business model innovation document
TRANSCRIPT
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Executive Summary
The premise of this brief is to compare and contrast the overall business models of four firms and
platforms leading innovation and market penetration for mobility in the world today:
Nokia/Microsoft, Apple, and Google/Android. It will, at a high level, explore the key elements of thebusiness models approach, scale, core value propositions, and the elements that make them unique
and competitive.
The biggest new computing trend since the Internet boom of the 1990s is the rise of smartphones,
the mobile mini-computers that are taking over the old "cellphone" market.
On these phones, the "phone" is an after-thought: What matters is the functionality of the handset
itself. Specifically, the quality of the screen and Internet connection, and the number of "apps" that
run on the phone.
Apple and Google will win the smartphone war, as the iPhone and Android continue to gain market
share. The iPhone and Android phones provide the best multi-media experience thanks to a wide
variety of apps. Realistically Google will keep moving ahead in market share because 100s of
different handset manufacturers make the Android, the platform is open, the ecosystem is
expanding at incredible speed, and the development is feeding the needs of a multitude of
Independent Software Vendors who create these apps; to them, it is a philosophical issue, akin to
the software dev days of open-source Linux versus, well, everyone else.
Based on the research conducted in the exploration of this topic and the firms concerned, I am
making a prediction as to the outcome of the current expansion, consolidation, and jockeying forposition that these companies are currently undertaking. My assertion, which this paper should
support, is that within a five year window the dominant player in the field with the greatest
penetration and market share will be Google with the Android platform. I will leverage the key
dimensions of business modeling as a guide to expose the relative strengths and weaknesses of each
firms market play.
The Overall Strategies
Nokia/Microsoft
Lets take a look firstly at the latest news making event in mobility that has really set tongues
wagging and opinions flying in the market. Nokias billion dollar partnership agreement with
Microsoft may be an early 2011 event, but the transition will take several years. Nokia have stated it
will take until 2013 before the majority of its phone portfolio moves to Microsofts Windows Phone
7 platform. During the transition, Nokias already declining market share is likely to accelerate; it
expects to only sell 150 million phones using its Symbian platform in the coming years.
The expectations set by Nokia come from a nearly 200-page Form 20-F filed with the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission. In this document, Nokia and Microsoft state several risks and
considerations regarding this partnership. It is standard procedure to do so, but here are a few key
risks that illustrate some fundamental issues moving forward:
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The Windows Phone platform is a very recent, largely unproven addition to the
market focused solely on highend smartphones with currently very low adoption and
consumer awarenessrelative to the Android and Apple platforms.
Our expected transition to the Windows Phone platform may prove to be too long
to compete effectively in the smartphone market longer term given the ongoingdevelopments of other competing smartphone platform
Our ability to innovate and customize on the Windows Phone platform may not
materialize as expected to enable us to produce smartphones that are differentiated from
those of our competitors.
We may not be able to change our mode of working or culture to enable us to work
effectively and efficiently with Microsoft in order to realize the stated benefits of the
proposed partnership in a timely manner.
Basically, Nokia has decided that its best option to stay viable is to risk it all on an unproven,
immature platform praying that it can survive the transition. And it hopes that its current customer
base will come along for the ride, saying theres an opportunity to retain and transition the installed
base of approximately 200 million Symbian owners to Nokia Windows Phone smartphones over
time. And ironically, the current version of Windows Phone 7 isn't geared for business users.
Microsoft (MSFT) is only now starting to roll out support for some web-based work applications and
a feature that lets people cut and paste text -- table stakes for corporate types.
Indeed, Microsoft intentionally designed its gaming-centric operating system to appeal to everyday
smartphone buyers, not IT departments, in the hope that consumers would fall in love with the
device and ask their companies to support it. After all, that's how Apple's iPhone and phones
powered by Google's Android operating system found their way into enterprises, a topic which I will
discuss here in a moment.
The proliferation of phone systems adds to the costs of CIO budgets in large and small companies,
and it makes it hard for them to negotiate deep discounts for buying devices in bulk. More
importantly, devices that aren't designed with corporate clients in mind often lack the security
features IT departments demand. This is one of the key gating factors for the new evolution cycle
sweeping the market place with cloud computing, and its even more serious with an environment of
small devices running rampant across the enterprise.
There are a number of issues with the strategy, but perhaps the biggest one is that of time. As Nokia
retools its handset portfolio, sales of iOS and Android devices are likely to continue growing, perhaps
at a faster rate than today. Apple has already sold 100 million iPhones since mid-2007, so how many
will it have sold by 2013 as Nokias transition takes place? Even with one handset model released per
year, another 200 million iPhones sold by then isnt out of the question. And Androids growth rate is
currently even higher.
