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Nuclear notebook

Israeli nuclear weapons 2014

Hans M Kristensen and Robert S Norris

AbstractAlthough the Israeli government neither confirms nor denies that it possesses nuclear weapons it is generallyaccepted by friend and foe alike that Israel is a nuclear-armed stateNtildeand has been so for nearly half a centuryThe basis for this conclusion has been strengthened significantly since our previous estimate in 2002 particu-larly thanks to new documents obtained by scholars under the US Freedom of Information Act and other openlyavailable sources1 We conclude that many of the public claims about the size of the Israeli nuclear arsenal areexaggerated We estimate that Israel has a stockpile of approximately 80 nuclear warheads for delivery by twodozen missiles a couple of squadrons of aircraft and perhaps a small number of sea-launched cruise missiles

Keywordsarms race cruise missiles Israel Jericho missiles Middle East nuclear weapons security

Nuclear policy issues

Since the late 1960s every Israeligovernment has practiced a policyof nuclear opacity that while

acknowledging that Israel maintains theoption of building nuclear weaponsleaves it factually uncertain as to whetherIsrael actually possesses nuclear weaponsand if so at what operational status Sincethe mid-1960s this policy has been pub-licly expressedNtildeand recently reaffirmedby Prime Minister Benjamin Netan-yahuNtildeas the phrase OgraveWe wonOtildet be thefirst to introduce nuclear weapons intothe Middle EastOacute (Netanyahu 2011)

This statement is widely seen as adeception because it is a long-held con-clusion among governments and experts

that Israel has produced a sizable stock-pile of nuclear warheads (probably unas-sembled) designed for delivery byballistic missiles and aircraft Commonsense dictates that a country that hasdeveloped and produced nuclear war-heads for delivery by designated deliveryvehicles has regardless of their oper-ational status introduced the weapons tothe region But Israeli governments haveattached so many interpretations toOgraveintroduceOacute that common sense doesnOtildetappear to apply

Declassified documents from USrdquoIsraeli negotiations in 1968rdquo1969 aboutthe sale and delivery of F-4 Phantom air-craft show that the White House under-stood full well that Ogravethey [Israel]interpreted that [OgraveintroductionOacute] to mean

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they could possess nuclear weapons aslong as they did not test deploy or makethem publicOacute (White House 1969a 1) In amemo prepared for President Nixon onthe Israeli nuclear program nationalsecurity advisor Henry Kissinger statedOgraveThis is one program on which the Israe-lis have persistently deceived usNtildeandmay even have stolen from usOacute (WhiteHouse 1969a 7 of attachment)

Both the Johnson and Nixon adminis-trations tried to get a clearer understand-ing of the Israeli interpretation ofOgraveintroductionOacute During a meeting at thePentagon in November 1968 IsraelOtildesambassador to the United States YitzhakRabin who later succeeded Prime Minis-ter Golda Meir as Israeli prime ministersaid that Ogravehe would not consider aweapon that had not been tested to be aweaponOacute Rabin noted that this was hispersonal understanding as a former mili-tary leader Moreover he said OgraveTheremust be a public acknowledgement Thefact that you have got it must be knownOacuteSeeking clarity US Assistant Secretary ofDefense Paul Warnke asked OgraveThen inyour view an unadvertised untestednuclear device is not a nuclear weaponOacuteRabin responded OgraveYes that is correctOacuteSo Warnke continued an advertised butuntested device or weapon would consti-tute introduction OgraveYes that would beintroductionOacute Rabin confirmed (Depart-ment of Defense 1968 2 3 4)

In a follow-up exchange in July 1969the Nixon administration plainly sum-marized its own understanding of theterm OgraveintroductionOacute OgraveWhen Israel saysit will not introduce nuclear weapons itmeans it will not possess such weaponsOacuteThe Nixon administration wanted Israelto accept the US definition but the Meirgovernment didnOtildet take the bait andinstead claimed OgraveIntroduction means

the transformation from a non-nuclearweapon country into a nuclear weaponcountryOacute (Department of State 1969a)In other words Israel construed itspledge not to be the first to introducenuclear weapons to mean that that intro-duction was not about physical posses-sion but about public acknowledgementof that possession

Kissinger saw a way out of the dis-agreement He informed PresidentNixon that what the Israelis had donewas to Ogravedefine the word OcircintroductionOtildeby relating it to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]Oacute KissingerOtildes argu-ment was that the Ogravedistinction betweenOcircnuclear-weaponOtilde and Ocircnon-nuclear-weaponOtilde states is the one which theNPT uses in defining the respective obli-gations of the signatoriesOacute By arguingthat the NPT negotiations Ograveimplicitlyleft it up to the conscience of the gov-ernments involvedOacute by being Ogravedeliber-ately vague on what precise step wouldtransform a state into a nuclear weaponstate after the January 1 1967 cut-off dateused in the treaty to define the nuclearstatesOacute and by arguing that the NPT doesnot define what it means to Ogravemanufac-tureOacute or OgraveacquireOacute nuclear weapons Kis-singer concluded that the new Israeliformulation Ograveshould put us in a positionfor the record of being able to say weassume we have IsraelOtildes assurance that itwill remain a non-nuclear state as definedin the NPTOacute (White House 1969b 1)

KissingerOtildes disingenuous interpret-ation provided the United States with away out of a diplomatic dilemma via atacit understanding between Nixon andMeir that the United States would nolonger pressure Israel to sign the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty as long as theIsraelis kept their program restrainedand invisibleNtildemeaning that Israel

2 Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 0(0)


would not test nuclear weapons andwould not acknowledge in public its pos-session of such weapons

The Nixon administration also tried toextract a pledge from Israel on the use ofUS-supplied aircraft In the Israeli letterthat requested the sale of50 F-4 PhantomsRabin formally promised the UnitedStates that Israel Ograveagrees not to use anyaircraft supplied by the US as a nuclearweapons carrierOacute (Embassy of Israel 19681) A similar promise was made in 1966 inconnection with the sale of A-4 Skyhawkaircraft It is not known if Israel madesimilar pledges when it acquired F-15 andF-16 aircraft in the 1980s and 1990s orwhen it purchased F-35sNtildewhich willstart to be delivered in 2017

If a formal pledge was made also forthe F-15 and F-16 aircraft it would appearto rule out Israel currently using US-sup-plied aircraft in a nuclear strike role Butgiven the preconditions the Nixonadministration discovered Israel hadattached to the Ograveno introductionOacutepledge Israel may also have attachedpreconditions to the pledge not to Ograveuseany aircraft supplied by the US as anuclear weapons carrierOacute What doOgraveuseOacute and OgravecarrierOacute mean Do they referto equipping an aircraft with the capabil-ity to deliver nuclear weapons or do theyrefer to the act of employment itselfDoes the pledge apply to US aircraftmodified by Israel And what doesOgravenuclear weaponsOacute mean Similar to theinterpretation of OgraveintroductionOacute Israelmay consider that as long as a nuclearbomb is not assembled nor its existenceannounced a US-supplied aircraft is notbeing used (by IsraelOtildes definition) as acarrier of nuclear weapons

The tacit understanding that theNixon administration reached withIsrael about OgraveintroductionOacute may have

resolved a diplomatic conundrum Butit failed to address the core issues firstthat Israel already possessed nuclearweapons and second that the UnitedStates would be seen as having a doublestandard when criticizing other MiddleEastern countries for pursuing nuclearweapons while turning a blind eye toIsraelOtildes arsenal And those have been irri-tants regarding the NPT and MiddleEastern security issues ever since help-ing provide excuses for other countriesin the region to reject criticism of theirown weapons of mass destruction

On a few rare occasions some Israeliofficials have made statements implyingthat Israel already has nuclear weaponsor could OgraveintroduceOacute them very quickly ifnecessary The first came in 1974 whenthen-President Ephraim Katzir stated OgraveIthas always been our intention to developa nuclear potential We now have thatpotentialOacute (quoted in Weissman andKrosney 1981 105) Long after his retire-ment in a 1981 New York Times inter-view former defense minister MosheDayan also came close to violating thenuclear ambiguity taboo when hedeclared for the record OgraveWe donOtildet haveany atomic bomb now but we have thecapacity we can do that in a short timeOacuteHe reiterated the official policy mantraOgraveWe are not going to be the first ones tointroduce nuclear weapons into theMiddle EastOacute but his acknowledgementthat Ogravewe have the capacityOacute and wouldquickly produce atomic bombs if IsraelOtildesadversaries acquired nuclear weaponswas a hint that Israel had in fact pro-duced all the necessary components toassemble nuclear weapons in a veryshort time (New York Times 1981)

