bt~s) igent of state ~: bactae~ detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptwstt(83 8w. (11 august 1970rrer...
TRANSCRIPT
l)II[, tj SXRARAASII:IG~E' IGBt~s)
11 AUGUST 1970
SANTIAGO f Q Dept of Stale, RPS/IpgMaqP Bas(Q~aa~
TO: D I RECTOR
RECO 11 AUGI -2220Z Q j
THE FOLLCMING IS FOR PASSAGE TO CRIMMINS FROM AMB KORRY
F'OR CRIMMINS FRCM KORRY
1. PERNIIT I'lE THREE QUICK C(NNENTS'Q
A. SINCE I SEE VERY LITTLE POSSIBILIIIMF. A DllLY-
ELECTED AND INAUGURATED . VERLURGltIN s I DO
RGI REGAROL AS A VERY RE~IS1' IO
ALT ERN AT IVE.
B. THIS OPTION SHOULD BE REALISTICALLY CONSIDERED~
~
+AFT' THE
LECT IONS AND PR.IOR T..O. .ZMIIZiURATJON
C. THE PROHIBITIONS I.'lioOSED BY THE DEPT ON THIS
ENBf +NAKE NY FOLLOWING
CCNNENTS OF DUBIOUS VALUE SINCE THEY DO NOT ENCONPASS
FIRN KNOWLEDGE OF THE THINKING OF KEY NENA
2. IF ALLENDE IS INAUGURATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS,
IT IS THE CT ESTINATE THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE
WILL PREVAIL. NILITARY INPLIES AHIIY SINCE WITHOUT THE
EXPLICIT OR INPLI'CIT SUPPORT OF THE ARN Y, THE OTHERS
(CARABINEROS, NAVY AND AIR FORCE) CAN DO NOTHING COHERENT ~
ONCE CONGRESS ELECTED ALLENDE, THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND
RDER TO A CONDITION OF CHAOS COULD BE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE
INPLUSE FOR ARMY INTERVENTION. OR 'SUCH CHAOS TO ENSUE, THE
CONDITIONS OR NOTIVATIONS FOR NI RY OVER M ~JQLEQDE
ent of StateBactae~ Detsg~:12srrr '2 21
/ ~nptWstt(83 8w .( 11 AUGUST 1970
rRER RARrlA22$
TO: DIRECTOR
5
gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202
3
THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR PASSAGE TO CRIMMINS FROM AMB KORRY
FOR CRIMMINS FRCM KORRY
1 ~ PERMIT NE THREE QUICK CelNENTS
A. SINCE I SEE VERY LITTLE POSSIBILLLXMF. A DULY-
l'L ELECTED AND INAUGURATED t' F - V ZLHMIslNs I DO
AS A VERY RE ISTIC
N
B. THIS OPTION SHOULD BE REALISTICALLY CONSIDERED
l ILFT~ THE
LECTIONS Af&D PRIOR IO. .JMIISURATION.C. THE PROHIBITIONS::;POSED BY THE DEPT ON THIS
SA RL IEIAKE NY FOLLOWING
CNIIENTS OF DUBIOUS VALUE SINCE THEY DO NOT ENCONPASS
FIRN KNOIAILEDGE OF THE THINKING OF KEY IAIEN.
2. IF ALLENDE IS INAUGURATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS,
IT IS THE CT ESTIN ATE THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE
CONDITIONS OR IAIOTIVATIONS FOR NI RY OVER /~~~/DEWILL PREVAIL. I'1ILITARY INPLIES ARIAIY SINCE WITHOUT THE
EXPLICIT OR INPLI'CIT SUPPORT OF THE ARN Ys THE OTHERS
(CARABINEROSR NAVY AND AIR FORCE) CAN DO NOTHING COHERENT.
