boyer firstclassconditions gtj

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Grace Theological Journal 2.1 (1981) 75-114.

[Copyright 1981 Grace Theological Seminary; cited with permission;

digitally prepared for use at Gordon College]

FIRST CLASS CONDITIONS:

WHAT DO THEY MEAN?

JAMES L. BOYER

This inductive study of the approximately 300 NT instances of

the first class condition (ei]+ indicative) disputes the common under-

standing that this construction should be interpreted as obviously

true and translated as "since." It is found that this is the case only

37% of the time. Surprisingly, in 51% of the occurrences the condition

is undetermined. Four proposed explanations of this construction are

examined and found to be inadequate. It is then argued that the correctexplanation of the first class condition is a simple logical connection

between protasis and apodosis.

* * *

THE meaning of words is properly determined by a study of the ways

they are used in their many contexts, not by theoretical rationaliza-

tions on root meanings and etymologies. In just the same way the

significance of a group of words in grammatical construction is

determined by careful study of the same construction in actuallyoccurring contexts, not by rationalizing about voice, mood, and the

technical terminology employed by grammarians to identify them.

A commonly occurring example of the neglect of this axiom is

the manner in which the construction frequently called "First Class

Condition" is handled in much exegetical literature. Reasoning from

the use ofei]instead ofe]a


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76 GRACE THEOLOGICAL JOURNAL

occurring in the NT. By using the GRAMCORD tool,2

a print-out was

produced of all places where the conjunction ei]is followed by anindicative verb. Next, the list was edited manually to remove non-

applicable situations3

and to supplement the list by inserting those

first class conditions not caught by the program.4

The result was a listof about 300 instances

5in the NT where first class conditions occur.

The procedure in case of uncertain instances was to include both,

noting, of course, the problem.

Having in this list the materials for study, a detailed analysis was

made of all kinds of information about the construction, such as

sentence connectives used, the negative particle (where it occurred),

the tense and mood of the verb(s) in both the protasis and apodosis,

the "time reference" involved, the form of the apodosis (admonition,

promise, rhetorical question, declarative statement, etc.). Since many

of these are not closely involved in the interpretive problem underconsideration in this article, they will not be tabulated here.

The consideration primarily involved in this study is the "relation

to reality" expressed in the ei]-plus-indicative protasis. This wascarefully appraised, listed, and tabulated, with the following results:

1. Instances where the condition was obviously true. 115 37%

II. Instances where the condition was obviously false. 36 12%

III. Instances where the condition was undetermined: 155 51% ,

1. Uncertain by reason of futurity. 5 2%

2. Uncertain by reason of providence, "the course

of events. 24 8%

3. Uncertain by reason of man's spiritual

condition. 38 12%

4. Uncertain by reason of man's actions or

choices. 72 24%

5. Uncertain by reason of man's ignorance or

doubt. 16 5%

The implications of this information are the materials for the rest of

the discusslon.

2

For information, see my article "Project Gramcord: A Report," GTJ1(1980) 97-99,3Ei]+ indicative, of course, also includes all second class conditions (contrary to

fact) and a few examples where ei]mh


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BOYER: FIRST CLASS CONDITIONS 77

PROPOSED EXPLANATIONS: TRUE TO FACT

It seems obvious why "relation to reality" is the crucial consider-

ation, and it quickly appears that this term is understood very

differently by different scholars. If it is understood to apply to the

actual truth of the condition--its correspondence to the real world

"out there"--then the three general categories (I, II, III) are sufficientto settle the controversy immediately and completely, Such an under-

standing is impossible. If the first class condition states or implies the

actual truth, then it could not possibly be used by Christ to say, "If [or

according to this view, since] I by Beelzebub cast out demons. . .

(Matt 12:27), nor "Since I do not do the deeds of my father. . . "(John

10:37), nor "Since I have spoken evil. . ." (John 18:23). Paul could not

have written "Since there is no resurrection. . ." (1 Cor 15:13), nor

"Since Christ is not raised. . ." (1 Cor 15:14). These are not isolated,

peculiar examples; they represent 12% of all the first class conditions in

the NT. It is simply not true that first conditions indicate the external

objective truth or reality of the condition. "Since," of course, could be

used in those cases where the condition happens to be true without

making the statement untrue, but even there it would be a mistransla-

tion, since it alters what the authors actually said. Greeks had a word

for "since" (at least two of them) but they deliberately chose "if." We

must assume they knew what they were doing.

