Northeastern Political Science AssociationTIe InlevnalionaI BeIalions oJ BegionsAulIov|s) Louis J. Canlovi and Sleven L. SpiegeIBevieved vovI|s)Souvce FoIil, VoI. 2, No. 4 |Sunnev, 1970), pp. 397-425FuIIisIed I Palgrave Macmillan JournalsSlaIIe UBL http://www.jstor.org/stable/3233994 .Accessed 27/02/2012 1512Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.Palgrave Macmillan Journals and Northeastern Political Science Association are collaborating with JSTOR todigitize, preserve and extend access to Polity.http://www.jstor.orgTheInternationalRelations of Regions* LOUIS J. CANTORI & STEVENL.SPIEGEL University of California, Los Angeles Hereis an attempt to advancethe studyof internationalrelations bydeveloping a model of the subordinate regionalsystem. It illus- tratestheextenttowhich political scienceisalliedto political geography. Aswithmostsuch attempts, its usefulness can only be assessed by thosescholarswho try to apply it to the real worldin the processofinvestigating their owninterests. Louis 7. Cantorididhis graduate workat Chicago, held Fulbright, SSRCand Ford awards for researchintheUnitedArab Republic (1963-65) and Morocco (1967-69) and has taught at UCLA since 1966. Hisinterestsare in comparativepoliticalsystems. His colleague at UCLA, StevenL. Spiegel, hasalsoheldhis presentpost since 1966 andis presently onleaveas a research associatewith theInstitute for War and Peace Studies, Colombia University. His graduate workwasdoneat Harvard andhis field is internationalrelations. "Research support forthis study was providedby a grant fromthe ResearchCommitteeoftheAcademic Senate,University of California, Los Angeles. 398 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS IT ISTHE PURPOSE ofthisarticleto suggest a comparativeapproach for analyzing theroleofthe region in present-day international politics. Wewillconsider regions tobeareasoftheworldwhichcontain geo- graphicallyproximate states forming, in foreignaffairs,mutually interrelatedunits.Wewill attempt hereto provide aframeworkfor studying the region intermsofthesharedfeaturesofall regions. Asa resultoftheseshared features,comparisons becomefeasibleand generalizations are facilitated. Recently, therehasbeena good dealofconcentrationonthe region asasubordinate system.1 Thisinteresthas developedsimultaneously withstudiesof integration andinternational organization, bothof whichhavealsobeen largelyregion-centered.2 Inthisarticleweare concerned primarily withthesubordinate systemapproach, which pro- videsuswithaunitof analysis thatfacilitates comparison andallows ustoconcentrateontheinternational politics ofa region ratherthan on particularprocesses(forexample,integration,organization). Since thedawnofthemodern era, the presentperiod isthefirst inwhichall regions oftheworldmaintaina measureof independence. The present isalsoa timeinwhichcommunicationsand technologypermit scholars 1 See, for example, Leonard Binder, "TheMiddleEastSubordinate International System," World Politics, x (April, 1958),408-29;Larry W. Bowman, "The Subordinate State System ofSouthern Africa," International Studies Quarterly, xII (September,1968),pp. 231-62; Michael Brecher, "International Relations and AsianStudies: The Subordinate State System of Asia," World Politics, xv (January,1963),213-35, and Brecher, The NewStates of Asia (London: Oxford University Press,1963),Chapters II and vI;George Modelski, "International RelationsandArea Studies," InternationalRelations (London), II (April,1961),143-55; WilliamI. Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," International Organization, xxI (Summer,1967),545-64. Fromanother perspective, BruceM.Russetthas attempted toexaminethe possible criteria for regions, using a variety of quantitative methods, International Regions andtheInternational System: A Study inPolitical Ecology(Chi- cago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967). For an attempt ata "systems approach" tothe study of regions, seeOran R. Young, "Political Discon- tinuitiesintheInternational System," World Politics, xx (April,1968), 369-92. 2 See, for example, Karl Deutsch, et al., Political Community andthe NorthAtlanticArea (Princeton,N.J.: Princeton UniversityPress,1957); Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting ofEurope (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1958);Haas, "The Uniting of Europe andthe Uniting ofLatin America,"Journal of CommonMarket Studies, v (June,1967),315-43; ErnstB.Haasand PhilippeSchmitter, ThePolitics of EconomicsinLatin LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL tobecome knowledgeable abouteventsthatoccur simultaneously aroundtheworld.The gaining of independence andtheincreaseof communicationsallowforan unprecedentedcapacity to compare regions toeachother.Butwearenotinterestedin comparison forits ownsake. Rather, weaimto develop ameansof judging thecausal factorswhichare responsible forthe particular mixtureof cooperation andconflict presentamong thenationswithina particularregion. We areinterestedinthe relationship betweensuchfactorsascultureand stability,power and order, communicationsandcohesion. Inthisarticlewewill attempt to explicate aframeworkforthede- lineationofsubordinate systems inordertoestablishabasisforthe study of regional internationalpolitics.3Wewill begin withadiscus- sionofsomeofthe problems inherentintheidentificationofsub- ordinate systems and then proceed to propose a methodfor subdividing theminto analytic sectors.Wewillthen provide four categories inthe formof pattern variableswhichare helpful in delineating subordinate systems andin explainingregionalpolitics withinthem.Wewillat- tempt toshowthe relationships betweenthe pattern variablesand sectors, and concludewitha briefdiscussionofintersubordinate system relations. American Regionalism: TheLatinAmericanFreeTradeAssociation After Four Years ofOperation(Denver, Colorado: University ofDenverMono- graph,1965); Karl Kaiser, "TheInteractionof RegionalSubsystems: Some Preliminary NotesonRecurrent PatternsandtheRoleof Superpowers," World Politics, xxI (October,1968),84-104;Joseph S. Nye,"Comparative RegionalIntegrationConcept andMeasurement,"International Organiza- tion,xxxII(Autumn,1968),855-80;Pan-Africanism andEast African Inte- gration,(Cambridge, Mass.:Harvard UniversityPress,1965); andAmitai Etzioni,Political Unification: A ComparativeStudyof LeadersandForces (New York: Holt, Rinehart& Winston,Inc., 1965). In addition, seethe excellentcollectionsofarticlesinInternationalPoliticalCommunities: An Anthology(GardenCity,N.J.:Doubleday & Company,Inc., Anchor Books, 1966) and Joseph S. Nye,Jr.,ed.,International Regionalism: Readings(Boston:Little, Brownand Company,1968).Finally, foracriticism of this integrationist approach to regional international relations which calls foran "empiricalsystems-analysis"approach, afairlabelforthe present study, see Roger D. Hansen,"RegionalIntegration ReflectionsonaDecade ofTheoretical Efforts," World Politics, xxi (January,1969)242-71. 3 ForfurtherelaborationseeLouis J. CantoriandStevenL. Spiegel, The InternationalPolitics ofRegions: A ComparativeApproach(Englewood Cliffs,N.J.:Prentice-Hall, 1970), and "Regional InternationalPolitics: The Comparison ofFiveSubordinate Systems," InternationalStudies Quarterly(December,1969). 399 400 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS I.The Identificationof Subordinate Systems Nation-statesaredelineated byevents, politicalpractice, and (at least in part)membership intheUnitedNations.Thedominant system, composed ofthemost powerful ofstatesin anyperiod of history, is moredifficulttodiscernandits precisemembership isamatterof constant conjecture, butthereareatleastaminimumofcontenders for predominant statusandthereforeaminimumof potentialconfig- urations.Thereisalsoa degree ofconsensus among mostobservers: someformof bipolarity is present.Regional orsubordinate systems, ontheother hand, donot easily lendthemselvestoclear-cutidentifi- cation:thereare many alternatives, potential definitions, and group- ings.Consequently, thedeterminationofsubordinate systems is difficultand complex.4 Giventhe complications of identifying subordinate systems, the authorshave attempted nonethelessto identify fifteensubordinate systems(see Table I).5They havedoneso on the following bases: Every nation-state (no matterhow strong orhow weak) isamem- berofonesubordinate system. Therearetwo exceptions tothis generalization: themost powerful statesarealsoactiveinother subordinate systems besidestheir own, andthereareafewstates whichexistontheborderlinebetweentwosubordinate systems and may beconsideredtocoexistinsome degree inboth (forexample, Finland,Turkey,Afghanistan, and Burma). Allsubordinate systems aredelineated-atleastin part-by refer- enceto geographical considerations, but social,economic,political, and organizational factorsarealsorelevant. Consequently, members ofsubordinate systems are proximate, but they neednotbe contiguous. 