Francis GillerlainRussian Comprehensives

There Is No Alternative?:

Russian Electoral Opposition in the 2012 Elections

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was well known for insisting that there was

“no alternative”i to free-market capitalism, and that it was the only viable economic model.ii

Echoes of this certainty are found today in Russia’s political system. Before the 2011 State

Duma election, and before the re-election of Vladimir Putin to a third term as president of the

Russian Federation,iii many claimed that there was “no alternative” to Putin and his party of

United Russia. The New York Times’ Tyler Miksanek claimed late in 2011 that “with no

established opposition, Putin is the only possible outcome for the future of Russia.”iv Putin’s

campaign manager Vladimir Litvinenko is on the record stating that Purin “is the only choice.”v

Even one of Putin’s 2012 presidential challengers, Mikhail Prokorov, was quoted in his blog

saying “Putin is so far the only figure who can manage this inefficient state machine.”vi

What of these claims? United Russia did maintain tenuous control of the State Duma in

2011,vii and Putin did win the 2012 Presidential Elections, albeit with widespread accusationsviii

of voter fraudix in both cases. To a certain extent, this backs up the assertions of Putin’s

“inevitability” when viewed in a certain light, but something is different about this round of

elections. The claim that there is “no opposition” is beginning to change. Though they did not

change the outcome, the turnouts of these elections have spawned humongous, spontaneous

protests against Putin and his regime,x lasting from before the State Duma elections until today,

in the aftermath of the Presidential Elections.xi New parties, opposition coalitions, and

movements are forming, both within the electoral system and outside of it, uniting under the

common goal of getting rid of Putin and United Russia.

Thesis

To what degree, then, is the conception that there is “no alternative” to Putin actually

true? What do the opposition parties themselves say, what are their programs for Russia, and

how much do these parties represent a realistic and reasonable “established opposition” that has

an actual chance of both meeting their shared goal and truly governing Russia?

A. United Russia (ER)

In order to understand the programs and goals of the opposition, one must first understand

who and what they are up against. Founded in 2001, the contemporary United Russia party was a

merger of Boris Yeltsin’s Unity Party and the Fatherland – All Russia Bloc. These individual

pieces, constituting the new Party, backed former PM Vladimir Putin for the presidency in the

2000 election, and formed the party shortly thereafter. With Putin’s continuing leadership, the

Party has maintained dominance within Russia’s political system since that time. Putin’s

ascension marked an end to the fierce competition raging in the 1990s, between parties that stood

behind the newly founded capitalist systems, and opposition parties who wished for a return to

the socialism of the Soviet Union. This argument was dropped in favor of addressing the

immediate concerns of national stability. Putin both promised and supplied that stability,xii

combatting the chaos of economic “shock therapy” with new economic programs, crushing some

of the burgeoning corrupt oligarchy under the heel of the state, and returning some of that

corporate power back to the state apparatus.

The contemporary program of United Russia reflects that continuing focus on prosperity and

stability at any cost. The modern Party promises a new “modernization of economy, education,

business climate, industry, infrastructure, innovation, productivity and safety regulations,” new

social welfare programs, combatting of continuing business and bureaucratic corruption, a re-

tooling of the judicial system, fighting both against illegal immigration and xenophobia,

development of a new, inclusive political system, strengthening internal and external security,

and a foreign policy focused specifically on the “welfare of the people” of Russia, as well as the

creation of a new Eurasian political and economic Union.xiii In a sentence, everything, for

everyone, at all times, centered around a gigantic modernization effort pushed forward by Putin

and fueled by Russia’s immense hydrocarbon export profits.

The strength of E.R. and Putin’s program comes primarily from its universality. E.R., as a

“centrist” party, has largely subsumed the policies and planks of the opposition and diluted them

into a palatable format for the average Russian voter. Combine that with a strong grasp on the

media, and this allegedly wide-spread voter fraud, and one begins to get a handle on the iron grip

Putin and United Russia have been able to maintain for so long. This control is seemingly

beginning to slip, with United Russia’s loss of 77 seats in the latest round of elections, falling

from 64.3% of the Duma vote in 2007 to 49.4% in 2011’s elections.xiv Putin’s popularity has also

dropped, earning only 63.60% of the popular vote,xv as opposed to the high 70% garnered both

by Medvedev in 2008 and Putin himself in 2004.xvi Despite electoral setbacks, United Russia

does still maintain a membership numbering around two million, according to their own

statistics, remaining the largest party membership in the Russian Federation.xvii This suggests

that, despite this widespread political ubiquity and dominance, Putin and United Russia’s

popularity may be beginning to wane.

B. The Opposition

Russian opposition to Putin and United Russia is composed of two blocs: the officially

registered political parties which compete in elections and thus operate “within the system,” and

those that have either been barred from registering, were banned outright, reject the political

process wholesale, therefore operating entirely “outside the system.”

i. “System” Opposition

There are only six registered political parties in Russia aside from United Russia that

compete in elections, four of which ran alternate presidential candidates, and three of which

i "Press Conference for American correspondents in London." Speeches, Interviews and Other Statements. Margaret Thatcher Foundation, n.d. Web. <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/Speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=104389&doctype=1>

ii "Origin of the expression: There is no alternative." The Phrase Finder. Phrases.co.uk, n.d. Web. <http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/376000.html>

iii "Russia election: Vladimir Putin celebrates victory." News - Europe. BBC, n.d. Web. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17254548>

iv Miksanek, Tyler. "Putin’s Problem: A Rumbling Russia- December 9, 2011 ." RantAWeek. N.p., n.d. Web. <http://rantaweek.com/putins-problem-a-rumbling-russia/>

v "Midas Touch in St. Petersburg: Friends of Putin Glow Brightly." World News. New York Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/02/world/europe/ties-to-vladimir-putin-generate-fabulous-wealth-for-a-select-few-in-russia.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all>

vi "Prokhorov sees no alternative to Putin, urges ruling party reform." Features - Society. RIANovosti, n.d. Web. <http://en.ria.ru/society/20111208/169496911.html>

