bribery as a non tariff barrier to trade

5/27/2018 Bribery as a Non Tariff Barrier to Trade

1/107| iBribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

A CASE STUDY OF EAST AFRICAN TRADE CORRIDORS

BRIBERY AS A NON-TARIFF

BARRIER TO TRADE


2/107ii | Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade


3/107| 1Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We express our heartelt gratitude to the ransparency International chapters in Burundi, Kenya,Rwanda, Uganda and the ransparency Forum in anzania or supporting and acilitating thesurvey across the region. Te sacrifices both in terms o staff time and other resources greatlymade the initiative a success.

Further, we kindly acknowledge the selfless contribution o different stakeholders in the tradeand transport sectors across the region who took their valuable time to grant interviews andattending orums on the survey. Te insights drawn rom them added valuable dimensions tothe report.

Te field survey was ably supported by a team o dedicated technical research assistants across

thefive countries. o them, we extend our unreserved gratitude.

Lastly, we register our appreciation to rademark East Arica (MEA) or their kind financialgrant that made the project possible. We are urther grateul to MEA or the constant supportand guidance in the various aspects o the survey.

Samuel Mbithi Kimeu

Executive DirectorTransparency International-Kenya


4/1072 | Bribery as a non-tariff barrier to trade

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 INRODUCION .............................................................................................................10

1.1 OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................ 10

1.2 SURVEY ASKS ................................................................................................................. 10

1.3 MEHODOLOGY............................................................................................................. 11

1.4 EXPECED SURVEY OUPUS ................................................................................... 12

2 SURVEY FINDINGS ......................................................................................................... 14

2.1 SRUCURE OF SURVEY RESPONDENS ...............................................................14

2.2 RESPONSES BY RANSPORERS AND DRIVERS ................................................... 15

2.3 RESPONSES BY CLEARING AND FORWARDING AGENS ................................. 46

2.4 CUSOMS AND POLICE OFFICERS RESPONSES O

CORRUPION ALLEGAIONS ..................................................................................... 65

3 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 76

4 RECOMMENDAIONS O IMPROVE RADE FACILIAION SERVICES

ALONG HE MAJOR EC RANSPOR CORRIDORS ............................................. 79



LIST OF CHARTS, TABLESAND ANNEXES

MAP 1: Major EAC road transport routes .................................................................................. 3

List of ChartsChart 1: Structure o respondents by country and category ................................................... 15

Chart 2: Structure o transport respondents by size o operations ....................................... 16

Chart 3: Frequency o interactions with revenue authorities .................................................21

Chart 4: ransporters interaction with police office ................................................................ 21

Chart 5: Frequency o interactions between drivers and police

officers at weighbridge stations ................................................................................ 22

Chart 6: ransporters / Drivers interactions with the customs officers ............................... 23Chart 7: Compliance to revenue authority laws ....................................................................... 25

Chart 8: Compliance with weighbridge laws ............................................................................ 26

Chart 9: Compliance with laws at police checkpoints ............................................................ 26

Chart 10: Effectiveness o rules or service delivery by revenue authorities.........................30

Chart 11: Effectiveness o rules or service delivery at weighbridge stations ...................... 30

Chart 12: Effectiveness o rules or service delivery at police checkpoints/roadblocks ...... 31

Chart 13: Bribes payment to transit staff by transporters ....................................................... 33

Chart 14: How bribery expenses appear in transporters books o account .......................... 33

Chart 15: Means through which drivers account or bribery expenses to employers ......... 33Chart 16: Amount o bribes paid by transporters to Regulatory

Authorities in 2011 (US Dollar) ............................................................................... 34

Chart 17: Bribes paid by the drivers to regulatory authorities in 2011 (US Dollars) ......... 35

Chart 18: Problems likely to prompt transporters to give a bribe to officers o

regulatory authorities ................................................................................................. 36

Chart 19: Problems likely to prompt drivers to give a bribe to officers o regulatory

authorities .................................................................................................................... 37

Chart 20: Factors that determine the size o bribe ................................................................... 37

Chart 21: Reporting o corruption by transporters ................................................................38Chart 22: Institution to which bribery was reported by drivers ............................................ 38

Chart 23: Why corruption was not reported by the transporters ..........................................39

Chart 24: Whether transporters are ever engaged in policy decisions relevant

to transport sector ....................................................................................................... 40

Chart 25: ransporters rating o engagement in policy-making orums ............................. 41

Chart 26: Whether transporters have ever complained to authorities .................................. 42

Chart 27: ransporters satisaction levels with how complaint was addressed ................... 43

Chart 28: Period o business operations ....................................................................................47

Chart 29: Whether C& F services are involved in corruption ............................................... 48

Chart 30: Corruption as a problem at transit points ............................................................... 48



Chart 31: Problems likely to prompt a clearing agent consider offering bribe .................... 49

Chart 32: Given or required to give bribe in the last 12 months ............................................ 50

Chart 33: Average bribe paid in last 12 months ....................................................................... 51

Chart 34: How did you know a bribe was expected rom you ............................................... 52

Chart 35: Point o bribe payment ............................................................................................... 53

Chart 36: Consequences o not paying bribes .......................................................................... 54

Chart 37: Institutions where bribe was paid ............................................................................. 54

Chart 38: Reporting o bribery incidences ............................................................................... .55

Chart 39: o whom bribe was reported .....................................................................................55

Chart 40: Reasons or not reporting bribery incidence........................................................... 56

Chart 41: Rank o officers most likely to demand / expect bribe ........................................... 57

Chart 42: Perception o bribery across different ranks o custom officials ........................... 58

Chart 43: Determining actor in the size o the deal ............................................................... 59

Chart 44: Expectation or year 2012 on corruption levels at customs................................... 59Chart 45: Reasons or delays in clearing goods at customs .................................................. 60

Chart 46: Whether CFAs are engaged in any policy decisions made or the

transport sector ...........................................................................................................61

Chart 47: Effectiveness o the transport sector policy

making orums as perceived by CFAs. .....................................................................62

Chart 48: Years o service or customs and police officers who responded to the survey .. 66

Chart 49: Responses by Customs and police officers on whether allegation that operations at

transit points and weighbridge stations involves corrupt

practices is a air perception ......................................................................................67Chart 50: Problems that prompt users to pay bribes perception by customs

officers .......................................................................................................................... 68

Chart 51: Problems that prompt bribery payments as perceived by police

officers .......................................................................................................................... 68

Chart 52: Awareness about bribery attempts and whether bribes are actually

taken ............................................................................................................................. 69

Chart 53: Rating o speed o delivery o service at customs transit stations and

police checks at weighbridges ................................................................................... 70

Chart 54: Whether corruption reporting mechanisms exist at weighbridge stations/ policecheckpoints and customs transit stations ................................................................ 71

Chart 55: Perceived effectiveness o corruption reporting mechanisms ............................... 71

Chart 56: Perceived capacity o Customs transit stations to serve customers ...................... 72

Chart 57: Perceived efficiency o Customs systems used to serve the

public at transit stations ............................................................................................. 73



LIST OF TABLES

able 1: arget survey respondents ......................................................................................... 14

able 2: Contributions by category o respondents and EAC countries to

the bribery incidences survey................................................................................... 15

able 3: Structure o drivers and transport respondents by country ................................. 16

able 4: Structure o drivers and transporters respondents by years in operations ......... 17

able 5: Frequency o transporting goods .............................................................................. 17

able 6: Weight o goods handled by the transporters and drivers per month .................19

able 7: ime (hours) taken at weighbridge stations ............................................................ 28

able 8: Bribery costs incurred by drivers and transporters as a percentage o

monthly value o goods transported ........................................................................ 35

able 9: Institutions that have previously invited transporters or engagement in

policy making ............................................................................................................. 41able 10: Reasons or poor ratings on effectiveness o policy-making orums ...................42

able 11: Key suggested improvements by transporters ....................................................... 44

able 12: Key suggested improvements by drivers .................................................................. 45

able 13: Distribution o CFAs respondents to the survey ....................................................46

able 14: Institutions that have previously engaged CFAs in discussion orums................ 61

able 15: Key suggested improvements by CFAs .................................................................... 64

able 16: Distribution o Customs Stations/ ransit points and Weighbridge

Stations/ Police checkpoints covered by survey ...................................................... 65

able 17: Key suggested improvements by Customs Officers ............................................... 74able 18: Key suggested improvements by Police officers ..................................................... 75



LIST OF ANNEXES

Annex 1: Most preerred transport routes by transporters .................................................... 81

Annex 2: Most preerred transport routes by drivers ............................................................ 85

