callaway energy center job performance measure · 2015. 2. 13. · callaway energy center job...

CALLAWAY ENERGY CENTER JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

of 5 09/14/2014 9:01 AM

A1 JPM Bank No: Set 2 G2 A.2 KSA No: 2.1.25 Revision Date: 08/07/2014 KSA Rating: 3.9 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: ADMINISTRATIVE Task Title: Determine Time to Boil for a Loss

of Shutdown Cooling

Completion Time: 15 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☒ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: OTO-EJ-00003, Loss of RHR While Operating at Reduced Inventory or

Mid-Loop Conditions, Rev. 009 OOA-BB-00003, Refuel Level Indications Tools / Equipment: None


of 5 09/14/2014 9:01 AM

Initial Conditions: The Plant is in a refueling outage. The core was completely offloaded. Fuel reload with a blend of new and reused assemblies is complete. An FME concern was identified during refueling.

• The Plant has now been shutdown for 15 days

• The present RCS temperature is 180 degrees F

• The RCS has been drained down to 62.5 inches indicated on BBLI53A and BBLI53B

• The Plant Computer is unavailable

Initiating Cues: The Shift Manager has requested you to determine the time to boil given OTO-EJ-00003, Loss of RHR while Operating at Reduced Inventory or Mid-Loop Conditions, and the following:

1. Using present plant conditions.

2. Three (3) days from now based on the following conditions:

• RCS level will be reduced to 14.5 inches on BBLI53A and BBLI53B

• RCS temperature will be lowered to 140 degrees F Task Standard: Condition 1, Time to Boil is determined to be 16 minutes (accept 15 to 17

minutes) Condition 2, Time to Boil is determined to be 34 minutes (accept 33 to 35 minutes)

Start Time:

Stop Time:


of 5 *Critical Step

JPM STEP

TASK ELEMENT EXAMINER CUE PERFORMANCE STANDARD

SCORE

1. Obtain a copy of drawing OOA-BB-00003, Refuel Level Indications, and a copy of OTO-EJ-00003, Loss of RHR while Operating at Reduced Inventory or Mid-Loop

Provide operator with procedure OTO-EJ-00003

Candidate obtained correct procedure.

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Comments:

2. Determine using OOA-BB-00003 that Condition 1 is REDUCED INVENTORY

Operator determined condition 1 is Reduced Inventory due to being less than 64”

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Comments:

3. Determine using OOA-BB-00003 that Condition 2 is MID-LOOP

Operator determined condition 2 is Mid–Loop due to being at 14.5”

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Comments:

4. Determine using OTO-EJ-00003, Step 4, that Figure 4 is used for condition 1

Operator determined: Figure 4 is used for condition 1, Reduced Inventory (Cold Core)

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Comments:

5. Determine using OTO-EJ-00003, Step 4, that Figure 3 is used for condition 2

Operator determined: Figure 3 is used for condition 2, Mid-Loop (Cold Core)

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Comments:

*6. Determine time to boil for condition 1 is 16 minutes

Operator determines using Figure 4 time to boil for condition 1 is 15 – 17 minutes

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Comments:


of 5 *Critical Step

*7. Determine time to boil for condition 2 is 34 minutes.

Operator determines using Figure 3 time to boil for condition 2 is 33 to 35 minutes

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Comments:

8. JPM IS COMPLETE Record Stop time on page 2.


Initial Conditions: The Plant is in a refueling outage. The core was completely offloaded. Fuel reload with a blend of new and reused assemblies is complete. An FME concern was identified during refueling.

• The Plant has now been shutdown for 15 days

• The present RCS temperature is 180 degrees F

• The RCS has been drained down to 62.5 inches indicated on BBLI53A and BBLI53B

• The Plant Computer is unavailable

Initiating Cues: The Shift Manager has requested you to determine the time to boil given OTO-EJ-00003, Loss of RHR while Operating at Reduced Inventory or Mid-Loop Conditions, and the following:

1. Using present plant conditions.

2. Three (3) days from now based on the following conditions:

• RCS level will be reduced to 14.5 inches on BBLI53A and BBLI53B

• RCS temperature will be lowered to 140 degrees F


Page 1 of 6 09/14/2014 9:10 AM

A2 JPM Bank No: URO-SBB-07-A014J KSA No: 2.1.18 Revision Date: 08/13/2014 KSA Rating: 3.6 Job Title: URO Duty: ADMINISTRATIVE Task Title: Complete RCS Inventory Balance Completion Time: 20 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☒ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: OSP-BB-00009 ADD 1, RCS Inventory Balance Excessive Leakage or

Manual Calculation, REV. 03 Handouts Marked up copy of OSP-BB-00009 ADD 1, RCS Inventory Balance

Excessive Leakage or Manual Calculation, REV. 03 Tools / Equipment: Calculator


Page 2 of 6 09/14/2014 9:10 AM

Initial Conditions: Callaway Plant has been operating at 100% steady state for the last 100 days.

• The Water Inventory Balance program on the PPC is not working

• A manual calculation using OSP-BB-00009 ADD 1, RCS Inventory Balance Excessive Leakage or Manual Calculation is required

• All information has been recorded on Attachments 1 and 3

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor has directed you to determine the RCS leakage using OSP-BB-00009 ADD 1, RCS Inventory Balance Excessive Leakage or Manual Calculation.

• The procedure has been completed up to Step 6.1.7.b

• Complete the calculation and inform the CRS when you are complete with the calculation.

Task Standard: Upon completion of the task the Candidate will have identified Total RCS

leakage is approximately 0.6809 gpm, Identified RCS Leakage is approximately 0.0764 gpm, and Unidentified RCS Leakage is approximately 0.6045 gpm.

Start Time:

Stop Time:


Page 3 of 6 *Critical Step

JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Review the procedure

Provide operator with Marked up copy of OSP-BB-00009 ADD 1, RCS Inventory Balance Excessive Leakage or Manual Calculation

Candidate reviewed procedure.

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Comments:

2. Candidate fills in “Performer, Initial/PIN. and Time/Date blocks on Attachment 6.

Candidate properly filled in “Performer, Initial/PIN. and Time/Date blocks on Attachment 6.

(SEE KEY)

3. Determine change in mass of water in the RCDT.

Att 6, STEP 1.b

Candidate determined there has been no change in mass of water in the RCDT.

(SEE KEY)

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Comments:

*4. Determine the change in mass if water contained in the VCT.

Att 6, STEP 2.a and b

Candidate filled in data on Attachment 6 from Attachment 3 and determined Li = 51% AND Lf= 43% and performed calculation in step 2.b and determined change in mass if water contained in the VCT to be 1361.0318 lbm.

(range of 1367.8370 to 1354.2266 lbm) (plus or minus 0.5%)

(SEE KEY)

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Comments:

5. Determine change in mass of water in the PZR.

Att 6, STEP 3.b

Candidate determined there has been no change in mass of water in the PZR.

(SEE KEY)

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Comments:



6. Determine change in mass of water in the PRT.

Att 6, STEP 4.b

Candidate determined there has been no change in mass of water in the PRT.

(SEE KEY)

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Comments:

7. Determine change in mass of water in the RCS LOOPS.

Att 6, STEP 5.b

Candidate determined there has been no change in mass of water in the RCS LOOPS.

(SEE KEY)

*8. Summarize RCS Leakages:

Att 6, STEP 6.a

Candidate transferred data from previous steps and calculated Total RCS Leakage as follows:

Δ M(VCT) = 1361.0318 lbm

Δ M(PZR) = 0 lbm

Δ M(RCS) = 0 lbm

0.6809 gpm Toal RCS Leakage

(range 0.6843 to 0.6775 gpm) (plus or minus 0.5%)

(SEE KEY)

*9. Determine Identified RCS Leakage.

Att 6, STEP 6.b

Candidate determined RCS Identified Leakage is 0.0764.

This information is obtained from Att 1

(SEE KEY)

*10. Determine Unidentified RCS Leakage.

Att, STEP 6.c

Candidate determined Unidentified Leakage is 0.6045 gpm.

(range 0.6075 to 0.6015 gpm) (plus or minus 0.5%)

(SEE KEY)



11. Candidate notifies CRS that they have completed the calculations.

Candidate notified CRS that they have completed the calculations.

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Comments:

12. THIS ADMIN JPM IS COMPLETE

Record Stop time on page 2.


Initial Conditions: Callaway Plant has been operating at 100% steady state for the last 100 days.

• The Water Inventory Balance program on the PPC is not working

• A manual calculation using OSP-BB-00009 ADD 1, RCS Inventory Balance Excessive Leakage or Manual Calculation is required

• All information has been recorded on Attachments 1 and 3

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor has directed you to determine the RCS leakage using OSP-BB-00009 ADD 1, RCS Inventory Balance Excessive Leakage or Manual Calculation.

• The procedure has been completed up to Step 6.1.7.b

• Complete the calculation and inform the CRS when you are complete with the calculation.

KEY

Attachment 4 Train B Containment Spray Pump Comprehensive Test Data Sheet

Sheet 1 of 1

Person (s) Performing (print) Initial/ PIN Date Started: TODAY

Date Completed: TODAY

Step 6.1.18 PEN01B start time: TODAY Step 6.1.20 SGL13B, AUX BLD CSP B RM CLR, started as required? (circle one) YES / NO

Step Parameter Actual Value Normal Range Alert

Range

Required Action Range Baseline

Low High

6.1.24.e.2 ENFO00001 Press at ENV0108 (psig) 236.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A 200

6.1.24.e.3 ENFO00001 Press at BNV0027 (psig) 38.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 37.5

6.1.24.e.4 Differential Pressure across ENFO0001 (psid) 197.9 N/A N/A N/A 162.5

6.1.23.e.5

Recirc Line Inches Of Water Column Differential at ENFE0030 (INWC)

549.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A 550

6.1.24.e6 ENFO0001 Flow (gpm) 307.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 278.4

6.1.24.e.7 Recirc Line Flow at ENFE0030 (gpm) 2854.3 N/A N/A N/A N/A 2854.8

6.1.24.e.8 Total Pump Flow (gpm) 3161.5 3130 to 3190 N/A N/A N/A 3133.2

6.1.24.e.9 Disch Press Test Gauge at ENV0034 (psig) 237.2 N/A N/A N/A N/A 238

6.1.24.e.10 Suct Press Test Gauge at ENV0033 (psig) 33.6 N/A N/A N/A N/A 31

6.1.24.e.11 Pump Differential Pressure (psid) 203.6 192.5 to 213.2 186.3 to

< 192.5 < 186.3 > 213.2 207

Flow gpm = (21.84) (Differential Press across ENFO0001 psid)

Flow gpm = (121.73) (h INWC)

Step 7.7.2 Calculated Pump Spin-up Time: N/A (≤ 5 sec)

M & TE Data: ID Numbers GA2013 GAP2041OP Cal Due Dates: 3-15-15 4-5-15

Comments: _____________________________________________________________________________


Page 1 of 5 09/14/2014 9:15 AM

A3 JPM Bank No: A3 Rev 1 KSA No: 2.2.12 Revision Date: 07/31/2014 KSA Rating: 3.7/4.1 Job Title: URO Duty: ADMINISTRATIVE Task Title: Review Pump Run Data and

Determine if Acceptance Criteria are Met

Completion Time: 15 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☒ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: OSP-EN-P001B, TRAIN B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP INSERVICE

TEST, REVISION 44 Student Handouts Copy of OSP-EN-P001B, Attachment 4 filled in with field data. Tools / Equipment: Calculator


Page 2 of 5 09/14/2014 9:15 AM

Initial Conditions: The comprehensive pump test is being performed for PEN01B, Containment Spray Pump B, in accordance with OSP-EN-P001B, TRAIN B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP INSERVICE TEST.

Field data for the surveillance has been recorded on Attachment 4, TRAIN B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP COMPREHENSIVE TEST DATA SHEET.

Group B pump testing is not being performed for this surveillance.

Initiating Cues: You are an extra RO on shift. The Shift Manager (SM) has given you Attachment 4 to complete the calculations and determine if the Acceptance Criteria has been satisfied in accordance with OSP-EN-P001B.

Give your results to the SM when complete.

Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the Applicant will have calculated pump flow

and D/P, completed Attachment 4 of OSP-EN-P001B, TRAIN B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP INSERVICE TEST, and determined that the acceptance criteria is met for the ‘B’ Containment Spray Pump.

Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

1. OBTAIN A VERIFIED WORKING COPY OF OSP-EN-P001B, TRAIN B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP INSERVICE TEST

Provide the candidate with a copy of ATTACHMENT 4 FILLED IN WITH FIELD DATA

OPERATOR OBTAINED PROCEDURE COPY

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Comments:

*2 CALCULATE ENFO0001 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE AND RECORD ON ATTACHMENT4

STEP 6.1.24.e.4

OPERATOR CALCULATES ENFO0001 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE AND RECORDS ON ATTACHMENT 4

DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE CALCULATED TO BE 197.9 PSID

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Comments:

*3. USING EQUATION ON ATTACHMENT 4, CONVERT ENFE0030 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INTO GPM FLOW AND RECORD ON ATTACHMENT 4

Step 6.1.24.e.6

OPERATOR CONVERTS ENFE0030 DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE INTO GPM FLOW AND RECORDS ON ATTACHMENT 4

ENFO0030 FLOW CALCULATED TO BE 307.2 GPM

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Comments:

*4. USING EQUATION ON ATTACHMENT 4, CONVERT ENFE0030 INCHES OF WATER COLUMN DIFFERENTIAL (H) INTO GPM FLOW AND RECORD ON ATTACHMENT 4

Step 6.1.24.e.7

OPERATOR CONVERTS ENFE0030 INCHES OF WATER COLUMN DIFFERENTIAL (H) INTO GPM FLOW AND RECORDS ON ATTACHMENT 4

ENFE0030 FLOW CALCULATED TO BE 2854.3 GPM

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Comments:

*5. CALCULATE PUMP TOTAL FLOW BY ADDING RECIRC LINE FLOW AND ENFO0001 FLOW AND RECORD ON ATTACHMENT 4

Step 6.1.24.e.8

OPERATOR CALCULATES PUMP TOTAL FLOW BY ADDING RECIRC LINE FLOW AND ENFO0001 FLOW AND RECORDS ON ATTACHMENT 4

PUMP TOTAL FLOW CALCULATED TO BE 3161.5 GPM

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Comments:



*6. CALCULATE PUMP DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE AND RECORD ON ATTACHMENT 4

Step 6.1.24.e.11

OPERATOR CALCULATES PUMP DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE AND RECORDS ON ATTACHMENT 4

PUMP DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE CALCULATED TO BE 203.6 PSID

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Comments:

*7. DETERMINE IF SURVEILLANCE RESULTS FROM ATTACHMENT 4 MEET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA

OPERATOR DETERMINES THAT ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA IS MET

Step 3.1: GROUP B PUMP TESTING NOT APPLICABLE FOR THIS SURVEILLANCE (GIVEN IN INITIAL CONDITIONS)

Step 3.2: ROOM COOLER AUTOMATICALLY STARTED WHEN PUMP WAS STARTED

Step 3.3: PUMP TEST DATA IS NOT WITHIN THE REQUIRED ACTION RANGE

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Comments:

8. JPM COMPLETE Record Stop time on page 2.

RECORD STOP TIME ON PAGE 2


Initial Conditions: The comprehensive pump test is being performed for PEN01B, Containment Spray Pump B, in accordance with OSP-EN-P001B, TRAIN B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP INSERVICE TEST.

Field data for the surveillance has been recorded on Attachment 4, TRAIN B CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP COMPREHENSIVE TEST DATA SHEET.

Group B pump testing is not being performed for this surveillance.

Initiating Cues: You are an extra RO on shift. The Shift Manager (SM) has given you Attachment 4 to complete the calculations and determine if the Acceptance Criteria has been satisfied in accordance with OSP-EN-P001B.

Give your results to the SM when complete.


Page 1 of 4 09/14/2014 9:42 AM

A4 JPM Bank No: Set 1 G1 A.3 KSA No: 2.3.14 Revision Date: 07/16/2014 KSA Rating: 3.4 / 3.8 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: ADMINISTRATIVE Task Title: Determine if Respirator Needs to

be Worn

Completion Time: 10 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☒ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: APA-ZZ-01000 “CALLAWAY ENERGY CENTER RADIATION

PROTECTION PROGRAM” Tools / Equipment: Calculator


Page 2 of 4 09/14/2014 9:42 AM

Initial Conditions: Callaway Plant is replacing Spent Fuel Pool Racks. The old racks must be cleaned prior to shipping.

Dose rate at the Spent Fuel Pool rack is 75 mrem/hr.

The old rack is drying out creating an Airborne Radioactivity Area.

Internal dose if respirator is worn is 0 mrem.

Internal dose if no respirator is worn is 42 mrem.

Time to complete job while wearing a respirator is 3.5 hours.

Time to complete job without wearing a respirator is 3 hours.

Initiating Cues: Determine if personnel working on the Spent Fuel Pool rack should wear a respirator.

Task Standard: Candidate calculates dose with and without a respirator and selects

performing the job with a respirator. Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

*1. Candidate calculates dose without a respirator.

Calculates dose without respirator as follows: Dose = (75 mrem/hr x 3 hours) + 42 mrem = 267 mrem

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Comments:

*2. Candidate calculates dose with a respirator.

Calculates dose without respirator as follows: Dose = 75 mrem/hr x 3.5 hours = 262.5 mrem

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Comments:

*3. Candidates selects to have the job completed with a respirator.

Job should be done with a respirator

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Comments

4. JPM IS COMPLETE RECORD STOP TIME ON PAGE 1.

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Comments


Page 1 of 4 09/14/2014 9:51 AM

A5 JPM Bank No: NEW KSA No: 2.1.18 Revision Date: 07/16/2014 KSA Rating: 3.8 Job Title: SRO Duty: ADMINISTRATIVE Task Title: Determine Reportability for a

Required Shutdown

Completion Time: 15 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☒ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: APA-ZZ-00520, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND

RESPONSIBILITIES, REVISION 43 Tools / Equipment: None


Page 2 of 4 09/14/2014 9:51 AM

Initial Conditions: You are an extra SRO on shift

An event has occurred, resulting in the following conditions:

The plant is at near rated power.

The 72 hour Tech Spec time clock has just expired for NE02 being inoperable.

A shutdown has been started, since it is required to be in MODE 3 in the next 6 hours.

Initiating Cues: You are an extra SRO on shift performing Control Room observations. The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the initial reportability requirements for this event per APA-ZZ-00520, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

Inform the Shift Manager of the shortest time requirement and the agency requiring notification

Task Standard: The operator will have determined that a 4 hour report is required to be

made to the NRC Operation Center. Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Obtain a verified working copy of APA-ZZ-00520, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Provide the candidate with a copy of APA-ZZ-00520, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

Candidate obtained correct procedure.

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Comments:

*2 Determines a 4 hour report is required

Attachment 1, Step 5.b

Determined a 4 hour report is needed

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Comments:

*3 Determines the NRC Operations Center is the agency required to be notified.

Attachment 1, Step 5.b.1)

Determined the NRC Operations Center is the agency required to be notified.

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Comments:



Initial Conditions: You are an extra SRO on shift

An event has occurred, resulting in the following conditions:

The plant is at near rated power.

The 72 hour Tech Spec time clock has just expired for NE02 being inoperable.

A shutdown has been started, since it is required to be in MODE 3 in the next 6 hours.

Initiating Cues: You are an extra SRO on shift performing Control Room observations. The Shift Manager has directed you to determine the initial reportability requirements for this event per APA-ZZ-00520, REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES.

Inform the Shift Manager of the shortest time requirement and the agency requiring notification


Page 1 of 4 09/14/2014 10:20 AM

A6 JPM Bank No: RSA-1 rev1 KSA No: 2.1.37 Revision Date: 07/31/2014 KSA Rating: 4.6 Job Title: SRO Duty: ADMINISTRATIVE Task Title: Review ECP Calculation Completion Time: 20 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☒ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: OSP-SF-00005 “Estimated Critical Position Calculation” Plant Curve Book Student Handouts OSP-SF-00005 “Estimated Critical Position Calculation” Curve Book Table 1-8 WINPCNDR Handouts Tools / Equipment: Calculator


Page 2 of 4 09/14/2014 10:20 AM

Initial Conditions: The plant was shutdown for R19 on 4/8/13 at 0322.

The refueling outage is complete.

The Start-up is scheduled for 5/26/13 at 1200.

Reactor Engineering department has reported that the ECP program is not available and that the ECP will be calculated using Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005.

The Reactor Engineers have determined that the amount of negative reactivity to be:

-242.2 pcm for Step 6.9.3.

It is desired to calculate boron concentration for the ECP.

DATA from various computer programs

XEPRED EFPD 0 PCNDR, section 7 BOL critical boron concentration

to control at HZP, ARO, (k=1.0) 1421 ppm

Anticipated RCS Tavg at startup

557°F

Initiating Cues: The Shift Manager has directed you to review and approve the completed Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005 “Estimated Critical Position Calculation” using the printouts and information provided by the Reactor engineer. Inform the Shift Manager of any issues with the calculation.

Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the Applicant will have identified the errors

in Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005 “Estimated Critical Position Calculation”.

Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Provide the candidate with a copy of OSP-SF-00005 “Estimated Critical Position Calculation” and the print outs from WinPCNDR

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Comments:

*2 Candidate reviews Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005 “Estimated Critical Position Calculation”

Wrong temperature in step 6.8.1

Applicant identified the error and informs the Shift Manager. See KEY for correct data.

Critical steps of the Attachment are marked on the KEY.

Error 1 wrong temperature reactivity in step 6.8.4

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Comments:

*3. Candidate reviews Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005 “Estimated Critical Position Calculation”

Wrong differential boron worth in step 6.12.2



Error 2 wrong required critical boron concentration in step 6.12.4

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Comments:

*4. Candidate reviews Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005 “Estimated Critical Position Calculation”

Wrong Max rod height in step 6.14.4



Error 3 wrong Max rod height in step 6.14.4

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Comments:



Initial Conditions: The plant was shutdown for R19 on 4/8/13 at 0322.

The refueling outage is complete.

The Start-up is scheduled for 5/26/13 at 1200.

Reactor Engineering department has reported that the ECP program is not available and that the ECP will be calculated using Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005.

The Reactor Engineers have determined that the amount of negative reactivity to be:

-242.2 pcm for Step 6.9.3.

It is desired to calculate boron concentration for the ECP.

DATA from various computer programs

XEPRED EFPD 0 PCNDR, section 7 BOL critical boron concentration

to control at HZP, ARO, (k=1.0) 1421 ppm

Anticipated RCS Tavg at startup

557°F

Initiating Cues: The Shift Manager has directed you to review and approve the completed Attachment 1 of OSP-SF-00005 “Estimated Critical Position Calculation” using the printouts and information provided by the Reactor engineer. Inform the Shift Manager of any issues with the calculation.


Page 1 of 4 09/14/2014 10:40 AM

A7 JPM Bank No: ILE-A034-SRO KSA No: 2.2.40 Revision Date: 08/07/2014 KSA Rating: 4.7 Job Title: SRO Duty: EQUIPMENT CONTROL Task Title: Determine Applicable Technical

Specifications

Completion Time: 15 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☒ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: Technical Specifications and Bases M-22KA05 drawing Student Handouts Tools / Equipment:


Page 2 of 4 09/14/2014 10:40 AM

Initial Conditions: With the Callaway Plant at 100% power, tagging is being written to replace the relief valve upstream of KAV0662, SG A AFW CTRL/MS ATMS RELV VLVS KAPCV0200 DNSTRM ISO. As part of the tagging, KAV0662 will be closed with a Hold Off.

Initiating Cues: Determine the impact (if any) of hanging this tagging on plant safety systems.

Identify all applicable Technical Specification Condition entries that will apply.

Task Standard: Upon completion of the JPM the candidate should determine that the

tagging will remove the safety related nitrogen to TDAFP flow control valve ALHV0008 and to Atmospheric Steam Dump ABPV0001. The applicable T/S are 3.7.4.A and 3.7.5.C.

Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Candidate reviews M-22KA05 to determine impact of closing KAV0662, SG A AFW CTRL/MS ATMS RELV VLVS KAPCV0200 DNSTRM ISO.

Candidate reviews print.

Candidate determines that closing this valve will isolate nitrogen to the TDAFP control valve and the Atmospheric Steam Dump.

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Comments:

2 Candidate reviews Technical Specifications and Bases to determine impact of isolating nitrogen to the associated TDAFP flow control valve.

Candidate determines that closing KAV0662, SG A AFW CTRL/MS ATMS RELV VLVS KAPCV0200 DNSTRM ISO makes ALHV008, TDAFP TO S/G A HV, inoperable.

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Comments:

3. Candidate reviews Technical Specifications and Bases to determine impact of isolating nitrogen to the associated Atmospheric Steam Dump.

Candidate determines that closing KAV0662, SG A AFW CTRL/MS ATMS RELV VLVS KAPCV0200 DNSTRM ISO makes ABPV0001, Atmospheric Steam Dump, inoperable.

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Comments:

*4. Candidate Identifies the applicable Technical Specifications

Candidate determines the applicable T/S condition is 3.7.4.A for the Atmospheric Steam dump Valve.

S U

Comments:

*5 Candidate Identifies the applicable Technical Specifications

Candidate determines the applicable T/S condition is 3.7.5.C for the Auxiliary Feedwater System.

S U

Comments:

6. JPM COMPLETE Record Stop time on page 2.



Initial Conditions: With the Callaway Plant at 100% power, tagging is being written to replace the relief valve upstream of KAV0662, SG A AFW CTRL/MS ATMS RELV VLVS KAPCV0200 DNSTRM ISO. As part of the tagging, KAV0662 will be closed with a Hold Off.

Initiating Cues: Determine the impact (if any) of hanging this tagging on plant safety systems.

Identify all applicable Technical Specification Condition entries that will apply.


Page 1 of 4 09/14/2014 9:42 AM

A4 [A8] JPM Bank No: Set 1 G1 A.3 KSA No: 2.3.14 Revision Date: 07/16/2014 KSA Rating: 3.4 / 3.8 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: ADMINISTRATIVE Task Title: Determine if Respirator Needs to

be Worn

Completion Time: 10 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☒ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: APA-ZZ-01000 “CALLAWAY ENERGY CENTER RADIATION

PROTECTION PROGRAM” Tools / Equipment: Calculator


Page 2 of 4 09/14/2014 9:42 AM









Task Standard: Candidate calculates dose with and without a respirator and selects

performing the job with a respirator. Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

*1. Candidate calculates dose without a respirator.

Calculates dose without respirator as follows: Dose = (75 mrem/hr x 3 hours) + 42 mrem = 267 mrem

S U

Comments:

*2. Candidate calculates dose with a respirator.

Calculates dose without respirator as follows: Dose = 75 mrem/hr x 3.5 hours = 262.5 mrem

S U

Comments:

*3. Candidates selects to have the job completed with a respirator.

Job should be done with a respirator

S U

Comments


S U

Comments


Page 1 of 5 09/14/2014 11:06 AM

A9 JPM Bank No: SRO-RER-02-A104J(TC) KSA No: 2.4.43 Revision Date: 07/18/2014 KSA Rating: 3.8 Job Title: SRO Duty: ADMINISTRATIVE Task Title: MAKE APPROPRIATE OFFSITE

NOTIFICATIONS DURING AN ALERT

Completion Time: 15 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☒ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☒ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: EIP-ZZ-00102, Emergency Implementing Actions EIP-ZZ-00212, Protective Action Recommendations Tools / Equipment: Copy of Procedures and Form CA2843 SENTRY Computer with printer


Page 2 of 5 09/14/2014 11:06 AM

This JPM is TIME CRITICAL from the moment you acknowledge understanding of the Initiating Conditions and Initiating Cues.

Initial Conditions: Callaway is operating at 100% power when the following happens:

• 0800 - A sudden tornado strikes the switch yard causing a loss of all offsite power and a reactor trip

• MET tower data showed winds in excess of 100 mph

• 0803 - The RO notices that ALL the level instruments for the RWST read 0

Initiating Cues: You have been provided the combined EAL attachments and directed to determine the Emergency Event Classification and complete the Sentry Notification form and perform the notification of off-site agencies within the allotted amount of time.

This JPM is TIME CRITICAL Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM the candidate will have determined the event

classification to be a Alert based on EAL HA 1.2, Tornado and damage to table H-1 system, within 15 minutes of start and completed the Sentry notification form and sent it within 15 minutes of the event classification time. Total time not to exceed 30 minutes but the second 15 minute clock starts at the EAL classification time on Attachment 1.

Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Obtain a verified working copy of EIP-ZZ-00101, Classification of Emergencies ADD 1 Wall Charts and combined EAL attachments

Candidate obtained procedure copies

S U

Comments:

2. NOTE: Initial classification should take place as soon as possible but NOT >15 minutes after recognition of initiating conditions

Candidate read note S U

Comments:

*3. Using the indications available and Attachment 1, Emergency Action Levels, Shift Manager DETERMINE the appropriate emergency classification:

Candidate declared a Alert based on EAL HA 1.2, within 15 minutes of start

S U

Comments:

Time of declaration

________________

(start of new 15 min clock)

4. Notify facility personnel of EAL declaration

EIP-ZZ-00102 Att 5 flow chart

Crew acknowledges EAL declaration

Candidate announced to the crew the EAL declaration

S U

Comments:

5. Notify onsite personnel of EAL declaration


Candidate sounded the emergency alarm and announced to the site the EAL declaration

S U

Comments:

6. Is the emergency an alert or higher


Yes Candidate determined this was a Alert

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

7. Have SAS activate callout per KOA-ZZ-000200


SAS acknowledges and activated callout using message #1

Candidate had SAS activate callout using message #1

S U

Comments:

8. Is emergency a general emergency


No Candidate determined this in NOT a general emergency

S U

Comments:

*9. Using Sentry Computer System fill out and send the completed Sentry notification form


If asked :

No release above normal operating limits

The JPM is complete

Candidate filled out the Sentry notification form an sent it within 15 minutes of completing the EAL classification

(Printed form)

S U

Comments:

Time sent

____________

(completion time of 2nd 15 min clock)


Initial Conditions: Callaway is operating at 100% power when the following happens:

• 0800 - A sudden tornado strikes the switch yard causing a loss of all offsite power and a reactor trip

• MET tower data showed winds in excess of 100 mph

• 0803 - The RO notices that ALL the level instruments for the RWST read 0

Initiating Cues: You have been provided the combined EAL attachments and directed to determine the Emergency Event Classification and complete the Sentry Notification form and perform the notification of off-site agencies within the allotted amount of time.


Page 1 of 7

P1 JPM No: URO-AEO-02-P015J - Modified KSA No: 068AA1.07 Revision Date: 03/18/2014 KSA Rating: 4.1/4.2 Job Title: URO Duty: Emergency operations Task Title: Operate the PZR Heaters at the

Aux Shutdown Panel

Completion Time: 15 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☒ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☒ Simulated ☐ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☒ RCA References: OTO-ZZ-00001, Control room inaccessibility, Attachment G, Rev 39 Tools / Equipment: PPE


Page 2 of 7

Initial Conditions: A reactor startup was in progress when a bomb was found in the control room.

The SM has directed a control room evacuation per OTO-ZZ-00001, Control room inaccessibility.

The reactor has been tripped and all rods have been verified fully inserted.

Initiating Cues: You are the BOP and have been directed to perform OTO-ZZ-00001, Control room inaccessibility, Att G with the CRS

The SM has given you 2 sets of keys from the emergency break class case, two portable radios, an Emergency ED attached to the “CRS” Emergency Equipment Bag, a copy of OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility Att G, Control Room Supervisor (CRS) Actions Without A Fire, the Hard Hat with Mounted Illumination, and the "CRS" Sling Bag from the CRS equipment bag

You exited the Control Room through SAS and are on your way to the next location listed in the procedure.

Notify the SM when you are maintaining the plant in stable Hot Standby conditions Note: Start this JPM in the RCA Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM the Operator will have demonstrated the

ability to control RCS temperature and PZR pressure from the Aux Shutdown Panel.