4 Itis adequate forour purposes todefine a system asthetotalinter- actionofrelations among theautonomous unitswithina particular arena ofinternational politics(forexampleglobe,region,nation-state). The authors, whileaware ofthe suggestiveness ofwhat they haveto say for systemstheory in political science, have deliberatelysought toavoid using the complicated technical vocabulary of systemstheory asit ap- pears, for example, inDavid Easton, A SystemsAnalysisof Political Life (New York: JohnWiley & Sons,Inc., 1965); Morton Kaplan,System and ProcessinInternationalPolitics (New York: JohnWiley & Sons,Inc., 1957); and0.R. Young, "A Survey ofGeneral SystemsTheory," General Systems, ix (1964), 6i-8o. 5 Fora virtually identical breakdown,independently arrived at, see G.Etzel Pearcy, "Geopolitics and Foreign Relations," Department of State Bulletin, L (March2, 1964),318-30. WewishtothankProfessor JohnSigler for calling thistoour attention. LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL 401 TABLEI Subordinate Systems of the World and Their Subdivisions REGION i.MiddleEast CORE UnitedArab Republic Yemen SaudiArabia Kuwait Iraq Lebanon Sudan Jordan Syria SouthYemen tPersianGulf States PERIPHERY Israel Turkey Iran ?Afghanistan INTRUSIVESYSTEM US USSR France Gr.Britain W. Germany PeoplesRepublic ofChina 2.Western Europe France W. Germany Italy Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg Northern: *Gr. Britain *Ireland *Switzerland Iceland ?Finland *Denmark *Sweden *Norway *Austria Southern: *Spain *Portugal ?Turkey Greece Malta Cyprus Poland Czechoslovakia Hungary Rumania Bulgaria *Albania *Yugoslavia Finland E. Germany US France W. Germany USSR PeoplesRepublic ofChina US USSR 3. Eastern Europe 4. RussiaUSSR 402 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS REGION 5. North America CORE US Canada PERIPHERYINTRUSIVESYSTEM ?Trinidadand Tobago ?Jamaica ?Barbados t?West Indies Associated States 6.Latin America 7. EastAsia Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia CostaRica Dominican Republic Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras tBritish Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Uruguay Venezuela Peoples Republic of China *Cuba Trinidadand Tobago Jamaica Barbados Guyana Haiti tSurinam tWestIndies Associated States *Taiwan North Korea South Korea *Mongolia Japan tHong Kong tMacao US USSR Gr. Britain Netherlands France PeoplesRepublic ofChina US Portugal Gr.Britain USSR 8.Southwest Pacific Australia NewZealand tIslands of South Pacific Western Samoa US France Gr. Britain USSR Japan LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL 403 CORE I.Maritime S.E.Asia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines II.Mainland S.E.Asia Laos North Vietnam South Vietnam Cambodia Thailand Sin tTe: tTei Bu PERIPHERYINTRUSIVESYSTEM LgaporePeoplesRepublic rritory ofofChina New Guinea Japan rritory of Portugal Portuguese Australia TimorUS rmaFrance Gr.Britain USSR Morocco Tunisia Algeria Ivory Coast Dahomey Guinea Senegal Upper Volta Mali Niger Togo SouthAfrica Rhodesia tAngola tMozambique *Ceylon *Nepal *Bhutan *Sikkim Afghanistan MaldiveIslands Pakistan Burma Mauritania Libya tSpanish Sahara Nigeria Liberia SierraLeone Gambia Ghana tPortuguese Guinea Malawi Malagasy Republic Lesotho US USSR Gr.Britain PeoplesRepublic ofChina France USSR US PeoplesRepublic ofChina Spain US USSR France Gr. Britain Portugal US Gr. Britain Portugal REGION 9. Southeast Asia io.SouthAsiaIndia ii.North Africa 12.West Africa 15. Southern Africa 404 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS PERIPHERYINTRUSIVESYSTEM Botswana Zambia Swaziland Mauritius Central African Rep. Chad Cameroon Gabon Congo (Brazzaville) Equatorial Guinea Ethiopia Somali Republic tFrench Somaliland US Belgium PeoplesRepublic ofChina USSR France Spain US USSR France PeoplesRepublic ofChina Gr.Britain *Peripheral states with core potential. tAngola = colony;only themost important colonieshavebeen chosen for their effect upon the subordinate systems. ?Afghanistan - stateswhichcould possibly bemembers ofasecond periphery. Sizedoesnot necessarily determinetheexistenceofasubordinate system. It may consistofonenationand be relativelylarge(theUSSR),6 or may consistofseveralnationsandbe relativelycompact inarea (the Middle East). Where only onenationisamemberofa region we can say thattheinternal (ordomestic) andsubordinate systems are identical. Withintheboundariesofasubordinate system, thereisa complex 6TheSovietUnionhasbeenconsidered a region inandofitselfbe- cause with reference to social, political, and geographic factors it resembles many oftheother subordinate systems. While many ofthestatesonthe SovietUnion'sborders might havebeenconsidered as part ofits periph- ery, Sovietrelationswiththesestatesresemblemore closely intrusive relationselsewhereratherthan core-periphery relations. REGIONCORE tSouth-West Africa 14. Central Africa 15. East Africa The Congo (Kinshasa) Rwanda Burundi Uganda Kenya Tanzania LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL 405 interactionbetween political,social, and geographic factors.Itisthis interactionwhichismost important in defining thelimitsofasub- ordinate system. For example,primarilypolitical boundariesdivide EastandWest Europe; socialand political boundariesdivideLatin AmericaandNorth America; geographic boundaries help to identify theMiddleEastanddivideNorthAfricafromtherestofAfrica. Indigenouspoliticalrelationships(antagonistic and cooperative), geographic factors, and socialand historical backgroundshelp todefine asubordinate system. Thus, theauthorsbelieve that, despite the Organization ofAfrican Unity(oAU), theAfricancontinentis frag- mented by a variety oflocal interactions, whileinLatin America, despitegreat differences, theareahasshownmore frequent interre- latedcharacteristics.7 Outside powersplay a rolein defining asubordinate system. Thisis particularly thecasein East Europe, Southeast Asia, and Latin America. Althoughgeographic boundariesdonot easilychange andsocial factors rarely do,political and ideological factorsarefluid.Conse- quently, the identity ofasubordinate system isbothtenuousand dynamic. For example, the nineteenth-century writerwould probably have suggested the significance oftheCentral European subordinate system, buthewouldnothavefoundmostofthenation-stateswhich are presently locatedinthe MiddleEast. Wecanthusconcludethatasubordinate system consistsofone state, oroftwoormore proximate and interacting stateswhichhave somecommon ethnic, linguistic, cultural,social, andhistorical bonds, andwhosesenseof identity issometimesincreased by theactionsand attitudesofstatesexternaltothe system. Theseven foregoing basic generalizations,plus this definition, shouldbesufficienttoenable us, atleast tentatively, to identify asubordinate system. Itwillbecome 7 It isworth noting inthis regard that Africa isalmost twice as large as LatinAmericaandthatits population isalsoabouttwiceas large. Somereaders may be surprised thattheauthorshavenotdefinedsuch areasasScandinaviaandCentralAmericaas separate subordinate sys- tems. It isour position that were political integration tooccur among such nations (Benelux andtheBritish WestIndies may be added), they would haveasimilar position intheir subordinate systems(for example, as part ofthecoreor periphery) totheir presentone, even though their power withinthe system wouldbeincreased.For example, aUnitedStatesof Central America would play asimilarroletothat playedby Mexicoor Venezuela asmembers oftheLatin American core, and aUnited States of Scandinavia wouldrelate toWest Europe asGreat Britain does at present. Our subsequent analysis ofcores and peripheries should further clarify the rationaleforthese judgments. 