Annex 3: Detailed suggested improvements by transporters to enhance efficiency

in the transportation o goods within EAC ............................................................ 90

Annex 4: Detailed suggested improvements by drivers to enhance efficiency in the

transportation o goods within EAC ........................................................................ 92

Annex 5: Detailed suggested improvements by CFAs to enhance

efficiency in the transportation o goods within EAC ........................................... 94

Annex 6: Customs station/ transit stations covered by survey ..............................................97

Annex 7: Weighbridge station/ police checkpoints covered by survey ................................97

Annex 8: Detailed suggested improvements by police officers to enhance efficiency

in the transportation o goodswithin EAC ..............................................................98Annex 9: Detailed suggested improvements by customs officers to

enhance efficiency in the ransportation o goods within EAC ......................... 100



LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BCI - Business Climate IndexCE - Common External ariff

CFA - Clearing and Forwarding Agents

EABC - East Arican Business Council

EAC - East Arican Community

EU - European Union

GVM - Gross Vehicle Mass

ICD - Inland Container Depots

KAM - Kenya Association o Manuacturers

NB - Non-ariff Barriers

SEA - South East Asia

SWS - Single Window System

USD - United States Dollars

UNRA - Uganda National Roads Authority

OECD - Organization or Economic Cooperation and Development

ABOA - anzania Bus Owners Association



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Te East Arican Common Market Protocol that came into orce in 2010 provides or the

ree flow o goods, labour, services and capital across the EAC bloc. o achieve this, membersundertook to remove all tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade. While progress has been madeon the removal o the ormer, doing away with the Non-tariff barriers along the main transportcorridors o the region has remained a challenge.

aking cognizance o this, ransparency International-Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundiin conjunction with the ransparency Forum in anzania conducted a survey along EACsmain corridors the Northern and Central corridors- that orm a vital trade link in the regionbetween August and November 2011. Te survey objectives were to measure the impact obribery practices and create public awareness on the vice.

Te survey covered 1731 respondents sampled across key players including drivers, clearing andorwarding agents, regulatory bodies; customs and police authorities.

Almost all private sector players interviewed (drivers, transporters and clearing and orwardingagents) cited the likelihood o unnecessary delays as the major reason that prompts briberypayments. Tis, it was noted, was a result o numerous documentation, slow pace o services,poor understanding o clearing procedures and high tax levels. Te survey urther reveals thatbribes were mainly demanded to speed up the service at various points, avoid ull verification ogoods and to avoid paying ull tax and other charges payable. Bribes were also offered to avoidinvestigation especially on raud attempts, contraband and illegal goods or excess weight carried

by the trucks, expired import licenses and speeding on the roads or parking offences.

In determining the size o bribe payable, negotiations came top. Te value o consignment andthe urgency were some o the other actors sighted by the despondents. According to the survey,truck drivers have devised various means o accounting or bribery expenses to their employers.Te most common is road trip expense. Tese are anticipated regular amounts given prior to thestart o a journey and ad hoc miscellaneous expenses. In the transporters books o accounts, thebribes are normally disguised either as anticipated regular amounts or as ad hoc miscella neousexpenses.

Te survey also established that regulatory authorities in anzania took the highest amounto bribes paid at USD12,640, Kenya (USD6,715), Uganda (USD3,672) Rwanda (USD679) andBurundi (USD293) in 2011. In the case o anzania, bribery costs per year consisted o about18.6% o the value o goods transported.

Te survey recommends various interventions to respond to the business environment to reduceopportunities and motivations or bribery. First, the bloc should harmonize such practices likecustom codes, valuation standards and import clearance. Harmonization will significantlyreduce delays occasioned by imports and exports standards not allowable in member states.Partner states need to strengthen the advocacy capacity o their business associations that dealwith transport and CFA issues, to enable such institutions to engage regulatory authorities in

effective policy dialogue that would acilitate efficient and corrupt-ree transportation withinthe region. Such capacity building could be acilitated with the support o donor resources sincemost business associations lack requisite financial resources to address the needs o their clients



to relevant regulatory authorities (especially with respect to CFAs and transporters associations).

Te member states should devise education programmes targeting the key players along thecorridors on issues touching on the rules, regulations and standards. Te same should also

include ethical practice, sanctions and penalties or non-compliance.



1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

Te East Arican Common Market Protocol came into orce in July 2010. It provides or theree flow o goods, labour, services and capital across the EAC Partner states. o achieve thisgoal, the Partner states committed themselves to acilitate the removal o all tariff and non-tariff barriers (NBs) to intra-EAC trade. While progress has been achieved on the removalo tariff barriers, doing away with the NBs has remained a key challenge. Tis is evidencedby the findings o the 2004, 2006/07, 2008, and 2011 Business Climate Index Surveys, whichtrack improvements and/or deterioration in the general business climate and NBs in the EACcountries.

Bribery along the transport corridors has been identified as one o the key NBs in the EAC

region. As part o efforts to acilitate the elimination o NBs, ransparency International withsupport rom MEA, conducted a survey on bribery incidences experienced along the EACtransport corridors between August and November 2011.

Te main objectives were:

a) o trace and measure the impact o bribery practices along the major transport arteries inthe East Arican Community region.

b) o create public awareness and evidence about bribery practices necessary to acilitateadvocacy on requisite legal, policy and administrative reorms.

Te survey was conducted through a series o interviews covering respondents rom thetransport and trade sector in all the five EAC partner states. Tese included; police officers,customs officials, clearing and orwarding agents (CFA), truck drivers and transport companieswho are involved in trade transactions along the Central and Northern transit corridors. Tedraf findings were presented and validated in workshops in all the partner states between Apriland May 2012.

1.2 Survey Tasks

Te key tasks o the study were:

a) o trace the prevalence, magnitude and trends o bribery practices along the main transportarteries in the East Arican region. Tis inormation is expected to provide necessaryevidence or ransparency International advocacy activities. Te country rating is alsoexpected to prompt Partner states into responsive action.

b) o study the efficiency o cargo clearance at the customs and weighbridges stations, and atpolice checkpoints along the major transport corridors in the region. Tis is because delayedcargo-clearance adds to storage and transport costs, and also provides opportunities orbribery practices in order to speed up the process.

I-Kenya in partnership with key civil society and private sector stakeholders across the regionwill use the findings o the study to advocate or the identified challenges to be addressed. Teexpected outcomes o these advocacy campaigns are legal, policy and administrative reormsthat address the transportation bottlenecks and related bribery practices experienced while



transporting goods along major transport corridors within the EAC.

1.3 Methodology

Te survey was coordinated in the five East Arican partner states by researchers rom I-Kenya,ocusing on establishing personal, first-hand experiences o bribery practices in 2011. It targetedkey players involved in transport activities along the Northern and Central corridors in EAC.Te respondents included (i) private sector players; drivers, and clearing and orwarding agents;and (ii) regulatory bodies covering customs and police authorities. Te survey interviews wereconducted between August and November 2011 using questionnaires that had both open-ended and closed questions. Te questions were tailor-made or each category o respondentsand administered through ace-to-ace interviews, ocusing on among other issues, key actorsperceived as being the driving orce behind bribery practices, existing mechanisms to deal withbribery, and recommendations on measures that need to be taken to combat the bribery practices.On account o the sensitivity o inormation sought, the researchers gave firm assurance that anyinormation given would be treated with strict confidentiality.

Te survey employed different strategies to collect the inormation. Key stakeholders in transportand acilitation services were identified prior to commencement o fieldwork. Te researchersconducted initial mapping meetings through ormal and inormal interactions with keystakeholders, including transporters associations, drivers associations, and representatives opolice and revenue authorities, aimed at identiying relevant issues and concerns that inormedthe design o the questionnaire. Tese initial meetings also served as an avenue to get a buy-inor the survey. Te sampling ramework or the transporters, clearing and orwarding agents(CFAs) and drivers was derived rom a list o members o the trade associations where available,

while in cases where such lists were not comprehensive enough, respondents were identifiedat the various interview points. Te survey thereafer selected a target o one respondent perstation among the CFAs and transporters. However, given the varied experiences betweencheckpoints and transit stations along the transport corridors, some o the companies wereinterviewed more than once at different points along the corridors. Te revenue authorities inthe respective countries provided lists o custom stations that cover the transport corridors romwhich relevant respondent officers were selected. At least two custom officers were targeted inthe survey in each o the selected customs stations. Police authorities helped to identiy relevantstations rom which at least two respondents were selected at random.

Based on initial meetings with those in the transport sector, the survey identified 2,111

target respondents; 197 rom Burundi, Kenya (683), Rwanda (239), anzania (707),and Uganda (285 ) respondents. Te distribution o these respondents was; 1,518 truckdrivers,CFAs(267),transporters (190), Customs Officers (68 ) and Police officers (68).

