8/2/2019 canon 18-21

1/22

EMMA DE JUAN VS ATTY.BARIA

Facts:

The complainant changed the respondent for negligence in handling her labor case theater against

Person. Because a Atty. Baria did not failed to file an motion for reconsideration on the decision of the

NLRC which reversed the decision of the labor arbiter in favor of her labor case. (Illegal termination

without Notice of explanation) Respondent, upon the investigation of the IBP denies the allegations that

he advice from the beginning that he was only a new lawyer as such. He lacks on legal experience, thus,

he failed to file a motion for reconsideration. The respondent also averred that the complainant

negligence was the reason why he did not file a motion for reconsideration. The IBP recommend that

the respondent be suspended for 3 mos.

Issue: Whether or not a lawyer can abandon his client due to the failure of his client to inform him

Held:

A lawyer is not at liberty to abandon his client and withdraw his services without reasonable cause and

only upon notice appropriate in the circumstances. Any dereliction of duty by a counsel affects the

client. A client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is authorized by law

and he may expect his lawyer to assert such remedy or defense.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

2/22

Feliza D. De Roy vs. CA

Facts:

A fire wall of the burned out building owned by the petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoringshop occupied by the family of private respondents resulting injuries and death of a members of the

private respondents. The trial court rendered a decision on June 30, 1986, finding the petitioners guilty

of gross negligence and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal by the petitioners the CA

affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto on August 17, 1987. The petitioners receive a copy of

decision on August 25, 1987 on September 9, 1987 the petitioners filed a motion for extension, of time

to file but was denied. The petitioners seeks that in habaluyas cases that decision should be published in

the official gazette.

Issue: whether or not a lawyer should always be aware on the facts and circumstance of the every case

promulgated by the Supreme Courts in the advance reports.

Held:

It was ruled in the habaluyas case that the 15 day period for appealing or filing a Motion for

reconsideration cannot be extended the petitioners filed an extension after 1 yr after the expiration of

the grace period. Considering the length of period petitioner cannot seek refuge in the ignoranceof their

counsel regarding the said rule for theircounsel regarding the said rule for their failure to file a MR

within the reglamentary period.

It is the bounden duty of the counsel and as a lawyer in active practice of law to keep abreast of

decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated andpublished in the advanced reports of the Supreme Court.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

3/22

DIMARUCOT v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:

Petitioner is the accused for Frustrated Murder in the Regional Trial Court After trial, on September 11,2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision convicting petitioner of frustrated homicide Upon receiving the

notice to file appellants brief, petitioner thru his counsel de parte requested and was granted

additional period of twenty (20) days within which to file said brief but was dismissed. Petitioner filed a

motion for reconsideration, his counsel admitting that he was at fault in failing to file the appellants

brief due to personal problems emanating from his *counsels+ wifes recent surgical operation. It was

thus prayed that the CA allow petitioner to file his appellants brief which counsel undertook to submit

within seven (7) days or until October 4, 2007.

Issue: whether or not a mistake of a counsel is a valid defense

Held:

Petitioner cannot simply harp on the mistakes and negligence of his lawyer allegedly beset with personal

problems and emotional depression. The negligence and mistakes of counsel are binding on the client.

There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the

client of due process of law, or when the application of the general rule results in the outright

deprivation of ones property or liberty through a technicality. However, in this case, we find no reason

to exempt petitioner from the general rule. The admitted inability of his counsel to attend fully and ably

to the prosecution of his appeal and other sorts of excuses should have prompted petitioner to be more

vigilant in protecting his rights and replace said counsel with a more competent lawyer. Instead,petitioner continued to allow his counsel to represent him on appeal and even up to this Court,

apparently in the hope of moving this Court with a fervent plea for relaxation of the rules for reason of

petitioners age and medical condition. Verily, diligence is required not only from lawyers but also from

their clients.Negligence of counsel is not a defense for the failure to file the appellants brief within the

reglementary period.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

4/22

APEX MINING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Petitioners through their retained counsel filed an answer denying the material allegations in the

complaint and alleging that the claims of private respondents were without factual and legal bases since

they constructed the tunnel within the mining claim area of APEX without any authority from or

approval of the latter. During trial on the merits respondents presented three witnesses who were

cross-examined by the petitioners' retained law firm through Atty. Gerardo C. Olaguer, a partner of the

firm. After private respondents rested their case, petitioners' counsel filed a demurrer to evidence,

which was denied by the trial court and set the reception of evidence for the defendants. when the case

was called petitioners' counsel did not appear. the trial court issued an order declaring defendants to

have waived their right to present evidence in their defense. Despite due notice of the order, counsel for

petitioners did not move for reconsideration of the order, the trial court rendered a decision finding

APEX liable for damages. the trial court rendered a decision finding APEX liable for damages. the

petitioners appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. However, it was subsequently dismissed

by the CA. for failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period. Again, despite due notice,

counsel for petitioners did not move for reconsideration of the dismissal of the appeal. Accordingly, the

resolution became final.