During a press conference in Wash-ington with US President Bill Clintonand JordanOtildes President Hussein in 1994

Kristensen and Norris 3


Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabinmade a similar statement saying OgraveIsraelis not a nuclear country in terms of weap-onsOacute and has Ogravecommitted to the UnitedStates for many years not to be the first tointroduce nuclear weapons in the con-text of the Arab-Israeli conflict But atthe same timeOacute he added Ogravewe cannotbe blind to efforts that are made in cer-tain Muslim and Arab countries in thisdirection Therefore I can sum upWeOtildell keep our commitment not to bethe first to introduce but we still lookahead to the dangers that others will doit And we have to be prepared for itOacute(Rabin 1994 emphasis added)

The ambiguity left by IsraelOtildes refusal toconfirm or deny the possession of nuclearweapons prompted the BBC in 2003 tobluntly ask former Prime MinisterShimon Peres whether the ambiguity wasjust another word for deception OgraveTheterm nuclear ambiguity in some ways itsounds very grand but isnOtildet it just aeuphemism for deceptionOacute Peres did notanswer the question but confirmed theneed for deception OgraveIf someone wants tokill you and you use deception to saveyour life itOtildes not immoral If we wouldnOtildet[sic] have enemies we wouldnOtildet needdeceptionsOacute (BBC 2003)

Three years later in a December 2006interview with German television then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appeared tocompromise the deception when he criti-cized Iran for aspiring Ograveto have nuclearweapons as America France Israel Rus-siaOacute (Williams 2006) The statementwhich he made in English attracted wide-spread attention because it was seen as aninadvertent admission that Israel pos-sesses nuclear weapons (Williams 2006)A spokesperson for Olmert later said hehad been listing not nuclear states butOgraveresponsible nationsOacute (Friedman 2006)

Ambiguity is not just about refusing toconfirm possession of nuclear weaponsbut also about refusing to deny it Whenasked during a 2011 CNN interview ifIsrael does not have nuclear weaponsNetanyahu did not answer directly butrepeated the policy not to be the first toOgraveintroduceOacute nuclear weapons into theMiddle East Undeterred the journalistfollowed up OgraveBut if you take an assump-tion that other countries have them thenthat may mean you have themOacute Netan-yahu didnOtildet dispute that but implied thatthe difference is that Israel doesnOtildet threa-ten anyone with its arsenal OgraveWell it maymean that we donOtildet pose a threat toanyone We donOtildet call for anyoneOtildes anni-hilation We donOtildet threaten to obliter-ate countries with nuclear weapons butwe are threatened with all these threatsOacute(Netanyahu 2011)

The nuclear alert

One of the scenarios where Israel mightdecide to OgraveintroduceOacute its nuclear arsenalis in a crisis that poses a threat to the veryexistence of the state of Israel It iswidely believed such an incident mighthave happened in October 1973 duringthe Yom Kippur War when Israeli lea-ders feared Syria was about to defeatthe Israeli army in the Golan HeightsThe rumor first appeared in Time maga-zine in 1976 was greatly expanded uponin Seymour HershOtildes book The SamsonOption in 1991 and several unidentifiedformer US officials allegedly stated in2002 that Israel put nuclear forces onalert in 1973 (see eg Sale 2002)

But an interview conducted by AvnerCohen with the late Arnan (Sini) Azar-yahu in January 2008 calls into questionthe validity of this rumor Azaryahu wassenior aide and confidant to Yisrael Galili



a minister without portfolio who wasGolda MeirOtildes closest political ally andprivy to some of IsraelOtildes most closelyheld nuclear secrets In the early after-noon of the second day of the warNtilde Octo-ber 7 1973Ntildewhen the Israeli militaryappeared to be losing the battle againstSyrian forces in the Golan Heights Azar-yahu said that the defense ministerMoshe Dayan asked Meir to authorizeinitial technical preparations for a Ogravedem-onstration optionOacuteNtildethat is ready nuclearweapons for potential use But Galili andDeputy Prime Minister Yigal Allonargued against the idea saying Israelwould prevail using conventional weap-ons According to Azaryahu Meir sidedwith her two senior ministers and toldDayan to Ograveforget itOacute (Cohen 2013 For ana-lysis of the Azaryahu interview and itsimplications see Cohen (nd))

A study by the Strategic Studies div-ision of the Center for Naval Analyses(CNA) in April 2013 appeared to confirmMeirOtildes rejection of DayanOtildes Ogravedemonstra-tion optionOacute and that IsraelOtildes nuclearforces were not readied The reportstates that even though the authors Ogravedidexhaustively scrutinizeOacute the documentfiles of US agencies and archives andinterviewed a significant number of offi-cials with firsthand knowledge of the1973 crisis OgraveNone of these searchesrevealed any documentation of an Israelialert or clear manipulation of its forcesOacuteand Ogravenone of our interviewees save onerecalled any Israeli nuclear alert or sig-naling effortOacute during the Yom KippurWar (Colby et al 2013 31rdquo32)

Even so the single former official whorecalled seeing an Ograveelectronic or signalsintelligence reportOacute at the time thatOgraveIsrael had activated or increased thereadiness of its Jericho missile bat-teriesOacuteNtildeand the extreme government

secrecy that surrounds the issue ofIsraeli nuclear weapons in generalNtildeledthe authors of the CNA study to con-clude that Ogravethe United States did observesome kind of Israeli nuclear weapons-related activity in the very early days ofthe war probably pertaining to IsraelOtildesJericho ballistic missile force Oacute(Colby et al 2013 34) The studyOtildes overallassessment was that OgraveIsrael appears tohave taken preliminary precautionarysteps to protect or prepare its nuclearweapons andor related forcesOacute (Colbyet al 2013 2 emphasis added)

The conclusion that Israel did some-thing with its nuclear forces in October1973Ntildealthough not necessarily placethem on full operational alert or preparefor a Ogravedemonstration optionOacuteNtildeseemssimilar to the assertion made by Peres in1995 who in an interview with the authorsof We All Lost the Cold War Ogravecategoric-ally denied that Jericho missiles weremade ready much less armed At mosthe insisted there was an operationalcheck The cabinet never approved anyalert of Jericho missilesOacute (Lebow andStein 1995 463 footnote 47)

Evidently some uncertainty persistsabout the 1973 events But then presum-ably as well as now the Israeli warheadswere not fully assembled or deployed ondelivery systems under normal circum-stances but stored under civilian controlAnd since no official confirmation wasmade back then either via a test or anannouncement no formal Ograveintroduc-tionOacute of nuclear weapons occurredNtildeatleast in the opinion of Israeli officials

Six years later on September 22 1979a US surveillance satellite known as theVela 6911 detected what appeared to bethe flash from a nuclear test in the south-ern parts of the Indian Ocean (for back-ground on the 1979 Vela incident see



Richelson 2006) Despite widespreadrumors about Israeli involvement in thetest which would constitute Ograveintroduc-tionOacute of nuclear weapons by the Israelidefinition Israeli governments havecontinued since to state that Israelwould not be the first to introducenuclear weapons in the region

How many warheads

Absent official public information fromthe Israeli government or intelligencecommunities of other countries specula-tions abound about IsraelOtildes nucleararsenal Over the past several decadesnews media reports think tanks authorsand analysts have sized the Israeli nuclearstockpile widely from 75 warheads up tomore than 400 warheads Delivery vehi-cles for the warheads have been listed asaircraft ballistic missiles artillery tac-tical or battlefield weapons such as artil-lery shells and landmines and morerecently sea-launched cruise missilesWe believe many of these rumors areinaccurate and that the most crediblestockpile number is on the order of 80warheads for delivery by aircraft land-based ballistic missiles and possiblysea-based cruise missiles (see Table 1)

In 1969 the US State Department con-cluded OgraveIsrael has moved as rapidly as

possible since about 1963Oacute in Ogravedevelopinga capability to produce and deploynuclear weapons and to deliver themby surface-to-surface missile or byplaneOacute (Department of State 1969b 1Department of State 1969c 3) By 1974the CIA concluded OgraveIsrael already hasproduced and stockpiled a smallnumber of fission weaponsOacute (CIA 197420) OgraveSmallOacute is a relative term to someanalysts it meant an arsenal of a dozenor two dozen weapons but the publicestimate would later balloonsignificantly

