bt~s) igent of state ~: bactae~ detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptwstt(83 8w. (11 august 1970rrer...

14
l)II[, tj SX RARAASII:IG~E' IG Bt~s) 11 AUGUST 1970 SANTIAGO f Q Dept of Stale, RPS/IpgMaqP B as(Q~aa~ TO: D I RECTOR RECO 11 AUGI -2220Z Q j THE FOLLCMING IS FOR PASSAGE TO CRIMMINS FROM AMB KORRY F' OR CRIMMINS FRCM KORRY 1. PERNIIT I'lE THREE QUICK C(NNENTS'Q A. SINCE I SEE VERY LITTLE POSSIBILIIIMF. A DllLY- ELECTED AND INAUGURATED . VERLURGltIN s I DO RGI REGAROL AS A VERY RE~IS1' IO ALT ERN AT IVE. B. THIS OPTION SHOULD BE REALISTICALLY CONSIDERED ~ ~ +AFT' THE LECT IONS AND PR.IOR T. . O. .ZMIIZiURATJON C. THE PROHIBITIONS I. 'lioOSED BY THE DEPT ON THIS ENB f +NAKE NY FOLLOWING CCNNENTS OF DUBIOUS VALUE SINCE THEY DO NOT ENCONPASS FIRN KNOWLEDGE OF THE THINKING OF KEY NENA 2. IF ALLENDE IS INAUGURATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS, IT IS THE CT ESTINATE THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE WILL PREVAIL. NILITARY INPLIES AHIIY SINCE WITHOUT THE EXPLICIT OR INPLI'CIT SUPPORT OF THE ARN Y, THE OTHERS (CARABINEROS, NAVY AND AIR FORCE) CAN DO NOTHING COHERENT ~ ONCE CONGRESS ELECTED ALLENDE, THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND RDER TO A CONDITION OF CHAOS COULD BE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE INPLUSE FOR ARMY INTERVENTION. OR 'SUCH CHAOS TO ENSUE, THE CONDITIONS OR NOTIVATIONS FOR NI RY OVER M ~JQLEQDE

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Page 1: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

l)II[, tj SXRARAASII:IG~E' IGBt~s)

11 AUGUST 1970

SANTIAGO f Q Dept of Stale, RPS/IpgMaqP Bas(Q~aa~

TO: D I RECTOR

RECO 11 AUGI -2220Z Q j

THE FOLLCMING IS FOR PASSAGE TO CRIMMINS FROM AMB KORRY

F'OR CRIMMINS FRCM KORRY

1. PERNIIT I'lE THREE QUICK C(NNENTS'Q

A. SINCE I SEE VERY LITTLE POSSIBILIIIMF. A DllLY-

ELECTED AND INAUGURATED . VERLURGltIN s I DO

RGI REGAROL AS A VERY RE~IS1' IO

ALT ERN AT IVE.

B. THIS OPTION SHOULD BE REALISTICALLY CONSIDERED~

~

+AFT' THE

LECT IONS AND PR.IOR T..O. .ZMIIZiURATJON

C. THE PROHIBITIONS I.'lioOSED BY THE DEPT ON THIS

ENBf +NAKE NY FOLLOWING

CCNNENTS OF DUBIOUS VALUE SINCE THEY DO NOT ENCONPASS

FIRN KNOWLEDGE OF THE THINKING OF KEY NENA

2. IF ALLENDE IS INAUGURATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS,

IT IS THE CT ESTINATE THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE

WILL PREVAIL. NILITARY INPLIES AHIIY SINCE WITHOUT THE

EXPLICIT OR INPLI'CIT SUPPORT OF THE ARN Y, THE OTHERS

(CARABINEROS, NAVY AND AIR FORCE) CAN DO NOTHING COHERENT ~

ONCE CONGRESS ELECTED ALLENDE, THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND

RDER TO A CONDITION OF CHAOS COULD BE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE

INPLUSE FOR ARMY INTERVENTION. OR 'SUCH CHAOS TO ENSUE, THE

CONDITIONS OR NOTIVATIONS FOR NI RY OVER M ~JQLEQDE

Page 2: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

ent of StateBactae~ Detsg~:12srrr '2 21

/ ~nptWstt(83 8w .( 11 AUGUST 1970

rRER RARrlA22$

TO: DIRECTOR

5

gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202

3

THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR PASSAGE TO CRIMMINS FROM AMB KORRY

FOR CRIMMINS FRCM KORRY

1 ~ PERMIT NE THREE QUICK CelNENTS

A. SINCE I SEE VERY LITTLE POSSIBILLLXMF. A DULY-

l'L ELECTED AND INAUGURATED t' F - V ZLHMIslNs I DO

AS A VERY RE ISTIC

N

B. THIS OPTION SHOULD BE REALISTICALLY CONSIDERED

l ILFT~ THE

LECTIONS Af&D PRIOR IO. .JMIISURATION.C. THE PROHIBITIONS::;POSED BY THE DEPT ON THIS

SA RL IEIAKE NY FOLLOWING

CNIIENTS OF DUBIOUS VALUE SINCE THEY DO NOT ENCONPASS

FIRN KNOIAILEDGE OF THE THINKING OF KEY IAIEN.

2. IF ALLENDE IS INAUGURATED BY CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS,

IT IS THE CT ESTIN ATE THAT IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT THE

CONDITIONS OR IAIOTIVATIONS FOR NI RY OVER /~~~/DEWILL PREVAIL. I'1ILITARY INPLIES ARIAIY SINCE WITHOUT THE

EXPLICIT OR INPLI'CIT SUPPORT OF THE ARN Ys THE OTHERS

(CARABINEROSR NAVY AND AIR FORCE) CAN DO NOTHING COHERENT.

ONCE CONGRESS ELECTED ALLENDE, THE BREAKDOWN OF LAW AND

ORDER TO A CONDITION OF CHAOS COULD BE THE ONLY EFFECTIVE

INPLUSE FOR ARN Y INTERVENTION. FOR 'SUCH CHAOS TO ENSUE 2 THE/~IIIIIllII&(lj:IE

Page 3: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

PAGE 2

NGlhSSIBED

SUPPORTERS OF ALESSANDRI WOULD HAVE TO FONENT A SERIOUS AND

COORDINATED CHALLENGE TO THE FREI GOVERNNENT 'S AUTHORITY AND

FREI WOULD HAVE TO PLAY THE DELIBERATE RO1 E OF INPOTENT OR

CON ~ IIIER. WHILE SUCH A SCENARIO IS HQT INPOSSIBLE, IT ISHIGHLY UIILIKELY QflCE THE CONGRES ELECTD ALLENDE. AN AI TFHPT

TO ROB ALLENDE OF HIS TRIi/NPH BY, SAY, A GENERAL VIAUX. WHO

HAS A CERTAIN 1Y1YSTIQUE WITHIN THE ARNY, WOULD ALL LIXE1.IHOO

FAIL Itl A POST-CQNGRESSSIQHAL DECISION PERIDQ AND BE AIPIOSI

Ii'1POSSIBLE POST-INAUGURATION Ul'1LESS ALLENDE IF!PRUDENTLY AND

UNEXPECTEDLY AROUSED APIY ANINUS BY FLOUTING ITS INSTITUTION-

ALITY.

3. IN CONSIDERING ALL THE PERNUTATIONS, THREE SEPARATE

I INE FRANES 1Y1UST BE KEPT IN VIEW: SEPT 5 OCT 24 WHEN THE

CONGRESS BEGINS ITS ELECTORAL DELIBERATIONS; FRON NOV. n ON WHEN

ALLENDE IS PRESIDENT.

4. FURTHER ASSU1I1PTIO OSSLBLE MILITARY INFLUENCES

OR ACTIOIIS INCLliDE THAI ALLENDE FINISHES FIRST BY A NAR GIN

OP I-SS THAN IBB MB OR THAT HE FINISHES SECOND BY LESS'I HAN IBB,BBB. IIF HE HAS ItlE EIESI .HAJQREI Y BY NORE THAN

1MBMS IT WI BE AIIY1 OST I1IIPOSS/QLE FOR CONGRESS T 0 OVERTURN.