Start Time: Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Obtain a copy of OTO-ZZ-00001, Control room inaccessibility

Operator obtained a procedure copy

S U

Comments:

2. Obtain the following:

Two sets of keys in the emergency break glass cases, two portable radios, and the SM equipment bag

Step G1

Given in the initiating cue Operator reads cue sheet and knows he has the items listed

S U

Comments:

3. Exit control room with BOP through SAS

Step G2

You have exited the Control Room through SAS. Head to the next location

Operator went to ASP S U

Comments:

4. Note: radio transmissions allowed in all areas to the plants during this event

Operator read note S U

Comments:

5. Inform the Control room ASP is manned

Step G3

Control room acknowledges

Operator informed the control room ASP is manned

S U

Comments:

6. Check reactor tripped

Check neutron flux lowering SE NI-61X and 61Y

Step G4

SE NI-61X and 61Y show low and slowly lowering

Operator checked SE NI-61X and 61Y for lowering flux

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

*7 Place the following SG Aux Fw Xfr Ctrl Vlv switches in local

AL HS-9

AL HS-6

AL HS-8

AL HS-11

Step G5

All switches indicate remote

After demonstrating how to place switches in local:

AL HS-9

AL HS-6

AL HS-8

AL HS-11

Have been placed in local position

Operator placed

AL HS-9

AL HS-6

AL HS-8

AL HS-11

in local

S U

Comments:

*8. Place the following switches in local

FC HS-313

AL HS-12

AL HS-7

AL HS-5

AL HS-10

Step G 6



FC HS-313

AL HS-12

AL HS-7

AL HS-5

AL HS-10

Have been placed in local position

Operator placed

FC HS-313

AL HS-12

AL HS-7

AL HS-5

AL HS-10

in local

S U

Comments:

9. Check MD AFP running

AL HIS-22B and 23B

Step G7

AL HIS-22B and 23B both have green lights off and red lights on

Operator verified both MD AFP AL HIS-22B and 23B running

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

10. Maintain SG WR level 59% to 69% using AFW Reg Vlv Ctrl

AL HK-5B

AL HK-7B

AL HK-9B

AL HK-11B

Step G8

All SG levels at 63% WR and stable

Operator checked SG level.

S U

Comments:

11. Direct OT to check both main feed pumps tripped

Step G9

OT reports Both main feed pumps are tripped

Operator directed OT to check both main feed pumps tripped

S U

Comments:

12. Direct OT to check condensate pumps only one running

Step G10

OT reports 'A' condensate pump is the only pump running

Operator checked only one condensate pump running

S U

Comments:

*13. Maintain RCS cold leg temperature at 557F

Place SG steam dump Ctrl Xfr switches in local

AB HS-1

AB HS-3

AB HS-2

AB HS-4

Step G 11.a



AB HS-1

AB HS-3

AB HS-2

AB HS-4

are in local

Operator placed all SG steam dump ctrl switches in local

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

14. Maintain RCS cold leg temperature at 557 F using the steam dumps

AB PIC-1B

AB PIC-2B

AB PIC-3B

AB PIC-4B

Step G11.b

RCS temperature indicates 557 F

Operator maintained RCS temperature at 557 F

Operator checked

• BBTI-413X • BBTI-423X • BBTI-433X • BBTI-443X

S U

Comments:

15. Maintain PZR level 25 to 30%

Step G12

PZR level is 25% Operator maintained PZR level at 25%

Operator checked

• BBLI 459B • BBLI 460B

S U

Comments:

*16. Check PZR pressure 2225 to 2250 psig

Step G 13

PZR pressure is 2180 psig

After demonstrating how to cycle any of the following:

• CYCLE Pzr Htr B/U Group B o BB HIS‑52B (RP

118B) • CYCLE Pzr Htr B/U

Group A o BB HIS‑51B (RP

118A)

PZR pressure is 2240 psig and stable

Operator manually restored PZR with in band by cycling either:

• Pzr Htr B/U Group B

And/or

• Pzr Htr B/U Group A

Operator checked BBPI 455B

S U

Comments:

17. Maintain plant is stable hot standby condition

Step G 14

JPM is complete Operator maintained stable conditions

S U

Comments:


Initial Conditions: A reactor startup was in progress when a bomb was found in the control room.

The SM has directed a control room evacuation per OTO-ZZ-00001, Control room inaccessibility.

The reactor has been tripped and all rods have been verified fully inserted.

Initiating Cues: You are the BOP and have been directed to perform OTO-ZZ-00001, Control room inaccessibility, Att G with the CRS

The SM has given you 2 sets of keys from the emergency break class case, two portable radios, an Emergency ED attached to the “CRS” Emergency Equipment Bag, a copy of OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility Att G, Control Room Supervisor (CRS) Actions Without A Fire, the Hard Hat with Mounted Illumination, and the "CRS" Sling Bag from the CRS equipment bag

You exited the Control Room through SAS and are on your way to the next location listed in the procedure.

Notify the SM when you are maintaining the plant in stable Hot Standby conditions


Page 1 of 6

P2 JPM No: EOS-AEO-05-P061J(A) KSA No: 017 AA1.07 Revision Date: 09/04/2014 KSA Rating: 3.5/3.4 Job Title: OT/URO/SRO Duty: Emergency Operations / Loss of

All AC Power (ECA 0.0)

Task Title: Local RCP Seal Isolation Completion Time: 30 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☒ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☒ Simulated ☐ Performed ☒ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☒ RCA References: EOP Addendum 22, Local RCP Isolation, Rev. 002 Tools / Equipment: PPE, Dosimetry, and RWP


Page 2 of 6

Initial Conditions: Callaway Plant has experienced a loss of all onsite and offsite power.

Operators are performing ECA 0.0, Loss of All AC Power, to restore power and stabilize plant conditions.

The Control Room Supervisor is at Step 8 of ECA-0.0.

Initiating Cues: CRS directs you to locally isolate RCP Seals using EOP Addendum 22, Local RCP Seal Isolation, inform the CRS when you are complete

Task Standard: The operator will successfully isolate RCP seals.




JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Obtain a verified working copy of EOP Addendum 22, RCP SEAL ISOLATION

Provide operator with procedure copy

Operator obtained procedure copy

S U

Comments:

2. OPEN the following breakers on NG02B (2026 AB South elect pen room)

NG02BCR1 (BGHV8100)

NG02BHF1 (EGHV0133)

EOP Add 22 Step 1

All handles pointing to ON

After operator demonstrates how to open breakers

Handle is in the OFF position

Operator manually opened breakers:

NG02BCR1

NG02BHF1

S U

Comments:

3. OPEN the following breaker on NG03C (2047 AB North control room HVAC room)

NG03CKF3 (EGHV0061)

EOP Add 22 Step 2

Handle pointing to ON

After operator demonstrates how to open breaker

Handle is in the OFF position as the Operator opens the breaker

Operator manually opened breaker:

NG03CKF3

S U

Comments:

*4. Close the following to ISOLATE RCP Seal Injection (2000 AB, Filter Row):

BGV0102, CVCS Seal Wtr Inj Fltr A Out Iso (Room 1306B)

BGV0106, CVCS Seal Wtr Inj Fltr B Out Iso (Rm 1306A)

EOP Add 22 Step 3

BGV0102 stem is down and no threads showing

BGV0106 stem is up and threads showing

After operator demonstrates how to close valve

BGV0102 stem is down and no threads showing

BGV0106 will not turn (stuck)

Operator closed:

BGV0102

BGV0106 – WILL NOT CLOSE – goes to RNO Column

(Start of Alternate Path)

S U

Comments:



5. PERFORM the following:

OPEN the following Breakers on NG04C (2047 AB South Control Room HVAC Room)

NG04CDF5 (BBHV8351A)

NG04CEF4 (BBHV8351B)

NG04CEF5 (BBHV8351C)

NG04CFF3 (BBHV8351D)

EOP Add 22 Step 3, RNO - a

CUE OPERATOR:

Another Operator has already opened the listed breakers

Operator started heading for the 2047 level of the Aux building to OPEN the listed breakers

S U

Comments:

*6. CLOSE the following valves (2000 AB South piping penetration room):

BBHV8351A, RCP A Seal Wtr Sply (Pen 41)

BBHV8351B, RCP B Seal Wtr Sply (Pen 22)

BBHV8351C, RCP C Seal Wtr Sply (Pen 39)

BBHV8351D, RCP D Seal Wtr Sply (Pen 40)

EOP Add 22 Step 3, RNO - b

NOTE: DO NOT ALLOW OPERATOR TO CROSS CONTAMINATION BOUNDARY

NOTE: If operator states he will go dress out to close valves say

You are dressed out

All valves threads are showing and position indicator is up


All valves no threads showing and position indicator is down

Operator closed the following valves by moving the handwheel in the clockwise direction:

BBHV8351A

BBHV8351B

BBHV8351C

BBHV8351D

S U

Comments:

*7. CLOSE the following valve: (2000 AB South piping penetration room):

BGHV8100, Seal Water Return Containment Isolation (Pen 24)

EOP Add 22 Step 4

BGHV8100 threads are showing and indicator is up


BGHV8100 no threads showing and indicator is down

Operator closed BGHV8100

S U

Comments:



*8. CLOSE the following valves (2000 AB North piping penetration room):

EGHV0061, RCP Thrm Bar Outer CTMT Iso (Pen 76)

EGHV0133, RCP Thrm Bar EGHV0061 Byp Iso (Pen 76)

EOP Add 22 Step 5

EGHV0061 NO threads are showing and indicator is up


EGHV0061 threads showing and indicator is down

EGHV0133 threads showing and indicator is down

Operator closed the following valves:

EGHV0061

EGHV0133

S U

Comments:

9. Inform the CRS when complete

The JPM is Complete ________________ Record Stop Time on Page 2

Informed the CRS task is complete

S U

Comments:


Initial Conditions: Callaway Plant has experienced a loss of all onsite and offsite power.

Operators are performing ECA 0.0, Loss of All AC Power, to restore power and stabilize plant conditions.

The Control Room Supervisor is at Step 8 of ECA-0.0.

Initiating Cues: CRS directs you to locally isolate RCP Seals using EOP Addendum 22, Local RCP Seal Isolation, inform the CRS when you are complete


Page 1 of 8

P3 JPM Bank No: MODIFIED

URO-AEO-15-P028J KSA No: 068AA1.14

Revision Date: 08/07/2014 KSA Rating: 4.2 / 4.4 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: Control Room Inaccessibility Task Title: Locally Trip Reactor Trip and

Bypass Breakers

Completion Time: 20 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☐ Simulator/Lab ☒ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☒ Simulated ☐ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☒ RCA References: OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility, Att A, Rev 40 Tools / Equipment: PPE


Page 2 of 8

Initial Conditions: The Control Room is being evacuated due to a fire

Initiating Cues: The SM has directed you to perform OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility Att A “Safe Shutdown Operator Actions with Fire” up to and including step A15. Inform the SM when you have completed step A15.

The SM has given you the “SSO” keys from the emergency break class case, a portable radio, an Emergency ED attached to the SSO Emergency Equipment Bag, a copy of OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility Att A “Safe Shutdown Operator Actions with Fire” the Hard Hat with Mounted Illumination, and the "SSO" Sling Bag from the SSO equipment bag

You exited the Control Room trough SAS and are on your way to the next location listed in the procedure.

Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM the operator will have isolated loads on MCC

NG04C, placed class 1E electrical equipment A/C unit in ISO/RUN, aligned CCW and locally tripped both reactor trip breakers and bypass breakers.




JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Note: To aid operators in identifying equipment covered by this procedure, components have been marked by placing yellow and black checkerboard tape on the components.

Radio transmissions is allowed in all plant areas during this event

Att I contains a list of phone numbers

Radio transmissions will be simulated during the performance of this JPM

Candidate read note S U

Comments:

2. Obtain the following:

• The "SSO" key ring in the emergency break glass case outside the Shift Manager's office.

• An Emergency ED attached to the SSO Emergency Equipment Bag.

• From The "SSO" Emergency Equipment Bag the Hard Hat with Mounted Illumination and the "SSO" Sling Bag.

Step A1

Given in the initiating cue Candidate read cue sheet and knows they have the items listed

S U

Comments:

3. Exit control room through SAS

Step A2

Given in the initiating cue Candidate read cue sheet and knows they have exited control room through SAS

Candidate went to The North HVAC Room

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

*4. OPEN The Following Breaker On NG03C:

• NG03CEF4, Fdr Bkr To ALHV0036 CST To TDAFW Pmp Iso

Step A3

After demonstrating ability to open a breaker, NG03CEF4, Fdr Bkr To ALHV0036 CST To TDAFW Pmp Iso indicates off

Candidate opened NG03CEF4, Fdr Bkr To ALHV0036 CST To TDAFW Pmp Iso

S U

Comments:

5. Proceed to the South HVAC Room (AB 2047 Rm 1501)

Step A4

Candidate proceeded to the South HVAC room

S U

Comments:

*6. OPEN The Following Breakers On NG04C by using the handswitch on the cubicle door:

• NG04CNF3, Fdr Bkr To EFHV0052 ESW To B CCW Hx Iso

• NG04CKF1, Fdr Bkr To EGHV0054 CCW Trn B Sply/Rtn Iso

• NG04CKF2, Fdr Bkr To EMHV8803B Boron Inj Header Inlet Iso Vlv

• NG04CKF3, Fdr Bkr To EMHV8801B Boron Inj Header Discharge Iso Valve

• NG04CJF3, Fdr Bkr To EGHV0016 CCW Trn B Sply/Rtn Iso

• NG04CFF1, Fdr Bkr To BGHV8105 Chg Hdr To Regen Hx Outer Ctmt Iso

Step A5

After demonstrating ability to open and locate NG04CNF3, Fdr Bkr To EFHV0052 ESW To B CCW Hx Iso on NG04C by using the handswitch on the cubicle door:

“NG04CNF3, Fdr Bkr To EFHV0052 ESW To B CCW Hx Iso indicates OFF”

After demonstrating ability to open and locate NG04CKF1, Fdr Bkr To EGHV0054 CCW Trn B Sply/Rtn Iso on NG04C by using the handswitch on the cubicle door:

“NG04CKF1, Fdr Bkr To EGHV0054 CCW Trn B Sply/Rtn Iso indicates OFF”

After demonstrating ability to open and locate NG04CKF2, Fdr Bkr To EMHV8803B Boron Inj Header Inlet Iso Vlv on NG04C by using the handswitch on the cubicle door:

“NG04CKF2, Fdr Bkr To EMHV8803B Boron Inj Header Inlet Iso Vlv indicates OFF”

Candidates opened the Following Breakers On NG04C by using the handswitch on the cubicle door:

• NG04CNF3, Fdr Bkr To EFHV0052 ESW To B CCW Hx Iso

• NG04CKF1, Fdr Bkr To EGHV0054 CCW Trn B Sply/Rtn Iso

• NG04CKF2, Fdr Bkr To EMHV8803B Boron Inj Header Inlet Iso Vlv

• NG04CKF3, Fdr Bkr To EMHV8801B Boron Inj Header Discharge Iso Valve

• NG04CJF3, Fdr Bkr To EGHV0016 CCW Trn B Sply/Rtn Iso

• NG04CFF1, Fdr Bkr To BGHV8105 Chg Hdr To Regen Hx Outer Ctmt Iso

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

After demonstrating ability to open and locate NG04CKF3, Fdr Bkr To EMHV8801B Boron Inj Header Discharge Iso Valve on NG04C by using the handswitch on the cubicle door:

“NG04CKF3, Fdr Bkr To EMHV8801B Boron Inj Header Discharge Iso Valve indicates OFF”

After demonstrating ability to open and locate NG04CJF3, Fdr Bkr To EGHV0016 CCW Trn B Sply/Rtn Iso on NG04C by using the handswitch on the cubicle door:

“NG04CJF3, Fdr Bkr To EGHV0016 CCW Trn B Sply/Rtn Iso indicates OFF ”

After demonstrating ability to open and locate NG04CFF1, Fdr Bkr To BGHV8105 Chg Hdr To Regen Hx Outer Ctmt Iso on NG04C by using the handswitch on the cubicle door:

“NG04CFF1, Fdr Bkr To BGHV8105 Chg Hdr To Regen Hx Outer Ctmt Iso indicates OFF”

*6. Place Class 1E electrical equipment A/C Unit B local hand switch in ISO/RUN (on EAST wall):

• GKHS0103

Step A6

Local hand switch is in ISO/RUN

Candidate placed local hand switch in ISO/RUN

S U

Comments:

7. PROCEED To CCW Pump A And CCW Train A Heat Exchanger Room (AB 2026 Rm 1406)

Candidate PROCEEDED To CCW Pump A And CCW Train A Heat Exchanger Room (AB

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

Step A7 2026 Rm 1406)

*8. CLOSE ESW To CCW Trn A Iso: (Near the wall, WEST of 'A' CCW Pump)

• EGV0182

Step A8

EGV0182 indicates closed

Candidate closed EGV0182, ESW To CCW Trn A Iso

S U

Comments:

9. PROCEED To CCW Pump B And CCW Train B Heat Exchanger area (AB 2026 Rm 1401)

Step A9

Candidate proceeded To CCW Pump B And CCW Train B Heat Exchanger area (AB 2026 Rm 1401)

S U

Comments:

*10. CLOSE ESW To CCW Trn B Iso: (SE Corner of Room Behind HVAC)

• EGV0185

Step A10

EGV0185 indicates closed

Candidate closed EGV0185, ESW To CCW Trn B Iso

S U

Comments:

*12. In the CCW Pump B And CCW Train B Heat Exchanger Room POSITION The Following Valve: (South Wall Center)

• EFHV0052, ESW Trn B To CCW Hx B Hv - OPEN

Step A11

EFHV0052 indicates open

Candidate opened EFHV0052, ESW Trn B To CCW Hx B Hv

S U

Comments:

*13. On The Plant West Wall, Manually OPEN EGHV0054, CCW TRN B SPLY ISO HV (North of 'B' CCW HX)

Step A12

EGHV0054 indicates open

Candidate opened EGHV0054, CCW TRN B SPLY ISO HV

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

*14. In The EAST/WEST Corridor Leading To The Rod Drive MG Set Room, Manually OPEN EGHV0016, CCW TRN B RTN ISO

Step A13

EGHV0016 indicates open

Candidate opened EGHV0016, CCW TRN B RTN ISO

S U

Comments:

15. PROCEED To Rod Drive MG Set Room (AB 2026 Rm 1403)

Step A14

Candidate proceeded to Rod Drive MG Set Room (AB 2026 Rm 1403)

S U

Comments:

*19. Perform the following:

Locally trip both Rx trip breakers Open

Locally trip both Rx trip bypass breakers Open

Step A15

After pressing the TRIP button:

Both Rx trip breakers are open

Both Rx trip bypass breakers are open

Candidate opened both Rx trip and bypass breakers

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Comments:

20. Inform the SM Att A through step A15 is complete

SM acknowledges

JPM is complete

Candidate informs the SM he has completed step A15

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Comments:


Initial Conditions: The Control Room is being evacuated due to a fire

Initiating Cues: The SM has directed you to perform OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility Att A “Safe Shutdown Operator Actions with Fire” up to and including step A15. Inform the SM when you have completed step A15.

The SM has given you the “SSO” keys from the emergency break class case, a portable radio, an Emergency ED attached to the SSO Emergency Equipment Bag, a copy of OTO-ZZ-00001, Control Room Inaccessibility Att A “Safe Shutdown Operator Actions with Fire” the Hard Hat with Mounted Illumination, and the "SSO" Sling Bag from the SSO equipment bag

You exited the Control Room trough SAS and are on your way to the next location listed in the procedure.


Page 1 of 6

S1 JPM Bank No: New KSA No: 004A4.07 Revision Date: 07/09/2014 KSA Rating: 3.9 / 3.7 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: CVCS Task Title: Perform a Dilution Completion Time: 10 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☒ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: OTN-BG-00002, REACTOR MAKEUP CONTROL AND BORON

THERMAL REGENERATION SYSTEM, REV 45 Tools / Equipment: none


Page 2 of 6

Initial Conditions: Callaway Plant is in Mode 1

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to dilute the RCS 100 gallons by performing a dilution per Attachment 6 of OTN-BG-00002, Reactor Makeup Control and Boron Thermal Regeneration System.

Note: Use IC 161 Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the Applicant will have diluted the RCS 100

gallons Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Obtain a verified working copy of OTN-BG-00002



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Comments:

2. Review Precautions and Limitations

Section 3.0

Precautions and Limitations are satisfied

Operator reviewed Precautions and Limitations

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Comments:

3. Review Prerequisites

Section 4.0

Prerequisites are satisfied

Operator reviewed Prerequisites

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Comments

4. Attachment 6 “Dilute Mode of RMCS”

NOTE: This attachment provides direction for frequently performed, nominal 120 gpm dilutions


Comments

5. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP

Attachment 6 Step 1

Operator PLACED BG HS-26 in STOP

BG HS-26 is in STOP

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Comments



6. PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in DIL

Attachment 6 Step 2

Operator PLACED BG HS-25 in DIL

BG HS-25 is in DIL

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Comments

7. RESET BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA FLOW TOTALIZER, to 000.

Attachment 6 Step 3

Operator RESET BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA FLOW TOTALIZER, to 000.

BG FY-111B, COMBINED M/U & BA FLOW TOTALIZER, is set to 000.

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Comments

8. NOTE: When setting BG FY-111B, allowance should be made in the setpoint to compensate for instrument inaccuracies and isolation valve closure times on total flow delivered. (Step 3.1.9 contains more information if required.)


Comments

*9. ENSURE BG FY-111B is set to deliver the desired amount of makeup water.

Attachment 6 Step 4

Operator SET BG FK-111B to deliver 100 gallons

BG FK-111B is set to 100 gallons

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Comments

*10. PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN

Attachment 6 Step 5

Operator PLACED BG HS-26 in RUN

BG HS-26 is in RUN

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Comments

11. WHEN the desired amount of water has been added, PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

Attachment 6 Step 6

Operator PLACED BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP.

BG HS-26 is in STOP

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Comments



12. IF required, PERFORM the following:

PLACE BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in AUTO

PLACE BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

Attachment 6 Step 7.a and b.

Operator PLACED BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in AUTO and BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in RUN.

BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, is in AUTO

BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, is in Normal after RUN.

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Comments


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Comments



Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to dilute the RCS 100 gallons by performing a dilution per Attachment 6 of OTN-BG-00002, Reactor Makeup Control and Boron Thermal Regeneration System.


Page 1 of 9

S2 MODIFIED JPM Bank No: URO-NOP-06-C153J KSA No: 006A4.09 Revision Date: 08/18/2014 KSA Rating: 4.1 / 4.2 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: NORMAL OPERATIONS Task Title: Initial RCS Depressurization and

SI Block

Completion Time: 15 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☒ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: OTG-ZZ-00006 Addendum 04, Initial RCS Depressurization and SI

Block, Rev 8 Tools / Equipment:


Page 2 of 9

Initial Conditions: CALLAWAY PLANT is in Mode 3, with RCS TAVE at 557°F and RCS pressure at 2050 psig.

‘A’ and ‘D’ RCPs are in operation

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to depressurize the RCS and block the SI signal, per OTG-ZZ-00006 Addendum 04, Initial RCS Depressurization and SI Block

OTG-ZZ-00006, Plant Cooldown Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown is in use and directs this action to take place.

Boron concentration is greater than required concentration to block SI below P-11

All Prerequisites are satisfied.

The BOP Operator is monitoring cooldown rate and SG levels Note: IC 162 Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the Applicant will have blocked both trains

of Pressurizer Pressure and Steam Line Pressure Safety Injection. Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Review OTG-ZZ-00006 Addendum 04, Initial RCS Depressurization and SI Block

Provide Operator with marked up copy of OTG-ZZ-00006 Addendum 04, Initial RCS Depressurization and SI Block

Operator reviewed OTG-ZZ-00006 Addendum 04, Initial RCS Depressurization and SI Block

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Comments:

2. Review Precautions and Limitations.

Step 3.1 and .2

IF ASKED, provide operator with a copy of OTG-ZZ-00006, Plant Cooldown Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown

Operator reviewed Precautions and Limitations.

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Comments:

3. Review General Notes.

Step 3.3

IF ASKED, provide operator with a copy of OTG-ZZ-00006, Plant Cooldown Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown

Operator reviewed General Notes.

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Comments:


Step 4


All prerequisites have been initialed or signed

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Comments:

5. Continuous Actions

Prior to blocking SI, MAINTAIN narrow range pressure between 1900 psig and 2250 psig.

Step 5.1.1

Operator reviewed continuous action step and initialed “Inititated” line

6 Continuous Actions

After blocking SI, MAINTAIN narrow range pressure between 1700 psig and 1900 psig.

Step 5.1.2

Operator reviewed continuous action step and initialed “Inititated” line



7. LOWER RCS pressure towards 1900 psig as follows:

Using the following, ENSURE all Pressurizer Backup Heaters are energized to maximize spray flow:

• BB HIS-51A, PZR HTR B/U GROUP A, in CLOSE

• BB HIS-52A, PZR HTR B/U GROUP B, in CLOSE

STEP 5.2.1.a

Operator ensured all Pressurizer Backup Heaters are energized

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Comments:

8. MONITOR pressure using the lowest reading Pressurizer Pressure indicator:

• BB PI-455A, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE

• BB PI-456, PRESSURIZER PRESSURE



Step 5.2.1.b

Operator monitored pressure using the lowest reading Pressurizer Pressure indicator

S U

Comments:

The Operator must use any one of the next 3 steps of the JPM to lower pressure. Only the step that the Operator used is a Critical Step.



*9. INITIATE depressurization by performing one of the following:

Using BB PK-455A, PZR PRESS MASTER CTRL, in AUTO, slowly adjust the potentiometer to lower pressure.

Step 5.2.1.c.1

Operator lowered pressure.

Operator adjusted the potentiometer for BB PK-455A, PZR PRESS MASTER CTRL, in AUTO, to lower pressure.

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Comments:

*10. Using BB PK-455A, PZR PRESS MASTER CTRL, in MANUAL, slowly lower pressure.

Step 5.2.1.c.2


Operator used BB PK-455A, PZR PRESS MASTER CTRL, in MANUAL, to lower pressure.

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Comments:

*11. Using the Spray Valve Controller for an operating RCS loop, in MANUAL, slowly OPEN the Spray Valve.

• BB PK-455B, PZR SPRAY LOOP 1 CTRL

• BB PK-455C, PZR SPRAY LOOP 2 CTRL

Step 5.2.1.c.3


Operator used the Spray Valve Controller for an operating RCS loop, in MANUAL, slowly OPENED the Spray Valve.

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Comments:

*12. WHEN Pressurizer Pressure approaches 1900 psig, MAINTAIN pressure between 1900 psig and 1910 psig.

Step 5.2.2

Operator maintained pressure between 1900psig and 1910 psig.

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Comments:

13. IF desired, ADJUST BB PK-455A, PZR PRESS MASTER CTRL to the new set point AND PLACE in AUTOMATIC.

Step 5.2.3

Operator may have adjusted BB PK-455A, PZR PRESS MASTER CTRL to the new set point AND may have PLACED in AUTOMATIC.

S U

Comments:



14. WHEN RCS boron concentration is equal to or greater than the required to block SI below P-11 per OSP-SF-00001, Shutdown Margin Calculations, THEN CONTINUE to next step.

STEP 5.2.4

Operator verified RCS boron concentration is equal to or greater than the required to block SI below P-11 per OSP-SF-00001, Shutdown Margin Calculations,

Given in Cue

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Comments:

15. PERFORM the following to block SI:

ENSURE required boron concentration for blocking SI below P-11 is met.

Step 5.2.5.a

Operator verified RCS boron concentration is equal to or greater than the required to block SI below P-11 per OSP-SF-00001, Shutdown Margin Calculations,

Given in Cue

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Comments:

16. On SB069, CHECK Permissive P-11 status light ON.

Step 5.2.5.b

Operator verified PERMISSIVE P-11 STATUS LIGHT IS LIT ON SB069

PERMISSIVE P-11 STATUS LIGHT IS LIT ON SB069

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Comments:

17. SET Operator Alarm for BBP1002, AUCT HI PZR PRESS, HI ALM at 1960 psig.

Step 5.2.5.c

Operator set Operator Alarm for BBP1002, AUCT HI PZR PRESS, HI ALM at 1960 psig.

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Comments:

*18. BLOCK Pressurizer Pressure SI by momentarily depressing:

SB HS-7, PZR PRESS SI TRN B BLOC/UNBLOCK

Step 5.2.5.d.1

Operator momentarily depressed SB HS-7, PZR PRESS SI TRN B BLOC/UNBLOCK

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Comments:



*19. BLOCK Pressurizer Pressure SI by momentarily depressing:

SB HS-8, PZR PRESS SI TRN A BLOC/UNBLOCK

Step 5.2.5.d.2

Operator momentarily depressed SB HS-8, PZR PRESS SI TRN A BLOC/UNBLOCK

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Comments:

20. On SB069, CHECK Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injection signal blocked status lights Train A and Train B are ON

Step 5.2.5.e

Operator checked Pressurizer Pressure Safety Injection signal blocked status lights Train A and Train B are ON

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Comments:

*21 BLOCK Steamline Pressure SI by momentarily depressing:

SB HS-9, STMLINE PRESS SI TRN A BLOC/UNBLOCK

Step 5.2.5.f.1

Operator momentarily depressed SB HS-9, STMLINE PRESS SI TRN A BLOC/UNBLOCK

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Comments:

*22. BLOCK Steamline Pressure SI by momentarily depressing:

SB HS-10, STMLINE PRESS SI TRN B BLOC/UNBLOCK

Step 5.2.5.f.2

Operator momentarily depressed SB HS-10, STMLINE PRESS SI TRN B BLOC/UNBLOCK

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Comments:

23. On SB069, CHECK the Steamline Isolation/Safety Injection signal blocked status lights Train A and Train B are on

Step 5.2.5.g

Operator checked the Steamline Isolation/Safety Injection signal blocked status lights Train A and Train B are on

S U

Comments:



24. NOTIFY CRS/SM that the Steam Line Isolation on high negative rate (100 psig in 50 seconds) of steam pressure is now enabled.

Step 5.2.5.h

Respond as CRS/SM when notified that the Steam Line Isolation on high negative rate (100 psig in 50 seconds) of steam pressure is now enabled.

The Operator NOTIFIED the CRS/SM that the Steam Line Isolation on high negative rate (100 psig in 50 seconds) of steam pressure is now enabled.

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Comments:

25. MONITOR Plant Computer screen HEATU or MODE3.

Step 5.2.6

The Operator MONITORED Plant Computer screen HEATU or MODE3.

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Comments:

26. MAINTAIN Pressurizer pressure below 1900 psig and above 1700 psig.

Step 5.2.7

Operator lowered pressure below 1900 psig and above 1700 psig.

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Comments:

27. NOTE any exceptions to the execution of this procedure.

Step 5.2.8

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Comments:

28. OBTAIN procedure completion signature from SM/CRS:

Step 5.2.9

THE CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR ACKNOWLEDGES THE TASK IS COMPLETE

Operator informed CRS procedure is complete and obtained SM/CRS signature.

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Comments:

29. THE JPM IS COMPLETE


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Comments:


Initial Conditions: CALLAWAY PLANT is in Mode 3, with RCS TAVE at 557°F and RCS pressure at 2050 psig.

‘A’ and ‘D’ RCPs are in operation

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to depressurize the RCS and block the SI signal, per OTG-ZZ-00006 Addendum 04, Initial RCS Depressurization and SI Block

OTG-ZZ-00006, Plant Cooldown Hot Standby to Cold Shutdown is in use and directs this action to take place.


The BOP Operator is monitoring cooldown rate and SG levels


Page 1 of 7

S3 JPM Bank No: URO-SBB-05-C077J(A) KSA No: 010A4.03 Revision Date: 07/07/2014 KSA Rating: 4.0 / 3.8 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: Reactor Coolant Task Title: Perform System Surveillance –

BBHV8000A Stroke Test

Completion Time: 10 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☒ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: OSP-BB-V0001, RCS Valve Inservice Test, Rev 24 Tools / Equipment: Calibrated Stop Watch


Page 2 of 7


Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to perform the Stroke Time Test for BBHV8000A, RCS PZR OUT PWR OPER RLF HV, per OSP-BB-V0001, RCS Valve Inservice Test, Section 6.1.

All Prerequisites are satisfied. Note: Use IC 161

1. Select Engineering Mode 2. ME Schematics/BB/m22bb02_a (Pressurizer) 3. Right click on motor for bbhv8000a (located on top of Pressurizer)

a) Select RT04RC_HV8000A_MCTCLOSE – Insert Selected Value to 25 AND b) Select RT04RC_HV8000A_MCTOPEN – Insert Selected Value to 25

Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the Operator will have completed the Stroke

Time Test for BBHV8000A per OSP-BB-V0001 and reported to the CRS that the Acceptance Criteria was not satisfied.

Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Obtain a verified working copy of OSP-BB-V0001

Provide Operator with procedure copy

Operator obtained working copy of OSP-BB-V0001

S U

Comments:

2. Review Acceptance Criteria

Section 3.1

Operator reviewed Acceptance Criteria per Attachment 1

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Comments:

3. Review Precautions and Limitations

Section 4.0

Operator reviewed Precautions and Limitations

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Comments


Section 5.0


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Comments

5. NOTE: The local position indication is performed every refuel prior to Mode 4 startup. These steps may be omitted when performing this procedure in

Mode 1, 2, or 3 on BBHV8000A.

Prior to 6.1

Examiner Note:

Given in initial cue that local position indication is not required for this test.