Issue whether or not actions of a lawyer is binding upon the client

Held:

It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule that any act

performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his

client. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of counsel may result in the rendition of an unfavorablejudgment against the client. However, the application of the general rule to a given case should be

looked into and adopted according to the surrounding circumstances obtaining. Thus, exceptions to the

foregoing have been recognized by the court in cases where reckless or gross negligence of counsel

deprives the client of due process of law, or when its application will result in outright deprivation of the

client's liberty or property or where the interests of justice so require, and accord relief to the client

who suffered by reason of the lawyer's gross or palpable mistake or negligence.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

5/22

RASMUS G. ANDERSON, JR vs. ATTY. REYNALDO A. CARDEO

Facts:

Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., an American citizen from Kodiak, Alaska, USA, filed an action before the then

Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), to recover title and possession of a parcel of land against the

spouses Juanito Maybituin and Rosario Cerrado, and Fernando Ramos. The case was dismissed by the

trial court, which declared the defendants the true and lawful owners of their respective portions of the

land in question. when Atty. Cesar S. de Guzman died. Anderson, Jr. was now without a counsel to

represent him. Upon referral by a friend, Anderson, Jr. engaged the services of herein respondent Atty.

Reynaldo A. Cardeo. Rasmus G. Anderson, Jr., filed an administrative complaint before this Court

wherein he alleged that respondent Atty. Reynaldo A. Cardeo caused "the loss" or the adverse ruling

against him in the aforementioned case before the RTC. Complainant concludes that Atty. Cardeo

abused his clients trust and confidence and violated his oath as a lawyer in failing to defend his clients

cause to the very end. Complainant prays that Atty. Cardeo be disbarred.

Issue: Whether or not a lawyer should always owes fidelity on his client

Held: SUSPENDED (6) months and WARNED that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with

more severely.

Thus, respondents defenses that the complainant was "uncooperative" as a client, that the voluminous

records turned over to him were in disarray, and that the complainant did not disclose to him certain

particulars of the case, are all unavailing. Thus, in view of the fact that he remained counsel of record for

the complainant, it was highly irregular for him to entrust the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration to

other people who did not lawfully appear interested in the subject litigation.

As a lawyer representing the cause of his client, he should have taken more control over the handling of

the case.

Respondent should know that as a lawyer, he owes fidelity to the cause of his client. When a lawyer

accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the requisite academic

learning, skill and ability to handle the case. The lawyer has the duty to exert his best judgment in the

prosecution or defense of the case entrusted to him and to exercise reasonable and ordinary care and

diligence in the pursuit or defense of the case.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

6/22

Legarda vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

Petitioner Lagrada was a owner of the parcel of land which the private respondents entered upon the

failure of lagrada to sign the agreement the private respondents filed a complaint before the RTC in

Quezon City Petitioner engaged the services of counsel to handle her case. Said counsel filed his

appearance with an urgent motion for extension of time to file the answer within ten (10) days from

February 26, 1985. 2 However, said counsel failed to file the answer within the extended period prayed

for. Counsel for private respondent filed an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner in default. This was

granted by the trial court on March 25, 1985 and private respondent was allowed to present

evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision favoring the

private respondents. Copy of said decision was duly served on counsel for the petitioner but he did not

take any action. Thus, the judgment became final and executory.

Issue: Whether or not a lawyer should render adequate preparation in handling a case

Held:

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and

defense of his rights and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be

taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. He should present every remedy or

defense authorized by the law in support of his client's cause, regardless of his own personal views. In

the full discharge of his duties to his client, the lawyer should not be afraid of the possibility that he may

displease the judge or the general public.

Judged by the actuations of said counsel in this case, he has miserably failed in his duty to exercise his

utmost learning and ability in maintaining his client's cause. It is not only a case of simple negligence as

found by the appellate court, but of reckless and gross negligence, so much so that his client was

deprived of her property without due process of law.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

7/22

Sambajon, et. al. v. Suing

Facts:

The labor arbiter renders a decision in favor of the complainant for the alleged illegal dismissal and

unfair labor practice. The labor arbiter renders in favor of the complainant and ordered the Microplast

Inc. to pay the sum of money to them. Upon the payment of the sum of money the counsel for the

Company Atty. Suing stated that the complainant already signed the quitclaim in his presence the

complainants thus, instituted an action against Atty. Suing complaint for Falsification against respondent

before the prosecutor office and disbarment before the IBP .