The most surprising lesson from this study is the size and

importance of the third category in the tabulation, Here are one-half

of all the examples, dealing withpossibilities rather than realities, and

the questions are not "true or false," but "probable or doubtful."

After long study, it seemed best to clarify the many "relations toreality" involved by listing them under the heading, "Non-determined

by reason of" five circumstances listed above in the tabulation. To

illustrate, note some examples,

Matt 5:29, 30: "If your eye (or hand) offend, . . ." Is that a truth

or a fact? It is clear that the reality of the condition depends on how

one has been using the eyes (or hands).

Matt 17:4: Peter said "If you wish, I will build three taber-

nacles. . . ." Did Christ so wish? Did Peter assume that he did? No;

Peter perhaps thought that he did and volunteered. The condition

was dependent on Peter's choice or desire, not on "relation toreality."

Matt 26:39, 42: Jesus prayed in Gethsemane "If it is possible. . ."

and a bit later "If it is not possible. . . ." It does not matter too much

some are uncertain (where the verb is left unexpressed). It should be noted that in no

case was uncertainty brought about by variant readings of the text.


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how we understand the content of that prayer. In any case, Christ

prayed for something, conditioning it on its possibility. Here appar-

ently the possibility depended on the providence of God, the course

of events he had determined. Of course, these two conditions cannot

possibly in any sense both be true; they are opposites.6

Acts 5:39: Gamaliel says, "If this is of God, you will not be ableto stop them." It is clear that Gamaliel was not stating that they were

from God, nor that he thought or assumed that they were from God.

He simply didn't know. I have labeled it "Uncertain by reason of

ignorance or doubt."

Rom 8:9: Paul says, "You are no longer in flesh if the Spirit of

God is in you. . . if anyone does not have the Spirit of Christ. . . he

is not of him." Paul is not implying by his use of the first class

condition that they were, or were not, in Christ (the same construc-

tion is used for both). He is saying that whether or not a person is in

Christ is determined by his spiritual condition--his possession of the

Spirit. Precisely the same reasoning may be applied to 1 Cor 3:14, 15,

7: 12-15, 9:17, etc.

2 Cor 1:6: "If we are being pressured. . . if we are being com-

forted. . . ." In this sentence it is probably true that they were actually

being tested andwere receiving God's encouragement; we know it

from the rest of the book. But it would be incorrect to say that this is

indicatedby the fact that it is a first class condition.

PROPOSED EXPLANATIONS: ASSUMED TRUE

Since actuality or truth is obviously notthe significance of firstclass conditions, another approach is needed. It is possible that the

reality or actuality indicated by the indicative is the reality of

statement, or the attitude of the speaker toward the condition stated;

he states it ''as true"; he assumes its truth for the sake of argument.

This has been a common expedient on the part of those who

recognized the problem dealt with in the preceding paragraphs, but

still want to see something "real" about these indicative verbs.7

And

such an approach is acceptable if certain safeguards are clearly

6

There are nineteen such pairs of first class conditional statements in the NewTestament; twelve, as here, expressing optional alternatives, and seven indicating oppo-

sites, either true or false.7 G. B. Winer,A Treatise on the Grammar of the New Testament Greek(Edin-

burgh: T. & T. Clark, 1870) 364; S. G. Green,A Handbook of the Grammar of the

Greek Testament(New York: Revell, n.d.) 317; A. T. Robertson,A Grammar of the

Greek New Testament in the light of Historical Research (Nashville: Broadman, 1934)

1007-12; Dana and Mantey,A Manual Grammar of the Greek New Testament(New

York: MacMillan) 287-89; W. D. Chamberlain,An Exegetical Grammar of the Greek

New Testament(Grand Rapids: Baker, 1941) 195.


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understood. For example, Paul did not actually assume the truth of

the statement, "If righteousness is through the law. . ." (Gal 2:20).

But this way of saying it may be acceptable if we understand it to

mean that Paul reasoned something like this: "Suppose for a moment

that righteousness is through the law, then consider the implications

of such, if it were true; for then Christ's death was wasted; he didn'tneed to die." However, this is not the way such a statement is

commonly understood or used by exegetes.

And while this manner of rationalizing, with careful safeguards,

may sometimes make plausible sense, it seems to be possible only in

contexts which suggest the idea of debate or argument. Where such is

not the case this rationalization becomes meaningless or even worse.

