Pelobello v. PalatinoFacts:Palatino was the mayor elect of Torrijos, Marinduque. Pelobello filed a quo warranto proceeding alleging that Palatino is no longer qualified to hold office because he was already convicted before and was even imprisoned. Because of such conviction and imprisonment, Pelobello averred that Palatino is already barred from voting and being voted upon. Palatino also invoked par (a), sec 94 of the Election Code which supports his contention. It is also admitted that the respondent-appellee was granted by the Governor-General a conditional pardon back in 1915; and it has been proven that on December 25, 1940, His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, granted the respondent-appellee absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.Issue:WoN absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal convictionHeld:YES. The pardoning power is only subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution, and cannot be controlled or restricted by legislative action. After the pardon was granted, Palatino had exercised the right of suffrage, was elected councilor of Torrijos, Marinduque, for the period 1918 to 1921; was elected municipal president of that municipality three times in succession (1922-1931); and finally elected mayor of the municipality in the election for local officials in December, 1940. Under these circumstances, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended on the date mentioned hereinabove and before the date fixed in section 4 of the Election Code for assuming office. We see no reason for defeating this wholesome purpose by a restrictive judicial interpretation of the constitutional grant to the Chief Executive.

Barrioquinto v FernandezFacts:Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war. The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was then sentenced to life imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy. Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well. However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged. Jimenez & Barrioquinto in fact said that a certain Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being charged to them.Issue:WoN an admission of guilt is necessary before an amnesty could be granted.Held:NO. In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance. Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits of amnesty and to be regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation, or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a public act, the courts as well as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms of said Proclamation and apply the benefits granted therein to cases coming within their province or jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with such offenses or not, if the evidence presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.

Vera vs. PeopleFacts:Vera, together with 92 others were charged for the crime of kidnapping with murder done against a certain Lozaes. The said crime was committed allegedly to aid the Japanese occupation. During the hearing, none of the petitioners-defendants admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact, Gaudencio Vera, the only defendant who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozaes, categorically denied it. Hence, the Amnesty Commission held that it could not take cognizance of the case, on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, could be invoked only by defendants in a criminal case who, admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial.Issue:Whether or not the accused can avail of amnesty sans admission of guilt.Held:It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act, or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation. The present rule requires a previous admission of guilt since a person would not need the benefit of amnesty unless he was, to begin with, guilty of the offense covered by the proclamation.

Monsanto v Factoran Jr.Facts:Petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced her to imprisonment and to indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately. She was given an absolute pardon by President Marcos which she accepted. Petitioner requested that she be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant, she also asked for the back pay for the entire period of her suspension. Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment. The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his suspension. In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a reappointment before he can reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or forfeited. The court viewed that is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for the result would still be the same.Issue:WoN a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.Held:No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction. The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents. The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment.

Llamas v OrbosFacts:Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension imposed upon him.Issue:WoN a pardon can be applied to Administrative cases.Held:YES. The SC held that pardon is applicable to Administrative cases. The SC does not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is a considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than criminal offenses.

Magdalo v ComelecFacts:Magdalo sa Pagbabago (MAGDALO) filed its Petition for Registration with the respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeking its registration and/or accreditation as a regional political party based in the National Capital Region (NCR) for participation in the 2010 National and Local Elections. It was represented by its Chairperson, Senator Antonio F. Trillanes IV (Trillanes), and its Secretary General, Francisco Ashley L. Acedillo (Acedillo). Taking cognizance of the Oakwood incident, the COMELEC denied the Petition, claiming that MAGDALOs purpose was to employ violence and unlawful means to achieve their goals. Issue:WoN in light of the Amnesty grant to the petitioner, COMELEC had gravely abused its discretion in rejecting the application of MagdaloHeld:NO. An amnesty grant guarantees the freedom from the burden of having been convicted in all aspects; however, it cannot be said that the COMELEC had gravely abused its discretion in rejecting Magdalos application as the COMELEC have stated sufficiently its grounds for doing so. Under Article IX-C, Section 2(5) of the 1987 Constitution, parties, organizations, and coalitions that seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means shall be denied registration. This disqualifications is reiterated in Section 61 of B.P. 881, which provides that no political party which seeks to achieve its goals through violence shall be entitled to accreditation. In the present case, the Oakwood incident was one that was attended with violence. As publicly announced by the leaders of MAGDALO during the siege, their objectives were to express their dissatisfaction with the administration of former President Arroyo and to divulge the alleged corruption in the military and the supposed sale of arms to enemies of the state. Ultimately, they wanted the President, her cabinet members, and the top officials of the AFP and the PNP to resign. To achieve these goals, MAGDALO opted to seize a hotel occupied by civilians, march in the premises in full battle gear with ammunitions, and plant explosives in the building. These brash methods by which MAGDALO opted to ventilate the grievances of its members and withdraw its support from the government constituted clear acts of violence.