Issue: Whether or not A Lawyer should act towards the administration of justice and deal with his clients

within the bounds of law.

Held:

As an officer of the court, a lawyer is called upon to assist in the administration of justice. He is an

instrument to advance its cause. Any act on his part that tends to obstruct, perverts or impedes the

administration of justice constitutes misconduct. While the Commission on Bar Discipline is not a court,

the proceedings therein are nonetheless part of a judicial proceeding, a disciplinary action being in

reality an investigation by the Court into the misconduct of its officers or an examination into his

character.

In Bantolo v. Castillon, Jr. the respondent lawyer was found guilty of gross misconduct for his attempts

to delay and obstruct the investigation being conducted by the IBP. Nonetheless, this Court found that a

suspension of one month from the practice of law was enough to give him "the opportunity to retrace

his steps back to the virtuous path of the legal profession."

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

8/22

LETICIA ADRIMISIN vs. ATTY. ROLANDO S. JAVIER

Facts:

Complainant alleges that on 12 July 1983, she was introduced by her cousin, Pablo Adrimisin, to

respondent. She needed the help of a lawyer in having her son-in-law, Alfredo Monterde ("Monterde"),

who was charged with the crime of qualified theft, released from the Caloocan City Jail. Complainant

claims that respondent advised her to file a bail bond. Complainant informed respondent that her only

money was P500. Complainant contends that respondent received the money, issued a receipt and

promised that Monterde would be released from jail the following day.

Complainant also alleges that respondent failed to keep his promise in having Monterde released.

Complainant went to respondent's office several times but it seemed that respondent was avoiding her.

Monterde was later released upon settlement of the case with his employer. Complainant claims that

she demanded for the return of the P500 but respondent failed to return this amount.

Respondent did not file any comment or answer. He only appeared in the investigative hearingsconducted by the Office of the Solicitor General ("OSG"). Respondent, in his testimony, claims he was

not hired by complainant as legal counsel. Respondent alleges complainant only asked his help to secure

a bail bond. Respondent admits he received P500 for the bail bond and called up Carlos Alberto

("Alberto"), an insurance agent. Respondent claims he gave the P500 to Alberto. However, the amount

was not sufficient to pay for the bond. Respondent denies that he promised to have Monterde released

immediately. Respondent claims he advised complainant to get back her money directly from Alberto.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated canon 18.03 of CPR

Held:

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 16 and Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility ("Code"). The Code mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all moneys and properties of

his client that may come into his possession. Consequently, a lawyer should account for the money

received from a client. The Code also enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,

and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

Respondent himself admitted the receipt of P500 from complainant as payment for the bail bond as

shown in his testimony and in Exhibit "A". By his receipt of the amount, respondent agreed to take up

complainant's cause and owed fidelity to complainant and her cause, even if complainant never paid any

fee. Lawyering is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is theprimary consideration.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

9/22

VALERIANA U. DALISAY vs. ATTY. MELANIO MAURICIO, JR

Facts:

On October 13, 2001, Valeriana U. Dalisay, complainant, engaged respondents services as counsel in

Civil Case No. 00-044, entitled "Lucio De Guzman, etc., complainants, v. Dalisay U. Valeriana,

respondent," pending before the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Binangonan, Rizal. Notwithstanding his

receipt of documents and attorneys fees in the total amount ofP56,000.00 from complainant,

respondent never rendered legal services for her. As a result, she terminated the attorney-client

relationship and demanded the return of her money and documents, but respondent refused.

Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commission

on Bar Discipline, found that "for the amount of P56,000.00 paid by the complainant x x x, no action had

been taken nor any pleadings prepared by the respondent except his alleged conferences and opinions

rendered when complainant frequented his law office." She recommended that respondent be required

to refund the amount of P56,000.00 to the complainant, and surprisingly, that the complaint be

dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the Respondent acts with neglect with her duty as a lawyer

Held:

It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every person who may

wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment. But once he accepts money from a

client, an attorney-client relationship is established, giving rise to the duty of fidelity to the clients

cause. From then on, he is expected to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must

serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with wholehearted

devotion.