For example, Paul's words in 1 Cor 15 may easily be understood as

"assuming for the sake of argument that there is no resurrection,

then. . . ." But can we use it in Christ's Gethsemane prayer ("assuming

for the sake of argument that it is possible for this cup to pass. . .")?

With whom was he arguing? It would seem more reasonable to admit

that such a rationalization is not the explanation of the meaning of

the first class condition.

PROPOSED EXPLANATIONS: DETERMINED AS FULFILLED

Apparently it was the influence of A. T. Robertson's monumental

Grammar8

which popularized a terminology that has given rise to the

current confusion. He speaks of these conditions under the heading:

"Determined as Fulfilled." The term "determined" refers to the use of

the indicative mood, and ''as fulfilled" distinguishes this from the

second class, which also was "determined" (used the indicative) butdetermined as notfulfilled (i.e. contrary to fact). Robertson supports

this terminology and concept very strongly in his theoretical explana-

tion of its meaning, but insists that this "has to do only with the

statement, not the absolute truth or certainty of the matter. . . . We

must distinguish always therefore between the fact and the statement

of the fact.9

Robertson himself shows that he understood well what

he meant and chooses his examples chiefly from among places where

the fact and the statement of the fact were at variance, as a warning

against misapplying his concept. But it has not saved many of his

followers from making the precise mistake he warned against.And there is good evidence that even Robertson failed at times

to heed his warning. In a spot-check of his Word Pictures10

on some

8 See note 7 for bibliographical information.9 Ibid., p. 1006.10 A. T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6 vols. (Nashville:

Broadman, 1930).


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passages where these first class conditions occur, his comments are

not always clear. In many instances where the condition was in fact

not true, he makes no mention that a first class condition is involved.11

In most instances his comment is, "assumed as true." What he means

by that seems not always to be consistent. He frequently uses it of

some statement which is obviously not "reality," considering it as-sumed for the sake of argument only.12

But there are times when he

seems to mean more than that. For example, in dealing with the

Gethsemane prayer of Christ (Matt 26:42) he says, "'Except I drink

it. . . .' Condition of the third class undetermined, but with likelihood

of determination, whereas 'if this cannot pass away' . . . is first class

condition, determined as fulfilled, assumed to be true. This delicate

distinction accurately presents the real attitude of Jesus towards this

subtle temptation.13

It is noteworthy that he does not recognize v 39,

"if it is possible," the exact opposite, as also first class, also pre-

sumably part of the delicate distinction which accurately presents the

real attitude of Jesus. Another example is Acts 5:39. The second

alternative is a condition of the first class, determined as fulfilled. . . .

By the use of this idiom Gamaliel does put the case more strongly in

favor of the apostles than against them. This condition assumes that

the thing is so without affirming it to be true.14

Again, in 1 Cor 15:2,

"Paul assumes that they are holding it fast."15

In such statements most

readers would understand that he is using the term to imply

factuality, not merely a conceivably logical premise to an argument.

Again on Col 3:1, he says, "The preceding argument in 2:20 to 2:23,

rests on the assumption that the Colossians had 'died with Christ

from the elements of the world.' He assumed that to be true by thevery form of the condition, 'if you died' (as you did).

16This last

sentence can hardly be understood any other way than expressing

Robertson's careless slipping into the error he in theory warns against

elsewhere.

11 E.g., Matt 5:29-30, 17:4,26:39; Rom 8:9; note particularly I Cor 15:12-19, where

of seven occurrences of this construction, only one is identified as such.12 Cf. his treatment of John 10:37-38; on v 37, "Condition of first class, assumed as

true"; on v 38, "Condition again of the first class, assumed as true, but with opposite

results." Also, on John 18:23, "Condition of the first class (assumed to be true). . . .

Jesus had not spoken evilly toward Annas. . . . For the sake of argument, Jesus puts itas if he did speak evilly. Then prove it, that is all" (Vol. 5, pp. 190, 289).

13 Ibid., I. 213.14 Ibid., 3. 69.15 Ibid., 4. 186.16 A. T. Robertson, Paul and the Intellectuals (Nashville: Sunday School Board,

1928) 143


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PROPOSED EXPLANATIONS: IMPLIES TRUTH OR FACTUALITY

These last examples from Robertson illustrate well the manner in

which this question is dealt with by some more careful writers

today.17

They understand the obvious fact that first class does not

mean "true to fact" condition, but they seek to keep part of that

misconception by holding that it indicates, implies, it is more stronglyin favor of the particular supposition so stated. But, to be consistent,

if the ei]+ indicative style of condition points out probability in anyinstance, it must in every instance, else such a conclusion is not an

implication of the construction, but of some other element, such as

context.

