book reviews - university of pennsylvania

1969]

BOOK REVIEWS

LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST. By MICHAEL

ZANDER. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1968. Pp. xi, 342. 70s.

Clive Anderson t

"The first thing to do, let's kill all the lawyers," ' cried Dickthe Butcher as he aroused the Blackheath mob to revolution.

As far back as Shakespeare's time the English lawyer was theobject of primitive, but not uncommon, criticism. A more sophisticatedcritique of the profession was recently made by an English judge:

To the ignorant, it appears to be parasitical; to the socialreformer, hide bound by tradition; to the politician, devotedto 18th century concepts of liberty and freedom of contractwhich are out of place in the world today; and to the Press,arrogant, stuffy, over privileged and standoffish.2

However embittered these slurs on the English legal institutionappear, they were for the most part impotent until the 1960's. It wasnot until then that nonprofesionals, who had long resented the "sacro-sanct" esteem of the professions in general, effectively acted in concertto criticize the bar. As long as the Trade Union could withstand theonslaught of daily public scrutiny, the "other side" should be exposedto a little investigation also.3

Michael Zander, riding the crest of this criticism, undertakes thetask of scrutinizing the English legal system and offering proposalsto improve its standing both with the public and for the public interest.He brings to this endeavor fine credentials. He is an English lawyerof wide experience, having served both as barrister and solicitor. Fur-thermore, he has more than a passing acquaintance with the Americanlegal system, and he uses the latter perspective to sharpen his objectiveand analytical study. The combination of these talents serves to pro-

t Legal Method Instructor, University of Pennsylvania. B.A. 1967, B.C.L. 1968,Oxford University (England).

1 W. SHAKESPEARE, HENRY VI, part II, act 4, scene ii.2 The Role and Responsibility of the Advocate, Lecture by Mr. Justice Lawton

at the University of Bristol (England), Nov. 4, 1966.3 In January, 1967 the Monopolies Commission was asked to report on the restric-

tive practices employed by the professions, under the powers granted by the Monopo-lies and Mergers Act of 1965, c. 50, § 5. The report is still under preparation. See740 HAzsRmD (H of C) Jan. 30, 1967, cols. 44-8.

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duce a thoroughly researched and documented account of the practiceof law in England.

Before reviewing this work, it is important to point out threegeneral problems confronting the prospective reader. First, there isthe obvious difficulty of foreign terminology that the American readerwill encounter, unfamiliar as he is with English legal procedures andjargon. For instance, the American lawyer must learn that a "brief"does not mean a document containing an advocate's argument to besubmitted to the court, but the instructions sent by a solicitor to thebarrister who will handle the case in court. However, obstacles ofthis nature are worth overcoming, because the book has its messageeven for the American practitioner. One of the unexpected by-productsof the work is that it shatters many myths concerning English lawwhich are prevalent in the American mind. American lawyers, whilerecognizing the inefficiency and stagnation in the English system, stillseem to credit it with providing the finest legal services in the world.4

Zander's book goes a long way towards shattering that misconception.The second problem stems from the fact that the book was written

in a transition period for the English legal system. Many of Zander'sproposed reforms have already been addressed by the English bar, andparts of the book are outdated. However, the legal profession has notas yet been turned upside down. Most, if not all, of the changes havebeen of detail, rather than substance. Outside of reforms in legaleducation, there is no indication of sweeping alterations. Thus, muchof Zander's commentary will be relevant for some time to come.

The final difficulty concerns the author's organization. Havingarticulated grievances in particular areas, he often offers more thanone solution. Usually, he pleads these proposals in the alternative,working from the most radical to the more moderate. Where hisdiscussion of reform is confined to one chapter, there is no difficultyin following his train of thought. An example of this clarity is foundin chapter seven, where there is a well-defined discussion of whetherbarristers ought to be divided into Queen's counsel and juniors. How-ever, in other parts of the book the reader is not offered such terseanalysis and may remain unaware of an underlying theme the authorhas attempted to weave over a series of chapters. One of the worstexamples of this faulty organization can be found in Zander's dis-cussion of the difficulties in transferring from one branch of the pro-fession to the other. The definition of the problem and the proposedsolution are separated by no less than nine chapters. ApparentlyZander hoped to save the suggestions for this crucial problem for hisconclusion. However, had he avoided dramatic effect for the virtues

4

The legal profession in England is often looked at starry-eyed by lawyersfrom this country and it is time that Americans examined the English situa-tion more closely.

