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actional competition

and political

development

in the

New World

dited by

E L I Z B E T H M B R U M F I E L

and

J O H N W FO X

BIQUC VC L V n

OdUS UEZ

M B R I D G E

U N I V E R S I T Y

P R E S S


2/31

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P U B L I S H E D B Y T H E P R E S S SY N D I C A T E O F T H E U N I V E R S I T Y O F C A M B R I D G E

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Factional competition and politicaldevelopmentin the New

Worid/edited by Elizabeth M. Brumfiel and John W. Fox.

p. cm. - New directions in archaeology)

I S B N O521 38400 I hardback

I Indians- Polities andgovemment.2. Political anthropology-

America.3. Social archaeology - America.

4. Indians - Antiquities.

5.America- Antiquities. I Brumfiel, Elizabeth M.

II Fox, John W., 1947- .I II Series.

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3/31

1

Factionalcompetition and

political

development in the

NewWorld:an introduction

E L I Z A B E T H M B R U M F I E L

This

volume calis attention to the importance of fac

tional

competitionas a

forc

of

social

transformation. It

rges

that factional competition is implicated in devel-

opments as diverse as the spread of ceramic technology

and maize agriculture, the origins of permanently insti-

tuted

leadership offices, the

exp nsin

and collapse of

States

and the European domination

o f

indigenous New

Wor ld peoples.

Although

this volumefocusesupon the

New Wor ld its perspective is relevant to the social

histories of other re sof thewor ldas well becauseall

non-egalitarian societies, both ancient and modern, are

shapedby the dynamics of

factional

competition. Bring-

ing

an agent-centered perspective to the study of

pol i

tical

development, this volume also contributes to a

general understanding ofsocialstabilityand change. An

agent-centered perspective maximizes the amount of

datadrawn into the analysis and thus permits the most

detailedand complete account of specificcasesofpol i

tical

continuity

and transformation.

Our

studies

o ffactional

competitionboth complement

and

critique

the

two prevailingapproaches

to prehistoric

social

change: cultural ecology and

Marxism.

Cultural

ecologyfocusesupon the dynamic interactions

o f

human

populations and their

local

environments. As a com

plement to this, the studies in this volume examine the

intemaldynamics of

local

populations, dynamics that

help to shape the strategy of resourceexploitation.

Marxist theory focuses upon the dynamics of

class

struggle: a model postulating solidaritywithin classes

and struggle between them. As a complement to

class

struggle, theessaysi nthis volume emphasize the import

ance

of conflicts

within

classesand alliances between

them.As critiques ofculturalecology and (particularly

structural)Marxism,

the studies in this volume

d emn

strate

the necessity of replacing a theory of strict

syste-

micor structural determination of human behavior

with

a theory that integrales agent-centered and system-

centered

analyses

into a single framework. Most of the

studies in this volume employ versions of an

agent-

centered practice theory developed in theworkof

Barth

(1966),Giddens (1979), and Ortner (1984).

Practice theory is especially suited to the analysis of

factional

competition.Factions are characterized by an

informal,

leader-focused organization (Nicholas 1965,

Bujra 1973, Silverman1977);thus, itseemsreasonableto

initiateanalysis by examining the goals and strategies

employedby factionleadersas

individual

social actors.

Furthermore, factions are groups whose singlefunction

appears

to be gainingaccess to limited physical and

social resources

(Bailey 1969:52), and

these

goals are

best

achieved through the application of a pragmatic,

advantage-seeking, maximizing strategy such as that

imputed

to

agents

in practice theory.

Finally,

factions

are structurally and

functionally

similar groups that

compete for

advantages

withina larger social

unit

such

as a kin group, ethnic group, village or chiefdom.

Prac

tice

theory anticipates

conflict

between

individuis

simi-

larly

positioned within society

while

cultural ecology

and

Marxism

do not. As argued below, this internal

competition supplies the dynamic for

political

devel

opment.

This

introduction

begins bydefiningfactions and fac

tionalcompetition. Then, it

discusses

the relationship

between factional competition and ecological vari

ables such as population, warfare, agricultural pro-

duction,and long-distance trade.Th i rd itproposeshow

factional

competition and

class

struggle interact to

produce the social formations discussed in the

case

studies that follow.

F o r t h

it considers how factions

and factional competition can be

identified

in the

archaeological record.

Finally,

i t examines the wider

theoretical

implications of an agent-centered per

spective.

What

are factions?

Aside from a few briefdiscussions of factions prior to

1955 (Lasswell 1931, L in ton 1936:229, French 1948,

Fenton 1955), anthropological interest in factions devel

oped as part of aneffort to expand thescopeof social

anthropology beyond the description and analysis of

formal social structure. This was accomplished rst

through

the recognition of the many

informal,

non-

corporate groups

present

in contemporary non-Western


4/31

4 Elizabeth M. Brumfiel

societies (including action groups, diques, networks,

factions, and patron-client dyads). andsecond,through

the investigation of how social structure isgeneratedby

individuis acting to maximize their self-interest given

their particularsetsofculturaland material constraints

(Whitten and Whitten 1972;Cohn 1974:40-3; Vincent

1978). From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the con

struction of modeis of

informal

groups and individual-

centered social transactions was aflourishing, if

some-

what insular, enterprise

within

social anthropology, and

factionsbecamethe object of considerable interest.

A t issue was the definition of factions (Lewis and

Dhil lon

1954;

Firth

1957; Boissevain 1964; Nicholas

1965),

whether factions served positive social functions

or were a

form

of social pathology (Siegel and Beals

1960; Schwartz 1969); the relationship between factions

and

classconflict

in

peasant

societies (Sandbrook 1972;

Alavi 1973; Gross 1973; Schryer 1977), and whether

factions were an obstruction or an

mpetus

to social

change (Bujra 1973; Silverman and Salisbury 1977).

However, this interest in factions abruptly collapsed in

the late 1970swhen anthropologists turned away from

local-level, agent-centered studies to pursue theissues

raised by the wor ldsystemsperspective. Although fac

tionshavecontinued toserveas a basicconstruct for

analyzing peasant polities (e.g., Hegland 1981; Green-

berg 1989; Munson 1989), the theoreticaldebates sur-

rounding factionshaveceased.

There are two

reasons

for resuscitating whatappears

to

be a

dead horse.

First, in the

sudden

move away

from

factions

fifteen

years

ago, a number of theoretical

issues

concerning factions were left underdeveloped or

unresolved. Second, while factional competition was

analyzed extensively in relation to contemporary

peasant

polities, its usefulness for understanding the

polities of prehistoric societies has not beenexplored.

Dealing firstwiththe most important of the unresolved

questions, we can ask, how should factions bedened

During the 1960s, factions were defined in terms of

their characteristics as a group. Factions were said to be

politically oriented conflict groups whose membership

was recruited and maintained through the efforts of a

leader

(Nicholas 1965; Bujra 1973; Silverman 1977). In

such groups, unity derives

from

ties betweenleadersand

followers; lateral ties among followers are poorly devel

oped (Nicholas 1965:28-9; Bujra 1973:134). This was

said to account for the loosely structured, personalistic

character

of factions

F i r th

1957:292). Factions were

also

said to be

based

upon calculations of self-interest

rather than moral commitment to the group (Bailey

1969:52), to be transitory groups with membership

recruited on many differentbases(Nicholas 1965), and

to be lacking in corporate property, frequent meetings,

structural

complexity,

and rules governingsuccessionto

leadership (Boissevain 1964; Bujra 1973). Explicitly or

implicitly, factions were contrasted with corporate

groups, the traditional focus of structural-functional

analysis in social anthropology.

Thesedefinitions are quite useful for investigating the

character

of factions as a type ofinformal group, but

they divert attention from the most interesting dynamic

property of factions, namely the competitive relation-

ships

between them. I f the object of investigation is to

discover how factional competitionacts as a

forc

of

social transformation, it is preferable to view factions in

terms of what they do rather than in terms of what they

are (Salisbury and Silverman 1977). Therefore, in this

volume,

factions are defined as

structurallyandfunc-

tionallysimilar groups which,byvirtueo theirsimilarity,

competefor

resources

and positions

o

power

or

prestige.

