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Capital Flows to Emerging Market Economies
Shaghil Ahmed and Andrei Zlate Federal Reserve Board*
XVI Annual Inflation Targeting Seminar
of the Banco Central do Brasil Rio de Janeiro, Brasil, May 15-16, 2014
*The views in this presentation are the responsibility of the presenter and should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or any other person associated with the Federal Reserve System.
1
Motivation
Properties of Private EME Flows/Policy Responses
Previous Literature/Our Work
Empirical Specification
Results: Basic Model
Results: Extended Model
Results: Robustness
Conclusions
OUTLINE
2
Large EME capital flows and their volatility pose policy challenges
Policy tensions between EMEs and AEs
Questions: Main drivers?
Is post-crisis period different?
Have recent capital controls been effective?
Effects of unconventional U.S. monetary expansion?
MOTIVATION
3
Pre-crisis run-up concentrated in banking flows, post-crisis runup in portfolio flows
PROPERTIES
Cumulative Net Inflows to EMEs
5
REER appreciations occurred post-crisis, but policymakers also appeared to intervene
Tempered policy rate increases
Several EMEs also used macroprudential measures and capital controls
REER Reserves Accumulation since 2005
POLICY RESPONSES
6
Surges
Ghosh et al (2012) o A variety of factors important
Forbes and Warnock (2012) o Global risk aversion matters a lot… o …but global interest rates/liquidity do not o Capital controls not effective
Common Component Byrne and Fiess (2011)
o U.S. interest rate crucial determinant
Exchange Rate Regime Ghosh et al (2012)
o Conditional on surge, magnitude of surge smaller the more flexible the exchange rate
Effects of U.S. LSAPs Fratzcher et al (2012)
o LSAP announcement and actual B/S changes significantly affect flows to EME-dedicated funds
Moore et al (2013) o Drop in U.S. yields raises share of foreign investments in EM bonds
PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND OUR WORK
7
Not identifying “surges” Common model with unusual changes in
explanatory variables and structural breaks
See also IMF (2011), Arias et al (2012)
Economic importance of different factors
Post-crisis period v. pre-crisis period
New data set of capital controls since 2009
U.S. LSAPs effects on BOP flows
Net vs. gross inflows
PREVIOUS LITERATURE AND OUR WORK
8
Panel, quarterly BOP data from 14 major emerging market economies over sub-periods from 2002:Q1 to 2013:Q2.
For NPI, alternatively use total net private inflows or portfolio net inflows; also report some regressions for gross private inflows
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
9
Growth differentials narrowed during GFC, widened post-GFC and since have narrowed Policy rate differentials widened post-GFC, but have since narrowed
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
10
Shifts in global risk sentiment have been accompanied by fluctuations in flows to EME funds
EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
11
Several factors important in driving EME net capital inflows
Growth differentials, policy rate differentials, and global risk aversion all appear to matter for total net inflows
Global risk aversion and policy rate differentials important in explaining portfolio flows
RESULTS: BASIC MODEL
Table 2: Determinants of net private capital inflows: basic model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Total net inflows/GDP
Portfolio net inflows/GDP
Interval: 2002q1 – 2008q2 2009q3 – 2013q2 2002q1 – 2008q2 2009q3 – 2013q2 Model: OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE Growth diff. vs. AEs 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.25** 0.26** 0.13 0.079 -0.0041 0.022 (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.085) (0.086) (0.097) (0.092) Rate diff. vs. US 0.14*** -0.097 0.78*** 0.25 0.064** -0.062 0.38*** 0.34 (0.035) (0.069) (0.12) (0.25) (0.027) (0.051) (0.11) (0.23) VIX -0.083* -0.049 -0.17** -0.15** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.11* -0.11* (0.049) (0.047) (0.071) (0.064) (0.038) (0.035) (0.067) (0.058) Trend 0.039 -0.012 -0.15* -0.13* -0.028 -0.051 -0.12 -0.11* (0.043) (0.043) (0.079) (0.071) (0.034) (0.032) (0.075) (0.064) Constant 0.0010 -1.98 8.89* 10.3** 2.22* 1.19 7.67* 6.29 (1.54) (1.74) (4.75) (4.68) (1.19) (1.29) (4.51) (4.22) Observations 364 364 224 224 364 364 224 224 R-squared 0.084 0.211 0.200 0.399 0.047 0.247 0.064 0.367
Note: Economies included are India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand from emerging Asia, and Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico from Latin America, as well as South Africa and Turkey. Standard errors are provided in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
12
For total net inflows growth differentials, policy rate differentials, and global risk aversion all matter
Note: The fitted values and counterfactuals are based on the model with country fixed effects, estimated separately for the periods 2002:Q1-2008:Q2 and 2009:Q3 to 2013:Q2. The counterfactuals are the fitted values obtained under the assumption that a particular determinant was equal to its initial value for each interval.