Data was then collected through ace-to-ace interviews with the selected transport companies,truck drivers and CFAs; and with customs and police officers manning the selected checkpointsand transit stations. For the drivers, the sampled respondents were interviewed at different transitpoints, weighbridges, roadblocks and other authorised stops, while or the transport companiesand CFAs, interviews were conducted in their offices. Te customs officers were interviewed romthe precincts o their offices in the different transit stations. In isolated cases, some respondents

were interviewed rom discrete points to ensure confidentiality. Te interviews were conductedin close proximity to the work or operation sites so as to maintain relevance and credibility



o the responses, using pre-prepared questionnaires with open-ended and closed questions. Inaddition, the research team made observations on actual practices taking place at the customstransit points, weighbridges and police roadblocks.

Te survey also sought to compare the findings with those that have emerged rom similarones, particularly the 2011 Business Climate Index (2011 BCI) survey. I-Kenya hopes that theinormation gathered will inorm statutory authorities and policy-makers about the extent anddepth o bribery and corruption practices along the EAC transport corridors and consequentlyguide the design o reorms aimed at making the transport industry competitive and efficient.

1.4 Expected Survey Outputs

Te key expected outputs o the survey were:

a) An analytical report with clearly documented bribery practices along the EAC transportcorridors, and indications o how the actors that underpin the practice are interlinked.b) Sufficient evidence o bribery practices that would orm the basis o I-Kenya advocacy

campaign strategy, and acilitate the design o a proactive approach by key institutionsinvolved in trade acilitation aimed at streamlining their service operations. Key tradeacilitation institutions include EAC Customs Authorities, Weighbridges and EAC policeauthorities.

c) Established contacts between I-Kenya and key players in the respective trade acilitationinstitutions

d) Documented bribery experiences by inland transport operators along major transportcorridors in the region.

SURVEY ACHIEVEMENTS

Te survey covered 1,731 respondents or 82% o the target number; transporters (19), drivers(1,185), CFAs (190), customs officers (98) and police officers (68). Kenya and anzania achieveda 100% success rate, while Uganda achieved 86% success rate. Burundi and Rwanda responseson the other hand, were quite dismal, with Burundi achieving 24% and Rwanda 21% responserates respectively. However, based on the overall success rate o 82%, the survey is consideredsuccessul, and its findings can thereore be used with confidence to demonstrate the bribery

practices that take place along the major transport corridors in EAC, namely the Northern andCentral Corridors, and additionally the Nairobi-Arusha link. Te Dar-es-Salaam-Moshi-Arushacorridor is also an important transport route.

Te major road transport routes covered in the survey are shown in Map 1 below.



Map 1 : MAJOR EAC ROAD TRANSPORT ROUTES



2 SURVEY FINDINGS

2.1 STRUCTURE OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS

2.1.1 TARGET RESPONDENTS

As pointed out in the methodology, the survey targeted 2,111 respondents; Burundi (68), Kenya(683), Rwanda (239), anzania (707), and Uganda (285) respondents. Tese target respondentswere distributed into truck drivers (1,518), CFAs (267), transporters (190), customs officers (68)and police officers (68 ) as shown in able 1 below.

Table 1: Target survey respondents

Respondent category Kenya Uganda Rwanda anzania Burundi otal arget

ruck Drivers 509 196 193 469 151 1,518

Clearing & ForwardingAgents

67 52 27 101 20 267

ransporters 69 11 5 99 6 190

Custom officials 18 13 7 20 10 68

Police 20 13 7 18 10 68

otal arget 683 285 239 707 197 2,111

otal Achieved 683 244 49 707 48 1,731

Percent success rate 100% 86% 21% 100% 24% 82%

Source: Survey Data

2.1.2 ACTUAL SURVEY RESPONDENTS

ruck drivers constitutted the largest proption o the sample at 68%, ollowed by transportersand CFAs each at 11%, Customs Officers at 6%, and Police officers at 4%. Overall, 44% o therespondents came rom anzania, Kenya (39%), Uganda (14%), and Rwanda and Burundieach 3%. Based on the large number o respondents, the equally large number o businessrepresentatives (transporters, drivers and CFAs), and the high responses by both anzania andKenya respondents (in which the Central, Northern Corridors and Nairobi-Namanga-Arushacorridors are located), the findings on bribery incidences thereore largely represent the briberybottlenecks experienced while transporting goods along these routes. Te distribution o thesurvey respondents by countries and respondent categories is presented in both able 2 andChart 1 below.



Table 2: Contributions by category of respondents and EAC countries to the bribery incidences survey

Country ransporters Drivers CFAs Customs Officers Police officersotalrespondents

Percentagecontribution

Burundi 6 6 6 20 10 48 3%

Kenya 69 509 67 18 20 683 39%

Rwanda 5 5 5 27 7 49 3%

anzania 99 469 101 20 18 707 41%

Uganda 11 196 11 13 13 244 14%

otalrespondents

190 1185 190 98 68 1731 100%

Percentagecontribution

11% 68% 11% 6% 4% 100%

Source: Survey Data

Chart 1: Structure of respondents by country and category

Source: Survey Data

2.2 RESPONSES BY TRANSORTERS AND DRIVERS

2.2.1 INTRODUCTION

Some 190 East Arica transport businesses responded to the survey, with 52% rom anzania,Kenya (36%) Uganda (6%), and Burundi and Rwanda each 3% as shown in able 3 below. Telargest percentage o respondents were rom medium-scale transport companies with between100-250 employees at 57%, ollowed by small-scale companies with between 10-99 employeesat 30%, large-scale companies with more than 250 employees (11%), and micro-companies with1-9 employees (3%) as shown in Chart 2 below.

Tose firms which have had more than five years o operations made up 59%, o the respondentsollowed by those with between 1-3 years at 21%, those with between 3-5 years at 12%, and thosewith less than one year in the transport business at 7% as shown in able 4 below.



Te survey covered 1,185 drivers; 509 or 43% rom Kenya, anzania (469 or 40%), Uganda (196or 17%). Rwandas and Burundis was negligible. Out o the total, those with more than fiveyears operational experience took the largest percentage o drivers respondent category at 47%,ollowed by those with between 3-5 years and between 1-3 years experience each taking 24%,

and those with less than one year experience at 6% as shown in able 4 below.

Te responses by transport companies largely represent the views o anzanian and Kenyantransporters in the SME category that have been in operation or more than three years (i.e. 3-5and more than five years experience).

Table 3: Structure of drivers and transport respondents by country

Country

Drivers ransporters

Number orespondents

Percentage contribution Number o respondentsPercentagecontribution

Burundi 6 1% 6 3%Kenya 509 43% 69 36%

Rwanda 5 0% 5 3%

anzania 469 40% 99 52%

Uganda 196 17% 11 6%

otal 1185 100% 190 100%

Source: Survey data

Chart 2: Structure of transport respondents by size of operations

Source: Survey Data



Table 4: Structure of drivers and transporters respondents by years in operations

Respondentcategory

CountryLess than 1year

1-3 years 3-5yearsMore than 5years

otal

Drivers

Kenya 17 125 120 247 509

Uganda 2 44 42 108 196anzania 49 110 114 196 469Rwanda 0 1 1 3 5Burundi 0 2 4 0 6

otal 68 282 281 554 1185

Percentage share o totalrespondents

6% 24% 24% 47% 100%

ransporters

Burundi 0 2 4 0 6Kenya 0 1 5 63 69Rwanda 0 4 1 0 5

anzania 14 32 12 41 99

Uganda 0 1 1 9 11

otal 14 40 23 113 190Percentage share o totalrespondents

7% 21% 12% 59% 100%

Source: Survey Data

2.2.2 FREQUENCY OF TRANSPORTING GOODS

Te survey sought to find how active the transporters and drivers have been in the transportbusiness, and by implication the level o exposure to bribery practices. As can be seen in able5 below, an average o 82% o transporters either make daily, weekly or 2-5 trips per week. Tisshows that most drivers who participated in the survey were involved in long-haul trade (that

is; journeys taking up-to a week). On the other hand, an average 80% o the drivers make eitherweekly or monthly trips an indication that the two groups rubbed shoulders with the regulatoryauthorities thereby raising the chances o being engaged in bribery.