Most publicly available estimatesappear to be derived from a rough calcula-tion of the number of warheads that couldhypothetically becreatedfrom theamountof plutonium Israel is believed to have pro-ducedinitsnuclearreactoratDimonaThetechnical assessment that accompaniedthe 1986 Sunday Times article aboutformer nuclear technician MordechaiVanunuOtildes disclosures about Dimona forexample estimated that Israel had pro-duced enough plutonium for 100 to 200nuclear warheads (Sunday Times 1986a1986b 1986c)2 In the public debate thisquickly became Israel possessing 100 to200 nuclear warheads the estimate thathas been most commonly used eversinceThereisuncertaintyabouttheoper-ationalhistoryorefficiencyoftheDimona

Table 1 Israeli nuclear forces 2014

LAND-BASED MISSLES

Jericho II 1984ndash1985 1500+ Possibly 25ndash50 at Zekharia for TELs in caves

Jericho III 4000 In development

SEA-BASED MISSLES

Dolphin-class submarines 2002 Possibly modified cruise missile for land-attack

TYPEYEAR FIRST DEPLOYED

RANGE (KM) COMMENT

AIRCRAFT

F-16ABCDI Fighting Falcon 1980 1600Nuclear bombs posssibly stored at underground facility near Tel Nof Air Base

F-15I Rarsquoam (Thunder) 1998 3500 Potential nuclear strike role



reactorOtildes operation over the years butplutonium production is thought to havecontinued after 1986 making for a total ofroughly 840 kilograms of plutonium formilitary purposes3 That amount couldpotentially be used to build 168 to 210nuclearweaponsassumingasecond-gen-eration single-stage fission-implosionwarhead design with a boosted pit con-taining 4 to 5 kilograms of plutonium4

Total plutonium production is a mis-leading indicator of the actual size of theIsraeli nuclear arsenal however becauseIsraelNtildelike other nuclear-armed sta-tesNtildemost likely would not have con-verted all of its plutonium intowarheads A portion is likely stored as astrategic reserve And given that Israelprobably has a limited portion of its air-craft and missiles that are equipped todeliver nuclear weapons it would inany case not produce many more war-heads than it can actually deliver

And this is where the estimates of 200to 400 warheads strain credibilityAssuming that Israel has no more than25 single-warhead land-based ballisticmissiles such a large stockpile wouldimply as many as 150 to 350 air-deliveredbombs or a significant inventory of othertypes of nuclear weapons In comparisonthe 180 US bombs deployed in Europehave roughly 20 bombs allocated to eachnuclear-capable fighter-bomber squad-ron IsraelOtildes nuclear posture has notbeen determined by war-fighting strategybut by deterrence needs so a more realis-tic estimate may be that Israel only has acouple of fighter-bomber squadronsassigned to the nuclear missions with per-haps 40 bombs in total

The higher stockpile estimates appearto come from rumors that Israel has pro-duced a significant number of othertypes of nuclear weapons or tactical

nuclear weapons A variety of differentsources over the years has claimed with-out providing much evidence that theother weapon types include artillerylandmines suitcase bombs nuclear elec-tromagnetic pulse weapons to take outelectronic circuits and enhanced radi-ation weapons (neutron bombs)5

Seymour HershOtildes 1991 best-seller TheSamson Option IsraelOtildes Nuclear Arsenaland American Foreign Policy claimedthat Israel had manufactured OgravehundredsOacute(Hersh 1993 276) of low-yield neutronnuclear warheads and that at least threenuclear-capable artillery battalions wereestablished after 1973 with self-propelled175-mm cannons assigned more than 108nuclear artillery shells Additional nuclearartillery shells were supplied for IsraelOtildes203-mm cannons Moreover Hershclaimed the warhead that was tested inIsraelOtildes suspected nuclear test in 1979Ogravewas a low-yield nuclear artillery shellthat had been standardized for use bythe Israeli Defense ForceOacute (Hersh 1993271) The New York Times reported theseclaims but also mentioned that the Ogravefor-malOacute United States intelligence estimatewas Ogravefewer than 100Oacute warheads quotedthe Carnegie Endowment as saying thatmost outsiders estimated as many as 200warheads but ended on HershOtildes estimateof an Israeli stockpile of Ograve300 or moreOacutewarheads (Brinkley 1991)

Partly building on these claims an art-icle published in JaneOtildes IntelligenceReview in 1997 by photo-interpreterHarold Hough used commercial satellitephotos to examine IsraelOtildes suspected mis-sile base near the town of Zakharia Thearticle concluded that the base mighthouse 50 Jericho II missiles and that fivebunkers at a nearby depot were capable ofstoring 150 weapons OgraveThis supports indi-cations that the Israeli arsenal may



contain as many as 400 nuclear weaponswith a total combined yield of 50 mega-tonsOacute) Hough (1997) asserted6

Thesatellitephotoswerenotveryclearhowever and imagery experts laterpointed out that Ograveclose examination ofthe published photos indicates that manyof these identified features are not visuallyevidentOacute leaving Ogravelarge uncertainty asso-ciated with these identificationsOacute (Guptaand Pabian 1998 97) Possibly indicatingsimilar doubts a New York Times articlereminded readers that a Rand Corporationstudy commissioned by the Pentagon andreported by the Israeli daily newspaperHaaretz had concluded that Israel onlyhad enough plutonium to make 70 nuclearweapons (Schmemann 1998)

The Rand estimate was in the samerange as the 60 to 80 nuclear warheadsthe US Defense Intelligence Agency(DIA) listed in a 1999 classified report(US Defense Intelligence Agency1999)7 Leaked and later published in2004 this report is to our knowledgethe most recent publicly available docu-ment that provides an official estimate ofhow many nuclear warheads Israel hasThe report the timing of which coin-cided with the commissioning of thefirst of IsraelOtildes six Dolphin-class submar-ines also contained a projection for thearsenal by 2020 65 to 85 warheads

During the 15 years that have passedsince the DIA report Israel presumablyhas continued production of plutoniumat Dimona for some of that time (althoughthe reactor is getting old) and probablyalso has continued producing nuclearwarheads Many of those warheads wereprobably replacements for warheads pro-duced earlier for existing delivery sys-tems such as the Jericho II missiles andaircraft Warheads for a rumored JerichoIII ballistic missile would probably

replace existing Jericho II warheads on aone-for-one basis Warheads for therumored submarine-based cruise missileif true would be in addition to the existingarsenal but probably only involve a rela-tively small number of warheads

Warhead designs

The large variety of warhead designs thatwould be needed to arm the many differ-ent types of launchers rumored toexistNtildereentry vehicles for ballistic mis-siles gravity bombs for aircraft artillerylandmines and a neutron bombNtildewouldbe a significant technical challenge for anuclear weapons complex that has onlyconducted one nuclear test or even a fewtests 35 years ago

It took other nuclear weapon statesdozens of elaborate nuclear test explo-sion experiments to develop such variedweapon designsNtildeas well as the war-fighting strategies to justify the expenseAccording to some analysts Israel hadOgraveunrestricted access to French nucleartest explosion dataOacute in the 1960s (Cohen1998 82rdquo83) so much so that Ogravethe Frenchnuclear test in 1960 made two nuclearpowers not oneOacute (Weissman and Kros-ney 1981 114rdquo117) Until France broke offdeep nuclear collaboration with Israel in1967 France conducted 17 fission war-head tests in Algeria ranging from a fewkilotons to approximately 120 kilotons ofexplosive yield (CTBTO nd NuclearWeapon Archive 2001)

Based on interviews with Vanunu in1986 Frank Barnaby a nuclear physicistwho worked at the British Atomic Weap-ons Research Establishment later saidthat VanunuOtildes description of Ograveproduc-tion at Dimona of lithium-deuteride inthe shape of hemispherical shells raised the question of whether Israel



had boosted nuclear weapons in itsarsenalOacute (Barnaby 2004 4) Althoughhe didnOtildet think Vanunu had much know-ledge about such weapons Barnaby con-cluded that Ogravethe information he gavesuggested that Israel had more advancednuclear weapons than Nagasaki-typeweaponsOacute (Barnaby 2004 4)

Barnaby did not mention thermo-nuclear weapons in his 2004 statementeven though he concluded in his bookThe Invisible Bomb in 1989 that OgraveIsraelmay have about 35 thermonuclear weap-onsOacute (Barnaby 1989 25) At the time thedirector of the CIA apparently did notagree but reportedly indicated that Israelmay be seeking to construct a thermo-nuclear weapon (Cordesman 2005)Yet The Samson Option claims that USweapon designers concluded fromVanunuOtildes information that OgraveIsrael wascapable of manufacturing one of themost sophisticated weapons in the nucleararsenalNtildea low-yield [two-stage] neutronbombOacute (Hersh 1993 199) The authors ofThe Nuclear Express in 2009 echoed thatclaim stating that the product of IsraelOtildespartnership with South Africa would be Ograveafamily of boosted primaries generic H-bombs and a specific neutron bombOacute(Reed and Stillman 2009 174)