When a lawyer accepts a case, his acceptance is an implied representation that he possesses the

requisite academic learning, skill and ability to handle the case. As a lawyer, respondent knew where to

obtain copies of the certificates of title. As a matter of fact, he admitted that his Law Office, on its own,

managed to verify the authenticity ofcomplainants title. It bears reiterating that respondent did not

take any action on the case despite having been paid for his services. This is tantamount to

abandonment of his duties as a lawyer and taking undue advantage of his client.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

10/22

Peter D. Garrucho vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:

the petitioner requested then Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation Andrea Domingo to issue

Hold Departure Orders against Ramon Binamira and Faustino Roberto. This was in connection with the

investigation being conducted by the Department of Justice involving anomalous transactions in

government securities affecting the PTA which entailed the loss of someP161,000,000.00. Commissioner

Domingo granted the request and issued Hold Departure Order Nos. 333 and 334 against Binamira and

Roberto on the said date. Roberto requested the lifting of the order, and Secretary Garrucho opposed

the same in a Letter dated August 22, 1990.1awphi1.ntRoberto then filed a complaint for prohibition

and damages against petitioner Garrucho and Commissioner Domingo in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)

of Makati City. Binamira, for his part, filed a complaint-in-intervention in the case. the trial court

rendered judgment in favor of respondent Binamira. The petitioner and Commissioner Domingo

appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals but was dismissed. Due to the failure to deliver the copy

many times because the petitioner and his counsel moved out without informing the court. Thus, the

court rendered a judgment in favor again to Roberto thus, upon the implementation of the writ of

execution petitioner recourse for the SC.

Issue: Whether or not a lawyer should inform the court should the counsel or the client change its

residency

Held:

The records show that the counsel of the petitioner in the trial court was the law firm of Remollo &

Associates with offices at Suite No. 23, Legaspi Suites, 178 Salcedo Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City.

Under Section 2, Rule 44 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the counsel of the parties in the court oforigin shall be considered as their counsel in the CA.

Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if any party has appeared by counsel,

service upon him shall be made upon his counsel unless served upon the party himself is ordered by the

trial court. Notice or service made upon a party who is represented by counsel is a nullity. Notice to the

client and not to his counsel of record is not notice in law. The rule admits of exceptions, as when the

court or tribunal orders service upon a party or when the tribunal defendant is waived. In the absence of

a proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or resolution

of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on record. It is the duty of

the party and his counsel to device a system for the receipt of mail intended for them, just as it is the

duty of the counsel to inform the court officially of a change in his address. It is also the responsibility of

a party to inform the court of the change of his address so that in the event the court orders that an

order or resolution be served on the said party to enable him to receive the said resolution or order. In

the present case, the law firm of Remollo & Associates, the petitioners counsel of record, moved out

from their office at the Legaspi Suites to Dumaguete City without informing the court of such fact. Based

on its records, the CA believed that the law office of the petitioners counsel was still at the Legaspi

Suites and sent copies of its resolutions to the counsel of the petitioner at the said address.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

11/22

ESTELA ANASTACIO-BRIONES vs. ATTY. ALFREDO A. ZAPANTA

Facts:

Complainant averred that on October 25, 2002, she showed respondent a copy of "Discharge andAppearance of Counsels with Ex-parte Motion to Cancel the October 25, 2002 Hearing" she intended to

file that day. She claimed that even prior to the hearing, she informed respondent of her joint venture

agreement with a real estate developer who offered the services of its own counsel. Complainant added

that respondent requested her not to file it and he would submit a withdrawal of appearance instead.

Complainant also informed respondent that she could not attend the hearing on January 6, 2003

because of other commitments. Respondent allegedly assured her that he would be present in the

hearing. On January 6, 2003, both respondent and complainant failed to appear in the hearing. As a

result, the trial court declared them to have waived their right to present further witnesses and directed

them to file their formal offer of evidence within ten days from notice. The trial court noted that

respondent received its Order on January 24, 2003, but respondent did not act on it within the ten-day

period. Instead of filing a formal offer of evidence, respondent filed a withdrawal of appearance on

March 5, 2003. On March 10, 2003, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice. On May 5, 2003,

complainant learned that the cases were dismissed and that respondent did not attend the January 6,

2003 hearing and did not file a formal offer of evidence. Complainant prayed that respondent be

disbarred for abandoning her case and withdrawing his appearance as counsel without her knowledge.

In his Comment dated June 10, 2004, respondent countered that he was discharged as complainants

counsel after the October 25, 2002 hearing. Respondent added that he prepared a withdrawal of

appearance on October 30, 2002 but complainant ignored his several requests to sign it in his office.

Nevertheless, he claimed he filed a withdrawal of appearance on March 5, 2003 without complainants

conformity.