406 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS clearaswe proceed toelaboratethe components ofour approach that weareatthesametime elaborating ourdefinition. Although the general identificationofa given subordinate system is relativelyeasilyestablished, the specificmembership ofcertainstates poses some difficulty. InTable I, theauthorshavedividedthe globe intofifteensubordinate systems, eachofwhichhasbeendetermined withreferencetotheconsiderations already discussed. (It is, of course, possible thatotherresearchers-even using asimilarframework- couldcometo slightly different conclusions.)Nevertheless,byaccept- ing thesedelineationsfortheremainderofthis article, thereader will beableto participate inan attempt to provide a methodology forcom- paring theinternational politics ofdiversesubordinate systems. II.Four Pattern Variables Grantedtheidentificationofasubordinate system inwhichthe pre- cedinggeneralizations are operative, itis possible todifferentiateit furtherintothreesubdivisions:thecore sector, the peripheral sector andtheintrusive system. Before turning toa discussionofthesethree subdivisionsofthesubordinate system, weshallfirst proceed toa discussionoffour pattern variableswhichwebelievetobecrucialto thedemarcationofthesesubdivisions.Theseare: (i) natureandlevel of cohesion,(2) natureof communications,(3) levelof power, and (4) structureofrelations.Thesevariablesare crucial tothe comparison of subordinate systems withdiverse qualities. NatureandLevel of Cohesion: By cohesionwemeanthe degree of similarity or complementarity inthe properties ofthe political entities being consideredandthe degree ofinteractionbetweentheseunits. The concept ofcohesion plays asimilarroleintheconsiderationof regions tothatwhichthe concept of integration has played inthe analysis ofnation-states.In the study of comparative national politics, integration hasbeenusedto mean, "The problem of creating asense ofterritorial nationality whichovershadows-oreliminates-subordi- nate parochial loyalties."8 When applied tothe study ofinternational relationsthe concept of integration canthus represent an assumption thatthestates beingcompared willlosetheir independence as they becomemoreinterlocked.Cohesioninvolvesnosuch assumption. As 8 Myron Weiner, "Political Integration andPolitical Development," in Political Modernization, ed., C. Welch (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1967), 150-51.Reprinted fromThe Annals, CCCLVIII (March,1965),52-64. LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL 407 statesbecomemoresimilarandmore interactive, thereisno guarantee that they willuniteor federate; onthe contrary, cohesiveness may as likely leadto disunity asto unity. Whentheterm "integration" is applied to regions itis usually assumedataminimumthatwarfare doesnotexist among themembersor thata more encompassingpoliti- calinstitutionresultsfromthe process."Integration and security community...imply stable expectations of peaceamong the partici- pating unitsor groups, whetheror nottherehasbeena merger oftheir political institutions,"or"Political integration isthe processwhereby political actorsinseveraldistinctnational settings are persuaded to shifttheir loyalities,expectations and political activitiestowarda new center, whoseinstitutions possess or demand jurisdiction overthe pre- existing nationalstates."9 There is, ontheother hand, nodirectcorre- lationbetweencohesionandabsenceofwarfareorbetweencohesion and a shiftof politicalloyalty. The concept ofcohesionasdiscussedherecanbefurtherdifferen- tiatedintoits social,economic,political, and organizational elements. Undertherubricofsocial cohesiveness, attentionisfocused upon the contributivefactorsof ethnicity,race,language,religion, culture, his- tory, and consciousnessofa common heritage. Thecontraststhatthese factors maypresent canbeseenintheextremesoftheMiddleEast subordinate system'shighdegree ofsocialcohesionandSoutheast Asia's extremely low degree ofsocialcohesion.Undertherubricof economic cohesiveness, thefocusis upon thedistributionandcom- plementarity ofeconomicresourcesaswellasonthecharacterof trade patterns. TheextremesofthisfactorcanbeseenintheWest Europeansystem'shighdegree ofeconomiccohesivenessand theWest AfricanandMiddleEastern systems' low degree. Undertherubricof political cohesivenessweareconcernedwiththemannerinwhichthe pattern and degree of complementarity of types of regime contribute ordetractfromthecohesionofasubordinate system. Inthis respect onecould compare West Europe, withitsmultitudeofreconciliation or parliamentary-typeregimes, andtheMiddle East, withitscontrast- ing mobilizationaland modernizing autocracies.10 Finally, undertherubricof organizational cohesionweshouldnote 9 Thefirst quotation isfromKarl Deutsch,"Security Communities," in InternationalPoliticsand ForeignPolicy,ed.,J.Rosenau,(New York:The Free Press,1961),98. ThesecondisfromErnst Haas, The Unitingof Europe(Stanford, California:Stanford University Press,1958), i6. 10 For thisclassification of politicalsystems, seeDavid Apter, The Poli- tics of Modernization (Chicago:University of ChicagoPress,1965), 28-38, Chapters9, 11. 408 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS the possible effects upon cohesionof membership in the UnitedNations andin regionalorganizations. The analysis of voting behaviorinthe UnitedNationshasrevealedtheexistenceof groupings ofstates identifiableas Afro-Asian, Latin American, andso forth, allofwhich contributeinsome degree to regional consciousness.ll Asfor regional organization, weshouldnotetowhatextenta regionalorganization is coterminuswiththe region'sboundaries,contrasting, for example, the European CommonMarketandtheArab League. Ifallmembers ofasubordinate system orasectorofasubordinate systembelong to a regional international organization, thistendstoreinforce cohesion, particularly iftheboundariesofthe membership coincidewiththe system's or sector'sboundaries. Nature of Communications:Thesecond patternvariable, thenature of communications, isdivisibleintofour aspects:personal communica- tions (mail,telephone,telegraph); massmedia (newspapers, radio, television);exchangeamong theelite (intraregional education, tour- ism,diplomatic visitswithinthe region); and transportation(road, water,rail, air). Itisevidentthat literacy ratesanddifferencesinlan- guage willaffectthefirstthreeandthat geography and technological development willaffectallfour. Regions willdifferfromeachother withthe degree towhichthesefourfactorsare present and applicable. SoutheastAsiaisweakinall four, for example, asisWest Africa, whileWest Europe hasbeenableto outweighlinguistic differences by thesheer profusion ofchannelsofcommunicationsandother pattern variables. Level of Power. "Power," thethird patternvariable, isdefinedhereas the present and potentialability andthe willingness ofonenationto altertheinternal decision-makingprocesses ofothercountriesinac- cordancewithitsown policies. Wecanisolatethreebroad aspects of anation's power: material,military, andmotivational.Thematerial elementsof powercomprise thebasisofanation's capacity: thesein- cludeitslocationand resources; the size,quality, andstructureofits population; its economy andindustrial capacity(particularly tobe measured bygross national product(GNP),percapitaGNP, and produc- tionand consumption of energy) andtherelative efficiency ofits administrationand government. The military elementsof power com- prise a nation's ability to wage war:its militarytechniques,weaponry, 11Foran analysisalong these lines, seeBruce Russett, International Regions andtheInternational System(Chicago: Rand McNally & Co.,1967), Chapters 4,5. LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL 409 manpower, and efficiency.They alsoincludetheeffectwhichscientific and technologicaldevelopments haveonthe ability of stronger nations toincreasetheir margin of superiority overweakernationsorof weakercountriestoovertaketheleaders. Finally, themotivational elementsof power centerona nation'swilltoseek prestige andstatus ininternational affairs, and onitsreadinesstosacrifice consumersatis- factiontobuilditsmaterialand militarypower. Motivationisinflu- enced by suchelementsas ideology, nationalcharacterand morale, nationalism,history, the personalities andabilitiesof particular states- men, and diplomatic skill. Because existing and potentiall2 national strengths andweaknesses are frequentlycontradictory, itisdifficultto produce a "power calcu- lation"inorder to compare states.Giventhe complexity ofthe process, the attempt toestimatethe power ofnationsnevertheless produces valuableinformationaboutthedistributionor