Spouses Constantino vs CuisiaFacts:During the Aquino regime, her administration came up w/ a scheme to reduce the countrys external debt. The solution resorted to was to incur foreign debts. Three restructuring programs were sought to initiate the program for foreign debts including buyback and bond-conversion programs. Constantino as a taxpayer and in behalf of his minor children who are Filipino citizens averred that the buyback and bond-conversion schemes are burdensome and that these do not constitute the loan contract or guarantee contemplated in Sec. 20, Art. 7 of the Constitution. And assuming that the President has such power unlike other powers which may be validly delegated by the President, the power to incur foreign debts is expressly reserved by the Constitution in the person of the President. They argue that the gravity by which the exercise of the power will affect the Filipino nation requires that the President alone must exercise this power. They argue that the requirement of prior concurrence of an entity specifically named by the Constitutionthe Monetary Boardreinforces the submission that not respondents but the President alone and personally can validly bind the country. Hence, they would like Cuisia et al to stop acting pursuant to the scheme.Issue:WoN the schemes constitute a delegation of the power enunciated in Sec 20, Art 7 of the Constitution and whether they can be delegated.Held:YES. There is no question that the president has borrowing powers and that the president may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of this country w/ prior concurrence of the Monetary Board. It makes no distinction whatsoever and the fact that a debt or a loan may be onerous is irrelevant. On the other hand, the president can delegate this power to her direct subordinates. The evident exigency of having the Secretary of Finance implement the decision of the President to execute the debt-relief contracts is made manifest by the fact that the process of establishing and executing a strategy for managing the governments debt is deep within the realm of the expertise of the Department of Finance, primed as it is to raise the required amount of funding, achieve its risk and cost objectives, and meet any other sovereign debt management goals. If the President were to personally exercise every aspect of the foreign borrowing power, he/she would have to pause from running the country long enough to focus on a welter of time-consuming detailed activitiesthe propriety of incurring/guaranteeing loans, studying and choosing among the many methods that may be taken toward this end, meeting countless times with creditor representatives to negotiate, obtaining the concurrence of the Monetary Board, explaining and defending the negotiated deal to the public, and more often than not, flying to the agreed place of execution to sign the documents. This sort of constitutional interpretation would negate the very existence of cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government. There are certain powers of the President that cannot be delegated; the powers in Sec 20, Article 7 of the Constitution is not among these non-delegable powers.

Commissioner of Customs v Eastern Sea TradingFacts:Eastern Sea Trading (EST) was a shipping company which imports from Japan onion and garlic into the Philippines. In 1956, the Commissioner of Customs ordered the seizure and forfeiture of the import goods because EST was not able to comply with Central Bank Circulars 44 and 45. The said circulars were pursuant to Executive Order 328. On the other hand, EO 328 was the implementing law of the Trades and Financial Agreements, an executive agreement, entered into between the Philippines and Japan. The said executive agreement states, among others, that all import transactions between Japan and the Philippines should be invoiced in dollar. In this case, the said items imported by EST from Japan were not invoiced in dollar. EST questioned the validity of the said EO averring that the executive agreement that the EO was implementing was never concurred upon by the Senate. The issue was elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals and the latter ruled in favor of EST. The Commissioner appealed.Issue:Whether or not the Executive Agreement is subject to the concurrence by the Senate.Held:No, Executive Agreements are not like treaties which are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive agreements and are no less common in our scheme of government than are the more formal instruments treaties and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges of notes and at other times that of more formal documents denominated agreements or protocols.The point where ordinary correspondence between this and other governments ends and agreements whether denominated executive agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise begin, may sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time. Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated with foreign governments. . . . It would seem to be sufficient, in order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934 are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties, and that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the Executive without the approval of the Senate.They cover such subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs matters, and commercial relations generally, international claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific congressional authorization but in conformity with policies declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.

Bayan v Executive SecretaryFacts:The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and negotiations, which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas Hubbard. Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999, the senate approved it by (2/3) votes. Petitioners assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII. Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:a) it must be a treaty,b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, andc) recognized as such by the other contracting state. Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.

Issue:Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the Constitution?

Held:Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate. The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines. It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

Pimentel v Office of the Executive Secretary Facts:The petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the Senate of the Philippines for its concurrence pursuant to Sec. 21, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution. The Rome Statute established the Int'l Criminal Court which will have jurisdiction over the most serious crimes as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression as defined by the Statute. The Philippines through the Chargie du Affairs in UN. The provisions of the Statute however require that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory state. Petitioners contend that ratification of a treaty, under both domestic and international law, is a function of the Senate, hence it is the duty of the Executive Department to transmit the signed copy to the senate to allow it to exercise its discretion. Issue:WoN the ratification of an international treaty is a function of the SenateHeld:NO. The President as the head of state is the sole organ and authorized in the external relations and he is also the country's sole representative with foreign nations, He is the mouthpiece with respect to the country's foreign affairs. In treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states and enter into treaties but this power is limited by the Constitution with the 2/3 required vote of all the members of the Senate for the treaty to be valid. (Sec. 21, Art VII). The legislative branch part is essential to provide a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations, to ensure the nation's pursuit of political maturity and growth.