HIS E EC EQUALLY UNLIXELY THAT INTERVENTION BY ANY"

T ~~ F ~~ E~CllULD Hg T~IS INAUGURATION AND PRESIDENCY1

ALIE~RNA III v~HE LOSES BY NORE THAN IBB,BBB HE NAS LIT~E

IJHCLASSIHEB

Page 4: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

~mtLhsQHEB

SANTIAGOW~

I HOPE OF OVERTURNING THE ELECTORAL ORDER; IF HIS FORCES SOUGHT

TO DO SO, IT IS LIKELY THEY.„WOULD B~R~ATJQ. FARY'MNHHECONGRESS AND IF NOT THERE THEN POSSIBLY BY NILITARY INTER-

VENTION. )

5. DOUBTLESS THERE ARE NANY ACTIVE OFFICERS PERSONALLY

OPPOSED TO THE IDEA OF AN ALLENDE PRESIDENCY. THE HAS

REPORTED HIS VIEWS AND HAS PUT

FORWARD THE COINCIDENTAL NAMES OF ft 0 WWI CH COULD BE ADDED

A COiliSIDERA BLE NU('i GER OF OThER OFFI CERS. HOWEVER WE ARE NOT

CONSIDERING VIEWS BUT Tj5E WILL..AN@. THE CAPACITY TO ACT AND

TO CONTROC.

6. THE D(ÃINANT FIGURE IN THE ARNY TCDAY IS GEN

SCHNEIDER. THE SCHNEIDER DOCTRINE OF NON-INTERVENTION AND

OF ACCEPT ANCE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL DECI SION T 0 NAME EIT HER

OF THE FIRST TWO CANDTDATES~HBEEII~W. EL+ ADDESZED.

SCHNEIDER IS THE ONE CHILEAN -GENERAL FOR:WHOili FREI SAID TO

N E HE HO DS NY .RESP CT' 'I AN PERSUADED SCHNEIDER NODSCONTROVERSIAL STATENENT WITH THE FULL KNO tLOT~R55PT-

~ING OF I AN FURTHER PEIISUADED THAT OIIE PURPOSE IIAS TO

MAINTAIN THE INSTITUTIONAL UNITY OF THE ARNY AT A DIFFICULT

TINE (AND WITH A VI AUX IN THE WINGS) AND THAT THIS AIiwi IS.I

e&NMl~P.

Page 5: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

PAGE IIllKLESSIFIPP

SANTIAGO t

t: 3INCREASINGLY UNDERSTOOD WITHIN THE ARNY; I AN CONVINCED THAT

SCHNEIDER HAD TONIC IN NIND AS POSSIBLE QECQSLDR ALLENDE

AS A FIRST IIIHEN HE ISSUED HIS STATENENI~ND WISHED TO KEEP

~OPE 'I~OTJJlNS T~EFE'~~NEIDER RELATIONSHIP- IS.THEREFOREA CRUCIAL ELENENT ABOUT .WHICH WE KNOM~TLE.

7N THE FREI-SCHNEIDER GANBI 0 HELP TONI AND TO KEEP

I HE ARN Y UNITED AND. . APOLITICAL. .HAS INCREASE PRESSURES

ON THE POLITICIANS WHO WILL HAVE TO VOTE IN CONGRESS STARTING

OCT. 24TH. IT SHOULD NEAN THAT THE ARNY WILL GUARANTEE ORDER

UNTIL THAI NOTE ST)LETS,AND IHATMI )YELL NOT ~NQT PER)LIT

N OB NUSCLE OT DISRUPT THE COI)L~~~~IP.B. IF I'IY ASSIISPT IO S NEEDER RE TION.—

SHIP lIRE CDRRECT, THE)I IF )ILLENDE SHOULD NIII THE FIRST

N AJORITY BY LESS THAN 188,888, THE NORE OR LESS UNIT D AHOY

WIIL ASSURE AT LEAST AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE CONGRESS TO BLOCK

ALLENDE 'S ASCENDANCY BY ELECTION OF N ERUP. IT ISCONCEIVABLE TOO THAT THE ARN Y NIGHT TAKE CERTAIN SYNOD jCACTIONS FOLLOWING THE CONGRESSIONAL VOTE TO PUT ITS STANP OF

APPROVAL ON THE NEWLY CHOSEN PRESIDENT PRIOR TO INAUGURATIONS.

9- IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT FREI HAS TOLD VISITORS THAT

IF ALLENDE WINS THE FIRST NAJCR ITY THERE WILL BE A "GOLPE DE

ESTIIDO" INITHOIII DEFIIIING IF THE ARNED FORCES GOULD ACI

L)NILATERALLY OR Gtl HIS Ul)GING). IlITHUIII ANY FACTIll)L SIIHST)iH-

Page 6: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

PAGE 5

SANTIAGO P3

TIAT ION, I BE1.IEVE THIS LEAKING T 0 BE ELECTORAL IN PURPOSE.

I GUESS THAT FREI IS SPREADING THE WORD IN ORDER TO .AFFECT

THE SEPT. 4TH VOTING AND THAT HE HAS CALCULATED THAT BOTH THE

I NTERNATIONAL PRESS AND THE MARXIST-LENIg)ISIS HERE WOULD

PUBLICIZE THIS POSSIBILITY +S~jgg BOTH HAVE. I RECKON

FREI BELIEVES THAT THIS BROPAGANDA-CONJURING MIGHT DISSUADE

SOME DISPOSED TO VOTE FOR ALLENDE. IT COULD CO CI~

WHAT HE SAYS BUT I HAVE NO RPT NO EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT ~

IN. THE CONOITIONN TIIAT CIIRRENTLY NREYAII~NTHE ANNE Y

M AKE DOUBTFUL ANY EFFECTIVE AiNY MOVE TO~C~LLEHQZ.WHILE YOUNGER OFFICERS MIGHT WANT ACTION FOR ACTION'S SAKE,

AND WHILE SCME MIGHT ACCURATELY CALCULATE THAT SUCH ACTION

W OULD DOUBTLESS LEAD T 0 GREATER RESPONSIBILITY, GREATER

POWER AND GREATER STAT USE THERE IS DOUBT ABOUT THE TROOPS .

WILLINGNESS TO FOLLOW THEIR OFFICERS FOR SUCH A PURPOSE AND

THERE IS SAID TO BE CONSIDERABLE ALLENDE .SENTIMENT AMONG

THE NON-COMS OR AT THE VERY MINIMUM AN UNWILLINGNESS TO

OBSTRUCT- HIM. THE PART ISAN FACTIONA1, ISM OF HIGHER OFFICERS

ACTS TO REINFORCE THEIR GENERAL RELUCTANCE AND INCAPACITY TO

Page 7: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

GOVERN .11~ IN ORDER TO REVE S S OUT OOK A GROUP OF

OFFICERS WOULD BE REINED TJ3 (A).. .P~N ~ZECT IVE TAKEOVER

WIIHOIJI THE KN IO( LEOG EOP GCHWEIOEH ~~ll (O) EXPLOIT

A CONTRIVED OR UNEXPECTED 0

BY A SIGNIFICANT PART F THE T IONA E

FOR A GOLPE ~ WHILE THE OOD MAN

ALESSANDRISTAS ARE PLAYING WITH THIS IDEA, I,THINK IT A NON-

STARTER WITHOUT THE BLESSING OF FREI IMPLICIT HO~EX ICIT,AND WITHOUT OUTSIDE SUPPORT IN THE F'ORM OF TECHNICAL ASSIST-

ANCE OR POLITICAL ACTION. WE ARE EXCLUDING ANY FOREIGN

TROOP HYPOTHESIS.

12. WHILE ALL SORTS OF CARIBBEAN CABALS CAN BE PLOTTED

AND WE HAVE INDULGED IN SPINNING S(ME OUT, THEY STRIKE l'lE AS

FANCIFUL AND REALLY UNPLANNABLE BECAUSE OF THE ARI'lY'5 CON-

DITION AND BECAUSE OF CHILE PARTICULARITIES. I. REMAINUNSWAYED, IN MY VIEW THAT FREI IS A CRITICAL AND DOMINANT

FIGURE, NOT ONLY BECAUSE HE IS PRESIDENT BUT BECAUSE HE ISTHE MOST POPULAR AND THEREFORE AND MOST INF'LUENTIAL .POLITICIANIN CHILE THIS JUDPlENT SHOULD NOT BE READ AS IMPLYING THAT

FREI HAS THE GUTS TO.TAKE HARD DECISIONS; INDEED, HIS PRO-

CLIVITY IS TO TRANSACT AND TO AVOID UNPLEASANTNESS UNLESS HE

IS PUSHED.