Total Net Inflows
RESULTS: ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE
015
3045
USD
billio
n
2002q1 2003q1 2004q1 2005q1 2006q1 2007q1 2008q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-growth
040
8012
0
2010q1 2011q1 2012q1 2013q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-growth0
1530
45US
D bil
lion
2002q1 2003q1 2004q1 2005q1 2006q1 2007q1 2008q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-policy rate
040
8012
0
2010q1 2011q1 2012q1 2013q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-policy rate
015
3045
USD
billio
n
2002q1 2003q1 2004q1 2005q1 2006q1 2007q1 2008q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-VIX
040
8012
02010q1 2011q1 2012q1 2013q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-VIX
Fitted value Counterfactual
13
Note: The fitted values and counterfactuals are based on the model with country fixed effects, estimated separately for the periods 2002:Q1-2008:Q2 and 2009:Q3 to 2013:Q2. The counterfactuals are the fitted values obtained under the assumption that a particular determinant was equal to its initial value for each interval.
Portfolio Net Inflows
RESULTS: ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE For portfolio net inflows, global risk aversion and policy rate differentials more important than growth differentials
-25
025
USD
billio
n
2002q1 2003q1 2004q1 2005q1 2006q1 2007q1 2008q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-growth
-25
025
5075
2010q1 2011q1 2012q1 2013q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-growth
-25
025
USD
billio
n
2002q1 2003q1 2004q1 2005q1 2006q1 2007q1 2008q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-policy rate
-25
025
5075
2010q1 2011q1 2012q1 2013q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-policy rate
-25
025
USD
billio
n
2002q1 2003q1 2004q1 2005q1 2006q1 2007q1 2008q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-VIX
-25
025
5075
2010q1 2011q1 2012q1 2013q1
Fitted vs. counterfactual ex-VIX
Fitted value Counterfactual
14
Higher cumulative net inflows in the post-crisis period than the pre-crisis model would predict, with evidence of sea-change for portfolio inflows
Note: The model predictions are based on results from the model with fixed effects estimated over the period from 2002:Q1 to 2008:Q2, with the results reported in Table 2.
Shifting Behavior of Net Inflows since 2008-09
RESULTS: PRE-CRISIS V. POST-CRISIS
Net inflows significantly more sensitive to policy rate differentials in post-crisis period
Structural Break Tests for the Determinants of Net Inflows
RESULTS: STRUCTURAL BREAKS
(1) (2)
(3) (4)
Dependent variable: Total net inflows/GDP
Portfolio net inflows/GDP
Interval: 2002q1 – 2013q2 2002q1 – 2013q2 Model: OLS FE OLS FE Growth diff. vs. AEs 0.38*** 0.36*** 0.13 0.079 (0.10) (0.11) (0.085) (0.084) Rate diff. vs. US 0.14*** -0.097 0.064** -0.062 (0.033) (0.064) (0.027) (0.050) VIX -0.083* -0.049 -0.13*** -0.11*** (0.046) (0.044) (0.038) (0.034) Trend 0.039 -0.012 -0.028 -0.051 (0.041) (0.040) (0.034) (0.031)
D_post-crisis * Growth diff. vs. AEs -0.13 -0.10 -0.13 -0.057 (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) D_post-crisis * Rate diff. vs. US 0.64*** 0.35 0.32*** 0.41* (0.14) (0.31) (0.11) (0.24) D_post-crisis * VIX -0.087 -0.10 0.015 -0.00042 (0.093) (0.088) (0.077) (0.069) D_post-crisis * Trend -0.19* -0.11 -0.093 -0.063 (0.099) (0.094) (0.082) (0.074) D_post-crisis 8.89 6.84 5.45 1.67 (5.62) (5.90) (4.65) (4.63) Constant 0.0010 -1.98 2.22* 1.19 (1.44) (1.61) (1.20) (1.26) Observations 588 588 588 588 R-squared 0.132 0.280 0.074 0.309
Note: The estimation excludes the crisis period from 2008:Q3 to 2009:Q2. D_post-crisis is an indicator variable that equals 1 for the period 2009:Q3-2013:Q2. The fixed effects and the trend are allowed to vary across the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. Economies included are the same as in Table 2. Standard errors are provided in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
16
Novel database of capital control measures introduced by EMEs since global financial crisis—collected from local press releases and news bulletins
EXTENDED MODEL: CAPITAL CONTROLS
Table 1: Type of capital controls on inflows introduced by EMEs since 2009
Restrictions on portfolio flows Restrictions on banking flows
Tax on
foreign investments
Restrictions by asset type or maturity
Tax on short-term external borrowing
Quantitative limits on banks’ foreign
exchange exposure
Required reserves on
banks’ foreign exchange liabilities
Brazil
Korea
Thailand
Indonesia
Korea
Taiwan
Brazil Korea
Indonesia Korea
Taiwan
Brazil
Indonesia
Taiwan
Source: Authors’ calculations from national press releases and media articles.