ONCE CONGRESS ELECTED ALLENDE, THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND
ORDER TO A CONDITION OF CHAOS COULD BE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE
INPLUSE FOR ARN Y INTERVENTION. FOR 'SUCH CHAOS TO ENSUE 2 THE/~IIIIIllII&(lj:IE
PAGE 2
NGlhSSIBED
SUPPORTERS OF ALESSANDRI WOULD HAVE TO FONENT A SERIOUS AND
COORDINATED CHALLENGE TO THE FREI GOVERNNENT 'S AUTHORITY AND
FREI WOULD HAVE TO PLAY THE DELIBERATE RO1 E OF INPOTENT OR
CON ~ IIIER. WHILE SUCH A SCENARIO IS HQT INPOSSIBLE, IT ISHIGHLY UIILIKELY QflCE THE CONGRES ELECTD ALLENDE. AN AI TFHPT
TO ROB ALLENDE OF HIS TRIi/NPH BY, SAY, A GENERAL VIAUX. WHO
HAS A CERTAIN 1Y1YSTIQUE WITHIN THE ARNY, WOULD ALL LIXE1.IHOO
FAIL Itl A POST-CQNGRESSSIQHAL DECISION PERIDQ AND BE AIPIOSI
Ii'1POSSIBLE POST-INAUGURATION Ul'1LESS ALLENDE IF!PRUDENTLY AND
UNEXPECTEDLY AROUSED APIY ANINUS BY FLOUTING ITS INSTITUTION-
ALITY.
3. IN CONSIDERING ALL THE PERNUTATIONS, THREE SEPARATE
I INE FRANES 1Y1UST BE KEPT IN VIEW: SEPT 5 OCT 24 WHEN THE
CONGRESS BEGINS ITS ELECTORAL DELIBERATIONS; FRON NOV. n ON WHEN
ALLENDE IS PRESIDENT.
4. FURTHER ASSU1I1PTIO OSSLBLE MILITARY INFLUENCES
OR ACTIOIIS INCLliDE THAI ALLENDE FINISHES FIRST BY A NAR GIN
OP I-SS THAN IBB MB OR THAT HE FINISHES SECOND BY LESS'I HAN IBB,BBB. IIF HE HAS ItlE EIESI .HAJQREI Y BY NORE THAN
1MBMS IT WI BE AIIY1 OST I1IIPOSS/QLE FOR CONGRESS T 0 OVERTURN.
HIS E EC EQUALLY UNLIXELY THAT INTERVENTION BY ANY"
T ~~ F ~~ E~CllULD Hg T~IS INAUGURATION AND PRESIDENCY1
ALIE~RNA III v~HE LOSES BY NORE THAN IBB,BBB HE NAS LIT~E
IJHCLASSIHEB
~mtLhsQHEB
SANTIAGOW~
I HOPE OF OVERTURNING THE ELECTORAL ORDER; IF HIS FORCES SOUGHT
TO DO SO, IT IS LIKELY THEY.„WOULD B~R~ATJQ. FARY'MNHHECONGRESS AND IF NOT THERE THEN POSSIBLY BY NILITARY INTER-
VENTION. )
5. DOUBTLESS THERE ARE NANY ACTIVE OFFICERS PERSONALLY
OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF AN ALLENDE PRESIDENCY. THE HAS
REPORTED HIS VIEWS AND HAS PUT
FORWARD THE COINCIDENTAL NAMES OF ft 0 WWI CH COULD BE ADDED
A COiliSIDERA BLE NU('i GER OF OThER OFFI CERS. HOWEVER WE ARE NOT
CONSIDERING VIEWS BUT Tj5E WILL..AN@. THE CAPACITY TO ACT AND
TO CONTROC.
6. THE D(ÃINANT FIGURE IN THE ARNY TCDAY IS GEN
SCHNEIDER. THE SCHNEIDER DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION AND
OF ACCEPT ANCE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DECI SION T 0 NAME EIT HER
OF THE FIRST TWO CANDTDATES~HBEEII~W. EL+ ADDESZED.
SCHNEIDER IS THE ONE CHILEAN -GENERAL FOR:WHOili FREI SAID TO
N E HE HO DS NY .RESP CT' 'I AN PERSUADED SCHNEIDER NODSCONTROVERSIAL STATENENT WITH THE FULL KNO tLOT~R55PT-
~ING OF I AN FURTHER PEIISUADED THAT OIIE PURPOSE IIAS TO
MAINTAIN THE INSTITUTIONAL UNITY OF THE ARNY AT A DIFFICULT
TINE (AND WITH A VI AUX IN THE WINGS) AND THAT THIS AIiwi IS.I
e&NMl~P.
PAGE IIllKLESSIFIPP
SANTIAGO t
t: 3INCREASINGLY UNDERSTOOD WITHIN THE ARNY; I AN CONVINCED THAT
SCHNEIDER HAD TONIC IN NIND AS POSSIBLE QECQSLDR ALLENDE
AS A FIRST IIIHEN HE ISSUED HIS STATENENI~ND WISHED TO KEEP
~OPE 'I~OTJJlNS T~EFE'~~NEIDER RELATIONSHIP- IS.THEREFOREA CRUCIAL ELENENT ABOUT .WHICH WE KNOM~TLE.