Nokia realizes this, and again admits defeat in thinking that Symbian would be a viable response to
competitors, saying this in the SEC filing:
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Other smartphone platforms with their related ecosystems have gained significant
momentum and market share, specifically Apples iOS proprietary platform and Googles
open source Android platform, and are continuing apace. Until very recently, we believed
our competitive position in smartphones could be improved with Symbian, as well as
MeeGo, and our strategy based on those platforms. We are now of the view, however, that
for the longer term our Symbian platform is not sufficiently competitive in leading markets.
Nokia isnt partnering with a company known for moving quickly in the mobile market. Microsoft
took nearly three years to respond to Apples iPhone. The platform offers a fresh take on user
experience, but lacks many features offered by competing operating systems. And perhaps even
worse: adding those features to the platform is taking too long.
Apple
For the Apple strategy and my predicition of its trajectory to make sense, we must look back at the
history of this firm and draw some analogies, and I'm going to make a bold prediction: Apple'siPhone will lose the mobile device wars (but it will come in 2nd place). Put another way: iPhone is to
Android -- and somewhat Symbian OS -- handsets as Macintosh was to the DOS/Windows PC in the
1980s and 1990s. The Mac's rocky start in 1984-85 gave way to great success because of several
killer applications, with desktop publishing being among the most important. But by the mid 1990s,
Windows PCs pushed down Mac market share. The iPhone is poised to track similarly.
Parallels between the past and present foreshadow iPhone's future. The IBM PC launched in mid-
1981. About 18 months later, Compaq announced its 12.5 kg clone, nicknamed the "luggable." A
year after Compaq started selling its IBM PC clone, Apple announced the Macintosh, in January
1984. Desktop publishing was the Mac's first killer application, contributing to sales growth over thenext five years. But Apple couldn't win the "Clone Wars" against DOS -- and later Windows -- PCs.
The resulting clone attack, essentially every other PC manufacturer against Apple, was too much for
Macintosh. The PC ecosystem overwhelmed Apple.
To reiterate: In the 2000s, like the 1980s, Apple successfully launched industry-changing platforms
iPad, iPhone and Macintosh, respectively. Like Macintosh, iPhone's end-to-end licensing model is
poised to limit the supporting ecosystem's growth. Meanwhile, Google, Microsoft and Nokia license
their mobile operating systems to third parties.
While DOS/Windows was more open than Mac OS during the 1990s, Windows Mobile is more closed
because Microsoft has failed to establish standards around the software. By comparison, Android,
which Google open-sourced, is to mobile devices more like DOS/Windows was to PCs in the 1980s
and 1990s: A more open operating system around which third parties make money and an
ecosystems thrive.
Clearly, the mobile device market will be bigger than just handsets, which is where Android already
is gaining adoption for use on other connected devices. Barnes & Noble's Nook ebook reader and
Verizon's Droid phone are but recent examples of where Android is going, and where Apple is again
innovating with iPad. Meanwhile, the current wave of analysts report show how Android emphasizes
information interoperability -- openness that should grow the ecosystem, like DOS/Windows did for
PCs decades ago.
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Google Android
Googles strategy is to weaken other companies businesses (say, email) by offering something quite
good or good enough for free, take over that market, and then use their new dominant position to
rake in advertising revenue.
This helps explain Googles motivation for Android. Google could, of course, just extend their search
advertising to mobile phones, Adsense for mobile devices and build mobile versions of their web
applications so anyone can use them. That might make for a fine business, but it would also be a
rather weak position to be in compared to where Google is now. Phone makers could change the
default search engine on their phones to something other than Google; mobile devices might change
how people find informationthey might switch away entirely from using a search engine, and in
that case, Google would be dead in the water; or, worse, perhaps mobile devices could move people
away from using advertising-supported web applications, and toward primarily using paid-for
applications.
So thats not what Google is doing. Instead, theyve built an entire mobile device platform and given
it away for free. But how are they going to make money from it? All of those things listed above
could or are happeningsince carriers and phone-makers are free to modify Android, they can (and
have) removed Google search entirely from the device; people are increasingly using context-specific
applications like Yelp to find information while on mobile devices; and Apples App Store, even if it
encourages low price-points, has tens of millions of users perfectly willing to purchase applications.
