Canada Nuclear ProgramInstrumentation and Control2013

Sunil TikkuCandu Energy, Mississauga, Ontario

24th Meeting of TWG-NPPIC, IAEA, 22nd May 2013

Presentation Outline

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•Nuclear in Canada

•I&C – Key Priorities

•Recommendations for IAEA

Nuclear in Canada

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Source: Canadian Nuclear Factbook 2013

CANDU Reactors In Operation

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4

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Nuclear Power in Canada

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• Bruce – 6272 Mwe (8 units)

• Darlington – 3512 Mwe (4 units)

• Pickering – 3094 Mwe (6 units)

• Point Lepreau – 635 MWe (1 unit)

Source: Canadian Nuclear Factbook 2013

Nuclear Power in Canada – Key Players

•National Regulator – Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC)

•Power Utilities - Ontario Power Generation, Bruce Power, New Brunswick Power

•Organization of Candu Industries - Association of 170 Leading Nuclear Suppliers

•Candu Energy:• New Build Projects

• Life Extensions

• Services

•AECL Nuclear Laboratories:• Research and development

• Isotopes

• Waste management / Decommissioning

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New Build - Enhanced CANDU 6 (EC6)

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• 60 km from Toronto downtown

• Darlington A – Current Output 3512 Mwe

• Favorable Environment Assessment Decision in

2012

• CNSC have issued a 10 year license to prepare

site for new construction to OPG

• Ontario’s energy plans calls for new 2000 Mwe

production

New Build I&C Design Enhancements

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•Compliance with new and more stringent licensing requirements

•Standards based development framework

•Programmatic considerations such as Human Factors, Cyber-Security integrated into design process

• Improvements to enhance plant safety margins

•Changes to address Fukushima review

•Changes to address obsolescence

• Improvements to address customer feedback

• Improvements for higher plant performance, reduced capital costs and more economic life-cycle operation

EC6 Overall I&C Architecture

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• Safety Systems– Two fully capable, independent, diverse trip systems– Separate from Control Systems– Cooling and Containment independent from trip

• Safety Monitoring System– SPDS functions

• Distributed Control System– Essential Control Subsystem– Plant Control Subsystem

• Plant Display System

• MCR and SCR panels– Safety panels– Control panels

Multiple PDS

Workstations

&

Soft Panel Devices

Single PDS

Workstation

HW Panel Devices

&

SMS Displays

(G2 & Limited G1)

Main Control RoomSecondary Control Room

Safety Equipment (Sensors/Actuators) Process Equipment (Sensors/Actuators)

HW Panel Devices

&

SMS Displays

(G1 & G2)

PDS

Gateways

LEGEND

PDS LAN

Signal Wiring Class 1

SMS LAN

Electrical Isolation Devices

PCSSECSSSafety Systems

SMS Gateways

Multiple

PartitionsG1

G2

G1

G1

G2

G2

Class 2

Class 3

Safety System Computers

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Present C6 Design • Process trips for SDS1 and SDS2 implemented in diverse computer

systems• Emergency Core Cooling, Containment and SDS Neutronic trips are

hardwired

EC6 Design • Neutronics computerized

o FPGA being considered (for one trip system) for improved diversity and speed

• Computerized Emergency Core Cooling • Computerized Safety System Testing

Plant Control System

EC6 Design – Functionally Partitioned DCS – Separate control of heat sources from that of heat sinks – Assign heat sinks to different partitions – Digital Device Control to replace most analog Device controls – Minimum Inventory of Hardwired essential controls

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Present C6 Design– Dual redundant Digital Control Computers– Complemented by hardwired low level device control

Digital HSI Improvements

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•Safety Parameter Display SystemoCritical safety parameters and safety overview displays

• Intelligent Alarm Annunciation (Coalescing, Conditioning, Filtering and Prioritization)

•Computer Based ProceduresoSafety system TestingoOperating Procedures (GOPs, EOPs)oFuel handling Sequence Control

•ACCIS is an in house SCADA system :

– High Safety Pedigree

– QNX based, POSIX Compliant

– Supervisory Control, Monitoring and Annunciation

– Data Acquisition Interfaces

– Historical Data Management

– Computer-Based Procedures

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Digital HSI

Control Centre Mock Up

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•State of the art fully functional virtual control room –Graphic displays with soft

panel emulations–Equipped with plant

simulator

• Individual system usability testing / reviews demonstrate design correctness from an HF standpoint

•Lab for integration and proofs of concept for various technologies

Enhancements for Severe Accidents

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• SBO and Extended SBO Coverage strengthened

• Dedicated diesel generator / batteries and power distribution system to handle severe accident recovery and heat removal

• Monitoring to deal with SA to be available in both MCR and SCA

• Instrumentation enhanced to cover the measurement ranges expected for SA

• Instrumentation assessed for layout and power source considerations for post SA effectiveness

• Instrumentation designed and assessed for survivability under SA conditions

• Enhanced reliability and fault tolerance of data to Emergency Support Centres

Development of Engineering Simulator C6SIM

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• To provide accurate prediction of dynamic behaviour of the CANDU® 6 reactor

• To provide functional validation and optimization for control algorithms

C6SIM User Interface

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I&C Developments at AECL Nuclear Labs

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Cyber-security

• Unidirectional Gateway for interface to QNX based display system

• Remote data authentication (Biometrics)

o Uniquely identifies field instrumentation ‘signature’

Instrumentation and Control

• High speed, high accuracy, data acquisition system development (MODAR, Gamma Scanner(s))

Plant Display System

• IEC 61513 / 61508 compliant safety display system

• ACCIS – Tricon Interface (SVDU development)

I&C Developments at AECL Nuclear Labs

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• Handheld data acquisition and procedural compliance

• Radio-frequency identification (RFID) applications for field instruments (NRU Personal Digital Assistant)

• Plant chemistry monitoring, analysis, scheduling, field data entry and management (ChemAND LIMS)

• Life of plant data historian (LOPH – Qinshan, NRU)

• Biological modeling of radioactive uptake (GenMod)

• Fuel performance monitoring and analysis (FPMAT/IFS)

Wireless Sensors inside RB

I&C Developments at AECL Nuclear Labs

Nuclear Security

UNRESTRICTED – ILLIMITÉ

Counter Terrorism – Canadian Cargo Inspection System

Combat illicit trafficking of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) at Canada’s Point of Entry

Work supported by the Center for Security Science – CRTI and Public Safety Canada

Canadian muon tomography system demonstration Summer 2012

US Patent submitted

Significant investment by all partners – 6.8 Million CAD

Partners: Canadian Border Agency, DRDC, Health Canada, Carleton University, ISR Inc. and Advanced

Applied Physics Solutions.

I&C Developments at AECL Nuclear Labs

Recommendations

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• Harmonization of international standards for • Qualification of important to safety I&C equipment • Cyber security for real time systems• Emergency Response and Emergency Operations Support

• Instrumentation for Design Extension Conditions• High Temperature Operation• Hydrogen Monitoring• Survivability Assessments

• Basis for coverage of supplementary control area vis-à-vis main control area

• Reliability testing (Statistical) for safety systems

• Low level Design Guidance for Digital Communication• Unidirectional Links• Bidirectional safety communication for normal control

• Knowledge Sharing and Retention

Thank You

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