Operator read note

Given in initial cue that local position indication is not required for this test.

S U

Comments

6. NOTE: If BBHV8000A, RCS PZR Out Pwr Oper Rlf HV, is on its backseat for normal operations, the stroke close time will be from the backseat position and not from the OPEN (limit switch) position.

Prior to 6.1.1


Comments



7. Using BB HIS-455A, PZR PORV, ensure BBPCV0455A is closed

Step 6.1.1

Operator ensured BBPCV0455A was closed

BB HIS-455A green light is lit and the red light is not lit

S U

Comments

8. Ensure BB HS-8000A, TRN A Cold O/P Bloc/Arm, is in the BLOCK position

Step 6.1.2

Operator ensured BB HS-8000A BLOCK PB was depressed

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Comments

9. Record Initial Remote Position of BB HIS-8000A, PZR PORV Block Vlv, on Attachment 1

Step 6.1.3

Operator recorded Initial Remote Position of BB HIS-8000A on Attachment 1

S U

Comments

10. If Position Indication Testing is scheduled, perform the following:

Step 6.1.4

Operator N/A’d step and proceeded to Step 6.1.5

Given in Initiating Cue that Position Indication Testing is not scheduled

S U

Comments

*11. Using BB HIS-8000A, PZR PORV Block Vlv, close BBHV8000A and measure the elapsed time between pushing the close pushbutton and when the open light goes out

Step 6.1.5

Operator closed BBHV8000A and measured the elapsed time between pushing the close pushbutton and when the open light went out

Measured stroke time was ~25 seconds

S U

Comments

12. Record Observed Stroke Time Closed for BBHV8000A, RCS PZR Out Pwr Oper Rlf HV, on Attachment 1

Step 6.1.6

If Operator recognizes that the stroke time does meet acceptance and indicates they would stop the test, direct them to complete the test.

Operator recorded Observed Stroke Time Closed for BBHV8000A on Attachment 1

(Observed stroke time should be ~25 sec)

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Comments



13. RECORD Full Stroke Remote Position of BB HIS-8000A, PZR PORV Block Vlv, on Attachment 1

Step 6.1.7

Operator recorded Full Stroke Remote Position of Closed for BB HIS-8000A on Attachment 1

S U

Comments

14. If Position Indication Testing is scheduled, record the Full Stroke Local Position of BBHV8000A, RCS PZR Out Pwr Oper Rlf HV, on Attachment 1

Step 6.1.8

Operator N/A’d step and proceeded to Step 6.1.9

Given in Initiating Cue that Position Indication Testing is not scheduled

S U

Comments

*15. Using BB HIS-8000A, PZR PORV Block Vlv, open BBHV8000A and measure the elapsed time between pushing the open pushbutton and when the closed light goes out

Step 6.1.9

Operator opened BBHV8000A and measured the elapsed time between pushing the open pushbutton and when the closed light went out

BB HIS-8000A red light is lit and the green light is not lit

Measured stroke time was ~25 seconds

S U

Comments

16. Record Observed Stroke Time open for BBHV8000A, RCS PZR Out Pwr Oper Rlf HV, on Attachment 1

Step 6.1.10

Operator recorded Observed Stroke Time open for BBHV8000A on Attachment 1

(Observed stroke time should be ~25 sec)

S U

Comments



*17. Perform the following:

a. Evaluate Observed Stroke Time against the Normal Stroke Time Range and the Maximum Allowable Stroke Time and determine if valve retest is required for BBHV8000A

b. If Observed Stroke Time for BBHV8000A does NOT meet acceptance criteria, notify SM/CRS

c. If retest is required, perform the retest per CA2716, Valve Retest Instructions

Step 6.1.11

Retest will NOT be performed at this time.

Operator evaluated Observed Stroke Time for BBHV8000A as exceeding the maximum allowable stroke time and NOT meeting acceptance criteria

Operator notified SM/CRS that valve stroke time did NOT meet acceptance criteria

S U

Comments


S U

Comments



Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor (CRS) directs you to perform the Stroke Time Test for BBHV8000A, RCS PZR OUT PWR OPER RLF HV, per OSP-BB-V0001, RCS Valve Inservice Test, Section 6.1.

The local position indication is NOT required for this test.

BBHV8000A, RCS PZR OUT PWR OPER RLF HV, is NOT on its backseat.



Page 1 of 11

S4 JPM Bank No: URO-AEO-01-C052J KSA No: E09EA1.1 Revision Date: 08/19/2014 KSA Rating: 3.5 / 3.5 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: Abnormal / Emergency

Operations

Task Title: Start Reactor Coolant Pump during RCS Natural Circulation Cooldown

Completion Time: 15 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☒ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☒ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: EOP Addendum 3, Starting an RCP, R002 Tools / Equipment: None


Page 2 of 11

Initial Conditions: The Callaway Plant experienced a Reactor Trip from full power.

A Switchyard fault resulted in the loss of the Startup Transformer.

The operating crew is performing the actions of ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown.

The PA Busses have been re-energized and the crew has returned to Step 1.

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor directs you to start Reactor Coolant Pump D in accordance with EOP Addendum 3, Starting An RCP.

Note: Use IC-163 Trip the Reactor and All RCPs Insert Override Switch (BB) X21I118S, Value = 1 Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the operator will have started RCP A.




JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Obtain a verified working copy of EOP Addendum 3, Starting An RCP



S U

Comments:

2. CAUTIONS: If RCP seal cooling had previously been lost, the affected RCPs should NOT be started prior to a status evaluation

If asked – “RCP seal cooling has NOT been lost”

Operator read caution S U

Comments:

3. NOTES: RCPs should be run in order of priority to provide normal PZR spray: RCP D, RCP A or RCP B, RCP C.


Comments:

4. ESTABLISH conditions for starting an RCP in order of priority:

13.8 KV Buses – ENERGIZED

• PA01 • PA02

Step 1.a

Operator ensured 13.8 KV Buses PA01 and PA02 energized

13.8 KV Buses PA01 and PA02 are energized

S U

Comments:

5. RCS pressure – GREATER THAN 325 PSIG

Step 1.b

Operator ensured RCS pressure is greater than 325 psig

RCS pressure is greater than 325 psig

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

6. Number 1 seal differential pressure – GREATER THAN 200 PSID

• BB PI-150A

Step 1.c

Operator ensured RCP D Number 1 seal differential pressure is greater than 200 psid

BB PI-150A

RCP D Number 1 seal differential pressure is greater than 200 psid

S U

Comments:

7. VCT pressure - GREATER THAN 15 PSIG

Step 1.d

Operator ensured VCT pressure is greater than 15 psig

VCT pressure is greater than 15 psig

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Comments:

8. RCP seal injection flow – BETWEEN 6 GPM AND 13 GPM PER RCP

• BG FR-157 • BG FR-156 • BG FR-155 • BG FR-154

Step 1.e

Operator ensured RCP seal injection flow is between 6 gpm and 13 gpm per RCP


RCP seal injection flow is between 6 gpm and 13 gpm per RCP

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Comments:

9. Number 1 seal leakoff flow – GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 0.2 GPM


Step 1.f

Operator ensured Number 1 seal leakoff flow is greater than or equal to 0.2 gpm


Number 1 seal leakoff flow is greater than or equal to 0.2 gpm

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

10. CCW To RCS Flow – INDICATED

• EG FI-128 • EG FI-129

Step 1.g

Operator ensured CCW To RCS Flow is indicated

• EG FI-128 • EG FI-129

CCW To RCS Flow is indicated

S U

Comments:

11. RCP CCW system annunciators – CLEAR

• 52A, CCW Lo • 70C, RCP A Th Bar • 71C, RCP B Th Bar • 72C, RCP C Th Bar • 73C, RCP D Th Bar • 74C, RCP TB CCW

Step 1.h

Operator ensured RCP CCW system annunciators are clear


RCP CCW system annunciators are clear

S U

Comments:

12. START Oil Lift Pump for RCP to be started:

• BB HIS-44

Step 1.i

Operator started Lift Pump for RCP D

• BB HIS-44

Lift Pump for RCP D has been started

S U

Comments:

13. Oil Lift Pump oil pressure interlock WHITE light – LIT

Step 1.j

Operator ensured RCP D Oil Lift Pump oil pressure interlock white light is lit

RCP D Oil Lift Pump oil pressure interlock white light is lit

S U

Comments:

14. NOTE: SI must be reset prior to starting RCP C or RCP D to prevent potential shutdown sequencer actuation on undervoltage of XNB02


Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

15. RESET SI If Necessary:

• SB HS-42A • SB HS-43A

Step 2

Operator ensured SI is reset

SI is reset

S U

Comments:

16. START Desired RCP As Follows:

CHECK associated oil lift pump – RUNNING GREATER THAN 2 MINUTES

Step 3.a

“The Lift Oil pump has been running for 2 minutes”

Operator ensured RCP D oil lift pump has been running greater than 2 minutes

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Comments:

17. START desired RCP:

BB HIS-40 (RCP D)

Step 3.b

Operator started RCP D using BB HIS-40

RCP D is NOT running

Alternate Path starts here

S U

Comments:

18. IF desired RCP can NOT be started, THEN PERFORM the following:

TRY to establish conditions and start another RCP in order of priority.

Return To Step 1.

Step 3.b.1) and 2) RNO

Operator determined that ‘D’ RCP did not start and informed CRS and returned to Step 1 of the procedure.

S U

Comments:

19. CAUTIONS: If RCP seal cooling had previously been lost, the affected RCPs should NOT be started prior to a status evaluation

If asked – “RCP seal cooling has NOT been lost”

Operator read caution S U

Comments:

20. NOTES: RCPs should be run in order of priority to provide normal PZR spray: RCP D, RCP A or RCP B, RCP C.

Operator read note and determined the next RCP to start is ‘A’ RCP.

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

21. ESTABLISH conditions for starting an RCP in order of priority:

13.8 KV Buses – ENERGIZED

• PA01 • PA02

Step 1.a

Operator ensured 13.8 KV Buses PA01 and PA02 energized

13.8 KV Buses PA01 and PA02 are energized

S U

Comments:

22. RCS pressure – GREATER THAN 325 PSIG

Step 1.b

Operator ensured RCS pressure is greater than 325 psig

RCS pressure is greater than 325 psig

S U

Comments:

23. Number 1 seal differential pressure – GREATER THAN 200 PSID

• BB PI-150A

Step 1.c

Operator ensured RCP A Number 1 seal differential pressure is greater than 200 psid

BB PI-153A

RCP A Number 1 seal differential pressure is greater than 200 psid

S U

Comments:

24. VCT pressure - GREATER THAN 15 PSIG

Step 1.d

Operator ensured VCT pressure is greater than 15 psig

VCT pressure is greater than 15 psig

S U

Comments:

25. RCP seal injection flow – BETWEEN 6 GPM AND 13 GPM PER RCP


Step 1.e

Operator ensured RCP seal injection flow is between 6 gpm and 13 gpm per RCP


RCP seal injection flow is between 6 gpm and 13 gpm per RCP

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

26. Number 1 seal leakoff flow – GREATER THAN OR EQUAL TO 0.2 GPM


Step 1.f

Operator ensured Number 1 seal leakoff flow is greater than or equal to 0.2 gpm


Number 1 seal leakoff flow is greater than or equal to 0.2 gpm

S U

Comments:

27. CCW To RCS Flow – INDICATED

• EG FI-128 • EG FI-129

Step 1.g

Operator ensured CCW To RCS Flow is indicated

• EG FI-128 • EG FI-129

CCW To RCS Flow is indicated

S U

Comments:

28. RCP CCW system annunciators – CLEAR


Step 1.h

Operator ensured RCP CCW system annunciators are clear


RCP CCW system annunciators are clear

S U

Comments:

*29. START Oil Lift Pump for RCP to be started:

• BB HIS-41

Step 1.i

Operator started Lift Pump for RCP A

• BB HIS-41

Lift Pump for RCP A has been started

S U

Comments:

30. Oil Lift Pump oil pressure interlock WHITE light – LIT

Step 1.j

Operator ensured RCP A Oil Lift Pump oil pressure interlock white light is lit

RCP A Oil Lift Pump oil pressure interlock white light is lit

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

31. NOTE: SI must be reset prior to starting RCP C or RCP D to prevent potential shutdown sequencer actuation on undervoltage of XNB02


Comments:

32. RESET SI If Necessary:


Step 2

Operator ensured SI is reset

SI is reset

SI was reset when attempting to start RCP D, it does not need to be reset again

S U

Comments:

33. START Desired RCP As Follows:

CHECK associated oil lift pump – RUNNING GREATER THAN 2 MINUTES

Step 3.a

“The Lift Oil pump has been running for 2 minutes”

Operator ensured RCP A oil lift pump has been running greater than 2 minutes

S U

Comments:

*34. START desired RCP:

BB HIS-37 (RCP A)

Step 3.b

Operator started RCP A using BB HIS-37

RCP A is running

S U

Comments:

35. CHECK RCP – RUNNING GREATER THAN 1 MINUTE

Step 3.c

Operator ensured RCP A has been running greater than 1 minute

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

*36. STOP Oil Lift Pump:

• BB HIS-41 (RCP A)

Operator stopped Oil Lift Pumps:

• BB HIS-41 (RCP A)

S U

Comments:

Report to CRS that RCP D did not start. RCP A has been started.

Operator may request to secure BB HIS 44 (RCP D) Lift oil pump. It is not required to secure this pump.

The JPM is Complete

_________________

Record Stop Time on Page 2


Initial Conditions: The Callaway Plant experienced a Reactor Trip from full power.

A Switchyard fault resulted in the loss of the Startup Transformer.

The operating crew is performing the actions of ES-0.2, Natural Circulation Cooldown.

The PA Busses have been re-energized and the crew has returned to Step 1.

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor directs you to start Reactor Coolant Pump D in accordance with EOP Addendum 3, Starting An RCP.


Page 1 of 5

S5 JPM Bank No: URO-SEN-04-C193J(A)(TC) KSA No: 026 A4.01 Revision Date: 07/07/2014 KSA Rating: 4.5 / 4.3 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: CONTAINMENT SPRAY

SYSTEM

Task Title: ALIGN CONTAINMENT SPRAY FOR RECIRCULATION

Completion Time: 10 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☒ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☒ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Rev 011 Tools / Equipment: None


Page 2 of 5

Initial Conditions: A Large Break LOCA has occurred inside Containment. The Crew has completed the actions of ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, through Step 5.

RWST Level has decreased to less than 12%.

Initiating Cues: You are directed to complete the actions of ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Step 6.

Note:

1. Initialize using any Mode 1 – 3 IC. (IC-172)

2. Override switch (EN) x17I149o, value = 0

3. Insert a large break LOCA inside containment at a break size to initiate CSAS. • Insert Malfunction (BB) BB001_D, Value = 75,000

4. Perform actions of ERGs through step 5 of ES 1.3.

5. Insert Plant Parameter (BN) TBN01TAZTLIL, Adjust the value until < 12%

6. Freeze simulator /make temporary IC with RWST level at 12% AND Annunciator 47B, RWST Lev LoLo 2

7. Put up SUMPBLK on screen

Task Standard: Train ‘B’ Containment Spray Pump is RUNNING in the RECIRCULATING

LINEUP. Train ‘A’ Containment Spray Pump is stopped. Start Time:

Stop Time:



JPM STEP


SCORE

1. OBTAIN A VERIFIED WORKING COPY OF ES-1.3, TRANSFER TO COLD LEG RECIRCULATION.

PROVIDE OPERATOR WITH PROCEDURE COPY

OPERATOR OBTAINED PROCEDURE COPY

S U

Comments:

2. VERIFY CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS ARE RUNNING.

• EN HIS-3

• EN-HIS-9

Step 6.a

OPERATOR VERIFIED BOTH CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS ARE RUNNING.

containment spray pumps are indicating a red light on and green off with flow on EN-FI-5 and 11 indicating 1.6X106lbm/hr and pressure on EN-PI-10 and 4 indicating 215 psig

S U

Comments:

3. VERIFY RWST LEVEL IS LESS THAN 12%.

Step 6.b

OPERATOR CHECKED RWST LEVEL IS <12%.

RWST LEVEL INDICATORS AND/OR ANNUNCIATOR 47B, RWST LEVEL LOLO 2 is lit.

S U

Comments

*4. RESET CSAS

• SB HS-51 • SB HS-54

Step 6.c

OPERATOR RESET CSAS USING SB HS-51 AND SB HS-54.

Both buttons have been pressed and the red annunciator 59A is not lit

S U

Comments

*5. OPEN Containment Recirc Sump To Containment Spray Pump valves:

• EN HIS‑1 • EN HIS‑7

Step 6.d

OPERATOR OPENED EN HIS-7 AND attempted to open EN HIS-1.

EN HIS-7 indicates red light on green off

EN-HIS-1 indicates green light on red off

(Alternate Path)

S U

Comments



*6. If any valve can NOT be opened,

THEN PLACE associated Containment Spray Pump in PULL-TO-LOCK:

EN HIS-3 (EN HV-1)

Step 6.d RNO

EN-HIS-3 in PULL-TO-LOCK.

Containment spray pump ‘A’ indicates green light on red off and EN-PI-4 reads 0 psig and EN-FI-5 reads 0 lbm/hr

7. MONITOR CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP DISCHARGE FLOW

Step 6.e

OPERATOR VERIFIED CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP FLOWS USING EN-FI-11.

Flow as indicated on EN-FI-11 shows 1.6X106Lbm/hr

S U

Comments

8. CLOSE RWST TO CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP VALVE BN HIS-4

Step 6.e

OPERATOR CLOSED BN HIS-4.

BN-HIS-4 indicates green light on red off

S U

Comments

*9. CLOSE RWST TO CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMP VALVE BN HIS-3.

Step 6.e

OPERATOR CLOSED BN HIS-3.

BN HIS-3 indicates green light on red off

S U

Comments

10. START CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS AS NECESSARY

Step 6.f

IF ASKED ABOUT STARTING PUMPS, PROVIDE FOLLOWING CUE: CRS DIRECTS YOU TO MAINTAIN CURRENT PLANT CONDITIONS

OPERATOR VERIFIED NECESSARY CONTAINMENT SPRAY PUMPS ARE RUNNING

S U

Comments


S U

Comments


Initial Conditions: A Large Break LOCA has occurred inside Containment. The Crew has completed the actions of ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, through Step 5.

RWST Level has decreased to less than 12%.

Initiating Cues: You are directed to complete the actions of ES-1.3, Transfer to Cold Leg Recirculation, Step 6.


Page 1 of 7

S6 JPM Bank No: MODIFIED

URO-AEO-05-C174J(A) KSA No: 064A4.06

Revision Date: 07/29/2014 KSA Rating: 3.9/3.9 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: SR Elect Gen and Dist (NE) Task Title: MANUALLY START DIESEL

GENERATORS

Completion Time: 10 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☒ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☒ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power, Rev. 19 Tools / Equipment: None


Page 2 of 7

Initial Conditions: Callaway Plant was in Mode 3 at Normal Operating Pressure and Temperature when an improper switching order caused a loss of both NB buses.

The crew has completed ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power up to and including Step 4.

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor directs you to continue in the procedure by performing all applicable sections of Step 5 of ECA-0.0.

Inform the CRS when you have completed Step 5.

Note: Using IC161 with rods withdrawn while keeping the Simulator in FREEZE

• Insert Remote Function (KJ) DGBLOCK_1, Value = True • Insert Remote Function (KJ) DGBLOCK_2, Value = True • Insert Remote Function (EF) PEF01A_1, Value = Block • Insert Remote Function (EF) PEF01B_1, Value = Block • Insert Remote Function (MD) N3PCB3B, Value = Open • Insert Remote Function (PA) LOAPA201, Value = Trip • Insert Overide Switch, X19I241S, Value = 1 • GO TO RUN • Trip RX

DURING the JPM Remotely secure the ‘B’ when directed by the examiner. Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the operator will have manually started the

“A” DG, re-energized NB01, and manually Start ESW Pump “A”.




JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Obtain a copy of ECA-0.0 Provide operator with procedure copy

Operator obtained procedure copy and went to Step 5 of the procedure

S U

Comments:

2. TRY To Restore Power to Any AC Emergency Bus

Energize AC emergency bus with diesel generator:

Check Both DGs Running – NO

Step 5.a.1

Operator observed that neither DG A nor DG B is running

Neither DG’s are running or indicate any voltage or frequency

S U

Comments:

*3. Manually START DG(s)

Step 5.a RNO 1)

Operator Started Both DG(s) by depressing start Pushbuttons:

KJ HS-8A has been pushed

S U

Comments:

4. Manually START DG(s)

Step 5.a RNO 1)

Operator Started Both DG(s) by depressing start Pushbuttons:

KJ HS-108A has been pushed

S U

Comments:

5. CHECK AC emergency buses – AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

• NB01 - YES

• NB02 - YES

Step 5.a 2

Operator observed that both NB Buses are energized

Both buses are indicating voltage on NE-EI-1 and 2 of 4160 kv and frequency on NE-SI-1 and 3 of 60 Hz

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

6. CHECK AC emergency buses – AT LEAST ONE ENERGIZED

NB01 – YES

OR

NB02 – YES

Step 5.b.

Operator determined that NB01 BUS and NB02 are Energized.

NB01 is indicating voltage on NE-EI-1 of 4160 kv and frequency on NE-SI-1 of 60 Hz

NB02 is indicating voltage on NE-EI-2 of 4160 kv and frequency on NE-SI-3 of 60 Hz

7. CHECK ESW associated with energized AC emergency bus(es) – RUNNING

EF HIS-55A NOT RUNNING

EF HIS-56A NOT RUNNING

Step 5.c

Operator verified:

“A” ESW Pump IS NOT running

“B” ESW Pump IS NOT running

‘A’ ESW pump has green light on and no red light and shows no flow or pressure

‘B’ ESW pump has green light on and no red light and shows no flow or pressure

Alternate path starts here

S U

Comments:


ENSURE ESW To UHS valves are OPEN

• EF HIS-37

• EF HIS-38

Step 5.c RNO c.1

Operator verified:

ESW to UHS valves are both OPEN

Both ESW valves indicate red light on and green light off

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

*9. PERFORM the following:

START ESW Pump(s) as necessary

Step 5.c RNO c.2

Operator started ESW Pump “A” using:

EF HIS-55A

‘A’ ESW pump has red light on green off and indicating on EF-FI-53 11X106 lbm/hr and pressure on EF-PI-1 of 116 psig

S U

Comments:


START ESW Pump(s) as necessary

Step 5.c RNO c.2

Operator attempted to start ESW Pump “B” using:

EF HIS-56A

‘B’ ESW pump has red light off green on and indicating on EF-FI-54 0 lbm/hr and pressure on EF-PI-2 of 0 psig

S U

Comments:


IF any DG is running with NO cooling water THEN STOP affected DG(s)

Step 5.c RNO c.3

Operator verified that ‘A’ DG is now running with appropriate cooling water and ‘B’ DG is running with NO cooling water

S U

Comments:

NOTE: Step 12 is only critical if the ‘B’ DG was started in step 4 of the JPM. If the DG was not started step 13 is N/A and the applicant will not perform these actions.

*12. IF any DG is running with NO cooling water, THEN locally STOP affected DG(s):

a) Place Master Transfer Switch to LOC/MAN. • KJ HS‑109

b) STOP the Diesel. • KJ HS‑108B

Respond as the OT contacted to locally secure the diesel. Use proper 3 way communication repeating back ONLY what the operator directs you to do.

The operator has dispatched an OT to Place Master Transfer Switch to LOC/MAN. (KJ HS-109) and STOPPED the Diesel. (KJ HS-108B)

The ‘B’ DG has stopped

Operator may request to open NB0211 prior to stopping EDG per ODP-ZZ-00025 guidance

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

13. Return To procedure and step in effect and IMPLEMENT Functional Restoration Procedures as necessary

Step 5.d

Acknowledge as the CRS that Step 5 of ECA-0.0 is complete

The JPM is Complete

__________________


Operator Completed Step 5 of ECA-0.0 and reported to the CRS actions that were necessary.

S U

Comments:


Initial Conditions: Callaway Plant was in Mode 3 at Normal Operating Pressure and Temperature when an improper switching order caused a loss of both NB buses.

The crew has completed ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power up to and including Step 4.

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor directs you to continue in the procedure by performing all applicable sections of Step 5 of ECA-0.0.

Inform the CRS when you have completed Step 5.


Page 1 of 6

S7 JPM Bank No: New KSA No: 016A4.01 Revision Date: 10/10/2014 KSA Rating: 2.9/2.8 Job Title: URO/SRO Duty: Instrumentation Task Title: Selection of available

Instrumentation

Completion Time: 10 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☒ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☐ Alternate Path ☐ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: OTO-NN-00001, LOSS OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENT POWER,

Rev. 33 Tools / Equipment: None


Page 2 of 6

Initial Conditions: Callaway Plant is in Mode 1.

A loss of power to NN01 has occurred

Step 1 of OTO-NN-00001, LOSS OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENT POWER has been completed and the plant is stable

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform Attachment A of OTO-NN-00001, LOSS OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENT POWER up to Step A7.

The BOP is monitoring and maintaining SG levels

The RO is in monitoring and maintaining PZR level and pressure

Note: Using IC 169 (loss of NN01 with Step 1 of OTO-NN-00001, LOSS OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENT POWER complete and PZR and SGs stable Act at the RO and BOP to maintain PZR level and pressure and SG levels Task Standard: Upon completion of this JPM, the operator will have selected the proper

instrumentation for SG Flow and Level and PZR pressure and level.




JPM STEP


SCORE

1. Obtain a copy of Attachment A of OTO-NN-00001, LOSS OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENT POWER


Operator obtained procedure copy.

S U

Comments:

2. ENSURE the following components are NOT selected:

Step A1

Operator ensured the following components are NOT selected

S U

Comments:

*3. SG A

AB FS‑512C

AE LS‑519C

Step A1

Operator selected away from

AB FS‑512C

AE LS‑519C

S U

Comments:

4. SG B

AB FS‑522C

AE LS‑529C

Step A1


AB FS‑522C

AE LS‑529C

S U

Comments:

*5. SG C

AB FS‑532C

AE LS‑539C

Step A1


AB FS‑532C

AE LS‑539C

S U

Comments:

6. SG D

AB FS‑542C

AE LS‑549C

Step A1


AB FS‑542C

AE LS‑549C

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

*7. Pressurizer

*BB PS‑455F

BB LS‑459D (NOT critical)

Step A1


BB PS‑455F

BB LS‑459D

S U

Comments:

*8. Main Turbine

AC PS‑505Z

Step A1


AC PS‑505Z

S U

Comments:

*9. PRESS SELECT On STEAM FLOW and Level for ALL Steam Generators on AE SS‑500, SG Level Control Input Selection.

Step A2

Operator PRESSED SELECT On STEAM FLOW and Level for ALL Steam Generators on AE SS‑500, SG Level Control Input Selection.

S U

Comments:

*10. PLACE BB TS‑411F, ΔT Defeat Switch in T411 position.

Step A3

Operator PLACED BB TS‑411F, ΔT Defeat Switch in T411 position.

S U

Comments:

*11. PLACE BB TS‑412T, Rod Control Tave Input Channel Defeat Switch in T412 position.

Step A4

Operator PLACED BB TS‑412T, Rod Control Tave Input Channel Defeat Switch in T412 position.

S U

Comments:

*12. ISOLATE letdown by closing all Orifice Isolation Valve(s):

● BG HIS‑8149AA (NOT critical)

● BG HIS‑8149BA (NOT critical)

● *BG HIS‑8149CA

Operator ISOLATED letdown by closing all Orifice Isolation Valve(s):

● BG HIS‑8149AA

● BG HIS‑8149BA

● BG HIS‑8149CA

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

*13. REDUCE Charging To RCPs Seals Only By Performing The Following Concurrently:

• Slowly CLOSE Charging Header Back Pressure Control valve:

• BG HC‑182 • Manually THROTTLE

appropriate Charging Discharge Flow Control valve to maintain RCP seal injection flow from 8 gpm to 13 gpm to each RCP while reducing charging flow:

• BG FK‑121 (CCP)

OR

• BG FK‑124 (NCP)

• ENSURE BG HC‑182 is full closed.

Operator slowly CLOSED Charging Header Back Pressure Control valve:

• BG HC‑182

Operator manually THROTTLED appropriate Charging Discharge Flow Control valve to maintain RCP seal injection flow from 8 gpm to 13 gpm to each RCP while reducing charging flow:

• BG FK‑121 (CCP)

OR

• BG FK‑124 (NCP)

Operator ENSURED BG HC‑182 is full closed.

The critical part of this step is that RCP seal injection flow is 8-13 gpm and BG HC-182 is closed at the end of this step

S U

Comments:

13. Report to CRS Attachment A is complete up to Step A7

Acknowledge report

The JPM is Complete

__________________


Operator reported to CRS Attachment A is complete up to Step A7

S U

Comments:


Initial Conditions: Callaway Plant is in Mode 1.

A loss of power to NN01 has occurred

Step 1 of OTO-NN-00001, LOSS OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENT POWER has been completed and the plant is stable

Initiating Cues: The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform Attachment A of OTO-NN-00001, LOSS OF SAFETY RELATED INSTRUMENT POWER up to Step A7.

The BOP is monitoring and maintaining SG levels

The RO is in monitoring and maintaining PZR level and pressure


Page 1 of 6

S8 JPM Bank No: URO-SBB-04-C159J(A) KSA No: 008 A4.01 Revision Date: 08/18/2014 KSA Rating: 3.3/3.1 Job Title: URO Duty: Component Cooling Water

System (EG)

Task Title: RESPOND TO A LOSS OF CCW TO THE RCPS

Completion Time: 10 minutes The performance of this task was evaluated against the standards contained in this JPM and determined to be: ☐ SATISFACTORY ☐ UNSATISFACTORY Reason, if UNSATISFACTORY: Evaluator Signature: Date: Task Performer: Location of Performance: ☐ Control Room ☒ Simulator/Lab ☐ Plant ☐ Classroom Method of Performance: ☐ Simulated ☒ Performed ☒ Alternate Path ☒ Time Critical ☐ RCA References: OTO-BB-00002, RCP OFF-NORMAL, REV. 031 Tools / Equipment: None


Page 2 of 6

Initial Conditions: CALLAWAY PLANT IS OPERATING AT 100% STEADY STATE POWER. AN INADVERTANT SIGNAL HAS CAUSED A LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER FLOW TO THE CONTAINMENT / REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS

THE VALVES HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR 30 SECONDS.

Initiating Cues: THE CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR HAS DIRECTED YOU TO PERFORM ATTACHMENT ‘C’ OF OTO-BB-00002, RCP OFF-NORMAL TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE.

Inform the CRS when CCW has been restored to the RCPs.

This is a Time Critical JPM

Note: USE IC 168, or any normal MODE 1 IC CLOSE THE FOLLOWING VALVES FROM THE CONTROL BOARD: EG HIS-58 EG HIS-71 THEN Insert Override Switches (EG), X19I213C, Plant Tag EGHIS71_IC, Value = TRUE Override EG HV62 open to prevent closing on false hi flow, EGHV0062, Value=1 Task Standard: UPON COMPLETION OF THIS JPM, THE OPERATOR WILL HAVE

RESTORED CCW TO CONTAINMENT AND THE REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS




JPM STEP


SCORE

1. OBTAIN A VERIFIED WORKING COPY OF OTO-BB-00002, RCP OFF-NORMAL and reads NOTE

PROVIDE PROCEDURE COPY, IF REQUESTED

OPERATOR OBTAINED PROCEDURE COPY and reads NOTE

S U

Comments:

2. CHECK RCP MOTOR PARAMETERS MEET ALL OF THE FOLLOWING:

• MOTOR BEARING TEMPS < 195 °F

• MOTOR STATOR WINDING TEMPS ARE < 311 °F

• CCW LOST TO RCP MOTORS < 10 MIN

STEP C1

IF ASKED – IT HAS BEEN LESS THAN 10 MINUTES

(GIVEN IN INITIAL CONDITIONS)

OPERATOR CHECKED ALL RCP MOTOR PARAMETERS MEET ALL OF THE FOLLOWING:

• MOTOR BEARING TEMPS < 195 °F

• MOTOR STATOR WINDING TEMPS ARE < 311 °F

• CCW LOST TO RCP MOTORS < 10 MIN

S U

Comments:

3. CHECK CCW FLOW TO CONTAINMENT - NORMAL OR HIGH FOR PLANT CONDITIONS:

• EG-FI-128 • EG-FI-129

STEP C2

OPERATOR CHECKED NO CCW FLOW TO CONTAINMENT

S U

Comments:

*4. RNO – ENSURE ALL CCW TO CONTAINMENT INNER AND OUTER ISOLATION VALVES ARE OPEN:

• EG HIS-58

• EG HIS-59

• EG HIS-60

• EG HIS-71

• EG HIS-61

• EG HIS-62

RNO STEP C2.a.