In this

definition,

factions are understood to be groups

engaged in

political

competition which are neither

classesor functionally differentiated interest groups.

The lack of structural and functionaldiTerentiation

between factions has

been

frequently noted. In a South

India village, Siegel and Beals (1960:396) found

"few

indicationsof consisten differences

between them in

terms of

policy

or kinds of people who belonged. In

Boissevain's (1964:1276) view, a faction is a loosely

ordered group inconflict wi tha similar group.

Simi-

larly,

Sandbrook (1972:111) defines a faction as a

segment

of a clientage network organized to compete

with

a unit or units ofsimilartype.

Bujra (1973:136-8) provides an excellent theoretical

account of the structural

similarity

of factions. She

explains that faction leaderscome from similar social

backgrounds because while social distance restricts

competition, social contiguityengendersit . . . Conflicts

thus often begin between people who are more socially

alike than different. Inaddition,factionleaderstend to

come from the dominant sectorsof society, since it is

these individuis who have the resources needed to

recruit large

followings.

Coming from the

same

privi-

leged

sector

of society, faction

leaders

are

likely

to

share

similarpolitical goals, and

these

goals are not

likely

to

challenge the

basic

structure of society.

Bujra

(1973:137)addsthat

leaders,

wishing to enlarge

their

followings,

will

seek

supporters in all the different

sectorsof society,claimingallegiance on many different

bases:pastor future patronage,

proximity

of

kinship,

a

common religinor ethnic identity, etc. Therefore, the

individuisforminga faction lack an identityof interests


5/31

Introduction

that

would engender

common political goals beyond

winningadvantages

for their own faction. or arethere

clear differences between themembersof different fac

tions that might result in

policy

differences between

them.

Thus,

while

factions compete for

resources,

their

structural

similarity insures

that they

w i l l hold

similar

ideas

about what the

wo r l d

is

l ike

and what it should be

l ike. Factional competition

tends

to be non-

revolutionary

in intent. The objective of factional com

petition

is to achieve a favorable allocation of existing

benefits;

each

faction

hopes

to gain more

while

its com-

petitors gain

less.

Participants conceptualize factional

competition as a zero-sum

game

in

which

one party's

gain is

another's

loss. Thus, in factional competition,

debategenerally

centers

upon the relative legitimacy of

each

faction's claims rather than the merits of

substan-

tivelydifferent social programs.

Given

the lack of structural differences between com-

peting

factions, it is at

firstdifficult

to see how they might

act as vehicles of social transformation.

Because

fac

tional

competition is non-revolutionary in intent, it has

often been

regarded as non-revolutionary in con

sequence

(Siegel and Beals 1960,

Gross

1973, Sandbrook

1972).

However, Salisbury and Silverman (1977:6-7)

observe

that factionalism has an inherent dynamism

grounded in competitive strategizing: Each confront-

ation[between factions]

changes

the terms on

which

the

next confrontation

w i l l

take place . . . [T]he strategy of

one side .. .

does

not produce an exact or mirror-image

strategy . . . Relations are, in fact, systematically oblique

and groupings are systematically unalike. Factionalism,

in short,

produces

actions and reactions that do not

simplybalance

o u t . . .

The

issue

of whether, as Silverman and Salisbury

suggest,

factional competition could

serve

as a

mechanism of social transformation has not

been

thoroughly

explored. A major obstacle to gauging the

transformative power of factional competition has

been

that, prior to this volume, factions

have been

studied in

contemporary communities under the dominance of a

state:

Native American communities supervised by the

Burean of Indian

AlTairs

and

peasant

communities in

colonial

or recently post-colonial nations. In such com

munities,

the

state

constrains both thescaleof

conflict

and thedegreeof structural

change

resulting from fac

tional

competition. For this

reason,

previous

studies

may easily

have

underestimated the transformative

power of factional competition. Almost certainly, fac

tionalcompetitionwas a more dynamicforcin

pre-state

societies than it is in the modern w o r l d.

Anotherissuethat has notbeenthoroughly explored

is the proper scaleof analysis for the study of factional

competition. In the ethnographic literature, outside

forces

have

sometimes

beenseen

as influencing factional

competition.

For example, the rise of factions is often

attributed

to the decline of traditional, power-holding

corporate groups under the impact of Western contact

(French 1948; Siegel and Beals 1960; Nicholas 1965;

Nagata 1977). And several

observers have suggested

that

the strength of factions and faction

leaders

varied

according to their

access

to outside

sources

of

revenue

and influence, most often supplied by the

state

(Schwartz

1969; Sandbrook 1972; Bujra 1973;

Gross

1973; Schryer

1977; Salisbury 1977). Nevertheless, factions

have been

regarded as an

aspect

of

local

level polities (Schwartz

1968),

impinged upon by regional or national polities

but not affecting them in

reverse.

I n contrast, severalessaysin this bookinvestgatethe

interplay

of local and regional

processes

in

tribal po l i -

ties.

Spencer

(Chapter 3)

arges

convincingly that the

internal

and external dimensions of

tribal

leadership are

intertwined.

The formation

o f

competing factions w i th i n

communities

goes

hand in hand

w i t h

the development of

alliances between faction

leaders

in different communi

ties. The net effect of this

process

is to turn an entire

regin

into a single

political

arena,

a community

wi th i n

which

competing coalitions of faction

leaders

vie

for resources.

In a similar fashion, it

becomes

extremely

difficult

to

di erentiate

between local,internal dimen

sions

of

political

violence (the suppression of rebellion)

and regional, external dimensions of

political

violence

(the pursuit of warfare)

once

communities

became

enmeshed

in intervillage alliances that compete at the

regional

level (see Anderson, Chapter 6, for Mississip

pian societies and Pohl and Pohl, Chapter 13, for the

Classic Maya).

I n

examining factional competition and

political

development in prehistoric societies, the

essays

in this

volumeraise

a number of

issues,

most of

which

are new

to

archaeology.

These

include: the opportunities and

constraints

presented

by different

mdiums

of com

petition including

feasting (Clark and Blake, Chapter 2),

external alliances and

trade (Spencer,

Chapter 3), and

warfare (Redmond, Chapter 4; Helms, Chapter 5); the

sourcesof factional competition in the kinship and po l i -

tical

structures of chiefdoms (Anderson, Chapter 6),

t tes (Byland and Pohl, Chapter 11; Pohl and Pohl,

Chapter 13; Fox, Chapter 14) and empires (van Zant

w i j k

Chapter 9); factional competition and ethnic

identity

(Pollard, Chapter 7; Brumfiel Chapter 8); and

factional competition and imperial expansin(Hicks,


6/31

6 ElizabethM Brumfiel

Chapter 10). The apparent absenceof corporate groups

and factional competition is analyzed for theValleyof

Oaxaca (Kowaiewski, Chapter 12), cycles of factional

competition

and

political change

are defined for the

southeastern

UnitedStates,

the Maya lowlands and the

Postclassic

highlands (Anderson, Chapter 6; Pohl and

Pohl,

Chapter 13; Fox, Chapter 14), and the

shifting

composition

of factions and factional

conflict

in pre-

imperial, imperial,

and

colonial

societies is examined for

the central Andes( D A l t r o y ,Chapter 15).

Al l theessaysin this volume are concerned

wi th

the

relationships of

factional

competition to ecological con-

ditionsand

classconflict.

The next two sections of this

introduction

exploretheserelationships.

actionalcompetition andculturalecology

A t firstglance, the study of factional competition and

culturalecology

would

seemtohave littletooffereach

other. Factional competitionfocusesattention upon the

inner

dynamics of

socialsystemswhile

ecosystem theory

derives the dynamics of social

change from

the inter

action

of human populations

wi th

their environments

(HiU

1977:88;

Binford

1983:221). The study of factional

competition

invoives consideration of strategic

de isin

making

by self-promoting

leaderswhile,

in the

view

of

cultural

ecologists, social

change

is unrelated to the

perceptions and motives of

social

actors

(Hil l

1977:66-7;

Price 1982:720). Despite these differences, cultural

ecology can

only

benefit

from

a more

explicit

consider

ation

of

factional polities.