vii "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2012 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100028713304&vrn=100100028713299®ion=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100028713304&type=233>

viii "Voters Watch Polls in Russia, and Fraud Is What They See." World News. New York Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/world/europe/russian-parliamentary-elections-criticized-by-west.html>

ix "Russia Elections: Voting Fraud Allegations Mar Putin's Win." Huffpost World. Huffington Post, n.d. Web. <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/04/russia-elections-fraud-putin_n_1319796.html>

x "Russian election: Biggest protests since fall of USSR."News - Europe. BBC, n.d. Web. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16122524>

xi "No to NATO, Afghan drugs and WTO: Communist anger spills into Russian streets." News. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/news/communists-nato-bases-protests-507/>

xii "Sudden rise of the Unity party ." News- Europe. BBC, 1999. Web. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/572646.stm>

actually passed the 7% threshold to receive Duma representation. Within this small band, there is

arguably one that represents a legitimate alternative political program, that has made any

considerable progress in creating political momentum against E.R.

a. Parties with Representation in State Duma

1. Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF)

The top “system” opposition party is the successor party to the banned Communist Party

of the Soviet Union, which hold the sorts of views one would expect them to. In their party

program, the Communist Party openly calls for the full and uncompromising restoration of the

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The KPRF believes that nothing less than a total return to

socialism, what they deem as an establishment of “democratic workers’ power” with “maximum,

and increasing worker participation in government,” can solve what they see as capitalism

“inevitably giving rise to exploitation of man by man,” leading to societal discord, or the “deep

split” in Russia’s society. They expand this further, claiming that there will be a “planet-wide

catastrophe” if capitalism remains the dominant system. They strongly reject Gorbachevian

reform attempts, or a “socialist democracy” with a “friendly face,” and strongly defend the

xiii "Программное обращение Партии." официальный сайт партии . ЕДИНАЯ РОССИЯ, n.d. Web. <http://er.ru/party/program/>

xiv Nordsieck, Wolfram. "Russia - 2007 & 2011 Duma Elections." Parties and Elections in Europe . N.p., n.d. Web. <http://www.parties-and-elections.de/russia.html>

xv "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2012 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100031793509&vrn=100100031793505&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100031793509&type=227>

xvi "Results of Previous Presidential Elections." Russia Votes. Centre for the Study of Public Policy The Levada Center - Moscow, n.d. Web. <http://www.russiavotes.org/president/presidency_previous.php>

xvii официальный сайт партии. ЕДИНАЯ РОССИЯ, n.d. Web. <http://er.ru/party/program/>

‘contributions’ of J.V. Stalin to Soviet socialism.xviii Party leaders have therefore called for a “re-

Stalinization” of Russia.xix In a move in this direction, the KPRF takes a tough stance on

immigration, calling for entry quotas, supremacy of the Russian language, and return to Soviet

era ethnic cataloguing in official documentation.xx

Perhaps surprisingly to Americans, and yet maybe also unsurprising for some Russians,

the KPRF has been steadily gaining in popularity. The KPRF gained 19% of the 2011 Duma

vote,xxi up from 11% in the last elections,xxii and Presidential Candidate Zyuganov gained 17% of

the 2012 vote,xxiii holding conspicuously steady from the previous cycle’s results.xxiv The

Communist Party also reportedly had a membership of some 180,000 spread in some 80 regions

as of 2007, though the number is likely higher today, corresponding with better success at the

polls.xxv This membership number also does not account for support from allied non-KPRF

socialist groups within Russia. These results suggest that the old question of capitalism vs.

socialism – the one moved away from with the end of the Cold War and the rise of United Russia

– may be coming back. Reuters recently suggested that the rise of the KPRF is accounted for

mainly by KPRF votes “against it all,” or support from liberal ‘fellow travelers’ whose vote was

merely a “count against United Russia” and not for the KPRF.xxvi The rise of Melechon and the

Front de Gauche in France,xxvii as well as the KKE in Greece,xxviii suggests that it may also be

more complicated than that, and that the KPRF may also be attracting a real base due to

economic instability, creating a loss of what little faith in the market existed in Russia.

Nonetheless, the KPRF is both continually criticized from those “farther Left” for being a

xviii "Программа партии." КПРФ, n.d. Web. <http://kprf.ru/party/program/>

xix "Communists lay carnations for Stalin." Breaking News. News.Com.AU, n.d. Web. <http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/communists-lay-carnations-for-stalin/story-e6frfku0-1225974765203>

xx "Minority report: Communists play ethnic card ." Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/communists-nationality-passport-election-587/>.

‘comprador’ or ‘Kremlin-backed’ party, while simultaneously receiving criticism from the right

for the simple fact of being self-described Communists. Despite such criticism, the Communist

Party still receives wide-spanning support, and the electoral results also suggest that the KPRF is

seen as the most “credible” of the approved opposition parties. This is enhanced by the KPRF’s

having of one of the more “radical” and truly distinguishable alternative programs. It remains

unclear how the KPRF would fare in such elections if other Leftist parties were allowed to

register and participate, but for the time being, the KPRF remains the strong voice of the official

left wing in Russia.