While a single-stage boosted fissiondesign warhead was probably withinIsraelOtildes technical reach at the time theclaim that Israel also was capable of pro-ducing two-stage thermonuclear war-head designs or even enhancedradiation weapons (which are also two-stage thermonuclear designs) is harderto accept based on the limited informa-tion that is publicly available aboutIsraelOtildes nuclear testing and design history

Whatever the composition of theIsraeli nuclear arsenal we neither seethe indicators that Israel has sufficient

nuclear-capable launchers for 200 to400 nuclear weapons nor understandwhy a country that does not have a strat-egy for fighting nuclear war would needthat many types of warheads or warheaddesigns to deter its potential adversariesIn our assessment a more credible esti-mateNtildetaking into consideration pluto-nium production testing history designskills force structure and strategyNtildeisan Israeli stockpile of approximately 80boosted fission warheads

Aircraft and airfields

Over the past 30 years the Israeli AirForce (IAF) has had several types ofUS-produced aircraft capable of carry-ing nuclear gravity bombs Theseinclude the A-4 Skyhawk F-4 Phantomand more recently the F-16 and F-15EMoreover Israel has purchased 20 F-35A Lightnings to replace older F-16sand plans to buy more

The A-4 and F-4 served long careers asnuclear strike aircraft in the US militaryand their potential roles as similar nu-clear weapons delivery vehicles withinthe IAF was the focus of much attentionat the time they were in use As noted ear-lier when it bought these aircraft Israelformally promised the United States thatit Ograveagrees not to use any aircraft suppliedby the US as a nuclear weapons carrierOacute(Embassy of Israel 1968 1) But theexperience with IsraelOtildes interpretation ofits promise not to be the first to Ograveintro-duceOacute nuclear weapons in the MiddleEast makes it hard to take its promisenot to use American aircraft for nuclearmissions without a pinch of salt

Since the 1980s the F-16 has been thebackbone of the Israeli Air Force Overthe years Israel has purchased well over200 F-16s of all types as well as specially



configured F-16Is Various versions ofthe F-16 serve nuclear strike roles in theUS Air Force and among NATO alliesand the F-16 is the most likely candidatefor air delivery of Israeli nuclear weap-ons at the present time

Since 1998 Israel has also used theBoeing F-15E Strike Eagle for long-rangestrike and air-superiority roles TheIsraeli version is characterized by greatertakeoff weightNtilde36750 kgNtildeand rangeNtilde4450 kmNtildethan other F-15 models Itsmaximum speed at high altitude is Mach25 The plane has been further modifiedwith specialized radar that has terrain-mapping capability and other navigationand guidance systems In the US AirForce the F-15E Strike Eagle has beengiven a nuclear role It is not known ifthe Israeli Air Force has added nuclearcapability to this highly versatile plane

Regardless of what happens with theF-15E Israel has decided to replace a por-tion of its F-16 fleet with a new planeunder development in the UnitedStates the F-35A In so doing it willbecome the first non-US country to oper-ate the aircraft The first F-35ANtildetheIsraeli version will be known as the F-35I (named OgraveAdirOacute for OgraveawesomeOacute orOgravemightyOacute)Ntildewill arrive in 2017 with thefirst squadron expected to become oper-ational at Nevatim Air Base in the Negevdesert in 2018 Israel purchased 20 of anearlier F-35 design in 2012 and plans tobuy over 100 of the new F-35Is but thehigh cost of the F-35 might limit theplans The F-35I will be adapted withIsraeli weapons and has unlike the F-15Iand F-16I the ability to fly long-rangemissions with internal weapons TheUS Air Force is upgrading its F-35As tocarry nuclear bombs and IsraelOtildes Chan-nel 2 reported that an unnamed Ograveseniorlevel US officialOacute refused to say if Israel

had requested such an upgrade for its F-35 s (Channel 2 2014)

It is especially difficult to determinewhich Israeli wings and squadrons areassigned nuclear missions and whichbases support them The nuclear war-heads themselves may be stored inunderground facilities near one or twobases Israeli F-16 squadrons are basedat Ramat-David Air Base in northernIsrael Tel Nof and Hatzor air bases incentral Israel and Hatzerim NevatimRamon and Ouvda air bases in southernIsrael Of the many F-16 squadrons onlya small fractionNtildeperhaps one or twoNtildewould actually be nuclear-certified withspecially trained crews unique proced-ures and modified aircraft The F-15 sare based at Tel Nof Air Base in centralIsrael and Hatzerim Air Base in theNegev desert We cautiously suggestthat Tel Nof Air Base in central Israeland Nevatim Air Base in the Negevdesert have nuclear missions

Land-based missiles

IsraelOtildes nuclear missile program datesback to the early 1960s In April 1963 sev-eral months before the Dimona reactorbegan producing plutonium Israelsigned an agreement with the Frenchcompany Dassault to produce a sur-face-to-surface ballistic missile Themissile system became known as theJericho (or MD-620)

The first purchase of 30 missilesoccurred in early 1966 but soon after theSix-Day War in June 1967 France imposedan embargo on new military equipment toIsrael Jericho production was transferredto Israel and the first two missiles deliv-ered in 1968 with 10 more by mid-1969The program was completed around 1970with 24 to 30 missiles Apparently not all



were nuclear with only 10 of the missilesOgraveprogrammed for nuclear warheadsOacuteaccording to the White House (Depart-ment of State 1968 2 White House1969a 1)8 Apparently the other missilescould be armed with chemical warheadsprobably nerve gas (White House 1969c)The short-range Jericho could deliver a1000-kilogram (2200 pound) reentryvehicle with a range of about 480 kilo-meters (298 miles) The accuracy was esti-mated to be roughly within 926 meters(approximately 06 miles) of its target(CIA 1974 22)

Most sources assert that Jericho was amobile missile transported and firedfrom a transportable erector launcher(CIA 1974) But there have occasionallybeen references to possible silos for theweapon A US State Department studyproduced in support of National SecurityStudy Memorandum 40 in May 1969 con-cluded that Israel believed it needed anearly invulnerable nuclear force todeter a nuclear first strike from its ene-mies Ograveie having a second-strike cap-abilityOacute The study stated OgraveIsrael is nowbuilding such a forceNtildethe hardened silosof the Jericho missilesOacute (Department ofState 1969d 7 emphasis added) It isnot clear that the claim of OgravehardenedsilosOacute constituted the assessment of theUS intelligence community and only afew subsequent sourcesNtildeall non-gov-ernmentalNtildehave mentioned Israeli mis-sile silos9 We did not find any publicevidence of Jericho silos

The Jericho range was sufficient totarget Cairo Damascus and all ofJordan but not the Soviet UnionNtildewhichwas gaining importance in IsraelOtildes plan-ning In collaboration with South AfricaIsrael in the late 1980s developedthe medium-range Jericho II that putthe southern-most Soviet cities and the

Black Sea Fleet within range Jericho II amodified version of the Shavit spacelaunch rocket was first deployed in theearly-1990s replacing the first Jericho

Unofficial estimates of the Jericho IIOtildesrange vary greatly and tend to be exag-geratedNtildesome even up to 5000 kilo-meters (3100 miles)10 The Jericho wasfirst flight-tested in May 1987 to approxi-mately 850 km (527 miles) The trajectorywent far into the Mediterranean SeaAnother test in September 1989 reached1300 km (806 miles) The US Air ForceNational Air Intelligence Center in 1996reported the Jericho II range as 1500 kilo-meters (930 miles) (NAIC 1996)

Half of Iran which has increased inimportance to Israeli military strategyover the past two decades is out of JerichoIIOtildes reach That includes Tehran (barely)Rumors abound that Israel has beendeveloping a longer-range missile pub-licly known as Jericho III with an esti-mated range of 4000 kilometers or 2480miles With such a missile Israel would beable to target all of Iran Pakistan and all ofRussia west of the UralsNtildeincluding forthe first time Moscow Jericho III wasfirst test-launched over the MediterraneanSea in January 2008 again in 2011 and mostrecently in July 2013 Unidentified defensesources told JaneOtildes Defence Weekly thatJericho III constitutes Ogravea dramatic leapin IsraelOtildes missile capabilitiesOacute (JaneOtildesDefence Weekly 2008 5) but many detailsand current status are unknown

How many Jericho missiles Israel has isanother uncertainty Estimates vary from25 to 100 Most sources estimate thatIsrael has 50 of these missiles and placethem at the Sdot Micha facility near thetown of Zakharia in the Judean Hillsapproximately 27 kilometers or about 17miles east of Jerusalem (There are manyalternative spellings and names for the



base including Zekharyeh ZekharaiaSdot Micha and Sdot HaElla)