Such studies

would

reveal the

internal needsand resource requirements of complex

political

institutions that affect their

distribution

in time

and

space.

And studies of

factional

polities

would

reveal

the importance of the traits that accompany complex

political

institutions but

appear

toserveno

critical

eco

logical function. Forthese

reasons,

perhaps,a concern

withfactional polities is alreadypresentin theworkof

several ecosystems theorists (Flannery 1972; Webster

1975, 1976; Yoffee 1979;Spencer1982).

Cultural

ecologists generallyassertthat

socio-political

hierarchies evolvebecausechiefly and

state

hierarchies

provide

for a more effective relationship

o f

a population

to

its environment; under certain demographic and

environmental

conditions,

political

hierarchies are

adaptive.

Ecosystem theorists often assume that incipiently

complex political

institutions are at leastsporadically

present in simpler societies, ready to be pressed into

service when they are favored by demographic and

environmental conditions. The

timing

and location of

incipiently complex institutions is said to be random;

they do not in themselves constitute a problem suitable

for

research. Variation,

as Price (1982:716)

observes,

arises

constantly in all

l iving systems

and

does

not, in

terms of an evolutionary paradigm, require expla

naron. But this is not entirely true.

Just

as

sociopoliti-

cal

complexity might be precluded by environmental

problems that

have

no managerial solution, complex

political

institutions might be precluded by ecological

conditions

that do not meet their own institutional

requirements.

A n excellent example of this principie is supplied by

Clark

and Blake (Chapter 2 , summarizing Hayden 1990;

Hayden and Gargett 1990).A l lbut the most ephemeral

formso f

political

leadership require a disposable surplus,

a fund of power (Sahhns 1968:89). But so long as

humans relied upon limitedand fluctuatingresources,

the competitive accumulation of surplus depleted com-

munal

resources

and was not tolerated. Henee, despite

the managerial benefits that more powerful specialized

leadership mighthaveconferred upon the population,

such leadership did not emerge

until

after subsistence

carne

to be

based

upon

r ich

and reliable

foodresources.

Asecond and even more interesting example concerns

long-distance trade. Long-distance trade has a tendency

to increase

as

political

institutions become more

complex.Cultural

ecologists,

wi th

their attention peren-

nially fixed on population-environment interaction,

havesupplied three accounts of long-distance trade. One

regardsit as a

means

ofprocuring

criticalresources

that

are not

locally

available (Rathje 1971; Johnson and

Earle 1987:245). A second regards it as a

means

of

gaining alliances and valuables (storable wealth) that

enhance

subsistence security (Flannery 1968; Halstead

and

O'Shea

1982). The thirdregardslong-distance trade

as unimportantbecauseit is most often concerned wi th

sumptuary, as opposed to subsistence, goods (Price

1977;Binford 1983:227-31;

Sanders

1984).

However,a llthese

accounts draw attention away

from

the fact that valuables acquired

from

distant

sources

supply

considerable

political

control

because

of their

ability

to attract

followers,

allies and patrons and to

maintain

hierarchies of control (Schneider 1977; Earle

1978; Friedman and Rowlands, 1978; Helms 1979;Kris-

tiansen 1981:257;

Brumfiel

and Earle 1987; Gosden

1989).Coalition

buildingis an essential

activity

in creat-

ing

andmaintaining

political

power. But we cannot

fully

appreciate the importance of

thisaspect

of long-distance

trade in valuables untilwe stop looking for a directly

adaptive function for thisinstitutionor, unable to find

one,assesssuch trade as epiphenomenal.


7/31

ntroduction 7

Although

factional competition must be

eonsidered

in

ecological

analyses

of

political

complexity, ecological

variables areessential for understanding factional com

petition.

As Hayden and Gargett (1990) suggest, fac

tional

competition

w i l l

not exist so long as

subsistence

is

based

upon

l imited

and fluctuating

resources associated

w i t h

generalized foraging. When factional competition is

present,

the

success

of faction

leaders

is partly

deter-

mined

by local

resource

productivity and

trade

route

accessibility. Faction

leaders w i l l

be most successful in

reas

that are most productive, giving the prevailing

methods

of

resource

exploitation. For example,

under

conditions of low agricultural

in tensicat ion,

faction

leadersw i l l

dobest in

reas l ike

the American Bottoms

regin

of the middle Mississippi River) where a large

fo l lowing

can

gather

to enjoy the benefits of factional

membership without incurring the costs of intensified

subsistence

effort. Butunderconditions of higher agri

cultural intensification,

leaders w i l l

dobest in

reas w i t h

the

greatest

quantity of intensifiable

resources

(irrigable

land,

etc.).

Pohl and Pohl (Chapter 13)

suggest

that ecological

variables affecting agricultural production also shape

the

onset

and intensity

of factional

competition. Rainfall

agriculture permits a more mobile commoner popu

lation,easily

able

to shift allegiance

from

one leader to

another. Leaders

then

compete

to control

segments

of

this mobile population. More intensive agricultural

regimes tie farmers to the land, lessening competition

between

political

lites

and permitting

greater

political

stability.

Price (1984) has

also

noted this difference,

adding that

leaders

in rainfall agricultural regimes are

more

l ikely

to

engage

in conspicuous generosity in order

to attract followers.

Anderson (Chapter 6)

suggests

that extreme com

petition and violence are common during periods of

environmental instability or change. He believes that

European contact intensified factional competition

among native

peoples

in the

southeastern

UnitedStates,

first

through the introduction of European diseasesthat

ki l led

individuis

who occupied strategic positions

in

the

regional alliance network, and

second

through the

intro

ductionof European trade goodsthat

opened

new possi-

bilities

for acquiring wealth items.

Spencer

(Chapter 3)

cites a

case

where

disease

in a

Shavante

village led to a

realignment of factions.

Geography, by affecting theshape of interaction

net

works, also shapes

factional competition. Clark and

Blake (Chapter 2)

arge

that more open settlement

systemsw i th

greaterpossibilities for regional interaction

have greater

potential for being dominated by a single.

advantageously

situated authority. Conversely, both

Anderson (Chapter 6) and Byland and Pohl (Chapter 12)

suggest

that, in patchy environments, the

dif i icul ty

of

maintaining

Communications

between

scattered

commu

nities

prevents

any one

from

dominating the others.

Under

these

conditions, factional competition

tends

to

persist in a more or

less stable equilibrium.

The recognition that factional competition is

shaped

by

ecological variables does not

imply

that factional

competition

is always, at the base,

caused

by

subsistence

shortages.

Cultural ecologists

have

frequently argued

that intercommunity warfare is the result of growing

populations competing for

scarce subsistence

resources

(Sanders

and Price 1968; Carneiro 1970; Webster 1975;

Ferguson 1984; Johnson and Earle 1987). Alternative

views on the

motivation

and

character of

warfare

appear

in

this volume. For example, Redmond (Chapter

4)

finds

that, in northern South America,

tribal

warfare is

m o t i -

vated by the

desire

for

revenge

rather than the

desire

for

resources.

A careful consideration of

Panamanian

chiefs

leads

Helms (Chapter 5) to conclude that their

leader

ship of warfare was motivated by theirdesire forper

sonal gain without the

added spur

of population

pressure. Spencer

(Chapter 3)

suggests

that the elitist

character of warfare in ranked

societies

is revealed

archaeologically in the fact that

litecenters

are

fortified

while

smaller communities are not.