Issue: whether or not respondent liable for negligence in the performance of his duties as counsel

Held:

Atty. Alfredo Zapanta was suspended by the Supreme Court for three months for his failure to follow the

proper procedure for withdrawal in a case, which resulted in the dismissal of his clients case.

The Court held that until Zapantas dismissal or withdrawal was made ofrecord, any judicial notice

sent to him was binding upon his client even though as between them the professional relationship may

have been terminated. Thus, unless properly relieved, respondent is responsible for the conduct of the

cases and his failure to attend the hearing and comply with the trial courts directive to file a formal

offer of evidence constitute inexcusable negligence.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

12/22

VALERIANA DALISAY vs. ATTY. MAURICIO

FACTS:

This is the case against Batas Mauricio, the TV host.Allegedly, Mauricio demanded and receivedexorbitant attorneys fees but did not take any action on Valeriana Dalisays case. Initially, she paid P25T

as acceptance fee. In total, she paid Mauricio P56T: P8T filing fee (though the case was already filed) thebalance might be a combination of the ff:Additional acceptance fee P90,000.00, with the explanationthat he can give a discount should she pay in cash.P3, 000.00 as appearance fee notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legalservice. She terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money anddocuments. Mauricio refused. The IBP Board of Governors wanted to dismiss the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case against Mauricio should be dismissed.

HELD:

No. He should be suspended for 6 months. When respondent accepted P56, 000.00 from complainant,it was understood that he agreed to take up the latters case and that an attorney-client relationshipbetween them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant withcompetence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion. But there is nothing on record thatMauricio entered his appearance as counsel of record. He did not even follow-up the case whichremained pending up to the time she terminated his services. Regarding the P8T: (allegedly as docketfees for other cases): there was no evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed

any case considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case.when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his

rights. Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, heshould charge only a reasonable amount of fees.

WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 isimmediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidanthis compliance with our Decision.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

13/22

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO

FACTS:

On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint1was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco

against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecomingof an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of paymentrepresenting attorneys fees. According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent

sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters DevelopmentBank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed houseand lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No.T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possessionthen pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610. Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for theissuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreementwhich she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.Respondent denied the accusations

against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for legalservices for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC CaseNo. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating Canon 20 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility

HELD:

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted. Inaddition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant

to existing jurisprudence. Respondents admission that he divided the legal fees with two other peopleas a referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a feefor legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) monthseffective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 tocomplainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance within three (3)days therefrom.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/ac_6317_2006.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/ac_6317_2006.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/ac_6317_2006.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/ac_6317_2006.html#fnt1

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

14/22

SHIRLEY LORIA TOLEDO and ROSIE LORIA DAJAC vs. JUDGE ALFREDO E. KALLOS

FACTS:

For our resolution is the verified complaint, written in the vernacular and dated 21 August 2002, ofsiblings Shirley Loria Toledo and Rosie Loria Dajac against respondent Judge Alfredo E. Kallos, Presiding

Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Legazpi City, Branch 10, for violation of the Code of JudicialConduct, the Code of Professional Responsibility, and Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code. Prior to hisappointment as a judge in March 1995, Judge Kallos was complainants counsel of record in Civil Case

No. 4879 filed with the RTC of Legazpi City, Branch 4, involving the recovery of hereditary shares withdamages. On 25 March 1979, a judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to, among otherthings, turn over to herein complainants, the plaintiffs therein, the possession and ownership of thetotal area of 4,514 square meters of lot 2082 Albay Cadastre. On appeal, the decision was affirmed bythe Court of Appeals and became final and executory on 16 December 1985. Several years thereafter, orin February 2002, the respondent filed in the same action, Civil Case No. 4879, before the RTC ofLegazpi, Branch 4, an Omnibus Motion praying, inter alia, for the issuance an order constituting in hisfavor an attorneys lien to the extent of one-third over the lot awarded in favor of the complainants

representing his attorneys fee. He based his motion on a written contingency agreement on attorneysfees for professional services rendered whereby he is entitled to one-third share of what would beawarded to the complainants. He claimed that this agreement had already been implemented whenone of the three (3) lots levied upon by the sheriff to answer for the award of damages was given to(him) as his one-third share while the other two lots went to the plaintiffs as their two-third share *as+

evidenced by the Definite Deed of Sale and Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-77728, T-77458 and T-77459. However, he misplaced a copy of said written agreement. In the meantime, or on 5 September2002, the complainants filed before this Court, through the Office of the Court Administrator, thesubject verified complaint. Here, complainants pray for three things. First, they pray for an orderdirecting the respondent to stop demanding his 1/3 share attorneys fees. They assert that therespondent has no basis for his claim because he failed to show in court proof of the alleged written

