butler, james_justice and the fundamental question of plato's republic_apeiron, 35, 1_2002!1!18

Justice and the FundamentalQuestion of Plato's RepublicJames Butler

To many Plato scholars, the Republic's defense of justice seems primarilyeudaimonist; that is, the challenge given to Socrates in Book II — whichhe ultimately answers in Book IX — is to show that justice itself is betterthan injustice because, aside from any advantages a just person may getfrom seeming just or having a reputation for justice, the just life is happierthan the unjust life.1 After all, at 361d, Glaucon says of the just personand the unjust person he wants examined ' ... so that both peoplereaching the extreme, one of justice, the other of injustice, we may passjudgment which of the two is happier.'

But the view that the Republic is eudaimonist is controversial. Mab-bott, seizing on the talk of justice being 'welcomed for its own sake'(357b6), rejects the eudaimonist reading of the Republic in favor of thefollowing view: In addition to contributing to happiness, justice is goodin itself, where 'good in itself is understood as good regardless of any

1 Advocates for this view of the Republic include Foster, M.B., Ά Mistake in Plato'sRepublic', Mind 46 (1937), 386-93, Irwin, Terence, Plato's Ethics (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press 1992); Sachs, David, Ά Fallacy in Plato's Republic', Richard Krauted., Plato's Republic: Critical Essays (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publish-ing 1997), 1-16; Kraut, Richard, "The Defense of Justice in Plato's Republic', RichardKraut ed., The Cambridge Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge Press 1992),309-337; White, Nicholas, A Companion to Plato's Republic (Indianapolis: HackettPublishing 1979).

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2 James Butler

consequences whatever for the agent's happiness that might flow m any wayfrom the agent being just.2

This paper will argue, contrary to Mabbott, that the Republic is eudai-monist, so that the way justice is 'welcomed for its own sake' cannot beby its being desirable apart from happiness. Rather, justice is 'welcomedfor its own sake' as a means to happiness in a perfectly ordinary causalway: justice produces the happiest life.

1 The Passage and the Project

Interpreters generally agree that the fundamental question of the Repub-lic begins in Book II when, on behalf of Thrasymachus, Glaucon andAdimantus challenge Socrates to show the superiority of justice evenwhen the rewards of reputation are set aside. The challenge begins withGlaucon making a three-fold classification of goods:

Do you agree that there is a kind of good which we would choose topossess, not from a desire for its after-effects, but welcoming it for its ownsake, as for example, enjoyment and pleasures which are harmless andwhere nothing happens because of them in the future, except to keep onenjoying ... And again there is a kind that we love both for its own sakeand for its consequences, such as understanding, sight, and health ...And can you discern a third kind of good under which fall exercise andbeing healed when sick and the art of healing and money-making gen-erally? For of them we would say that they are irksome, yet beneficial,and we would not choose to have them for their own sakes, but only forthe rewards and other things that accrue from them. (357b-d)3

Socrates thinks that justice belongs to the second, finest class: thosethings that must be welcomed both for their own sake and for theirconsequences by anyone who is going to be blessed [τω μελλοντι μακαρίωεσεσθαι] (358a2-3). Nonetheless, he agrees with Glaucon that most peo-

2 Advocates for this position include Mabbott, J.D., 'Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?',Mind 46 (1937), 468-74, (reprinted with revisions in Plato Π, G. Vlastos ed., GardenCity, NY ([1971] 57-65), Annas, J., An Introduction to Plato's Republic, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press (1982), and Devereux, D., "The Structure of Socrates' Argument forJustice in the Republic (APA Pacific Meeting, Berkeley, March 1999).

3 All translations are based on Shorey with my occasional modifications.Brought to you by | UNAMAuthenticated


Justice and the Fundamental Question of Plato's Republic 3

pie place justice in the third class, as irksome yet 'practiced for the sakeof rewards and reputation stemming from opinion' [μισθών θ' ένεκα καιευδοκιμήσεων δια δόξαν έπιτηδευτέον] (358a5-6). In an attempt to resolvethe difference of opinion, Glaucon asks Socrates to say 'what justice andinjustice are and what sort of power (δύναμιν) each one itself has whenalone in the soul but to leave out the rewards and the things that comefrom them' [τί τ' εστίν έκάτερον και τίνα έχει δύναμιν αυτό καθ' αυτό ενόνεν τη ψυχή τους δε μισθούς και τα γιγνόμενα απ' αυτών έασαι χαίρειν](358b5-7). Adimantus agrees, asking Socrates to set aside all those re-wards that depend upon reputation and show that justice is welcomedfor its own sake (367c).