Commercial satellite images showwhat appear to be two clusters of whatmight be caves for mobile Jericho IIlaunchers The northern cluster includes14 caves and the southern cluster has ninecaves for a total of 23 caves This numberof caves roughly matches the 24 to 30 mis-siles mentioned in a 1969 White Housememo (White House 1969a) Each clusteralso has what appears to be a covereddrive-through facilitypotentially for mis-sile handling or warhead loading A sep-arate circular facility with four tunnels tounderground facilities could potentiallybe for warhead storage Consequentlywe conclude that estimates of 50 to 100missiles are exaggerated and estimatethat Israel deploys about two dozenmobile launchers for Jericho missiles

Most reports only mention one missilesite but a US State Department back-ground paper from 1969 stated that therewas Ograveevidence strongly indicating thatseveral sites providing operationallaunch capabilities are virtually com-pleteOacute (Department of State 1969c 4emphasis added) The Sdot Micha baseis relatively small at 16 square kilometersand the suspected launcher caves arelocated along two roads each of which isonly about one kilometer long Althoughthis layout would provide protectionagainst limited conventional attacks itwould be vulnerable to a nuclear surpriseattack For the Jericho missiles to havemilitary value they would need to beable to disperse from their caves

Sea-based missiles andsubmarines

Rumors abound that Israel has developeda nuclear warhead for a sea-launched

cruise missile which would be launchedfrom diesel-electric Dolphin-class attacksubmarines that Israel has acquired fromGermany Some rumors say that thenuclear-capable sea-launched cruisemissile is a modification of the conven-tional OgravePopeye TurboOacute air-to-surfacemissiles while others claim that Israelconverted the US-supplied HarpoonNtildealong-standing US anti-ship missileNtildetonuclear capability

It is difficult to say with certaintywhen the rumors first emerged orwhere but one early candidate is aCenter for Strategic and InternationalStudies study from 1998 which listedOgraveVariant of the Popeye air-to-surfacemissile believed to have nuclear war-headOacute (Cordesman 1998 17) There wasno source for the claim but it quicklymade its way into The WashingtonTimes under the headline OgraveIsrael buying3 submarines to carry nuclear missilesOacuteThe article also referenced a June 8 1998report in the Israeli paper Haaretz OgravethatIsraeli military planners want to mountnuclear-armed cruise missiles on thenew submarinesOacute (Sieff 1998)

An article published by Gerald MSteinberg from Bar Ilan University inRUSI International Security Review in1999 described Ograveunconfirmed reportsthat Israel is developing a cruise missile(known as the Popeye Turbo) with arange of 350 kilometers to be operationalin 2002Oacute that Ogravecould become the basis ofa sea-based second strike deterrentOacute(Steinberg 1999 215rdquo224)

When the Clinton administration pro-posed returning the Golan Heights toSyria the Israeli government respondedwith a $17 billion security package requestthat included 12 long-range BGM-109Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles(The US Navy possessed a nuclear-



armed version of the Tomahawk between1983 and 2012) Israel argued that it wouldneed the Tomahawk to compensate forthe loss of strategic depth if it gave upthe Golan Heights although targetingIran was clearly also a factor But the Clin-ton administration turned down theIsraeli request in March 2000

Only three months later in June 2000an article in the Sunday Times quotedunnamed OgraveIsraeli defense officialsOacute assaying that Israel had secretly tested asubmarine-launched cruise missile to arange of more than 1500 kilometers(930 miles) in the Indian Ocean (Mah-naimi and Campbell 2000)

The reports about a nuclear Popeyecruise missile and a 1500-kilometercruise missile test were soon conflatedinto one missile which has been referredto as fact in numerous publications eversince After the widely respected bookDeadly Arsenals printed this informationin June 2002 (Cirincione et al 2002)coverage in The Washington Post addedunnamed former Pentagon and StateDepartment officials who confirmed thatIsrael was arming three newly acquireddiesel submarines with Ogravenewly designedcruise missiles capable of carrying nuclearwarheadsOacute The report said the US Navymonitored the Israeli cruise missile testalthough a former Pentagon official cau-tioned OgraveIt is above top secret knowingwhether the sub-launched cruise missilesare nuclear-armedOacute (Pincus 2002)

The lead author of the Sunday Timescruise missile test article Uzi Mahnaimihas written other articles about IsraelOtildesnuclear capabilities some of which laterturned out to be incorrect A 2007 articleclaimed Ograveseveral Israeli military sourcesOacutehad told the Sunday Times that two Israeliair force squadrons were training to blowup an Iranian facility using low-yield

nuclear Ogravebunker-bustersOacute (Mahnaimi andBaxter 2007) In 2010 Mahnaimi claimedOgravethe decision has now been takenOacute to con-tinuously deploy at least one of IsraelOtildesOgravesubmarines equipped with nuclearcruise missiles in the Gulf near theIranian coastlineOacute The article quoted anunidentified navy officer saying that theOgrave1500-km range of the submarinesOtildecruise missiles can reach any target inIranOacute (Mahnaimi 2010) These and otherarticles have caused media critics includ-ing Marsha B Cohen on PBSOtildes Frontline todescribe Mahnaimi as a OgravesensationalistOacutewith Ogravea long and consistent recordNtildeforbeing wrongOacute (Cohen MB 2010)

Up until 2002 news media reportsfocused on a naval version of the air-launched Popeye Turbo missile But inOctober 2003 the Los Angeles Timesquoted unnamed US and Israeli officialssaying that Israel had modified the US-supplied Harpoon cruise missile to carrynuclear warheads on submarines OgraveTwoBush administration officials describedthe missile modification and an Israeliofficial confirmed itOacute the paper stated(Frantz 2003)

This added to the mystery because therange of the Harpoon is even shorter thanthe range of the Popeye Turbo (110-pluskilometers or about 68 miles versus300-plus kilometers or about 186 miles)Former Israeli Deputy Defense MinisterEfraim Sneh dismissed the Harpoon story

Anyone with even the slightest understanding ofmissiles knows that the Harpoon can never beused to carry nuclear warheads Not even[IsraelOtildes] extraordinarily talented engineers andits sophisticated defense industries can trans-form the Harpoon into a missile capable ofdoing this ItOtildes simply impossible (Haaretz 2003)

SnehOtildes claim that Ogravethe Harpoon cannever be used to carry nuclear warheadsOacute



is not entirely correct Between 1973 and1980 the United States considered equip-ping the Harpoon with a nuclear warheadbut the program was terminated (Coch-ran et al 1984) IsraelOtildes nuclear weaponsengineering capability is much lessadvanced than that of the United Statesand the PentagonOtildes Defense SecurityCooperation Agency which overseesUS military sales abroad told Arms Con-trol Today that although IsraelOtildes contractfor Harpoon missiles does not explicitlyprohibit Israel from modifying them tocarry nuclear warheads Ogravewe have hadno reason to believe that the governmentof Israel had any intention to modify orsubstitute the warheads of these missilesOacute(Boese 2003)

Contrary to the Harpoon rumor thenormally well-informed Avner Cohenwrites in The Worst-Kept Secret that thesubmarine cruise missile developed forIsraelOtildes sea-based strategic leg of itsnuclear deterrent has been Ogravedevelopedand built in IsraelOacute (Cohen A 2010 83)

Israel plans to operate six Dolphin-class submarines The last three submar-ines are 10 meters (approximately 33feet) longer than the first three due tothe addition of an improved air-indepen-dent propulsion system After delivery ofthe first three submarines rumors ofnuclear capability reportedly promptedGermany to demand that Israel assurethat the additional submarines itwanted would not be carrying nuclearweapons (Ben-David 2005)

Whether the German demand wasactually made remains unknown but in1999 after delivery of the first Dolphinsubmarine then-Prime Minister EhudBarak told the National Defense Collegethat the submarines Ograveadd an importantcomponent to IsraelOtildes long armOacute (Barak1999) And the Israeli defense force chief

of staff made it clear in 2005 that Israelwas modifying its military capabilities inresponse to IranOtildes suspected nuclearweapons ambitions OgraveWe cannot sitindifferent in the face of the combinationof an irrational regime with non-conven-tional weapons We have to concentrateall our efforts to create different capabil-ities that would allow us both to defendand to reactOacute (Ben-David 2005 4)