2. A Fair/Just Russia (SR)

Originally formed with Kremlin backing in 2006 as a merger of the Rodina, Pensioners

and Life parties, and later the Greens and other socialist parties, the Russian Social Democrats

represent a more moderate, pseudo-Euro-socialist party.xxix A Just Russia calls for a vast political

and economic liberalization (sans their call for a total renationalization of all natural resource

monopolies), including the introduction of direct elections from local to Federal levels, strong

public-access television, reduction of income and VAT taxes and new ‘wealth’ taxes, subsidies

for alternative energy production, and social welfare.xxx They, too, openly wish for a Eurasian

Union, and the ‘protection of ethnic Slavs’ within “post-Soviet space.” The SR terms this

program a “New Socialism, (…) implementing universal and national values in a real social

practice.” They also criticize United Russia as “not interested in change,” the KPRF as “stuck in

the distant Soviet past,” the LDPR as “loudly criticizing, but quietly cooperating with the

government,” and the ‘Just Cause’ as “a convenient oligarchic sparring partner for ‘United

Russia,’” making the SR out to be the only legitimate alternative choice, of course outside of the

merely ‘outdated’ KPRF. A Fair/Just Russia boasts an impressive 400,000 members, though this

does not necessarily translate into equally impressive electoral results.xxxi The SR is the third

most popular political party, up 4% from the 2007 Duma Elections to 13% in 2011.xxxii

Presidential candidate Mironov is slightly less popular than his party, only winning 3.8% of the

popular vote in the 2012 Presidential Elections.xxxiii Mironov himself predicted a Putin win in

2012 and promised himself to back Communist candidate Zyuganov,xxxiv as well as Putin in

2004,xxxv seemingly never believing in his own ability to run. As it stands right now, the SR is

Kremlin “pocket opposition” in the hands of Mironov. It lines up with United Russia or the other

registered political parties in most of its policies, and does not represent a true alternative

xxi "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2011 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100028713304&vrn=100100028713299&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100028713304&type=233>

xxii "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2007 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100021960186&vrn=100100021960181&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100021960186&type=233>

xxiii "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2012 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100031793509&vrn=100100031793505&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100031793509&type=227>

xxiv "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2008 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100022249920&vrn=100100022176412&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100022249920&type=227>

xxv "Коммунистическая партия Российской Федерации."Партии. Lenta.Ru, n.d. Web. <http://duma.lenta.ru/parties/kprf/>

xxvi Carbonnel, Alissa. "Russian communists win support as Putin party fades." World. Reuters, n.d. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/05/us-russia-election-communists-idUSTRE7B40KL20111205>

xxvii "In French Vote, Sound and Fury From the Left ." News -World. New York Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/world/europe/in-french-elections-sound-and-fury-from-the-lefts-melenchon.html>

xxviii “πολιτικού κόμματος KKE." Elections Meter. N.p., n.d. Web. <http://electionsmeter.com/polls/communist-party-of-greece?title=Greece>

political force. The SR seems also to believe that it will not move forward with Mironov at the

helm, and may be gearing up for a merger with the KPRF and other leftist parties.xxxvi There are

also rumors that the SR may boot Mironov in favor of a total revamp, including an alliance with

other, currently unregistered political forces.xxxvii If the merger or revamp go through, it is

possible that the SR could revitalize itself and its program, and become a political force to be

reckoned with.

3. Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR)

Another allegedly Kremlin-backed “project,” the LDPR was formed in 1991 with leader

Vladimir Zhirinovsky at the helm. Zhirinovsky still leads the party to this day, and represents the

greatest “draw” of the LDPR: “crazy Vlad’s” own personality. He has been called both a

“fascist”xxxviii and the “Russian Hitler” on multiple occasions, not helped by the fact that he has

allied his party with other Russian ultranationalists as well as German far-right extremist parties,

threatening to close the borders of Russia as well as encourage Russian ethnic separatism in

European states.xxxix The party program itself is not much different, showing itself to be far more

aggressive than United Russia or the KPRF. The LDPR suggests re-nationalization of the energy

sector, restoration of a planned economy, and “priority of the military-industrial complex” within

the Russian economy. They are also unabashedly anti-immigration, stating that the country is in

need of “defense (…) from migrants.” The LDPR, like the KPRF, also calls for Russian

linguistic and ethnic centralism. The “Liberal Democrats” then represent a third step of

extremism after the KPRF and United Russia, in that they essentially want the Soviet economy

back without the Marxist-Leninist overtures to labor, with some social welfare windowdressing,

and a huge focus on the military. The LDPR also take a very hard line in foreign policy. They

state that the “sole source of aggression in international politics (…) is the United States,” and

that the main goals of the LDPR are to contain and combat the United States and strengthen

Russian power. They aim to do this through what is ostensibly a forced “economic and political

integration ‘of the Slavic world’ [and] former Soviet republics.” They also seek to cool relations

with China and strongly protect the Russian Far East, force the EU through economic warfare to

abandon NATO and the Baltic states, and reach out to form stronger military and economic

partnerships with “Iran, India, Pakistan, (…) and Venezuela.”xl This extreme party boasted a

membership count of 185,000 in 2010, although it has been known to “puff up” membership

numbers in the past.xli The LDPR is the fourth largest party within the Duma, winning 11% of the

vote in 2011, up from 8% previously. Candidate Zhirinovsky only managed to collect 6% of the

xxix Wilson, Josh. Chapman, Hannah."A Fair and Just Russia The Political Platform of Russia's Social Democrats Part 1: Philosopy and the Current State of Russia." POLITICS IN TRANSLATION. SRAS, n.d. Web. <http://www.sras.org/fair_and_just_russia>

xxx "Манифест парти." СПРАВЕДЛИВАЯ РОССИЯ, n.d. Web. <http://www.spravedlivo.ru/information/manifest2011/>

xxxi "History." Homepage. Sergei Mironov, n.d. Web. <http://mironov.info/just-russia-party/history/>

xxxii "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2011 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100028713304&vrn=100100028713299&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100028713304&type=233>

xxxiii "Сводная таблица результатов выборов 2011 г." Выборы и референдумы. Центральной избирательной комиссии Российской Федерации n.d. Web. <http://www.vybory.izbirkom.ru/region/region/izbirkom?action=show&root=1&tvd=100100028713304&vrn=100100028713299&region=0&global=1&sub_region=0&prver=0&pronetvd=null&vibid=100100028713304&type=233>

xxxiv "Fair Russia candidate predicts Putin win in first round."Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/mironov-election-zyuganov-conference-947/>

xxxv "Zyuganov and Mironov: Back to the future ." Russian Elections. Al-Jazeera, n.d. Web. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/russianelections/2012/02/201222535730502215.html>

xxxvi Andre Ballin, Russland Aktuell. "Mironov reassesses his political future." Politics. Russia Beyond the Headlines - Rossiskaya Gazeta, n.d. Web. <http://rbth.ru/articles/2012/03/11/mironov_reassess_his_political_future_15027.html>

xxxvii "Fair Russia goes radical." Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/fair-russia-opposition-nemtsov/>

popular vote in 2012, down from 9% in 2008, again suggesting a rising party and a falling leader,

marred with continual accusations of cooperation with, and respect of Putin.xlii This suggests that,

even though the SR itself is considered to be a Kremlin-backed ‘artificial’ party, the criticisms of

the SR’s party program may, in fact, be entirely truthful.