OPERATOR CHECKED THE PANEL AND IDENTIFIED THAT EG HIS-58 AND EG HIS-71 ARE CLOSED

EG HIS-58 AND EG HIS-71 SHOW GREEN LIGHT ON AND RED LIGHT OFF

EG HIS-58 OPENED UPON TAKING THE VALVE TO “OPEN”

EG HIS-71 WILL NOT OPEN

This is the start of the ALTERNATE PATH

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

5. IF ANY VALVE(S) FAIL TO OPEN, THEN OPEN THE ASSOCIATED BYPASS VALVE USING ATTACHMENT F, CCW CNTMT ISOLATION VALVES

RNO STEP C2.b

IF ASKED, EG HIS-71 CANNOT BE OPENED LOCALLY

OPERATOR IDENTIFIED THAT EG HIS-71 CANNOT BE OPENED AND OPENS THE BYPASS VALVE USING ATTACHMENT F

S U

Comments:

6. PLACE Administrative Controls for any OPEN Containment Isolation CCW Bypass Valve:

ATT F, STEP F1

Respond as the CRS that administrative controls have been established.

OPERATOR COMMUNICATED THAT ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROLS MUST BE ESTABLISHED

S U

Comments:

*7. Use The Tables Below For Additional Containment Isolation CCW Valves Information:

EGHV0071 (EG HIS-71)

Bypass EGHV0126

Switch EG HIS-126

Bypass Iso/Non Iso Switch EG HIS-126A

ATT F, STEP F2

OPERATOR LOCATED HANDSWITCH EG HIS-126A ON PANEL RL020. DEPRESSED THE NON-ISO PUSHBUTTON

LOCATE HANDSWITCH EG HIS-126 ON PANEL RL020. DEPRESSED THE OPEN PUSHBUTTON. OBSERVE THE RED LENS IS LIT.

OBSERVED CCW FLOW TO CONTAINMENT

S U

Comments:

TIME CCW flow restored __________

(must be less than 9 minutes and 30 since start of JPM)

8. CHECK CCW Flow From RCPs ‑OPEN

• BB HIS‑13 • BB HIS‑14 • BB HIS‑15 • BB HIS‑16

STEP C3

Operator checked CCW Flow From RCPs ‑OPEN

• BB HIS‑13 • BB HIS‑14 • BB HIS‑15 • BB HIS‑1

S U

Comments:



JPM STEP


SCORE

9. CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow ‑ BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM PER PUMP

• BG FR‑157 • BG FR‑156 • BG FR‑155 • BG FR‑154

Step C4

Operator CHECKED RCP Seal Injection Flow ‑ BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM PER PUMP

• BG FR‑157 • BG FR‑156 • BG FR‑155 • BG FR‑154

S U

Comments:

10. CHECK CCW Train Supplying the RCPs ‑ LESS THAN 105°F

• EG TI‑31 • EG TI‑32

Step C5

Operator CHECKED CCW Train Supplying the RCPs ‑ LESS THAN 105°F

• EG TI‑31 • EG TI‑32

S U

Comments:

11. CONTINUE Monitoring RCP Parameters

Step C6

Operator CONTINUED to Monitoring RCP Parameters

S U

Comments:

8. Report to CRS Actions taken. The Operator could report CCW flow restored any time after STEP 7 of the JPM.

ACKNOWLEDGE REPORT

THE JPM IS COMPLETE

Record time on page 2

INFORMED THE CRS OF ACTIONS

S U

Comments:


Error! Reference source not found.

Initial Conditions: CALLAWAY PLANT IS OPERATING AT 100% STEADY STATE POWER. AN INADVERTANT SIGNAL HAS CAUSED A LOSS OF COMPONENT COOLING WATER FLOW TO THE CONTAINMENT / REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS

THE VALVES HAVE BEEN CLOSED FOR 30 SECONDS.

Initiating Cues: THE CONTROL ROOM SUPERVISOR HAS DIRECTED YOU TO PERFORM ATTACHMENT ‘C’ OF OTO-BB-00002, RCP OFF-NORMAL TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE.

Inform the CRS when CCW has been restored to the RCPs.

This is a Time Critical JPM

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES-D-1

Facility: Callaway Scenario No.: 1, Rev 0 Op-Test No.: 2014-1 Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% Turnover: ‘B’ CCP is tagged out due to oil leak

Event

No.

Malf. No. Event Type*

Event Description

1 PT0456 SRO (I) RO (I) PZR Pressure instrument Fails high (Tech Specs)

2 ABFT0542 SRO (I) BOP (I) SG Steam Flow Inst Fails low

3 SFB08_DR SRO (C) RO (C) Dropped rod (Tech Specs)

4 SF2CD2/2

SRO (M) RO (M) BOP (M)

Second Dropped Rod / Rx Trip

5 AB001_A


Steam Line Break inside containment

6 SAS9XX_1, 2, 3, 4 SRO (C) BOP (C) MSIVs fail to close

7 PEN01A_2 and EN08RL_420TVSP

SRO (C) BOP (C)

Containment Spray Pump Auto Start Failure and Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valve Failure

* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Target Quantitative Attributes (Per Scenario; See Section D.5.d)

Actual Attributes

1. Total malfunctions (5-8) 5 2. Malfunctions after EOP entry (1-2) 2 3. Abnormal events (2-4) 3 4. Major transients (1-2) 2 5. EOPs entered/requiring substantive actions (1-2) 1 6. EOP contingencies requiring substantive actions (0-2) 0 7. Critical tasks (2-3) 2

Scenario Event Description Callaway 2014 NRC Exam Scenario #1, rev. 0

The plant is at 100% with the ‘B’ CCP tagged out After the crew takes the watch, the lower selected PZR Pressure Channel BB PT-456 fails high. Annunciator PZR PRESS HI and RX PARTIAL TRIP will alarm to alert the operator of the malfunction. The CRS should enter OTO-BB-00006, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction, and transfer pressure control to remove the failed channel. After the Technical Specifications from the previous event have been identified, a Steam Flow Channel on ‘D’ S/G Fails Low. The crew will respond using, OTO AE 00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Malfunctions and select SG steam flow channel selector to an operable channel on AB FS-542C and DFWCS. After the crew has selected away from the failed channel, a dropped rod occurs as indicated by DRPI and Control Rod Alarms. The ROs will perform the immediate actions of OTO-SF-00001 to place rods in manual. The crew will establish conditions for rod recovery identify Technical Specifications and begin restoration. During rod recovery, another control rod drop into the core. The operators will take immediate action to trip the reactor. After the Reactor Trip, a Steam Line Break inside containment will occur. The MSIVs will fail to auto close. The crew will respond IAW E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation The ‘A’ Containment Spray Pump fails to auto start and the ‘B’ Containment Spray Pump discharge valve fails to open. The crew can manually start the ‘A” Containment Spray Pump and/or direct an OT to open EN-HV-12, CS PUMP B DISCH, in the field while performing the actions of E-0. The crew will continue to perform the actions of E-2, and isolate the ‘A’ SG, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination. The scenario can be terminated after the transition to ES-1.1 occurs


Critical Tasks: Critical Tasks Isolate the faulted ‘A’ SG before transition out of E-2 Manually actuate containment cooling by:

1) Starting the 'A' Containment Spray Pump OR 2) Directing an equipment operator to locally OPEN EN-HV-12, CS PUMP B DISCH before completion of Attachment A of E-0

EVENT 5 7 Safety significance

Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the following CSFs: • Integrity • Subcriticality • Containment (if the break is inside containment)

If one train of containment spray is not actuated, the FSAR assumptions and results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to manually actuate at least one train of containment spray under the scenario conditions and when it is possible to do so constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Cueing Both of the following: • Steam pressure and flow rate indications that make it possible to identify ‘A’ SG as

faulted AND • Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to the

faulted ‘A’ SG

Indication that containment cooling is required by Containment pressure either currently or has been greater than 27 psig Indication and/or annunciation that no train of containment spray has successfully actuated by both: • ‘A’ Containment Spray Pump not running • ‘B’ Containment Spray Pump discharge valve NOT open

Performance indicator

• ISOLATE AFW flow to faulted SG(s): o CLOSE associated MD AFP Flow Control Valve(s):

AL HK-7A (SG A) o CLOSE associated TD AFP Flow Control Valve(s):

AL HK-8A (SG A) • CLOSE Steamline Low Point Drain valve from faulted SG(s):

o AB HIS-9 (SG A) • FAST CLOSE all MSIVs and Bypass valves:

o AB HS‑79 o AB HS‑80

1) Starting the 'A' Containment Spray Pump OR

2) Directing an equipment operator to locally OPEN EN-HV-12, CS PUMP B DISCH

Performance feedback

Crew will observe the following: • Any depressurization of intact SGs stops • AFW flow rate indication to faulted SG of zero

Indication that 'A' Containment Spray Pump is running OR Indication that ‘B’ Containment Spray Pump discharge valve EN-HV-12 is open AND Containment pressure lowering

Justification for the chosen performance limit

“before transition out of E-2” is in accordance with the PWR Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines. It allows enough time for the crew to take the correct action while at the same time preventing avoidable adverse consequences.

“before completion of Attachment A of E-0” is in accordance with the PWR Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines. It allows enough time for the crew to take the correct action while at the same time preventing avoidable adverse consequences.

PWR Owners Group Appendix

CT-17 Isolate faulted SG CT-3 Manually actuate containment cooling


References OTO-BG-00001, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction OTO-AE-00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Malfunctions OTO-SF-00001, Rod Control/Malfunctions E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation ES-1.1, SI Termination Tech Spec 3.3.1.E & M for Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Tech Spec 3.3.2.D and L for Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Tech spec 3.1.4.B for Rod Group Alignment Limits ODP-ZZ-00025, EOP/OTO User's Guide

PRA Systems, Events or Operator Actions

1. Main Steam Line Break Inside Containment (T(MSI)) a. Close MSIVs b. Isolate Feedwater to the affected SG

Scenario Setup Guide:

Establish the initial conditions of IC-10, MOL 100%: • RCS boron concentration 752 ppm • CCP A 765 ppm minus 5 days • CCP B 775 ppm minus 15 days • Rod Control Bank D 215 steps, Other banks 228 steps • ENSURE BB-PT-455 / BB-PT-456 is selected on BB-PS-455F • “B” CCP is tagged out with breaker in P-T-L and tag on handswitch

=============SCENARIO PRELOADS / SETUP ITEMS================ “B” CCP Tagged out due to an oil leak.

• ME Schematics (BG) e23bg01b BG02NB0201_BKRTA_BKPOS, Value = 3 Steam Line Break inside containment / MSIV auto close failure (Event 5)

• Insert Malfunctions (AB)AB001_A/3600 klbm per hr, cond rec0009 le 1.0 (reactor trip) • Insert Malfunction SAS9XX_1, 2, 3, 4 – Value = Enable

Containment Spray Pump Auto Start Failure and / Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valve Failure (Event 6)

• Inhibit start of ‘A’ Containment Spray Pump Auto Start o Insert Malfunction (EN) PEN01A_2, Value = 1

• Containment Spray Pump ‘B’ Disch fails to open on CISB – Event 6

o Go To ME Schematics (EN) e23en03_b, click on 42 o relay in middle of page o Override ‘open’ relay EN08RL_42oTVSP, Value = 0

============= EVENT 1 ================================== PZR Pressure Channel BB PT-456 fails high

• Insert Malfunction (BB) BBPT0456, Value = 2500 ============= EVENT 2 ================================== “D” S/G Steam Flow Channel Failure ABFT0542

• Insert Malfunction (AB) ABFT0542, value = 0 ============= EVENT 3 ================================== Dropped Rod

• Insert Malfunctions (SF) SF B08 = DR, Value = stationary gripper =============EVENT 4 ==================================== Second Dropped Rod / Rx Trip

• Insert Malfunctions (SF) SF2CD2, Value = 2 rods =============EVENT 5 PRELOADED================================== Steam Line Break inside containment

• See Preloads Above =============EVENT 6 PRELOADED===================== Containment Spray Pump Auto Start Failure and / Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valve Failure

• See Preloads Above



____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________


Event

No.


Event Description

1 PT0456 SRO (I) RO (I) PZR Pressure instrument Fails high (Tech Specs)

2 ABFT0542 SRO (I) BOP (I) SG Steam Flow Inst Fails low

3 SFB08_DR SRO (C) RO (C) Dropped rod (Tech Specs)

4 SF2CD2/2


Second Dropped Rod / Rx Trip

5 AB001_A


Steam Line Break inside containment

6 SAS9XX_1, 2, 3, 4 SRO (C) BOP (C) MSIVs fail to close

7 PEN01A_2 and EN08RL_420TVSP

SRO (C) BOP (C)

Containment Spray Pump Auto Start Failure and Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valve Failure



Actual Attributes



The plant is at 100% with the ‘B’ CCP tagged out After the crew takes the watch, the lower selected PZR Pressure Channel BB PT-456 fails high. Annunciator PZR PRESS HI and RX PARTIAL TRIP will alarm to alert the operator of the malfunction. The CRS should enter OTO-BB-00006, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction, and transfer pressure control to remove the failed channel. After the Technical Specifications from the previous event have been identified, a Steam Flow Channel on ‘D’ S/G Fails Low. The crew will respond using, OTO AE 00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Malfunctions and select SG steam flow channel selector to an operable channel on AB FS-542C and DFWCS. After the crew has selected away from the failed channel, a dropped rod occurs as indicated by DRPI and Control Rod Alarms. The ROs will perform the immediate actions of OTO-SF-00001 to place rods in manual. The crew will establish conditions for rod recovery identify Technical Specifications and begin restoration. During rod recovery, another control rod drops into the core. The operators will take immediate action to trip the reactor. After the Reactor Trip, a Steam Line Break inside containment will occur. The MSIVs will fail to auto close. The crew will respond IAW E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection, and transition to E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation The ‘A’ Containment Spray Pump fails to auto start and the ‘B’ Containment Spray Pump discharge valve fails to open. The crew can manually start the ‘A” Containment Spray Pump and/or direct an OT to open EN-HV-12, CS PUMP B DISCH, in the field while performing the actions of E-0. The crew will continue to perform the actions of E-2, and isolate the ‘A’ SG, then transition to ES-1.1, SI Termination. The scenario can be terminated after the transition to ES-1.1 occurs


Critical Tasks: Critical Tasks Isolate the faulted ‘A’ SG before transition out of E-2 Manually actuate containment cooling by:

1) Starting the 'A' Containment Spray Pump OR 2) Directing an equipment operator to locally OPEN EN-HV-12, CS PUMP B DISCH before completion of Attachment A of E-0


Failure to isolate a faulted SG that can be isolated causes challenges to CSFs beyond those irreparably introduced by the postulated conditions. Failure to isolate a faulted SG can result in challenges to the following CSFs: • Integrity • Subcriticality • Containment (if the break is inside containment)

If one train of containment spray is not actuated, the FSAR assumptions and results are invalid. Because compliance with the assumptions of the FSAR is part of the facility license condition, failure to manually actuate at least one train of containment spray under the scenario conditions and when it is possible to do so constitutes a violation of the license condition.

Cueing Both of the following: • Steam pressure and flow rate indications that make it possible to identify ‘A’ SG as

faulted AND • Valve position and flow rate indication that AFW continues to be delivered to the

faulted ‘A’ SG

Indication that containment cooling is required by Containment pressure either currently or has been greater than 27 psig Indication and/or annunciation that no train of containment spray has successfully actuated by both: • ‘A’ Containment Spray Pump not running • ‘B’ Containment Spray Pump discharge valve NOT open


• ISOLATE AFW flow to faulted SG(s): o CLOSE associated MD AFP Flow Control Valve(s):

AL HK-7A (SG A) o CLOSE associated TD AFP Flow Control Valve(s):

AL HK-8A (SG A) • CLOSE Steamline Low Point Drain valve from faulted SG(s):

o AB HIS-9 (SG A) • FAST CLOSE all MSIVs and Bypass valves:

o AB HS‑79 o AB HS‑80

1) Starting the 'A' Containment Spray Pump OR

2) Directing an equipment operator to locally OPEN EN-HV-12, CS PUMP B DISCH


Crew will observe the following: • Any depressurization of intact SGs stops • AFW flow rate indication to faulted SG of zero

Indication that 'A' Containment Spray Pump is running OR Indication that ‘B’ Containment Spray Pump discharge valve EN-HV-12 is open AND Containment pressure lowering


“before transition out of E-2” is in accordance with the PWR Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines. It allows enough time for the crew to take the correct action while at the same time preventing avoidable adverse consequences.

“before completion of Attachment A of E-0” is in accordance with the PWR Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines. It allows enough time for the crew to take the correct action while at the same time preventing avoidable adverse consequences.


CT-17 Isolate faulted SG CT-3 Manually actuate containment cooling


References OTO-BG-00001, Pressurizer Level Control Malfunction OTO-AE-00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Malfunctions OTO-SF-00001, Rod Control/Malfunctions E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation ES-1.1, SI Termination Tech Spec 3.3.1.E & M for Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Tech Spec 3.3.2.D and L for Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Tech spec 3.1.4.B for Rod Group Alignment Limits ODP-ZZ-00025, EOP/OTO User's Guide


1. Main Steam Line Break Inside Containment (T(MSI)) a. Close MSIVs b. Isolate Feedwater to the affected SG



Establish the initial conditions of IC-10, MOL 100%: • RCS boron concentration 752 ppm • CCP A 765 ppm minus 5 days • CCP B 775 ppm minus 15 days • Rod Control Bank D 215 steps, Other banks 228 steps • ENSURE BB-PT-455 / BB-PT-456 is selected on BB-PS-455F • “B” CCP is tagged out with breaker in P-T-L and tag on handswitch

=============SCENARIO PRELOADS / SETUP ITEMS================ “B” CCP Tagged out due to an oil leak.

• ME Schematics (BG) e23bg01b BG02NB0201_BKRTA_BKPOS, Value = 3 Steam Line Break inside containment / MSIV auto close failure (Event 5)

• Insert Malfunctions (AB)AB001_A/3600 klbm per hr, cond rec0009 le 1.0 (reactor trip) • Insert Malfunction SAS9XX_1, 2, 3, 4 – Value = Enable

Containment Spray Pump Auto Start Failure and / Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valve Failure (Event 6)

• Inhibit start of ‘A’ Containment Spray Pump Auto Start o Insert Malfunction (EN) PEN01A_2, Value = 1

• Containment Spray Pump ‘B’ Disch fails to open on CISB – Event 6

o Go To ME Schematics (EN) e23en03_b, click on 42 o relay in middle of page o Override ‘open’ relay EN08RL_42oTVSP, Value = 0

============= EVENT 1 ================================== PZR Pressure Channel BB PT-456 fails high

• Insert Malfunction (BB) BBPT0456, Value = 2500 ============= EVENT 2 ================================== “D” S/G Steam Flow Channel Failure ABFT0542

• Insert Malfunction (AB) ABFT0542, value = 0 ============= EVENT 3 ================================== Dropped Rod

• Insert Malfunctions (SF) SF B08 = DR, Value = stationary gripper =============EVENT 4 ==================================== Second Dropped Rod / Rx Trip

• Insert Malfunctions (SF) SF2CD2, Value = 2 rods =============EVENT 5 PRELOADED================================== Steam Line Break inside containment

• See Preloads Above =============EVENT 6 PRELOADED===================== Containment Spray Pump Auto Start Failure and / Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valve Failure

• See Preloads Above

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 1 rev.0 Event # 1 Page 6 of 23 Event Description: PZR Pressure Channel BB PT-456 fails high Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

Booth Operator Instructions • T = 3 minutes or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner

• PZR Pressure Channel BB PT-456 fails high

o Insert Malfunction/BB/PT0456/2500/Ramp Time 180 sec/Insert

• When contacted, respond as I&C. Acknowledge the request to trip bistables and investigate the channel failure.

• When contacted, respond as Duty Manager. Acknowledge the channel failure and Tech Spec entry.

Indications Available T=3

ANN 33 B PZR HI PRESS DEV ANN 83 C RX PARTIAL TRIP (delayed)

NOTE Crew members may take manual control of Pressurizer Pressure prior to OTO entry

OTO-BB-00006, Pressurizer Pressure Control Malfunction CRS Implement OTO-BB-00006, Pressurizer Pressure Control

Malfunction

OTO-BB-00006 RO

(Step 1) Check Pressurizer Pressure Indicator – Failed, • BB PI-456

RO (Step 2.a) CHECK Pressurizer Pressure: • Between 2225 psig and 2250 psig - YES

RO

(Step 3) IF Required TRANSFER Pressurizer Pressure Control Selector To Remove Failed Channel From Control:

• BB PS-455F

RO

(Step 4) CHECK Pressurizer Pressure Within One Of The Following:

• Trending to between 2225 psig and 2250 psig OR

• Between 2225 psig and 2250 psig

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 1 rev.0 Event # 1 Page 7 of 23 Event Description: PZR Pressure Channel BB PT-456 fails high Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

RO

(Step 5) WHEN Pressurizer Pressure Is Restored To Setpoint, PLACE Pressurizer Pressure In AUTO CONTROL

a. Verify PZR Spray Valves in AUTO b. PLACE PZR PRESS MASTER CTRL in AUTO

• BB PK-455A

BOP (Step 6) Check P-11 in Correct State Within One Hour of the Pressurizer Pressure Failure

RO

(Step 7) Select an Operable Channel for: • RCS Pressure Recorder BB PS-455G • OPDT/OTDT Temperature Recorder SC TS-411E • Computer Digital Readout Display: REP0481A, 482A or

483A

CRS

(Step 8) Review Applicable Tech Specs, Attachment J • 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1 Item 6 Cond E (OTDT 72hr) • 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1 Item 8 Cond M, E (P 72hr) • 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1 Item 1.d Cond D (SI 72hr) • 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1 Item 8.b Cond L (P-11 1hr) • 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1 Item 9 Cond D (PORV 72hr)

BOP (Step 9) Record Permissive P-11 is in Correct State in CR log

CRS (Step 10) REVIEW Attachment A, Effects of Pressurizer Pressure Instrument Failure

NOTE At Lead Examiner’s discretion move to the next Event

CRS (Step 11) Direct I&C to Trip Protective Bistables – Att. B

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 1 rev.0 Event # 2 Page 8 of 23 Event Description: “A” S/G Steam Flow Channel Failure ABFT0542 Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior


• “D” S/G Steam Flow Channel Failure ABFT0542

• Insert Malfunction (AB) ABFT0542, value = 0

• Act as I&C and acknowledge the failure of AB FT-542. Inform the CR that troubleshooting/repair will begin.

Indications Available: T= 20

ANN 83 C RX PARTIAL TRIP (in already from previous malfunction) ANN 111 D SG D FLOW MISMATCH ANN 111C SG D LEV DEV (possible if SG level goes out of band)

OTO-AE-00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Instrument Malfunctions

CRS Implement OTO-AE-00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Instrument Malfunctions

OTO-AE-00002

BOP

(Step 1) Check SG Water Level Control Instrument – NORMAL. RNO: SG D: AB LI-542 Take MANUAL Control of Affected SG MFRV or MFRV Bypass and MAINTAIN SG Level: • SG D:

o AE FK‑540, SG D MFW REG VLV CTRL OR

o AE LK‑580, SG D MFW REG BYPASS CTRL

BOP

(Step 2) For the Failed Instrument, SELECT An Operable Channel: • Select AB FS-542C to operable channel • On DFWCS, SELECT appropriate Level, FW Flow or

Steam Flow on AE SS‑500

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 1 rev.0 Event # 2 Page 9 of 23 Event Description: “A” S/G Steam Flow Channel Failure ABFT0542 Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior BOP (Step 3) RESTORE Affected SG NR Level to between 45% and

55%

BOP

(Step 4) Return Affected SG MFRV or MFRV Bypass to AUTO Control:

• SG D: o AE FK‑540

OR o AE LK‑580

CRS (Step 5) Review Attachment A, Effects of Instrument Failure

CRS

(Step 6) Review Applicable Tech Specs, Attachment F • None applicable

CRS (Step 7) Perform Notifications per ODP-ZZ-00001, Add 13


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 1 rev.0 Event # 3 Page 10 of 23 Event Description: Dropped Rod Cntrl Bank C1 Rod B8 Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior


• Dropped Rod Cntrl Bank C1 Rod B8

• Insert Malfunctions (SF) SF B08 = DR, Value = stationary gripper

• When requested to investigate as I&C, wait 5 minutes and report that there is a blown fuse and it has been replaced

• When contacted as Reactor Engineering wait 5 minutes and report that there is no reason

the rod cannot be recovered

• When contacted, respond as Duty Manager, acknowledge entry into the OTO


ANN 79 C CONTROL ROD DEV ANN 80 C RPI ROD DEV ANN 81 B ROD AT BOTTOM (plus others)

OTO-SF 00001, Rod Control Malfunctions

CRS Implement OTO-SF 00001, Rod Control Malfunctions

NOTE Steps 1 through 6 are immediate action steps

OTO-SF 00001

RO

(Step 1) Check Both of the Following are Met for Indication of Multiple Dropped Rods ANN 81A, TWO/More Rods at Bottom Lit Rod Bottom lights lit for greater than one rod

• RNO Go to Step 3

RO (Step 3) Check Main Turbine Runback Or Load Reject – IN PROGRESS

• RNO Go to Step 5

RO

(Step 5) Place Rod Control in Manual • SE HS-9


RO (Step 6) Check Control Rods Motion STOPPED

RO (Step 7) Check Instrument Indication Normal

RO/BOP

(Step 8) Check Annunciator 79A LIT – NO: RNO: Maintain RCS Tavg/Tref and go to Step 10

• ADJUST Turbine load. • ADJUST RCS boron concentration. • ADJUST Control Rods.

RO

(Step 10) Check Annunciator 81B and all Rod Bottom Lights Extinguished – NO: RNO: Go to Attachment ‘A’

RO (Step A1) Check Reactor Power less than 5% - NO: RNO: Go to Step A3

CRS (Step A3) Contact I&C to determine reason for Dropped Rod

CRS (Step A4) CHECK Shutdown Margin Is Within The Limits Provided In The COLR Within 1 Hour

CRS

(Step A5) CHECK Axial Flux Difference (AFD) - WITHIN THE LIMITS OF CURVE BOOK, FIGURE 1-1, AXIAL FLUX DIFFERENCE LIMITS

CRS (Step A6) CHECK QPTR - LESS THAN OR EQUAL TO 1.02

CRS (Step A7) Check Dropped Rod can be recovered in less than one hour.


CRS

(Step A8) CONSIDER The Following Prior To Recovering The Rod:

• Length of time the rod has been misaligned • Power Level at which the realignment will be performed • Rate of control rod movement during realignment • Movement of other control rods to support realignment

CRS (Step A9) PERFORM Notifications Per ODP-ZZ-00001 Addendum 13, Shift Manager Communications

CRS (Step A10) NOTIFY Reactor Engineering Prior To Attempting Recovery Of The Control Rod

CRS

(Step A11) CHECK Both Of The Following Are Met: • Reason for dropped/misaligned rod has been identified • Problem has been corrected


CRS (Step A12) PERFORM Attachment B, Dropped/Misaligned Rod Recovery

NOTE

While some recovery actions of Attachment B may be performed, the intent is to proceed to the next event after the Technical Specification declaration. Therefore Attachment B actions are not listed here.

CRS

(Step A13) REVIEW Applicable Technical Specifications: • 3.1.4.B for Rod Group Alignment Limits • 3.2.4.A for QTPR (if QTPR >1.02)

NOTE

Any time after the Technical Specifications have been identified and at Lead Examiner’s discretion, move to the next Event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 1 rev.0 Event # 4, 5, 6, 7 Page 14 of 23 Event Description: Second Dropped Rod / Rx Trip / Steam Line Break inside containment / MSIVs

fail to close / Containment Spray Pump Auto Start Failure and Containment Spray Pump Discharge Valve Failure

Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior


• Multiple Dropped Rods

• Insert Malfunctions (SF) SF2CD2, Value = 2 rods

• Preloaded malfunctions: • Steam Line Break inside containment / MSIV auto close failure (Event 5) • Containment Spray Pump Auto Start Failure and / Containment Spray Pump

Discharge Valve Failure (Event 6)

• When contacted, respond as Duty manager, acknowledge entry into the EOP

Indications Available: T= 45 ANN 81 A TWO/More Rods at Bottom Lit

OTO-SF 00001, Rod Control Malfunctions

RO

(Step 1) Check Both of the Following are Met for Indication of Multiple Dropped Rods

• ANN 81A, TWO/More Rods at Bottom Lit • Rod Bottom lights lit for greater than one rod

CRS

(Step 2) Perform the Following: • Trip the reactor • Go To E-0, Reactor Trip of Safety Injection

E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

E-0 CRS Implement E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection

NOTE Steps 1 through 4 are immediate actions




RO

(Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip - Yes • Rod Bottom Lights – All Lit • Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers – Open • Neutron Flux – Lowering

BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip a. Turbine Stop Valves – Closed

BOP

(Step 3) CHECK Power to AC Emergency Buses a. At Least One Emergency Bus – Energized b. Both Emergency Buses – Energized - YES

RO

(Step 4) CHECK SI Status a. Check if SI is Actuated b. Check both Trains of SI Actuated

• LOCA Sequencer ANN 30A – Lit • LOCA Sequencer ANN 31A – Lit • SB069 SI Actuate Red Light – Lit Solid

RO/BOP (Step 5) Perform Attachment A, Automatic Action Verification, while continuing with this procedure

E-0 Att A RO/BOP (Step A1) CHECK Charging Pumps – NO

CCP Pump “B” Out of Service

RO/BOP

(Step A2) CHECK SI and RHR Pumps – All running

RO/BOP (Step A3) CHECK ECCS Flow – BIH flow indicated




RO/BOP (Step A4) CHECK ESW Pumps – BOTH RUNNING

• EF HIS-55A • EF HIS-56A

RO/BOP

(Step A5) CHECK CCW Alignment: • CCW Pumps – ONE RUNNING IN EACH TRAIN • CCW Service Loop Supply and Return valves for one

operating CCW pump – OPEN • OPEN CCW To RHR HX valves • CLOSE Spent Fuel Pool HX CCW Outlet Valves • STOP Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump(s) • RECORD The Time Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump

Secured

RO/BOP (Step A6) CHECK Containment Cooler Fans – RUNNING IN SLOW SPEED

RO/BOP (Step A7) CHECK Containment Hydrogen Mixing Fans – RUNNING IN SLOW SPEED

RO/BOP (Step A8) CHECK If Containment Spray should Be Actuated – YES

RO/BOP

(Step A8 RNO) START the 'A' Containment Spray Pump OR Direct an equipment operator to locally OPEN EN-HV-12, CS PUMP B DISCH




Critical Task CREW

Manually actuate containment cooling by: 1) Starting the 'A' Containment Spray Pump OR 2) Directing an equipment operator to locally OPEN EN-HV-12, CS PUMP B DISCH before completion of Attachment A of E-0

RO/BOP

(Step A9) CHECK If Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated: YES • Containment pressure > 17 psig • Steamline pressure – LESS THAN 615 PSIG

B. Check MSIVs and Bypass valves ‑ CLOSED – NO

b. FAST CLOSE all MSIVs and Bypass valves: o AB HS‑79 o AB HS‑80

IF valve(s) will NOT fast close, THEN CLOSE MSIV(s) and bypass valves as necessary.

Critical Task CREW Isolate the faulted ‘D’ SG before transition out of E-2

RO/BOP (Step A10) CHECK ECCS Valves – PROPER EMERGENCY ALIGNMENT

RO/BOP

(Step A11) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A a. ESFAS status panels CISA sections:

• SA066X White lights – ALL LIT • SA066Y White lights – ALL LIT




RO/BOP

(Step A12) CHECK SG Blowdown Isolation: a. ESFAS status panels SGBSIS sections:


RO/BOP (Step A13) CHECK Both Trains of Control Room Ventilation Isolation

RO/BOP (Step A14) CHECK Containment Purge Isolation

RO/BOP

(Step A15) NOTIFY CRS of the following: • Unanticipated Manual actions taken. • Failed Equipment status • Attachment A, Automatic Action Verification, completed.

NOTE CREW

The crew may isolate the ‘D’ SG at any time using the Foldout Page for E-0

• FAST CLOSE MSIVs. • Manually CLOSE or locally ISOLATE any failed open

ASD(s). • ISOLATE feed flow to faulted SG(s). • MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 285,000 lbm/Hr until

narrow range level is greater than 7% [25%] in at least one SG.