To understand why Google has bet so big on Android, its first necessary to understand that mobile
devices are the next big growth market. This is a market growing dramatically, fueled by widespread
adoption in the developed world and growing demand in the developing world, where asmartphones lower price-point is within reach of billions going forward. This is important for Google
because while Google isnt licensing Android (and thus doesnt directly benefit from increased phone
sales), smartphones are effectively replacing computers for many people, and thus are upsetting the
computer industry. This not only means that Google must be prepared for itmobile devices mean
that Google must adjust their advertising business from its computer-focusbut that it provides an
opportunity for them. This is an inflection point in the computer industrys history, and an
opportunity for Google to dominate the next big industry, and thus to realize even greater
advertising revenue.
Google is building Android not so they can make great mobile devices and sell them to consumers.Rather, they are making them for these two simple reasons: (1) to disrupt Apples growing
dominance of mobile devices, both so Google doesnt have to rely on Apple for access to their users
and to eliminate their paid-for application model; and (2) so Google can control the mobile industry
and thus secure advertising from it. Android isnt an attempt to build the best mobile platform and
sell it on its merits; its a play to control the vast majority of the mobile market, secure eyeballs for
Google advertising and eliminate any threat to Google.
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Revenue Models
There are a lot of ways to make money off the shift to mobile computing. Some companies have
found several ways to profit from mobile like Apple. Microsoft in particular seems to be in a tough
spot due to its late start in mobile, a very small market share, lack of leverage with the all-powerful
carriers, and a revenue model based on licensing the operating system. The new Nokia alliance helpsto some degree, but the alliance pains are going to take a few years to sort out. Google appears to
offer its platform for free, but lets never forget that Google is not a non-profit organization, and its
core business is advertising.
Nokia/Microsoft
The model for these firms is centered on the software licensing model. The disturbing part of all this
for the Nokia/Microsoft alliance is that thus far, Windows Phone 7 is a failed product without a
business model. Steve Ballmer used to criticize Google as being a business model that he could not
sell to shareholders. However, the failed business model is not Google, but Microsoft's WindowsPhone 7.
Microsoft not only paid Nokia ($1 billion). Microsoft also paid the other Windows Phone 7 OEMs,
covering all their handset development and marketing costs. Microsoft is also paying software
developers, who would otherwise not be interested. The billions of dollars that Microsoft pours into
keeping Windows Phone 7 on life support makes it even more unsustainable. That Windows Phone 7
is suffering lackluster and declining sales shows that Microsoft failed.
Nokia would have been better to go with Android or at least stay with MeeGo, their open source
effort. Steve Elop, Nokia CEO, was indoctrinated with the Microsoft belief that the only way to enter
a market is with brute force using billions of dollars. Elop, believing Microsoft's fallacy, got scared
and didn't think Nokia was capable of making a phone platform work. However, a natural ecosystem
that open-source MeeGo would have had would attract more developers, apps, and consumers. The
Nokia deal appears to have all the hallmarks of failure before it even gets started. Windows Phone 7
has no business model, and its very existence has heretofore appeared to be unsustainable, even for
Microsoft and its billions.
It is very easy to see the strategic alliance becoming a merger wherein Nokia would become
Microsoft's portable hardware division. That would seem to give Microsoft, at least in its own eyes,
the ability to compete with Apple head-on and Apple sets a very strong example of what you cando when one company has absolute control over everything in its product range. Based on this, its
not difficult to predict the state of the union one year from now: Nokia will have changed: some of
its best people will have left, taking their expertise onto the market or into start-ups. Some senior
software people will have moved to the US: it's that or move Microsoft's Windows Phone team to
Finland. Both companies have plenty of experience of trying to run large R&D efforts across time
zones, and thus plenty of reasons not to do it. There will be little or no work on software, let alone
alternative platforms, within Nokia.
Microsoft, however, will be much the same. All it needs from this deal is a compliant partner who
can work miracles in hardware design, which Nokia is exceptionally good at. Provided it can resist
meddling, Microsoft will get some great handsets out of this, an unparalleled worldwide distribution
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network and a huge potential presence in the developing world that, at the moment, is hard to call.
Its hard to imagine the Nokia/Microsoft will be making much profit in the next 12 months. Apple
only works because it makes enormous margins of the order of twice Nokia's and can thus
throw reality-bending amounts of cash at R&D, marketing and supply line management in
maintaining the Apple brand. Nokia can't rebuild its brand on the back of someone else's software.
Further, Nokia's margin will now be split with Redmond, whereas Apple keeps the lot.