Table 5: Frequency of transporting goods

Respondent

category

Frequency o

transporting goodsKenya anzania Uganda Rwanda Burundi

otal

respondents

Percentage

contribution

Drivers

More than once a day 3 1 15 3 0 22 2%

Once a day 32 3 71 1 0 107 9%

Weekly 321 116 211 0 5 653 55%

Monthly 111 40 148 1 1 301 25%

Occasionally 42 36 24 0 0 102 9%otal respondents 509 196 469 5 6 1185 100%Percentagecontribution to totaldrivers covered

43% 17% 40% 0% 1% 100%

ransporters

Daily 17 8 39 3 0 67 35%wice to five times aweek

15 2 20 1 0 38 20%

Weekly 17 1 28 0 5 51 27%

Monthly 7 0 3 1 1 12 6%Occasionally 5 0 9 0 0 14 7%

Never 8 0 0 0 0 8 4%

otal respondents 69 11 99 5 6 190 100%

Percentagecontribution to totaltransporters covered

36% 6% 52% 3% 3% 100%

Source: Survey Data



2.2.3 VALUE OF GOODS TRANSPORTED ALONG THE EACCORRIDORS

Te value o goods moved through the EAC region totaled USD54.84 million per month anaverage o USD 553,914 per company per month. Te task o customs officers is to check whethergoods have been correctly declared in the import/export documents, and i wrong declaration isdetected, this becomes an avenue to solicit or bribery so as to give clearance. On the other hand,part o police officers responsibilities is to check whether drivers carry the correct transportdocuments including those relating to goods being erried, and i such documents are missing,this increases the chances or bribery incidences.

2.2.4 WEIGHT OF GOODS HANDLED BY THE TRANSPORTERSAND DRIVERS PER MONTH

Te 1,185 drivers who participated in the survey, excluding the ones rom Rwanda, transporteda combined haulage o 255,984 tons per month , with most o it transported through anzania(237,635 tons), Kenya (12,665 tons), Uganda (4,844 tons) and Burundi (840 tons). Rwandadrivers did not give the required data on the weight o goods transported.

Te total tonnage or the 182 transport companies that participated in the survey is 834,514 tonsper month, with Kenya taking the lead at 445,374 tons or 53% o the total weight, ollowed byUganda (302,369 tons), anzania (81,491 tons), Rwanda (4,860 tons) and Burundi (4,230 tons)as shown in able 6 below.

While there are discrepancies between drivers and transporters data, the volume o goodstransported in a given period is huge. Given that one o the major reasons or police roadblocksis to check whether transport vehicles have exceeded the allowed weights on both the GrossVehicle Mass (GVM) and axle load limits, the large volume o goods transported along EACsmajor corridors is an indication that there could be high levels o bribery practices takingplace. Tis problem is compounded by the act that EAC countries apply varying measures orchecking truck weight. Kenya applies the GVM (the weight o the goods and the truck) whileUganda and anzania use axle load limits (allowed weight on each axle). Rwanda and Burundiboth have weighbridge regulations that speciy trucks should not exceed a maximum o 53 tons.However, Rwanda enorces weight limits or customs revenue purposess, while Burundi doesnot have weighbridges to enable enorcement o the regulations. rucks originating rom Kenya

could get approval or conorming to required weight specifications, but when they cross intoUganda, they get charged or exceeding axle load limits especially because some o the goodserried may tilt towards some axles during vehicle movement thus indicating excess weight onsuch axles despite the truck conorming to the required GVM. As a result, drivers are chargedin Ugandan courts or overloading. o avoid going to court which results in a lot o timewastage and delayed deliveries drivers offer to pay bribes afer which they get clearance toproceed with their journey. Tis problem is especially cited as prevalent at the Busitema andMbale weighbridges stations (about 40 km rom Malaba Border Station). Based on the largenumber o commercial trucks that ply the major transport routes in the region, including trucksthat lack required documents to prove that their trucks are within the allowed weight limits,bribery ends up as a serious problem thus contributing substantially to the high cost o doingbusiness. A casual glance at the vehicles stopped at all EAC roadblocks would indicate that theyare commercial vehicles (whether passenger or goods-type vehicles). In the mean time, EACpartner states have agreed to harmonise their weighbridge regulations at a maximum o 56 tons.



Table 6: Weight of goods handled by the transporters and drivers per month

RespondentCategory

Weight o goods permonth (onnes)

Kenya Uganda anzania Burundi Rwandaotalweight

Drivers summaryweights o goodstransported

Lowest weight

transported per month(tonnes)

4 2 2 50 no data

Highest weighttransported per month(tonnes)

3,780 648 100,000 420 no data

otal weight transportedper month (tonnes)

12,665 4,844 237,635 840 no data255,984(Excl.Rwanda)

Average weighttransported per month(tonnes)

25 25 516 70 no data

ransporterssummary weights ogoods transported

Lowest weighttransported per month(tonnes)

8 4 2 50 10

Highest weighttransported per month(tonnes)

400,000 300,000 20,000 120 3,000

otal weight transportedper month (tonnes)

445,374 302,369 81,491 420 4,860 834,514

Average weighttransported per month(tonnes)

6,748 27,488 867 70 3,353

Source: Survey Data

2.2.5 MOST FREQUENTLY USED ROUTES

For Burundi, the most important route used by transporters is the Central Corridor, startingrom Dar-es-Salam-Muyinga-Ngozi-Kayanza-Bujumbura; this corridor carries up to 83% oexports and imports into land-locked Burundi. Te Northern Corridor, which stretches romBujumbura -Kigali-Kampala, takes the balance, an indication o the importance o the CentralCorridor.

For Kenyan transporters, the Northern Corridor that starts rom Mombasa passing throughNairobi and onwards to other inland and neighbouring countries towns (such as Nakuru,Eldoret, Kisumu, Malaba, Busia, Kisii, Kampala, Juba, Kigali), was cited as the route mostrequently used. Tis route is used by at least hal (59%) o the respondents to the survey. Teimportance o the route to the regional traffic cannot be overemphasized. It links Uganda, mostparts o Rwanda and South Sudan with the outside world.

For Rwanda, the most popular route cited by the five transporters is the Central Corridor thatstarts rom Dar es Salaam-Rusumo-Kigali, taking 80% o the countrys outgoing and incomingcargo; while the Northern Corridor starting rom Mombasa to Kigali takes the remainder. Tesignificance o this finding is that transporters opt to use the longer Central Corridor as opposed

to the shorter Northern Corridor route, which was the previously preerred route o choice. Tisis probably because the Northern Corridor has numerously been cited as a difficult route totransit through due to the numerous police roadblocks and weighbridges where each truck hasto make a stop.



Tis could be the main reason why the Northern Corridor route is avoided by Rwandantransporters leading to loss o economic opportunities or Kenya (such as hotel and ood businessservices and business sales by ueling stations). Te consequences o corrupt practices, includingthe increased operational costs and indirect economic losses to Kenya is staggering.

Almost hal o the anzanian respondents (44%) said the most requently used route is theDar es Salaam-Moshi-Arusha-Namanga-Nairobi. Tis route links with both the Central andNorthern Corridors through Arusha, but is not indicated as a significant route. Te othertransport routes covering the Central Corridor rom Dar es Salaam to anzania inland townsand linking anzania with Zambia through unduma and Mbeya take 56% o the countrys

volume o goods.

For Ugandan transporters, the most requently used route is the Northern Corridor romMombasa-Nairobi-Malaba/Busia and vice versa, which takes an average 78% o the countrysincoming and outgoing cargo. Other transport routes are the Kampala-Kinshasa, Kabale-

Kaluma, and Kampala to Kigali and Southern Sudan.

2.2.6 NATURE OF INTERACTIONS WITH REGULATORYAUTHORITIES

2.2.6.1 INTERACTIONS WITH REVENUE AUTHORITIES

As shown in Chart 3 below, most transporters and drivers interact with revenue authorities ona daily or weekly basis with revenue authority officers as they move goods within the region.At least 71% o the total EAC transporters and 53% o drivers have either had daily or weekly

interactions with the officers while 35% o the drivers indicated that they had monthly interactionswith revenue authorities. Te average requency o interactions with the authorities is similarto country level responses. Tese interactions occurred during the declaration o incoming oroutgoing cargo, payment o relevant taxes, applications or and cancellation o transit bonds,movement o cargo rom customs bonded warehouses and Inland Container Depots (ICDs) andother customs documentation processes relating to the transport o goods. Tese responsibilitiesare usually handled by the cargo owner or the transporter rather than the driver, and the latteronly gets necessary documentation rom the transporter just beore the start o a journey.