E-0 (cont'd) BOP (Step 6) CHECK Generator Output Breakers – Open




BOP

(Step 7) CHECK Feedwater Isolation a. Main Feedwater Pumps – Tripped b. Main Feedwater Reg Valves – Closed c. Main Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves – Closed d. Feedwater Isolation Valves – Closed

RO

(Step 8) CHECK AFW Pumps a. MD AFW Pumps – Both Running b. TD AFW Pump – Running

RO

(Step 9) CHECK AFW Valves – Proper Emergency Alignment • MD AFP Flow Control Valves – Throttled • TD AFP Flow Control Valves – FULL OPEN • TD AFP Loop Steam Supply Valves – Both OPEN IF

NECESSARY

BOP (Step 10) CHECK Total AFW Flow ‑ GREATER THAN 285,000 LBM/HR

RO

(Step 11) Check PZR PORVs And Spray Valves: a. PZR PORVs ‑ CLOSED b. PZR PORVs ‑ BOTH IN AUTO c. PORV Block Valves ‑ BOTH OPEN d. Normal PZR Spray valves ‑ CLOSED

RO

(Step 12) CHECK If RCPs Should Be Stopped: a. RCPs ‑ ANY RUNNING – YES b. ECCS Pumps ‑ AT LEAST ONE RUNNING – YES c. RCS pressure ‑ LESS THAN 1425 PSIG – YES d. STOP all RCPs



Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior NOTE Temperature will be less than 557°F. The crew should have closed

MSIVs by this time.

RO

(Step 13) CHECK RCS Temperatures: • NO RCPs running ‑ RCS COLD LEG TEMPERATURES

STABLE AT 557°F OR TRENDING TO 557°F – NO THEN CONTROL total feed flow: MAINTAIN total feed flow greater than 285,000 lbm/Hr until narrow range level is greater than 7% [25%] in at least one SG.

CRS

(Step 14) CHECK If Any SG Is Faulted: - YES Go to E-2 Faulted Steam Generator Isolation, Step 1

E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation

E-2 CRS Implement E-2, Faulted Steam Generator Isolation

BOP

(Step 1) CHECK MSIVs And Bypass FAST CLOSE all MSIVs and Valves – CLOSED (RNO) The MSIV may already have been closed by either E-0 foldout page or Attachment A of E-0 FAST CLOSE all MSIVs and Bypass valves:

• AB HS-79 • AB HS-80

IF valve(s) will NOT fast close, THEN CLOSE MSIV(s) and bypass valves as necessary.

Critical Task CREW Isolate the faulted ‘A’ SG before transition out of E-2




BOP

(Step 2) CHECK If Any SG Secondary Pressure Boundary Is Intact:

a. CHECK pressures in all SGs - ANY STABLE OR RISING - YES

CRS (Step 3) IDENTIFY Faulted SG(s): - Should identify the ‘A’ SG as

the faulted SG

BOP

(Step 4) ISOLATE Faulted SG(s): a. ISOLATE AFW flow to faulted SG(s):

• CLOSE associated MD AFP Flow Control Valve(s): o AL HK-7A (SG A)

• CLOSE associated TD AFP Flow Control Valve(s): o AL HK-8A (SG A)

(May be isolated per the foldout page of E-0) b. CHECK ASD from b. CLOSE valve(s) as faulted SG(s)-

CLOSED • AB PIC-1A (SG A)

c. (not applicable) d. CHECK Main Feedwater valves to faulted SG(s) – CLOSED

• Main Feedwater Reg Valve: o AE ZL-510 (SG A)

• Main Feedwater Reg Bypass valve: o AE ZL-550 (SG A)

• Feedwater Isolation Valve: o AE HIS-39 (SG A)

e. CHECK SG Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve from faulted SG(s) – CLOSED • BM HIS-1A (SG A)

f. CLOSE Steamline Low Point Drain valve from faulted SG(s): • AB HIS-9 (SG A)



Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior Critical Task CREW Isolate the faulted ‘A’ SG before transition out of E-2

BOP (Step 5) CHECK CST To AFP Suction Header Pressure –

GREATER THAN 2.75 PSIG - YES

BOP

(Step 6) CHECK Secondary Radiation: a. PERFORM the following:

• PERFORM EOP Addendum 11, Restoring SG Sampling After SI Actuation

• DIRECT Chemistry to periodically sample all SGs for activity

• DIRECT Radiation Protection to survey steamlines in Auxiliary Building Area 5 as necessary

b. CHECK unisolated secondary radiation monitors: • SG Sample radiation:

o SJL 026 • SG ASD radiation:

o AB RIC-114 (SG D) • Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Exhaust

radiation: o FC RIC-385

c. Secondary radiation – NORMAL – YES d. Levels in all SGs:

• NO SG LEVEL RISING IN AN UNCONTROLLED MANNER - YES




RO

(Step 7) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Reduced: a. RCS subcooling – GREATER THAN 30°F [50°F] – YES b. Secondary heat sink:

• Narrow range level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 7% [25%] - YES

OR • Total feed flow to intact SGs – GREATER THAN 285,000

LBM/HR – YES c. RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING – YES d. PZR level – GREATER THAN 9% [29%]

RO (Step 8) RESET SI:


BOP

STOP All But One CCP: • BG HIS-1A

OR • BG HIS-2A

CRS Go To ES-1.1, SI Termination, Step 3 NOTE At the Discretion of the Lead Examiner OR once the crew has

transitioned to ES-1.1 – The Scenario can be STOPPED.


Facility: Callaway Scenario No.: 2, rev. 0 Op-Test No.: 2014-1

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% Power, Steady State Conditions. Turnover: NE02 is tagged out for maintenance. Currently in hour 20 of 30 hours scheduled duration. On coming crew will be swapping Service Water Pumps for maintenance. The Outside OT has been briefed and is standing by to swap SW pumps.

Event No.


Event Description

1 N/A

SRO (N) BOP (N)

Start Service Water Pump ‘C’ Secure Service Water Pump ‘A’

2 N/A SRO (C) RO (C)

RCS High Activity / Place 120 gpm Letdown in-service (Tech Spec)

3 BBTE0421B SRO (I) RO (I) Tavg Channel Failure – Loop 2 Tc fails high (Tech Spec)

4 NB01_F

SRO (C) RO (C) BOP (C)

Loss of NB01

5 KAC01_1


Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip

6 Lossofswitchyard.lsn


Loss of all AC Power

7 PAL02_3

SRO (C) BOP (C)

TDAFW fails to Auto Start



Actual Attributes


Scenario Event Description Callaway 2014 Scenario #2, rev. 0

The plant is operating at 100%, steady state power. NE02 is tagged out for maintenance. Currently in hour 20 of 30 hours scheduled duration. On coming crew will be swapping Service Water Pumps for maintenance. After the crew takes the watch, the crew will start ‘C’ Service Water Pump and secure ‘A’ Service Water Pump IAW OTN-EA-00001, Service Water System. After the Service Water Pumps are swapped, a report from Chemistry indicates high activity in the RCS. The Crew will enter OTO-BB-00005, RCS High Activity and establish 120 gpm letdown flow IAW OTN-BG-00001 Addendum 04, Operation of CVCS Letdown. The CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.16. After Tech Specs have been addressed for the RCS High Activity, Tcold Channel BB TE 421 B fails high. The crew will respond using OTO-BB-00004, RTD Channel Failure, and select an operable channel. The CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1. After the crew has addressed the Tcold Channel trip, NB01 will trip and lockout. The crew should enter OTO-NB-00001, Loss of Power to NB01. OTO-NB-00001 will direct the crew to secure NE01 and verify the electric plant line up. After NE01 has been secured a Turbine Trip will occur. This will cause a Reactor Trip. The crew should respond by entering E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The crew will then transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. After the crew has transition to ES-0.1 and prior to Step 6 a Loss of Off Site Power will occur. The crew will transition to ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. The crew will manually start the TDAFW and restore power using EOP Addendum 39, Alternate Emergency Power Supply The scenario can be terminated after power has been restored to NB02.


Critical Tasks: Critical Tasks Establish greater than 285,000 lbm/hr AFW flow rate to the SGs prior to SG dryout

occurring. Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus prior to RCP seal degradation


Failure to establish minimum AFW flow in this scenario is a violation of the basic objective of ECA-0.0 and of the assumptions of the analyses upon which ECA-0.0 is based. Without AFW flow, the SGs could not support any significant plant cooldown. Thus, the crew would lose the ability to delay the adverse consequences of core uncovery.

In the scenario, failure to energize at least one ac emergency bus results in the needless continuation of a situation in which the pumped ECCS capacity and the emergency power capacity are both in a completely degraded status, as are all other active safeguards requiring electrical power. Although the completely degraded status is not due to the crew's action (was not initiated by operator error), continuation in the completely degraded status is a result of the crew's failure to energize at least one ac emergency bus.

Cueing Both of the following: • Indication of Station Blackout AND • Less than 285,000 lbm/hr AFW flow to the SGs

Indication and/or annunciation that all ac emergency buses are de-energized • Bus energized lamps extinguished • Circuit breaker position • Bus voltage • EDG status


Manipulation of the: • TDAFW Steam Supply valve(s):

• AB HIS‑5A (SG B) • AB HIS‑6A (SG C)

• TDAFP Mechanical Trip/Throttle valve: • FC HIS‑312A

Manipulation of controls as required to energize at least one ac emergency bus from the AEPS

• Using PBXY0001 CLOSE AEPS FDR BKR PB0502 TO NB0214 o PB0502

• CLOSE NB02 AEPS SUPPLY BKR NB0214 o NB HIS-68


Crew will observe greater than 285,000 lbm/hr AFW flow to the SGs. Indication that NB02 is energized • NB02 Bus energized light • NB02 bus voltage


Without AFW flow, decay heat would open the SG safety valves and would rapidly deplete the SG inventory, leading to a loss of secondary heat sink, or SG dryout. Decay heat would then increase RCS temperature and pressure until the pressurizer PORVs open, imposing a larger LOCA than RCP seal leakage.

Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.


CT - 23, Establish AFW flow during SBO CT - 24, Energize at least one ac emergency bus


References OTN-EA-00001, Service Water System OTO-BB-00005, RCS High Activity OTN-BG-00001 Addendum 04, Operation of CVCS Letdown OTO-BB-00004, RTD Channel Failure OTO-NB-00001, Loss of Power to NB01 E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power EOP Addendum 39, Alternate Emergency Power Supply


1. Station Blackout (T(1S)) a. Manually Operate TDAFW pump b. AEPS used to power AC Bus

Scenario Setup Guide: Establish the initial conditions of IC-10, MOL 100% power:

• RCS boron concentration 752 ppm • CCP A 765 ppm minus 5 days • CCP B 775 ppm minus 15 days • Rod Control Bank D 215 steps, Other banks 228 steps • NE02 is tagged out with breaker in P-T-L and tag on handswitch • Ensure A and B SW pumps running with C SW pump in STBY

=============SCENARIO PRELOADS / SETUP ITEMS================ NE02 is tagged out for an LCO

• Remote Function (KJ) DGBLOCK_2, Block_Both • Remote Function (KJ) KJHS0109, Local_Manual • ME Schematic (NE) e23nell_b, NE15NB0211_BKRTA_BKPOS, Value=3

TDAFW failure to auto start

• Insert Remote Function (AL) PAL02_3, Value = 1 ============= EVENT 1 ================================== Start Service Water Pump ‘C’ and Secure Service Water Pump ‘A’

• None ============= EVENT 2 ================================== RCS High Activity / Place 120 gpm Letdown in-service

• None =============EVENT 3 ================================== Tavg Channel Failure – Loop 2 Tc

• Insert Malfunction (BB) BBTE0421B, Value = 630 =============EVENT 4 ================================== Loss of NB01

• Insert Malfunction (NB) NB01_F, Value=Fault =============EVENT 5 ============================ Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip

• Insert Malfunction (AC) KAC01_1, Value=True =============EVENT 6 PRELOADED======================= Loss of all AC Power

• Run lesson: All/Generic/lossofswitchyard.lsn =============EVENT 7 PRELOADED======================= TDAFW fails to Auto Start SEE PRELOADS ABOVE


Facility: Callaway Scenario No.: 2, rev. 0 Op-Test No.: 2014-1

Examiners: ____________________________ Operators: _____________________________

____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 100% Power, Steady State Conditions. Turnover: NE02 is tagged out for maintenance. Currently in hour 20 of 30 hours scheduled duration. On coming crew will be swapping Service Water Pumps for maintenance. The Outside OT has been briefed and is standing by to swap SW pumps.

Event No.


Event Description

1 N/A

SRO (N) BOP (N)

Start Service Water Pump ‘C’ Secure Service Water Pump ‘A’

2 N/A SRO (C) RO (C)

RCS High Activity / Place 120 gpm Letdown in-service (Tech Spec)

3 BBTE0421B SRO (I) RO (I) Tavg Channel Failure – Loop 2 Tc fails high (Tech Spec)

4 NB01_F


Loss of NB01

5 KAC01_1


Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip

6 Lossofswitchyard.lsn


Loss of all AC Power

7 PAL02_3

SRO (C) BOP (C)

TDAFW fails to Auto Start



Actual Attributes



The plant is operating at 100%, steady state power. NE02 is tagged out for maintenance. Currently in hour 20 of 30 hours scheduled duration. On coming crew will be swapping Service Water Pumps for maintenance. After the crew takes the watch, The crew will start ‘C’ Service Water Pump and secure ‘A’ Service Water Pump IAW OTN-EA-00001, Service Water System. After the Service Water Pumps are swapped, a report from Chemistry indicates high activity in the RCS. The Crew will enter OTO-BB-00005, RCS High Activity and establish 120 gpm letdown flow IAW OTN-BG-00001 Addendum 04, Operation of CVCS Letdown. The CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.16. After Tech Specs have been addressed for the RCS High Activity, Tcold Channel BB TE 421 B fails high. The crew will respond using OTO-BB-00004, RTD Channel Failure, and select an operable channel. The CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1. After the crew has addressed the Tcold Channel trip, NB01 will trip and lockout. The crew should enter OTO-NB-00001, Loss of Power to NB01. OTO-NB-00001 will direct the crew to secure NE01 and verify the electric plant line up. After NE01 has been secured a Turbine Trip will occur. This will cause a Reactor Trip. The crew should respond by entering E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The crew will then transition to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response. After the crew has transition to ES-0.1 and prior to Step 6 a Loss of Off Site Power will occur. The crew will transition to ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power. The crew will manually start the TDAFW and restore power using EOP Addendum 39, Alternate Emergency Power Supply The scenario can be terminated after power has been restored to NB02.


Critical Tasks: Critical Tasks Establish greater than 285,000 lbm/hr AFW flow rate to the SGs prior to SG dryout

occurring. Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus prior to RCP seal degradation


Failure to establish minimum AFW flow in this scenario is a violation of the basic objective of ECA-0.0 and of the assumptions of the analyses upon which ECA-0.0 is based. Without AFW flow, the SGs could not support any significant plant cooldown. Thus, the crew would lose the ability to delay the adverse consequences of core uncovery.

In the scenario, failure to energize at least one ac emergency bus results in the needless continuation of a situation in which the pumped ECCS capacity and the emergency power capacity are both in a completely degraded status, as are all other active safeguards requiring electrical power. Although the completely degraded status is not due to the crew's action (was not initiated by operator error), continuation in the completely degraded status is a result of the crew's failure to energize at least one ac emergency bus.

Cueing Both of the following: • Indication of Station Blackout AND • Less than 285,000 lbm/hr AFW flow to the SGs

Indication and/or annunciation that all ac emergency buses are de-energized • Bus energized lamps extinguished • Circuit breaker position • Bus voltage • EDG status


Manipulation of the: • TDAFW Steam Supply valve(s):

• AB HIS‑5A (SG B) • AB HIS‑6A (SG C)

• TDAFP Mechanical Trip/Throttle valve: • FC HIS‑312A

Manipulation of controls as required to energize at least one ac emergency bus from the AEPS

• Using PBXY0001 CLOSE AEPS FDR BKR PB0502 TO NB0214 o PB0502

• CLOSE NB02 AEPS SUPPLY BKR NB0214 o NB HIS-68


Crew will observe greater than 285,000 lbm/hr AFW flow to the SGs. Indication that NB02 is energized • NB02 Bus energized light • NB02 bus voltage


Without AFW flow, decay heat would open the SG safety valves and would rapidly deplete the SG inventory, leading to a loss of secondary heat sink, or SG dryout. Decay heat would then increase RCS temperature and pressure until the pressurizer PORVs open, imposing a larger LOCA than RCP seal leakage.

Failure to perform the critical task also results in needless degradation of any barrier to fission product release, specifically of the RCS barrier at the point of the RCP seals. Failure to perform the critical task means that RCS inventory lost through the RCP seals cannot be replaced. It also means that the RCP seals remain without cooling and gradually deteriorate. As the seals deteriorate the rate of RCS inventory loss increases.


CT - 23, Establish AFW flow during SBO CT - 24, Energize at least one ac emergency bus


References OTN-EA-00001, Service Water System OTO-BB-00005, RCS High Activity OTN-BG-00001 Addendum 04, Operation of CVCS Letdown OTO-BB-00004, RTD Channel Failure OTO-NB-00001, Loss of Power to NB01 E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power EOP Addendum 39, Alternate Emergency Power Supply


1. Station Blackout (T(1S)) a. Manually Operate TDAFW pump b. AEPS used to power AC Bus


Scenario Setup Guide: Establish the initial conditions of IC-10, MOL 100% power:

• RCS boron concentration 752 ppm • CCP A 765 ppm minus 5 days • CCP B 775 ppm minus 15 days • Rod Control Bank D 215 steps, Other banks 228 steps • NE02 is tagged out with breaker in P-T-L and tag on handswitch • Ensure A and B SW pumps running with C SW pump in STBY

=============SCENARIO PRELOADS / SETUP ITEMS================ NE02 is tagged out for an LCO

• Remote Function (KJ) DGBLOCK_2, Block_Both • Remote Function (KJ) KJHS0109, Local_Manual • ME Schematic (NE) e23nell_b, NE15NB0211_BKRTA_BKPOS, Value=3

TDAFW failure to auto start

• Insert Remote Function (AL) PAL02_3, Value = 1 ============= EVENT 1 ================================== Start Service Water Pump ‘C’ and Secure Service Water Pump ‘A’

• None ============= EVENT 2 ================================== RCS High Activity / Place 120 gpm Letdown in-service

• None =============EVENT 3 ================================== Tavg Channel Failure – Loop 2 Tc

• Insert Malfunction (BB) BBTE0421B, Value = 630 =============EVENT 4 ================================== Loss of NB01

• Insert Malfunction (NB) NB01_F, Value=Fault =============EVENT 5 ============================ Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip

• Insert Malfunction (AC) KAC01_1, Value=True =============EVENT 6 PRELOADED======================= Loss of all AC Power

• Run lesson: All/Generic/lossofswitchyard.lsn =============EVENT 7 PRELOADED======================= TDAFW fails to Auto Start SEE PRELOADS ABOVE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 1 Page 6 of 36 Event Description: Start Service Water Pump ‘C’ and Secure Service Water Pump ‘A’ Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

Booth Operator Instructions

• T = 0 minutes or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner

• Per the turnover the crew was directed to start ‘C’ Service Water pump and secure ‘A’ Service Water pump per OTN-EA-00001, Service Water System

• If contacted as the Outside OT to ensure service water pump oil sightglass is filled to the

normal level indication wait 5 minutes and report “The oil sightglass is filled to the normal level”

• Respond as the Outside OT for:

o Step 5.3.1 to ENSURE switch for Service Water Pump to be started is RESET: CSTEA2101C, CTRL STA FOR S.W. PUMP C Wait 1 minute and respond “CSTEA2101C, CTRL STA FOR S.W. PUMP

C is RESET” o Step 5.3.2 OPEN the applicable Strainer Differential Pressure Switch Equalizing

Valve: VEA2168C, STRAINER DIFF PRESS SW PRESS EQUAL VALVE. Wait 1 minute and respond “VEA2168C, STRAINER DIFF PRESS SW

PRESS EQUAL VALVE is OPEN” o Step 5.3.2 CLOSE the applicable Strainer Differential Pressure Switch Equalizing

Valve: VEA2168C, STRAINER DIFF PRESS SW PRESS EQUAL VALVE. Wait 1 minute and respond “VEA2168C, STRAINER DIFF PRESS SW

PRESS EQUAL VALVE is CLOSED” o Step 5.4.8 IF any service water pumps are in NAS, ENSURE CSEA2102, SERV

WTR PMPS AUTO BACK-UP SELECTOR SW, (on CPEA2107, SERVICE WATER VALVE CONTROL CABINET) is in AUTO.

Wait 1 minute and respond “CSEA2102, SERV WTR PMPS AUTO BACK-UP SELECTOR SW is in AUTO.”

• If contacted as the Outside OT to check is ‘C’ SW pump is running normally wait 2

minutes and report “‘C’ SW pump is running normally”

OTN-EA-00001, Service Water System

CRS Implement OTN-EA-00001, Service Water System to start ‘C’ Service Water pump and secure ‘A’ Service Water pump

OTN-EA-00001 CRS (Precautions and Limitations) CRS reviews Precautions and

Limitations

CRS (Prerequisites) CRS reviews and verifies Prerequisites are met.


CRS (Section 5.3) Direct the BOP to start the ‘C’ Service Water pump using section 5.3 and secure ‘A’ Service Water pump using section 5.4.

(CAUTION) Any Service Water Pump Lockout or Pump/Bus Lockout/Undervoltage will result in one of the following: • Cause an auto start of an idle pump if in STANDBY,

provided CSEA2102 is in AUTO. • Prevent normal shutdown of a running pump.

BOP

(Step 5.3.1) ENSURE switch for Service Water Pump to be started is RESET:

• CSTEA2101C, CTRL STA FOR S.W. PUMP C

BOP

(Step 5.3.2) START a service water pump as follows: a. OPEN the applicable Strainer Differential Pressure

Switch Equalizing Valve: • VEA2168C, STRAINER DIFF PRESS SW

PRESS EQUAL VALVE. b. Using the applicable switch below, START the desired

service water pump and ENSURE the associated discharge valve opens.

• PBHIS12303, SERV WATER PUMP C c. CLOSE the applicable Strainer Differential Pressure

Switch Equalizing Valve: • VEA2168C, STRAINER DIFF PRESS SW

PRESS EQUAL VALVE.

BOP (Step 5.3.3) IF three service water pumps are operating, Go To Section 5.4 to secure the selected pump.


BOP (Step 5.4.1) IF swapping Service Water Pumps, ENSURE the replacement pump is started prior to securing the pump to be replaced.

BOP (Step 5.4.2) ENSURE sufficient SW/ESW pumps are available to maintain cooling to system loads.

NOTE (NOTE) Service Water provides lube water to the Circulating Water pumps.

BOP (5.4.3) This step is N/A

(Caution) Any Service Water Pump Lockout or Pump/Bus Lockout/Undervoltage will result in one of the following:

• Cause an auto start of an idle pump if in STANDBY, provided CSEA2102 is in AUTO.

• Prevent normal shutdown of a running pump.

BOP (Step 5.4.4) This step is N/A

BOP

(Step 5.4.5) Using the applicable switch below, SECURE the desired Service Water Pump:

• PBHIS12303, SERV WATER PUMP C

BOP (Step 5.4.6) CHECK SW/ESW component parameters to ensure adequate cooling flow exists.



BOP (Step 5.4.8) IF any service water pumps are in NAS, ENSURE CSEA2102, SERV WTR PMPS AUTO BACK-UP SELECTOR SW, (on CPEA2107, SERVICE WATER VALVE CONTROL CABINET) is in AUTO.



Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 2 Page 10 of 36 Event Description: RCS High Activity / Place 120 gpm Letdown in-service Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior



• Call Control room as Chemistry and inform the CRS that the RCS sample indicates 4 micro curies per gram of I-131with a rising trend.

• Respond as Chemisrty • Respond as RP • Respond as Duty Manager

Indications Available: T= 15 Call from Chemistry Lab

OTO-BB-00005, RCS Activity

CRS Implement OTO-BB-00005, RCS Activity

OTO-BB-00005 RO (Step 1) MAXIMIZE Letdown Flow Through CVCS Letdown Mixed

Bed Demineralizer

CRS Directs changing letdown from 75 gpm to 120 gpm per OTN-BG-

00001 ADD 04, Operation of CVCS Letdown Step 5.6

OTN-BG-00001 ADD 04

CRS (Precautions and Limitations) CRS reviews Precautions and Limitations

CRS (Prerequisites) CRS reviews and verifies Prerequisites are met.

(NOTE) To prevent flashing at the Letdown orifices, letdown temperature must be maintained less than or equal to 350°F on BG TI-127, REGEN HX LTDN OUTLET TEMP.


(CAUTION) Changes in letdown temperature affect Core reactivity. Therefore, when changing letdown flow rates, operation of BG TK-130, LTDN HX OUTLET TEMP CTRL, should be closely monitored such that letdown temperature per BG TI-130, LTDN HX OUTLET TEMP, is slowly changed following letdown flow changes. A significant temperature rise at the Regenerative Hx. Outlet can cause leakage through BG8117, CVCS LTDN HDR PRESS RLF.

BOP (Step 5.6.1) INFORM Chemistry letdown flow is being changed.

RO

(Step 5.6.2) ENSURE Pressurizer Backup Heaters are in Manual Heater Operation per OTN-BB-00005, Pressurizer And Pressurizer Pressure Control.

RO

(Step 5.6.3) RAISE charging flow to 115 to 120 gpm using one of the following controllers:

• IF NCP is in service, ADJUST BG FK-124, NCP DISCH FLOW CTRL

RO

(Step 5.6.4) IF NCP is in service, WHEN flow indicated at BG FI 0121A, CHG HDR FLOW, is greater than 100 gpm, CLOSE BGHV8109 using BG HIS 8109, NCP RECIRC VLV.

BOP

(Step 5.6.5) ADJUST BG HC-182, CHG HDR BACK PRESS CTRL, to maintain seal injection flow of approximately 8 gpm per pump, as indicated on:

• BG FR-154, RCP D SEAL LEAKOFF & INJ FLOW • BG FR-155, RCP C SEAL LEAKOFF & INJ FLOW • BG FR-156, RCP B SEAL LEAKOFF & INJ FLOW • BG FR-157, RCP A SEAL LEAKOFF & INJ FLOW

RO

(Step 5.6.6) PLACE BG PK-131, LTDN HX OUTLET PRESS CTRL, in MANUAL and ADJUST output to control pressure on BG PI-131, LTDN HX OUTLET PRESS, at approximately 190 psig.


RO (Step 5.6.7) Using BG HIS-8149AA, LTDN ORIFICE A VLV, OPEN

45 gpm Letdown orifice.

RO

(Step 5.6.8) MONITOR pressure at BG PI-131, LTDN HX OUTLET PRESS, and:

a. IF required, SLOWLY ADJUST BG PK-131, LTDN HX OUTLET PRESS CTRL, to control pressure at approximately 350 psig.

b. WHEN letdown flow and pressure have stabilized, AND BG PI-131 is reading 350 psig, PLACE BG PK-131 in AUTO.

RO (Step 5.6.9) CHECK BG TI-130, LTDN HX OUTLET TEMP.

RO

(Step 5.6.10) IF required, slowly adjust potentiometer on BG TK-130, LTDN HX TEMP CTRL (3.0 to 4.3 turns) to control temperature at 95°F to 115°F.

RO (Step 5.6.11) PLACE in MANUAL and ADJUST BB LK-459, PZR

LEV MASTER CTRL, to obtain an output of 64 to 68 %.

RO (Step 5.6.12) IF NCP is in service, PLACE BG FK-121, CCP DISCH FLOW CTRL, in MANUAL and ADJUST to 25 % demand.

RO (Step 5.6.13) WHEN pressurizer level is being maintained at program level, PLACE the following in AUTO as required:

• BG FK-124, NCP DISCH FLOW CTRL

RO

(Step 5.6.14) RESTORE Pressurizer Backup Heaters to Automatic Heater Operation per OTN-BB-00005, Pressurizer And Pressurizer Pressure Control.

OTO-BB-00005

(Note) RCS coolant and seal injection filters D/P will rise if a crud burst has occurred.


BOP (Step 2) MONITOR D/P On RCS Coolant And Seal Injection Filters

CRS (Step 3) DIRECT Chemistry To Sample RCS For Activity

BOP (Step 4) NOTIFY Radiation Protection Of Rising RCS Activity

CRS (Step 5) DIRECT Chemistry To Determine If Decontamination Factor (DF) of CVCS Letdown Mixed Bed Demineralizer Is Acceptable Per CDP-ZZ-00800, Callaway Resin Monitoring Program

BOP (Step 6) CHECK DF Of Inservice CVCS Letdown Mixed Bed

Demineralizer - ACCEPTABLE

CRS (Step 7) REVIEW Technical Specification 3.4.16 TS 3.4.16 Condition A is applicable

NOTE After 120 gpm letdown has been established, TS identified

and at Lead Examiner’s discretion move to the next Event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 3 Page 14 of 36 Event Description: Tavg Channel Failure – Loop 2 Tc (TS) Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

Booth Operator Instructions T = 25 minutes or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner

Tavg Channel Failure – Loop 2 Tc (TS)

• Insert Malfunction (BB) BBTE0421B, Value = 630

• When contacted, respond as I&C. Acknowledge the request to trip bistables and investigate the channel failure. Tripping of Bistables will not be performed this shift.

• When contacted, respond as Duty Manager. Acknowledge entry into the OTO Indications Available: T= 25

Ann 67B LOOP 2 ΔT LO DEV Ann 66D LOOP 2 TAVG LO Ann 68D LOOP 3 TAVG LO Ann 69D LOOP 4 TAVG LO Ann 65C AUCT T AVG HI Ann 65E TREF/TAUCT LO (and others)

OTO-BB-00004, RTD Channel Failure

CRS Implement OTO-BB-00004, RTD Channel Failure

OTO-BB-00004 RO (Step 1) Place Rod Control in Manual

RO (Step 2) Check RCS Loop NR Tavg and Delta-T Indicator FAILED

RO (Step 3) Select ΔT and Tavg Channel Defeat switches to failed Channel


RO

(Step 4) Check RCS Tavg Within 1.5°F of Tref (potential RNO) RESTORE RCS Tavg to within 1.0 F of Tre f using any of the following:

• ADJUST Control Rods. • ADJUST Turbine load. • ADJUST RCS Boron concentration.

RO

(Step 5) Check Rod Control in Auto (potential RNO) WHEN RCS Tavg is stable within 1.0°F of Tref AND Shift Manager/Control Room Supervisor concurs, THEN PLACE Rod Control in Auto.

CRS (Step 6) Check PZR Level Trending to or At Program Level

CRS (Step 7) Select an Operable Channel for the OPΔT/OTΔT Temperature recorder

RO (Step 8) Review Attachment A for effects of RCS RTD Instrument failure

CRS

(Step 9) Review Applicable Technical Specifications, Refer to Attachment J TS 3.3.1 Cond E, 72 hours

CRS (Step 10) Direct I&C to Trip The Protective Bistables for the Failed Channel within 72 hours of the Channel Failure.

CRS (Step 11) Place the Inoperable RCS NR RTD Channel in the EOSL

CRS (Step 12) Initiate Actions to Repair the Failed Channel


CRS (Step 13) Perform notifications per ODP-ZZ-00001, Add. 13

NOTE After the Technical Specification is identified and at Lead Examiner’s discretion move to the next Event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 4 Page 17 of 36 Event Description: Loss of NB01 Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior


Loss of NB01

• Insert Malfunction (NB) NB01_F, Value=Fault

• When contacted, respond as Duty Manager as requested

• If contacted as the Secondary OT to investigate Loss of NB01 wait 5 minutes and respond “NB01 and the feeder breaker are locked out and NB0112 has an instantaneous overcurrent”

• If contacted as an OT to investigate TDAFP wait 3 minutes and respond “The TDAFP appears normal”

• When contacted as an OT to:

o PLACE NE01 Local Master Transfer Switch to LOCAL/MAN position and PRESS DG train A local STOP push‑button to stop the EDG, wait 3 minutes and respond “NE01 Local Master Transfer Switch is in LOCAL/MAN position and ‘A” DG has been stopped”

o Insert Remote KJ HS0009 local and KJ HS0008B Indications Available: T=30

ANN 18A, NB01 Bus Lockout ANN 18B, NB01 Bus UV ANN 19A, XNB01 Xfmr Lockout ANN 19B, NB01 Bus Dgrd Volt Multiple other alarms

OTO-NB-00001, Loss of Power to NB01

OTO-NB-00001 CRS Implement OTO-NB-00001, Loss of Power to NB01

BOP

(Step 1) CHECK 4160 VAC Bus NB01 ‑ DEENERGIZED • 4.16 KV Bus NB01 light ‑ EXTINGUISHED

o NB ZL‑5 • 4.16 KV Bus NB01 Voltage indicates zero

o NB EI‑1


(Note) The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump(s) remain operable with its discharge valves closed or throttled in order to maintain SG levels when started due to an AFAS. (RFR 010782A, RFR 010782C)

BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump ‑ SECURED

NOTE The TDAFW pump SHOULD have started. The crew should recognized this and continue on in the procedure.