b. Parties with No Representation in State Duma

4. Patriots of Russia (PR)

Founded in 2005 from the dregs of the KPRF, the Patriots of Russia are a bizarrely

unspecific Euro-socialist party, if it is not indeed an elaborate Kremlin-produced joke. Adorned

with a beautiful rainbow right below the very serious subtitle “Political Party,” the Patriots of

Russia online program, like that of many an impressionable first-year university student, loudly

proclaims the party’s “anti-political patriotic ideology,” consisting mainly of platitudes about

loving one’s country, not seeing divisions of “left and right,” or splits based on “nationality,

religion, sex and social status (…) only seeking to unite all citizens interested in the prosperity of

our country,” only seeing the gloriously ambiguous “Russian Patriot.” Their social policy is

summed up simply as “a happy man makes a happy country.” What the party stands for, outside

of these platitudes, or what is already being done by United Russia or has been said by A

Fair/Just Russia, is not elaborated in the party program. The PR also promises a doubling of

income, strong demographic growth, social welfare for all, and the complete elimination of mass

unemployment.xliii One then begins to wonder why the PR left out the very important “bring back

unicorns” and “cake for everybody” policies, as they fit in with the level of political “maturity.”

Such political infantilism is reflected in their unimpressive garnering of a mere .97% in the 2011

elections, and their Kremlin links are illuminated in their failure to run their own party leader

Gennady Semigin, instead backing Putin in the 2012 elections.xliv Nonetheless, the party still

managed to retain some 86,000 official members as of 2011.xlv The Patriots of Russia may be on

the way out, but like the Just Cause party, they simply desperately hang on year after year.

5. Just Cause (PD)

Formed in 2008 as a merged of the Union of Right Forces, Civil Force and the

Democratic Party of Russia, the PD is an openly Kremlin-sponsored, pro-oligarch, right-wing

“liberal” party, again correctly noted by the SR political platform. The PD political platform is

mainly centered on “liberation of entrepreneurship and economic growth,” primarily through

liberalization and privatization in the political and economic spheres, combined with

maintenance of some of the old Soviet-style social welfare systems. This program was made

manifest in the choice of billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov to run for president – he is the owner of

the New Jersey Jets and one of Russia’s wealthiest oligarchs. This presidential choice also

caused a split within the PD leadership, where candidate Prokhorov quit the party to run as an

independent after calling the PD a “puppet Kremlin party,” and railing against the electoral

system as an “elaborate sham orchestrated by a puppet master (…) Vladislav Surkov,” deputy

head of the administration. Despite this, Prokhorov, who managed to win 7% of the popular vote

in 2012, failed to criticize Putin or United Russia, and as noted earlier in fact praised Putin as

xxxviii Umland, Andreas. "Zhirinovsky’s "Last Thrust to the South" and the Definition of Fascism." Russian Politics and Law, vol 46, #4. <http://ku-eichstaett.academia.edu/AndreasUmland/Papers/91919/Zhirinovskys_Last_Thrust_to_the_South_and_the_Definition_of_Fascism>

xxxix Bidder, Benjamin. "Zhirinovsk'ys Follies Nuclear Threats and Busty Ladies in the Race for Second-Place in Russia." Russia. Spiegel.de, n.d. Web. <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,538403,00.html>

xl "Программа ЛДПР." Либерально-демократическая партия России LDPR, n.d. Web. <http://www.ldpr.ru/>

xli Umland, Andreas. "Neo-Fascist Vladimir Zhirinovsky and His Extremely Right-Wing LDPR in Russia's Upcoming Parliamentary Elections." World. Foreign Policy Journal, n.d. Web. <http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2011/11/07/vladimir-zhirinovsky-and-the-ldpr/>

xlii "Zhirinovsky, Mironov congratulate Putin on election win."Russian Presidential Elections 2012. radio Voice of Russia, n.d. Web. <http://english.ruvr.ru/2012_03_05/67538538/>

being the only capable leader. PD itself has fared much worse, being a pro-oligarch party in a sea

of anti-oligarch public sentiment, and is now left without a semi-popular leader. The party still

retains 60,000 members,xlvi but the PD is holding at just .6% of the Duma vote, and it is likely

that Just Cause will cease to exist in the next election, barring Prokhorov making an unlikely

return, or the party undertaking significant revamp.

6. Russian United Democratic Party (“Yabloko”)

Formed in 1993 from the pro-US and EU-oriented western integration electoral grouping

of Yavlinsky-Boldyrev-Lukin,xlvii the last registered, non-represented party is the RODP:

“Yabloko,” which holds many of the same views as its prior electoral bloc. Current leader Sergei