On the other hand, transporters and drivers have almost equally significant weekly interactions

with the officers, which occur when cargo is either on transit or in the process o being movedto an ICD or to the market. In such cases, customs officers periodically check to reduce cases odiversion o the goods into the domestic market. ransporters and drivers also reported highmonthly interactions with revenue officers when transit bonds are being retired, and whengoods or which customs duty had not been paid are being accounted or. All these differentinteractions between drivers and transporters with revenue authorities present opportunity orbribery, especially when the transporters or drivers have not complied with mandatory customsrequirements, or when they want the clearance process speeded up.



Chart 3: Frequency of interactions with Revenue authorities

Source: Survey Data

2.2.6.2 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN TRANSPORTERS ANDDRIVERS WITH POLICE OFFICERS

Te requency o daily and weekly interactions between transporters and drivers with the police

officers is quite high as shown by Chart 4 below. At least 96% o all transporters and 69% o thedrivers have either daily or weekly interactions with police officers during the transportationo goods. In theory, it is only the drivers who should constantly be on the road, but in reality,the transporters also maintain their presence to ensure smooth running o their businessesby cultivating a good relationship with the police. Tis creates a perect situation or bribery.Tis is similar to the country-level interactions although or Burundi, all interactions betweentransporters and police officers are indicated as taking place on a weekly basis.

Chart 4: Transporters interaction with police officers

Source: Survey Data



2.2.6.3 INTERACTIONS WITH POLICE OFFICERS ATWEIGHBRIDGE STATIONS

Out o the 1,152 drivers interviewed, at least 77% indicated they interacted with police officers

at weighbridge stations either on a daily or weekly basis, while a lower requency (18%) hadmonthly interactions as shown in Chart 5 below. Te regional picture is not much differentrom the country-level responses, except in the case o Rwanda where indications are that allinteractions between drivers and police officers at weighbridge stations took place on a monthlybasis. Te overall picture however, is that there are constant interactions between the driversand police officers at weighbridge stations during the course o transporting goods especiallybecause the officers task is to check that trucks conorm to the allowed Gross Vehicle Mass(GVM) and axle load limits. Tis provides ertile grounds or bribery to take place, based on the

varied and axle load limits within EAC Partner states.

Chart 5: Frequency of interactions between drivers and police officers at weighbridge stations

Source: Survey Data

Te 2011 BCI survey supports the survey findings on the requency o interactions betweentransporters/ truck drivers and weighbridge stations officers. Te survey ound that Kenyaand anzania each have 12 and 13 weighbridges along the Northern and Central Corridors

respectively. Te weighbridges are used to check or compliance to allowed GVM, and axle loadspecifications.

2.2.6.4 INTERACTIONS WITH CUSTOMS OFFICERS

Te requency o interactions with customs officers among the transporters and drivers isvery high as evidenced by Chart 6 below. Ninety three percent o the transporters and 53% odrivers registered daily or weekly interaction. In addition, 37% o drivers said they interactedwith customs officers on a monthly basis. While the regional picture is not much different romcountry-level responses, there is some slight difference or monthly interactions given by driversrom the country-level responses, where 44% o anzania, 77% o Rwanda and 49% o Burundidrivers indicated they interacted with customs officers on a monthly basis. Interaction withcustoms officers include during manual presentation and declaration o import consignmentsand checks on goods being erried across the borders. Tis presents opportunities or bribery.



In countries such as the European Union (EU) and South East Asia where the Single WindowSystem (SWS) has been implemented, interactions between importers or their representativesand customs officers are minimal. Tis is because import processes are made electronically;including declarations, Harmonised System (HS) classification and payment o applicable duty,

classification/coding and payment o applicable duties. In addition, the EU and South East Asian(SEA) countries have separated the physical release o goods rom customs fiscal control unctions.Tat means customs can release goods prior to completion o all documentation ormalitiesand final settlement o tax accounts. Te availability o ull-time automated processing at thecustoms entry ports together with SWS has replaced manual processes and greatly increasedthe speed o clearing an import consignment. Consequently this has reduced the interactionsbetween importers or their representatives with customs officers and also with officers o othertrade acilitation bodies . In turn, this has reduced incidences or bribery practices.

Chart 6: Transporters / Drivers Interactions with the customs officers

Source: Survey Data



2.2.7 COMPLIANCE WITH REVENUE AUTHORITIES LAWS

ransporters and drivers complied with the revenue authority laws, with 81% o transportersand 84% o the drivers saying they always or sometimes complied (see Chart 7). Tis scenario

is similar to the country-level responses. However, where non-compliance to revenue authoritylaws is noted, the survey indicated that it might be due to ignorance about existing and newlyintroduced laws. Tis is supported by the 2011 BCI findings, which ound that many had alimited knowledge about customs documentation and administrative procedures, with 21%o EAC businesses (importers/ exporters, CFAs and transporters) indicating that they werenot aware about the relevant customs, port and border stations regulations or importing andexporting in their home country, and an average 23% indicating they were not aware aboutcustoms regulations or importing and exporting in other EAC countries (through borderstations and sea ports).



Chart 7: Compliance to revenue authority laws

Source: Survey Data

2.2.8 COMPLIANCE TO LAWS AT WEIGHBRIDGE STATIONSAND POLICE CHECKPOINTS

Obedience o the law at the weighbridge stations by the drivers closely ollows the samepattern as that or revenue authority laws, with 70% o the drivers confirming that they alwaysor sometimes complied with the relevant laws as shown in Chart 8 below. Te category thatindicated that the law was rarely or never obeyed, stands at 28% o all drivers interviewed acrossthe region. Te scenario is much the same with that o the country-level responses. All Burundiand Rwanda drivers indicated nil non-compliance.

At least hal (55%) o the transporters and 60% o the drivers indicated that they always orsometimes complied with the relevant laws as shown in Chart 9 below. Te regional pictureis similar to the country-level responses albeit with some ew variances, where or example, a

much higher percentage (84%) o Rwanda drivers indicated that they always, or sometimes,complied with the relevant laws. None o the Rwanda transporters responded on this issue.

Like in the case o customs laws, non-compliance by drivers o relevant laws at weighbridgestations and police checkpoints is ofen not done intentionally, but occurs due to ignorance aboutexisting and newly introduced laws although it is ofen cited as the cause o bribery practices atthe weighbridges.



Chart 8: Compliance with Weighbridge laws

Source: Survey Data

Chart 9: Compliance with laws at police checkpoints

Source: Survey Data

2.2.9 AVERAGE TIME TAKEN AT WEIGHBRIDGE STATIONS,POLICE CHECKS AND CUSTOMS STATIONS

2.2.9.1 TIME SPENT AT WEIGHBRIDGE STATIONS

ruck drivers spend enormous time at some o the weighbridges, with the Magerwa weighbridgein Rwanda taking an average o 28.7 hours or an average o 1.2 days per truck per trip. However,weighbridges in Rwanda are used or customs revenue purposess but not to check or weightlimits. But even the process o weighing trucks or revenue purposes in Rwanda ends up havingthe same adverse effects as the checks or weight limits (see able 7 below). Te least time spenton weighbridge checks within the region is at Busitema weighbridge in Uganda and Makambako

weighbridge in anzania where drivers spend 0.2 hours or an average 13 minutes per truck pertrip. Te Central Corridor on the whole seems to take much less time or the weighing processthan the Northern Corridor, where trucks spend 3.6 hours at Mariakani according to Kenya



truck drivers and 2.4 hours according to Uganda truck drivers. Weighbridges are non-existentin Burundi. Te survey findings are close to the 2011 BCI findings that indicated that an average85% o EAC businesses spend between 30 minutes to 2 days to get clearance at the weighbridges.

ransit trucks, which have customs seals, experience hiccups at intermediate weighbridges dueto calibration and intolerances between different weighbridge stations. Lack o harmonizedweight requirements across EAC makes administration o the process even more challenging.Te inefficiency and corruption that takes place at weighbridges has elevated them to non-tariffbarriers.

2.2.9.2 TIME TAKEN AT POLICE CHECKS (HOURS)

Tere have been complaints rom businesses about delays at roadblocks likely to create briberyopportunities. Tere is a strong positive correlation between the average time spent at policeroadblocks and other tell-tale signs o sources o corruptive practices such as requency ointeractions with police and levels o obedience to laws related to police checks. Te longesttime is spent at Jinja in Uganda, where trucks spend an average 3.4 hours during police checksas indicated in able 7 below. rucks spend the least time is at Isebania, where an average o 0.12hours or 7.2 minutes is spent to get police clearance.

Te 2011 BCI closely ties with the surveys finding on time taken, with indication that between30 minutes to more than one hour was indicated as the average time taken to complete thepolice. Delays at police checks is thereore a concern or the region since it induces drivers tooffer bribes to police officers manning such roadblocks to speed up the checking process.