contingency fee agreement. They also belie respondents insistence in his Omnibus Motion that the saidagreement had already been implemented when, on execution, one of three lots levied upon by thesheriff was given to him as his 1/3 share. They emphasize that all the lots levied by the sheriff weregiven to them. However, the respondent forced them to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale on 16 January1990 involving a parcel of land valued in the document at P10, 000, but actually worth more than P500,000, in payment of his attorneys fees. While they did not want to sign the document becauserespondent appeared in their case only during execution, they were constrained to do so for fear thatsomething adverse might happen to their case, as the respondent so warned them. The latter told them

that they would not have won the case were it not for his services.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code.

HELD:Foremost of these principles is that the act of demanding attorneys fees for services rendered isnot a ground for an administrative sanction. On the contrary, Canon 20 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility allows lawyers to charge fair and reasonable fees. As long as a lawyer honestly and ingood faith serves and represents the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable compensationfor his service. Lawyers are thus as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice on the part of

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

15/22

their clients as the clients are against abuses on the part of counsel. The duty of the court is not only tosee that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that lawyers are paid their just andlawful fees. Hence, with or without a contingency agreement between the complainants and therespondent, the trial court must determine the propriety of respondents claim for attorneys fees andthe reasonable amount thereof. No evidence was presented to prove respondents alleged abusive

conduct unbecoming a judge. The complainants do not dispute the fact that the respondent was not yeta judge when the assailed action or conduct was allegedly committed by him. As such, and to thatextent, there is no reason to bind him by the strict standards of the Code of Judicial Conduct for actscommitted as counsel to a case prior to his appointment as a judge.

WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED for being premature and for lack ofmerit.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

16/22

VALERIANA DALISAY vs. ATTY. MAURICIO

FACTS:

This is the case against Batas Mauricio, the TV host.Allegedly, Mauricio demanded and receivedexorbitant attorneys fees but did not take any action on Valeriana Dalisays case. Initially, she paid P25T

as acceptance fee. In total, she paid Mauricio P56T: P8T filing fee (though the case was already filed) thebalance might be a combination of the ff:Additional acceptance fee P90,000.00, with the explanationthat he can give a discount should she pay in cash.P3, 000.00 as appearance fee notwithstanding her payments, respondent never rendered any legalservice. She terminated their attorney-client relationship and demanded the return of her money anddocuments. Mauricio refused. The IBP Board of Governors wanted to dismiss the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the case against Mauricio should be dismissed.

HELD:

No. He should be suspended for 6 months. When respondent accepted P56, 000.00 from complainant,it was understood that he agreed to take up the latters case and that an attorney-client relationshipbetween them was established. From then on, it was expected of him to serve complainant withcompetence and attend to her case with fidelity, care and devotion. But there is nothing on record thatMauricio entered his appearance as counsel of record. He did not even follow-up the case whichremained pending up to the time she terminated his services. Regarding the P8T: (allegedly as docketfees for other cases): there was no evidence nor any pleadings submitted to show that respondent filed

any case considering that the filing fee had to be paid simultaneously with the filing of a case.when a lawyer takes a clients cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his

rights. Just like any other professional, a lawyer is entitled to collect fees for his services. However, heshould charge only a reasonable amount of fees.

WHEREFORE, we DENY respondents motion for reconsideration. Our Decision dated April 22, 2005 isimmediately executory. Respondent is directed to report immediately to the Office of the Bar Confidanthis compliance with our Decision.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

17/22

LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO

FACTS:

On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint1was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco

against respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecomingof an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of paymentrepresenting attorneys fees. According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent

sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her deposit with Planters DevelopmentBank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed houseand lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No.T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possessionthen pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610. Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial court in the hearing for theissuance of the Writ of Possession and did not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreementwhich she subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.Respondent denied the accusations

against him. He averred that the P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for legalservices for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did not include LRC CaseNo. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Bian, Laguna.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of violating Canon 20 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility

HELD:

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law for six months is warranted.In addition, he is directed to return to complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees

pursuant to existing jurisprudence. Respondents admission that he divided the legal fees with two otherpeople as a referral fee does not release him from liability. A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to dividea fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 ofthe Code of Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) monthseffective from notice, and STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.He is further ordered to RETURN, within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 tocomplainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this Court proof of his compliance within three (3)days therefrom.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/ac_6317_2006.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/ac_6317_2006.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/ac_6317_2006.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/aug2006/ac_6317_2006.html#fnt1

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

18/22

DOY MERCANTILE, INC., vs.