Mitrokhin “proposed to build “a modern state of the European type” in Russia,” with “people

capitalism” replacing “oligarchic capitalism,” including all of the guaranteed constitutional

freedoms and privatizations that would entail. Despite the fact that they are approved to

participate in elections by the Kremlin, the party’s opposition candidate Grigory Yavlinsky was

barred from running in the 2012 Presidential Elections. Yavlinsky criticized this move, but

himself admits that “only 20% of Russians have turned out to march against [these unfair]

parliamentary elections” opposed to 80% in the 1990s, and that “the opposition lacks any real

goal or leader,” again suggesting a lack of confidence in his own party’s ability to effect change

as well as in his own ability as a leader. The party currently has 55,000 members,xlviii and has

xliii "ПРОГРАММА ПАРТИИ." Патриоты России, n.d. Web. <http://www.patriot-rus.ru/partyProgramm/>

xliv "Russia's Patriots party supports Putin for president."Presidential elections in Russia (2012). RIANovosti, n.d. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20111219/170366069.html>

xlv "Patriots of Russia ." Russian Parliamentary elections 2011. radio Voice of Russia, n.d. Web. <http://english.ruvr.ru/2011/09/21/56511568.html>

xlvi "О партии." ПРАВОЕ ДЕЛО, n.d. Web. <http://www.pravoedelo.ru/party/about>

fared as well as is possible given the restrictive elections. The “Yabloko” recently made small

progress in the Duma, doubling from 1.59% in 2007 to 3.43% in 2011, but they remain hobbled

due to policy absorption by A Fair/Just Russia and United Russia itself. This assimilation of

policies led the “Yabloko” leadership to claim that this was a deliberate attempt by the Kremlin

at splitting their voting bloc.xlix This splitting and poor performance has led Yabloko mainly to

act as electoral observersl in the recent voting cycles. In doing so, they have uncovered vast cases

of fraud, but it is unknown if this will translate into better success at the polls.

With only three effective, strongly represented registered opposition parties in the

running, two of which are difficult to distinguish from United Russia, disillusion is no surprise.

The masses of people who went out on the streets to protest against allegedly fraudulent

elections were not only fed up with United Russia, but with the lack of officially sanctioned

alternative choices. The “system” opposition has responded, through occasional attempts to unite

the various personalities and parties that make up the opposition, though typically with littleli to

no success, without cooperation from parties on the “outside.” It is certainly no surprise, then,

that people are increasingly turninglii to such parties “outside the system” to vent their frustration

and focus their efforts at real political change.

ii. “Non-System” Opposition

xlvii "Программные документы Российской объединенной демократической партии "ЯБЛОКО"." . ЯБЛОКО, n.d. Web. <http://www.yabloko.ru/Union/program.html>

xlviii "Краткая справка о партии." ЯБЛОКО, n.d. Web. <http://www.yabloko.ru/about>

xlix Golosov, Grigorii. "Reflections on Mikhail Prokhorov and the Right Cause." Post-Soviet World. oDRussia, n.d. Web. <http://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/grigorii-golosov/reflections-on-mikhail-prokhorov-and-right-cause>

l "United Russia Ready to Work with Yabloko Observers."Russia. RIANovosti, n.d. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120125/170947807.html>

The Russian “non-system” opposition is comprised of political parties that have either failed

to meet registration requirements or have refused to participate in the electoral process. Broadly

categorized, they either fall into coalitions of the political Left or coalitions on the Right. The

following list of the opposition is not exhaustive and only covers the largest coalitions and their

constituent members in the immediate aftermath of the 2011 and 2012 elections.

a. The Left

1. The “Left Front”

The “non-system” Russian Left has mainly organized itself into a loose coalition of far-

leftist parties, organizations, and yet more coalitions, in order to strengthen its position and

increase its political clout. This coalition includes not only hard-line Marxist-Leninists, but also

allied Trotskyists, Maoists, Anarchists, Stalinists, and essentially anyone and everyone involved

in Left politics that is willing to join them.liii The “Left Front” does have decent ties with the

KPRF, whom they backed in the 2012 Presidential Elections,liv although many members openly

criticize the Communist Party for their Kremlin approval as well as many different iterations of

what each Leftist party deems ideological “revisionism.” This also led the “Front” to seek

registration as an official party, which was denied due to their extremist tendencies.lv Despite this li "Russian Opposition Parties Unite In Udmurtia." Russia. RFERL, n.d. Web. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russian_opposition_parties_unite_in_udmurtia/24408832.html>

lii "Московская полиция объявила численность митингов." Политика. Lenta.ru, n.d. Web. <http://lenta.ru/news/2012/02/04/gumvd/>

liii "The Voice of the Left." Transnational Institute. Russia Profile, n.d. Web. <http://www.tni.org/inthemedia/voice-left>

liv "News Analysis: The Paradox Of Russia’s Left ." Russia. RFERL, n.d. Web. <http://www.rferl.org/content/the_paradox_of_russias_left/24488988.html>

lv "Opposition activists ask Supreme Court to register Rot Front party." Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/rot-front-supreme-court/>

unity in voting, the “Left Front” is hardly a cohesive faction, and the differing tendencies with

divergent within it each organize and act in accordance with their own goals, more closely

resembling the Unity Frontslvi of the early Comintern than an actual political party. The three

main tendencies are centered around the so-called “anti-revisionist” Marxist-Leninsts, the

Trotskyites, and associated Anarchists.

i. United Labor Front (ROTF) “Rot Front”

Founded in 2010, the United Labor Front represents the “anti-revisionist” hard-line

‘Tankie’ wing of the Russian far-left. This group’s leadership has claimed that “the Communist

Party of Gennady Zyuganov is in many ways not communist: it combines nostalgic 'Sovietism'

with Russian nationalism and religious aspirations, [Russian] Orthodoxy,” and represents a

“more bourgeois than revolutionary” force in politics.lvii Instead of a simple homage to the Soviet

past in nostalgic calls for “re-Stalinization” with Russian nationalist overtones, the ROTF’s

member parties are more committed to a complete revitalization of “Soviet power” in the legacy

of Stalin, Enver Hoxha, or Yuri Andropov. This is evidenced in the party program of “Rot Front”

member party “Revolutionary Communist Worker’s Party – Revolutionary Party of

Communists” (RKRP-RPK), who blast Gorbachev as leading Russia to “degeneration and

opportunism,” and call the nomenklatura of the old Russian Communist Party “disguised social

democrats.”lviii This specific party within the larger ROTF claimed 55,000 members as of 2006,

suggesting even larger numbers for the entirety of the “Rot Front,”lix easily on par with Yabloko

or Just Cause. The “Rot Front” openly calls for yet another Russian Revolution and has

participated in several protest actions against the Putin regime, reaching out to organize for

lvi "The united front." . International Socialism Quarterly Journal, 117, n.d. Web. <http://www.isj.org.uk/index.php4?id=397&issue=117>

revolt against the regime with like-minded trade unions and political organizations in the