The nature of the question put to Socrates, especially the distinctionbetween 'welcomed for its own sake' and 'welcomed for its conse-quences' is not immediately clear. And for good reason: one is unsure towhat the expressions 'welcomed for its own sake' and 'welcomed for itsconsequences' refer. One thing is certain, however: We must take care tointerpret this distinction as Plato intends it, and not simply to read it inaccordance with our modern views.

Mabbott argues that the distinction is between on the one hand thosegoods that are 'good in themselves' without any reference to any othergood (including ευδαιμονία) and on the other hand those goods that arewelcomed for their consequences.4 Since Socrates places justice in thesecond class of goods, his task, according to Mabbott, is two-fold:

the task of Socrates, on my theory, is to show that justice is in "the bestclass" good in itself and good for its consequences. In proving the firsthalf of the thesis all consequences must be eliminated ... In proving thesecond, the necessary and inevitable consequences must be broughtback in again. (1937,471)

This view, therefore, divides the Republic into two distinct sections.Mabbott states that On my view Plato shows in Book IV that justice isgood in itself and in Book IX that it is good for its consequences' (1971,62).

Eudaimonists however, claim that Mabbott is mistaken, for happinessseems to be an ongoing theme in Socrates' entire discussion. So ratherthan dividing Books II-IX into two separate arguments, eudaimonistsargue that the whole discussion is intended to establish that justice

4 See Mabbott (1937), 468-74. Brought to you by | UNAMAuthenticated


4 James Butler

should be 'welcomed for its own sake' because justice by itself is a meansto the happiest life. (Book X then establishes that justice is 'welcomed forits consequences' by producing a good reputation among gods and men.)

As a group, however, eudaimonists are scarcely in agreement aboutexactly how Socrates shows that justice by itself is a means to the happiestlife. Foster argues that justice produces two types of beneficial results,those that follow directly from the possession of justice and those thatfollow from justice only in conjunction with circumstances (like reputa-tion).5 Thus, Socrates' project in Books II-IX is to show that justice is'welcomed for its own sake' because the happy life is the direct result ofjustice without the need of any other good.6

Irwin, on the other hand, introduces a distinction widely employed(certainly since Ackrill7) between instrumental means and componentmeans, and consequently attacks the talk of happiness as a result ofjustice as talk of justice as an instrumental means to happiness. Irwinsuggests that rather than being an instrumental means to happiness,justice is an essential component or part of happiness. Hence, we mightcall Irwin's view 'Component Eudaimonism'. According to ComponentEudaimonism, because justice is a component of happiness, if we saythat we desire the whole (i.e., happiness) 'for its own sake', we arejustified in saying that we desire a part — or certainly a part as importantas justice — for its own sake.

In this paper I shall primarily take issue with the views of Mabbottand Irwin. Mabbott is incorrect to think that Socrates is showing justiceis good in itself apart from happiness in Books II through IV. On the otherside, Irwin — who is surely correct that the three-fold classification ofgoods refers to means to happiness — is too quick to dismiss the viewthat happiness is a consequence of justice in favor of the view that justiceis an essential part of happiness.

5 For instance, using Glaucon's own example of understanding, knowing arithmetichas the direct benefit of being able to balance one's checkbook as well as the indirectreward of getting a good grade in math class contingent upon one's rapport with theinstructor. (This follows Foster's example [387].)

6 See Foster (1937), 387. Foster uses a slightly different terminology: Instead of directand indirect consequences, Foster uses the terms 'natural' and 'artificial'.