17
EXTENDED MODEL: CAPITAL CONTROLS
Example, capital control measures in Brazil: 2009 Oct: IOF reinstated on foreign investment in equity and fixed
income. 2010 Oct: IOF on fixed income raised twice, extended to cover
foreign investment in mutual funds and derivatives. 2011 Jan: IOF on foreign investment in mutual funds lowered. 2011 Mar-Apr: IOF imposed on short-term external loans, then
extended to cover longer maturities. 2011 Apr: URR imposed on banks’ short FX positions. 2011 Dec: IOF removed for foreign investment in equities and certain
types of corporate bonds. 2012 Feb-Mar: IOF on short-term external loans extended again to
cover longer maturities. 2012 Jun-Dec: reduced maturity for external loans subject to IOF. 2012 Dec: increased deductible for URR on banks’ short FX positions. 2013 Jun: IOF on foreign investment in fixed income, derivatives
removed.
18
Database used to construct two variables on capital controls—number of measures in place and number of new measures introduced in any given quarter
EXTENDED MODEL: CAPITAL CONTROLS
19
LSAP indicator variables and U.S. 10-yr Treasury yield changes attributable to LSAPs used to estimate effect of U.S. unconventional monetary expansion
LSAP indicator variables LSAP purchases
Regress 10-yr U.S. Treasury yields on LSAPS one quarter ahead
Difference between yield and estimate of what it would be without LSAPs = component of yield attributable to LSAPs
EXTENDED MODEL: U.S. LSAPS
20
Net private EME inflows were dampened by capital control measures in recent years and amplified by LSAP announcements
EXTENDED MODEL: RESULTS
Net capital inflows to EMEs, the effects capital controls and LSAPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dependent variable: Total gross inflows/GDP Portfolio gross inflows/GDP Interval: 2009q3 – 2013q2 2009q3 – 2013q2 Model: FE FE FE FE FE FE Growth diff. vs. AEs 0.20* 0.23** 0.23** -0.014 0.0090 -0.0023 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.097) (0.095) (0.095) Rate diff. vs. US 0.27 0.29 0.22 0.33 0.34 0.25 (0.26) (0.26) (0.27) (0.23) (0.23) (0.24) VIX -0.12 -0.13* -0.16** -0.095 -0.079 -0.14* (0.075) (0.067) (0.078) (0.068) (0.060) (0.069) Cumulative controls (inflows) -0.61*** -0.60*** -0.59*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.57*** (0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
U.S. Treasury yield 0.38 -0.029 (1.01) (0.91) LSAP announcements 0.82 1.02 (0.72) (0.64) LSAP effect on yields 0.43 0.97 (0.92) (0.81) Trend 0.039 -0.0085 -0.0090 -0.0099 0.011 -0.0091 (0.18) (0.081) (0.091) (0.16) (0.073) (0.080) Constant 4.10 6.97 8.74 4.20 2.44 6.27 (11.8) (4.92) (5.51) (10.7) (4.41) (4.83) Observations 208 208 195 208 208 195 R-squared 0.433 0.436 0.416 0.404 0.411 0.433 Note: D_LSAP announcements is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the quarters with the initial announcements of LSAPs and the decisions to continue them (see Figure 8, panel a). LSAP effect on yields is the difference between the actual 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield and an estimate of what the yield would have been without LSAPs (see Figure 8, panel b and its footnote). Economies included are the same as in Table 2. Standard errors are provided in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
21
Stronger evidence for effects of U.S. monetary policy on gross inflows, but effect of LSAP-related change in yields does not appear to be bigger
EXTENDED MODEL: RESULTS