But i f

warfare

arises

from

the

desire

for

revenge,

why

does

it occur in

some

societies

but not

others

(Johnson

and Earle 1987:124, 134)? And

i f

warfarearises

from

the

selfishmotives of chiefs, why do followers

particpate

A s

Redmond (Chapter 4)

makes

clear,

individuis

are

very

reluctant to

fight;

in fact, an

ambitousleader

may

earn

the

indebtedness

of

individuis

who must seek

revenge

by organizing a

raiding

party on their

behalf

(see

also Spencer,Chapter

3). Presumably,

leaders

organize

these

rads

on thesame basis as other activities that they

carry out, by

calling

to action

thosendebted

to them for

previous favors. Thus, warfare

becomes

possible

once

individual

jealousies

and thedesire forrevenge become

linked

to the

politicalgoals

of self-aggrandizing

leaders

whohave established followings that they can

cali

upon

to implement theirplans (seealso Sillitoe 1978).

I n

more stratified societies, the participation ofsub

ordnate

groups in warfare is

less

problematic. Rulers

compel participation through

coer c in,

and they reward

participation by conferring promotions of status upon

those

whose

performance is outstanding. The

l ink

between warfare and population pressure in stratified

societies

is weak. This is clearly indicated by Pohl and

Pohl s

(Chapter 13) observation that the population of


8/31

8

Elizabeth

M Brumfiel

Caracol grew by 325 percent in the 130

years

after it

defeated

T ika l . f

Caracol was making war

wi th

a popu

lation

oflessthan one-third ofitscapacity, it is

difficult

to

believe that the war was aconsequenceofpopulation

pressure.

actional

competition and class conflict

I f, because

of earlier

research

agendas, factions

have

frequently

beencontrasted

with

corporate groups, our

own

interest in social transformation

leads

us to contrast

factions

withclasses.

Under conditions ofclassstruggle,

ociety is divided by horizontal

cleavages

that

seprate

nternally

solidary and externally competing

strata.

This

wi th

a situation of factional competition in

society is divided by vertical

cleavages

that unite

of differentstrata and foster conflict between

of the

samestrata.

Intra-class competition is a common theme in Marx's

on capitalist society. Marx (1977:266-7)

erved that capitalist society contained two market-

intra-class struggles: on the one hand, the

waro fcapitalists among themselves to main

profits, on the other hand, the competition among

competition is only

overeme

byclassconscious-

brought about by class struggle: The

seprate

form a classonlyin so far as theyhaveto carry

a common battie against another

class;

otherwise they

wi th each

other as competitors

and Engels 1947:48-9). Thus, factional compe

and

classconflict

are

presented

as inversely related,

intensies.

Andclass

greaterexplanatory weight: The

of all hitherto existing society is the history of

struggles

(Marx

1977:222).

AsBloch(1983:18) points out, Marx'semphasisupon

struggle has not

been

very

helpful

for anthropolo

causesof

change

inclasslesssoci

absenceo fclassstruggle, Marxist anthropo

have

variously attributed social

change

in

societies to technological development and

change

(see Levine and

Wright

1980); to

structural incompatabilities ( contradictions )

tween the forces of production, the relations of pro

and the social and ideological superstructure

r 1977; Friedman 1975; Friedman and Rowlands

conflict

of interests between

individuis

occupy

subordnate

statuses

wi thin

society (women,

those who domnate them

1983:160). The dynamics of

conflict

among

those

similar social positions has received

little

attention.

On the other hand, several anthropologists, working

from

a variety of positions sympathetic to Marxism,

have suggested

that factional conflict

wi thin

the

lite

stratum explains the intensification, modification and

decline of

lite

power in chiefdoms and agrarianstates

(Webster 1975; Earle 1978, 1987;

Cowgill

1979;

Kristian-

sen 1981;

Brumfiel

1983; Gailey and Patterson 1987;

Patterson 1991). This volume

extends

their arguments to

suggest

that conflicts

wi thin

(both commoner and

lite

stratainteract

with

conflicts betweenstratato determine

the

course

of

political

development.

First of all , competition between non-elites provides

frequent opportunities for

leaders

to expand their influ

enceand power. As

Spencer

(Chapter 3) and Redmond

(Chapter 4)ind cate ,leadersin lowland South America

increased their influence by assisting

individuis

embroiled

in personaldisputesor blood feuds.

Brumfiel

(Chapter 8)

suggests

that mediating competition

between calpulliand teccalli groups for houses, land,

titles,and other

resources

was an important service per-

formed by city-state rulers in central

Mxico

prior to

Aztec rule. Pohl and Pohl (Chapter 13)

indcate

that the

Postclassic

Maya

lites,

as patrons to their subjects,

resolved property disputes and defended community

resources

against outside attack. And the

military

com-

manders

of the pre-Inka Wanka prosecuted wars that at

least

ostensbly

defended community

resources from

radsby neighboring groups (D Al t r o y , Chapter 15). In

each

of

thesecases,

competition among non-elites

mot i

vated commoners to

subordnate

themselves

to a

po l i

ticalleader.The resultingalgnmentswere factions.

A t the

same

time, competition among political

ehtes

frequently

moderates the intensity

with

which com

moners are exploited. In the

tribal

societies described

by Clark and Blake (Chapter 2),

Spencer

(Chapter 3),

and Redmond (Chapter 4)

leaders

compete

wi th

each

other to supply benefits to followers, although the

suc

cessful

leader wil lalso havecultvated

his

ability

tocali

in

his

debts

at critical junctures. In chiefdoms and

cty-states, rulers seek to finance their competition

against

rival lites

by enlarging the

size

of their tribute-

paying

populations. Although this is sometimes accom

plished

through conquest, it can also be achieved by

offerng

commoners prime

agricultural

land (Earle 1978)

or a low per

capta

tribute burden (Pohl and Pohl,

Chapter 13) as inducements to settle. In pre-Aztec

Mxico , intense

competition

wi thin

the

rulng class

enabled commoners to move

from

one city-state to

another,thus

avoidng

conditionso fintenseexploitation

(Hicks 1982;

Brumfiel,

Chapter 8).

The suppression of commoner residential

mobility


9/31

Introduction

may be a

necessary

condition for the existence of

class

stratification in agrarian states.This could be accom

plished

through social circumscription (Carneiro

1970),

as Pohl and Pohl (Chapter 13)suggest for the

t nMaya. Or, it might be accomplished by the

po l i

tical unification

of a

regin,

resulting in

uniform

con

ditionsofexploitation for the commoner class.Seeing

the

advantages

of

unification,

ruling

lites

might

volun-

tarily

surrender their sovereignty to an expanding

regional

state(Smith 1986;Hicks,Chapter 10).

Commoners can sometimes exploit intra-elite com

petition

to their ownadvantageeven without leaving

home. When plagued by oppressiverule,commoners can

support the efforts of

some

ambitious prince to over-

throwthe incumbentruler.Classwarfare canassumethe

guise of c iv il war between noble factions (Fallers

1956:247; Sahlins 1968:92-3). Thus, the suppression of

intra-elite

competition is a second condition

necessary

fortheemergence

of

class

stratification.

Mechanisms for

unifying the ruling class include fostering a homo-

geneous

lite

culture (Pollard, Chapter 7;

Brumfiel,

Chapter 8),liteintermarriage (vanZantwijk, Chapter

9) ,

the rotation of status-conferring ritual and political

activities (van Zantwijk, Chapter 9; Pohl and Pohl,

Chapter 13; Fox, Chapter 14), and the forging of

patron-client relationships between the

state

and

indi

vidual

members of the regional

nobili ty

(Pollard,

Chapter 7; Hicks, Chapter 10; Fox, Chapter 14;

D A l t r o y ,

Chapter 15). Interestingly enough, a homo-

geneous

lite

culture,

lite

intermarriage, and possibly

the rotationo fritualresponsibilities werepresentamong

the Classic Maya, who never achieved regional

unifi

cation

(Pohl and Pohl, Chapter 13). Thus, intra-elite

patron-client relationships, backed by coercive forc,

emergeas the most important mechanism for securing a

unified

rulingclassamong therelatively non-bureaucra-

ticAztecs and Inkas.