Page 8: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

PAGE 7

WI', LISSIPIH)

THE CRUCIAL

PERIOD IS SEPT ~ 5 TO OCT 24 WHEN VARIOUS PERTINENT POSSIBILITIES

A. IF WE ASSUNE ALLENDE HAS WON BY LESS THEN

IBB,BBB THEN HIS SIIPPORTERS HAVE A KEEN ItfTEREST Itf

AVOIDING ANY NILIIARY INTERVENTION THAT VOII D ROB THEN jtPP

OF THEIR ELECTORAL TRIUNPH. IF TONIC WERE SECOND QQ

ALLENDE COULD ONLY BE BLOCKED FRCN THE PRESIDENCY BY

THE NACIONALES AND/OR DISSIDENT RADICA VOTING FOR

TUNIC. F I WOULD PULL OUI ALL Sl'OPS FOR T IHIC AND

WOULD PREDICT SEEK OUR ND THE ARN Y'S SUPPORT IN

APPLYING PRESSURES.

B. IF ALESSANDRI VERE SECOND, W FACE AN EXTRA-

ORDINARY STEN-WINDER. ALESS D L

ACCEPT THE WINNER OF THE FIRST NAJOR IIV 'AS DEFINITIVE ~

THE NACIONALES HAVE SAID THEY WOULD VOTE FOR THE NAN

VHO HAD THE FIRST NAJORITY. THUS THESE PLEDGES WOULD

VE TO BE IGNORED AND MOREOVER THE. PDC VOULD HAVE T 0

THROW THEIR VOTES 0

WERE NOT TO BECENE PRESIDENT.

"j C

AUG 9 TO SPECULATE INTE HYP OT HET ICAL

SITUATION. H NOTED THAT IF ALE SSANDRI VERE ELECTED BY

Page 9: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

Ml,'Lt,BSEBPAGE 8

SANTiAGOP

CONGRESS THE QLD NAtl CQIILll KEEP HIS ELECTORAL PLEDGE TO

RESPECT THE FIRST NAJO Z.~PT THE

PRESIDENCY. IALESSANDRI MAS ALIIAYS SAID HE WOULD tlQT

SEEX TO GOVERN WITHOUT EFFECTIVE SUPPORT AND SUCH

RENUNCIATION WOULD ALSO BE CONSISTENT WITH THIS VIEW. )

I F ALESSANDRI REFUSED THE CON'GRESSIONAL WILL THEN

ACCORDING TO PABLO, NEW ELECTIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE CALLED

WITii TIIE PRESIDENT OF THE SENA~TE CTIIIG AS IIITERIll

FRESIDEllT. FREI MQULD BE A CANDIDATE IM THE MEW

ELECTION AND WOULD SURELY WIN AN OVEBJQKLtL~~~JILIT Y

(AND PABLO WOULD HAVE REACHED THE HE .GREGISTERED IN HISTORY AS ONE OF CHILE'S PRE ENTS. )

IN OTHER WORDS, THERE WOULD BE A DEAL BETWEEN NACIONALES

AND PDC TO BLOCX ALLENDE AND T 0 RE-ELECT FREI. THE SUP-

PORT OF SCHNEIDER AND THE ARNY IN THE FACE OF CERTAIN7

8 AGEIST NOB IIIOLENCE, GENERAL STRIKES AND NIR CRIMES

W OULD, OF COURSE, BE ESSENTIAL, SO WOULD OUR FINAN IAL

RESOURCES INTELLIGENCE DATA AND COVERT NORALY SUPPORT.