Colonel Yoni the head of the Israelisubmarine fleet in 2006 refused to com-ment on reports about the submarinesOtilderumored nuclear capability but addedthat Ogravehitting strategic targets is notalways a task the Air Force or the infan-try can carry out a submarine can per-form the missionOacute he explained OgraveThefact that foreign reports refer to the sub-marines as a deterring factor says some-thingOacute (Greenberg 2006)

In June 2009 Israeli defense sourcesreported that the INS LeviathanNtildeone ofthe first three diesel-electric Dolphin-class submarines but without the air-inde-pendent propulsion of later purchases ofsubmarineNtildehad sailed through the SuezCanal on its way to a naval exercise Somenews media reported the submarinesailed for an exercise in the Persian Gulfbut instead it docked at the Israeli navalbase at Eilat in the Red Sea Speculationserupted about the deployment being asignal to Iran and therefore indirectly aconfirmation of the Dolphin-submarineOtildesrumored nuclear capability and thatIsrael might deploy submarines perman-ently at Eilat But an Israeli defense offi-cial said there would be no permanentsubmarine deployment in Eilat OgraveIf any-thing we are scaling down our navaloperations in EilatOacute (Haaretz 2009)

Even so an article published by theSunday TimesNtildewritten by the samereporter that wrote the article about the



1500-km cruise missile test and the plansto bomb Iran with low-yield nuclearbombsNtildeclaimed that Israel had made adecision Ograveto ensure a permanent presenceof at least oneOacute of the Dolphin-class sub-marines in the Persian Gulf Ogravenear the Iran-ian coastlineOacute (Mahnaimi 2010)

The German magazine Der Spiegelreported in 2012 that the German govern-ment had known for decades that Israelplanned to equip the submarines withnuclear missiles Former German offi-cials said they always assumed Israelwould use the submarines for nuclearweapons although the officials appearedto confirm old rumors rather than pro-vide new information The articlequoted another unnamed ministry offi-cial with knowledge of the matterOgraveFrom the beginning the boats were pri-marily used for the purposes of nuclearcapabilityOacute (Der Spiegel 2012)

Setting the record straight

From these examples it should be appar-ent that there is much that is unclearabout what kind of nuclear weaponsIsrael has how many there are underwhat circumstances they would beused or how they would be deliveredto their targets All Israeli governmentshave preferred to keep this informationsecret Nevertheless from our examin-ation of the publicly available informa-tion we conclude that widespreadclaims of an Israeli nuclear stockpile of200 to 400 warheads and 50 to 100 Jerichomissiles are exaggerated

In our assessment based on analysisof available sources and examination ofcommercial satellite imagery we esti-mate that Israel has a stockpile ofapproximately 80 nuclear warheads fordelivery by two dozen mobile Jericho

missiles a couple of squadrons of air-craft and perhaps a small inventory ofsea-launched cruise missiles Muchuncertainty remains however aboutthe structure and diversity of IsraelOtildesnuclear arsenal because of IsraelOtildespolicy of keeping its nuclear capabilityambiguous and because other countriesdonOtildet reveal some of what their intelli-gence communities know

Despite IsraelOtildes stated policy that itwill not be the first to introduce nuclearweapons in the Middle East there is littledoubt that Israel has already introducednuclear weapons in the region and thatonly a deception based on a narrow inter-pretation of what constitutes Ograveintroduc-tionOacute keeps Israel from officially being anuclear weapon state Thanks to invalu-able research by researchers such asAvner Cohen and William Burr previ-ously unknown nuances of IsraelOtildesopaque nuclear policy have becomeavailable to the public

FundingThis research was conducted with generous supportfrom the New Land Foundation and the PloughsharesFund

Notes

1 For collections of declassified US govern-ment documents relating to IsraelOtildes nuclearweapons capability see Cohen and Burr(2006)

2 Frank Barnaby who cross-examined Vanunuon behalf of the Sunday Times stated in 2004that the estimate for IsraelOtildes plutoniuminventoryNtildesufficient for Ogravesome 150 nuclearweaponsOacuteNtildewas based on VanunuOtildes descrip-tion of the reprocessing plant at Dimona(Barnaby 2004 3rdquo4)

3 International Panel of Fissile Materials (201320) For additional information about Israelifissile material production see InternationalPanel of Fissile Materials (2010 107rdquo116)



4 The 4 to 5 kilograms of plutonium per war-head assumes high-quality technical andengineering performance for productionfacilities and personnel Lower perform-ance would need a greater amount of pluto-nium per warhead and therefore reduce thetotal number of weapons that Israel couldpotentially have produced

5 For examples of claims about tactical andadvanced nuclear weapons see Hersh(1993 199rdquo200 216rdquo217 220 268 276 (note)312 319)

6 The 400-warhead claim apparently wasbased on an earlier article in the samemagazine (Brower 1997)

7 The secret document was leaked and repro-duced in Scarborough (2004 194rdquo223) It isimportant to caution that as a DIA docu-ment the report does not necessarily rep-resent the coordinated assessment of theUS Intelligence Community as a wholeonly the view of one part of it An excerptfrom the DIA report is available at Kristen-sen and Aftergood (2007)

8 Another declassified document at the timestated OgraveIsrael plans to produce and deployup to 60 missilesOacute (Joint Chiefs of Staff1969 2)

9 For examples of sources claiming Jerichomissiles are deployed in silos see Cordes-man (2008) Missilethreatcom (2012) Cor-desman references the Nuclear ThreatInitiative country profile on Israeli missilesas the source for the silo claim The NTI hassince updated its page which no longermentions silos See httpwwwntiorgcountry-profilesisraeldelivery-systems

10 For examples of large range estimates forthe Jericho II see Hough (1997 407 rdquo410)Missilethreatcom (2012)

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Barnaby F (1989) The Invisible Bomb London IBTauris

Barnaby F (2004) Expert opinion of Charles FrankBarnaby in the matter of Mordechai VanunuSunday Times June 14 Available at httpfasorgnukeguideisraelbarnabypdf

BBC (2003) IsraelOtildes secret weapon March 2003Available at httpwwwyoutubecomwatchvfrac14z6Aq24Q2xXc

Ben-David A (2005) Israel looks to acquire moreGerman submarines JaneOtildes Defence WeeklyNovember 30

Boese W (2003) Israel allegedly fielding sea-basednuclear missiles Arms Control Today November2003 Available at httpwwwarmscontrolorgact2003_11Israel

Brinkley J (1991) Israeli nuclear arsenal exceeds ear-lier estimates book reports New York TimesOctober 20 Available at httpwwwnytimescom19911020worldisraeli-nuclear-arsenal-exceeds-earlier-estimates-book-reportshtml

Brower KS (1997) A propensity for conflict Potentialscenarios and outcomes of war in the Middle EastJaneOtildes Intelligence Review special report no 14February pp 14rdquo15

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (1974) SpecialNational Intelligence Estimate SNIE 4174August 23 Available at httpwww2gwuedunsarchivNSAEBBNSAEBB240sniepdf

Cirincione J Wolfsthal J and Rajkumar M (2002)Deadly Arsenals Tracking Weapons of MassDestruction Washington DC Carnegie Endow-ment for International PeaceAvailable at httpmceiporg20020612carnegie-book-release-deadly-arsenals-tracking-weapons-of-mass-destruction8ggz

Channel 2 (2014) F-35 Lightning II plane can carrynuclear weapons March 26 Available at httpwwwmakocoilnews-militarysecurityArticle-11d7f8f4b2df441004htm (in Hebrew)

Cochran T Arkin WM and Hoenig MM (1984)Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume I USNuclear Forces and Capabilities Cambridge MABallinger

Cohen A (1998) Israel and the Bomb New York Col-umbia University Press

Cohen A (2010) The Worst-Kept Secret IsraelOtildes Bar-gain with the Bomb New York Columbia Univer-sity Press

Cohen A (2013) When Israel stepped back from thebrink New York Times October 3 Available athttpwwwnytimescom20131004opinionwhen-israel-stepped-back-from-the-brinkhtml

Cohen A (nd) Arnan OcircSiniOtilde Azaryahu NuclearProliferation International History Project Woo-drow Wilson Center Available at httpwwwwilsoncenterorgarnan-sini-azaryahu (accessedOctober 4 2013)



Cohen A andBurr W (2006) Israel Crosses the ThresholdElectronic Briefing Book no 189 NationalSecurity Archive April 28 Available at httpwww2gwuedunsarchivNSAEBBNSAEBB189indexhtm

Cohen MB (2010) LondonOtildes Sunday Times All the nukesunfit to print PBS Frontline May 31 Availableat httpwwwpbsorgwgbhpagesfrontlineteh-ranbureau201005londons-sunday-times-all-the-nukes-unfit-to-printhtml