“Front.” Simultaneously, the ROTF pledges in its party manifesto that it will operate within the

law,lx and has also attempted to stand for registration as a legitimate political party on its own,

although owing to its extreme radicalism, it has also been denied again and again.lxi These

hardline neo-Soviets are the largest participants in the Front, but they are not alone.

ii. The Russian Socialist Movement (RSD)/CWI

There also exists a large coalition of Russian Trotskyite organizations allied with the

“Left Front,” known as the “Russian Socialist Movement,” as well as several separate Russian

Trotskyite parties, such as branches of the Committee for a Workers Internationallxii and the

International Committee of the Fourth International.lxiii These groups split due to various

lvii "Russian Left-Wing Party Holds Founding Congress."News : From Our Bureaus. RFERL, n.d. Web. <http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_LeftWing_Party_Holds_Founding_Congress/1965322.html>

lviii "Введение." Наша Программа. РКРП-РПК , n.d. Web. <http://rkrp-rpk.ru/content/view/1/47/>

lix Backes, Moreau. "Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe." GoogleBooks. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, n.d. Web. p. 561.

<http://books.google.com/books?id=H23Pv4Ik3vMC&pg=PA561&lpg=PA561&dq=55,000+members+as+of+2006+Russia+Communist&source=bl&ots=aqBPoXdV-o&sig=WpNzrgHcSY6aA7eMBUoZK8ZpDQ4&hl=en&sa=X&ei=1JSHT-KoBevRiALgp-SkAg&ved=0CDUQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=55%2C000%20members%20as%20of%202006%20Russia%20Communist&f=false>

lx УСТАВ политической партии «Российский Объединённый Трудовой Фронт»." . Российская Коммунистическая Рабочая Партия - Революционная Партия Коммунистов, n.d. Web. <http://rkrp-rpk.ru/content/view/4414/63/>

lxi "Opposition activists ask Supreme Court to register Rot Front party." Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/rot-front-supreme-court/>

lxii "Программа секции КРИ в СНГ." . Комитета за Рабочий Интернационал, n.d. Web. <http://socialistworld.ru/programma-sekczii-kri-v-sng>

lxiii, Duncan. "Russian socialists regroup to deepen struggle for new left party Vpered and Socialist Resistance merge into Russian Socialist Movement." News from around the world - Russia. International Viewpoint, n.d. Web. <http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article2400&var_recherche=Russian Socialist Movement>

disagreements on policy, especially the position on the 2008 South Ossetian War, though all of

them take active roles in protests and actively defend Russia’s LGBTQ communities.lxiv Within

the Trotskyites alone, there is a tremendous amount of infighting about ‘which Workers

International is the best representative of the “true” Fourth International,’ with groups slinging

around accusations of ‘opportunism’ and ‘comprador tendencies’ at one another freely, without

getting into numerous jabs at the “Rot Front.”lxv RSD is the only cohesive Trotskyite group

actively participating within the “Left Front,” though it is also possible the other groups

participate in some respect. Regardless, these groups do not represent as powerful or cohesive a

grouping as the “orthodox” Marxist-Leninist groups, and gain traction only through associations

in the “Left Front.”

iii. Anarchist Organizations

Even more fractured than the Trotskyites are the Anarchists. One of the largest loose

anarchist/libertarian groupings, Autonomous Action, is the only group openly associating with

the “Left Front.”lxvi Other groups, such as the “Confederation of Revolutionary Anarcho-

Syndicalists”lxvii may also participate, but very little is published and known about such

groupings and their activities outside of reports of the normal anarchist fare of squatting, setting

up autonomous communes, vandalism, and corporate sabotage.

lxiv ‘Igor.’ "Repression of Gay Pride in Moscow." LGBT - Russia. CWI-CIT, n.d. Web. <http://www.socialistworld.net/eng/2007/06/02russia.html>

lxv Volkov, Vladimir. "The Russian Socialist Movement—a political trap for the working class." World Socialist Website. International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI), n.d. Web. <http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/dec2011/russ-d23.shtml>

lxvi " Новости об анархизме, антифашизме, акциях протеста." анархисты, либертарные коммунисты, антифа. Автономное Действие, n.d. Web. <http://avtonom.org/>

lxvii "КОНФЕДЕРАЦИЯ 2009." Главная. РЕВОЛЮЦИОННЫХ АНАРХО-СИНДИКАЛИСТОВ - СЕКЦИЯ МЕЖДУНАРОДНОЙ АССОЦИАЦИИ ТРУДЯЩИХСЯ (К.Р.А.С. - М.А.Т.), n.d. Web. <http://www.aitrus.info/node/2>

b. The “Center”

1. “Other Russia” (DR)

The “Other Russia” coalition represents an interesting intermeshing of very different

political parties of all stripes into a singular oppositional coalition and is the reason for the quotes

around “Center” in this heading. It includes such personalities as Gary Kasparov, former Chess

Master and president of the United Civil Front liberal party, Eduard “You Know I Love the Taste

of Blood”lxviii Limonov, formerly of the National Bolshevik semi-ironic “left-wing Nazi party,”

as well as their supporters, some members of the “Rot Front,” and other various liberal and leftist

parties and leaders. Collectively, the “Other Russia” states in its party program that it wants

nationalization of key mineral export sectors, a secular state, wealth taxes, a new capitol, new

infrastructural and agricultural focuses, nationalism, a new Union State, independent judiciary,

Islamic religious self-determination in the Caucasus, extensive social welfare programs, and

abolishing of conscription in favor of volunteer forces.lxix This more closely resembles the later