2.2.9.3 TIME TAKEN AT CUSTOMS STATIONS

Delays at customs in the region are higher compared to weighbridge stations and policeroadblocks as indicated in able 7. Te worst customs stations in terms o the time spent toget clearance is between the Kenya and anzania borders. Relevant stations in this respect areNamanga, aveta,Holili, Horohoro,Lunga Lunga,, and Loitoktok. At these border stations, truckdrivers spend an average o 68 hours to get customs clearance. Tis provides a good opportunityor drivers to offer bribes in order to speed up the process. On the other hand, the least time orcustoms clearance in the region was reported at the anzania - Burundi border (namely Koberostation (Burundi side), alternatively known as Kabanga on anzania side), where trucks spendan average o 0.8 hours or 48 minutes. Burundi drivers report the least time spent on customsclearance within their national borders

Tere are huge time variances or customs clearance between EAC border stations; Kenya-anzania 68 hrs, Uganda-Kenya 14.8 hrs, anzania-Burundi 0.8 hrs, and Rwanda-anzania 72hrs).



Table7:Time

(hours)takenatweighbridgestations

Kenya

Uganda

anzania

Rwanda

Burundi

StationNam

e

Averagetime

takenpertruck

(hrs)

StationName

Averagetime

takenper

truck(hrs)

StationName

Averagetime

taken

per

truck

(hrs)

Station

Name

Average

timetaken

pertruck

(hrs)

StationName

Averagetime

taken

pertruck(hrs)

SelectedWeighbridgeStations

Gilgil

1.5

Mariakani

2.4

Kibaha

0.5

Rwanda

Revenue

Authority

5.3

Noweighbridgestations

Mariakani

3.6

Busitema

0.2

Mikese

0.5

Magerwa

28.7

Mlolongo

2.1

Busia

2.4

Makambako

0.2

Rusumo

0.1

SelectedPolicecheckpoints/Roadblocks

Namanga

4

Busitema

0.4

Makambako

0.23

Rusomo

1.3

Kayanza

2.5

Mlolongo

1.1

Malaba

2.0

Kibaha

0.23

Katuna

1.7

Muyinga-NNgozi-

Kayanza-Bujumbura

0.4

Mariakani

0.2

Jinja

3.4

Iringa

0.17

Kigali

2.1

Uvira-Gatumba-

Bujumbura

0.4

Nairobi

Nakuru

Kisumu

Highway

0.5

Mabira

0.3

Chalinze

0.12

Rusizi

0.4

Ngozi-Kayanza-

Bujumbura

0.4

Isebania

0.3

Mityana

0.12

Mlandizi

0.18

Gisenyi

0.2

Kobero-NNgozi-

Bujumbura

0.6

CustomsStations

WithinKeny

a

29

Within

Uganda

23.1

Customs

within

anzania

33.5

Within

Rwanda

9.9

WithinBurundi

1.6

Kenya-anzania

68

Uganda-

Kenya

14.8

anzania

-Burundi

borderpoints

0.8

Rwanda

-anzania

72

Source:Surve

yData



2.2.10 EFFECTIVENESS OF RULES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY BYTHE REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

2.2.10.1 EFFECTIVENESS OF RULES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY BYALL REVENUE AUTHORITIES

Chart 10 below captures the drivers and transport companies views on perceived effectivenesso the customs rules. Te proportion o the total number o responding transport companiesand drivers who believe that customs rules are very effective was 24% and 17% respectively.About hal (49%) o transporters believe the rules are effective with 43% o the drivers thinkingthe same. Sixteen percent o the drivers and transporters were non-committal observing that therules were neither effective nor ineffective. Te rest o the transporters and drivers indicated thatthe rules were ineffective, very ineffective or did not know. A notable percentage o respondentswho were non-committal on the effectiveness o the rules combined with those indicating the

rules were either ineffective, very ineffective or dont know33% or transporters and 31% ordrivers are most likely the ones who abuse them by being non-compliant and consequentlypaying bribes to get clearance. Te regional pattern on effectiveness o the rules is similar to thecountry-level indications except in the case o Uganda where 45% o the transporters indicatedthe revenue authorities rules were ineffective.

Some o the respondents who were either non-committal or indicated the rules were eitherineffective, very ineffective, supported their poor ratings with the ollowing justifications:

a) Te officers do not ollow the lawb) Te officers are unriendly and harass peoplec) Te officers work at a slow paced) Te procedures are very demandinge) Te officers are indifferent to the demands o customers) Te officers lack suitable resources such as office equipments (scanners and computers) to

perorm their duties efficientlyg) Some customs officials are corrupt and ask or bribesh) Customs departments are understaffed

With specific reerence to service delivery by customs officers, the justification given or goodratings include:

a) Te customs officers always serve customers well as long as the documentation is correctand complete

b) Te customs officers are customer riendlyc) Te officers ollow the lawd) Te officers deliver quick service



Chart 10: Effectiveness of rules for service delivery by Revenue authorities

Source: Survey Data

2.2.10.2 EFFECTIVENESS OF RULES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY ATWEIGHBRIDGE STATIONS

Te survey results on effectiveness o rules or service delivery at weighbridge stations are similarto those on revenue authorities (see Chart 11 below). Only 44 % o the drivers indicated therules were either very effective or effective, 31% were non-committal, while 24% indicated therules are either ineffective or very ineffective. In a scenario where only 44% indicated the rules

were either very effective or effective, there was a high likelihood or bribery practices to takeplace. Te regional picture differs slightly rom the country responses in the case o Burundiand Rwanda, with 99% o Burundi drivers indicating that the rules are either very effective oreffective, while 100% o the Rwanda drivers were non-committal on effectiveness o the rules.Te Rwanda responses are based on the act that the country does not have weighbridges oroverload control, since the existing stations at border stations are used only or customs revenuepurposess.

Chart 11: Effectiveness of rules for service delivery at weighbridge stations

Source: Survey Data



Poor ratings o effectives o weighbridge stations rules were justified by the ollowing reasons:

i. Te rules cause unnecessary delaysii. Different weighbridges generate different weight results or the same load, implying some

stations have aulty equipmentiii. Te stations do not give the drivers their rightsiv. Te weighbridge officers simply do not ollow the regulations

v. Te weighbridge equipment is sometimes in poor condition, implying poor maintenanceo the weighing equipment

2.2.10.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF RULES FOR SERVICE DELIVERY ATPOLICE CHECKPOINTS/ROADBLOCKS

Only 34% o both the transporters and drivers rated the rules or service delivery at police

checkpoints/roadblocks as very effective or effective, while 42% and 28% o the transporters anddrivers respectively, rated the rule as neither effective nor ineffective as shown in Chart 12 below.At least 23% o the transporters and 37% o drivers rated the rules as very ineffective, ineffectiveor indicated they didnt know.

Te above ratings resonate well with previous studies within the region that have showed trafficpolice as being highly corrupt. About 72% o Kenya drivers indicated that no checks were doneafer a truck was stopped at police roadblocks. Tis implies that no rules were applied, sincethe actual reason or such stops was actually to solicit or bribes that range between 1-5 USDor 100% o Burundi and anzania drivers and less that USD 1 or 100% o Kenya and 71% oUganda drivers at every police roadblock. Tus trucks are stopped at police checkpoints not to

check or compliance with the relevant rules, but as an avenue or extorting bribes.

Chart 12: Effectiveness of rules for service delivery at police checkpoints/roadblocks

Source: Survey Data



Various reasons were provided or the ratings on the rules being either very effective or effective,including:

i. When you comply with the rules and regulations, officers dont bother you

ii. Police officers at checkpoints boost security on the transport corridorsiii. Police officers deliver services quicklyiv. Tere are no cases o corruption

On the other hand, the ollowing reasons were given or poor ratings on effectiveness o policecheck rules:

i. Police officers always demand bribesii. Police officers harass truck driversiii. Police are very slow in their work, leading to delaysiv. Police officers do not ollow the laid down rules and regulations

v. Te transport corridors have many checkpoints leading to delays since trucks are stoppedat almost every check point

vi. Te roadblocks lack suitable equipment

2.2.11 BRIBERY PAYMENTS TO TRANSIT STAFF

Te proportion o transporters who admitted paying bribes in the course o transporting goodsthrough the corridors was very high, with 86% o Kenya transporters indicating that they paidsuch bribes, ollowed by anzania (82%), Uganda (55%), Burundi (50%) and Rwanda (20%) asshown in Chart 13.