balanceof poweramong nationsinasubordinate system. This analyticalprocess alsofacilitates the comparison ofthecharacterofvarioussubordinate systems. Itis possible todetectseven types ofnation-statesinthecurrent period:primarypowers,secondarypowers, middle powers, minor powers,regionalstates,micro-states, andcolonies.Which category a nation-state belongs in depends onits degree of power, as suggested by thethreefactorsdiscussedaboveandits range of influence, asin- dicated by thenumberorlocationofstateswithwhicha particular nationisabletoexerciseits power. PRIMARYPOWERS:The primarypowers(the usand USSR),together withthe secondarypowers constitutethe greatpowers, thatisnations whichinfluencedomestic politics and foreignpolicies ofothercoun- triesinseveralareas oftheworldandare individuallysuperior to other nations materially,militarily, andinmotivation. Primarypowers are superior to secondarypowers onthebasisofthesethree factors, but both typescompose thedominant system ininternational politics. SECONDARYPOWERS: Compared to primarypowers,secondarypowers (the United Kingdom, France, West Germany,Japan, and China) have alimited capacity to participate inselectedsubordinate systems ofthe world. MIDDLEPOWERS:Middle powers(forexample,Italy, Canada, Aus- tralia, East Germany) arethosestateswhoselevelof powerpermits 12 "Potential" applies toeachfactorof power(material, military, and motivational). Anadvancedstate may be capable of growing furtheror maychange inmotivation asaresult ofaltered international conditions or anewdomestic regime. A developing state's potentiality may be long or short-term, depending upon its possibledevelopment andrateof growth. 410 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS themto playonlydecidedly limitedandselectedrolesinsubordinate systems otherthantheirown. MINORPOWERS:Minor powers(forexample, Cuba,Algeria, United Arab Republic) arethosestateswhich playleading rolesintheinter- nationalrelationsoftheir own systems. REGIONALSTATES: Regional states (forexample, Greece, Hungary, Syria) arethosestateswhichareableonoccasionto play alimited butnot leading roleintheirownsubordinate systems.They alsotend tohave greaterflexibility withreferenceto strongerpowers thando micro-statesand colonies. MICRO-STATES:Micro-states (forexample,Jamaica,Togo,Laos) are stateswhichhavelittleornoinfluencein regional internationalrela- tionsbecausetheir power calculationleavesthemalmost totally within theorbit ofoneor more large powers. COLONIES:Colonies (forexample,SpanishSahara,Angola,Hong Kong) arethefew remainingpolitical entitieswhichhavelittleorno independent motivational power. This categorization allowsustomakeanestimateofboththedis- tributionand hierarchy of power withinasubordinate system. West Europe isdistinctivefor its prevalence of secondary and middle powers. In Latin Americathereare only onemiddle power(Brazil), a fewminor powers and a few regionalpowers, and many micro-states.In theArab sectoroftheMiddleEast congeries of regional andmicro-statesare allminor powers. The categories alsofacilitatethe comparison ofsub- ordinate systems: the predominance of secondary andmiddle powers inWest Europe indicatesthatitslevelof power is greater thanthatof either Latin Americaor the MiddleEast. Structure of Relations:Thefourth pattern variable, thestructureof relations, referstothecharacterofthe relationships whichexist among thenation-statesthat compose asubordinate system. Itisim- portant heretodetermine: (i) whichstatesare cooperating andwhich are inconflict (thespectrum of relations);(2) thebasesfortheir amity or antagonism(the causesof relations); and (3) theinstrumentswhich they usetoeffecttheirrelations-for example,types of weapons, ways of amelioratingconflict, methodsof cooperation(the meansof relations). THESPECTRUMOFRELATIONS:13Thestructureofa system's inter- relationscanbedescribed by referencetotheconditions depicted in Table II, whichshowsa spectrumextending fromtheclose coopera- 13 The concept of power, theseven types of nations, andthe spectrum ofrelationsarediscussedin greater detailina forthcoming book by StevenL. Spiegel tobe published byLittle, Brown and Company. LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL 411 tionofabloctotheexacerbatedconflictofdirect military confronta- tion. TABLEII Spectrumof Relations bloc alliance limited cooperation equilibrium stalemate sustained crisis direct military conflict Conditionsof amity include:a bloc, inwhichtwoormorenations actininternational politics asif they wereone politicalentity; an alliance, inwhich theyagree toaideachotherin specifiedways- usuallyincludingmilitarymeans; andtentative cooperation, inwhich they coordinatetheiractionsfor specificpurposes andovera very short period oftime (days ratherthan weeks, weeksratherthan months). Fromthe opposite direction, conditionsof antagonism in- clude:direct military conflict, inwhichcombatoccursbetweenthe troops oftwo opposing sides; sustained crisis, inwhich contending parties make persistentattempts, shortofdirect military conflict, to alterthebalanceof power between them; and stalemate, inwhich contentioncontinueswhileneithersideis prepared orabletoalter the existingrelationship. Indirect conflict, themeansusedto change thestatus quo areforcefuland deliberate, butinsustainedcrisisthe primary meansofcontentionaremoresubtle: they include political maneuveringamong neutraland independent states, arms races, limitedlocalwarfarebetween partiesaligned oneither side,vitupera- tive exchanges, crises, andin general achaotic atmosphere filledwith tension.In stalemates, contentionisata lowerlevelbecausebothsides decide that,givenexistingconditions,they would prefer tolivewith thesituationthanfacethe consequences of attempting to upset the prevailing balanceofforces. Only whenwearriveat equilibrium dowefindastandoffincom- petitivepower betweentwosidesthatis mutuallyacceptable. Whether ornotan equality of power exists, theeffectisthesame:thestates- 412 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS menofbothsidesnot onlyaccept thesituationbut prefer itto any foreseeablealternative.Thestatus quo becomesastandardofthe acceptable balanceof power, andso long asneithersidemovesto alteritor perceives thatitis being alteredthe equilibrium willcon- tinue.Thedifferencebetweenstalemateand equilibrium isthatina stalemateoneorbothsideswould change conditionsif they couldand are seeking meansof doingso; in equilibrium neithersidebelieves thatitwouldalter thebalanceof power evenifithadthemeanstodo so. Equilibrium isa prerequisite tomost stages of amity-except the lowestformsoflimited cooperation.14 THECAUSESOFRELATIONS:States are, of course, not always consistent intheirrelations.In anyrelationship betweentwoor morestatesthere may beelementsofconflictononelevelandof cooperation onothers. Many LatinAmericanstates (forexample,Peru,Chile, Bolivia) are in astalematewithreferencetoborderissueswhile they arealliedin economicand diplomatic international organization. SaudiArabiaand theUAR havebeeninasustainedcrisisin regard toYemenbutinan alliancein regard toIsrael.Itistherefore necessary toconsiderthe relative significance of major issueswhichcauseconflictor coopera- tionbetween particular statesinasubordinate system. InLatin America, theeffectofAmericaninfluencehasbeentosubordinate localissuesto regionalpursuits.Similarly, intheMiddle East, intra- Arab disputes aremuted by theconfrontationwithIsrael. Whenthereis conflict, thenatureofthe disputed issuesrevealsthe intensity ofthecontention.For example, border and economic disputes are usually less damaging to peaceful internationalrelationsinthe region than racial, religious,ideological, andhistoricalrivalries.Simi- larly, whenthereis cooperation thereasonsforcollaborationindicate the strength ofthecross-nationalties.Acommon enemy is likely to bea stronger tiethanmutualeconomic interest; under present con- ditions, economicsis likely tobea stronger incentiveto cooperation thanare religious ties. THEMEANSOFRELATIONS:The spectrum ofrelations within a subor- dinate system isfurtherelucidated by referencetothemeanswhich are usedinsuchrelations.The type ofwarfare (forexample,guerilla versus conventional)being carriedon helps to explain therelations whichexist. Moreover, themannerinwhichconflictsareameliorated 14 The spectrum wehave presented doesnotinclude nationswhichare "neutral" towardeachotherinthesenseofnoninvolvementinhostile