium France Finland Germany Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain
1985 1999
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Implication for banks: the early facts
• Banks merge, but mostly within countries– Regulations remain local in spite of
harmonization efforts– Cultural differences– Tax considerations
• Early effect– More concentration and less competition– Merger is not the only possibility: banks could
establish branches abroad: they don’t, really
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Little change in market penetration
Share of branches of foreign banks (%)
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0.60
0.80
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1.60
Bel
gium
Ger
man
y
Spa
in
Fra
nce
Ital
y
Net
herla
nds
Aus
tria
Por
tuga
l
Fin
land
Sw
eden
U.K
.
1997
2001
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Implication for bond markets: the principles
• Bond markets deal in highly standardized loans
• They used to be segmented by currency risk– Risk of devaluation implies higher interest rates
• Gone currency risk, convergence has happened, and is nearly complete– Not fully complete, though– Maybe the effect of national regulations
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Implication for bond markets: the facts
Long-term rates Short-term rates
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Jan.1995 Jan.1996 Jan.1997 Jan.1998 Jan.1999 Jan.2000 Jan.2001 Jan.2002 Jan.2003
France GermanyGreece ItalySpain United Kingdom
EMU starts Greece joins
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25
Jan.1995 Jan.1996 Jan.1997 Jan.1998 Jan.1999 Jan.2000 Jan.2001 Jan.2002 Jan.2003
France GermanyGreece ItalySpain United Kingdom
Greece joinsEMU starts
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Implication for stock markets: the principles
• Worldwide stock markets have remained surprisngly national: the home bias– Information asymmetries– Currency risk
• With the single currency, euro area stock markets should be less subject to home bias
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Implication for stock markets: the facts
• Some increase in the use of the euro in world portfolios, nothing dramatic yet
• Mergers of exchanges– Euronext (Amsterdam + Brussels + Paris)– Failed attempt between London, Frankfurt and
Stockholm
• Overall, European markets remain small relatively to the US
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Loose ends: regulation and supervision
• A single financial market would seem to require a single regulator and a single supervisor
• Instead, the chosen route has been to:– harmonise and recognise each other’s
regulation– foster cooperation among supervisors
• This can be a cause of inefficiencies– Rampant protectionsim– Inadequate information in case of crisis
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The international role of the euro
• 19th century: the pound Sterling
• 20th century: the US dollar
• 21th century: the euro?
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The international role of the euro
• As it is internally, a currency can be:– An international unit of account: trade
invoicing– An international medium of exchange: a
vehicule currency– An international store of value: foreign
exchange reserves, individual hoarding
• Internally, these functions are established by law.
• Externally, they have to be earned
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Trade invoicing
• Small changes so far
• The dollar remains the currency of choice in international trade and for pricing commodities (oil, wheat, etc.)
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Vehicle currency: exchange markets
• Currencies are used on exchange markets:– Directly for conversion into/from other
currencies– Indirectly as intermeadiary for other bilateral
conversions
• Realtive to its constitutent currencies, the euro’s overall share on world exchange markets has declined following the disappearance of within-EU conversions.
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Vehicle currency: international reserves
• The euro remain a small part of international reserves of central banks
• The euro is used as anchor currency by 35 countries, mostly succeeding its constituent currencies.
$ € £ ¥ CHF
2001 share (%) 64.6 14.2 5.3 4.7 1.1
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Parallel currency
• In troubled countries, foreign currencies circulate alongside the national currency
• The dollar has long dominated
• The euro takes up the role of the DM and the French franc in areas close to the EU and Africa
• Overall, the ECB has shipped abroad 8% of its initial production of euros, more has leaked
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Does it matter?
• Trade invoicing in euro reduces currency risk for euro area exporters
• Large financial markets are more efficient
• Seigniorage is small
• Some cherish the symbol
• The ECB has taken a hands-off attitude