Q. JOHNSTONE & D. Hopsox, LAWYERS AND THEm Wo x 4 (1967).

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of organization, the reader certainly would have gained.The author appropriately enough begins his analysis by examining

the requisites for entrance into the profession. The focus of his dis-cussion is on what restrictions should exist. Unfortunately, he skirtsover the complementary and equally vital question of the actual effec-tiveness of the English lawyer's training. Although he might havewished to refrain from a complex analysis of this subject to avoidraising a myriad of peripheral problems, some greater detail couldhave been incorporated without totally losing perspective. For ex-ample, the author asserts that all lawyers should have a law degreefrom a university before they begin to practice. This is well and fine;however, the author has some responsibility to demonstrate why thedegree is so necessary. This is especially important in light of theimpression one gets from the book that legal education is only deficientwhen administered by such professional bodies as the Inns of Courtor the "crammers." While it can hardly be denied that the rotememorization required of students to pass the Bar or solicitors finalsis not the finest legal education, the alternatives are not consideredto be much better. Some critics recently stated that "serious defi-ciencies exist in every kind of institution that provides formal instruc-tion for law students, including the universities." ' This viewpointhas even been shared by the universities themselves,' since they haveespoused the philosophy that the study of law at that level is not thestart of a professional man's training, but the end of a young man'seducation. Certainly this aspect of the English legal system could usefurther analysis.

Aside from the above, many other pressing questions are leftunanswered. What would be the best method for integrating thetwo required sets of examinations? Should the university courses belinked to the requirements of the Bar or solicitors examinations, orshould the students who pass the former be exempted from the latter?How much practical training should be required? How should thepractical training be linked to the academic training? Should therebe a common education for both barristers and solicitors? How soonafter completion of the educational process should the choice betweenthe two branches be made? These are questions that are vital to thepractice of law in England today. Yet, Mr. Zander totally avoids theseissuesY

For what it may be worth, this reviewer would like to see asystem in which the majority of lawyers first acquire a law degree

G Id. 569.6See generally B. ABEL-SMITH & P, STEVENS, LAWYERS AND THE COURTS 565-75

(1967). This passage discusses the controversy within university law facultieswhether the study of law is intended to provide liberal education or professionaltraining.

"The preceding discussion naturally proceeds upon the assumption that fusionof the profession is not possible, which is a reasonable assumption in the presentclimate of legal opinion.

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(although this would not be mandatory) from universities that havemade a serious effort to strengthen their curriculum. Thereafter, theprospective practitioner should spend a short period of time in practicaltraining before opting for one branch or the other. Professional ex-aminations should only be given to those who have not attended anaccredited university. Furthermore, for those who are certain thatthey wish to be solicitors, practical training should be much lessextensive. Inexperience is not a pressing problem for a new solicitor,since the firm he joins can carry him through his initial steps in lawpractice. In any event practical training should be held to an absoluteminimum for both solicitors and barristers in order to avoid the harsheffects of the unsalaried period. This training should serve as a sub-stitute for the present pupillage or articles requirements.8 Theseapprenticeships, which keep solicitors employed in articles at a pittance,and prevent barristers from earning anything, discourage many youngmen from entering the profession. The recruitment of bright youngpeople would be increased if this period of poverty could be avoided.If the American experience is typical, there is little danger in lettingnewly fledged lawyers loose soon after qualification; the responsibilitygiven to them seems to have been a beneficial boost to their laterdevelopment as practitioners.