While

factional competition affects the dimensions of

socialinequality,classstructureshapescompetitionand

alliance building

(L loyd

1965). In the tribal systems

described by Clark and Blake (Chapter 2),

Spencer

(Chapter 3), and Redmond (Chapter 4),

classes

are

absent,and followersalign themselves w i th the leader

who

supplies them

w i th

the

greatest

immediate benefits.

These

verticalalliances are shallow, extending

only from

followersto thelocalleader. On the regionallevel, l ink-

ages

are supplied by alliances between village leaders,

and theselinkages are the most critical

advantage

that

incumbentleadersenjoy over aspiringrivals.Alliances

between

leaders

give incumbents greater

access

to exotic

goods and

mili tary

assistancethan is available to their

rivals. Spencer

(Chapter 3) suggests that efforts by

incumbent

leaders

to regularize relationships

w i thin

their alliance network might lead them to deal prefer-

entially

with

the heir of a

deceased

leader, initiatinga

form

of ascriptive leadership that could develop into a

permanent chieftainship.

Institutionalized tribute extraction in chiefdoms and

city-states makesavailable greater quantities of wealth

for lite competition and alliance building.Anderson

(Chapter 6)suggeststhat competition is most intense

when the material rewardsassociated

w i th

leadership are

greatest, and this is borne out by the high level of

factional competition

w i thin

the

lite

stratum of the

chiefdoms and city-states described in this volume.

Internally, cisekinsmen struggle to control leadership

offices;externally,

leaders

struggle to gain higher posi

tions in the regionalpolitical hierarchy. Their allies in

this

quest

are an unstable

coalition

o f

consanguineal and

affinal kin and commoners raised to noble rank as a

reward for valorous

mili tary

service.

These

coalitions are

heldtogether by the redistribution of tribute wealth to

noble followers and the allotment of

segments

of the

tribute-paying

population to the

leader's

strongest

rivals.

But

the intra-elite competition, as discussed above,

limitsexploitation, creating a chronically underfunded

ruling

class.

To augment their incomes,

leaders

make

war upon their neighbors, and, as Redmond (Chapter 4)

documents so convincingly, warfare in chiefdoms

reaches

an intensity that is clearly greater than that

found among tribal peoples. To survive both internal

and external competition, leaders place themselves

under the patronage of strong regional leaders.

These

verticalallianceshavegreater depth (three or four

levis

andterritorialrangethan the vertical alliances found in

tribal big-man

systems.

Anderson (Chapter 6) sug

gests

that such

systems

are marked by a secular trend

away from intra-elite and inter-class relations

based

upon

display and redistribution toward the greater use

o f forc.

The

unification

of

lites

in a regionalstate permits

very

high

levis

of tribute extraction. This surplus

flows

to the paramount ruler who

establisheshimself

as the

primarysuppliero fsumptuary goods and

mili tary

assist

ancetosubordnateleaders. Thus, vertical alliance net

works

all converge on thestaterulerswhilehorizontal

alliances between

local

rulers wither away.Statepatron

age permits

subordnate

rulers to enjoy a definite

in-group

advantageover theirlocal rivals.As in modern

systems

of centralized patronage, the

level

of overt fac

tional

competition

tends

to be quite low.


10/31

ElizabethM Brumfiel

Thepositionof local litesis further weakened when

the

state creates

newterritorialunits and administrative

offices filled by members of the state s ruling group

instead of by local rulers. Such policies result in the

severing of ties between rulers and

ruled

and strengthen

class

stratification

( D A l t r o y ,

Chapter 15). Sub-

sequently, these policies may give rise to disputes

between those who have

traditional

claims on resources

and

those who derive claims from the new system, both

of

whommustturn to thestatefor recognition of their

claims.

The absence of local

solidarity

and the com

petition

between localfactions for favorable treatment

by the state weakens the

local

capacity for resistance

(D Al t roy , Chapter 15; see also Dennis 1987). The

greatest threat tothese

states

is

factional competition

at

the very highest level,

wi th in

the

royal family

(van

Zantwijk,Chapter 9;D A l t ro y , Chapter 15).

As

states

disintegrate, considerable wealth and power

maybecomelodgedoutside therealmo f politicalcontrol.

Blanton (1983) points out that associations organizing

craft productionor exchange tend to arise

during

periods

of

weakened

statecontrol.Religious

power may also be

lodged

in more orlessautonomous institutionssuch as

the priesthood

during

Postclassic times in Oaxaca and

possibly

also the

Mayalowlands(Pohl

and

Pohl,

Chapter

13;

see also Patterson 1985). To deal

wi th

thesegroups,

political

lites are sometimes forced to admit their

members

topolitical

officeso that the interests

o f

outside

groups coincide

wi th

the interest of the political

lite

(Lloyd

1965:98). At other times, such groups promote

factional

competitionamong

political

litesto maintain

their

own

autonomy.Aligning themselves

wi th

different

litefactions, outside groups may succeed in transform-

ing

a

tributarystateinto

a broker state, in which

factional

competition

is overshadowed by competition between

functionallydifferentiated interest groups.

actional

competitionandthe archaeological record

Factionalcompetition invoives twocomplementary pro

cesses: the construction of coalitions of support and

participationin

political

contests. Inbuilding

coalitions

of

support, leaders forge ties between themselves and

their clients, allies, and patrons. Inpolitical contests,

leaders exchange Information on the strength of their

coalitions

and determine who wi l l

control

contested

resources (seeBailey 1969).Coalition buildingand con

testsmay occursimultaneously,as

when

leaders compete

o

offer potential supporters the most attractive

gifts.

oth alliancebuilding and political contests leave dis-

inctiveimprintson the archaeological record.

Alliance building is frequently achieved through

exchange.

Locally,

the liberal

distribution

of gifts and

preferred foods is used to attract followerswho are then

tied to the leader by their indebtedness for unrecipro-

cated favors (Sahlins 1968:88-90).Regionally,balanced

gift

exchange establishes a pattern

o f

mutual

aid between

allied leaders whileasymmetrical exchange

(involving

the movement of staple crops upward and the flow of

valuables downward) characterizes relations between

locallitesand regional paramounts. The valuables used

in theseexchanges are

scarce

andhighlyvalued, usually

owing to their

foreign

origin or the quantity of labor

involved in their production (Drennan 1976:357). The

valuables are endowedwi th

symbolic

meanings that val-

date the alliances under

construction;

furthermore, the

valuables are distributed inritualcontexts that further

vahdate the relations of

alliance.

The

intensity

andorganization

o f

alliance

building

are

visible in the frequency and distribution of exotic or

highly crafted wealth items, preferred foods, and

feasting

paraphernalia in prehistoric sites.

Clark

and

Blake

(Chapter 2) cite the presence of

finely

finished,

elaborately decorated ceramies and maize to rge for

competitive

coalition building on coastal Chiapas by

1600 BC.

D A l t r o y

(Chapter 15)

suggests

that thehigh

concentrationof butchered camelidbones and certain

jar and basin types inlite households are evidence of

lite sponsorship of

feasts

at Tunanmarca, Per. Since

there appear to have been few dietary differences

between

lites

and commoners, commoners were prob

ablythe

guests

at elite-sponsored

feasts

(see also Costin

and Earie 1989).

A more exclusive

sphere

oflitealliancebuilding at

Tunanmarca is suggested by the

restriction

to lite

housesofmetalworkingand metal artifacts.Metalwas

probably

used in gift exchanges that created

coalitionso f

support among

political lites.

In Barinas, Venezuela, a

similar restrictionof polished stonejewelry(much of it

from extra-local serpentine) to lite contexts also sug

geststhe existence of a sepr te

sphere

oflitealliance

building

(Spencer, Chapter 3).

The

presence

of

non-local

goods in non-elite contexts

mightreveal another

dimensin

o f alliancebuilding.For

example, in Early to Middle Formative Oaxaca, the

uniformity

among households of the

sources

of

obsidian

usedsuggeststhat obsidian wasdistributed to a ll house

holds from a single point

(Winter

and Pires-Ferreira

1976).