relations. Incurrent subordinate systems,equilibrium orstalemateinre- spect totwo conflicting sidesis frequently eitherthecauseortheeffect ofneutral policies ofindividualstates. LOUISJ.CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL 413 andterminatedindicatesthe strength of particular conditionsinthe spectrum ofrelations.For example, conditionsinLatin America, whereanelaboratesetof diplomatic devicesexistsforthesettlement of manytypes of conflict, are very differentfromconditionsinthe Middle East, wherecease-firesare arrangedby intermediariesand thereislittleornocontactbetweentheArabsandIsraelis.West Europe, wherestatesarealso likely inthecurrent period toresortto establishedmeansof amelioration, isdifferentfromSoutheast Asia, where guerrillas either emerge victoriousorfadeintotheinteriorand whererare agreements arebroken freely.Finally, theextentofestab- lishedconsultativedevicesandthe range oftiesbetween cooperating governments not onlyhelp toindicatewhethera bloc,alliance, or limited cooperation isin progress;they alsohintatthe durability of these relationships. Thesethree elements,then,provide aframeofreferenceforexam- ining the prevailing natureof relationships withinasubordinate sys- tem. They enableustomake comparisons withothersubordinate systems, bothwith respect totheinfluenceofwhatweshallcallthe "intrusive system" andtheeffectoflevelsof cohesion, power, and communication.Asweshall see, thesefour pattern variables, when applied toa given subordinate system, unveiltheexistenceofwhat weterm "core"and "peripheral" sectors. III.TheCoreandthe Periphery TheCoreSector:Thecoresectorconsistsofastateor group ofstates whichformacentralfocusoftheinternational politics withina given region. It usually consistsofmorethanone state, andwhenitdoes theconstituentunits possess ashared social, political, and/or organi- zational background or activity. There may bemorethanonecore sectorwithina given subordinate system.15 Wecanmakeourdefinitionmore specific anduseful byexamining 15 Generally, theidentification ofacoresectorisassisted by theexist- enceofan easily identifiable culturallyheterogeneousperipheral sector. Whenthe peripheral sectorisnotso heterogeneous, as, for example, in theWestAfrican Anglophonicperipheralsector, suchfactorsas degree of cohesion, sizeor geographicalarea,population, andeconomic wealthhavetobeconsidered inorder todetermine the political center of gravity of the subordinate system. In West Africa, the high level of cohesion relative tothe periphery and the vastnessofthe Francophonic area are the decisivefactors. 414 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS a hypothetical coresectorintermsofourfour pattern variables:the levelof cohesion, thenatureof communications, thelevelof power, andthestructureofrelations.Theminimalconditionsfortheexist- enceofacoresectorcanbedetermined by itslevelofcohesionwhich requires a considerationofthe degree of social,economic, and political similarity,complementarity, and interactionwithinthe particular group ofstates.In addition, thefactorof organizational cohesionwould havetobeconsidered. Thus, an analysis ofthe similarity or comple- mentarity ofsocialcohesivenesswouldtakeintoaccount ethnic, linguistic,cultural, andhistorical similarities, whileeconomiccohe- sivenesswould dependupon the complementarity ofnaturalresources aswellasthe patterns andthe degree oftradewithinthecoreand withinthe periphery. Politicalcohesivenesswouldbedetermined by thesimilarities amongregimes andthemannerinwhichthese might contributetoordetractfromthecohesivenessofthecoresector.For example, inWest Europe the regimes ofthecoresectorare relatively similar, whileintheMiddleEast they arenot. Organizational cohe- sionwouldberevealed by theextenttowhichan organization(for example, the European commonmarketandtheWest European core sector) coincideswithacoresector.The degree ofcommonmember- ship ininternational organizations, moreover, wouldbeanindication oftheextentofinteractionwithinthecoresector.Itisevidentthata knowledge ofthe degree of similarity or complementarity ofthese factorsofcohesionwillassistustodelineateacoresector.Itisalso evidentthatone type ofcohesion may be more pronounced thanothers ina given coresector (forexample, the organizational inWest Europe and thesocialintheMiddle East), whilestillothercoresectors may be significantly united by allfourelementsofcohesion (for example, North America, Southwest Pacific). Most often,however, oneormoreoftheelementsof cohesion, butnotallof them, are significantlypresent ina core. Thesecond pattern variable, thenatureof communications, should furtherinformusaboutthenatureofacoresectorintermsof per- sonal communications, mass media,interchangeamong the elite, and transportation facilities. Striking, for example, istheextenttowhich theflowofcommunicationwithinasubordinate system canbere- strictedtoacoresectorandfailto penetrate the peripheral sector (for example, the Francophonic coresectorofWestAfricaandthe Anglo- phonicperipheralsector). An analysis ofthecoresectorintermsoflevelsof power, ourthird pattern variable, shouldinformusofthe politicalcapabilities con- tainedwithinit.Asina region asa whole, thedistributionof power withinthecorerevealsthe politicalprocesses atwork.The primacy LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL 415 ofFranceandWest Germany intheCommon Market, ofAustralia intheSouthwest Pacific, of Algeria inNorth Africa, andofthe UnionofSouthAfricainSouthernAfrica may becontrastedwith the roughequalityamong the participants inthecoresofmaritime SoutheastAsiaandEastAfrica.The degree of supremacy ofthe pre- eminentstatesofa core (forexample, UnitedStatesinNorthAmerica versustheUARintheMiddle East), can becontrastedwiththe position ofweakerstates (forexample, CanadainNorthAmericaversus Jordan, Yemen, andSouthYemenintheMiddle East), therelative gap between strongest andweakestmustalsobeassessed. Finally, indis- tinguishing thecorefromthe peripheral sectoritis important tonote therelative power ofeach.TheMiddleEastandWestAfricaare dis- tinctiveforthe strength oftheir peripheral statesvis-a-visthe core, whileinLatinAmericaandSoutheastAsiathe peripheries are par- ticularly weak.InWest Europe, thecoreand periphery comecloser to approximatingequality thanin any ofthecases just cited. Thefourth pattern variable, thestructureof relations,completes the profile ofacoresector.Itis closely connectedtothethird variable, foritinformsusofthe dynamics oftheexerciseof power.Differing levelsof power withinacoresectorwillhave profoundconsequences onitsinternalrelations.TheconflictsbetweentheUARandSaudi Arabia, Braziland Argentina, NorthVietnamand Thailand, Guinea andthe Ivory Coast,among Indonesia,Malaysia, andthe Philippines, andbetween Algeria andhertwo neighbors, Tunisiaand Morocco, arerelatedto power conditionswithinthecore.Themeansofboth conflictand cooperation are,moreover,directly connectedtothelevel of power ofthe core-except whereoutside powers interveneand provide theirowninstrumentsofcontention (forexample,jetfighters) orcollaboration (forexample, international organization). Thecauses of relations,however, ofteninvolvewiderissuesthanmerelevelof power. Cohesionandcommunicationsare especiallysignificant inex- plaining thereasonsforthe particular structureofrelationswithinthe core.For example, thefactorof political cohesion helps to explain the split withintheArab core;improved communicationsand political and organizational cohesion help to explain Franco-Germanreconciliation. Itcanthusbeseenthatwhiletheinitialdelineationofthesub- ordinate systemmay itselfbeconsideredsomewhat subjective, the application ofthefour pattern variablessoonrevealsthe identity of thesubordinate system andofthemorewell-definedcoresectoras well.In fact, our ability todelineatethecoresectorso sharply inturn assistsusto define thesubordinate system itself. The Peripheral Sector:The peripheral sectorincludesallthosestates 416 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS withina given subordinate system whicharealienatedfromthecore sectorinsome degreebysocial, political,economic, or organizational factors, butwhichnevertheless play aroleinthe politics ofthesub- ordinate system. Whilethecoresectortendstowards cultural,social, and politicalhomogeneity, the peripheral sectoris characteristically heterogeneous, andthereis usually littleinteraction amongperiphery members.Theminimalfactor accounting