AMA COMPUTER COLLEGE and ERNESTO RIOVEROS

FACTS:

On June 1, 1990, petitioner Doy Mercantile, Inc. (DOY) through its then counsel, respondent Atty.

Eduardo P. Gabriel, Jr., filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City a Complaint forAnnulment of Contract, Damages with Preliminary Injunction against AMA Computer College, Inc. (AMA)and one Ernesto Rioveros. Petitioner alleged that it owns Lots 2-A and 2-B, and the improvementsthereon, located at No. 640 Osmea Boulevard, Cebu City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)Nos. 68951 and 68952. DOY assailed the Deed of Conditional Sale supposedly executed by one of DOYsdirectors, Dionisio O. Yap, in favor of AMA. Dionisio allegedly sold the properties to AMA without properauthorization from DOYs Board of Directors. DOY also questioned the Secretarys Certificate which was

executed by DOY Corporate Secretary Francisco P. Yap, authorizing Dionisio to sell the properties and tosign the contract in behalf of DOY. Through Atty. Gabriel, Jr., DOY filed an Urgent Ex Parte Motion forthe Issuance of a Restraining Order, which was granted by the RTC on June 14, 1990. On June 23, 1990,Atty. Gabriel also filed an Answer to Defendants Counterclaim. On July 2, 1990, he filed DOYs Formal

Rejoinder to AMAs Opposition for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He also filed on July 24,1990, an Omnibus Motion seeking (1) the reconsideration of the order denying DOYs application for awrit of preliminary injunction, (2) the setting of the case for pre-trial and trial on the merits, and (3) theimposition of disciplinary sanctions to Atty. Winston Garcia, who notarized the Deed of Conditional Saleand the Secretarys Certificate. On August 31, 1990, Atty. Gabriel also filed a Rejoinder to AMAs

Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, etc.During this period, that is, before pre-trial, DOY filed aPetition for Certiorari, Prohibition with a Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (CA-G.R. S.P. No.22727) with the Court of Appeals. It questioned the Order of the RTC dated July 5, 1990, denying DOYs

prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and dissolving the temporary restraining orderpreviously issued. DOY also assailed the Order dated August 10, 1990, which denied DOYs OmnibusMotion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reasonable attorneys fees cannot be justified based on quantum meruit.

HELD:

Petitioners contention that the appellate court should also have taken into account the importance of

the subject matter in controversy and the professional standing of counsel in determining the latters

fees is untenable. Although Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and Rule 20.01 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility list several other factors in setting such fees, these are mere guides in ascertaining thereal value of the lawyers service.8 Courts are not bound to consider all these factors in fixing attorneys

fees. While a lawyer should charge only fair and reasonable fees,9 no hard and fast rule maybe set in thedetermination of what a reasonable fee is, or what is not. That must be established from the facts ineach case.10 As the Court of Appeals is the final adjudicator of facts, this Court is bound by the formersfindings on the propriety of the amount of attorneys fees.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition and AFFIRM the Decision of the Court ofAppeals.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

19/22

VINSON B. PINEDA vs. ATTY. CLODUALDO C. DE JESUS, ATTY. CARLOS AMBROSIO and ATTY.

EMMANUEL MARIANO

FACTS:

On April 6, 1993, Aurora Pineda filed an action for declaration of nullity of marriage against petitioner

Vinson Pineda in the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 151, docketed as JDRC Case No. 2568. Petitioner wasrepresented by respondents Attys. Clodualdo de Jesus, Carlos Ambrosio and Emmanuel Mariano. Duringthe pendency of the case, Aurora proposed a settlement to petitioner regarding her visitation rightsover their minor child and the separation of their properties. The proposal was accepted by petitionerand both parties subsequently filed a motion for approval of their agreement. This was approved by thetrial court. On November 25, 1998, the marriage between petitioner and Aurora Pineda was declarednull and void. Throughout the proceedings, respondent counsels were well-compensated.They,including their relatives and friends, even availed of free products and treatments from petitioners

dermatology clinic. This notwithstanding, they billed petitioner additionallegal fees amounting to P16.5million which the latter, however, refused to pay. Instead, petitioner issued them several checks totalingP1.12 millionas "full payment for settlement."Still not satisfied, respondents filed in the same trial court

a motion for payment of lawyers fees for P50 million.On April 14, 2000, the trial court orderedpetitioner to pay P5 million to Atty. de Jesus, P2 million to Atty. Ambrosio and P2 million to Atty.Mariano. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reduced the amount as follows: P1 million to Atty. de Jesus,P500, 000 to Atty. Ambrosio and P500,000 to Atty. Mariano. The motion for reconsideration was denied.Hence, this recourse.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Pasig RTC, Branch 151 had jurisdiction over the claim for additional legalfees and (2) Whether or not respondents were entitled to additional legal fees.