7 Ackrill, J.L., 'Aristotle on Eudaimonia' in A. Rorty ed, Essays on Aristotle's Ethics,Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980. Brought to you by | UNAM

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Even so, this is not to imply that I endorse Foster's position. AlthoughFoster is essentially correct to think that the three-fold classification isabout the causal means to happiness, he is incorrect to think that being'welcomed for its own sake and for its consequences' contains a distinc-tion between direct and indirect consequences. Instead, the point of thethree-fold classification is that some goods are 'welcomed for their ownsakes' because they are a means to happiness in their immediate aspectsand others are 'welcomed for its consequences' because they are a meansto happiness in their broader aspects. For instance, Glaucon says of thosegoods welcomed only for their own sakes (e.g., enjoyment and harmlesspleasures) that 'nothing happens because of them in the future, except tokeep on enjoying.' Glaucon's explanation of these goods suggests thatin their immediate aspects — immediate temporal aspects in this case —such goods are an immediate means to happiness, though they providenothing as a means to future happiness except perhaps to keep onenjoying. Similarly, when discussing those goods that are welcomedmerely for their consequences (exercise, money making, etc.) Glauconsays, 'we would say that they are irksome, yet beneficial'. His statement,coupled with the contrast between these goods and those 'welcomed fortheir own sake', again suggests that in the present goods welcomedmerely for their consequences are irksome and so not a means to happi-ness, but their later consequences (health, wealth) are a means to happi-ness. Justice then, being welcomed both for its own sake and for itsconsequences, is desirable for two reasons: (i) its immediate aspect (awell-ordered soul) is a means to happiness and (ii) its broader aspects(e.g., having a good reputation) are also a means to happiness.

I shall suggest that we can further understand the fundamental ques-tion of the Republic by examining where, I believe, Plato answers thisquestion: the comparison of the just and unjust lives in Book IX. There,Socrates gives three proofs — the third of which he calls 'most decisive'— showing that justice produces a happier life than injustice. Arrivingat this conclusion, Socrates immediately returns to the Book II challenge,implying that the three proofs constitute his response. The fundamentalchallenge of the Republic, therefore, is to show that justice not injusticeproduces the happiest life.8

8 One of my referees (who I would like to thank for his extended comments) haspointed out to me that some scholars may take Socrates' promise in Book IV (435c)Brought to you by | UNAM


6 James Butler

I will begin with an explanation and criticism of Mabbott's view andthen turn to an examination of Irwin's view. I follow with a brief accountof the three proofs in favor of the just life in Republic IX. Finally, I suggesthow these three proofs clarify why justice is to be 'welcomed for its ownsake and for its consequences'.

2 Mabbott

Mabbott believes that when Socrates places justice among the things'welcomed for their own sake and for their consequences' and Glauconseeks to know justice's power 'itself by itself, phrases like 'for its ownsake' and 'itself by itself stand for justice itself regardless of consequences.9

to provide a more complete account of justice — which he fulfills in Book VI (504cff)— as a switch from justice as it is in this world (as a harmony of three parts) to theForm of Justice as it is in another world. And as such, the fundamental question ofthe Republic would be about the Form of Justice rather than the justice in this world.This suggestion, to my mind, would too sharply divide the justice in this world fromthe Form of Justice, as if we were to consider the Form of Justice too sublime forpeople in this world even when they are just.

I cannot undertake here to defend my position against this worthy suggestion,only to point out the differences with my view. The Book VI account, as I see it,requires that the tripartite account of justice be regimented to the Form of the Good.What is involved in this account is not a turning away from justice as psychologicalharmony in Book IV (as the referee supposes) but ensuring that psychologicalharmony is made beneficial and useful by means of knowledge of the Good. Thetext of the Book VI passage is as follows:

Well then he must take the longer road ... There is something more importantthan these virtues. However, even for the virtues themselves, it isn't enough tolook at a mere sketch, as we did before while neglecting the most completeaccount ... for you've often heard it said that the form of the good is the mostimportant thing to learn about and it's by their relation to it that just things andthe others become useful and beneficial (504c-5a)

Plato relates the Form of the Good to just things (including justice itself presumably)in terms of the latter becoming useful and beneficial. His point, then, is not that theForm of Justice is something quite other than the psychological harmony found inBook IV. Rather, the Form of Justice is psychological harmony rendered beneficialby being regimented to the Form of the Good.