Colby E Cohen A McCants W et al (2013) The IsraeliOcircNuclear AlertOtilde of 1973 Deterrence and Signalingin Crisis Center for Naval Analysis April Avail-able at httpwwwcnaorgsitesdefaultfilesresearchDRM-2013-U-004480-Final2pdf

Cordesman A (1998) India Pakistan and Proliferationin the Middle East Center for Strategic and Inter-national Studies June 3 Available at httpcsisorgfilesmediacsispubsprolifinme-brief6-3-98[1]pdf

Cordesman A (2005) Proliferation of Weapons of MassDestruction in the Middle East The Impact on theRegional Military Balance Center for Strategicand International Studies March 25 (reviseddraft) Available at httpcsisorgpublicationproliferation-weapons-mass-destruction-middle-east-impact-regional-military-balance

Cordesman A (2008) Israeli weapons of mass destruc-tion An overview 1st working draft June 2 Avail-able at httpcsisorgfilesmediacsispubs080602_israeliwmdpdf

CTBTO (nd) 13 February 1960 rdquo The first Frenchnuclear test Available at httpwwwctbtoorgspecialstesting-times13-february-1960-the-first-french-nuclear-test (accessed September 82014)

Department of Defense (1968) Office of the AssistantSecretary of Defense Memorandum of Conversa-tion Subject Negotiations with Israel rdquo F-4 andAdvanced Weapons November 12 Available athttpwww2gwuedunsarchivisraeldocu-mentsbattle12-01htm

Department of State (1968) Briefing MemorandumParker T Hart to the Secretary Dean Rusk Sub-ject Issues to be Considered in Connection withNegotiations with Israel for F-4 Phantom AircraftOctober 15 Available at httpwww2gwuedunsarchivNSAEBBNSAEBB189IN-01pdf

Department of State (1969a) Memorandum of Con-versation Subject Israeli Nuclear Program Octo-ber 15 enclosure to Elliot L RichardsonMemorandum for the President Subject IsraelOtildesNuclear Program October 17 attachment to Mem-orandum Kissinger to Nixon Subject IsraelOtildesNuclear Program November 6 Available at

httpwww2gwuedunsarchivNSAEBBNSAEBB189IN-25pdf

Department of State (1969b) Henry Owen to Secre-tary Subject Impact on US Policies of an IsraeliNuclear Weapons Capability rdquo ACTION MEM-ORANDUM February 7 Available at httpwww2gwuedunsarchivNSAEBBNSAEBB189IN-05pdf

Department of State (1969c) Memorandum USDepartment of State Theodore L Elliott toHenry Kissinger Subject Briefing Book rdquo Visitof Mrs Golda Meir September 19 Available athttpwww2gwuedunsarchivNSAEBBNSAEBB189IN-21pdf

Department of State (1969d) I IsraelOtildes NuclearWeapon Intentions enclosed as Basic Study toLetter John P Walsh US State Department tothe Assistant to the President for National Secur-ity Affairs et al Subject Israeli Nuclear WeaponsProgram rdquo NSSM 40 May 30 Available at httpwww2gwuedunsarchivnukevaultebb485docsDoc206205-30-6920NSSM204020reportpdf

Der Spiegel (2012) IsraelOtildes deployment of nuclear mis-siles on subs from Germany June 4 Availableat httpwwwspiegeldeinternationalworldisraeldeploysnuclearweaponsongermanbuiltsubmarinesa836784html

Embassy of Israel (1968) Letter Ambassador Lt GenY Rabin to Assistant Secretary of Defense PaulWarnke November 22 Available atwww2gwuedunsarchivisraeldocumentsbattle14-01htm

Frantz D (2003) Israel adds fuel to nuclear dispute LosAngeles Times October 12 Available at httpthe-handstandorgarchivenovember2003articlesshamirhtm

Friedman M (2006) Israel nuke comment sparks con-troversy Associated Press December 12 The ori-ginal article is no longer available online but acopy is posted here wwwfreerepubliccomfocusf-news1752227posts

Greenberg H (2006) Sub fleet chief We can hit targetsoverseas Ynetnewscom February 28 Availableat httpwwwynetnewscomarticles07340L-322185300html

Gupta V and Pabian F (1998) Viewpoint Commercialsatellite imagery and the CTBT verification pro-cess The Nonproliferation Review SpringrdquoSum-mer 89rdquo97 Available at httpkms1isnethzchserviceengineFilesISN114492ichaptersec-tion_singledocument2e01aa10-1408-4033-af96-1c78a94f367denViewpoint04-Guptapdf

Haaretz (2003) Experts scorn report on IsraelOtildesnuclear submarines Associated Press



October 13 Available at httpwwwhaaretz-comprint-editionnewsexperts-scorn-report-on-israel-s-nuclear-submarines-1102495

Haaretz (2009) Israel wonOtildet base submarines in RedSea says defense official Reuters July 5 Availableat httpwwwhaaretzcommiscarticle-print-pageisrael-won-t-base-submarines-in-red-sea-says-defense-official-1279380

Hersh S (1993) The Samson Option IsraelOtildes NuclearArsenal and American Foreign Policy LondonFaber and Faber

Hough H (1997) Could IsraelOtildes nuclear assets survivea first strike JaneOtildes Intelligence Review Septem-ber 407rdquo410

International Panel of Fissile Materials (2010) GlobalFissile Materials Report 2010 Princeton NJ Prin-ceton University Program on Science and GlobalSecurity Available at httpipfmlibraryorggfmr10pdf


JaneOtildes Defence Weekly (2008) Israel launches leap inIRBM capabilities January 23

Joint Chiefs of Staff (1969) Memorandum EarleWheeler Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff toMelvin Laird March 26 Available at httpwww2gwuedunsarchivnukevaultebb485docsDoc204A205-5-6920stash20re20Feb201969pdf

Kristensen HM and Aftergood S (2007) Nuclearweapons Federation of American Scientists Janu-ary 8 Available at httpfasorgnukeguideisraelnuke

Lappin Y (2013) IAF will house F-35 fleet at Nevatimbase Jerusalem Post October 1 Available atwwwjpostcomDefenseIAF-will-house-F-35-fleet-at-Nevatim-base

Lebow RN and Stein JG (1995) We All Lost The ColdWar Princeton NJ Princeton University Press

Lev Kay Y (2009) Israeli sub sails through Suez Canalsending warning to Iran Arutz Sheva 7 July 5Available at httpwwwisraelnationalnewscomNewsNewsaspx132206U_t4vuZdU_A

Mahnaimi U (2010) Israel stations nuclear missilesubs off Iran The Sunday Times May 30 Availableat httpswebarchiveorgweb20110506200452httpwwwtimesonlinecouktolnewsworldeuropearticle7140282ece

Mahnaimi U and Baxter S (2007) Revealed Israelplans nuclear strike on Iran The Sunday TimesJanuary 7 Available at httpwwwinformation-clearinghouseinfoarticle18688htm

Mahnaimi U and Campbell M (2000) Israel makesnuclear waves with submarine missile testSunday Times June 1 Available at httpfasorgnewsisraele20000619israelmakeshtm

Missilethreatcom (2012) Jericho 123 November 5Available at httpmissilethreatcommissilesjericho-123

National Air Intelligence Center (NAIC) (1996)IsraelOtildes Satellites and Missiles NAIC-ID(RS)T-0568-96 December 18 Available at httpoaidticmiloaioaiverbfrac14getRecordampmetadataPrefixfrac14htmlampidentifierfrac14ADA321046

Netanyahu B (2011) Interview with PM Netanyahu onCNN rdquo Piers Morgan Tonight March 17 IsraelMinistry of Foreign Affairs Available at httpmfagovilMFAPressRoom2011PagesInter-view_PM_Netanyahu_CNN_17-Mar-2011aspx

New York Times (1981) Dayan says Israelis have thecapacity to produce A-Bombs June 25 Availableat httpwwwnytimescom19810625worlddayan-says-israelis-have-the-capacity-to-pro-duce-a-bombshtml

Nuclear Weapon Archive (2001) FranceOtildes nuclearweapons Origin of force de frappe December24 Available at httpnuclearweaponarchi-veorgFranceFranceOriginhtml

Pincus W (2002) Israel has sub-based atomic armscapability Washington Post June 15 Available athttpwwwconvergeorgnzpmacra0532htm

Rabin Y (1994) Press Conference with President Clin-ton King Hussein and Prime Minister Rabin theWhite House July 26 IsraelOtildes Foreign RelationsSelected Documents Volume 13rdquo14 1992rdquo1994Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs Available athttpmfagovilMFAForeignPolicyMFADo-cumentsYearbook9Pages21520Press20-Conference20with20President20Clinton-20Kingaspx