The game is played in the margins, and Microsoft is under huge pressure from investors to keep
those up. (Investors including one Stephen A Elop, listed as seventh biggest individual Microsoft
shareholder, see below). Absorbing a large hardware company dependent on the cut-throat mobile
market will hit the books a lot harder than having an arms-length relationship which just delivers
software profits. Microsoft's recent and expensive experience with gaming underlines that logic:
while the Xbox franchise may look healthy, that's purely on the Xbox Live billion-dollar, 60 percent
margin business. The consoles themselves are basically break-even. This does not bode well for the
hardware side of the partnership.
If Windows Phone 7 doesn't deliver the numbers, then cutting loose the devastated hulk of Nokia
will be much easier than having to soak up the pain internally. And if it does make money, it will be
for Microsoft alone. The investment needed for Nokia to survive in anything like its current form will
be unavailable; Microsoft remains free to discard the deal if Windows Phone 7 is a winner and pick
up with a lower-cost, far Eastern partner.
Apple
When it comes to making money off mobile computing, the expert is Apple. How do they profit? Let
us count the ways. First, they sell iPhones and iPads directly from their stores. Second, they sell
accessories for those devices in their stores. Third, they get a kickback for devices the carriers sell at
their stores. Fourth, they take a cut of every app purchased through the App Store. Fifth, they take a
cut of any in-app sale or subscription. Sixth, they run the iAd network for displaying in-app
advertisements and receive revenue from advertisers. This model clearly delivers on the theme from
our class around designing a model that appropriates the maximum amount of profit with the
minimal use of resources.
It's not just a case of having many channels to make money, but also a question of how much money
you can squeeze out of each one. Apple's release cadence for the iPhone is an example of how the
company maximizes profits. There is an artificial scarcity created by Apple's insistence on just one
current model of the phone. You can be sure that there will be a new model out every summer with
a few nice new touches, and it will be improved enough to make you want to trade in your previous
iPhone.
Accessories are another opportunity for very high profit margins. If you buy a low-end iPad it will
cost $500.00 USD. Here is where the accessory strategy begins. You dont want to damage the
beautiful device, so you look for a cover or sleeve for it. Apple answered with the Smart Cover, a
$40.00 USD slip that covers the screen. If this is not high end enough for the device, there is an
Italian leather version is available for $70.00USD. There's no standard video output port, so you will
have to lay out $40.00 for an HDMI dongle if you want to show video on a TV screen. Need a cable to
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show your iPod video on a VGA display? No problem if you have another $40.00 for yet another
dongle. This model just goes on and on, and its replicated with virtually every Apple product, iPad
included.
Give Apple their due credit; they basically reinvented the smartphone category when they released
the original iPhone in 2007, and have done it again with the iPad. Because of that, AT&T was willingto pay Apple a pretty decent kickback for exclusivity in the U.S. market. Although that exclusivity has
expired now that Verizon has the iPhone as well, it no doubt piled some serious dollars onto Apple's
bottom line during those years. Regardless, Apple still gets its share of revenue from every iPhone or
iPad that either AT&T or Verizon sell.
So let's turn our attention to the software and services side. The only way a non-rooted phone can
get apps is to use the App Store, controlled by Apple. The company uses a heavy hand to control
what appears in the App Store. The Internet is full of sad stories from developers who have had their
apps rejected by Apple for reasons that were vague, arbitrary, or non-existent. Yet that is just one
more way that Apple controls their iPhone and iPad ecosystem, creating a walled garden that has
served their business pretty well to this point.
To round off the revenue model story for Apple however, I must mention the new subscription
service they have just announced. The gist basically is this: any service offering an app with any sort
of subscription component must now offer it within the app using the new in-app subscription
options. Those companies are welcome to offer subscriptions outside of the app as well, but they
must also have to option to do it in-app and it must be for the same price (or cheaper) than the out-
of-app option. If a subscriber signs up in-app, Apple keeps 30 percent of those revenues. If they sign
up outside of the app (still granting them accesses to the app), the company keeps 100 percent of
the revenues.
Apple clearly knew this announcement would spark controversy, and you can see that very plainly in
Apples press release on the model. Just look at this quote from CEO Steve Jobs:
Our philosophy is simplewhen Apple brings a new subscriber to the app, Apple earns a 30
percent share; when the publisher brings an existing or new subscriber to the app, the
publisher keeps 100 percent and Apple earns nothing. All we require is that, if a publisher is
making a subscription offer outside of the app, the same (or better) offer be made inside the
app, so that customers can easily subscribe with one-click right in the app. We believe that
this innovative subscription service will provide publishers with a brand new opportunity toexpand digital access to their content onto the iPad, iPod touch and iPhone, delighting both
new and existing subscribers.