7N THE FREI-SCHNEIDER GANBI 0 HELP TONI AND TO KEEP
I HE ARN Y UNITED AND. . APOLITICAL. .HAS INCREASE PRESSURES
ON THE POLITICIANS WHO WILL HAVE TO VOTE IN CONGRESS STARTING
OCT. 24TH. IT SHOULD NEAN THAT THE ARNY WILL GUARANTEE ORDER
UNTIL THAI NOTE ST)LETS,AND IHATMI )YELL NOT ~NQT PER)LIT
N OB NUSCLE OT DISRUPT THE COI)L~~~~IP.B. IF I'IY ASSIISPT IO S NEEDER RE TION.—
SHIP lIRE CDRRECT, THE)I IF )ILLENDE SHOULD NIII THE FIRST
N AJORITY BY LESS THAN 188,888, THE NORE OR LESS UNIT D AHOY
WIIL ASSURE AT LEAST AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE CONGRESS TO BLOCK
ALLENDE 'S ASCENDANCY BY ELECTION OF N ERUP. IT ISCONCEIVABLE TOO THAT THE ARN Y NIGHT TAKE CERTAIN SYNOD jCACTIONS FOLLOWING THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE TO PUT ITS STANP OF
APPROVAL ON THE NEWLY CHOSEN PRESIDENT PRIOR TO INAUGURATIONS.
9- IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT FREI HAS TOLD VISITORS THAT
IF ALLENDE WINS THE FIRST NAJCR ITY THERE WILL BE A "GOLPE DE
ESTIIDO" INITHOIII DEFIIIING IF THE ARNED FORCES GOULD ACI
L)NILATERALLY OR Gtl HIS Ul)GING). IlITHUIII ANY FACTIll)L SIIHST)iH-
PAGE 5
SANTIAGO P3
TIAT ION, I BE1.IEVE THIS LEAKING T 0 BE ELECTORAL IN PURPOSE.
I GUESS THAT FREI IS SPREADING THE WORD IN ORDER TO .AFFECT
THE SEPT. 4TH VOTING AND THAT HE HAS CALCULATED THAT BOTH THE
I NTERNATIONAL PRESS AND THE MARXIST-LENIg)ISIS HERE WOULD
PUBLICIZE THIS POSSIBILITY +S~jgg BOTH HAVE. I RECKON
FREI BELIEVES THAT THIS BROPAGANDA-CONJURING MIGHT DISSUADE
SOME DISPOSED TO VOTE FOR ALLENDE. IT COULD CO CI~
WHAT HE SAYS BUT I HAVE NO RPT NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT ~
IN. THE CONOITIONN TIIAT CIIRRENTLY NREYAII~NTHE ANNE Y
M AKE DOUBTFUL ANY EFFECTIVE AiNY MOVE TO~C~LLEHQZ.WHILE YOUNGER OFFICERS MIGHT WANT ACTION FOR ACTION'S SAKE,
AND WHILE SCME MIGHT ACCURATELY CALCULATE THAT SUCH ACTION
W OULD DOUBTLESS LEAD T 0 GREATER RESPONSIBILITY, GREATER
POWER AND GREATER STAT USE THERE IS DOUBT ABOUT THE TROOPS .
WILLINGNESS TO FOLLOW THEIR OFFICERS FOR SUCH A PURPOSE AND
THERE IS SAID TO BE CONSIDERABLE ALLENDE .SENTIMENT AMONG
THE NON-COMS OR AT THE VERY MINIMUM AN UNWILLINGNESS TO
OBSTRUCT- HIM. THE PART ISAN FACTIONA1, ISM OF HIGHER OFFICERS
ACTS TO REINFORCE THEIR GENERAL RELUCTANCE AND INCAPACITY TO
GOVERN .11~ IN ORDER TO REVE S S OUT OOK A GROUP OF
OFFICERS WOULD BE REINED TJ3 (A).. .P~N ~ZECT IVE TAKEOVER
WIIHOIJI THE KN IO( LEOG EOP GCHWEIOEH ~~ll (O) EXPLOIT
A CONTRIVED OR UNEXPECTED 0
BY A SIGNIFICANT PART F THE T IONA E
FOR A GOLPE ~ WHILE THE OOD MAN
ALESSANDRISTAS ARE PLAYING WITH THIS IDEA, I,THINK IT A NON-
STARTER WITHOUT THE BLESSING OF FREI IMPLICIT HO~EX ICIT,AND WITHOUT OUTSIDE SUPPORT IN THE F'ORM OF TECHNICAL ASSIST-
ANCE OR POLITICAL ACTION. WE ARE EXCLUDING ANY FOREIGN
TROOP HYPOTHESIS.