RO

(Step 3) CHECK Reactor Power ‑ LESS THAN 100% • SE NI‑41B • SE NI‑42B • SE NI‑43B • SE NI‑44B • BB TI‑411A (ΔT) • BB TI‑421A (ΔT) • BB TI‑431A (ΔT) • BB TI‑441A (ΔT)

Potential RNO • REDUCE Turbine load using the Load Limit Potentiometer.

OR • REDUCE Turbine load using the %/Min Loading Rate:

(Note) RCPs that lose Seal Injection AND CCW To Thermal Barrier Heat Exchanger must have at least one restored within 6 minutes or the RCP MUST be secured.

BOP

(Step 4) CHECK CCW Pump B Or D ‑ RUNNING • EG HIS‑22 • EG HIS‑24


BOP

(Step 5) CHECK CCW Service Loop Is Being Supplied From Train B:

• EG ZL‑54 ‑ OPEN • EG ZL‑16 ‑ OPEN

BOP (Step 6) CHECK If CCW aligned to the RCPs

BOP

(Step 7) CHECK RHR ‑ IN SERVICE PRIOR TO EVENT RNO - Go To Step 10.

BOP

(Step 10) CHECK Steam Generator NR Level Within One Of The Following:

• Trending to between 45% and 55% OR

• Between 45% and 55%

BOP

(Step 11) CHECK Pressurizer Level Within One Of The Following: • Trending to Program Level

OR • At Program Level

RO

(Step 12) CHECK Pressurizer Pressure Within One Of The Following:

• Trending to between 2220 psig and 2250 psig OR

• Between 2220 psig and 2250 psig


BOP

(Step 13) ENSURE the following 4160 VAC bus NB01 loads shed: (LSELS actuation, handswitch light green):

• ESW Pump A: o EF HIS‑55A

• CCW Pump A/C: o EG HIS‑21 o EG HIS‑23

• SI Pump A: o EM HIS‑4

• Ctmt Spray Pump A: o EN HIS‑3

• RHR Pump A: o EJ HIS‑1

BOP (Step 14) OPEN NB01 Normal And Alternate Feeder Breakers:

• NB HIS‑2, NB01 Normal Supply Breaker NB0112 • NB HIS‑3, NB01 Alternate Supply Breaker NB0109

(Note) Attachment B, Diesel Generator A Engine Shutdown Relay, may be used as an aid.

BOP (Step 15) CHECK EDG A ‑ RUNNING

(Note) • Attachment C, Requirements For Auto Closure Of NE01

Output Breaker, may be used as an aid. • Attachment D, NE01 Output Breaker Trips, may be used

as an aid.


BOP

(Step 16) CHECK NB01 Emergency Supply Breaker ‑ CLOSED • NE HIS‑25

RNO PERFORM the following: a. N/A due to lockout b. IF EDG A is running AND ESW flow can not be

established to EDG A, THEN PERFORM the following: 1) PLACE NE01 Local Master Transfer Switch to

LOCAL/MAN position: • KJ HS‑9

2) PRESS DG train A local STOP push‑button to stop the EDG:

• KJ HS‑8B

(Note) 'A' Train CCW pump handswitches are placed in Pull‑To‑Lock to prevent breaker cycling while NB01 is de‑energized.

BOP

(Step 17) CHECK 4160 VAC Bus NB01 ‑ ENERGIZED RNO Perform the following: Place 'A' CCW Train Pump handswitches in Pull‑To‑Lock until power is restored to NB01

• EG HIS‑21 • EG HIS‑23

RO

(Step 18) CHECK NCP Or CCP B ‑ RUNNING • BG HIS‑3 (NCP)

OR • BG HIS‑2A (CCP B)

BOP (Step 19) CHECK RCP Seal Injection Flow ‑ BETWEEN 8 GPM AND 13 GPM PER PUMP

BOP (Step 20) CHECK Any Service Air Compressor ‑ RUNNING


CUE Any time after NE01 is secured and at Lead Examiner’s discretion move to the next Event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 5 Page 23 of 36 Event Description: Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

Booth Operator Instructions T = 50 minutes or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner Turbine Trip / Reactor Trip

• Insert Malfunction (AC) KAC01_1, Value=True Loss of all AC (Inserted AFTER the entry into ES-0.1 and prior to step 6 of ES-0.1 or if the Crew attempt to transition to FR-H.1 and at the discretion of the Lead Evaluator)

• Run lesson: All/Generic/lossofswitchyard.lsn TDAFW Pump fails to AUTO Start

• PRELOADED

• When contacted, respond as Duty Manager. • When contacted as Radiation Protection, respond as requested. • When contacted as Chemistry, respond as requested. • When contacted as the STA, respond as requested. • When contacted as Transmission, respond “It is unknown when power will be restored”. • When contacted as the Field Supervisor, respond as requested. • When contacted as an OT to perform various EOP Addendums, respond as requested. • When contacted as an OT to locally CLOSE CST Makeup to Hotwell Isolation, APV0012,

wait 3 minutes and respond “CST Makeup to Hotwell Isolation, APV0012 is CLOSED” Indications Available: T=50 All rod bottom lights lit



Note Steps 1 through 4 are immediate actions.

RO

(Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip • Rod Bottom Lights – All Lit • Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers – Open • Neutron Flux – Lowering

BOP (Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip a. Turbine Stop Valves – Closed


E-0 BOP

(Step 3) CHECK Power to AC Emergency Buses a. At Least One Emergency Bus – Energized b. Both Emergency Buses – NO

NOTE

RO

(Step 4) CHECK SI Status a. Check if SI is Actuated - NO

IF SI is NOT required, THEN Go To ES‑0.1, Reactor Trip Response, Step 1.

CRS Transitions to ES-0.1, Reactor Trip Response

ES-0.1

BOP

(Step 1.a) CHECK RCS Temperature Control: a. CHECK RCPs - ANY RUNNING – NO

RNO a. TRANSFER Condenser Steam Dump to Steam Pressure

Mode: 1) Check Condenser ‑AVAILABLE

• C‑9 interlocks LIT • MSIVs ‑ ANY OPEN

2) PLACE Steam Header Pressure Controller in MANUAL and ZERO OUTPUT:

• AB PK‑507 3) PLACE Steam Dump Select switch in STM PRESS

position: • AB US‑500Z

4) PLACE Steam Header Pressure Controller in AUTO:

• AB PK‑507

BOP

(Step 1.b) CHECK RCS temperature response – NORMAL RCS COLD LEG TEMPERATURES STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 557°F IF NO RCP RUNNING


BOP

(Step 2) CHECK Status Of AC Buses: a. CHECK Generator Output Breakers – OPEN

• MA ZL-3A (V55) • MA ZL-4A (V53)

b. CHECK All AC Buses - ENERGIZED BY OFFSITE POWER

• PA01 • PA02 • NB01 • NB02

RNO PERFORM the following: 1) ENSURE both PZR PORVs are in AUTO unless closed

due to low PZR pressure: • BB HIS-455A • BB HIS-456A

2) ENSURE both PORV Block Valves are energized and OPEN unless closed to isolate an open PORV:

• BB HIS-8000A (NG01BBR3) • BB HIS-8000B (NG02BDF1)

3) IF any AC emergency bus(es) are NOT energized by offsite power, THEN ENSURE DGs have assumed the following loads:

• CCP(s) • ESW Pump(s) • CCW Pump(s) (One per Train) • Containment Cooler Fan(s) • MD AFW Pump(s) • Control Room AC Unit(s) • Class 1E Electrical Equipment Room AC Unit(s)

RO/BOP

(Step 3) CHECK PZR Pressure Control: a. Pressure - GREATER THAN 1849 psig b. Pressure - STABLE AT OR TRENDING TO 2235 PSIG


RO

(Step 4) CHECK PZR Level Control: a. PZR Level – GREATER THAN 17% b. CHECK Instrument Air Supply Containment Isolation

valve – OPEN • KA HIS-29

c. CHECK charging – IN SERVICE d. CHECK letdown - IN SERVICE e. PZR level – TRENDING TO 25%

RO/

(Step 5) CHECK Shutdown Reactivity Status: a. CHECK all control rods - FULLY INSERTED b. CHECK if uncontrolled RCS dilution - IN PROGRESS c. ALIGN charging pump suction to RWST:

1) OPEN both Charging Pump Suction From RWST valves:

• BN HIS-112D • BN HIS-112E

2) CLOSE both VCT Outlet valves: • BG HIS-112B • BG HIS-112C

CUE Prior to Step 6 of ES-0.1 Run lesson: All/Generic/lossofswitchyard.lsn when directed by the Lead Evaluator

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014 Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 6, 7 Page 27 of 36 Event Description: Loss of All AC Power and TDAFW pump fail to start Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power

CRS

Recognizes loss of all AC power though direct observation or reports from RO and BOP. Transitions to ECA-0.0, Loss of All AC Power

ECA-0.0

(Note) • Steps 1 and 2 are immediate action steps. • CSF status trees should be monitored for information only.

Functional Restoration Procedures should NOT be implemented.

RO

(Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip: • Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers ‑ OPEN • Neutron Flux ‑ LOWERING

BOP

(Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip: a. All Turbine Stop valves ‑ CLOSED

RO

(Step 3) CHECK If RCS Is Isolated: a. Letdown isolation valves ‑CLOSED

1) Letdown Orifice Isolation valves: • BG HIS‑8149AA • BG HIS‑8149BA • BG HIS‑8149CA

2) RCS Letdown to Regen HX valves: • BG HIS‑459 • BG HIS‑460


RO/BOP

(Step 3 continued) CHECK If RCS Is Isolated: b. PZR PORVs ‑ CLOSED

• BB HIS‑455A • BB HIS‑456A

c. RCS To Excess Letdown HX valves ‑ CLOSED • BG HIS‑8153A • BG HIS‑8154A • BG HIS‑8153B • BG HIS‑8154B

d. Reactor Head Vent Valves ‑CLOSED • BB HIS‑8001A • BB HIS‑8002A • BB HIS‑8001B • BB HIS‑8002B

RO

(Step 4) CHECK AFW Flow ‑ GREATER THAN 285,000 LBM/HR RNO PERFORM the following:

a. CHECK TDAFW Pump running. IF TDAFW Pump is NOT running, THEN START TDAFW Pump:

• OPEN AFP Turbine Loop Steam Supply valve(s): • AB HIS‑5A (SG B) • AB HIS‑6A (SG C)

• OPEN TDAFP Mechanical Trip/Throttle valve: • FC HIS‑312A

Critical Task CREW Establish greater than 285,000 lbm/hr AFW flow rate to the

SGs prior to SG dryout occurring.


BOP

(Step 5) TRY To Restore Power to Any AC Emergency Bus: a. ENERGIZE AC emergency bus with diesel generator: - NO b. CHECK AC emergency buses ‑AT LEAST ONE

ENERGIZED – NO c. CHECK ESW Pump associated with energized AC

emergency bus(es) ‑RUNNING RNO

d) IF NO AC emergency bus is energized, THEN PERFORM the following:

1. OPEN Control Room cabinet doors using EOP Addendum 20, Control Room Cabinet Door List.

2. Go To Step 6. OBSERVE CAUTIONS prior to Step 6.

(Caution) • When power is restored to any AC emergency bus, recovery

actions should continue starting with Step 24. • If an SI signal exists or if an SI signal is actuated during this

procedure, it should be reset to permit manual loading of equipment on AC emergency bus(es)

• An ESW pump should remain available (NOT locked out) to automatically load on its energized AC emergency bus to provide diesel generator cooling.


BOP

(Step 6) PLACE Following Equipment Switches In PULL‑TO‑LOCK Position:

• CCPs: o BG HIS‑1A o BG HIS‑2A

• SI Pumps: o EM HIS‑4 o EM HIS‑5

• RHR Pumps: o EJ HIS‑1 o EJ HIS‑2

• Containment Spray Pumps: o EN HIS‑3 o EN HIS‑9

• CCW Pumps: o EG HIS‑21 o EG HIS‑22 o EG HIS‑23 o EG HIS‑24

• Containment Cooler Fans: o GN HIS‑5 o GN HIS‑9 o GN HIS‑13 o GN HIS‑17

• Motor Driven AFW Pumps: o AL HIS‑22A o AL HIS‑23A

• Control Room AC Unit: o GK HIS‑29 o GK HIS‑40

• Class 1E Electrical Equipment Room AC Unit: o GK HIS‑100 o GK HIS‑103


BOP

(Step 7) RESTORE AC Power: a. CHECK if offsite power source ‑ AVAILABLE – NO

2. CONSULT Power Supervisor and Transmission Dispatcher for status and assistance in restoring an offsite power source. IF offsite power is NOT available, THEN RESTORE power to one NB Bus using: • EOP Addendum 39, Alternate Emergency

Power Supply

CRS (Step 8) Locally ISOLATE RCP Seals Using EOP Addendum 22, Local RCP Seal Isolation (direct OT to perform this task)

RO

(Step 9) CHECK If CST Is Isolated From Hotwell: a. PLACE condenser hotwell level controllers in MANUAL

and ZERO OUTPUT: • Condensate Reject To CST Controller:

• AD LIC‑79A • Condenser Hotwell Makeup Level Controller:

• AD LIC‑79B b. Locally CLOSE CST Makeup To Hotwell Isolation:

• APV0012


RO

(Step 10) CHECK SG Status: a. MSIVs and Bypass valves ‑CLOSED b. Main Feedwater Reg Valves - CLOSED

• AE ZL‑510 (SG A) • AE ZL‑520 (SG B) • AE ZL‑530 (SG C) • AE ZL‑540 (SG D)

b. Main Feedwater Reg Bypass Valves - CLOSED • AE ZL‑550 (SG A) • AE ZL‑560 (SG B) • AE ZL‑570 (SG C) • AE ZL‑580 (SG D)

c. Feedwater Isolation Valves - CLOSED • AE HIS‑39 (SG A) • AE HIS‑40 (SG B) • AE HIS‑41 (SG C) • AE HIS‑42 (SG D)

b. SG Blowdown Isolation valves - CLOSED • BM HIS‑1A (SG A) • BM HIS‑2A (SG B) • BM HIS‑3A (SG C) • BM HIS‑4A (SG D)

EOP Addendum 39, Alternate Emergency Power Supply

CRS Directs use of EOP Addendum 39, Alternate Emergency Power Supply, to energize NB02

EOP ADD 39

(Caution) The Diesels from the Alternate Emergency Power Supply (AEPS) are designed to support only one AC Emergency Bus at a time. Central Electric Power Reform Substation may be able to supply power to both AC Emergency Buses depending on power reserves


(Note) • Figure A, Alternate Emergency Power Supply One Line

Diagram, is available for reference. • Attachment F, AEPS Diesel Generator Alarms and Trips, is

available for reference.

CRS/BOP (Step 1) EVALUATE Plant Status To Determine Which AC Emergency Bus To Energize: NB02

BOP

(Step 2) ALIGN AC Emergency Buses For Alternate Emergency Power Supply

a. PLACE NB01 Emergency Supply Breaker NB0111 in PULL-TO-LOCK

• NE HIS-25 b. PLACE NB01 Alternate Supply Breaker NB0109 in PULL-

TO-LOCK • NB HIS-3

c. PLACE NB01 Normal Supply Breaker NB0112 in PULL-TO-LOCK

• NB HIS-2 d. PLACE NB02 Normal Supply Breaker NB0209 in PULL-

TO-LOCK • NB HIS-4

e. PLACE NB02 Alternate Supply Breaker NB0212 in PULL-TO-LOCK

• NB HIS-5 f. PLACE NB02 Emergency Supply Breaker NB0211 in

PULL-TO-LOCK • NE HIS-26

g. PLACE NB02 AEPS Supply Breaker NB0214 in PULL-TO-LOCK

• NB HIS-68 h. PLACE NB01 AEPS Supply Breaker NB0114 in PULL-TO-

LOCK • NB HIS-67


BOP

(Step 3) PERFORM Applicable Attachment As Necessary: b. NB02

• Attachment B, Energizing NB02 From Alternate Emergency Power Supply (AEPS), Step B1

BOP

(Step B1) CHECK PB05 – ENERGIZED a. CHECK PB05 Energized by Central Electric Power

Reform Substation b. NOTIFY Central Electric Power Transmission System

Operator (TSO) of Callaway's required approximately 6 MW for emergency power from the Reform Substation

• 573-761-2800 (Main number) (if on AEPS DGs this call does not need to be made)

BOP

(Step B2) PLACE ESW PUMP B In PULL-TO-LOCK • EF HIS-56A

BOP

(Step B3) Using PBXY0001 CLOSE AEPS FDR BKR PB0502 TO NB0214

• PB0502

(NOTE) Handswitch NB HIS-68 must be held in the CLOSE position for a minimum of 3 seconds to allow the Undervoltage relay to reset

BOP

(Step B4) CLOSE NB02 AEPS SUPPLY BKR NB0214 • NB HIS-68

Critical Task CREW Energize at least one AC Emergency Bus prior to RCP seal

degradation


(Note) An AEPS DG at full load uses 139 gal/hr fuel. At this rate, the low fuel level alarm will be received in approximately 19 hours and will be empty in 25 hours.

BOP

(Step B5) MONITOR AEPS System Using PBXY0001: • Watts • Amps • Volts • Fuel (DG only)

BOP

(Step B6) NOTIFY Jefferson City Oil To REFUEL AEPS DGs As Necessary:

• Contact information located in Call Out List (if on COOP power this call does not need to be made)

(Caution) To avoid tripping other NB02 loads 'B' ESW pump must be started first.

(Note) No loading restrictions apply if NB02 is energized by Central Electric Power Reform Substation.

BOP (Step B7) CHECK NB02 Energized By Central Electric Power Reform Substation Or A Minimum Of 3 AEPS DGs

BOP

(Step B8) When Off-Site Power Is Available Restore Power To NB02 Using Attachment E, Restore Normal Power To NB02, Step E1

CRS/BOP Return To Procedure and Step In Effect

ECA-0.0 Loss of All AC Power


CRS Upon restoration of AC Power the CRS will direct a transition to step 24 of ECA-0.0

ECA-0.0

BOP

(Step 24) CHECK If AC Emergency Power Is Restored: a. CHECK AC emergency buses ‑AT LEAST ONE

ENERGIZED • NB02

BOP

(Step 25) STABILIZE SG Pressures: a. Manually CONTROL SG ASDs to maintain existing SG

pressures

BOP

(Step 26) Check Following Equipment Loaded on Energized AC Emergency Bus:

• NB02: o 480 Volt Buses:

NG02 breakers NB0213 and NG0201 NG04 breakers NB0210 and NG0401

o Battery Chargers: NK24 breaker NG0203 NK22 breaker NG0403

o Instrument and Control: NN02 NN04

o Communications: QF076 Emergency Supply Breaker PN0803

NOTE At the Discretion of the Lead Examiner OR once the crew has Re-Energized an AC Bus – The Scenario can be STOPPED.



____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________


Event No.


Event Description

1 SEN0044 SRO (I) RO (I) Nuclear Instrument Fails high. (Tech Specs)

2 AELT0519 SRO (I) BOP (I) SG Level Instrument Fails to 75% (Tech Specs)

3 PAE01A_2 PAE01A_3 PAE01A_4

SRO (R) RO (R) BOP (C)

MFP Vibrations Forcing Downpower

4 PAE0`A.1 SRO (C) RO (C) BOP (C)

MFP Trip / Rx Trip

5 SF006 SRO (M) RO (M) Reactor Trip Failure / ATWS

6 TBB03 SRO (M) RO (M) Pressurizer Steam Space Leak

7 SIS_A SIS_B

SRO (C) RO (C) Automatic SI Actuation Failure Both Trains



Actual Attributes


Scenario Event Description Callaway 2014-1 NRC Scenario #3, rev. 0

The plant is steady at 100% power. After the crew takes the watch, N44 will fail high. The crew will respond with OTO-SE-00001, Nuclear Instrument Malfunction, to select an operable channel and bypass the failed instrument. The CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1. After the failed NI has been bypassed and the CRS has identified the applicable Tech Specs, Steam Generator ‘A’ controlling level channel slowly fails to 75%. The crew will respond using OTO-AE-00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Instrument Malfunctions, to control SG level. The CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1. and 3.3.2 After Tech Specs have been addressed, ‘A’ MFP will develop vibrations. The crew will respond with OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction to lower power to below 65%. The crew will lower turbine load and borate to lower power. After the crew has lowered power 5 to 10 MWe and prior to reducing power less than 70%, ‘A’ MFP will trip. The crew will respond IAW OTO-AE-00001, Feedwater System Malfunction and attempt to trip the reactor. When the crew attempts to trip the reactor rods will not insert. The crew will respond by entering E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and transitioning to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. The crew will be able to successfully de-energize PG19 and 20, insert control rods, and emergency borate the RCS. After rods have been inserted and the reactor has been shutdown the crew will transition back to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. After the transition back to E-0, a leak in the PZR steam space develops. When the RCS depressurizes SI fails to automatically initiate. The crew will manually initiate SI and transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. The scenario can be terminated after the EDGs are secured in E-1.


Critical Tasks: Critical Tasks Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before

dispatching operators to locally Trip the Reactor • Deenergize PG19 and PG20 • Insert Control Rods • Establish emergency boration flow to the RCS

Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards equipment before transition to E-1.


In the scenario, failure to insert negative reactivity by one of the methods listed previously can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the crew (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the crew's failure to insert negative reactivity.

In the scenario, failure to manually actuate Sl results in a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Failure to manually actuate Sl in the scenario would be a violation of the facility license condition. Although the degraded status is not due to the crew's action, continuation in the degraded status would be a result of the crew's failure to manually actuate Sl.

Cueing Both of the following: • Indication of ATWS (the reactor is not tripped and that a manual reactor trip is not

effective)

Indication and/or annunciation that that Sl is required • PRZR pressure or SG pressure less than Sl actuation setpoint No indication or annunciation that Sl is actuated


Manipulation of controls in the control room as required to initiate the insertion of negative reactivity into the core (at least one of the following)

• Open supply breakers to PG19 and PG20. o PG HIS-16 and PG HIS-18

• Insert Control Rods at the Maximum Rate. • ALIGN emergency boration flow path:

o Start boric acid transfer pumps BG HIS-5A and BG HIS-6A

o OPEN Emergency Borate To Charging Pump Suction valve: BG HIS-8104

Manipulation of controls as required to actuate at least one train of Sl • SB HS-27 • SB HS-28


Crew will observe the following: • Indication of a negative SUR on the intermediate range of the excore NIS • Indication of less than 5% power on the power range of the excore NIS

Indication that both Trains of SI – Actuated • LOCA Sequencer annunciator 30A – Lit • LOCA Sequencer annunciator 30B – Lit • SB069 SI Actuate Red Light – Lit SOLID (NOT blinking)


Local operator actions would result in reactor trip, which would shut down the reactor faster than boration (and faster than rod insertion). However, it is anticipated that effecting the local actions will be time-consuming and that actions that can be implemented from the control room should be given precedence. Thus, before dispatching operators to perform local actions to trip the reactor, the crew should perform or initiate performance of at least one of the three methods listed previously for shutting down the reactor and providing shutdown margin.

The crew has had ample opportunity to recognize the need for Sl and the fact that Sl has not automatically actuated. Given the postulated plant conditions, transition from E-0 to ES-0.1 constitutes an error in using the E-0 procedure. The crew is in the wrong procedure; however, the crew is allowed to recover from this error up through Step 3.a of ES-0.1. The ERG network is designed to "catch" errors in procedure usage. Step 3.a is designed to get the crew back to E-0, if that is in fact where the crew should be. If the crew members pass through Step 3.a and remain in ES-0.1, they have missed the last step that would return them to the correct procedure.


CT- 52, Insert negative reactivity into the core CT-2, Manually actuate Sl


References OTO-SE-00001, Nuclear Instrument Malfunction OTO-AE-00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Instrument Malfunctions OTA-RK-00026 Add 120E, MFP A VIB ALERT OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction OTO-AE-00001, Feedwater System Malfunction E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-1, Loss of Primary or Secondary Reactor coolant FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS Tech Spec 3.3.1 for Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Tech spec 3.3.2 for ESFAS Instrumentation ODP-ZZ-00025, EOP/OTO User's Guide


1. ATWS from Loss of Main Feedwater (TAT2) a. Manually open control rod drive motor generator breakers b. Manually drive in control rods

2. LOCA (S(2 or 3)) a. Manually Initiate SI


Establish the initial conditions of IC-10, MOL 100% power: • RCS boron concentration 752 ppm • CCP A 765 ppm minus 5 days • CCP B 775 ppm minus 15 days • Rod Control Bank D 215 steps, Other banks 228 steps • ‘B’ CCP is tagged out due to oil leak

=============SCENARIO PRELOADS / SETUP ITEMS================ Reactor Fails to Trip in Auto and Manual (Event 5)

• Insert Malfunction (SF) SF006, Value = Both_modes PZR steam leak (Event 6)

• Insert Malfunction (BB) TBB03, Value = 200, Ramp = 1 min, conditional rec0009 le 1.0 with a delay of 5 minutes

SI Fails to Automatically Actuate (Event 7) • Malfunctions (SB)SIS_A_Block_Auto, Value = Block • Malfunctions (SB)SIS_B_Block_Auto, Value = Block

============= EVENT 1 ================================== N44 fails high

• Insert Malfunction (SE) SEN0044, Value = 120, Ramp = 10 sec

============= EVENT 2 ================================== Steam Generator ‘A’ controlling level channel slowly fails to 75%

• Insert Malfunction (AE) AELT0519, Value = 75, ramp = 1 min

=============EVENT 3 ================================== Main Feed Pump Vibration– ‘A’ MFP

• Insert Malfunctions • (AE) PAE01A_2, Value = 0.042 • (AE) PAE01A_3, Value = 0.038 • (AE) PAE01A_4, Value = 0.03

=============EVENT 4 ================================== Main Feed Pump Trip– ‘A’ MFP

• Insert Malfunction (AE) PAE01A_1, Value = Trip

=============EVENT 5 ================================== Reactor Fails to Trip in Auto and Manual SEE PRELOADS ABOVE =============EVENT 6 PRELOADED======================= PZR steam leak SEE PRELOADS ABOVE =============EVENT 7 PRELOADED===================== SI Fails to Automatically Actuate SEE PRELOADS ABOVE



____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________


Event No.


Event Description

1 SEN0044 SRO (I) RO (I) Nuclear Instrument Fails high. (Tech Specs)

2 AELT0519 SRO (I) BOP (I) SG Level Instrument Fails to 75% (Tech Specs)

3 PAE01A_2 PAE01A_3 PAE01A_4


MFP Vibrations Forcing Downpower

4 PAE0`A.1 SRO (C) RO (C) BOP (C)

MFP Trip / Rx Trip

5 SF006 SRO (M) RO (M) Reactor Trip Failure / ATWS

6 TBB03 SRO (M) RO (M) Pressurizer Steam Space Leak

7 SIS_A SIS_B

SRO (C) RO (C) Automatic SI Actuation Failure Both Trains



Actual Attributes



The plant is steady at 100% power. After the crew takes the watch, N44 will fail high. The crew will respond with OTO-SE-00001, Nuclear Instrument Malfunction, to select an operable channel and bypass the failed instrument. The CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1. After the failed NI has been bypassed and the CRS has identified the applicable Tech Specs, Steam Generator ‘A’ controlling level channel slowly fails to 75%. The crew will respond using OTO-AE-00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Instrument Malfunctions, to control SG level. The CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.3.1. and 3.3.2 After Tech Specs have been addressed, ‘A’ MFP will develop vibrations. The crew will respond with OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction to lower power to below 65%. The crew will lower turbine load and borate to lower power. After the crew has lowered power 5 to 10 MWe and prior to reducing power less than 70%, ‘A’ MFP will trip. The crew will respond IAW OTO-AE-00001, Feedwater System Malfunction and attempt to trip the reactor. When the crew attempts to trip the reactor rods will not insert. The crew will respond by entering E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection and transitioning to FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS. The crew will be able to successfully de-energize PG19 and 20, insert control rods, and emergency borate the RCS. After rods have been inserted and the reactor has been shutdown the crew will transition back to E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. After the transition back to E-0, a leak in the PZR steam space develops. When the RCS depressurizes SI fails to automatically initiate. The crew will manually initiate SI and transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant. The scenario can be terminated after the EDGs are secured in E-1.


Critical Tasks: Critical Tasks Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before

dispatching operators to locally Trip the Reactor • Deenergize PG19 and PG20 • Insert Control Rods • Establish emergency boration flow to the RCS

Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards equipment before transition to E-1.


In the scenario, failure to insert negative reactivity by one of the methods listed previously can result in the needless continuation of an extreme or a severe challenge to the subcriticality CSF. Although the challenge was not initiated by the crew (was not initiated by operator error), continuation of the challenge is a result of the crew's failure to insert negative reactivity.

In the scenario, failure to manually actuate Sl results in a significant reduction of safety margin beyond that irreparably introduced by the scenario. Failure to manually actuate Sl in the scenario would be a violation of the facility license condition. Although the degraded status is not due to the crew's action, continuation in the degraded status would be a result of the crew's failure to manually actuate Sl.

Cueing Both of the following: • Indication of ATWS (the reactor is not tripped and that a manual reactor trip is not

effective)

Indication and/or annunciation that that Sl is required • PRZR pressure or SG pressure less than Sl actuation setpoint No indication or annunciation that Sl is actuated


Manipulation of controls in the control room as required to initiate the insertion of negative reactivity into the core (at least one of the following)

• Open supply breakers to PG19 and PG20. o PG HIS-16 and PG HIS-18

• Insert Control Rods at the Maximum Rate. • ALIGN emergency boration flow path:

o Start boric acid transfer pumps BG HIS-5A and BG HIS-6A

o OPEN Emergency Borate To Charging Pump Suction valve: BG HIS-8104

Manipulation of controls as required to actuate at least one train of Sl • SB HS-27 • SB HS-28


Crew will observe the following: • Indication of a negative SUR on the intermediate range of the excore NIS • Indication of less than 5% power on the power range of the excore NIS

Indication that both Trains of SI – Actuated • LOCA Sequencer annunciator 30A – Lit • LOCA Sequencer annunciator 30B – Lit • SB069 SI Actuate Red Light – Lit SOLID (NOT blinking)


Local operator actions would result in reactor trip, which would shut down the reactor faster than boration (and faster than rod insertion). However, it is anticipated that effecting the local actions will be time-consuming and that actions that can be implemented from the control room should be given precedence. Thus, before dispatching operators to perform local actions to trip the reactor, the crew should perform or initiate performance of at least one of the three methods listed previously for shutting down the reactor and providing shutdown margin.

The crew has had ample opportunity to recognize the need for Sl and the fact that Sl has not automatically actuated. Given the postulated plant conditions, transition from E-0 to ES-0.1 constitutes an error in using the E-0 procedure. The crew is in the wrong procedure; however, the crew is allowed to recover from this error up through Step 3.a of ES-0.1. The ERG network is designed to "catch" errors in procedure usage. Step 3.a is designed to get the crew back to E-0, if that is in fact where the crew should be. If the crew members pass through Step 3.a and remain in ES-0.1, they have missed the last step that would return them to the correct procedure.