Mabbott (and those who agree with him) fails to acknowledge an importantconsequence of reading 'welcomed for its own sake' as 'good in itself regardless ofconsequences': Since Glaucon lists enjoyment and harmless pleasures as examplesBrought to you by | UNAM



Accordingly, Socrates argues in Books II-FV that justice is good in itselfregardless of any consequences and then shifts in Books V-IX to showthat justice produces beneficial results, namely happiness.

Yet why should we think, as Mabbott does, that Plato divides BooksII-1X into two distinct arguments? Mabbott points to the end of Book IV(444cl-5b7) where Socrates claims to have discovered that justice is 'akind of health of the soul ... a natural relation of control' by reason(444d-e). Mabbott explains this passage as follows:

health was one of the examples given in 357c of something both goodin itself and good for its consequences and the explicit and clearlydeveloped parallel between health and justice ... seems to me to be thefinal piece of evidence that Plato never forgot his promise to put justicein the "best class", that he takes himself by the end of Book IV to haveaccomplished the/irsf and greater part of his task, [emphasis mine] (1937,473)10

In essence, to support his view that Socrates is arguing that justice isgood in itself regardless of consequences in Book IV, Mabbott connectstwo passages: Glaucon's classification of goods at the beginning of BookII and Socrates' claim that justice is a kind of health of the soul at the endof Book IV.11 The former passage, Mabbott claims, establishes health asboth good in itself and good for its consequences, while the latter, bymaking justice a species of health, shows that justice must be good in

of goods welcomed simply for their own sakes, Mabbott is committed to the viewthat harmless pleasures and enjoyment are good in themselves regardless of conse-quences, contrary to what many modem philosophers (following Kant) have cometo believe.

10 Cf. Annas, An Introduction to Plato's Republic, 68

11 Devereux (14-15) further argues that since just actions are said to be profitablebecause they produce just state of the soul (444cl-d2), justice itself must be valuable.But because at this stage in the argument justice itself is not said to produceanything, Devereux concludes that justice must have value in itself. We should grantthat just acts are profitable because they produce a just soul, and thus justice mustbe valuable, but it does not follow that justice is good in itself. Justice is said to beprofitable as well (445a) and we may ask 'profitable to what?' We could answer, asthe eudaimonist theory would have it, that justice is profitable in contributing to thehappiest life. Thus, justice is not good in itself; it is merely valuable as an interme-diate good, leading to the happiest life. Brought to you by | UNAM


8 James Butler

itself (at least in part). Then, after establishing that justice is good in itself,Socrates shifts arguments to show that justice leads directly to thehappiest life. (Then in Book X, he argues that justice provides one witha good reputation amongst gods and humans).

Mabbott's view, I believe, is untenable and the eudaimonists' criticismof it is surely correct. Irwin (1992) argues that when Socrates claims thatjustice must be welcomed both for its own sake and for its consequencesT?y anyone who is going to be blessed' (τω μέλλοντι μακαρίφ εσεσθαι),'the clause "to anyone who is going to be blessed" shows that the threeclasses of goods are meant to include all the goods that might beconsidered as ways of achieving happiness' (1992,190). Thus, Socrates'comment immediately after the three-fold classification of goods desig-nates happiness as the ultimate reason why such 'goods' are to bewelcomed.

No doubt Mabbott would concede that Socrates does argue in BooksV-IX that justice contributes to happiness, but that particular argumentis wholly separate from the argument that justice is good in itself in BookIV.12 Yet, if Socrates is indeed giving wholly separate arguments that (i)justice is good in itself (Books II-IV) and (ii) justice contributes to happi-ness (Books V-IX), we would expect him not to consider the happinessof the just life until after showing that justice is good in itself at 444cl-5b7.We do not find anything of the sort however. Two passages in Book IV,prior to the crucial link between justice and health at the end of the book,explicitly tell us that the aim of Socrates' investigation is about happiness;they mention nothing about justice being good in itself.13 At 420b Socra-tes states that what he and the brothers have been inquiring into for along time—presumably why justice is to be 'welcomed for its own sake'from Book II — is how to make the city as a whole (and analogously theperson) happiest.14 He mentions nothing which suggests that their in-quiry has anything to do with justice being good in itself.

12 Mabbott (1937), 471, quoted above.

13 Mabbott (1971) discusses these passages, but suggests, rather implausibly, that if'ευδαιμονία' is not taken to be 'happiness', but instead as referring to a virtuousactivity of the soul, these passages need not count as evidence that Plato is focusingon the consequences of justice.