Gross capital inflows to EMEs, the effects of capital controls and LSAPs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Dependent variable: Total gross inflows/GDP Portfolio gross inflows/GDP Interval: 2009q3 – 2013q2 2009q3 – 2013q2 Model: FE FE FE FE FE FE Growth diff. vs. AEs 0.32*** 0.28** 0.28*** 0.053 0.022 0.0046 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.068) (0.068) (0.068) Rate diff. vs. US -0.44 -0.41 -0.32 0.058 0.082 0.069 (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.17) (0.17) (0.18) VIX -0.30*** -0.19*** -0.18** -0.23*** -0.14*** -0.14*** (0.082) (0.074) (0.081) (0.049) (0.045) (0.051) Cumulative controls (inflows) -0.015 -0.048 -0.14 -0.40*** -0.42*** -0.46*** (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
U.S. Treasury yield -2.63** -2.15*** (1.10) (0.67) LSAP announcements 1.35* 1.23** (0.79) (0.48) LSAP effect on yields -1.26 -0.68 (0.96) (0.61) Trend -0.56*** -0.11 0.0063 -0.43*** -0.062 -0.014 (0.20) (0.090) (0.095) (0.12) (0.055) (0.060) Constant 40.4*** 10.3* 4.60 30.4*** 5.67* 3.65 (12.9) (5.39) (5.72) (7.85) (3.27) (3.59) Observations 176 176 165 176 176 165 R-squared 0.410 0.400 0.435 0.337 0.322 0.322
Note: D_LSAP announcements is an indicator variable equal to 1 for the quarters with the initial announcements of LSAPs and the decisions to continue them (see Figure 8, panel a). LSAP effect on yields is the difference between the actual 10-year U.S. Treasury bond yield and an estimate of what the yield would have been without LSAPs (see Figure 8, panel b and its footnote). Economies included are the same as in Table 2. Standard errors are provided in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
22
Results fairly robust to alternatives
Adding China and smaller economies in emerging Asia and Latin America Very similar results
Adding emerging European economies
VIX effects very similar Somewhat smaller effects of growth and interest rate
differentials
Using Credit Suisse’s GRAI instead of VIX Nearly identical results on growth and interest rate differentials Effects of risk appetite generally similar, although a bit less strong
Basic model using gross inflows instead of net
Effects of risk appetite bigger, but of growth and interest rate differentials smaller
ROBUSTNESS
23
Net capital flows to EMEs determined by several factors, including: growth differentials, policy rate differentials, global risk aversion Considering economic importance, all three variables
appear to be important for total net inflows For portfolio net inflows, global risk aversion and policy
rate differentials much more important than growth differentials
Pre-crisis model applied to post-crisis period underpredicts net inflows, esp. portfolio inflows Sensitivity of flows to policy rate differentials has
increased
CONCLUSIONS
24
Capital control measures introduced in recent years appear to have been effective
Significant effects of U.S. monetary expansion on EME net and gross inflows But U.S. unconventional policy is one among
several important determinants
No evidence that monetary expansion due to unconventional policy works in a different way
CONCLUSIONS
25
LSAP events (Fratzcher, LoDuca and Straub, 2012)
QE1 initial announcements
QE2 initial announcements
EXTRA SLIDES
28
Effect of LSAPs on Treasury yields
Source: Asset purchases proxied by the change in end-of-quarter holdings of agency debt securities, mortgage-backed securities, and US Treasury securities, collected from FRB H.4.1 table.
-200
020
040
060
0U
SD
bill
ion
-20
24
6P
erce
ntag
e po
ints
2002q1 2004q1 2006q1 2008q1 2010q1 2012q1
US Treasury 10y yield LSAPsEffect of purchases
Effect of 1-quarter ahead LSAPs on yields Yields (ppt) = 3.87 –
0.002 * LSAPs[+1] (US$ bn)
On average, US$ 100 bn in LSAPs per quarter decreased yields by about 20 basis points, significant at the 10% level.