This

could

be interpreted as evidence that obsi

dian

procurement and

distribution

was used by a

faction

leader tobui ld a popularfol lowing (seeClark 1987 for a

discussion of how the procurement and processing of


11/31

Introduction

obsidian provided opportunities for political entre-

preneurship inMiddleFormative Mesoamerica).

Shifts in the frequency and distribution of prestige

goods, preferred foods, and feasting paraphernalia

provide

Information

on changes in the structure and

intensity

of alliance

building

over time. Anderson

(Chapter 6)argesthat thedecliningfrequency of pres

tige goods in Mississippian chiefdoms marks the tran-

sition from

leadership

based

on

persuasin

(which

required chiefs to build amass following among com

moners) to leadershipbasedoncoercin(whichpermit-

ted chiefs to l imittheir attentions to a smaller group of

strong-arm men).I ntheValleyo f

Mxico

and the central

Andes, a decline in the frequency ofvessels used in

feasting in the capitals of

previously

autonomousstates

reflects the suppression ofpoliticalcompetition among

local polities by a powerful regional state

(Brumfiel

1987a, Costin and Earle 1989).

Marriages also play an important role in alliance

building.Unfortunately, the archaeological recordonly

rarely

preserves

evidence of marriage alliance. Stone

inscriptions

from

the Classic Maya constitute one of the

very few instances where such records are preserved

(Marcus 1976). Pohl and Pohl (Chapter 13)

suggest

that

the Late toTerminalClassic

shift in

stelaesubject matter

frommarriage to warfarereectsa secular trendinMaya

political

factionalism from an earlier

dependence

upon

alliances among regional

lites

to a later pattern of

violent competition.

The construction

o f

coalitionsrequires the production

of surplus wealth

which

can underwrite

gift exchange

and feasting (Sahlins 1968, D A l t roy and Earie 1985).

Because the vast majority of production in agrarian

societies is household

based,

changesin the intensity of

factionalcompetition should be marked bychangesin

household size and composition. The ini tia l stagesof

coalition building ought to be marked by high bir th

rates,

polygamy, and/or the inception of

dependent

labor

wi thin

the households of faction

leaders

(Sahlins

1968:89, Coontz and Henderson 1986).

Increases

in

leaders' influence and power should be reflected in the

size and structure of

a

growing

number of households as

the leader extracts increasing amounts of goods and

labor

from

a widercircleof clients and subjects.

Successful

coalition building

might leave its imprint

onsettlement patterns. The sizeo ftheleader'ssettlement

may suddenlyincreaseas it did during theemergenceof

chiefdoms on the south Chiapas

coast

(Clark and Blake,

Chapter 2) .The early

expansin

of San

os

Mogote in

theValley of Oaxaca might also be an example of an

unusually large settlement created by successful

coali

t ion building (Flannery and Marcus 1983b). Thesuc

cessful control of

local

rivals should be reflected in the

distribution of

literesidenceswi thin

a

regin,

as in de

MontmolHn's (1989:191-6) Ehte Forced Settlement

measure- the proportion of

lite residences

found at

political

centers

compared to the total number of

ehte

residences

in the political catchment controUed from

thesecenters. Alternatively,paramounts might favor a

policy

of dispersing their rivals to a

mximum

extent

(Anderson, Chapter 6). A lack of control over rivals

might

be indicated by evenly dispersed, tightclusters of

lite

and commoner housing indicative of leader-

followergroupings

well

suited to factional competition.

Successful coalition building may also be evident in

constructions that by their size or complexity

suggest

communal labor: raised fields and

causeways

in Venez

uela (Spencer, Chapter 3), agricultural terraces and

defensive works in

Per (D Al t roy ,

Chapter 15), and

fortifications

and monumental architecture among the

Mayas (Pohl and Pohl, Chapter 13; Fox, Chapter 14).

The particular type of labor investment reflects different

strategies

for competitive

success.

Agricultural intensifi

cationmay improve the

leader'sabil i ty

to attract

follow

ers by sponsoring largerfeastsor bysupplyingthemwi th

improvedlands (Earle 1978). Fortifications

suggest

that

warfare provided wealth that a leader could redistribute

to

followers (Webster 1975). Monumental architecture

might

involve

manipulation of the symbols of group

unity:the ancestral or

patrn

deity.Such symbolswould

be most prominent under conditions of

competition

at

the regional

level

as part of an

effort

to

crate

bonds

between

leaders

and followers that could not be easily

transferred to competing leaders. Ethnic symbols may be

manipulated

wi th

similar goals

(Brumfiel,

Chapter 8;

Pohl

and Pohl, Chapter 13). Public architecture also

suggests efforts to impress a regional audience of

potentialallies andrivalswho use the size

o f

thebuilding

projects to judge the size and commitment of one's

following.

Competitionon the regional

level

often

takes

the

form

of

warfare. Warfare is archaeologically visible in a

number of ways: physical evidence ofviolentdeath and

the taking of war trophies, defensive works, large settle

ment size, ephemeral site occupation, defacejnent of

public

buildings and prestige goods, and depictions of

warfare

in

art andinscriptions. Drawingupondata

from

Oaxaca, Kowaiewski (Chapter 12)suggests that terri-

torial ly based

competing polities on the regional

level

might also be indicated by the occurrence of shrines,

boundary markers, and bufferzonesbetween localities,

by roughly equivalent amounts of civic-ceremonial


12/31

12

Elizabeth

M

Brumfiel

architectureacrosssubregions, by theabsenceoforganic

sohdarity between subregions, by the existence of subre-

gional differences in settlement patterns and ceramic

styles, and by a settlement plan in regional capitals that

provides representation of geographically

affiliated

sub

regions. Many of the archaeological manifestations of

sociopolitical

and spatial segmentation in theValleyof

Oaxaca are also to be found in the Classic Maya

polity

analyzed by de Montmol l in(1989).

onclusin implic tions for theory

This

overview of factional competition and political

development has eonsidered a wide variety of ecological

and social variables. Resource productivity, geo-

graphical

boundedness,

long-distance exchange,

warfare, kinship and marriagesystems,rules ofsucces

sion,

class,

corporate group structure, and ethnicity all

impinge

upon the patterning and intensity of factional

competitionand are, in

turn,

affected by

it .

The number

of

variables discussed reflects the fact that competitive

advantageis pursued through the strategicmanipulation

o fmany material and social variables;

winningstrategies

must be fabricated according to the

resources

available.

The relativeadvantagesof extensive or intensive agri

culture,

attached craft production or long-distance

exchange, marriage alliance or warfare, ethnic assimila-

tionor ethnicpersistencevary according tolocal

circum-

stances.In addition, the efficacy of different

strategies

v res

over time, depending upon the development of

resources,alliancesystems,and competitivestrategiesas

consequencesof earlier rounds of

competition.

Given the great variation of competitivestrategies

over time andspace,no twocasesare identical.While

the logic of factional competition provides an essential

principiefor understanding thecourseof

local

history,

the study of factional competition isunlikelyto reveal

any universal laws of cultural development. The vari-

ablesinvolved

are too numerous; the

strategies

for

mobi-

lizing

resources

are too diverse.Althoughfactional com

petition

provides a common

mpetus

to political

development, any particular

sequence

of development is

uniquelycomplex and contingent.

Inthe face of suchcomplexity,it isnecessarytoaltr

nate

between a subject-centered and a system-centered

analysis. A subject-centered analysis organizes ecological

and social variables byweighingthem according to their

importance in

specic

competitive strategies. A system-

centered analysis

reveis

how the implementation of

strategiesalters thequalityanddistribution o fecological

and socialresourcesfor the next round ofcompetition.

Asubject-centered analysis is also required in order to

account for the dynamics ofpoliticaldevelopment.