14 '. We aren't looking to make any one group outstandingly happy, but ίο make thewhole city so, as far as possible. We thought that we'd find justice most easily in suchBrought to you by | UNAM



More importantly at 427b, after establishing the just city, Socratesexamines the analogy between the just city and the just person:

Well, son of Ariston, your city might now be said to be established ...look inside it and see where the justice and the injustice might be in it,what the difference between them is and which of the two the personwho is to be happy [τον μέλλοντα εύδαίμονα είναι]15 should possess,whether its possession is noticed by the gods and people or not. (427d)[my emphasis]

This second passage is particularly telling: for immediately afterestablishing the just polis, Socrates does not ask the brothers anythingabout whether justice is good in itself or not. Instead, he asks them todistinguish between justice and injustice and to discover which of thetwo will make a person happy.

Notice also that this passage exactly foretells the remainder of BookIV: Socrates finds justice in the city (432b-3d), shows a crucial differencebetween justice and injustice — justice is the natural order of the soulwhile injustice is unnatural (444d-e) — and then draws out the conse-quences of these differences to the question of happiness (444e). Thus,we need not conclude, as Mabbott contends, that Socrates shifts hisargument from justice being good in itself to justice producing happi-ness; Socrates merely sets out an important difference between justiceand injustice, and then continues with the fundamental question: whichof the two leads to the happier life.

These two passages, both of which precede the end of Book IV, takentogether suggest that contrary to Mabbott's view Socrates will answerthe fundamental question 'why is justice to be welcomed for its ownsake?' by showing that justice will make one happier than injustice.16

a city and injustice, by contrast, in the one that is governed worst and that byobserving both cities, we'd be able to judge the question we've been inquiring intofor so long' (420b; my emphasis).

15 This phrase bears a striking resemblance to Socrates' claim in Book II that one mustwelcome justice if one is to be blessed [τφ μέλλοντι μακαριά) έσεσθαι]. Just as theBook II passage (as Irwin points out) makes happiness the context of the three-foldclassification, this Book IV passage is further evidence that Socrates' argument isabout happiness.

16 I mention in passing that I believe that at the end of Book IV, Plato is responding toBrought to you by | UNAMAuthenticated


10 James Butler

3 Irwin

Having dismissed Mabbott's view, we must turn to consider Irwin'sComponent Eudaimonism. If eudaimonists are correct that Socrates'entire argument in Books II-IX is ultimately about the happiness of thejust life, how should we interpret the contrast between 'welcomed for itsown sake' and 'welcomed for its consequences' which lies at the centerof the brother's challenge? We might think, following Foster and White,that regardless of the way some people might interpret such phrases,17

the brother's challenge and Socrates' subsequent argument make it clearthat 'for its own sake' refers to the direct consequences of justice by itselfand 'for its consequences' refers to those indirect consequences that comefrom the reputation for being just.

Irwin rejects Foster's contrast of 'welcomed for its own sake' and'welcomed for its consequences' since, he believes, such an interpreta-tion would be inconsistent with Glaucon's three-fold classification ofgoods. He writes:

This contrast, however does not explain why Plato divides the secondfrom the third class of goods in the way he does. Exercise is treated asa good of the third class ... we choose it only for its consequences.Whether the desirable consequence of exercise is a consequence ofexercise itself seems not to affect the fact that exercise belongs to thethird class. (1992, 190-1)

Presumably, since exercise has good direct consequences — 'betterhealth is the natural and inevitable result of moderate and well-plannedexercise' (190) —but is placed in the third class of goods (those welcomedsolely for their consequences), the third class cannot be limited to thosegoods which have only indirect consequences. Irwin therefore concludes

the first part of Glaucon's (and Thrasymachus) claim that injustice is good by nature(348c, 358e) Hence Socrates shows (444d-e) that injustice is contrary to nature, andjustice is in accordance with nature. Yet in establishing this, it is not necessary thatPlato show that it is good in itself; nor is it necessary that such a response isindependent of the relation of justice to happiness.