Both theLaw Society and the new Senate of the Four Inns of Courthave recently developed their own solutions,' and the latter has beenadopted.' Of the two, the Law Society's proposals, though primarilyconcerned with solicitors, come closest to the proposals outlined above.They advocate that the students qualify as "lawyers," not as barristersor solicitors, whereas the Bar proposals envisage common preliminaryexaminations, but separate final tests to preserve the division of theprofession. The Bar places special emphasis on the fact that studentswill receive practical training as part of their Bar finals; however, itfails to explain the philosophical inconsistency of retention of the pupil-lage requirement.

The new Bar proposals also envision a year's course at the Councilof Legal Education. However, adding the eighteen months that thiscourse requires (counting two three-month summer periods), to asix months of pupillage, results in two years of starvation. TheBar hopes to mitigate the hunger pains by encouraging the government

8 "Pupillage" and "articles" are required periods of apprenticeship for barristersand solicitors, respectively. Taking place after the student has taken his finalexaminations, pupillage lasts 1 year, and articles takes 2 years for the law graduateand longer for the nongraduate. A solicitor in articles is paid a salary by the firmto whom he is "articled"; a barrister may not earn anything at all for the first 6months of pupillage, and thereafter his income is whatever he can earn (usually nota lot). Both types of apprenticeship have been heavily criticized, since they are notvery effective for providing the newly qualified lawyer with practical education. TheLaw Society appears to be ready to abolish articles.

9 The Times (London), May 11, 1968, at 4, col. 1; id. Nov. 4, 1968, at 2, cols. 1-2.10 Id., March 3, 1969, at 3, cols. 1-2.

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to make grants to students during this period. Grants, however, arehardly a substitute for a decent wage."

One final reason for finding fault with the Bar proposal is theretention of final examinations. Nowhere in their report do theybother to articulate the reason for retaining them. It is difficult toimagine that they will take any other form than the present "cramexaminations," which are valueless. At the same time, it would bea futile exercise to alter them so that they contain an emphasis onlegal analysis and critical evaluation of legal rules, since the examinee,in most instances, has already passed this kind of examination inthe university.

After his discussion of admission to practice, Zander allots thebulk of the book to an analysis of the regulations governing the activitiesof practicing barristers and solicitors. A constantly recurring themeis that practitioners, especially barristers, are unnecessarily burdenedwith minor regulations. He views this situation as a conflict betweenthe "public interest" in having a legal profession as free as possible frompetty restrictions, and the Bar's insistence that only through these con-trols will the high standard of conduct and ethics presently attributed tobarristers be maintained. The reader quickly is brought to the con-clusion that elimination of several of these regulations will not resultin total moral decay among practitioners. As Zander points out, theBar can justly be proud of its high standards of conduct, but thosestandards are not solely the product of regulations. Indeed, if this wereso, it would not be very flattering for the Bar. Moreover, other pro-fessions enjoy comparable reputations for ethical conduct, yet theyhave not seen the need for such stern regulatory control on the activitiesof their members.

One often feels that the rules under consideration work well inthe majority of cases, and that Zander seeks repeal more for the sakeof symmetry than need. He admits that if the rules were abolished theactual practice would not be altered significantly. Of course, the merefact that rules work well in most cases does not mean that the remaindershould be forgotten; however, it does mean that there is a heavier burdenon one claiming that change is necessary. Many of the rules regulatingbarristers are historical relics and are almost certainly recognized assuch. However, as long as no substantial harm results to the publicfrom their continued employment, tradition will keep them operative.Outsiders may regard this as untidy, but as Zander points out in a

11 However, a letter in the Times said that since the local authorities were unwill-ing in the past to make grants available to students in order to take Bar Exams, theywere unlikely to do so now merely because the examination was "reformed." Accord-ingly, the writer suggested that a levy be made on the profession itself, under theprovisions of the Industrial Training Act of 1964, c. 16, §§ 4, 12, to be used to payfor the training of Bar students until they were able to start earning. The suggestionhas considerable merit, as it may well be that the responsibility for insuring that theprofession continues to receive well-trained entrants rests upon the profession itself,although it is seeking to pass the responsibility to the state. The Times (London),Apr. 2, 1969, at 10, col. 5.

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different context, it may be too much to expect the Bar unilaterallyto make a change which offers only marginal relief to the public,while causing upheaval in the Bar itself.