Poli-

ticaldevelopment should be attributed to the efforts of

individuis

toadvancetheir goals of

material

advantage

and socialesteemby

joining

factions or

class

alliances

that prosecute their interests in competition

with

oppos-

ing factions or classes. Competition occurs

within

a

structure or matrix of ecologicalresources,social rela

tions,

and cultural rules and

vales which

constrain

behavior but which also provide opportunities for

innovation.The growth ofpoliticalcomplexity,marked

by

the

emergence

of larger, more centralized polities

with

greaterdegreeso fverticaland horizontaldifferenti-

ation,is an epiphenomenalconsequenceof thestrategies

and counter-strategies employed by

leaders

and

fol low-

ersengagedin factionalcompetitionand

lites

and com

moners locked inclassstruggle (see Clark and Blake,

Chapter 2).

The methodological

individualism

at thebasisof this

formulation

might be criticized as a projection of the

competitive,self-seeking, pragmatic ideology

o f

Western

capitalist society. This is

partially

true, although the

problemis ameliorated by situating self-interested com

petition

in specific ecological, social,cultural,and his-

torical

contexts. Even so, such a

formulation

might be

inappropriate for analyzing the more expressive and

solidary

aspectsof social

life.

However, an assumption

o fcompetitive, self-seeking, pragmatic social actors is

eminently suited to the analysis offactional competition,

for,

as Earle (1987:294)

observes,

factional competition,

which

is inherently a competitive, pragmatic

process,

requires

a maximizing strategy (see also Bailey

1969:36-7).

The subject-centered/system-centered approach to

factional competition and political development

adopted in this volume contrasts sharply

with

the

exclusively system-centered focus of both cultural

ecology and structural

Marxism,

currently the two most

popular theories for explaining political

change

in

ancient societies. Bothcultural ecology and structural

Marxism focus upon strictly bounded, culturally dis-

tinct

social groups. In

cultural

ecology, the social

unit

is

defined

by external boundaries, created by geographic

isolation and by the competitive relationships that

develop between populations under conditions of

resource scarcity

(Sanders

and Price 1968; Carneiro

1970; Ferguson 1984). In structuralMarxism,the social

unit

is defined by its internal organization of social

production and reproduction under a guiding set of

social

rules and practices ( structures ) (Friedman 1975;

Godelier 1977:63).


13/31

Introduction 3

Both

cultural ecology and structural

Marxism post-

late the narrow constraint of human behavior and deci

sinmaking

with in

thesesystems:by stringent consider-

ations of energetic efliciency in cultural ecology Price

1982:719) and by the Hmits of structurally determined

consciousness

in structural

Marxism

Godelier

1978:768).

Thesesame

constraints

opr te

equally for

all

members of society,

implying

a condition of cultural

homogeneity for human groups.

Based upon such assumptions, cultural ecology and

structural

Marxism

supply accountsofthegrowthof

poli-

ticalcomplexitythat are quite different

from

the one pro-

posed in this volume. Cultural ecologists believe that

incipientpolitical

complexityoccurs as a normal part of

the array of random,

low-level

cultural variation

present

in all populations Price 1982:724). However,political

complexitybegins togrowonlyafterpopulation

pressure

has created the need to intensify production

within

groups and to compete for

resources

belonging to others

Sandersand Price 1968; Carneiro 1970; Webster 1975;

Ferguson 1984; Johnson and Earle 1987:16-18). Through

either

exp nsin

or emulation, the beliefs and practices

that resultinlarger groupswithgreaterabilityto organize

production

and warfare

prev lwithin

a

regin.

The con

centration ofwealth,coercive power, and prestige in the

hands of political leaders contributes to managerial

capacityby

giving

leaderstheabilitytocoordn telarger,

more complex populations Webster 1975, 1976).

This formulation can becriticized on two grounds.

First,

it

proposes

that populationpressureand

resource

shortages

arenecessarytoinitiatetheprocessofpolitical

development and to maintain its progress. There is,

however, empirical evidence to the contrary, presented

in

this volume and elsewhere. Second, in analyzing the

concept of power, cultural ecologists focus attention on

the energy used to maintain competing populations and

the

Information flows

used to organize them e.g., White

1959; Price 1982;Wright 1969; Flannery 1972; Johnson

1978).

But they tend to ignore the relations of alliance

and dominance that brings organizational structures

into existence and maintain them. The manipulation of

social

relations is as important as the manipulation of

natural

resources

i n

theprocessofpoliticaldevelopment,

a pointwhichculturalecologists tend to ignore but not

always, see Webster 1975, 1976;Spencer1982).

Structural Marxists

present

an epigenetic model of

political development Friedman and Rowlands 1978).

Politicalchangeis not due to the goal-directedstrategies

ofpolitical

leaders

but, rather, is a

consequence

of struc

tural contradiction that is, the

incompatibility

of the

interlinked

forces of production, relations of pro

duction, and social and ideological superstructure)

resulting in structural reorganization Friedman 1975;

Godelier

1977:63, Bloch 1983:154). Power is not con

structed by

individuis,

but rather

falls

to certain people

as a

consequence

of the prevailing cultural rules,

especially

those

allocating

resources,

labor, and product

Godelier 1978; Bender 1985). In the

init ial

phasesof

politicalcomplexityand socialinequality,the conferring

of

superordinate statusoccurs with the consent of sub

ordn te

groups,

with

superordinate status

falling

to

those

who

med te

between humans and deities, i.e.

thosewho control the imaginarymeansof social repro

duction through religious

ritual

Friedman and Row

lands 1978; Godelier 1986:156-64; Bender 1985).

Likecultural ecology, this account ofpoliticaldevel

opment is deficient. Its principal difiiculty is that it

postl les

consensus

with in

the bodypolitic

prior

to the

emergence

of

class

and

class

struggle.

While

the consent

of

followers

is

certainlyneededbyleadersinthe veryfirst

stagesofpoliticalcomplexity Clark and Blake, Chapter

2;

Spencer,

Chapter

3;

Redmond, Chapter

4 ,

evidence

in

this volume

and elsewheresuggeststhatcoercinand not

consensus

is a dominant

mo t i f in

complex chiefdoms and

is absolutely pervasive in agrarianstates.

Culturalecology and structural

Marxism

difier

from

the approach taken in this volume in yet another way.

They bothpostl testrict behavioral determinismwhile

this volume

takes

seriously the impactofhuman purpose,

creativity, and choice. This difference derives

from

the

number of variables employed by

each

of the

analyses.

Both cultural ecology and structural Marxismemploy

models constructed of relatively few variables,

which

necessarilylimitshuman choice and agency toafewhighly

redundant options. As aconsequence,human behavior

emergesas

highly

determined. In contrast, the studies in

this volume consider the

rich

complexity of

competitive

strategizing,

which invoives the manipulation of every

conceivable ecological and social variable

in

complex and

contingent ways. In doing so, they broaden the dimen

sions

of

human choice and leave room for the exercise of

human agency. Thus, the

willingness

to consider the

full

complexity

of specific historical situations

restores

the

concept of agency to the study of

social

change.

Acknowledgments

Earlierdrafts of

this

chapter were patiently read by John

Clark,

Timothy

Earle, John Fox, Roberto Korzenie-

wicz, Hattula Moholy-Nagy,Mary Pohl, and Glenn

Perusek. Their criticisms, comments, and lineediting

shaped

the chapter in many important ways. I am grate-

fu l for their help.


14/31

Ethnicity

and political

control in a complex

society:

theTarascan

state

of

prehispanic

xico

H E L E N P E R L S T E I N P O L L R D

The interrelationship between ethnic units and a central

political authority is known historically to have been

crucial to the operation of complex societies. In the

process of this interaction central authorities,

par

ticularly ruling lites havecreated new ethnic groups,

havealtered the attributeswhichdefine ethnic identity,

and

have

restructured relationships between ethnic

groups (Enloe 1980:17ff.).

Political

authoritieshavetwo

fundamental goals for the survival of their centralized

power: (1) the economic

exploitation o f

populations and

resources,

and (2) the protection of the integrity of the

state

frontiers. In achieving both

these

goals ethnic

diversity

can either

faciltate

or hinder

lite

action.