fortheinclusionofthemem- berstatesofthe peripheral sectorinthesubordinate systemappears tobe primarilygeographical,although additional social,cultural, polit- ical, andhistoricalfactorsexist.It follows,then, thatthe peripheral sector, as compared withthecore sector, ischaracterized by lessco- hesion, less communication,relatively unrelatedlevelsof power, and muchmorefluid relations. Therearesome exceptions, however, inareaswheretheretendsto besome degree of homogeneity ifnotalsocohesiveness (notably inthe Anglophonicperiphery ofWest Africa, groupings intheWestEuro- peanperiphery, theBlackstatesoftheSouthernAfrican periphery, andthe Francophonic areaofCentral Africa). InWest Africa, for example, acommonBritishcolonial experience and knowledge ofthe Englishlanguageamong theelitecontributetothis comparative homo- geneity. Whereboththecoreand periphery are cohesive, itisneces- sary toassesstherelative degree ofcohesivenessandthefocusof politicalcentrality withinthesubordinate system before assigning thelabel"core." Oneofthe oustanding characteristicsofthe periphery isthatits diplomatic orientationis typically outsideofthe region; for example, peripheral states usually seektheir diplomaticalignments outside of, ratherthan within, thesubordinate system. Thiscanbe seen, for example, inthe key role playedbyNigeria, amemberoftheWest African peripheral sector, inthe founding oftheOAUandinthe membership ofIranand Turkey, membersoftheMiddleEastern peripheral sector, intheCentral TreatyOrganization(CENTO). Another characteristicofthe peripheral sectoristhatitoftenservesasa geo- graphic and diplomatic bufferbetweenexternal powers. This largely geopolitical circumstancecanbeseenin Libya and Mauritania, which arebuffersfortheNorthAfricancore sector, andin Burma, whichis abufferforthemainlandSoutheastAsiancoresector. Aberrationsinthe Periphery: Thefluidnatureofthe periphery occa- sionally makesit necessary to qualify itsdelineation.In thissectionwe shall identify two groupings of peripheral statesinWest Europe and weshallalsodiscussthe problem ofborderline peripheral states.Both the large sizeandcertaindichotomousfeaturesoftheWest European peripherysuggest thatitcanbedividedintoNorthernandSouthern LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL groupings(see Table I). TheNorthern peripheral statesaremorein- dustrialized, more developedeconomically, andmore democratically governed thanthe South; asa consequence, mostofthesestateshave a higher core potential.They arealso distinguished fromtheSouth because they aremoreProtestantand linguistically more Nordic, Anglo-Saxon, andGermanic.Thisdistinctiondoes not,however, affectthemethodof core-peripheryanalysisalreadypresented, be- causeitisoffset by the importance ofintrasector organizational and economiccohesion. Afewofthestateswhichwehavedescribedas peripheral are,by virtueoftheir activities, dividedbetweenthe peripheries oftwosub- ordinate systems. Intermsofourfour pattern variablesthis generally appears tooccurwhencertainstates (notablyTurkey,Finland, Af- ghanistan, and Burma) canbeidentifiedwithonesubordinate system intermsofcohesionandcommunicationswhile they interactwith anotherintermsof power andthestructureofrelations.In addition, the Anglophonic areaoftheCaribbean appears tolieastrideboththe NorthAmericanandLatin Americansubordinate systems, aselements ofthefour pattern variablesand geographypull thesemicro-statesin bothdirectionsinthis period oftransitionfrom colony to independ- ence.l6 Some degree ofverificationofthe marginal character ofborder- linestatesis providedby thefactthatourconsiderationofthem revealsthat they are always locatedina periphery, andneveracore. Thus,although borderline peripheral statesaredifficulttolocate withina specific subordinate system, itis possible toexaminetheir positionbyutilizing this comparativeregionalapproach. RelationsBetweentheSectors:Asthedefinitionofthe peripheral sector indicated, the periphery isin part defined by its relationship to thecore.Inrelationsbetweenthecoreandthe periphery, alienation isacentral factor, aswascohesioninourdiscussionofrelations withinasector. The core, asthecenterof politicalgravity inthesubordinate sys- tem, relates individually toisolatedstatesortosmall groups ofstates inthe periphery. Theiralienation may arisefora variety ofreasons. Geography is frequently a complement toother factors, butitisnot ordinarily the only element leading toalienationfromthe core, andin 16 Further examples ofstateswhich may be placed inmorethanone subordinate systemmayreadily occur toourreaders (forexample, Mon- golia,Yugoslavia, Mauritania). Atthis stage inour study, anexamination ofconditions in terms ofthe four pattern variables yielded only the border- line peripheral stateswhich are listedinTable I, although theaddition of othersis possible asfurther research continues. 417 418 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS fact may notbeanelementat all, asthecaseofIsraelshows.In West Europe,geography hascontributedtoGreatBritain'salienationfrom the core, but politicaldevelopments havealsobeencrucial.Were BritaintobeadmittedtotheCommon Market, shewould thereby becomeamemberofthe core, since organizational cohesionisthe most important elementin determining theWest European core.In theMiddle East, ontheother hand, socialcohesionis extremely im- portant in delineating the periphery;therefore, thethreenon-Arab states,Iran, Turkey and Israel, formthe periphery. The degree ofalienationbetweenthetwosectorscan perhaps be seeninthedistinctionbetweenstates with, andstates without, the potentiality of becomingpart ofthecore (forexample, Taiwanand GreatBritain versus Jamaica and Israel). A highdegree of political and organizational cohesioninthecoretendstobreed peripheral states whichare potential membersofthecore sector, whilea highdegree ofsocialcohesioninthecoretendsto precludeperipheral statesfrom having such potentialities(see Table I). Thereis frequently disaffectionbetweenthecoreandthe periphery. Among thefifteensubordinate systems ofthe world, someformof tensionbetweenthetwosectorsis especially severeintheMiddle East, East Europe, Latin America, East Asia, andSouthAsia. Only in SoutheastAsiaandNorthAfricadoestensionwithinthecoreexceed thetensionbetweenthesectors.Asfortensionwithinthe periphery, this hardly exists, becauseofthelowlevelofinteractioninthe periph- ery. The majorexceptions areGreeceand Turkey(whenTurkey is viewedasamemberoftheWest Europeanperiphery); Albaniaand Yugoslavia inEast Europe, theKoreasinEast Asia, and Ethiopia and theSomali Republic inEastAfrica.Stateswhichare potentiallypart ofthecoreandthosewhicharenotseemtobe equallylikely tofind themselvesin antagonisticrelationships withtheircore.Insomecases thedifferenceswhichcontributetothe difficulty of becomingpart of thecorecreatean antagonisticrelationship withsomeorallofthe corestates (forexample,Israel,Pakistan,Mauritania),although fre- quently the potentiality of joining thecore itselfseemstocreate aliena- tionandconflict (forexample,Taiwan,Albania, and Cuba). IV.TheIntrusive System Anintrusive system consistsofthe politicallysignificantparticipation ofexternal powers intheinternationalrelationsofthesubordinate system. Whilethecoreand peripheral sectorsbothinvolvethestates locatedwithinthe region, an analysis ofalmost everyregion reveals thatthesestatesare notthe only oneswhich play a role in theactivities LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL 419 ofthesubordinate system. Asonewould expect inaninternational system witha hierarchyconsisting ofseven types of nations, external countriesinvolvethemselvesintheinternational politics ofsubordi- nate systems otherthantheirown.This pattern is only absentinthe NorthAmericancoreandintheSoviet Union, wherethelevelof power is extremelyhigh.Additionally, inthecoreofNorth America, thelevelof cooperation betweenthetwo members, theUnitedStates and Canada, is extremelyhigh.17 Therearetwo types of externally based regionalparticipation: politicallysignificant involvementand politicallyinsignificant involve- ment. Politicallyinsignificant involvement comprises material aid, trade, economic investment, and culturalandeducationaleffortswhich donot usuallyproduceparticipation inthebalanceof power ofthe region. Middle powers, andtosome degreesecondarypowers, are most likely toundertakethis type ofinvolvement. Spanish involve- mentintheMiddleEastandCanadianaidtoIndiaare examples. Muchof Japanese