Comintern policy of creating a politically broad “Popular Front”lxx of opposition forces, as

opposed to a smaller, ideologically similar “Unity Front.” The “Other Russia” has also been

extensively involved with protests against United Russia, being a major force behind the “Russia

Without Putin” and “March of the Dissenters” protest movements.lxxi Despite being an odd mash-

up, the “Other Russia” nonetheless has a dedicated cadre of respected opposition leaders and

lxviii Interview with Professor Walter Richmond, Occidental College

lxix "Программа." политической партии "Другая Россия". Другая Россия, n.d. Web. <http://drugoros.ru/programm.html>.

lxx Harman, Mike. "1914-1946: Third Camp Internationalists in France during World War II." LibCom, n.d. Web. <http://libcom.org/library/1914-1946-third-camp-internationalists-france-during-world-war-ii>

lxxi Stolyarova, Galina. "THOUSANDS TAKE TO CITY STREETS FOR PROTEST." News. The St. Petersburg Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.sptimesrussia.com/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=20875>

calls on the aid of numerous supporters, representing a potent organizing force within the anti-

systemic movement.

2. People’s Freedom Party (“Parnas”)

Founded in 2010 as a merger of the Russian People’s Democratic Union, Republican

Party, Democratic Choice and the non-Kasparov segments of United Civil Front, the “Parnas”

Party represents a grassroots attempt at the political program espoused partially by both the

“Yabloko” and Just Cause parties, including liberalization and democratization.lxxii Much like the

“Yabloko” and PD, the Parnas party program calls for Russia to become “part of the all-

European civilization.”lxxiii The union currently holds 46,000 members, and is gaining more

members at a rapid pace. The “Parnas” Party has attempted to register for both Duma and

Presidential elections, but has been rejected due to application “inconsistencies.”lxxiv This led

party leader Boris Nemtsov to call for a mobilization “for a struggle. From now on, there will be

mass street protests all across the country,”lxxv a call which was indeed heeded. Individual

“Parnas” members have participated in these protests and have also been arrested teaching others

how to invalidate their ballots as a protest measure.lxxvi Parnas, then, represents an interesting,

lxxii Michael Smeltzer, Josh Wilson, Molly Goodwin-Jones. "Parnas: The People's Freedom Party History and Platform." POLITICS IN TRANSLATION . SRAS, n.d. Web. <http://www.sras.org/parnas_people_freedom_party>

lxxiii "Opposition leaders set up Party of People’s Freedom."Politics. RT, n.d. Web. <http://rt.com/politics/russia-opposition-people-freedom/>

lxxiv "Russian Opposition Party Denied Registration." News: From Our Bureaus. RFERL, n.d. Web. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russia_opposition_party_denied_registration/24242929.html>

lxxv Nemtsova, Anna. "To the Streets! Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov predicts more street protests—and countrywide economic decline.." World News. The Daily Beast, n.d. Web. <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/09/26/boris-nemtsov-russian-opposition-leader-interview.html>

lxxvi "Russian Opposition Party Devises Way To Sabotage Duma Election." News: From our Bureaus. RFERL, n.d. Web. <http://www.rferl.org/content/russian_opposition_party_devises_way_to_sabotage_duma_election/24384761.html>

new, and truly moderate or “reasonable” grassroots political force, with some potential to

become a registered anti-Kremlin party.

b. The Right

1. Nationalists and Neo-Nazism

While difficult to distinguish, the Russian right is composed primarily of ethnic-

supremacist nationalists, fascists, and neo-Nazi groupings. Nationalist organizations include the

semi-self-explanatory “Movement Against Illegal Immigration” (DPNI), in fact more broadly an

anti-immigration and pro-Russian ultranationalist organization,lxxvii and the similarly-oriented

Slavic Union and Russian Public Movement. All of these organizations call openly for the

expulsion of migrant workers, make claims of Russian ethnic superiority, and increasingly hold

anti-Semitic views, though claim not to be Nazis themselves. Many of these groups are

themselves banned, and have therefore occasionally supported the LDPR, whom they believe

hold similar views to their own.lxxviii These nationalist organizations only represent the public

face of nationalism and fascism in Russia.

Although very murky, there definitively exist several Neo-Nazi or Fascist groups within

the Russian Federation. This runs the gamut from Neo-Nazi organizations responsible for

murders of immigrants and ethnic minorities, such as the Russian National Socialist Party,lxxix to

the ultra-nationalist/fascist goose-stepping and uniform-wearing Russian National Unity Party.lxxx

lxxvii "Лента новостей. Последние новости экономики, криминала, политики." ДПНИ, n.d. Web. <http://www.dpni.org/>.

lxxviii True, Christopher. "Candidates exploit nationalism in Russia poll." Russian Elections. Al-Jazeera, n.d. Web. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/russianelections/2012/03/20123162536448660.html>

lxxix Schwirtz, Michael. "Video Draws Attention to Growing Violence Against Minorities in Russia." World News. New York Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/12/world/europe/12moscow.html?_r=1>

lxxx "Главная страница • Новости и события."ОБЩЕРОССИЙСКОЕ ОБЩЕСТВЕННОЕ ПАТРИОТИЧЕСКОЕ ДВИЖЕНИЕ. Русское Национальное Единство, n.d. Web. <http://soratnik.com/>

Both hold to a National-Socialist ideology of anti-Semitism and ethnic and nationalist

supremacism, and exist as paramilitary organizations, combined in the Russian context with

Russian Orthodox Christianity. Despite not representing a large, united force, these organizations

nonetheless exist and carry out terrorist acts on Russian soil and can represent a future threat in

the event of further unrest. This is evidenced by Greece’s Neo-Nazi “Golden Dawn” Party, very

similar to the Russian National Unity Party, possibly reaching thresholds necessary to enter into

the Greek parliament.lxxxi

All of the non-systemic opposition parties, no matter the external projected unity in

protest, face an internal split on political tactics. Strife arises over the choice between five major

political tactics, outside of the direct use of violence reserved for the fascists, anarchists, and

ultra-leftist communists. These tactics include the “passive boycott” of avoiding the ballot and

also protesting, “spoiling ballots” by invalidating them, removing or destroying ballots,