C. I ALLEHDE WERE TO FINISH SECOND Wll'HIN 188 888V OTES OF ALESSANDRI THE PROBLEM IS NO LESS COMPLEX ~

THERE WOULD BE PERHAPS A THIRD OF THE CHRISTIAN DENOCRATES

(THAT IS UP TO 25) IN THE CONGRESS DISPOSED TO VOTE FOR

Page 10: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

~;,a tllIB((l)IE

CALLENDE AND THERE MIGHT BE SOME ORTHODOX RADICALS PRE-

PllRED TO ASANDOtt IILLENDE IN THE SECllET D T. UNLESS

FREI AND HIS LIEUTENANTS WERE I 0 EXERC~ISE LL OF THEIR

INFLUENCE WITHIN THE PARTY AND UNLESS ALL EVENS OF

PRESSURE WERE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE RADICALS E

ALLENDE FORCES WOULD PREV IL. (PERHAPS THIS IS THE

PLACE TO INTERPOSE A JUDPlENT ON TCMIC. IF HE FINISHES

WELL BEHIND THE OTHER TWO F UENCE IN THE PDCW ILL BE CONSIDERABLE; BUT IF TONIC IS THIRD BY A COM-

FARAT 1VEL Y EMAALL NUMBER OF VOTES THE R CR IM INATIONS

AGAINSI FREI BY TK TOMICISTAS WILL 13E 'BITTER AND T IR

, INO INAT IONS (ING. UDI NG TONIC'S) TO FIGHT FREI AND TO

HELP ALLENDE W ILL BE VERY POWERFUL. )14. NO ONE HERE CAN CONCEIVE OF ANY SUPPO

FCR A U. S. ROLE STRICTLY lI TO HE M'

ITARY

GIUElt tISONE. ANO NITHQIII A U. S. TACTICAL ROLE, NE HIND IT

DITPICILT I 0 SUGGEST ltHIII [ M IGHT D 0; THEYW ISH US TO TELL I IME.

15. BUT AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET

"THERE, 'I CONTINUE TO

BELIEVE THAT T HE U. S. DOES HAVE AN OPPORT T A

CONSTR UCI IV E AND EFFECT IVE ROLE I N WHICH THE MILITARY WOULD

B~EI t~OED. IT IS BECAUSE WE HAVE THE POWER TO INFLUENCE

Page 11: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

s ~ tiKSMfBGE 11

SANT1ACO (3

FAM IL IAR POPULAR UNITY TUNE OF THE OTHER SIDE. FROM

CABINET M INISTERS WHO ACCOMPANIED FPEI ON THE L2 HOUR INAUGUR-

AT ION OF EL TEN IENTE ' S EXPANSION SATURDAY, I HEARD URGINGS'

THAT I HE CASTRO ADMISSION OF' FAILURE BE PLAYED TO THE HII T.l 7. OLD ME THAT THE CRITICAL T IME FRAME WILL

FCR CONGRESSIONAL VOTES BEGINS. fj )illI

l

THE DEPT 'S DESIRE TO PROTECT DENT AND THE EMBASSY

TO T HE MAX IMPl EXTENT FROM AND EXPOSURE. /MY OWN VIEW IS THAT

I HE USUAL ALTER NAT IVE S-fBE INCOMPATIBLE V ITH I HE

V OULD /'

SIT UATION AND MORE RI OF FAILURE

AND EXPOSURE THAT .ANYT HING I MIGHT DO. TO RECONCIL

TWO PREOCOu)P7M)- ~

Ql

Page 12: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

SECRET'PAGE 12

9')

77.

Page 13: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

28. T IE POINT OF THIS PROPOSAL IS TO NAKE THE EFFORT A

CHILEAII ONE IINO TO REOIICE U. O. EXPONIIRE POTENTIAL TO THE

GP- I

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

Page 14: Bt~s) IGent of State ~: Bactae~ Detsg 12srrr '2 21 / ~nptWstt(83 8w. (11 AUGUST 1970rRER RARrlA22$ TO: DIRECTOR 5 gggfftj REED 11 ARE 22202 3 THE FOLLOAIING IS FOR …

This document is from the holdings of:

The National Security Archive

Suite 701, Gelman Library, The George Washington University

2130 H Street, NW, Washington, D.C., 20037

Phone: 202/994-7000, Fax: 202/994-7005, [email protected]

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