california energy crisis: fact or fiction? presented to the california independent petroleum...
TRANSCRIPT
![Page 1: California Energy Crisis: Fact or Fiction? Presented to The California Independent Petroleum Association June 2002 Richard McCann, Ph.D. Partner, M.Cubed](https://reader035.vdocuments.mx/reader035/viewer/2022081821/56649e375503460f94b2792c/html5/thumbnails/1.jpg)
California Energy Crisis:Fact or Fiction?
Presented to
The California Independent Petroleum Association
June 2002
Richard McCann, Ph.D. Partner, M.CubedDavis, California
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Perfect Mess: Confluence of Forces
25 years of government policies, corporate decisions, economics and weather
Government policies often oversteered Environmental policies not to blame, but are
impediment to solving crisis Market did not cause problem, but
exacerbated impacts
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A Brief Chronology
1970s energy crisis1970s & 1980s deregulation1982 California “QFs”1986 Gas pipeline deregulation1988 Diablo Canyon agreement1990s “Age of Surpluses”
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How Did Rough Seas Rise So Quickly?
National natural gas prices doubled Rapid demand growth throughout the West Reduced hydropower supplies and oncoming
drought Aging power plant fleet CA gas pipeline market decoupled and explosion Utilities deterred retail competition Failure to lock in low prices in long terms
contracts Lack of trust among utilities, ratepayers and
regulators
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Comparison of CEC Demand Forecasts
52952
53260
44000
46000
48000
50000
52000
54000
56000
58000
60000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Pea
k D
eman
d (
Meg
awat
ts)
1998
2000
Actual
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0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
Gig
awat
t-H
ou
rs p
er Y
ear
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Year
Key California Generation Sources 1983-2000
Gas Energy Imports Hydroelectric
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Underlying Market Factors vs PX Price
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
Apr-9
8
May
-98
Jun-
98
Jul-9
8
Aug-9
8
Sep-9
8
Oct
-98
Nov-9
8
Dec-9
8
Jan-
99
Feb-9
9
Mar
-99
Apr-9
9
May
-99
Jun-
99
Jul-9
9
Aug-9
9
Sep-9
9
Oct
-99
Nov-9
9
Dec-9
9
Jan-
00
Feb-0
0
Mar
-00
Apr-0
0
May
-00
Jun-
00
Jul-0
0
Aug-0
0
Sep-0
0
Oct
-00
Nov-0
0
Dec-0
0
$ p
er M
egaw
att
Ho
ur
Gas RTC SP15
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How Did California Survive Summer of 2001?
Consumers reduced demand 8-10% after December
CDWR maniacally bought forwards Generators “jawboned” into stopping
withholding FERC finally imposed price caps El Paso reauctioned pipeline capacity CPUC imposed two rate hikes, totaling
4.5 cents on avg.
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The State of the Crisis: Two Parts
Financial PG&E Bankruptcy DWR Power Purchases and State Bond Issuance SCE-CPUC Bailout Settlement
Physical Demand Reduction Programs Undersubscription Drought and Hydro Shortage Capacity Shortage, "Gaming," and Higher Outages
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Bailing Out the Utilities:
SCE-PUC Settlement - September 2001
$6.3 billion owed Current rates frozen until December 31, 2003 No dividends until December 2005 Ratepayers' share = $3 to 6 billion Shareholders = $300 million to $3 billion
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PG&E Bankruptcy: Competing
Plans of Reorganization (POR)
PG&E POR - $12 billion debt
- Spin off generation, transmission and gas pipeline
- Wholesale power contracts with utility for 12 years
- No significant shareholder losses
CPUC POR - Refinance $6 billion of debt
- Issue $1.75 billion in added stock
- Shareholders contribute $1.6 billion
- Ratepayers contribute $4.7 billion from frozen rates through January 2003
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CDWR Power Purchases CDWR is purchasing all “net short” energy for 3
IOUs CPUC has raised rates by 3 cents/kWh to cover
QFs and CDWR purchases CDWR is covering purchases through 2002, but
contracts in place past 2010. SCE Settlement in rates, but not PG&E yet. CDWR likely “net long” for at least 4 years
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DWR Contracts 2001-2010
-
10,000
20,000
30,000
40,000
50,000
60,000
70,000
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Years
Me
ga
wa
tts
of
Pe
ak
Ca
pa
cit
y
DWR Contracts
URG & QFs
Demand - 0% Growth
Demand - 1% Growth
Demand - 2% Growth
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The Federal Government’s Role
Deregulation of gas and electricity FERC pipeline and transmission decisions 1992 EPAct mandated open access 1994 EPA approves SCAQMD air emission
permit market 1995 FERC rejection of California BRPU 1997 FERC approval of restructuring 2000-01 FERC acted timidly to enforce market
rules
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Some Misconceptions about the Crisis
Retail price freeze suppressed response Utilities were forced to sell their plants Power plants were not constructed Utilities were prohibited from signing long- term
contracts Everyone was forced to buy and sell in one
marketplace The rules in other states are much different What about stranded cost recovery?