Centralized authorities canassuremaximalaccessto

populations and

resources

when

decisin

making

flows

from the top downward, according to principiesestab

lished

by dominant

lites.

Ethnicdiversityoften disrupts

this

f low

by interposing local or regionalleaders,who

acquire power not through their allegiance to central

hierarchies, but through positions of ethnic

status.Deci

sin

making may be undertaken to reflect the needsof

local

populations or local

lites

at theexpense of the

state.

On the other hand, under conditions of rapid

territorial

expansin

when large populations and/or

resources

are being incorporated into a single political

unit,

the existing lines of authority, legitimacy, and

social

cohesinpresent

n ethnically

distnct

populations

may provide central authorities

wi th

an infrastructure

o f political

and economic networks that can be tapped

to

the benefit of the

state.

In a similar manner, the main-

tenance

of the state's territorial integrity

demands

populations w ing to defend that territory, and not

themselves

act to foster rebellion against central auth

or i ty . That can be achieved in at least two ways: the

acceptance of

state

ideology and legitimacy, usually

through the

identification

of

individuis

and groups as a

single social group, i.e.,

coirmion

ethnicity;or theaccept

anceof common self-interest among ethnically diverse

populations who see their itmninent survival as depend

ent on subordination to a central authority. The second

is often found on active mil i tary frontiers or among

refugee populations fleeing

conquest.

To the

state

such

peoples

can provide valuable service as warriors,mess-

engers, spies, and long-distance traders, services that

may outweigh the hazard of desertion.

T o

a great extent our understanding of the evolution

o f complex societies is

based

on societies known pri-

marily or exclusively through archaeology. One

approach to studying the archaeology of

ethnicity,

that

o f ethnoarchaeology, has primarily concentrated on

acephalous

societies, attempting to

test

the regularities

in

relationships between isolable cultures and artifact

distributions

(e.g. Hodder 1979). A second major

approach, modeling the spatial and functional

distri-

bution

of prehistoric ethnic groups on the

basis

of

ethnohistoric evidence, has the

advantage

of dealing

directly

wi th

complex, ethnically plural societies. The

primarydisadvantageis its l imitat ion tothose societies

knowable through both ethnohistoric and

archaeo

logical

Information.

These

societies,

while

representing

only a small sample of complex societies which have

ever evolved,

nevertheless

provide a

basic resource

for

the identification of

those

ethnic

processes

of sig-

nificance in societal evolution and their detection

archaeologically. In the New

Wo r id

such an approach

has

been used

in the Andes to

evalate

the

patterns

of

Inka

expansin

(Morris 1982; Rowe 1982; Wachtel

1982, among others) and to

genrate

models of ethnic/

state

interaction

which

can be applied to earlier periods

(Schaedel 1978).

The central defining feature of an ethnic group, self-

identification,

and categorization by the governinglite

is cleariy beyond the

resources

of archaeologically

derived

research.

Nevertheless,

because

ethnicity is gen

erally

associated

wi th

high

rates

of endogamy, the

sharing of clusters of beliefs and vales marked by the

use of a common language, and is often

territorially

isolable, the discemment of ethnic variation is not

impossible. As

wi th

allaspectsof archaeological analy

sis, the introduction of ethnicity into the variables

studied must bedone

wi th

care.Ethnic boundaries are

fluid contracting or expanding

wi th

majorpoliticaland

economic shifts in the society at large. Ethnic identifica-

tions coexist

w i th

other social

identi f cat ions

meaning

79


15/31

80 HelenPerislein Pollard

that occupational and class boundaries, for example,

may cross-cut ethnic groups. Different artifact

classes,

or

properties of artifacts may signal thesedifferent social

boundaries. Moreover,

wi th in

a single multi-ethnic,

complex society the intensity of ethnic

affiliation

may

differ,

and along

wi th

this the number and kinds of

markers usedby a group to signal ethnicity may vary.

Finally,

the archaeologist

deals with

units of time that

often

compress

ethnic maps andobscurethe

processes

ofethnicemergenceandchange.

Justas complex societies vary in theirbasicstructures

and developmental trajectories, one must expect similar

variation in the structure and significance of ethnicity.

Aspart of the larger processof developing theories of

the nature of complex societies, one goal should there

fore

be the development o fmodels ofethnicity,

based

on

various ethnohistorically knowable societies, and their

application to earlier

polities.

Wi th

this goal in

mind,

a model of the structure o f

ethnicity

in the proto-

historic

Tarascan state of central

Mxico

(AD 1450-

1520) is hereinpresented Fig.7.1).

TheTarascanterritorialstatein its sixteenth-century

orm is renowned for its high degree of political

and relatively unchallenged control of its

p AZTEC

H TARASCAN

y

QUICHE

M

7 1

Protohistoric

Mesoamerica

territory

(Gorenstein and Pollard 1983, Pollard 1993).

When viewed

from

the perspective of the geopolitical

core, the Lake

Ptzcuaro

Basin,thesecharacteristics can

be related to theemergence,by the protohistoric period,

of a social system

with

a fully

Tarascan

identity, pro-

duced by the conscious subordination and replacement

of

localethnic/linguisticstatusas thebasisfor social or

political power. Despite clear indications of earlier

ethnic heterogeneity in central

Michoacn

Relacinde

Michoacn [1541] 1956), by the sixteenth century the

population

was self-identifying and being identified by

othersas solelyTarascan RelacindeMichoacn[1541]

1956;Suma deVisitasdePueblos[1547-50] 1905;Rela-

ciones

Geogrficas[1579-81] 1987; Warren 1968, 1985,

among others).

Such subordination and replacement of ethnic

vari

ationdistinguishes this system

from

the mainstream of

protohistoric Mesoamerica,

which

was characterized by

ethnic economic and political specialization and

mult i -

ethnic social classes (Carrasco 1971; Zantwijk 1973).

Along the Tarascan mil i tary frontier, however, the

Tarascan poli ty

was multi-ethnic,

plural,

and demo-

graphically largely non-Tarascan (Mendieta y

Nez

1940; Brand 1943; Gorenstein 1974, 1985; Herrejn

Peredo

1978;

onzlez

Brespo 1979; Contreras

Ramrez

1987). Taken together,

these

policies, the one emphasiz-

ingsocial homogeneity of the

lite

and a new common

Tarascan

identity, and the other emphasizing

plurality

and heterogeneity, appearto be in

conflict.

However,

these

two distinct policies of ethnic assimi-

lation and ethnic segregation, dominated community

interaction

in geographically

seprate

zones of the

Tarascan

poli ty.

By 1520 they had resulted in the ethnic

boundaries recorded inthe early documents and mapped

by

Brand (1943; Fig. 7.2). Combining our knowledge of

the ecological, economic,

poli t ical ,

and artifactual

vari

ation

wi th in

this territory we canproposethe following

model of the

Tarascan state.

one

ofassimilation

This

is the territory

wi th in which

Tarascan was the

dominant

language

and cultural identity was ethnic Tar

ascan.

It included at

least

two distinct regions.

Ethnicheartland

This

is the

zonewi th inwhich

the

Tarascan

politicalcore

existed,

wi th in

whichTarascan

vales

and norms were

held by the bulk of the population, and

wi th in

which

there

was a similar economic and settlement adaptation

to the

regin

(Stanislawski 1947). Thus, thiszonedefines

the regional marketing network of the core Fig.7.3) and


16/31

Ethnicityin theTarascanstate 81

ig

7.2 Sixteenth century

ethnicllinguisticboundaries.

Based on

Brand

1943.

the primary extent of

Tarascan religin

and ideology.

The population

wi th in

this

zone,

especially the

lite,

participated in a unitary social system dating to the

political

incorporation of central

Michoacn

(1350-

1440) and the

emergence

of

Tarascan

identity (Goren

stein and Pollary 1983). The geographical extent of this

zone is largely co-terminous

wi th

the

regin wi th in

brumfield y fox 1994. factional competition (1).pdf

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