andWestGermanaid (except West Germany's activity inEast Europeanpolitics anditsHallstein Doctrine) hasnot been politically motivatedor accompaniedby a desireto participate in localinternationalrelations.Theseconditions maychange, however. Politicallysignificant involvement, ontheother hand,produces participation inthebalanceof power ofthesubordinate system and may affectthedominant system's balanceaswell.This participation is expressedby the possession ofa colony; economicor military aid producing analterationinthebalanceof power inthe region; formal alliance, troopcommitment, or anyagreement whichcausestheex- ternal power toactin ways whichresemblethe types ofactionsthat would ordinarily betaken by a countryindigenous tothe region. This type ofinvolvementisalsodetermined by referencetothe objectives, power,motivation,location, andinternational position oftheintrud- ing nation.Since onlypoliticallysignificant memberscanbedefined as being membersoftheintrusive system, wewill primarily becon- cernedherewiththese types ofexternal powers. Even politically significant involvement by one state, onceidentifiedas such, hastobe judged furtherinrelationtootherintrusive powers.Thus, for example, Australiaand Portugal meettheminimum requirements for politically significant involvementinSoutheast Asia, buttheir participation is nowherenearas significant asthatoftheUnited States,China, or the SovietUnion. 17 It might be suggested thatFrench and British involvement inCanada isinformsimilartointrusiveactioninothersubordinate systems. The authors rejected this interpretation, however, becauseofboththe indig- enous power of Canada and its close relationship with the U.S. 420 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS Wecanisolateninecharacteristic ways inwhichexternal powers participate inthe politics ofa givenregion. Theseare:multilateral arrangements; bilateral arrangements; trade andeconomic investment; possession ofa colony;militaryintervention;subversion; useofthe United Nations; culturalandeducational activities; and propaganda. Alloftheseare employed inonesituationoranother bypolitically significant external powers, whilea few-particularly theeconomic andculturalavenues-areused occasionallyby thosewhichare politicallyinsignificant. Thesecharacteristic ways of participation intheintrusive system haveboth positive and negative effects upon thefour pattern variables ofthesubordinate system:cohesion,communications,power, andthe structureofrelations. Cohesion:The social,economic,political, and organizationalaspects ofthecohesionofasubordinate system areaffectedinanumberof waysby the participation ofanexternal power. Socialcohesioncanbe enhanced by theeducationaleffortsofanexternal power, iftheseef- fortsreinforcethe pre-existing educationaland linguisticpatterns withinthe system. An example ofthis type of activity isthecontinued educationaleffortsoftheFrenchintheirformercoloniesinNorth Africaandsub-SaharanAfrica.Another way anintrusive powermay affectsocialcohesionistoassistinthetransferof populations(for ex- ample, the Russians, in moving theGermanandPolish populations westwardafterWorldWar II). In general,however, external powers are lessable toaffectsocialcohesionas such.Economic cohesioncan be increasedifeconomicassistance programs haveastheiraimtheen- hancementofeconomic complementaritythrough the encouragement of industrialization, improved methodsof agriculture, oreconomic integration.Examples ofexternal attempts toinfluenceeconomicco- hesionincludeAmericaneffortsinLatinAmericaandWest Europe, RussianeffortsinEast Europe, andBritisheffortsinEastAfrica.In eachcasethe purpose ofexternal pressure andefforthasbeenatleast in part the encouragement ofa divisionoflabor withinthe region. The effectofexternal participationuponpolitical cohesion may beseen whenthe support ofa givenpower servesto perpetuate a conservative, radical, ormoderate regime in power, orto prevent a particulartype of regime from coming to power,therebyreinforcing or reducing cleav- ages withinthe system. In addition, thereareinstanceswherethe concernofanexternal power with regionalsecurityarrangements or economic arrangements haseithercontributedtoorhinderedthe organizational cohesionofasubordinate system. Intrusive powers havebeenabletoact whetheror not they have actually beenmembers LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL oftheseinternational organizations(forexample,NATO,CENTO, COMECON). Communications:External powers influencecommunicationswithin subordinate systems ina variety of ways. Economicassistance pro- grams haveaidedinmail delivery and telephone and telegraph facili- ties.Ina variety ofcircumstances they havealsoledto improvements in transportationsystems and have expedited theintroductionofradio andtelevision.Theactivitiesofanexternal power ina region canalso encourageinterchange ofelite groups.Diplomatic visitsand education withinthe region havebeen promotedby intrusive powers. Moreover, studentsand diplomats havefoundthemselvesincontactwithmem- bersofotherelite groups oftheirown region, onthe territory ofan intrusive power, at its universities, andatconferences sponsoredby it. Level of Power:Itis upon the pattern variableoflevelof power that external powers have perhaps their greatest effect.External powers can promote thematerial power ofmembersofsubordinate systems byproviding economic aid,food, technical assistance, favorabletrade terms, birthcontrol assistance,teachers, andadministrativeadvice.Of moredirecteffectonthebalanceof power ofasubordinate system is a change in militarypower. In ascending orderof importance, the types ofthiskindofaidexternal powers can give membersofthe subordinate system are:economicaidwhichfreesfundsforarms purchases;grants orsalesofarmsandthe trainingnecessary forthe useofthese arms; transferofthe technology,know-how, and material necessary to permitindigenous manufactureof weaponry; and finally, thecommitmentof troops. Ofthethreefactorsof power, themotivationalfactorisherethe most significant.Through their participation inthe region, external powersmay affectthe political,social, and ideological directionwhich particular nationsinthesubordinate system follow.Exterior powers willdecidewhetherto supportexistinggovernments orwhetherto supportopposition or rebellious groups, and theymay either moderate or encourage thedesireof indigenous countriesforincreasedinfluence oftheirown.External powersmay then play anessentialroleinde- termining whichelitecomesto power ina large numberofstatesof the region andwhichkindsof political institutionswill prevail. In extreme cases,theymay evenaffectthenumberofstateswhichexist inthesubordinate system. Structure of Relations:Asthis analysis oftherisksattendant upon theinvolvementofintrusive powerssuggests, external powers affect 421 422 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS andindeedattimesdeterminethestructureofrelationswithina subordinate system. The highdegree of cooperation inbothEast Europe andLatinAmericaisaffected by the primacy oftheSoviet UnionandtheUnited States, respectively, intheseintrusive systems. Itis interesting tonotethatwheneithertheUnitedStatesorthe SovietUnionloses power ineitherofthese regions,regional conflict tendstobe aggravated. Ontheother hand, the competition ofintru- sive powers exacerbatesconflictintheMiddle East, Southeast Asia, East Asia, North Africa, andWestAfrica.IntheMiddleEastand SoutheastAsia particularly, sustainedcrisisanddirect military conflict havebecome prevalent astheconflictsofthedominantandsubordi- nate systems havefused. The type of military aid and involvementofintrusive powers affects themeansofrelations.Consultationand ameliorationare facilitated by oneormoreoftheintrusive powers inWest Europe, Latin America, East Europe, North Africa, andSouthAsia.InSoutheastAsiaandthe Middle East, ontheother hand, massive military aidhasraisedthe levelofconflictandmadeitfarmore dangerous. In addition, China hascontributedtotheturmoilinSoutheastAsia through its concep- tualand practical assistancein guerrilla warfare.The great influence oftheintrusive powersupon themeansofrelationsinSoutheastAsia isattestedto by thefactthat regional warsare frequentlyaccompanied bypeace conferencesattended by several greatpowers. Intrusive powersusually havelessinfluenceonthecausesofrela- tionsthanontheotherelementsofthestructureofrelations. They may notbe responsible forlocal religious andracial