CORRECT EXPLANATION: LOGICAL CONNECTION

What then does this examination of the first class conditions

indicate as the correct significance of this construction?

It seems better to drop entirely such references to reality (oractuality, or assumption, or implication of reality) and return to a

"working" rather than "theoretical" definition of the first class condi-

tion. The classical grammarians along with the older NT scholars had

the right idea. This form of the conditional sentence was called the

"Simple Condition." The essence of this approach may be seen from a

few quotations.18

When the protasis simply states a particular supposition, implying

nothing as to the fulfillment of the condition, it has the indicative

with ei].19

17 Cf. Nigel Turner, Grammatical Insights Into the New Testament(Edinburgh:

T. & T. Clark, 1965) 52. Discussing the mixed condition in Luke 17:5, he says, "A

grammarian would complain that the present indicative in the protasis in place of the

correct imperfect had changed the clause from an unreal to a real condition. It means

that the supposition introduced by 'if' is no longer a vague one but is a real situation. It

means that Jesus was not saying, 'If you had faith' (implying that they had not), but 'If

you have faith' (leaving the matter open, but implying that they have)." He explains the

ungrammatical words as "a subtle politeness." But note what his last statement

indicates regarding his attitude toward the significance of a first class condition:

"leaving the matter open, but implying that they have."18 Beside these representative quotes, others taking this basic approach are: H. P. V.

Nunn,A Short Syntax of New Testament Greek(Cambridge: Cambridge University,

1951) 117. James Hope Moulton,An Introduction to the Study of New Testament Greek(New York: MacMillan, 1955) 135.

19 W. W. Goodwin, Greek Grammar, rev. C. B. Gulick (Boston: Ginn, 1930) 294.


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Simple present and past conditional sentences are sometimes called

'neutral,' because nothing is implied with regard to the truth of either

condition or conclusion.20

This form merely sets forth the nexus between the conclusion and the

condition; it sets forth the conclusion as real, if the condition isreal--but implies nothing as to the latter.21

The protasis simply states a supposition which refers to a particular

case in the present or past, implying nothing as to its fulfillment. . . .

Conditional clauses of the first class are frequently used when the

condition is fulfilled, and the use of the hypothetical form suggests no

doubt of the fact. This fact of fulfillment lies, however, not in the

conditional sentence, but in the context.22

If a more descriptive title for this class of construction than

"Simple Condition" is desirable, "The Condition of Logical Connec-

tion" may be useful. This form of conditional sentence affirms a

logical connection between the condition proposed in the protasis and

the conclusion declared in the apodosis. Sometimes this connection is

that of cause and effect, but not always. "If there is a natural body

there is also a spiritual one" (1 Cor 15:32) does not mean that the

natural body causes or produces the spiritual one. It affirms a logical

connection, a concurrence of the two; they "go together." If the

protasis is true, it is logical that the apodosis is true.

In summary, what does a first class conditional sentence in NT

Greek mean? It means precisely the same as the simple condition inEnglish, "If this. . . then that. . . ." It implies absolutely nothing as to

"relation to reality." It is saying that the result (the apodosis) is as

sure as the condition (the protasis). It is a forceful device of language

which leaves the judgment and convictions of the hearer with regard

to the truthfulness of the supposition to prove or disprove and to

enforce the truth of the conclusion. These statements can be made of

everyone of the 300 NT examples and are equally true of everyone

of them. It is the verdict of a usage study of this grammatical

construction.

20 H. W. Smyth,A Greek Grammar(New York: American Book Co., 1916) 341. The

statement quoted follows a statement almost identical to that made by Goodwin.21 Adolph Kaegi,A Short Grammar of Classical Greek(St. Louis: B. Herder,

1914) 144.22 Ernest De Witt Burton, Syntax of Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek

(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1897) 102.