This is Jobs and Apple explaining why this policy makes sense, and theres no question that it does
make sense for Apple. A ton of third-party developers and ISVs both large and small have
becomes increasingly upset by this move because it totally changes the game. Companies with
subscription elements of their content had been accustomed to leveraging Apples platform for free,
similarly to Googles Android. Now there will be a very significant fee for this.
Among technology platforms, the Windows PC is classic example of a robust and vital ecosystem.
The Google informational/search platform is another. Around either platform, there is a discernible
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Oh, and if you used Google Checkout, they got more money that way, too! But why would Google be
so interested in giving away a mobile operating system? Google makes money (and justifies giving
away the OS) by licensing the Google Apps that come on most Android phones (but not all). Apps like
Gmail, the Android Market, Google Search, and others come in something called GAPPS. The Market
is really where Google is interested. Sure, the other GAPPS add value to the phone (hence why
carriers license their inclusion on Android-powered phones), but Google is making money with every
app sold through the Market.
Even free apps make Google money. Developers have to pay to have an account to list their apps
under. Even ad-sponsored apps are likely using Google Mobile Ads, so Google's getting revenue from
that source as well. That's not the elegance of Google's mobile revenue stream. Google isn't so much
after making money from apps sold through their Market, or even by charging developers an
admission fee to get their apps listed. Instead, Google saw that computers were getting smaller and
smaller, more and more mobile, and connected to the internet in more ways.
Now, instead of trying to remember something to look up on your desktop computer later, pull out
the laptop... or better yet: your phone. But Google didn't stop at just having their search engine in
your pocket. They made search easier. You can search through Google's database by using your
keyboard, using your voice, and even by using the camera on your phone. You can "scan" a barcode
and see who has the best price (getting ads along the way) before you make your purchase.
Google even knows where you are, so your search results are even more relevant to you. Google can
tell you that you can buy that item for $5 less at a store 1.5 miles away. They'll even give you turn-by
turn directions to get there. Google knows that searching using input other than text is the next big
thing. Spoken search is important, but people speak very differently all over the world, even across
the country. To address this, Google bought a company called Grand Central (now Google Voice) to
get voice samples from people -- and give you "free voicemail transcription" along the way. You can
even call Google (+1-800-GOOG-411) to get free 411 information from your phone -- any phone
albeit in the US only for now. They'll even connect you for free.
Google knows that searching by taking a picture is going to be big, too. So Google Goggles was
created. Tie this in with the new face-recognition feature of Google Picasa and you may soon be able
to search for someone just by snapping a picture of them. How does Google make money? By
learning who you are, what you're interested it, and how you search for stuff... then helping you find
it in an intuitive manner anywhere you are.
The Bottom Line
The trend was obvious for quite some time, and now it finally happened: Android is the most
popular smartphone platform among U.S. subscribers.
According to comScores data, Googles Android rose from 23.5% market share in October 2010 to
31.2% in January 2011, enough to securely grab first place from RIMs BlackBerry, which fell 35.8% in
October 2010 to 30.4% in January 2011. A recent report from Nielsen also claimed that Android is
now the number one smartphone platform in the U.S., albeit with slightly different numbers. Apples
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iOS experienced a minute growth in the same period: from 24.6% to 24.7%, while Microsoft and
Palm continued losing market share, ending at 8.0% and 3.2%, respectively.
Recent data from Canalys showed that Android is also the worlds most popular smartphone
platform, and with the onslaught of Android smartphones this year, were sure that Android will
continue doing well throughout 2011.
My prediction in summary is that Android will, primarily because of its open dev/open source play
become the evangelical platform of choice, and as more device makers take it up, Android will begin
to permeate across the wide spectrum of connected devices at a rate superseding that of both
Nokiasoft and Apple. Apple will come in second with gorgeous design and elegant software, not to
mention continually brilliant ways of appropriating profits at every turn. Nokia/Microsoft I fear is
doomed to continue to set false expectations and disappoint share holders. I also see Nokia merging
with Microsoft to become a device division; the writing there is on the wall, and the fact the Steve
Elop is also MSFTs 7th
largest individual shareholder certainly alludes to his possibility.
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corporation/msft/nas/institutional-ownership
Making money from Android viewed March 18thhttp://mobilephonedevelopment.com/archives/1116
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