“Limonov’s Option” of publicly demanding to be removed from the voter rolls, or “Navalny’s

Option” (named after a prominent activist) of voting for any party other than United Russia, such

as KPRF. The differences over such tactics, as well as individual political ideologies, keep the

opposition relatively fractured and weak despite the large protests.

c. Reforms and Effects: Chaos and the Parties of Kind People and Beer Lovers

United Russia has noticed the rise of the KPRF and the insurgent strength of the fractured

non-system opposition in its protests. The Kremlin under Medvedev began reaching out to the

“non-system” opposition to brainstorm political reform, in an attempt to seemingly subsume the

opposition in talks, while stalling real reforms and further protests.lxxxii Surprisingly, within two

months, the Kremlin eased party registration requirements, such as lowering signature

lxxxi RACHEL DONADIO and DIMITRIS BOUNIAS. "Hard Times Lift Greece’s Anti-Immigrant Fringe." World News. New York Times, n.d. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/13/world/europe/far-right-golden-dawn-sees-opening-in-greeces-woes.html>

requirements for registration from 40,000 to 500. This has led to a massive surge of registration

attempts, including return registrations of the old joke Parties of the Party of Beer Lovers and

Party of Love, as well as attempts from new parties like the Ten Commandments’ Party, Party of

Subtropical Russia, and Party of Social Networking Sites.lxxxiii There are also new coalitions

forming, including a new union of the ultranationalist anti-immigration/semi-fascist parties into

the National Democratic Party,lxxxiv a new Swedish-styled pro-IP-infringement Pirate Party,lxxxv a

freshly revitalized Gorbachev-backed Social-Democratic party, and new attempts to register

parties in the “Left Front.” This reform and political restructuring has led to massive unrest in the

opposition, with new political unions forming and breaking apart at light-speed based on the

ever-changing political calculus introduced through these reforms.lxxxvi

In all, 68 new parties have expressed interest in becoming established and registered.

This move is simultaneously a “concession” from the Kremlin as well as a possible political

masterstroke. There are rumblings that this is an attempt at a “smooth transition from ‘soft

authoritarianism’ to expanded political competition in Russia”lxxxvii in order to further fracture

lxxxii "Meeting with leaders of unregistered political parties ."News. Office of the President of the Russian Federation, n.d. Web. <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/3441>

lxxxiii "Russia’s Political Discontent Moves from Winter to Spring." News. VOANews, n.d. Web. <http://www.voanews.com/english/news/Russias-Political-Discontent-Moves-from-Winter-to-Spring--146135395.html>

lxxxiv "Russian Nationalists Unite to Form New Party."Features, Opinion & Analysis. RIANovosti, n.d. Web. <http://en.rian.ru/russia/20120329/172469704.html>

lxxxv "Председателю «Пиратской партии России» грозит 6 лет тюрьмы." Анонсы . Пиратская партия России, n.d. Web. <http://pirate-party.ru/page.php?id=402>

lxxxvi "Opposition Leaders Will Not Join Gorbachev’s New Party." Khodorkovsky & Lebedev Communications Center. The International Legal Team of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, n.d. Web. <http://www.khodorkovskycenter.com/news-resources/stories/opposition-leaders-will-not-join-gorbachev’s-new-party>

lxxxvii Morozov, Alexander. "Party Time in Russian Politics The Latest Party Law Reform Preserves United Russia’s Dominance." Politics. Russia Profile, n.d. Web. <http://russiaprofile.org/politics/57097.html>

opposition while appearing to stimulate and embrace it, thus extend Putin and United Russia’s

lifespan. Opening up the field to multitudes of new players may shatter the unity that was

beginning to show in the 2011-2012 protests, scattering the opposition due to their new political

conflicts. The steady gains made by the KPRF may also be undercut by the official registration

of fresh grassroots leftist and liberal political formations.

B. Conclusions: The Future of Russian Political Opposition

It is very likely in the short term that the political reforms initiated by the Kremlin will

succeed in stalling oppositional unity and organization efforts, but the question becomes “for

how long?” The cracks in Putin’s political empire are already becoming visible, evidenced by a

near-‘Ceausescu moment’ of deputies walking out his address to the Duma in 2012.lxxxviii It is

impossible to predict whether this reform strategy will succeed in maintaining the political status

quo, or whether the KPRF will be undercut, leading the political arena to implode for a time.

Either situation could eventually result in a re-coalescence of opposition political parties,

whether with stronger coalitions behind the old registered parties, or with new, stronger, more

legitimate opposition. If such ‘fake’ reform attempts or a true political fracturing can’t be

dragged out until the next elections in 2018, E.R. may be voted out by a theoretical new

oppositional juggernaut. If E.R. can drag it out, then Putin and United Russia will have prevented

the opposition from succeeding at the ballot box. This stifling of oppostition may still lead to a

popular revolt dragging them out of the Kremlin, especially if Russia’s economic situation

worsens again.

This set of political dynamics therefore makes the short-run chances of “regime change”

low, with longer-run prospects within the next six to ten years moderate to high. As far as the

lxxxviii Timothy Heritage and Gleb Bryanski. "Russia's Putin calls for unity but opponents walk out."World News. Reuters, n.d. Web. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/11/us-russia-putin-idUSBRE83A06Z20120411>

ideological substance of a possible replacement, statistics, general trends, and historical inertia

tend to indicate that (barring a sudden explosion of popularity for Yabloko or Parnas) whoever

replaces United Russia and Putin will likely be more ideologically extreme. Whether the stated

views of any party that manages to displace United Russia will actually translate into governance

is unknown, but nobody truly expected Hitler or Stalin to act in the ways that they did either.

Only time will tell.

Bibliography