rivalries, butas wehave alreadysuggestedthey are capable of fanning theflamesof contention byintroducingideologicalrivalries,byimposing theirown politicalcompetitions onthe area, and byencouraging localadventur- ism.ThedivisionofKoreaandofVietnam may becitedas examples ofexternal powersinfluencing localconflict.Inlike manner,although toa lesser extent,they can organize localblocsandalliancesto support their policies(forexample, NATO, Warsaw Pact) and thereby enforce cooperationamong local parties. In general, the experience ofintrusive powers hasbeenthatitiseasierto impose conflictthan cooperation upon the membersofa subordinate system. External powers canthusserveto intensify orreducethelevelof conflictofsubordinate systems. Their presencemayencourage divi- sionor integrationamong thenation-statesoftheseareas.Intrusive powersmaypromoteregional associationsasameansof extending theircontrolorof aiding theeconomic development ofthe indigenous states.Ontheother hand, their presencemay limit regional cohesive- nessand producefissiparous tendencies.Whatevertheir effect, the LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL 423 external powers mustbeviewedasan integralpart oftheinternational politics ofalmost everyregion withoutwhichtheformofeachsub- ordinate system wouldbe considerably dissimilar. V.Relations Between Subordinate Systems Thefinal subject tobeconsideredhereisthe relationship between subordinate systems. Wecan distinguish twofundamental types of such relationships, thatorientedtowardcohesionandthatoriented toward power. Relationswhichare orientedtowardcohesionare based primarily(although not solely) ontheeffectofthefirsttwo pattern variables:cohesionandcommunications. They tendtooccur among subordinate systems whichare geographicallyproximate, havesimilar political andsocial backgrounds, and havea highdegree ofinteraction. Examples ofsuchrelationsbetween systems aretheMiddleEastand North Africa, andCentralAfricaandWestAfrica.Power-oriented relationsareinfluenced primarilyby the pattern variablesoflevelof power andthestructureof relations, andarecharacterized by the presence ofintrusive systems. Themost powerful subordinate systems arethemost highly interactive.In general, relationsorientedtoward cohesionexistbetween regions whichare similarin power, and power- orientedrelationsexistbetweensubordinate systemsunequal in power. Of course, subordinate systems donot always relatetoeachother asa whole; in particularcases, onesectororevenone countrymay bemore important thanothersin determining the pattern ofrelations withanother region. In individual cases,then, wemust investigate the countriesor group ofcountrieswhichrelatetoanother system, as well astheroleofthe periphery andthecoreintheserelations. Letusselecta single subordinate systembyway ofillustration.In theMiddle East, relationswithNorth America, theSoviet Union, West Europe, East Europe,and, toaminor degree, EastAsiaare power- oriented. They aredetermined largelyby thelevelof power andthe spectrum ofrelationswith geographicproximity also playing anim- portant roleinsomecases.Ontheother hand, thefactorsofcohesion andcommunicationsare particularly-although not solely-significant inthecohesiverelationsofmostMiddleEasternstateswithNorth Africa and, toamuchlesser degree, with West,East, andCentral Africa.Factorsofcohesionand geographicproximity aremostim- portant inthe region's cohesiverelationswithSouthAsia and, toa lesser extent, initscohesiverelationswithSoutheast Asia, where theIslamic solidarity betweenmostoftheMiddleEastand Malaysia andIndonesiaisthemost significant influence. Israel, unliketheother 424 INTERNATIONALRELATIONSOFREGIONS statesintheMiddle East, conducts power-oriented relationswith many countriesinsub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and parts ofLatin America. Besides identifying thefactorswhichcontributetorelationsbe- tweentwoormore systems, itis necessary toformsomeestimate ofthe intensity oftheserelationsbetweensubordinate systems. In this regard, oneofthemost significant indicesisthe degree ofshared participation ininternational organizations, which mayoperate either towardcohesionor power. For example, OECDandNATO represent the cohesiveinterconnectednessofWest Europe andNorth America, but they alsoare significantlypower-oriented. TheArab League isan indi- catorofthecohesivetiesbetweentheMiddleEastandNorth Africa, andtheOAUlinksthevarious regions ofAfricainabroadermanner. Toalesser extent, power-orientedorganizationsencourage moreco- hesiverelationsbetweensubordinate systems: theColomboPlanhas encouragedgreater cohesivecontactsbetweenSouthandSoutheast Asia; OCAMlinks FrancophonicAfrica; theBritish Commonwealth, in amuchbroader way, hasservedtoincrease incipient cohesivelinks betweena variety ofsubordinate systems. Inthis way, international organizations like OECD, NATO, the OAU,OCAM, theArab League, and theBritishCommonwealthcanbeviewedas supraregional inchar- acter; thatisto say,they tendtofunctionas aggregators of regions. Byproviding forumsfor greaterinterchangethey enable particular subordinate systems to intensify theirinteractionstowardeitherco- hesionor power. Thus, relationsbetweensubordinate systems, while largely unstruc- turedand uneven, canhavea significant effect upon theinternational politics of particular areasoftheworld.The relationships between diversesubordinate systems, betweenindividualcountriesindifferent regions, andbetweencoresor peripheries ofdifferent regions, can affectlocal balances, localintrusive systems, and thedominant system. Consequently, in anycompleteanalysis oftheinternational system itisinsufficienttoconsidereachsubordinate system inisolation.Its relationship toother systems mustalsobe explored. VI.Conclusion Wehavebeen engaged inthe exploratory ventureof attempting to characterizethenatureoftheinternationalrelationsofa region. As our point of departure, wehaveendeavoredtotreatthe region asa unitof analysis unto itself, aunitwhich possesses itsowninternal dynamicprocesses. Wehave attempted todothis by meansofan LOUIS J. CANTORIANDSTEVENL.SPIEGEL inductively arrivedat classificatorysystem whichcanbeusedto specify howthesubordinate system canbeidentifiedandwhatits component elementscanbesaidtobe:core sector,peripheralsector, andintrusive system. Ourintroductionofthefour pattern variables -levelof cohesion, natureof communications, levelof power, and the structureofrelations-wasintendedtoestablishthatthesematrical elementsare ofintrinsic importance tothedelineationand understand- ing ofthecoreand peripheral sectorsandtheintrusive system. As part ofthefour patternvariables, weincludedaseven step rankingsystem toestimatethelevelof power ofeachmemberstateof theinternational system, aswellasa spectrum ofinternationalrela- tionswhich encompasses conditionsof cooperation and antagonism. We attempted to show,by meansofthese categories, thatbothan- tagonistic and cooperativerelationships contributetothedelineation ofasubordinate system anditssectors.Both antagonistic and coop- erative relationships existwithinthecoreandthe peripheral sector andbetweenthecoreand peripheralsectors, andtheseassistusin identifying a particular subordinate system. Wecannot fully understandtheinner dynamics ofasubordinate system,however, untiltheeffectsof politicallysignificantparticipation by external powers inwhatwehavecalledthe"intrusive" system havebeenadded. Only a considerationofthe antagonism and coopera- tioninculcatedwithinthesubordinate systemby external powers can provide a completepanorama ofthefullnetworkofrelationsatwork within anyparticular subordinate system. Aswehave seen, the sup- port orwithdrawalof support ofanexternal power can radically alter theinternalbalanceofa subordinate system. Thus, our attempt herehasbeento provide aschemaforthecom- parison oftheinternationalrelationsof regions. Wehave sought to produce a basisfor analyzing unitsofinternationalrelationsofdiverse socialand politicalbackgrounds.Any sucheffortrunstheriskof ignoring crucialfactorsor magnifying minorelements.Wehaveen- tertainedsucha risk, being convincedofthe significance of beginning to categorize andillustratethe patterns and processes atworkinthe intermediatearenaoftheinternational system-the subordinate sys- tem.Forinthiseraofthe collapse of European influenceininterna- tionalaffairsandofthedecolonizationof formerlydependentpeoples, the region hasbecomeoneofthecrucial unitsofinternational politics. 425