12. WHILE ALL SORTS OF CARIBBEAN CABALS CAN BE PLOTTED
AND WE HAVE INDULGED IN SPINNING S(ME OUT, THEY STRIKE l'lE AS
FANCIFUL AND REALLY UNPLANNABLE BECAUSE OF THE ARI'lY'5 CON-
DITION AND BECAUSE OF CHILE PARTICULARITIES. I. REMAINUNSWAYED, IN MY VIEW THAT FREI IS A CRITICAL AND DOMINANT
FIGURE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE HE IS PRESIDENT BUT BECAUSE HE ISTHE MOST POPULAR AND THEREFORE AND MOST INF'LUENTIAL .POLITICIANIN CHILE THIS JUDPlENT SHOULD NOT BE READ AS IMPLYING THAT
FREI HAS THE GUTS TO.TAKE HARD DECISIONS; INDEED, HIS PRO-
CLIVITY IS TO TRANSACT AND TO AVOID UNPLEASANTNESS UNLESS HE
IS PUSHED.
PAGE 7
WI', LISSIPIH)
THE CRUCIAL
PERIOD IS SEPT ~ 5 TO OCT 24 WHEN VARIOUS PERTINENT POSSIBILITIES
A. IF WE ASSUNE ALLENDE HAS WON BY LESS THEN
IBB,BBB THEN HIS SIIPPORTERS HAVE A KEEN ItfTEREST Itf
AVOIDING ANY NILIIARY INTERVENTION THAT VOII D ROB THEN jtPP
OF THEIR ELECTORAL TRIUNPH. IF TONIC WERE SECOND QQ
ALLENDE COULD ONLY BE BLOCKED FRCN THE PRESIDENCY BY
THE NACIONALES AND/OR DISSIDENT RADICA VOTING FOR
TUNIC. F I WOULD PULL OUI ALL Sl'OPS FOR T IHIC AND
WOULD PREDICT SEEK OUR ND THE ARN Y'S SUPPORT IN
APPLYING PRESSURES.
B. IF ALESSANDRI VERE SECOND, W FACE AN EXTRA-
ORDINARY STEN-WINDER. ALESS D L
ACCEPT THE WINNER OF THE FIRST NAJOR IIV 'AS DEFINITIVE ~
THE NACIONALES HAVE SAID THEY WOULD VOTE FOR THE NAN
VHO HAD THE FIRST NAJORITY. THUS THESE PLEDGES WOULD
VE TO BE IGNORED AND MOREOVER THE. PDC VOULD HAVE T 0
THROW THEIR VOTES 0
WERE NOT TO BECENE PRESIDENT.
"j C
AUG 9 TO SPECULATE INTE HYP OT HET ICAL
SITUATION. H NOTED THAT IF ALE SSANDRI VERE ELECTED BY
Ml,'Lt,BSEBPAGE 8
SANTiAGOP
CONGRESS THE QLD NAtl CQIILll KEEP HIS ELECTORAL PLEDGE TO
RESPECT THE FIRST NAJO Z.~PT THE
PRESIDENCY. IALESSANDRI MAS ALIIAYS SAID HE WOULD tlQT
SEEX TO GOVERN WITHOUT EFFECTIVE SUPPORT AND SUCH
RENUNCIATION WOULD ALSO BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS VIEW. )
I F ALESSANDRI REFUSED THE CON'GRESSIONAL WILL THEN
ACCORDING TO PABLO, NEW ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE CALLED
WITii TIIE PRESIDENT OF THE SENA~TE CTIIIG AS IIITERIll
FRESIDEllT. FREI MQULD BE A CANDIDATE IM THE MEW
ELECTION AND WOULD SURELY WIN AN OVEBJQKLtL~~~JILIT Y
(AND PABLO WOULD HAVE REACHED THE HE .GREGISTERED IN HISTORY AS ONE OF CHILE'S PRE ENTS. )
IN OTHER WORDS, THERE WOULD BE A DEAL BETWEEN NACIONALES
AND PDC TO BLOCX ALLENDE AND T 0 RE-ELECT FREI. THE SUP-
PORT OF SCHNEIDER AND THE ARNY IN THE FACE OF CERTAIN7
8 AGEIST NOB IIIOLENCE, GENERAL STRIKES AND NIR CRIMES
W OULD, OF COURSE, BE ESSENTIAL, SO WOULD OUR FINAN IAL
RESOURCES INTELLIGENCE DATA AND COVERT NORALY SUPPORT.