EXTRA SLIDES
29
Effect of capital controls on net inflows EXTRA SLIDES
Table 4: The effect of capital controls on net private capital inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Total net inflows/GDP
Portfolio net inflows/GDP
Interval: 2009q3 – 2013q2 2009q3 – 2013q2 Model: OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE Growth diff. vs. AEs 0.14 0.20* 0.23** 0.26** -0.087 -0.014 -0.015 0.024 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.097) (0.100) (0.095) Rate diff. vs. US 0.91*** 0.27 0.84*** 0.26 0.48*** 0.33 0.42*** 0.39 (0.11) (0.26) (0.12) (0.27) (0.11) (0.23) (0.11) (0.24) VIX -0.15* -0.12 -0.12 -0.14* -0.10 -0.095 -0.082 -0.10 (0.079) (0.075) (0.082) (0.075) (0.078) (0.068) (0.079) (0.068) U.S. Treasury yield 0.54 0.38 0.28 -0.31 0.13 -0.029 0.14 -0.13
(1.07) (1.01) (1.09) (1.01) (1.05) (0.91) (1.06) (0.91)
Cumulative controls -0.69*** -0.61*** -0.50*** -0.55*** (0.12) (0.20) (0.11) (0.18) New controls -0.22 0.21 0.28 0.40 (0.48) (0.45) (0.46) (0.41) L1.new controls -0.26 0.47 -0.54 -0.29 (0.48) (0.47) (0.47) (0.43) L2.new controls -0.97** -0.19 -0.79* -0.46 (0.49) (0.48) (0.47) (0.43) L3.new controls -1.21** -0.56 -0.45 -0.14 (0.51) (0.49) (0.49) (0.44) Trend 0.029 0.039 -0.098 -0.16 -0.017 -0.0099 -0.089 -0.13 (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) Constant -0.54 4.10 4.70 9.72 2.95 4.20 5.21 8.25 (12.4) (11.8) (12.7) (11.7) (12.2) (10.7) (12.2) (10.5) Observations 208 208 224 224 208 208 224 224 R-squared 0.318 0.433 0.241 0.406 0.140 0.404 0.086 0.374
Note: Cumulative controls is the number of capital control measures introduced since 2009 that are in place in any given quarter. New controls is the number of new capital control measures introduced in any given quarter, with L1, L2, L3 indicating lagged values. Economies included are the same as in Table 2. Standard errors are provided in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 30
Effect of capital controls on gross inflows EXTRA SLIDES
Table 5: The effect of capital controls on gross private capital inflows
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent variable: Total gross inflows/GDP
Portfolio gross inflows/GDP
Interval: 2009q3 – 2013q2 2009q3 – 2013q2 Model: OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE Growth diff. vs. AEs 0.18 0.32*** 0.26** 0.32*** -0.00023 0.053 0.0014 0.070 (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.069) (0.068) (0.066) (0.068) Rate diff. vs. US 0.33** -0.44 0.24* -0.53* 0.16** 0.058 0.14* 0.10 (0.13) (0.28) (0.13) (0.28) (0.074) (0.17) (0.072) (0.18) VIX -0.31*** -0.30*** -0.29*** -0.34*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.22*** (0.092) (0.082) (0.093) (0.079) (0.053) (0.049) (0.054) (0.051) U.S. Treasury yield -2.28* -2.63** -2.39* -3.34*** -2.03*** -2.15*** -1.82** -2.03***
(1.24) (1.10) (1.24) (1.06) (0.72) (0.67) (0.71) (0.68)
Cumulative controls -0.57*** -0.015 -0.23*** -0.40*** (0.13) (0.21) (0.075) (0.13) New controls -0.47 0.17 0.44 0.43 (0.51) (0.44) (0.29) (0.28) L1.new controls -0.31 0.74 -0.15 -0.11 (0.51) (0.46) (0.29) (0.30) L2.new controls -0.52 0.51 -0.58* -0.47 (0.51) (0.47) (0.29) (0.30) L3.new controls -0.77 0.038 -0.47 -0.36 (0.54) (0.47) (0.31) (0.30) Trend -0.44** -0.56*** -0.56** -0.69*** -0.46*** -0.43*** -0.47*** -0.50*** (0.22) (0.20) (0.22) (0.19) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) Constant 37.2** 40.4*** 42.3*** 57.3*** 33.7*** 30.4*** 33.1*** 34.1*** (14.5) (12.9) (14.4) (12.6) (8.34) (7.85) (8.29) (8.10) Observations 176 176 192 192 176 176 192 192 R-squared 0.190 0.410 0.130 0.414 0.176 0.337 0.174 0.311
Note: Cumulative controls is the number of capital control measures introduced since 2009 that are in place in any given quarter. New controls is the number of new capital control measures introduced in any given quarter, with L1, L2, L3 indicating lagged values. Economies included are those in Table 2 minus India and Malaysia, for which gross inflows are only partially available. Standard errors are provided in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
31