East Asia ForumEconomics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asiaand the Pacifichttp://www.eastasiaforum.org

Cambodia’s unsteady foreign policy balance

3rd July, 2015

Author: Leng Thearith, UNSW Canberra

Since the fiasco of the 2012 ASEAN Summit, Cambodia has more or less been viewed as aChinese client state. But this is not wholly true. In fact, Phnom Penh has attempted to strike aforeign policy balance between China on the one hand and ASEAN, Japan, and the UnitedStates on the other.

At a regional level, the Cambodian government has attempted to pacify Vietnam, which wasupset by its continued refusal to criticise China’s growing assertiveness in the South ChinaSea. This approach was evident in Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen’s 2013 visit to Vietnam,when he reiterated the Vietnamese contribution to the 1979 liberation of Cambodia fromgenocide in front of several Vietnamese senior officials and former veterans.

More importantly, he made his remarks in Vietnamese rather than English, in order to build apersonal rapport with the Vietnamese. This is evidence of his attempt to treat Hanoi as a closefriend despite the obvious tension, since speaking in Vietnamese wins Hun Sen no favoursdomestically. Instead, it may strengthen a perception of subordination to the Vietnamese thatcould further weaken the popularity of his party, which suffered a significant decline in support inthe 2013 national election. Many Cambodians harbour strong anti-Vietnamese sentiment andfear further loss of territory to their eastern neighbour, as was the case in the country’spre-colonial history.

More evidence of Phnom Penh’s intention to develop good ties with Hanoi can be witnessed inthe former’s handling of the disputed history of Cochinchina/Kampuchea Krom, whichconstitutes a major part of today’s southern Vietnam. In 2014 a Vietnamese diplomat stated thatthe area had historically belonged to Vietnam long before the French officially ceded it to

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East Asia ForumEconomics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asiaand the Pacifichttp://www.eastasiaforum.org

Vietnam in 1949, a statement that outraged Cambodians and triggered a series ofanti-Vietnamese demonstrations.

From the Cambodian perspective, the statement was tantamount to an act of historicalfabrication regarding the Khmer Kingdom’s Cochinchina, which was steadily absorbed andassimilated by Vietnam’s Nguyen dynasty in the 1620s. Phnom Penh has not taken anydiplomatic action requiring Hanoi to clarify this contentious historical interpretation, insteadarresting 11 anti-Vietnamese demonstrators in November 2014 in an indication of its intent toprevent a possible diplomatic row with Hanoi.

At a global level, Hun Sen has also attempted to draw closer to China’s regional rivals, Japanand the United States. Following the upgrade of Cambodia–China relations to that of aComprehensive Strategic Partnership in December 2010 — the highest level of cooperation theHun Sen government has ever concluded with a foreign government — Phnom Penh alsoelevated its ties with Tokyo into a ‘strategic partnership’ in December 2013. Further, bothCambodia and Japan have stressed the need for freedom of air navigation in the region,irritating China to an extent.

More recently, in order to encourage Japanese engagement in Cambodia, Hun Sen ordered theprinting of a new Cambodian currency note featuring the image of Cambodia’s Tsubasa bridge,which was built by Japanese aid and given a Japanese name. This gesture demonstrates thatPhnom Penh’s long-term vision is to engage Tokyo in order to balance its relations with Beijing.

In relation to the United States, Cambodia has become one of the Southeast Asian countriesmost staunchly in support of combating the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. In September2014, Hun Sen expressed his firm commitment to preventing the harbouring of IS in Cambodia,dismantling IS’s financial activities, and sharing information useful for the United States infighting the group.

Phnom Penh’s quest for closer ties with Washington is also evidenced by Hun Sen’s strongdesire to be a part of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), designed by Washington to counterBeijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific. During the World Economic Forum on East Asia in April2015, Hun Sen’s interest in joining the TPP was expressed in his speech as he questioned whythe TPP did not include all ASEAN members.

Cambodia’s strategic balancing may at times be precarious, as Cambodia may occasionally optto side with China, particularly when its larger neighbours — Vietnam and Thailand — present acredible threat to its state security. But this balancing act may be undermined more generally ifASEAN, Japan, and the United States fail to offset the rising economic influence [1] of China inCambodia [2], or alternatively if Hun Sen cannot withstand US pressure regarding his handling ofhuman rights and democratic governance problems [3] at home.

Leng Thearith is a PhD Candidate in Political and International Studies at the University of NewSouth Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra.

Article from the East Asia Forum: http://www.eastasiaforum.org

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East Asia ForumEconomics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asiaand the Pacifichttp://www.eastasiaforum.org

URL to article: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/?p=46735

[1] fail to offset the rising economic influence: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/04/03/dont-blame-cambodia-for-asean-inaction-on-south-china-sea/

[2] China in Cambodia: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/07/16/chinese-investment-and-aid-in-cambodia-a-controversial-affair/

[3] democratic governance problems: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2015/03/18/after-thirty-years-of-hun-sen-where-is-cambodia-now/

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