In the transporters books o accounts, the bribes are normally disguised in a number o ways asshown in Chart 14. At least 70% o the respondents indicated the bribes were recorded as eitheranticipated regular amounts or as ad hoc miscellaneous expenses, while 28% indicated the costwas recorded as road trip expenses. Only 3% disguised such costs as drivers allowance. Teregional picture is similar to the country-level responses among Kenya, Uganda and anzaniatransporters, while 100% o Burundi and 100% o Rwanda transporters respectively indicatedthe bribery expenses were recorded as ad hoc miscellaneous expenses and road trip expenses.Over time, transporters have accepted bribery as a normal cost o doing business, but have tofind an appropriate means o accounting or such expenses.

At both the regional and country level, road trip expenses take the major portion o how briberyexpenses are accounted or to employers. (see Chart 15). Some o these reasons could actuallybe ways in which drivers cheat their employers in order to earn some extra income, but theburden is eventually borne by the employer thus raising the implications o bribery along EACstransport routes.



Chart 13: Bribe payment to transit staff by transporters

Source: Survey Data

Chart 14: How bribery expenses appear in transporters books of account

Source: Survey Data

Chart 15: Means through which drivers account for bribery expenses to employers

Source: Survey Data



2.2.12 AMOUNTS OF BRIBERY COSTS PAID BY TRANSPORTERSAND DRIVERS TO REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

On average, the highest bribes paid to the revenue authority officers were recorded by anzanian

transporters, who incurred bribes amounting to US$2,656, ollowed by Kenya at US$ 1,250,Uganda at US$490 and Rwanda at US$100 (see Chart 16). Burundi transporters did not indicatethe bribery amounts, probably out o ear that the answers could jeopardize their uture relationswith the respective authorities and thus affect business operations. anzania transportersalso topped the list o bribes paid at weighbridge stations (USD5, 914), ollowed by Uganda(USD370), and Rwanda ( USD100). Kenya, like Burundi, did not indicate the bribery amountsat weighbridge stations, probably out o ear. Bribery amounts to customs officers are also quitehigh with anzania averaging USD1,776 in 2011, ollowed by Kenya (USD1,286), and Uganda(USD408). Like Burundi, Rwanda transporters did not give indication o bribes paid to customs.Te amounts o bribes paid to the Police officers are not as high as those paid to revenue

authorities, customs and weighbridge stations. Tis actually is expected as indicated by the 2011BCI, which ound that small value bribes were paid at police roadblocks. However, the smallervalue bribes do not imply lesser bribery costs, since based on the numerous roadblocks25 onthe Northern Corridor, 22 on Central corridors and 6 on the Nairobi-Namanga route as perthe 2011 BCI the eventual amount incurred per annum is high. All Kenyan drivers surveyedindicated they paid less than one USD at every stop, All (100%) o anzania drivers paid betweenUSD 1-5 at every stop, 100% o Uganda drivers paid between less than one USD and 1-5 USDat every stop, thus amounting to enormous bribery costs per annum or the transport industry.

Te highest amount o bribes paid to regulatory officials were to weighbridge officers in Kenya whopocketed USD1,597, Uganda Police officers received USD1,113 rom truck drivers as shown in

Chart 17 below. Te highest bribery amount to customs officers was recorded by Uganda driverswho incurred an average USD432 in 2011. Te survey findings show that bribery practices aremore severe at weighbridge stations and police roadblocks. Tis is collaborated by the findingso 2011 BCI, which indicated that these are the two main points where bribery practices almostautomatically take place during the course o transporting goods across the region.

Chart 16: Amount of bribes paid by transporters to Regulatory Authorities in 2011 (US Dollar)

Source: Survey Data



Chart 17: Bribes paid by the drivers to regulatory authorities in 2011 (US Dollars)

Source: Survey Data

anzania takes the highest amount o bribes paid by transporters and drivers to all regulatory

authorities at USD12,640, ollowed by Kenya (USD6,715), Uganda (USD3,672) Rwanda (USD679) and Burundi (USD293) -see able 8. When expressed as a percentage o the total valueo goods handled by transport companies per month, bribery costs per month are 18.6% othe value o goods transported in anzania; in Kenya (1.4%,) Rwanda (0.5%,) and Uganda andBurundi each at 0.1%. I the bribe amounts were to be set against the net profits or the otheroperating costs o transport companies, the proportions would be much higher.

Table 8: Bribery costs incurred by drivers and transporters as a percentage of monthly value of goods transported

Countryotal amount o bribesper month (USD)

Average value o goods transportedper month (USD)

Bribes per month a percentage ovalue o goods

Kenya 6,715 491,713 1.4%

Uganda 3,672 5,268,367 0.1%

anzania 12,640 68,081 18.6%

Rwanda 679 145,188 0.5%

Burundi 293 263,903 0.1%

Source: Survey Data

2.2.13 PROBLEMS LIKELY TO PROMPT BRIBERY PAYMENTS

Te transporters identified various problems that are likely to trigger bribery payments toofficials o regulatory authorities. As shown in Chart 18 below, 46% o the transporters citedthe likelihood o unnecessary delays as the major reason, ollowed by numerous documentation(20%), slow pace o services (14%), poor understanding o clearing procedures (9%), and hightax levels (8%). Te regional picture is much similar to the country responses, except in the caseo Rwanda where all (100%) o the transporters cited unnecessary delays as the major reason orprompting bribery payments.



Regionally, the main issue why bribes are paid is to avoid harassment and payment o penaltiesas indicated by:

i. 43% and 47% respectively with respect to bribes at weighbridges;

ii. 29% and 25% respectively regarding bribes to customs officers; andiii. 63% and 26% respectively with respect to bribes at police checkpoints

At the country level, (See Chart 19) Rwanda and Burundi drivers did not respond on bribes toofficers at weighbridge stations since weighbridges do not exist in both countries or overloadcontrol. At the same time, 100% o Burundi and Rwanda drivers indicated that they paid bribesto revenue authority officers to avoid harassment

Chart 18: Problems likely to prompt transporters to give a bribe to officers of regulatory authorities

Source: Survey Data

Tere is no clear correlation between the effectiveness o rules enorced by regulatory authoritiesand the amount o bribes paid, since although the highest amount o bribes are paid to revenueauthorities/ customs officers, the indication by drivers and transporters is that the level oeffectiveness or non-effectiveness o the rules under revenue authorities/ or customs stationsis similar to that under weighbridges and police checks. Tis means that effectiveness/non-effectiveness o the rules is not necessarily the reason or the amount o bribes paid. Non-compliance to rules enorced by regulatory authorities is not cited as a major reason that promptstransporters to give a bribe and also is not cited as among the major actors that determine thesize o a bribe shown in Charts 19 and 20 below.



Chart 19: Problems likely to prompt drivers to give a bribe to officers of regulatory authorities

Source: Survey Data

2.2.14 FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE SIZE OF BRIBES PAIDBY TRANSPORTERS

Negotiations were the key actor determining the size o a bribe. Te value o the consignmentat 23%, urgency o the consignment at 17%, expected penalties at 14%, number o public officers

involved in the bribery deal at 5%, and fixed bribery amount per consignment at 4% werethe other actors mentioned. Tis regional picture is much similar to the country responses,although or Rwanda respondents, the urgency o a consignment especially or perishable goodsis given as the only reason or bribery payments.

Chart 20: Factors that determine the size of bribe

Source: Survey Data



2.2.15 CORRUPTION REPORTING

Very ew drivers and transporters reported bribery incidents as seen in Chart 21. All Ugandan,Rwandan and Burundian transporters sampled never reported bribery incidences. In Kenya,(83%) and 93% in anzania indicated that they didnt report bribery incidences. Almost all(99%) o Uganda, anzania (92%), Kenya (89%), Burundi (87%), and Rwandan (83%) driversdid not report such incidences. Only 29% o all drivers indicated they reported bribery to themanagement authorities where such incidences took place, 27% reported to the police while 7%reported to the regulators oversight office. At least 24% o drivers reported such incidences tothe employer. Only 11% o the drivers reported the incidences to anti-corruption authorities.(See Chart 22. )

Chart 21: Reporting of corruption by Transporters

Source: Survey Data

Chart 22: Institution to which bribery was reported by drivers

Source: Survey Data



2.2.16 REASONS FOR NOT REPORTING CORRUPTIONINCIDENCES

Chart 23 below captures the reasons why bribery incidences are never reported. At least hal(52%) o EAC transporters indicated that bribery was a normal and acceptable practice in theregion, while 28% stated that they knew no action would be taken against the wrong-doers. Inaddition, 21% said reported such incidents would be sel-incriminating, while 20% did not seethe need to report. Tis is similar to country-level responses. In Kenya, 65% o the transportersdid not report corruption because to them, the vice was a normal and almost acceptable practice.