17 As White (1979) notes: '... by his phrases "for its own sake" and "because of itsconsequences", as the Greek expressions are translated, Plato does not intend thesame contrast that we translate and understand him to intend' (79).Brought to you by | UNAM



that when Socrates places justice among the second class of goods, hecannot have in mind a distinction between direct and indirect conse-quences; for such a distinction belongs equally to the third class.

What then does Socrates hope to show by placing justice in the secondclass, all the while maintaining a connection between justice and happi-ness? On Irwin's view, since 'welcomed for its own sake' cannot refer tothe direct results of being just, he infers that Socrates is trying to showthat justice is the dominant component of happiness which 'contributesnon-causally to happiness by being a part of it' (193). Irwin bases thisinference on his reading of the analogy between justice and health inBook IV, where (as he believes) health is shown to be a crucial componentof happiness:18

The absence of health makes life no longer worth living only if I cannotperform any significant human activities to a worthwhile degree ... Insuch a case I am justified in choosing health (more exactly, a sufficientdegree of health to avoid this intolerable condition) over any combina-tion of other bodily or external goods. Health therefore is dominantover other bodily or external goods. (1992,255)

The point of Socrates' analogy, on Irwin's view, is to show that weshould value justice over all other goods (including physical health)because justice is the crucial component of happiness.

Irwin's view is suspect for several reasons: First, Irwin fails to presenta passage where Plato directly refers to happiness having parts, or justicebeing a part of happiness. Thus, Irwin must infer that Socrates' purposeis to show that justice is an essential part of happiness and not a causeof happiness. And when Socrates speaks in a way as to suggest a causalrelation between justice and happiness, Irwin strains to find a way toexplain away such passages. For instance, when the brothers want toknow the power (δύναμις) of justice (358b) and what justice does for thesoul (367b), Irwin argues:

when Plato asks what justice "does" or what its "power" (δύναμις) is,he may simply be asking ... in what respect a just soul is different fromother souls ... If Plato intends "justice itself" and "what justice does inthe soul" to describe the essential properties of the state of the soul that

18 'Plato believes that the analogy between justice and health helps to explain not onlywhy justice is an intrinsic good but also why it dominates other goods' (1995,254).Brought to you by | UNAM


12 James Butler

is justice ... he is distinguishing these properties from the causalconsequences of justice. (1992,191)"

Irwin's use of 'δύναμις' is curious. Rather than allowing 'δύναμις' (asit is quite commonly used) to refer to causal 'power', Irwin has it referto the essential 'quality' of justice. Yet the context of the challenge beforeSocrates — especially Glaucon's defense of injustice on behalf of themany (358bff) — clearly implies that the contest between the just personand unjust person centers on the power ['δύναμιν' 358b5, 'τον δυνάμενον'359b2] of the each to produce certain results: Unlike the unjust person,the just person is unable to take revenge (359a7), to do injustice (358e6),or, as Gyges did, to seduce the queen, kill the king, and take over akingdom (359cff)· (Moreover, we shall see a similar causal account of'δύναμις' in Book IX.)

Moreover, it is not obvious that Irwin is entitled to the distinctionbetween essential properties and causal properties which lies at thecenter of his interpretation of 'δύναμις'. For why can't a causal propertybe essential? Surely something, like a heart, has a causal property as oneof its essential properties, namely its ability to pump blood. So, even ifIrwin were correct that Plato is describing 'the essential properties of thestate of the soul that is justice', these properties may still be causal. Thus,given all the other evidence that 'δύναμις' refers to a causal 'power', weshould assume that the 'δύναμις' of justice refers to its causal 'power'.

Indeed, in his own argument for why Socrates finds health better thandisease (and thus by analogy justice better than injustice), Irwin himselfcannot help but to appeal to causal consequences, claiming that underdiseased conditions one is 'justified in choosing ... a sufficient degree ofhealth to avoid this intolerable condition' (255). Thus, one should wel-come health because it causes a more tolerable (i.e., less painful) condi-tion.20

Finally, Irwin is drawn to the Component Eudaimonism view becausehe does not believe that the distinction between 'welcomed for its ownsake' and 'welcomed for its consequences' can be about direct andindirect causal consequences. For, as he puts it, exercise is placed in the