Zander's argument is least convincing when discussing the vexingquestion of remuneration. Whereas certain criticisms (such as hisobjection to fixing barristers' fees by advance guess-work 12) are cer-tainly valid, his overall exhortation to the legal profession to be morecompetitive and willing to adopt some of the normal incidents of busi-ness (price-cutting in particular) is unconvincing. Without any doubthe is correct in stating preliminarily that the professional man isadept at deluding himself concerning the nature of his trade. Becausehe claims to be providing a service, rather than selling a product, hisattitude toward his craft differs from that of a merchant. Althoughlawyers profess to subordinate money-making to the more noble goalof insuring the welfare of their clients and refuse to sully their pro-fessional lives with base commercial activities such as self-promotion orcompetition, Mr. Zander rejects these protestations as cant. Theprofessional sells a product, and must perforce compete, just like thescorned business man.

In his campaign to enlighten the Bar toward the true nature ofits profession and to breathe competition into the life of the law, theauthor misses one crucial fact: under the present circumstances, thereis just no pressure to compete. Throughout the country, especiallyat the Bar, there is a sufficient shortage of lawyers for the majorityto be able to make a comfortable income, without fighting amongstthemselves for the spoils. Moreover, the individual lawyer cannotcorner a larger share of the market by offering lower rates, becausehe has a limited capacity for work. Given the shortage, he is probablyworking very close to capacity at present. If this smacks of a mo-nopoly of a small group of lawyers holding the public up to ransomin the form of disproportionately high fees, that is not the case. Thereis no evidence that the fees now being charged by the profession areexcessive, and, in fact, many barristers think they charge too little. Evenif the demand did not far exceed the supply, the author does not detailhis proposals to change lawyers' attitudes toward "non-professional"activities. Nor does he consider what other effects such a change ofattitude could be expected to have. His plea for competition, as wellas his readiness to cut prices, needs further study.

In sharp contrast to the shallow treatment of competition, theauthor offers a detailed and thoughtful analysis of the division of theprofession in England. Mr. Zander nicely illustrates the surprisingnumber of times the two branches of the profession are at odds with

12 This rule has other, even less defensible, by-products, not the least of which isthat a barrister is entitled to the sum named on the brief, whatever happens to thecase thereafter, whether or not he does the work. Thus, if the case is settled thefollowing day after the receipt of the brief, the barrister still gets the full fee. SeeM. ZANDER, LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 95-114, (1968).

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one another. For example, barristers and solicitors are actually start-ing to war against each other over the Bar's monopoly of the rights ofaudience in higher courts. More militant solicitors have formed theBritish Legal Association (which describes itself as "the profession'sonly union") in order to challenge the Bar's claim to an exclusiveright of audience. The attacks have consisted of a solicitor's appearancein court, demanding an audience 13 from the sitting judge. Althoughthese efforts may be a bit premature, since the entire question is nowbeing studied by the British Government, they indicate, nevertheless,increasing resentment toward a distinctly monopolistic rule favouringthe Bar. The Association, which now claims membership of aboutten per cent of all solicitors, seems likely to continue to try to embarrassthe Bar into action. How far the Bar is prepared to go is not clear,but there is no reason for the right of audience to be so restricted.

It is impossible in the limited space available for this Review eitherto do justice to the very thorough presentation, or to credit the con-siderable number of perceptive criticisms made by the author. How-ever, mention should be made of the lengthy consideration given tothe possibilities of reconstruction. Ink has been spilled for over acentury in arguments over whether the profession ought to remaindivided. Having first enumerated every argument that has beenadvanced for division, Zander skillfully refutes each in turn. Althoughhe attempts to be objective, his bias in favor of fusion causes himto reject too quickly one major argument for maintaining division:that is, it encourages the development of a breed of specialists, notablyin trial advocacy. He also tends to give too much prominence tothe argument that fusion would reduce legal costs. It may be undulycynical, but it is unlikely that substantial saving would result fromthe overall reorganization of the manner in which English lawyershandle a case. Fusion, Zander claims, would eliminate the duplicationof work that arises from the practice of the solicitor first preparinga case, and then handing it over to a barrister who repeats the prepara-tion for trial. Yet the American law firms that maintain a separatelitigation section operate in the same manner. When the litigationdepartment receives a case from another section of the firm, the triallawyer must be briefed on every aspect of the case in much the sameway a solicitor briefs a barrister. Presumably, the American firmscontinue the practice because it gets good results.