C. I ALLEHDE WERE TO FINISH SECOND Wll'HIN 188 888V OTES OF ALESSANDRI THE PROBLEM IS NO LESS COMPLEX ~
THERE WOULD BE PERHAPS A THIRD OF THE CHRISTIAN DENOCRATES
(THAT IS UP TO 25) IN THE CONGRESS DISPOSED TO VOTE FOR
~;,a tllIB((l)IE
CALLENDE AND THERE MIGHT BE SOME ORTHODOX RADICALS PRE-
PllRED TO ASANDOtt IILLENDE IN THE SECllET D T. UNLESS
FREI AND HIS LIEUTENANTS WERE I 0 EXERC~ISE LL OF THEIR
INFLUENCE WITHIN THE PARTY AND UNLESS ALL EVENS OF
PRESSURE WERE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE RADICALS E
ALLENDE FORCES WOULD PREV IL. (PERHAPS THIS IS THE
PLACE TO INTERPOSE A JUDPlENT ON TCMIC. IF HE FINISHES
WELL BEHIND THE OTHER TWO F UENCE IN THE PDCW ILL BE CONSIDERABLE; BUT IF TONIC IS THIRD BY A COM-
FARAT 1VEL Y EMAALL NUMBER OF VOTES THE R CR IM INATIONS
AGAINSI FREI BY TK TOMICISTAS WILL 13E 'BITTER AND T IR
, INO INAT IONS (ING. UDI NG TONIC'S) TO FIGHT FREI AND TO
HELP ALLENDE W ILL BE VERY POWERFUL. )14. NO ONE HERE CAN CONCEIVE OF ANY SUPPO
FCR A U. S. ROLE STRICTLY lI TO HE M'
ITARY
GIUElt tISONE. ANO NITHQIII A U. S. TACTICAL ROLE, NE HIND IT
DITPICILT I 0 SUGGEST ltHIII [ M IGHT D 0; THEYW ISH US TO TELL I IME.
15. BUT AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET
"THERE, 'I CONTINUE TO
BELIEVE THAT T HE U. S. DOES HAVE AN OPPORT T A
CONSTR UCI IV E AND EFFECT IVE ROLE I N WHICH THE MILITARY WOULD
B~EI t~OED. IT IS BECAUSE WE HAVE THE POWER TO INFLUENCE
s ~ tiKSMfBGE 11
SANT1ACO (3
FAM IL IAR POPULAR UNITY TUNE OF THE OTHER SIDE. FROM
CABINET M INISTERS WHO ACCOMPANIED FPEI ON THE L2 HOUR INAUGUR-
AT ION OF EL TEN IENTE ' S EXPANSION SATURDAY, I HEARD URGINGS'
THAT I HE CASTRO ADMISSION OF' FAILURE BE PLAYED TO THE HII T.l 7. OLD ME THAT THE CRITICAL T IME FRAME WILL
FCR CONGRESSIONAL VOTES BEGINS. fj )illI
l
THE DEPT 'S DESIRE TO PROTECT DENT AND THE EMBASSY
TO T HE MAX IMPl EXTENT FROM AND EXPOSURE. /MY OWN VIEW IS THAT
I HE USUAL ALTER NAT IVE S-fBE INCOMPATIBLE V ITH I HE
V OULD /'
SIT UATION AND MORE RI OF FAILURE
AND EXPOSURE THAT .ANYT HING I MIGHT DO. TO RECONCIL
TWO PREOCOu)P7M)- ~
Ql
SECRET'PAGE 12
9')
77.
28. T IE POINT OF THIS PROPOSAL IS TO NAKE THE EFFORT A
CHILEAII ONE IINO TO REOIICE U. O. EXPONIIRE POTENTIAL TO THE
GP- I
END OF MESSAGE
SECRET
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