19 Mabbott's view of 'δύναμις' (1937,470 and 1971, 60) is similar to that of Irwin.

20 We might rhetorically ask Irwin in this case: If health were an intrinsically good partof happiness, then shouldn't we still choose it even if the intolerable conditioncontinues? Brought to you by | UNAM



third class even though it has both direct and indirect consequences. ButIrwin (like Foster) misconstrues the distinction between 'welcomed forits own sake' and 'welcomed for its consequences'. The distinction (as Isuggested above) is between something (i) being a means to happinessin its immediate aspects and (ii) being a means to happiness in its broaderaspects.21 Thus, nothing prevents these means of achieving happinessfrom being causal means. Justice is accordingly welcomed for its ownsake because its immediate aspects (a well-adjusted soul) causes happi-ness right away and its broader aspects (building a good reputation)causes happiness in the future.

In conclusion, Irwin is correct in thinking that the fundamental ques-tion of the Republic is ultimately about happiness: justice is to be wel-comed because it is a means to the happiest life. Yet, he has giveninsufficient grounds for believing that justice is a means to the happy lifeby being a part of happiness, rather than by producing happiness.

4 Book IX

So if Mabbott and Irwin's interpretations fail to give a convincinginterpretation of the fundamental question of the Republic, how are weto find precisely what is being asked of Socrates? I suggest that we lookin Book IX where Socrates directly compares the happiness of the justand unjust lives.

In Book IX, Socrates presents three proofs in favor of the just life. Thefirst proof, which begins in Book VIII (544a), concludes,' ... The son ofAriston pronounced the best man and the most just is the happiest[ευδαιμονέστατον] ... and declared the worst and the most unjust is themost unhappy' (580b9-c3).22 Socrates then says, "This then would be oneof our proofs; but examine this second one to see if there is anything in it'

21 My way of reading the distinction, unlike Foster's, escapes Irwin's criticism: In itsimmediate aspects (e.g., sweat, toil, and pain) exercise is not a means to happiness,but in its broader (perhaps even direct) aspects (health) it is a means to happiness.Thus exercise belongs in the third class.

22 It is clear from the text of the first proof that the tyrant's unhappy life is filled withpain (578a, 579b-c, and esp. 579d9-e6). These references to the tyrant's life beingpainful in the first argument, we shall see, cast some doubt on other interpreters'contention that the first argument is about happiness but the second and third areonly about pleasure Brought to you by | UNAM


14 James Butler

[emphasis mine] (580c9-dl) and proceeds to a second (and indeed athird) argument that the just life is the most pleasant.

Many other eudaimonist interpreters have suggested that betweenthe first and second arguments, Socrates is switching topics, from show-ing that the just life is happiest in the first proof to showing that the justlife is most pleasant and not that it is happiest in both the second andthird.23 But as I have argued elsewhere,24 Socrates' move from a proofabout justice and happiness to proofs that the just life is most pleasant isbest understood as Plato believing that the happiest life just is the mostpleasant life. For when Socrates claims that the first argument is One ofour proofs', we might ask One of our proofs for what?' Without lookingforward to the second and third arguments, there could be no questionthat the first argument is a proof that the just life is happier than the unjustlife. But if so, men the second and third arguments — which Socratesintroduces without any suggestion that he is switching topics — shouldbe proofs about precisely that conclusion, even though they focus onpleasure. Therefore, on this reading all three arguments are given asproofs for the same conclusion: the just life is happiest.

Briefly, the third proof — which Plato calls the 'most decisive' argu-ment in favor of the just life — comes to the following conclusions: (i)being filled with knowledge, reason, and the Forms (which are onlyavailable to the just person) is truly pleasant (585d-e) and (ii) the justsoul, having reason in charge of the other two parts of the soul, attainsthe best and truest pleasures throughout its life (586e). Socrates con-cludes that the just person's life is more pleasant than the thoroughlyunjust person (the tyrant), whose life is dominated by confusion, unful-filled desire, and pain. But more than that, Socrates claims that pleasuremakes one's life virtuous, elegant, and beautiful:

Then if a good and just person has decisively that much more pleasurethan the bad and unjust person, will he not also have a life incalculablygreater in elegance, beauty and virtue? (588a)

Evidently, Socrates believes that he has established, by means of the

23 See Kraut (1992), 309-37; Murphy (1951), 207; Gosling and Taylor (1982), ch. 6; White(1979), 226, and Cross and Woozley (1964), ch. 11.