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10. Matt 11:14 kai>ei]qe


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20. Matt 19:10 Ei]ou!twj e]sti>n h[ai]ti


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31. Mark 8: 12 ei]doqh


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41. Mark 14:35 kai>proshuei]a]gapa?te tou>j a]gapw?ntaj u[ma?j , poi


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50. Luke 11:20 ei]. . . e]n daktu


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59. Luke 17:6 Ei]e@xete pi


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69. John 5:47 ei]de>toi?j e]keie@rga tou?patro II.10

pisteumh>pisteu


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78. John 11:12 Ku


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90. John 20:15 Kue]bae]k qeou?e]stin, ou]dunhn e@dwken au]toi?j o[ I.13

qeo>j w[j kai>h[mi?n . . . e]gw>tijkwl u?sai to>n qeo>n;If God has given to them an equal gift as also to

us. . . who was I [to be] able to hinder God?

94. Acts 16:15 Ei]kekri


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99. Acts 25:5 ei@tia@topon III.5kathrorein ou#n a]dikw?kai>a@cion qana


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109. Rom 4:14 ei]ga>r oi[e]k no


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117. Rom 8:9 u[mei?j de>ou]k e]ste>e]n sarki>a]l l a>e]n pneuXristo>j e]n u[mi?n, to>me>n sw?ma nekro>n dia> III.3a[martide>pneu?ma zwh>dia>dikaiosuto>pneu?ma tou?e]gein ]Ihsou?n e]k III.3nekrw?n oi]kei?e]n u[mi?n, o[e]gein] Xristo>ne]k nekrw?n z&opoihta>qnhta>swr kata>sa


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127. Rom 9:22 ei]de>qej e]ndein o]rgh>n kai> I.gnwridunato>n au]tou? h@negken e]n pol l ?makroqumi


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BOYER.: FIRST CLASS CONDITIONS 97

137. Rom 11:24 ei]ga>r su>e]k th?j kata>f u


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146. 1 Cor 3:18 ei@tij dokei?sof o>j ei#nai e]n u[mi?n e]n t&?ai]w?ni III.4touj gene


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156. 1 Cor 8:3 ei]de>tij a]gap%?to>n qeoj o[path


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166. I Cor 10:30 ei]e]gw>xar ou]katal un gunaiki>to>kei


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176. 1 Cor 15:2 di ]ou$kai>s&ou]k e]geiXristo>j II.e]ghXristo>j ou]k e]gh


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187. 1 Cor 15:44 ei]e@stin sw?ma yuxikopneumatikon kuti


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196. 2 Cor 3: 11 ei]ga>r to>katargoudomee@stin kekal ummeeu]agge


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207. 2 Cor 8:12 ei]ga>r h[proqumin e@x^ III.3eu]proou]k [email protected] the readiness is present, [one is] accepted

according to . . .

208. 2 Cor 10:7 ei@tij peh[mei?j .If anyone is convinced that he himself belongs to

Christ, let him reckon. . . that just as he [is] of

Christ so also [are] we.

209. 2 Cor 11:4 ei]me>n ga>r o[e]rxo


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217. Gal 2:14 Ei]su> ]Ioudai?oj u[paou]xi> III.4]Ioudai*kw?j z ?j , pw?j ta>e@qnh a]nagkazhtou?ntej dikaiwqh?nai e]n Xrist&? III.4

eu[reau]toi>a[martwl oija[marti


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228. Gal 5:25 ei]zw?men pneur dokei?tij ei#nain w@n, f renapat%? III.5e[auton th?j xreito>zh?n e]n sarki


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237. Phil 3:8-11 a]l l a>menou?nge kai>h[mou?mai paj III.4u[mi?n a]pokal ukai>ei@tij e@painoj , tau?ta l ogide>a]pokathl l at&?pneun u[mi?n ei]mi,Even if I am absent in the flesh, yet I am with

you in spirit.

242. Col 2:20 Ei]a]peqan Xrist&? a]po>tw?n stoixei


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245. 2 Thess 1:5, 7 ei]j to>kataciwqh?nai u[ma?j th?j basil ei


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255. 1 Tim 6:3, 4 ei@tij e[terodidaskal ei?kai>mh>prose


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267. Heb 6:9 Pepeiperi>u[mw?n, a]gaphtoi I.kreie]xoperisso


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275. Jas 2:8 ei]meth>n III.427

graf h


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284. I Pet 2:2-3 a@dol on ga


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295. 2 Pet 2:4-9 Ei]ga>r o[qeo>j a]gge


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304. Rev 13:10 ei@tij ei]j ai]xmal wsi

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