Reed T and Stillman D (2009) The Nuclear Express APolitical History of the Bomb and Its ProliferationMinneapolis MN Zenith Press

Richelson J (2006) The vela incident Nuclear test ormeteorid Electronic Briefing Book no 190National Security Archive May 5 Available athttpwww2gwuedunsarchivNSAEBBNSAEBB190

Sale R (2002) Yom Kippur IsraelOtildes 1973 nuclear alertUPI September 16 Available at httpwwwupicomBusiness_NewsSecurity-Industry20020916Yom-Kippur-Israels-1973-nuclear-alertUPI-64941032228992print

Scarborough R (2004) RumsfeldOtildes War WashingtonDC Regnery

Schmemann S (1998) Israel clings to its Ocircnuclear ambi-guityOtilde New York Times June 21 Available



at httpwwwnytimescom19980621worldisrael-clings-to-its-nuclear-ambiguityhtml

Sieff M (1998) Israel buying 3 submarines to carrynuclear missiles Washington Times July 1 Avail-able at httpfasorgnukeguideisraelsubinternatl1html

Steinberg G (1999) Re-examining IsraelOtildes SecurityDoctrine RUSI International Security ReviewLondon Royal United Services Institute forDefence Analysis Available at httpsfacultybiuacilsteingarmsdoctrinehtm

Sunday Times (1986a) Inside Dimona IsraelOtildes nuclearbomb factory October 5

Sunday Times (1986b) RevealedNtildeThe secrets ofIsraelOtildes nuclear arsenal October 5

Sunday Times (1986c) How the experts were con-vinced October 5

US Defense Intelligence Agency (1999) A Primer onthe Future Threat The Decades Ahead 1999rdquo2020The document was leaked An excerpt is availableat httpfasorgnukeguideisraelnuke

Weissman S and Krosney H (1981) The Islamic BombThe Nuclear Threat to Israel and the Middle EastNew York Times Books

White House (1969a) Memorandum Henry Kissingerto Richard Nixon Subject IsraelOtildes Nuclear ProgramJuly 19 Available at www2gwuedunsarchivnukevaultebb485docsDoc2010207-19-6920circapdf

White House (1969b) Memorandum Kissinger toNixon Subject IsraelOtildes Nuclear Program Novem-ber 6 Available at httpwww2gwuedunsarchivNSAEBBNSAEBB189IN-25pdf

White House (1969c) Talking paper for the DeputySecretary of Defense and the Chairman JointChiefs of Staff (Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committeeof the NSC Review Group) June 20 Attachment toMemorandum Jeanne Davis Secretariat NationalSecurity Council to Under Secretary of StateRichardson et al June 5 Available at httpwww2gwuedunsarchivnukevaultebb485docsDoc207pdf

Williams D (2006) IsraelOtildes Olmert under fire overnuclear remarks Washington Post December 12Available at httpwwwwashingtonpostcomwp-dyncontentarticle20061212AR2006121200463_pfhtml

Author biographies

Hans M Kristensen is the director of theNuclear Information Project with the Federa-tion of American Scientists (FAS) in Washing-ton DC USA His work focuses on researchingand writing about the status of nuclear weaponsand the policies that direct them Kristensen is aco-author of the world nuclear forces overviewin the SIPRI Yearbook (Oxford UniversityPress) and a frequent adviser to the newsmedia on nuclear weapons policy and oper-ations He has co-authored Nuclear notebooksince 2001 Inquiries should be directed toFAS 1725 DeSales St NW Sixth Floor Washing-ton DC 20036 USA (202) 546-3300

Robert S Norris is a senior fellow with theFederation of American Scientists in Washing-ton DC USA A former senior research associ-ate with the Natural Resources DefenseCouncil his principal areas of expertise includewriting and research on all aspects of thenuclear weapons programs of the UnitedStates the Soviet Union and Russia theUnited Kingdom France and China as well asIndia Pakistan and Israel He is the author ofRacing for the Bomb General Leslie R Grovesthe Manhattan ProjectOtildes Indispensable Man(Steerforth 2002) and co-author of Making theRussian Bomb From Stalin to Yeltsin (West-view 1995) He co-authored or contributed tothe chapter on nuclear weapons in the1985rdquo2000 editions of the SIPRI Yearbook(Oxford University Press) and has co-authoredNuclear notebook since 1987



they could possess nuclear weapons aslong as they did not test deploy or makethem publicOacute (White House 1969a 1) In amemo prepared for President Nixon onthe Israeli nuclear program nationalsecurity advisor Henry Kissinger statedOgraveThis is one program on which the Israe-lis have persistently deceived usNtildeandmay even have stolen from usOacute (WhiteHouse 1969a 7 of attachment)

Both the Johnson and Nixon adminis-trations tried to get a clearer understand-ing of the Israeli interpretation ofOgraveintroductionOacute During a meeting at thePentagon in November 1968 IsraelOtildesambassador to the United States YitzhakRabin who later succeeded Prime Minis-ter Golda Meir as Israeli prime ministersaid that Ogravehe would not consider aweapon that had not been tested to be aweaponOacute Rabin noted that this was hispersonal understanding as a former mili-tary leader Moreover he said OgraveTheremust be a public acknowledgement Thefact that you have got it must be knownOacuteSeeking clarity US Assistant Secretary ofDefense Paul Warnke asked OgraveThen inyour view an unadvertised untestednuclear device is not a nuclear weaponOacuteRabin responded OgraveYes that is correctOacuteSo Warnke continued an advertised butuntested device or weapon would consti-tute introduction OgraveYes that would beintroductionOacute Rabin confirmed (Depart-ment of Defense 1968 2 3 4)

In a follow-up exchange in July 1969the Nixon administration plainly sum-marized its own understanding of theterm OgraveintroductionOacute OgraveWhen Israel saysit will not introduce nuclear weapons itmeans it will not possess such weaponsOacuteThe Nixon administration wanted Israelto accept the US definition but the Meirgovernment didnOtildet take the bait andinstead claimed OgraveIntroduction means

the transformation from a non-nuclearweapon country into a nuclear weaponcountryOacute (Department of State 1969a)In other words Israel construed itspledge not to be the first to introducenuclear weapons to mean that that intro-duction was not about physical posses-sion but about public acknowledgementof that possession

Kissinger saw a way out of the dis-agreement He informed PresidentNixon that what the Israelis had donewas to Ogravedefine the word OcircintroductionOtildeby relating it to the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty]Oacute KissingerOtildes argu-ment was that the Ogravedistinction betweenOcircnuclear-weaponOtilde and Ocircnon-nuclear-weaponOtilde states is the one which theNPT uses in defining the respective obli-gations of the signatoriesOacute By arguingthat the NPT negotiations Ograveimplicitlyleft it up to the conscience of the gov-ernments involvedOacute by being Ogravedeliber-ately vague on what precise step wouldtransform a state into a nuclear weaponstate after the January 1 1967 cut-off dateused in the treaty to define the nuclearstatesOacute and by arguing that the NPT doesnot define what it means to Ogravemanufac-tureOacute or OgraveacquireOacute nuclear weapons Kis-singer concluded that the new Israeliformulation Ograveshould put us in a positionfor the record of being able to say weassume we have IsraelOtildes assurance that itwill remain a non-nuclear state as definedin the NPTOacute (White House 1969b 1)

KissingerOtildes disingenuous interpret-ation provided the United States with away out of a diplomatic dilemma via atacit understanding between Nixon andMeir that the United States would nolonger pressure Israel to sign the NuclearNon-Proliferation Treaty as long as theIsraelis kept their program restrainedand invisibleNtildemeaning that Israel
















The nuclear alert















How many warheads






LAND-BASED MISSLES



SEA-BASED MISSLES



RANGE (KM) COMMENT

AIRCRAFT



















Warhead designs






















Land-based missiles






















































Notes













References



















































































Author biographies


















The nuclear alert















How many warheads






LAND-BASED MISSLES



SEA-BASED MISSLES



RANGE (KM) COMMENT

AIRCRAFT



















Warhead designs






















Land-based missiles






















































Notes













References



















































































Author biographies















How many warheads






LAND-BASED MISSLES



SEA-BASED MISSLES



RANGE (KM) COMMENT

AIRCRAFT



















Warhead designs






















Land-based missiles






















































Notes













References



















































































Author biographies



















Warhead designs






















Land-based missiles






















































Notes













References



















































































Author biographies





















Land-based missiles






















































Notes













References



















































































Author biographies






















































Notes













References



















































































Author biographies












References



















































































Author biographies





































































Author biographies