24 See Butler (1999), 37-48. Brought to you by | UNAMAuthenticated



pleasure arguments, that the just person's life is happier and also morevirtuous, elegant and beautiful than the unjust.

Having reached these conclusions, Socrates immediately moves thediscussion back to the Book Π challenge:

Since we've reached this point in the argument, let us return to the firstthings we said, since they are what led us here. / think someone said atsome point that injustice profits a completely unjust person who is believed tobe just. Isn't that so? ... Now let us discuss this with him, since we'veagreed on the respective powers (δύναμιν) that justice and injustice have.(588b) [emphasis mine]

Socrates' suggestion clearly recalls 360e where Glaucon asks for ajudgment between the unjust person who appears to be just and the justperson who appears to be unjust. Revisiting the Book Π challenge at thispoint in the discussion indicates a completion of Socrates' task:25 he hasshown that the just life is happiest. But since Socrates has just given threeproofs for the happiness of the just life, the third of which using pleasureas the 'most decisive' authority by which to compare lives, it is plausibleto believe that Socrates' answer to 'which life is happiest?' is ultimatelyresolved by answering the question 'which life is most pleasant?'

Moreover, Socrates states that they have now reached an agreementon another issue from Book Π: the power (δύναμνν) of justice and injusticein the soul (358b, 366e). But what is this power on which they all agree?Since the agreement immediately follows proofs that the just person livesmost pleasantly (i.e., happily), it is natural to assume that justice has thepower to produce the most pleasant life.26 For it is difficult to conceivehow the just life would be most pleasant without thinking at the sametime that pleasure comes as a consequence of being just.27

25 Jowett and Campbell (1894) seem to agree:Socrates, not without the air of triumph returns to the source of the discussion,which is finally disposed of, — the old argument of Thrasymachus ... (434)

26 There is little to suggest that we can read 'δύναμις' here in a way consistent withIrwin's suggested use of 'δύναμις' as a non-causal 'quality'. Rather, it seems clearfrom the passage that the challenge is to show the 'power' of justice by showing thatjustice results in the most pleasant life. Instead of positing an ambiguity in Plato'sterm 'δύναμις', I suggest that we consistently translate 'δύναμις' as 'power'.

27 I do not mean to suggest that pleasure resulting from justice is a feeling or sensationBrought to you by | UNAMAuthenticated


16 James Butler

So since, as I have argued, the fundamental question of the Republicis about happiness, and Socrates' arguments that the just life is happiestare decisively resolved by an appeal to pleasure, it seems that thefundamental question of the Republic is whether the just life results in amore pleasant life than the unjust life.

Conclusion

I hope that I have given plausible reasons to read the Republic as thor-oughly eudaimonistic: From the outset of the challenge to Socrates inBook II to the final judgment in favor of the just life in Book IX, Plato isultimately concerned to show that justice is better than injustice becausejustice produces a happier life than injustice. But more than that, becauseSocrates uses pleasure as the ultimate authority when comparing the justand the unjust lives, he believes that what makes a life happiest is that itis most pleasant. The Book IX proofs, therefore, tell us Socrates' reasonwhy justice should be 'welcomed for its own sake': justice results in themost pleasant life. Thus we may plausibly conclude that when Glauconand Adimantus ask Socrates to show that justice is 'welcomed for its ownsake' but to leave aside the rewards of reputation, Socrates understandsthis as a request to show that justice produces the most pleasant life.28

Department of PhilosophyBerea College

Berea, KYU.S.A.

[email protected]

of pleasure which attends on a just state of the soul. Rather, as Ryle points out (1949,107-110) pleasure is taken in things which only the just soul has access to, e.g.,knowledge, reason and the Forms.

28 I would like to thank Amber Ross, Daniel Devereux, Nicholas Smith, NaomiReshotko, Tony Chu, Pat Mooney, George Rudebusch, and two anonymous Apeironreferees, all of whom offered valuable comments on this paper. In particular, Iwould like to thank Terry Penner for his invaluable guidance and helpful discussionduring all stages of this paper. Brought to you by | UNAM



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