CT- 52, Insert negative reactivity into the core CT-2, Manually actuate Sl


References OTO-SE-00001, Nuclear Instrument Malfunction OTO-AE-00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Instrument Malfunctions OTA-RK-00026 Add 120E, MFP A VIB ALERT OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction OTO-AE-00001, Feedwater System Malfunction E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-1, Loss of Primary or Secondary Reactor coolant FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS Tech Spec 3.3.1 for Reactor Trip System Instrumentation Tech spec 3.3.2 for ESFAS Instrumentation ODP-ZZ-00025, EOP/OTO User's Guide


1. ATWS from Loss of Main Feedwater (TAT2) a. Manually open control rod drive motor generator breakers b. Manually drive in control rods

2. LOCA (S(2 or 3)) a. Manually Initiate SI



Establish the initial conditions of IC-10, MOL 100% power: • RCS boron concentration 752 ppm • CCP A 765 ppm minus 5 days • CCP B 775 ppm minus 15 days • Rod Control Bank D 215 steps, Other banks 228 steps • ‘B’ CCP is tagged out due to oil leak

=============SCENARIO PRELOADS / SETUP ITEMS================ Reactor Fails to Trip in Auto and Manual (Event 5)

• Insert Malfunction (SF) SF006, Value = Both_modes PZR steam leak (Event 6)

• Insert Malfunction (BB) TBB03, Value = 200, Ramp = 1 min, conditional rec0009 le 1.0 with a delay of 5 minutes

SI Fails to Automatically Actuate (Event 7) • Malfunctions (SB)SIS_A_Block_Auto, Value = Block • Malfunctions (SB)SIS_B_Block_Auto, Value = Block

============= EVENT 1 ================================== N44 fails high

• Insert Malfunction (SE) SEN0044, Value = 120, Ramp = 10 sec

============= EVENT 2 ================================== Steam Generator ‘A’ controlling level channel slowly fails to 75%

• Insert Malfunction (AE) AELT0519, Value = 75, ramp = 1 min

=============EVENT 3 ================================== Main Feed Pump Vibration– ‘A’ MFP

• Insert Malfunctions • (AE) PAE01A_2, Value = 0.042 • (AE) PAE01A_3, Value = 0.038 • (AE) PAE01A_4, Value = 0.03

=============EVENT 4 ================================== Main Feed Pump Trip– ‘A’ MFP


=============EVENT 5 ================================== Reactor Fails to Trip in Auto and Manual SEE PRELOADS ABOVE =============EVENT 6 PRELOADED======================= PZR steam leak SEE PRELOADS ABOVE =============EVENT 7 PRELOADED===================== SI Fails to Automatically Actuate SEE PRELOADS ABOVE

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 3 rev.0 Event # 1 Page 6 of 29 Event Description: NI Failure Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior



• Power Range channel N44 fails HIGH • Insert Malfunction (SE) SEN0044, Value = 120, Ramp = 10 sec

• When contacted as the I&C supervisor to trip bistables, respond that you will brief a team

and contact the control room when ready to trip bistables but it won’t be this shift. • When contacted, respond as WWM. Acknowledge that you will develop a work package

to trouble shoot and repair the failed NI • When contacted, respond as Duty Manager. Acknowledge entry into the OTO


Ann 78A PR Channel Dev Ann 82A PR Over PWR Rod Stop Ann 83C RX Partial Trip

OTO-SE-00001 OTO-SE-00001 CRS Implement OTO-SE-00001, Nuclear Instrument Malfunction

(Note) Crew could enter OTO-SF-00001 and return to the correct procedure

OTO-SE-00001, Att A

RO

(Step 1) CHECK Power Range Nuclear Instruments - NORMAL RNO

a. Ensure rod control is in manual • SE HS-9

c. Go to ATT A for power range malfunction

BOP (Step A1) Stop any main turbine load changes.


RO

(Step A2) Maintain RCS Tavg within 1.5°F of Tref using manual control rods. RNO Restore RCS Tavg to within 1.0°F of Tref using turbine load or adjusting RCS boration concentration.

BOP

(Step A3) Check the following permissives are in the correct state within one hour Of the Power Range Channel Failure per Attachment H, Permissives

• P-7 LIT • P-8 LIT • P-9 LIT • P-10 LIT

RO

(Step A4) Select an operable channel on NIS recorder • SE NR-45

BOP

(Step A5) Bypass the malfunctioning channel by selecting the affected channel on the following switches

a. On the detector current comparator drawer • Place the upper section switch to the failed

channel: IRN44 • Place the lower section switch to the failed

channel: PRN44 • Place the rod stop bypass switch to the failed

channel: Bypass PRN44 • Place the power mismatch bypass switch to the

failed channel: Bypass PRN44 b. On the comparator and rate drawer place comparator

channel defeat switch to the failed channel: N44 c. Ensure the following annunciators are out

• 78A • 78B • 78C • 82A


RO

(Step A6) Check rod control in auto • SE HS-9

RNO WHEN RCS Tavg is stable within 1.0°F of Tref AND Shift Manager/Control Room Supervisor concurs, THEN PLACE Rod Control in Auto.

BOP

(Step A7) Check any SG level being controlled by MFW REG BYP VLV

• RNO go to step A8

RO (Step A8) Check reactor power greater than 10%

BOP

(Step A9) Trip protective bistables for the failed channel per ATT D, Tripping Power Range Protective Bistables, within the Time Limit Specified in the Applicable Technical Specification

NOTE Tripping of bistables would not be expected to be performed this shift.

RO

(Step A10) Check reactor power meets one of the following • Greater than 75%

CRS (Step A11) Verify QPTR every 12 hours per OSP-SE-

CRS

(Step A12) Record any of the following in the control room log • Permissives are in the correct state • Any fuses that have been pulled .

CRS (Step A13) Place the inop channel in the EOSL


CRS (Step A14) Review applicable T. S.

• T.S. 3.3.1.D, E and S/T

CRS (Step A15) DIRECT I&C To Repair Failed Channel


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 2 Page 10 of 29 Event Description: Steam Generator ‘A’ controlling level channel slowly fails to 75% Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior



• Steam Generator ‘A’ controlling level channel slowly fails to 75% • Insert Malfunction (AE) AELT0519, Value = 75, ramp = 1 min

• When contacted, respond as I&C. Acknowledge the request to trip bistables and investigate the channel failure. Tripping of Bistables will not be performed this shift.

• When contacted, respond as Duty Manager. Acknowledge entry into the OTO


Ann 83C RX PARTIAL TRIP Ann 108C SG A LEV DEV Ann 108 D SG A FLOW MISMATCH

OTO-AE-00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Instrument Malfunctions

CRS Implement OTO-AE-00002, Steam Generator Water Level Control Instrument Malfunctions

OTO-AE-00002

BOP

(Step 1) Check SG Water Level Control Instrument RNO: SG A: AB LI-519 Take MANUAL Control of Affected SG MFRV or MFRV Bypass and MAINTAIN SG Level:

• SG A: o AE FK‑510, SG A MFW REG VLV CTRL OR o AE LK‑550, SG A MFW REG BYPASS CTRL

BOP

(Step 2) For the Failed Instrument, SELECT An Operable Channel: • Select AB FS-512C to operable channel • On DFWCS, SELECT appropriate Level, FW Flow or

Steam Flow on AE SS‑500

BOP (Step 3) RESTORE Affected SG NR Level to between 45% and 55%

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 2 Page 11 of 29 Event Description: Steam Generator ‘A’ controlling level channel slowly fails to 75% Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

BOP

(Step 4) Return Affected SG MFRV or MFRV Bypass to AUTO Control:

• SG A: o AE FK‑510 OR o AE LK‑550,

CRS (Step 5) Review Attachment A, Effects of Instrument Failure

CRS

(Step 6) Review Applicable Tech Specs, Attachment F • 3.3.1, Table 3.3.1-1 Items 14.a and 14.b Cond E 72 hr • 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1 Item 5.c and 5.e Cond D & I 72 hr • 3.3.2, Table 3.3.2-1 Item 6.d Cond D 72 hr

CRS (Step 7) Perform Notifications per ODP-ZZ-00001, Add 13

CRS (Step 8) Direct I&C to Trip Protective Bistables – Att. D

NOTE Tripping of bistables would not be expected to be performed this shift.

CRS (Step 9) Place AB LI-519 in the EOSL

CRS (Step 10) Initiate Action to Repair AB LI-519


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Audit Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 3 Page 12 of 29 Event Description: Main Feed Pump Vibration. Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

Booth Operator Instructions T = 25 minutes or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner Main Feed Pump Vibration– ‘A’ MFP

• Insert Malfunctions (AE) PAE01A_2, Value = 0.042 (AE) PAE01A_3, Value = 0.038 (AE) PAE01A_4, Value = 0.03

• If contacted as an OT, report nothing abnormal but the grating by the ‘A’ MFP is vibrating

more than ‘B’ MFP is.

• If contacted as Engineering, recommend securing per normal shutdown procedure when plant conditions can support securing the pump.

• When contacted, respond as Duty Manager. Acknowledge entry into the OTO and power

reduction.

Indications Available: T= 25 Ann 120E MFP A VIB ALERT

OTA-RK-00026 Add 120E

CRS Implement OTA-RK-00026 Add 120E, MFP A VIB ALERT

NOTE

This alarm will re-flash when any input reaches its DANGER set point. During steady-state, reaching the DANGER set point within the next 15 minutes is considered a Rapidly Degrading Condition. Valid DANGER set points are normally accompanied by multiple alarms. An alarm from computer point FCZE0394C, MFP A AXIAL POS, is common during transient conditions and pump shutdown.

OTA-RK-00026 Add 120E

BOP (Step 3.1) MONITOR the vibration of the A MFP using the table at the end of this Section.


BOP (Step 3.2) VALIDATE the alarm condition by local observation

CRS

(Step 3.4) IF monitoring indicates DANGER set point reached OR a Rapidly Degrading Condition (except for FCZE0394C, MFP A AXIAL POS, during transient conditions), TRIP the A MFP and ENTER OTO-AE-00001, Feedwater System Malfunction.

CRS

(Step 3.5) IF monitoring indicates steady or a slowly degrading condition (except for FCZE0394C, MFP A AXIAL POS, during transient conditions), PERFORM the following:

(Step 3.5.1.) REDUCE Reactor power to less than 65% per OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction. (Step 3.5.2.) CONTACT the system Engineering Duty Supervisor (EDS) for additional guidance

OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction

OTO-MA-00008 RO (Step 1) Place Rod Control In AUTO

a. SE HS-9

CRS

(Step 2) Manage Reactivity a. Perform Reactivity Management Brief:

• Discuss Amount and Rate of Turbine Load Reduction

• Determine amount of boric acid needed

(CAUTION) • If using the Load Limit Potentiometer, unloading at greater

than 50 MWe per minute may arm the Main Condenser Steam Dumps.

• If changing load reduction methods to the Load Limiter ENSURE Load Set is restored to AT SET LOAD prior to using the Load Limiter.

(NOTE) Steps 3 and 4 may be performed concurrently while continuing in this procedure


CRS/BOP

#(Step 3) REDUCE Turbine Load at Less than or Equal to 5% per Minute using any of the following:

• Reduce Turbine load using the %/Min Loading Rate • Reduce Turbine load using the Load Limit Potentiometer

NOTE

For step #4 of OTO-MA-00008, the candidate may either use OTO-MA-00008 step 4 or OTN-BG-00002, Attachment 8. The procedural actions to Borate from the VCT are the same and OTO-MA-00008 steps are listed below.

CRS/RO

#(Step 4) Borate From the BAST by performing any of the following:

• BORATE to the VCT:

RO #(Step 4a) Place BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP

RO #(Step 4b) Place BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in BORATE

RO #(Step 4c) Set Boric Acid Flow Controller, BG FK-110, to the desired flow rate

RO #(Step 4d) Place BG FK-110 in AUTO

RO #(Step 4e) RESET BG FY110B, BA COUNTER, to 000

RO

#(Step 4f) SET BG FY‑110B for the desired gallons of boric acid to be added

RO #(Step 4g) PLACE BG HS‑26 in RUN


RO #(Step 4h) WHEN the desired boration is complete, THEN PLACE

BG HS-26 in STOP

RO #(Step 4i) repeat Boration as necessary

RO

(Step 5) Initiate Boron Equalization by performing the following: a. ENERGIZE at least one group of Pressurizer Backup

Heaters: • B/U Group A BB HIS-51A • B/U Group B BB HIS 52A

b. Place Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller in MAN: • BB PK-455A

c. Lower Pressurizer Pressure Master controller output to 38% to 42%

d. Place Pressurizer Master Controller in AUTO

BOP

(Step 6) Check MFP Turbine Speed Control – IN AUTO • FC SK-509B • FC SK-509C

CUE

Once the crew starts to reduce power using steps 1-6 of OTO-MA-00008, as proven by observation lowering load 5-10 MWe AND prior to the crew reducing power <70%: GO TO THE NEXT EVENT AS CUED BY LEAD EXAMINER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 4 Page 16 of 29 Event Description: Main Feed Pump Trip Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

Booth Operator Instructions T = 40 minutes or at the discretion of the Lead Examiner Main Feed Pump Trip– ‘A’ MFP


• When contacted, respond as Duty Manager as requested Indications Available: T=40 Ann 120A MFP A TRIP

OTO-AE-00001, FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION

CRS Implement OTO-AE-00001, FEEDWATER SYSTEM MALFUNCTION

OTO-AE-00001 RO

(Step 1) PLACE Rod Control In AUTO: • SE HS-9

BOP (Step 2) CHECK Main Feed Pump ‑TRIPPED

RO

(Step 3) CHECK Reactor Power ‑ LESSTHAN 70% RNO IF only one Main Feed pump is running, THEN PERFORM the following:

a. Manually TRIP the Reactor. b. Go To E‑0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection.

CUE Go to the next Event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: Audit Scenario # 2 rev.0 Event # 5, 6, 7 Page 17 of 29 Event Description: Reactor Trip Failure / ATWS / Pressurizer Steam Space Leak / Automatic SI

Actuation Failure Both Trains Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior


• When contacted, respond as EDO. • When contacted as Radiation Protection, respond as requested. • When contacted as Chemistry, respond as requested.

Indications Available: T=45

Ann 86A LO FLOW & P8 RX TRIP Ann 108B SG A LEV LO Ann 109B SG B LEV LO Ann 110B SG C LEV LO Ann 111B SG D LEV LO



Note Steps 1 through 4 are immediate actions.

RO

(Step 1) CHECK Reactor Trip • Rod Bottom Lights – NO • Reactor Trip and Bypass Breakers – CLOSED • Neutron Flux – Steady

RNO If power > 5%, Go To FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS

FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS

FR-S.1 CRS Implement FR-S.1, Response to Nuclear Power Generation/ATWS

NOTE Steps 1 and 2 are immediate actions.



RO

(Step 1) Check Reactor Trip: RNO– Manually Trip the Reactor.

• SB HS-1 • SB HS-42 (BOP)

IF Reactor will NOT trip, THEN PERFORM the following: a. Insert Control Rods at the Maximum Rate. b. Open supply breakers to PG19 and PG20.

• PG HIS-16 • PG HIS-18

Critical Task

CREW

Insert negative reactivity into the core by at least one of the following methods before completing the immediate action steps of FR-S.1

• Deenergize PG19 and PG20 • Insert Control Rods • Establish emergency boration flow to the RCS

BOP

(Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip a. Turbine Stop Valves – Closed

BOP

(Step 3) Check AFW Pumps Running a. MDAFPs – Both running b. TDAFP – Running if necessary



RO

(Step 4) Initiate Emergency Boration of the RCS a. At least one charging pump running b. ALIGN emergency boration flow path:

1) Start boric acid transfer pumps • BG HIS-5A • BG HIS-6A

2) OPEN Emergency Borate To Charging Pump Suction valve:

• BG HIS-8104 3) Check Emergency Boration flow > 30 gpm

• BG FI-183A 4) Maintain charging flow > BG FI-183A flow

c. Check PZR pressure < 2335 psig

RO/BOP

(Step 5) Check Containment Purge Isolation ESFAS status panels CPIS sections:

• SA066X WHITE lights - ALL LIT • SA066Y WHITE lights - ALL LIT

RNO – Manually actuate CPIS • SA HS-11 • SA HS-15

RO/BOP

(Step 6) Check if the Following Trips Have Occurred a. Reactor Trip RNO – Locally trip breakers b. CLOSE supply breakers to PG19 and PG20:

• PG HIS-16 • PG HIS-18

c. Turbine Trip • All Turbine Stop valves - CLOSED

RO (Step 7) Check if Reactor is Subcritical YES – GO TO STEP 16



RO (Step 16) Return To Procedure And Step In Effect



NOTE Steps 1 through 4 are immediate actions.

NOTE Per ODP-ZZ-00025 since this is a return entry to E-0 the immediate actions are not required to be performed but they must be verified.

RO


BOP (Step 2) Check Turbine Trip a. All Turbine Stop Valves – Closed

BOP

(Step 3) Check Power to AC Emergency Buses a. AC emergency buses – At Least One Energized

• NB01 OR NB02



RO

(Step 4) Check SI Status a. Check if SI is actuated

• Any SI annunciator 88A through 88D – Lit OR • SB069 SI Actuate Red Light – Lit OR • LOCA Sequencer annunciators 30A or 31A – Lit

RNO: a. Check if SI is required

• PZR pressure less than or equal to 1849 PSIG OR • Any SG pressure less than or equal to 615 PSIG OR • Containment pressure greater than or equal to 3.5

PSIG If SI is required then manually actuate SI

• SB HS-27 • SB HS-28

b. Check both Trains of SI – Actuated • LOCA Sequencer annunciator 30A – Lit • LOCA Sequencer annunciator 30B – Lit • SB069 SI Actuate Red Light – Lit SOLID (NOT

blinking)

Note

Depending on the time it takes the crew to complete FR-S.1 pressure may not have decreased enough to SI. If this is the case the crew will transition to ES-0.1 and perform the manual actuation of SI at Step 3 and return to E-0

Critical Task CREW Manually actuate at least one train of SIS-actuated safeguards

equipment before transition to E-1.

BOP/RO (Step 5) Perform Attachment A, Automatic Action Verification, While Continuing With This Procedure



E-0 Att A RO/BOP (Step A1) CHECK Charging Pumps – Both CCPs running – NO

CCP Pump “B” Out of Service

RO/BOP (Step A2) CHECK SI and RHR Pumps – All running –

RO/BOP (Step A3) CHECK ECCS Flow – BIH flow indicated – NO CCP Pump “B” Out of Service

RO/BOP

(Step A4) CHECK ESW Pumps – BOTH RUNNING • EF HIS-55A • EF HIS-56A

RO/BOP

(Step A5) CHECK CCW Alignment: • CCW Pumps – ONE RUNNING IN EACH TRAIN • CCW Service Loop Supply and Return valves for one

operating CCW pump – OPEN • OPEN CCW To RHR HX valves • CLOSE Spent Fuel Pool HX CCW Outlet Valves • STOP Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump(s) • RECORD The Time Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump

Secured



RO/BOP (Step A8) CHECK If Containment Spray should Be Actuated – NO



RO/BOP (Step A9) CHECK If Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated:

• Containment pressure > 17 psig • Steamline pressure – LESS THAN 615 PSIG


RO/BOP

(Step A11) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A a. ESFAS status panels CISA sections:


RO/BOP

(Step A12) CHECK SG Blowdown Isolation: a. ESFAS status panels SGBSIS sections:



RO/BOP

(Step A14) CHECK Containment Purge Isolation: a. ESFAS status panels CPIS sections:


RO/BOP





BOP


BOP

(Step 8) CHECK AFW Pumps a. MD AFW Pumps – Both Running – YES b. TD AFW Pump – Running

BOP


NECESSARY

BOP (Step 10) CHECK Total AFW Flow – Greater than 285,000 lbm/hr

BOP

(Step 11) CHECK PZR PORVs and Spray Valves a. PZR PORVs – Closed b. PZR PORVs – Both in AUTO c. PORV Block Valves – Both Open d. Normal PZR Spray Valves – Closed

BOP

(Step 12) CHECK if RCPs should be Stopped a. RCPs – Any Running b. ECCS Pumps – At least One Running c. RCS Pressure – Less than 1425 psig d. Stop all RCPs

The RCP may have already been secured per the fold-out page



BOP #(Step 13) CHECK RCS Temperatures

• RCPs Running – Tavg 557 Deg F • No RCPs Running – Tcold 557 Deg F

RO/BOP

(Step 14) CHECK if any SG is Faulted - NO a. CHECK pressures in all SGs:

• Any SG pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner - • Any SG completely depressurized

RNO Go To Step 15

RO/BOP

(Step 15) Check if SG Tubes are Intact: • Levels in all SGs:

o No SG narrow range level rising in an uncontrolled manner

• SG Steam Line N16 radiation – Normal • Condenser Air Removal radiation – Normal before

Isolation • SG Blowdown and Sample radiation – Normal before

Isolation • SG ASD radiation – Normal • Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump exhaust

radiation - Normal

RO/BOP

(Step 16) Check if RCS is Intact: • Containment Pressure – Normal – NO • Containment Normal Sump level – Normal - NO • Containment radiation – Normal before Isolation – NO

RNO Go to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant, Step 1.

E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant

CRS Transition to E-1, Loss of Reactor or Secondary Coolant



E-1

RO

(Step 1) Check if RCPs should be stopped: a. RCPs – any running b. ECCS Pumps – At least One running c. RCS pressure – Less than 1425 psig d. Stop all RCPs

BOP

(Step 2) Check if any SG is Faulted: a. Check pressures in all SGs:

• Any SG pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner - NO

• Any SG completely depressurized – NO RNO Go to Step 3

BOP

(Step 3) Check Intact SG Levels: a. Narrow range levels – Greater than 7% [25%] b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range levels between

7% [25%] and 52%

BOP

(Step 4) Check secondary radiation – Normal a. Perform the following:

• Perform EOP Addendum 11, Restoring SG sampling after SI actuation

• Direct Chemistry to sample all SGs for activity • Direct Radiation Protection to survey steamlines in

Auxiliary building Area 5 as necessary b. Check unisolated secondary radiation monitors:

• SG Sample radiation • SG ASD radiation • TDAFW Pump exhaust radiation

c. Secondary radiation - Normal



RO

(Step 5) Check PZR PORV and Block valves: a. Power to Block Valves- available b. PZR PORVs – Closed c. Block Valves – Both Open

RO

(Step 6) Check if ECCS flow should be reduced: - NO a. RCS subcooling – Greater than 30˚F [50˚F] b. Secondary heat sink:

• Narrow range level in at least one intact SG-Greater than 7% [25%]

• Total feed flow to intact SGs- Greater than 285,000 lbm/hr

c. RCS pressure – stable or rising d. PZR level – Greater than 9% [29%]

RNO Go To Step 7

RO (Step 7) Check if Containment Spray should be stopped:

a. Spray pumps – Any running – NO RNO Go to Step 8. Observe Cautions prior to Step 8.

(Caution) • If offsite power is lost after SI reset, manual action may be

required to restart safeguards equipment. • If RCS pressure lowers in an uncontrolled manner to less than

325 psig, the RHR pumps must be manually restarted to supply water to the RCS.



RO

(Step 8) Check if RHR pumps should be stopped: a. Check RCs Pressure:

1) Pressure – Greater than 325 psig 2) Pressure – Stable or Rising

b. RHR Pumps – Any running with suction aligned to RWST c. Reset SI if necessary


d. Stop RHR Pumps and place in Standby: • EJ HIS-1 • EJ HIS-2

e. Monitor RCS Pressure

BOP (Step 9) Check SG and RCS Pressures:

• Check pressure in all SGs – Stable or Rising • Check RCS pressure – Stable or lowering

BOP

(Step 10) Check if Diesel Generators Should be Stopped: a. AC emergency buses – Energized by offsite power b. Reset SI if necessary


c. Load equipment on AC emergency buses as necessary using EOP addendum 8, Loading Equipment on AC Emergency Buses.

d. Stop and unload DG(s) and place in standby: • Push START/RESET button:

o KJ HS-8A o KJ HS-108A

• Push STOP button: o KJ HS-8A o KJ HS-108A

• Perform EOP addendum 9, Placing DGs in Standby



NOTE At the Discretion of the Lead Examiner OR once the crew has

secured the EDGs – The Scenario can be STOPPED.



____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 80%

Turnover: ‘A’ MDAFWP is tagged out for Breaker PMTs

Event No.

Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description

1 N/A SRO (N) BOP (N) Place Mini-Purge in service

2 WEIUBGTC0130TVSPNO AUTO

SRO (C) RO (C) LTDN HX Temp Cont Valve Fails

3 (AB)PV004A SRO (C) BOP (C) ‘D’ SG ASD Fails Open (Tech Specs)

4 (BB) EBB01D


SG Tube leak / Downpower (Tech Specs)

5 (BB) EBB01D


SG Tube Rupture

6

CPIS_A_BLOCK_AUTO CPIS_B_BLOCK_AUTO

SRO (C) BOP (C) Mini-Purge Failure to isolate

7 (BB)BBPCV0455A

SRO (C) RO (C) IA valve failure / PZR PORV Failure



Actual Attributes


Scenario Event Description Callaway 2014 NRC Scenario #4, rev. 0

The plant is steady at 80% power steady state. ‘A’ MDAFWP is tagged out for Breaker PMTs. After the crew takes the watch, they will place Mini-Purge in service in IAW OTN-GT-00001, Containment Purge System, in preparation for Containment entry. After the Mini-Purge system has been placed in service, the Letdown HX temperature control valve will fail closed. The crew will take actions IAW OTA-RK-00018 ADD 39B. After the crew has addressed the letdown HX temperature control valve failure the SG ‘D’ ASD fails open. The crew will respond IAW OTO-AB-00001, Steam Dump Malfunction. The crew will close the ‘D’ ASD. The CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.4.A After Tech Specs have been evaluated, ‘D’ SG will develop a tube leak. The crew will respond IAW OTO-BB-00003. The Crew will lower power and the CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage After the power reduction has been commenced, the tube leak will increase. The crew will trip the reactor due to the increased leak and respond IAW E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The crew will identify that Mini-Purge failed to isolate. The crew will manually isolate Mini-Purge. The crew will transition to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture and isolate the ruptured ‘D’ SG Instrument Air cannot be restored to containment due to a valve failure, therefore normal pressurizer spray is NOT available. When the crew opens the PZR PORV to lower pressure the PORV will stick open. The crew will then have to close the PORV block valve. The scenario can be terminated after the cooldown is in progress and the PORV has been isolated.


Critical Tasks: Critical Tasks Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to

ECA-3.1 occurs. Terminate the RCS depressurization by closing PORV block Valve prior to transitioning to ECA-3-1.


Isolating the ruptured SG maintains a differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The differential pressure (250 psi) ensures that minimum RCS subcooling remains after RCS depressurization.

In the scenario, closing the block MOV constitutes a task that is essential to safety, because its improper performance or omission by an operator will result in direct adverse consequences or significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. In particular, the crew has failed to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release. In this case, the RCS fission product barrier can be restored to full integrity simply by closing the block MOV.

Cueing All of the following: • Indication and/or annunciation of SGTR in one SG

o Increasing SG water level o Radiation

• Indication and/or annunciation of reactor trip • Indication and/or annunciation of Sl

All of the following: • Valve position indication and/or annunciation that the PRZR PORV is open, even

after attempts to close it manually from the control room • Indication and/or annunciation of decreasing RCS pressure • Indication and/or annunciation consistent with the discharge of PRZR fluid to the

PRT o PRT temperature, level, pressure o Tailpipe RTDs

• Valve position indication that the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PRZR PORV is open


Manipulation of controls as required to isolate the ruptured SG • Close Steam line Low point Drain valve from ruptured SG

o AB HIS-10 (SG D) • Close MSIV and MSIV bypass valve from ruptured SG

o AB HIS-11 (SG D) • Stop feed flow to ruptured SG

o CLOSE AL HK-5A and AL HK-6A

Manipulation of controls as required to close the block MOV for the stuck open PRZR PORV


Crew will observe the following: • Indication of stable or increasing pressure in the ruptured SG • Indication of decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate in the ruptured SG

Valve position indication that the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PRZR PORV is closed


When the crew cannot maintain the 250 psi differential, the ERGs require a transition to contingency ERG ECA-3.1. This transition unnecessarily delays the sequence of actions leading to RCS depressurization and Sl termination.

“before transitioning to ECA-3.1” is in accordance with the PWR Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines. The PWR Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines states: by completion of the first step in the ERG network that directs the crew to close the block MOV. If the crew does not close the block MOV in Step 17 of E-3, Step 18 directs the crew to close the PZR PORV Block Valve if RCS pressure is NOT RISING. If the crew does not close the valves and RCS pressure continues to lower, the crew is directed to transition to ECA-3.1


CT 18, Isolate the Ruptured SG. CT 10, Close PRZ PORV Block Valve.


References OTN-GT-00001, Containment Purge System OTN-BG-00001 ADD 4, Operation of CVCS Letdown OTA-RK-00018, ADD 39B, Letdown Heat Exchanger Discharge Temperature High. OTO-AB-00001, Steam Dump Malfunction OTO-BB-00001, Steam Generator Tube Leak OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction OTN-BG-00002, Attachment 8, Borate Mode of RMCS Operation E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Tech Spec 3.7.4.A, Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDs) Tech Spec 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage ODP-ZZ-00025, EOP/OTO User's Guide


1. Steam Generator Tube Rupture (T(SG)) a. Isolate Ruptured Steam Generator b. Cool Down and Depressurizes the RCS


Establish the initial conditions of IC-2, MOL 80% power: • RCS boron concentration 958 ppm • CCP A 960 ppm minus 2 days • CCP B 965 ppm minus 5 days • Rod Control Bank D 190 steps, Other banks 228 steps • ‘A’ MDAFWP is tagged out for Breaker PMT

=============SCENARIO PRELOADS / SETUP ITEMS========== ‘A’ MDAFWP is tagged out

• Insert ME schematics (AL) e23al01a/AL01NB0105IA_BKPOS/Value = 3

Mini-Purge Failure to isolate (Inhibit CPIS Actuation with damper GT-HZ-11 stuck OPEN after CPIS manually actuated) (Event 6)

• Insert Malfunction (SB) CPIS_A_BLOCK_AUTO, Value = Block • Insert Malfunction (SB) CPIS_B_BLOCK_AUTO, Value = Block • Insert ME Schematic (GT) m22gt01_b, GTHZ0011_ATVFAILSP, Value = 1.0, cond HWX20O49R eq

1 • Insert ME Schematic (GT) m22gt01_b, GTHZ0012_ATVFAILSP, Value = 1.0, cond HWX20O52R eq

1 • Delete ME Schematic (GT) m22gt01_b, GTHZ0012_ATVFAILSP, Value = 1.0, cond X20I52C eq 1

PZR PORV Failure (Event 7)

• Malfunctions/BB/BBPCV0455A/100/cond=HWX21o149req1 • Malfunctions/BB/BBPCV0465A/100/cond=HWX21o150req1 • Override sw (KA) X24I32o Value=0

============= EVENT 1 ================================== • Place Mini-Purge in service ============= EVENT 2 ================================== LTDN HX Temp Cont Valve Fails Closed

• Insert ME schematics (EG) m22eg03, X8809d58s009 analog 053247, WEIUBGTC0130TVSPNO AUTO, Value = 1

============= EVENT 3 ================================== ‘D’ SG ASD Fails Open

• Insert Malfunction (AB)PV0004A_1, ramp 30 sec, value 1

=============EVENT 4 ================================== ‘D’ SG Tube leak / Downpower

• Insert Malfunction (BB) EBB01D, value=30, ramp 5 min

=============EVENT 5 ================================== ‘D’ SG Tube Rupture / Reactor Trip

• Insert Malfunction (BB) EBB01D, value=400, ramp 10 min =============EVENT 6 PRELOADED======================= Minipurge fails to isolate See preloads above =============EVENT 7 PRELOADED======================= PZR PORV Failure See preloads above



____________________________ _____________________________ ____________________________ _____________________________

Initial Conditions: 80%

Turnover: ‘A’ MDAFWP is tagged out for Breaker PMTs

Event No.

Malf. No. Event Type* Event Description

1 N/A SRO (N) BOP (N) Place Mini-Purge in service

2 WEIUBGTC0130TVSPNO AUTO

SRO (C) RO (C) LTDN HX Temp Cont Valve Fails

3 (AB)PV004A SRO (C) BOP (C) ‘D’ SG ASD Fails Open (Tech Specs)

4 (BB) EBB01D


SG Tube leak / Downpower (Tech Specs)

5 (BB) EBB01D


SG Tube Rupture

6

CPIS_A_BLOCK_AUTO CPIS_B_BLOCK_AUTO

SRO (C) BOP (C) Mini-Purge Failure to isolate

7 (BB)BBPCV0455A

SRO (C) RO (C) IA valve failure / PZR PORV Failure



Actual Attributes



The plant is steady at 80% power steady state. ‘A’ MDAFWP is tagged out for Breaker PMTs. After the crew takes the watch, they will place Mini-Purge in service in IAW OTN-GT-00001, Containment Purge System, in preparation for Containment entry. After the Mini-Purge system has been placed in service, the Letdown HX temperature control valve will fail closed. The crew will take actions IAW OTA-RK-00018 ADD 39B. After the crew has addressed the letdown HX temperature control valve failure the SG ‘D’ ASD fails open. The crew will respond IAW OTO-AB-00001, Steam Dump Malfunction. The crew will close the ‘D’ ASD. The CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.7.4.A After Tech Specs have been evaluated, ‘D’ SG will develop a tube leak. The crew will respond IAW OTO-BB-00003. The Crew will lower power and the CRS will evaluate Tech Spec 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage After the power reduction has been commenced, the tube leak will increase. The crew will trip the reactor due to the increased leak and respond IAW E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection. The crew will identify that Mini-Purge failed to isolate. The crew will manually isolate Mini-Purge. The crew will transition to E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture and isolate the ruptured ‘D’ SG Instrument Air cannot be restored to containment due to a valve failure, therefore normal pressurizer spray is NOT available. When the crew opens the PZR PORV to lower pressure the PORV will stick open. The crew will then have to close the PORV block valve. The scenario can be terminated after the cooldown is in progress and the PORV has been isolated.