With respect to drivers, their main reasons or not reporting bribery incidences is that they didnot see the reason and they knew no action would be taken as indicated by 48% o the EACrespondents. Tis response is similar to country-level responses. Additionally, 21% o the EACaverage responses indicated this would be a sel-incriminating action. In Rwanda, 50% o the

drivers gave this indication.

Chart 23: Why corruption was not reported by the transporters

Source: Survey Data



2.2.17 ENGAGEMENT OF TRANSPORTERS IN POLICY-MAKINGDECISIONS RELEVANT TO TRANSPORT SECTOR

ransporters are rarely engaged by regulatory authorities in the policy-making process relevant

to issues in the sector. In Chart 24, 17% o the transporters are ever engaged. Te rest have neverbeen engaged and also do not know o any transporters who have ever been engaged. Uganda isthe only country where majority o transporters were involved in policy-making as indicated by82% o respondents giving an affirmative response.

Chart 24: Whether transporters are ever engaged in policy decisions relevant to transport sector

Source: Survey Data

2.2.18 INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE PREVIOUSLY ENGAGEDTRANSPORT COMPANIES IN DIALOGUE ONTRANSPORTATION ISSUES; AND EFFECTIVENESS OFPOLICY DIALOGUE

Te transporters cited the institutions listed in able 9 below as among those that have previouslyengaged them in dialogue related to transportation difficulties and requisite reorms. At a glance,it is quite clear that the key policy making institutions such as revenue and police authorities,ministries o transport, and weighbridge departments have ignored transport companies whilemaking decisions that affect their operations. However, in Kenya and Uganda, the Kenya UrbanRoads Authority and Uganda Revenue Authority respectively, have invited transporters orengagement in policy-making. Tis, to a large extent ,could explain the poor ratings given onthe effectiveness o the engagements, with 24% giving a positive indication as shown in Chart25 below. It is only in Uganda where transporters think highly o the effectiveness o the policy-making orums, with 44% o transporters interviewed rating the orums as very effective.Meanwhile, 27% and 36% o anzania transporters rated the orums as being either ineffective

or very ineffective respectively. Specific reasons put orward to explain such poor ratings asshown in able 10 below include: (i) Resolutions were never implemented; (ii) Te institutionsinvolved (that is, business associations) do not push or the needs o transporters; (iii) Issuesraised are never taken seriously, and; (iv) Te institutions involved have no power and mandate



to deal with allegations made by the transporters.

Table 9: Institutions that have previously invited transporters for engagement in policy making

Kenya Uganda anzania Rwanda Burundiype oorganisation

No omeetings

ype oorganisation

No omeetings

ype oorganisation

No omeetings

ype oorganisation

No omeetings

ype oorganisation

ruck OwnersAssociation

3KenyaransportersAssociation

1anzaniaransporterAssociation

5

PrivateSector (PSF)

1

No datagiven

Kenya LongDistanceruck DriversAssociation

1

Kenya LongDistanceruckDriversAssociation

2KinondoniMunicipalCouncil

2

KenyaManuactures

Association

1 UCIFA 1Chama ChaMawakala

Ubungo

1

CommunicationCommission oKenya

2UgandaRevenueAuthority

2

anzaniaBus OwnersAssociation(ABOA)

2

Kenya UrbanRoads Authority

2 UNRA 1

KenyaCanvas Ltd

1

KenyaransportersAssociation

3

UgandaShippersassociation

1

No response 1

otal 12 otal 9 otal 11 otal 1

Source: Survey Data

Chart 25: Transporters rating of engagement in policy-making forums

Source: Survey Data



Table 10: Reasons for poor ratings on effectiveness of policy-making forums

Kenya Uganda anzania Rwanda

Reasons orpoor ratings

Percentresponse


Percentresponse

Reasons or poorratings

Percentresponse


Percentresponse

Institutionstake too longto meet orollow ups

33%Issues raisedare not takenseriously

20%

Te orums are notpowerul and lackthe jurisdictionand mechanismsto deal with theallegations

55%

Customs haveinsufficientnumber oworkers todeal withcomplaints

100%

Resolutionsneverimplemented

33%

Policiespassedare neverimplemented

70%Tere is neitherollow up nor co-operation

27%

Institutionsdo not pushor our needs

(transporters)

17% Reliable 10% No complaints 18%

Source: Survey Data

2.2.19 COMPLAINTS TO THE REGULATORY/OVERSIGHTAUTHORITIES REGARDING CHALLENGES EXPERIENCEDIN THE COURSE OF TRANSPORTING GOODS ACROSSEAC BORDERS

As indicated in Chart 26 below, only 10% o the transporters have ever complained aboutchallenges encountered while transporting goods across the EAC borders. Despite experiencing

transportation challenges, 74% o transporters indicated that they did not complain while therest indicated they did not have a reason to complain.

Chart 26: Whether transporters have ever complained to authorities about difficulties faced in transporting goods

across borders

Source: Survey Data



For Te nature o complaints raised by the transporters were diverse, including:

a) Tere are numerous disputes between individual transporters, or example regardingtransport malpractices

b) Problems experienced at the port such as delaysc) High charges and taxes or various services offered by the regulatory authoritiesd) Disputes related to licensing and regulations

Institutions where disputes and complaints have previously been launched by transportersinclude (i) the Kenya ransport Association; (ii) Kenya Ports Authority; (iii) Police; (iv) UgandaRevenue Authority; (v) Uganda Shippers Association; (vi) Uganda Ministry o ransport andWorks, and: (vii) anzania Revenue Authority.

Only 26% o the transporters indicated their complaints were addressed satisactorily, while45% were either dissatisfied or very dissatisfied as shown in Chart 27 below. Some 11% indicated

their complaints were never addressed. Only 38% o Uganda transporters were satisfied whilethe corresponding rating or Kenya and anzania was 20% and 17% respectively. Kenya had thehighest proportion o dissatisfied transporters at 40% while 20% stated that the complaint wasnever addressed. A hal o the transporters sampled in anzania were very dissatisfied.

Chart 27: Transporters satisfaction levels with how complaints were addressed

Source: Survey Data



2.2.20 SUGGESTIONS BY TRANSPORTERS AND DRIVERS TOIMPROVE TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY ALONGMAJOR EAC TRANSPORT CORRIDORS

Te five major suggestions by transporters and drivers or improving transportation along majorcorridors are presented in ables 11 and 12 below, while the detailed tabulations are presented inAnnexes 3 and 4 to this report. Key suggestions include the need to computerize paperwork andinvestment in IC; improvement o the physical inrastructure (roads, parking yards, reductiono the number o weighbridges); and involvement o anti-corruption authorities in the fightagainst corruptive practices in the transport industry.

Table 11: Key suggested improvements by transporters

Kenya Uganda anzania Rwanda Burundi

Suggested

improvements

Percent

response

Suggested

improvements

Percent

response

Suggested

improvements

Percent

response

Suggested

improvements

Percent

response

Suggested

improvements

Percent

response

Computerize

all paper work17%

Work aster

to reduce

backlogs and

delays

19%

Punish Police,

drivers and

officials who

break the law

by asking or

bribes

16% No idea 40%

Computerization

o transport

service systems

30%

Quicken

cancellation

o Custom

security bonds

14%Improve on

IC13%

Integrity to

be instilled

in custom

officials so as

to offer better

services

10%

Build modern

inrastructure

at Rusumo

border

(parking &

electricity)

20%

Reduction o

administrative

procedures

30%

Improve and

or Invest in

IC

13%

Improve

inrastructure

e.g. roads

13%

Increaseprocessing

to reduce

backlogs and

delays

10%

Avoid

unnecessary

documentation

and delays

20%Punish

Corruption20%

Service Weigh

Bridges Well

in order to

give standard

measures

12%

Revenue

authority to

reduce taxes

13%

Presence o

anti-graf

authorities at

border points

9% No Response 20%

Abolition o slow

pace o delivery

o goods and

services

10%

Improve

Inrastructure

8%

Reduce the

clearing

procedures

13%

Improve

technology

such as power

generatorsand internet

8%

Avoid

unnecessary

delays

10%

Source: Survey data



Table

12:Keysuggestedimprovementsbydrivers

Kenya

Uganda

anzania

Rwanda

Burundi

Suggested

improvements

Percent

response

Suggested

improveme

nts

Percent

response

Suggested

improvements

Percent

response

Suggested

improvements

Percent

response

Suggested

improvements

Percent

response

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rien

dly

bribery as a non tariff barrier to trade

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survey findings

te field survey

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recommendaions o

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srucure of survey respondens