HELD:

First, a lawyer may enforce his right to his fees by filing the necessary petition as an incident of the mainaction in which his services were rendered or in an independent suit against his client. The former is

preferable to avoid multiplicity of suits. The Pasig RTC, Branch 151, where the case for the declaration ofnullity of marriage was filed, had jurisdiction over the motion for the payment of legal fees.Respondents sought to collect P50 million which was equivalent to 10% of the value of the propertiesawarded to petitioner in that case. Clearly, what respondents were demanding was additional paymentfor legal services rendered in the same case.

Second, the professional engagement between petitioner and respondents was governed by theprinciple of quantum meruit which means "as much as the lawyer deserves." The recovery of attorneys

fees on this basis is permitted, as in this case, where there is no express agreement for the payment of

attorneys fees. Basically, it is a legal mechanism which prevents an unscrupulous client from runningaway with the fruits of the legal services of counsel without paying for it. In the same vein, it avoidsunjust enrichment on the part of the lawyer himself. Further, Rule 20.4 of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility advises lawyers to avoid controversies with clients concerning their compensation and toresort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud. Suits to collect fees should beavoided and should be filed only when circumstances force lawyers to resort to it. In the case at bar,respondents motion for payment of their lawyers fees was not meant to collect what was justly due

them; the fact was, they had already been adequately paid.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

20/22

ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO, SEVERINO P. MERCADO AND

SPOUSES JESUS AND ROSARIO MERCADO vs. ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA

FACTS:

It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon

those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for theconferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyerhas the privilege and right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it formisconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has beenafforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or right, an attorneys right to practice law

may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit tohold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood thatthe purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whosemisconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to anoffice of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of

justice, rather than to punish the attorney. In the present case, the respondent committed professional

malpractice and gross misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance ofthe IBP Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In the present case, however,we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent against his former client and others close toher was meant to overwhelm said client and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily afterhe was meted a penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. De Vera should be disbar for malpractice and misconduct

HELD:

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated his duties as an

officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice, but he did so against a former clientto whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters andinformation acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios counsel.

Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents, and otherpertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit ofhis malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client relationship with hereincomplainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of laweffective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

21/22

REBECCA J. PALM vs. ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR.

FACTS:

Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of computer softwaredevelopment. From February 2003 to November 2003, respondent served as Comtechs retained

corporate counsel for the amount of P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September to October2003, complainant personally met with respondent to review corporate matters, including potentialamendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on 1 October 2003, respondent suggested thatComtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow participation during board meetings, throughteleconference, of members of the Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines. Prior to thecompletion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant became uncomfortable with theclose relationship between respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director ofComtech, who resigned and who was suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporatefunds. Thus, Comtech decided to terminate its retainer agreement with respondent effective November2003. In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as proxy for Gary

Harrison (Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm, members of the Board of Directors,

were present through teleconference. When the meeting was called to order, respondent objected tothe meeting for lack of quorum. Respondent asserted that Steven and Deanna Palm could notparticipate in the meeting because the corporate by-laws had not yet been amended to allowteleconferencing.

On 24 March 2004, Comtechs new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to return or account for theamount of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized disbursements when she was the CorporateTreasurer of Comtech. On 22 April 2004, Comtech received Soledads reply, signed by respondent. InJuly 2004, due to Soledads failure to comply with Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a

complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutors Office. In the proceedings before

the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as Soledads counsel. Respondent alleged

that there was no conflict of interest when he represented Soledad in the case for Estafa filed byComtech. He alleged that Soledad was already a client before he became a consultant for Comtech. Healleged that the criminal case was not related to or connected with the limited procedural queries hehandled with Comtech.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Violate the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Relationship

HELD:

We agree with the IBP that in the course of complainants consultations, respondent obtained the

information about the need to amend the corporate by-laws to allow board members outside the

Philippines to participate in board meetings through teleconferencing. Respondent himself admittedthis in his Answer. It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumptionof confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential. Since the proposedamendments must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amendedby-laws must be filed with the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential.Thus, the disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting could not be considered aviolation of his clients secrets and confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the

8/2/2019 canon 18-21

22/22

clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for mattersthat arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of merit.