Critical Tasks: Critical Tasks Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured SG before a transition to

ECA-3.1 occurs. Terminate the RCS depressurization by closing PORV block Valve prior to transitioning to ECA-3-1.


Isolating the ruptured SG maintains a differential pressure between the ruptured SG and the intact SGs. The differential pressure (250 psi) ensures that minimum RCS subcooling remains after RCS depressurization.

In the scenario, closing the block MOV constitutes a task that is essential to safety, because its improper performance or omission by an operator will result in direct adverse consequences or significant degradation in the mitigative capability of the plant. In particular, the crew has failed to prevent degradation of any barrier to fission product release. In this case, the RCS fission product barrier can be restored to full integrity simply by closing the block MOV.

Cueing All of the following: • Indication and/or annunciation of SGTR in one SG

o Increasing SG water level o Radiation

• Indication and/or annunciation of reactor trip • Indication and/or annunciation of Sl

All of the following: • Valve position indication and/or annunciation that the PRZR PORV is open, even

after attempts to close it manually from the control room • Indication and/or annunciation of decreasing RCS pressure • Indication and/or annunciation consistent with the discharge of PRZR fluid to the

PRT o PRT temperature, level, pressure o Tailpipe RTDs

• Valve position indication that the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PRZR PORV is open


Manipulation of controls as required to isolate the ruptured SG • Close Steam line Low point Drain valve from ruptured SG

o AB HIS-10 (SG D) • Close MSIV and MSIV bypass valve from ruptured SG

o AB HIS-11 (SG D) • Stop feed flow to ruptured SG

o CLOSE AL HK-5A and AL HK-6A

Manipulation of controls as required to close the block MOV for the stuck open PRZR PORV


Crew will observe the following: • Indication of stable or increasing pressure in the ruptured SG • Indication of decreasing or zero feedwater flow rate in the ruptured SG

Valve position indication that the block MOV upstream of the stuck open PRZR PORV is closed


When the crew cannot maintain the 250 psi differential, the ERGs require a transition to contingency ERG ECA-3.1. This transition unnecessarily delays the sequence of actions leading to RCS depressurization and Sl termination.

“before transitioning to ECA-3.1” is in accordance with the PWR Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines. The PWR Owners Group Emergency Response Guidelines states: by completion of the first step in the ERG network that directs the crew to close the block MOV. If the crew does not close the block MOV in Step 17 of E-3, Step 18 directs the crew to close the PZR PORV Block Valve if RCS pressure is NOT RISING. If the crew does not close the valves and RCS pressure continues to lower, the crew is directed to transition to ECA-3.1


CT 18, Isolate the Ruptured SG. CT 10, Close PRZ PORV Block Valve.


References OTN-GT-00001, Containment Purge System OTN-BG-00001 ADD 4, Operation of CVCS Letdown OTA-RK-00018, ADD 39B, Letdown Heat Exchanger Discharge Temperature High. OTO-AB-00001, Steam Dump Malfunction OTO-BB-00001, Steam Generator Tube Leak OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction OTN-BG-00002, Attachment 8, Borate Mode of RMCS Operation E-0, Reactor Trip or Safety Injection E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture Tech Spec 3.7.4.A, Atmospheric Steam Dump Valves (ASDs) Tech Spec 3.4.13, RCS Operational Leakage ODP-ZZ-00025, EOP/OTO User's Guide


1. Steam Generator Tube Rupture (T(SG)) a. Isolate Ruptured Steam Generator b. Cool Down and Depressurizes the RCS



Establish the initial conditions of IC-2, MOL 80% power: • RCS boron concentration 958 ppm • CCP A 960 ppm minus 2 days • CCP B 965 ppm minus 5 days • Rod Control Bank D 190 steps, Other banks 228 steps • ‘A’ MDAFWP is tagged out for Breaker PMT

=============SCENARIO PRELOADS / SETUP ITEMS========== ‘A’ MDAFWP is tagged out

• Insert ME schematics (AL) e23al01a/AL01NB0105IA_BKPOS/Value = 3

Mini-Purge Failure to isolate (Inhibit CPIS Actuation with damper GT-HZ-11 stuck OPEN after CPIS manually actuated) (Event 6)

• Insert Malfunction (SB) CPIS_A_BLOCK_AUTO, Value = Block • Insert Malfunction (SB) CPIS_B_BLOCK_AUTO, Value = Block • Insert ME Schematic (GT) m22gt01_b, GTHZ0011_ATVFAILSP, Value = 1.0, cond HWX20O49R

eq 1 • Insert ME Schematic (GT) m22gt01_b, GTHZ0012_ATVFAILSP, Value = 1.0, cond HWX20O52R

eq 1 • Delete ME Schematic (GT) m22gt01_b, GTHZ0012_ATVFAILSP, Value = 1.0, cond X20I52C eq

1 PZR PORV Failure (Event 7)

• Malfunctions/BB/BBPCV0455A/100/cond=HWX21o149req1 • Malfunctions/BB/BBPCV0465A/100/cond=HWX21o150req1 • Override sw (KA) X24I32o Value=0

============= EVENT 1 ================================== • Place Mini-Purge in service ============= EVENT 2 ================================== LTDN HX Temp Cont Valve Fails Closed

• Insert ME schematics (EG) m22eg03, X8809d58s009 analog 053247, WEIUBGTC0130TVSPNO AUTO, Value = 1

============= EVENT 3 ================================== ‘D’ SG ASD Fails Open

• Insert Malfunction (AB)PV0004A_1, ramp 30 sec, value 1

=============EVENT 4 ================================== ‘D’ SG Tube leak / Downpower

• Insert Malfunction (BB) EBB01D, value=30, ramp 5 min

=============EVENT 5 ================================== ‘D’ SG Tube Rupture / Reactor Trip

• Insert Malfunction (BB) EBB01D, value=400, ramp 10 min =============EVENT 6 PRELOADED======================= Minipurge fails to isolate See preloads above =============EVENT 7 PRELOADED======================= PZR PORV Failure See preloads above

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 4 rev.0 Event # 1 Page 6 of 30 Event Description: Place Mini-Purge in service Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior



• Ensure crew has a copy of OTN-GT-00001, CONTAINMENT PURGE SYSTEM, and Gaseous Radwaste Release Permit.

• When contacted as the Rad/Chem Technician (Count Room) respond as directed.


OTN-GT-00001

OTN-GT-00001 CRS Implement OTN-GT-00001, CONTAINMENT PURGE

SYSTEM

CRS (Section 3) Review Precautions and Limitations

CRS (Section 4) Review Prerequisites

CRS

(Note) Containment Mini-Purge is normally used in MODES 1 - 4 to reduce noble gas concentrations and establish conditions for containment entry. Mini-Purge may be placed in operation in MODE 5, MODE 6 and No Mode when Shutdown Purge in not available. Operation of Mini-Purge to Raise or Lower Containment pressure is normally performed using OTN-GT-00001 ADD01.

CRS (Step 5.2) Placing Mini-Purge System In Service.

CRS (Step 5.2.1) ENSURE Section 5.1 has been performed. (Given in turnover)

CRS/BOP (Step 5.2.2) ENSURE Shutdown Purge System is NOT in service.


BOP (NOTE) MINIVENT time trend may be used.

BOP

(Step 5.2.3) MONITOR the following instrumentation: • SDRE0041, MANIPULATOR CRANE RAD MONITOR,

or plant computer point SDR0041H, MANIP CRANE RAD MON

• SDRE0042, CTMT BLDG RAD MONITOR, or plant computer point SDR0042H, CTMT BUILDING RAD

• GT PDI-40, CTMT DP, or plant computer point GTD0040, CTMT-AUX BLD DIFF PRESS

BOP

(Step 5.2.4) RECORD containment pressure as read on GT PDI-40, CTMT DP, or plant computer point GTD0040, CTMT-AUX BLD DIFF PRESS, on Gaseous Radwaste Release Permit.

BOP

(Step 5.2.5) IF in MODES 1 - 4 OR preparing to enter MODE 4 from MODE 5, ENSURE one of the following:

a. ENSURE the following are in OPERATE with “CONTAINMENT PURGE IN PROGRESS DO NOT BYPASS” covers in place over the switches:

1. GTRT22 (located on Drawer 7N168-1 in SA036D)

2. GTRT33 (located on Drawer 7N168-2 in SA036E)

b. IF T/S 3.3.6 Action B was entered for GTRE22 and/or GTRE33, PERFORM the following:

1. ENSURE the following INOPERABLE rad monitor(s) is/are in BYPASS:

• GTRT22 (located on Drawer 7N168-1 in SA036D)

• GTRT33 (located on Drawer 7N168-2 in SA036E)

2. ENSURE Administrative Controls are in place in compliance with T/S 3.3.6 Required Action B.1.


BOP (Step 5.2.6) Step is N/A

BOP (Step 5.2.7) Using GT HIS-20, CTMT MINI PURGE EXH FAN & DAMPER, START CGT02.

BOP (Step 5.2.8) Using GT HIS-11, CTMT MINI PURGE EXH INNER CTMT ISO, OPEN GTHZ0011.

BOP (Step 5.2.9) Using GT HIS-12, CTMT MINI PURGE EXH OUTER CTMT ISO, OPEN GTHZ0012

BOP (Step 5.2.10) Using GT HIS-28, CTMT PURGE EXH DAMPER, OPEN GTHZ0028.

BOP (Step 5.2.11) Using GT HIS-29, CTMT PURGE EXH DAMPER, OPEN GTHZ0029.

BOP (Step 5.2.12) RECORD date and time dampers were opened on Gaseous Radwaste Release Permit.

BOP (NOTE) It is permissible to continue with the remainder of this section while Step 5.2.13 is in progress.

BOP (Step 5.2.13) NOTIFY Rad/Chem Technician (Count Room) of time of purge initiation.

BOP

(Step 5.2.14) WHEN containment pressure is less than 10.0 in. H20, OPEN the following using GT HIS-41, CTMT MINI PURGE SPLY/EXH DAMPERS:

• GTHZ0041, CTMT MINI PURGE EXH INNER CTMT UPSTRM DMPR OPER

• GTHZ0042, CTMT MINI PURGE AIR SPLY INNER CTMT DNSTRM DMPR OPER


BOP

(Step 5.2.15) WHEN containment pressure is less than 4.25 in. H20 as read on GT PDI-40, CTMT DP, or plant computer point GTD0040, CTMT-AUX BLD DIFF PRESS, PERFORM the following:

• Using GT HIS-26, CTMT PURGE SYS AIR SPLY DAMPER, OPEN GTHZ0026.

• Using GT HIS-27, CTMT PURGE SYS AIR SPLY DAMPER, OPEN GTHZ0027.

BOP

(CAUTION) SGT02, CTMT MINI PURGE AIR SPLY UNIT, should be running anytime CGT02, CTMT MINI PURGE EXH FAN, is running and Equipment Hatch is closed to prevent drawing excessive vacuum in Containment and creating a personnel hazard.

BOP (Step 5.2.16) Using GT HIS-23, CTMT MINI PURGE AIR SPLY UNIT, START SGT02.

BOP (Step 5.2.17) Using GT HIS-5, CTMT MINI PURGE AIR SPLY CTMT ISO, OPEN GTHZ0005.

BOP (Step 5.2.18) Using GT HIS-4, CTMT MINI PURGE AIR SPLY CTMT ISO, OPEN GTHZ0004.

BOP

(Step 5.2.19) MAINTAIN containment pressure +41.5 to -8.35 in. H20 as read on GT PDI-40, CTMT DP, or plant computer point GTD0040, CTMT-AUX BLD DIFF PRESS.


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 4 rev.0 Event # 2 Page 10 of 30 Event Description: LTDN HX Temp Cont Valve Fails. Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior



• LTDN HX Temp Cont Valve Fails o Insert ME schematics (EG) m22eg03, X8809d58s009 analog 053247,

WEIUBGTC0130TVSPNO AUTO, Value = 1

• When contacted as Primary Operator, • When contacted as the Duty Manager, acknowledge the failure.


Ann 39B LTDN HX DISCH TEMP HI Ann 39A LTDN HX TEMP HI DIVERT

OTA-RK-00018 ADD 39B

OTA-RK-00018 ADD 39B

CRS Implement OTA-RK-00018 ADD 39B, Letdown Heat Exchanger Discharge Temperature High.

(Note) If Letdown Hx outlet temperature reaches 137°F, letdown will automatically divert to the VCT. Changing letdown temperature can affect Core reactivity due to boron concentration changes by the Letdown Demineralizers, (concentration raises on raising temperature and lowers on lowering temperature). Reactivity effects of letdown temperature changes are more noticeable at EOL than at BOL.

RO (Step 3.1) MONITOR the following:

• BG TI-130, LTDN HX OUTLET TEMP • BGTI-127, REGEN HX LTDN OUTLET TEMP

RO

(Step 3.2) IF letdown temperature exceeds 120°F, PERFORM the following for BGTK-130, LTDN HX OUTLET TEMP CTRL: 3.2.1. CHECK output is at OR RAISING towards 100%. 3.2.2. IF required, TAKE MANUAL control and RAISE CCW flow to the Letdown Heat Exchanger.


RO

(Step 3.3) IF letdown temperature exceeds 130°F, MANUALLY DIVERT letdown to the VCT using BG HIS-129, CVCS DEMIN INLET DIVERT VLV.

RO

(Step 3.4) MONITOR the following: • BG FI-121A, CHG HDR FLOW • BG FI-132, LTDN HX OUTLET FLOW

RO (Step 3.5) IF a Charging and Letdown flow mismatch exists, ADJUST Charging and Letdown flows as necessary to lower BGTI-127, REGEN HX LTDN OUTLET TEMP.

(Note) High letdown temp may be due to abnormal CCW conditions, (indicated by one or more of the following):

• Improper operation of the SW/ESW temperature control valve for the affected CCW Hx

• CCW Pump Low Flow alarms (Windows 51C, 52C, 53C, or 54C)

• Inadequate CCW flow to the non-essential loop (may be indicated by Window 54F, CCW SEAL HX FLOW HILO)

BOP

(Step 3.6) CHECK CCW conditions from available indications, including the temperature of the CCW train supplying the non-essential loop:

• EG TI-31, CCW HX A OUTLET TEMP • EG TI-32, CCW HX B OUTLET TEMP

BOP (Step 3.7) IF CCW appears to be the problem, Refer To OTO-EG-00001, CCW System Malfunctions - NO

(Note) Maximum RCP Seal Injection temperature, (BG TI-216, RCP SEAL WTR INJ TEMP), is:

• 135°F with RCS greater than 400°F • 150°F with RCS less than 400°F


RO

(Step 3.8) IF letdown temperature cannot be reduced, PERFORM the following per OTN-BG-00001, Chemical And Volume Control System. 3.8.1. SECURE normal letdown. 3.8.2. ESTABLISH Excess letdown.


Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 4 rev.0 Event # 3 Page 13 of 30 Event Description: SG ASD Fails Open Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior


• ‘D’ SG ASD fails open o Insert Malfunction (AB)PV004A_1, ramp 30 sec, value 1

• When contacted, respond as Duty Manager. Acknowledge entry into the T/S.

Indications Available: T= 25 Ann 109F SG PORV Open

OTO‑AB‑00001, STEAM DUMP MALFUNCTION

BOP Prior to entry in to the OTO procedure the BOP may check SG pressure and close the SG ASD.

CRS Enters OTO‑AB‑00001, STEAM DUMP MALFUNCTION

BOP (Step 1) CHECK Reactor Power ‑ LESS THAN 100%

BOP (Step 2) CHECK At Least One SG ASD ‑FAILED OPEN

BOP

(Step 3) PLACE The Affected SG ASD Controller In Manual And CLOSE The Valve:

• AB PIC‑4A (SG D)

BOP (Step 4) NOTIFY Count Room Technician Of Opening And Closing Times Of The SG ASD

BOP (Step 5) Go To Step 17

CRS (Step 17) INITIATE Actions To Repair The Failed Component

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 4 rev.0 Event # 3 Page 14 of 30 Event Description: SG ASD Fails Open Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

CRS (Step 18) REVIEW Technical Specification 3.7.4

CRS (Step 19) PLACE Inoperable Component In The EOSL

CRS (Step 21) PERFORM Notifications Per ODP‑ZZ‑00001 Addendum 13, Shift Manager Communications

NOTE Any time after the Tech Specs have been identified and at Lead Examiner’s discretion move to the next Event

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 4 rev.0 Event # 4 Page 15 of 30 Event Description: SG Tube Leak requiring a downpower Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior


• Steam Generator “D” Tube Leak of 30 gpm o Insert Malfunction (BB) EBB01D, value=30, ramp 5 min

• When contacted, respond as Chemistry that you will perform CTP-ZZ-02590, Primary To

Secondary Leakrate Determination

• When contacted, respond as Count Room Tech and inform the Control Room the higher than Normal Radiation readings from ‘D’ Steam Generator are valid

• When contacted, respond as Duty Manager. Acknowledge entry into the OTO Indications Available: T=35

Ann 61A, PROCESS RAD HIHI Ann 61B, PROCESS RAD HI

OTO-BB-00001, SG Tube Leak

OTO-BB-00001

CRS Implement OTO-BB-00001, SG Tube Leak

RO

(Step 1) CHECK if PZR Level can be maintained – YES (eventually becomes – NO)

a. Control charging flow as necessary to maintain PZR level b. Check Pressurizer Level – Stable or Rising

RNO • ISOLATE letdown as necessary. • RAISE charging flow as necessary.

RO

(Step 2) CHECK if VCT Level Can be Maintained – YES a. VCT Level – Maintained Greater Than 5% by Normal

Makeup

CRS (Step 3) Notify Chemistry to Perform CTP-ZZ-02590, Primary to Secondary Leakrate Determination


RO/BOP

(Step 4) Try to identify Affected SG – "D" Steam Generator • High radiation on N16 monitors at the RM-11 station

RO/BOP

(Step 5) Determine SG Tube Leak Rate a. Should calculate leak rate of 20 – 40 gpm b. Leak rate – LESS THAN 50 GPM

NOTE

(NOTE) • The upper leak rate limit of 75 gpd requires plant shutdown

independent of whether this limit is exceeded by a qualitatively confirmed leakage spike or progressively rising leakage.

• To avoid unnecessary shutdown, leakage should be qualitatively confirmed prior to declaration Action level 2 or 3. If a second radiation monitor is not available, actions should be based on the indications of the available monitor.

CRS

(Step 6) CHECK if Plant should be Shutdown a. Using the table in this step determine appropriate actions

• EPRI Action Level 3, > 75 gpd including confirmed spikes

• Perform Actions in Attachment D

OTO-BB-00001, Att D

CRS (Step D1.a) Initiate Step 7 and commence a controlled shutdown to Mode 3. Reduce power to < 50% within 1 hour, and be in Mode 3 within the next 2 hours

CRS (Step D1.a.1) Perform Applicable procedures as necessary a. OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction

OTO-MA-00008, Rapid Load Reduction


OTO-MA-00008

RO (Step 1) Place Rod Control In AUTO b. SE HS-9

CRS

(Step 2) Manage Reactivity a. Perform Reactivity Management Brief:

• Discuss Amount and Rate of Turbine Load Reduction

• Determine amount of boric acid needed

(CAUTION) • If using the Load Limit Potentiometer, unloading at greater

than 50 MWe per minute may arm the Main Condenser Steam Dumps.

• If changing load reduction methods to the Load Limiter ENSURE Load Set is restored to AT SET LOAD prior to using the Load Limiter.

(NOTE) Steps 3 and 4 may be performed concurrently while continuing in this procedure

CRS/BOP

#(Step 3) REDUCE Turbine Load at Less than or Equal to 5% per Minute using any of the following:

• Reduce Turbine load using the %/Min Loading Rate: • Reduce Turbine load using the Load Limit Potentiometer

NOTE

For step #4 of OTO-MA-00008, the candidate may either use OTO-MA-00008 step 4 or OTN-BG-00002, Attachment 8. The procedural actions to Borate from the VCT are the same and OTO-MA-00008 steps are listed below.

CRS/RO #(Step 4) Borate From the BAST by performing any of the following:

• BORATE to the VCT:

RO #(Step 4a) Place BG HS-26, RCS M/U CTRL, in STOP


RO #(Step 4b) Place BG HS-25, RCS M/U CTRL SEL, in BORATE

RO #(Step 4c) Set Boric Acid Flow Controller, BG FK-110, to the desired flow rate

RO #(Step 4d) Place BG FK-110 in AUTO

RO #(Step 4e) RESET BG FY110B, BA COUNTER, to 000

RO

#(Step 4f) SET BG FY‑110B for the desired gallons of boric acid to be added

RO #(Step 4g) PLACE BG HS‑26 in RUN

RO #(Step 4h) WHEN the desired boration is complete, THEN PLACE BG HS-26 in STOP

RO #(Step 4i) repeat Boration as necessary

RO

(Step 5) Initiate Boron Equalization by performing the following: a. ENERGIZE at least one group of Pressurizer Backup

Heaters: • B/U Group A BB HIS-51A • B/U Group B BB HIS 52A

b. Place Pressurizer Pressure Master Controller in MAN: • BB PK-455A

c. Lower Pressurizer Pressure Master controller output to 38% to 42%

d. Place Pressurizer Master Controller in AUTO


BOP

(Step 6) Check MFP Turbine Speed Control – IN AUTO • FC SK-509B • FC SK-509C

CUE

Once the crew starts the shutdown using steps 1-6 of OTO-MA-00008, as proven by observation lowering load 5-10 MWe: GO TO THE NEXT EVENT AS CUED BY LEAD EXAMINER

Appendix D Operator Action Form ES-D-2 Op Test No.: 2014-1 Scenario # 4 rev.0 Event # 5, 6, 7 Page 20 of 30 Event Description: Steam Generator “D” Tube Rupture / Reactor Trip / Mini-Purge Failure to

isolate / PZR PORV fails to close Proc /Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior



‘D’ SG Tube Rupture • Insert Malfunction (BB) EBB01D, value=400, ramp 10 min

• When contacted to locally open KA HV 29, wait 3 minutes and report that valve cannot be

opened locally, the handwheel spins freely.

• If contacted, respond as Count Room Tech and inform the Control Room the higher than Normal Radiation readings from Steam Generator “D” are valid

• When contacted, respond as Duty Manger. Acknowledge entry into the OTO

Indications Available: T=60

Ann 42A CHG LINE FLOW HILO Ann 32C PZR LO LEV DEV Ann 111C SG D LEV DEV

OTO-BB-00001, Steam Generator Tube Leak (Continuous Action Step 1)

OTO-BB-00001

#(Step 1) CHECK if PZR Level can be maintained a. Control charging flow as necessary to maintain PZR level b. Check Pressurizer Level – Stable or Rising - NO

RNO b. PERFORM the following: 1) Isolate letdown as necessary 2) RAISE charging flow as necessary 3) If PZR level can NOT be maintained greater than 6%,

THEN PERFORM the following: a) Manually TRIP the reactor. b) When reactor trip is verified, THEN ACTUATE SI. c) Go To E-0, Reactor Trip Or Safety Injection, Step 1





NOTE Steps 1 through 4 are immediate actions

RO


BOP

(Step 2) CHECK Turbine Trip a. Turbine Stop Valves – Closed

BOP

(Step 3) CHECK Power to AC Emergency Buses a. At Least One Emergency Bus – Energized b. Both Emergency Buses – Energized

RO

(Step 4) CHECK SI Status a. Check if SI is Actuated b. Check both Trains of SI Actuated

• LOCA Sequencer ANN 30A – Lit • LOCA Sequencer ANN 31A – Lit • SB069 SI Actuate Red Light – Lit Solid

RO/BOP (Step 5) Perform Attachment A, Automatic Action Verification, while continuing with this procedure

E-0 Att A RO/BOP (Step A1) CHECK Charging Pumps – Both CCPs running

RO/BOP (Step A2) CHECK SI and RHR Pumps – All running

RO/BOP (Step A3) CHECK ECCS Flow – BIH flow indicated



RO/BOP

(Step A4) CHECK ESW Pumps – BOTH RUNNING • EF HIS-55A • EF HIS-56A

RO/BOP

(Step A5) CHECK CCW Alignment: a. CCW Pumps – ONE RUNNING IN EACH TRAIN b. CCW Service Loop Supply and Return valves for one

operating CCW pump – OPEN c. OPEN CCW To RHR HX valves d. CLOSE Spent Fuel Pool HX CCW Outlet Valves e. STOP Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump(s) f. RECORD The Time Spent Fuel Pool Cooling Pump

Secured



RO/BOP (Step A8) CHECK If Containment Spray should Be Actuated – NO

RO/BOP

(Step A9) CHECK If Main Steamlines Should Be Isolated: • Containment pressure > 17 psig • Steamline pressure – LESS THAN 615 PSIG


RO/BOP (Step A11) CHECK Containment Isolation Phase A



RO/BOP (Step A12) CHECK SG Blowdown Isolation


RO/BOP

(Step A14) CHECK Containment Purge Isolation a. ESFAS status panels CPIS sections:

• SA066X WHITE lights ‑ALL LIT - NO • SA066Y WHITE lights ‑ALL LIT - NO

RNO Manually ACTUATE CPIS: • SA HS‑11 • SA HS‑15

IF CPIS damper(s) are NOT closed, THEN manually CLOSE damper(s) as necessary. Manually close GT-HZ-12

RO/BOP



BOP




BOP (Step 8) CHECK AFW Pumps

a. MD AFW Pumps – B Running (A MD AFW pump tagged out)

b. TD AFW Pump – Running

BOP


NECESSARY

BOP (Step 10) CHECK Total AFW Flow > 285,000 lbm/hr

BOP

(Step 11) CHECK PZR PORVs and Spray Valves a. PZR PORVs – Closed b. PZR PORVs – Both in AUTO c. PORV Block Valves – Both Open d. Normal PZR Spray Valves – Closed

BOP

(Step 12) CHECK if RCPs should be Stopped a. RCPs – Any Running b. ECCS Pumps – At least One Running c. RCS Pressure – Less than 1425 psig – NO RNO Go To Step 13

BOP

#(Step 13) CHECK RCS Temperatures • RCPs Running – Tavg 557 Deg F • No RCPs Running – Tcold 557 Deg F



RO/BOP

(Step 14) CHECK if any SG is Faulted a. CHECK pressures in all SGs:

• Any SG pressure lowering in an uncontrolled manner - • Any SG completely depressurized RNO – Go to Step 15

RO/BOP

(Step 15) CHECK if SG Tubes are Intact • Levels in all SGs – "D" NR Level is rising uncontrollably • SG Steamline N16 radiation – Normal – NO • Condenser Air Removal radiation – Normal before

Isolation – NO • SG Blowdown and Sample radiation – Normal before

Isolation – NO • SG ASD radiation – Normal • Turbine Driven Aux Feedwater Pump Exhaust radiation –

normal GO TO E-3, Steam Generator Tube Rupture

E-3, STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE

NOTE

• Personnel should be available for sampling during this

procedure • Seal Injection flow should be maintained to all RCPs • Step 1 criteria applies until an operator controlled cooldown is

initiated

E-3

RO

(Step 1) CHECK if RCPs should be stopped a. RCPs – Any Running b. ECCS Pumps – At Least one Running c. RCS pressure – Less than 1425 PSIG - NO

RNO Go To Step 2



BOP

(Step 2) Identify Ruptured SG(s) • Unexpected rise in any SG narrow range level • High radiation from any SG sample • High radiation from any SG steamline • High radiation from any SG blowdown line sample

BOP

(Step 3) Isolate Flow From Ruptured SG a. Adjust ruptured SG ASD controller to 1160 PSIG

• AB PIC-4A (SG D) b. Check ruptured SG ASD – closed

• AB PIC-4A (SG D) c. N/A d. CHECK SG Blowdown Containment Isolation Valve from

ruptured SG – CLOSED • BM HIS-4A (SG D)

e. Close Steam line Low point Drain valve from ruptured SG

• AB HIS-10 (SG D) f. Check if C-9 interlock is lit g. Close MSIV and MSIV bypass valve from ruptured SG

• AB HIS-11 (SG D)

BOP

(Step 4) CHECK Ruptured SG level a. Narrow range level > 7% [25%] b. Stop feed flow to ruptured SG CLOSE AL HK-5A and AL HK-6A (may have

been closed per fold out pages) Critical Task CREW Isolate feedwater flow into and steam flow from the ruptured

SG before a transition to ECA-3.1 occurs. RO/BOP (Step 5) CHECK Ruptured SG Pressure - > 340 psig



CAUTION If RCPs are NOT running, the following steps may cause a false CSF-1, Figure 4, Integrity Status Tree indication for the ruptured loop. Disregard the ruptured loop T-cold indication until after performing Step 29

NOTE

After the low steamline pressure SI signal is blocked, main steamline isolation will occur if the high steam pressure rate setpoint is exceeded.

BOP

(Step 6) Initiate RCS Cooldown a. CHECK RCS pressure – < 1970 PSIG b. Block Steamline Pressure SI c. Determine required core exit temperature (based on

table in E-3 and Lowest “Ruptured” SG Pressure d. Dump steam to condenser from the intact SGs at

maximum rate using steam dumps or ASDs e. Core exit TCs – less than required temperature – NO

RNO – WHEN core exit TCs are REQUIRED TEMPERATURE less than required temperature, THEN PERFORM Steps 6.f and 6.g. Continue with Steps 7 through 12 without delay while continuing with cooldown.

f. Stop the RCS cooldown g. Maintain core exit TCs – Less than required

Temperature

BOP (Step 7) Check Intact SG Levels:

a. Narrow Range levels – Greater than 7% [25%] b. Control feed flow to maintain narrow range levels between

22% [26%] and 52%.

BOP (Step 8) Check PZR PORVs and Block Valves

a. Power to Block Valves – Available b. PZR PORVs – CLOSED c. Block Valves – Both Open

RO (Step 9) Reset SI.



RO (Step 10) Reset Containment Isolation Phase A and Phase B

BOP

(Step 11) Establish Instrument Air to Containment: a. Check if ESW to Air Compressor valves – OPEN

• EF HIS-43 • EF HIS-44

b. Start Air Compressor(s). • KA HIS-3C • KA HIS-2C

c. Open Instrument Air Supply Containment Isolation valve. • KA HIS-29

RNO locally open the valve, continue with Step 12 CUE

When contacted to locally open KA HV 29, wait 3 minutes and report that valve cannot be opened locally, the handwheel spins freely.

BOP (Step 12) Check if RHR Pumps should be stopped:

a. RHR Pumps – Any running with suction aligned to RWST b. RCS Pressure – Greater than 325 psig c. STOP RHR Pumps and Place in standby.

RO (Step 13) Check if RCS Cooldown should be stopped:

a. Core exit TCs – Less than required temperature b. Stop RCS cooldown. c. Maintain core exit TCs – Less than required temperature.

BOP (Step 14) Check Ruptured SG pressure – Stable or Rising

RO

(Step 15) Check RCS Subcooling – Greater than 50 ºF [70 ºF] • Containment Pressure – Normal • Containment Normal Sump level – Normal • Containment Radiation – Normal before isolation



RO (Step 16) Depressurize RCS to Minimize Break Flow and Refill PZR:

a. Normal PZR Spray – Available – NO RNO: Go to Step 17.

RO

(Step 17) Depressurize RCS using PZR PORV to Minimize Break Flow and Refill PZR:

a. PZR PORV – At least One Available. b. Open One PZR PORV until any of the following conditions

are satisfied: • Both of the following:

1) RCS pressure – Less than Ruptured SG Pressure

2) PZR level – Greater than 9% [29%] OR

• PZR Level – Greater than 74% [64%] OR

• RCS Subcooling – Less than 30°F [50°F] c. Close PZR PORV.

RNO: Close associated Block Valve

Critical Task CREW Terminate the RCS depressurization by closing PORV block

Valve prior to transitioning to ECA-3-1. RO (Step 18) CHECK RCS Pressure – RISING

RO

(Step 19) CHECK If ECCS Flow Should Be Terminated: a. RCS subcooling – Greater Than 30˚F [50˚F] b. Secondary heat sink:

• Narrow range level in at least one intact SG - GREATER THAN 7% [25%]

OR • Total feed flow to SG(s) - GREATER THAN 285,000

LBM/HR AVAILABLE c. RCS pressure - STABLE OR RISING d. PZR level - GREATER THAN 9% [29%]



NOTE

EVAL Once the PORV block Valve has been closed in STEP 17 OR at the discretion of the Lead evaluator – The Scenario can be STOPPED

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