It is this reviewer's opinion, nonetheless, that fusion would bebeneficial. Although the legal profession has responded to pressure tointroduce lesser measures that would alleviate the effects of division

13 The most recent was on March 31st, 1969, at Bristol Quarter Sessions, wherethe Recorder, Sir Joseph Molony, Q.C., refused Mr. George Bates's application foraudience. Mr. Bates is a member of the British Legal Association; he promisedthat more attempts would be forthcoming. His was already the fifth in the recentcampaign. The Times (London), Apr. 1, 1969, at 2, cols. 4-5.

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(such as the reform of the educational requirements mentioned earlier),the prospect for complete reform seems remote at best.

Unfortunately, Zander approaches reform as an all or nothingconcept. He does not make an attempt to support the more limited,yet very deserving, changes, such as allowing barristers to formpartnerships.'4 At the moment the barrister is a completely free agent,possessing only loose ties with other members of his chambers. Formany, this independence is the primary attraction of the Bar. How-ever, independence also has its disadvantages. It exposes the barristerto all the risks of the vicissitudes of professional life and unpredictablepersonal health. The only security he has to rely on are personal re-sources. This reviewer believes that it is more reasonable to give thebarrister the option of deciding whether he prefers the independenceof working alone or the security of a partnership.

The special committee of the Bar Council concluded that therewas no substantial demand for partnerships 5 (which is probably anaccurate observation). They have also come to the conclusion thatthere is no evidence that partnerships would serve the public interest.'This latter conclusion is founded on the theory that it is improper fora member of a partnership to appear before a judge who is, or was, amember of the same partnership. This liability hardly seems to beoverwhelming in light of the American experience. The committee'sfinal concern was that they felt that partnerships could in no way im-prove the quality of the Bar.' This is certainly a selfish attitude.Difficult as it may be to argue that it would improve the quality of theBar, the prospect of providing financial security to the Bar's youngermembers would certainly seem to be a desirable goal. This securitymight also serve to lure those talented young people who are otherwisedriven from the legal profession by the early "lean years." 18

Mr. Zander has written a book which, in his own words, isharshly critical of the English profession. He insists that his criticismhas a positive side, and hopes that if some of the criticisms effect

14 The English legal profession remains opposed to any proposal to allow partner-ships. The Times (London), May 16, 1969, at 2, col. 3.

:1 Id.16 Id.

171d.is The threat of economic ruin during the period of training causes many young

lawyers to reject the profession upon completion of their course of University study.Out of 13 lawyers in the 1967 class at Worcester College, Oxford, there were 5 whointended to become, and did become, solicitors. The remaining 8 became Bar students,but not one has yet entered chambers. To my knowledge, only 2 have taken the Barfinals. More significant, 4 have taken full-time salaried employment outside the law,and have no intention to practice. In 3 of the 4 cases, this was a conscious decisionto exchange the !uncertainty of the young barrister's start in his career for thesecurity of salaried employment.

These figures are in no way regarded as significant, or representative of nationwidetrends, but are set out merely to show that intending barristers are still being scaredoff by the old bogey of the first few years of penury.

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changes, the profession will be the better for it. Not all of his proposalsare equally meritorious, but many are excellent. When a group isassailed with such profuse criticism and overwhelmed with diverse sug-gestions, there is a tendency to resist any change. Fortunately, the legalprofession may have raised its arms to block the sun, but it has notclosed its eyes. Though the pace of change may not be as fast as itcould be, reform is in the air. Let us hope that some of Mr. Zander'ssuggestions become realities, in this fertile atmosphere.

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3/5 OF A MAN. By FLOYD McKissicK. London: The MacmillanCompany, 1969. Pp. ix, 223. $4.95.

Stephen A. Saltzburg t

To be black in America is to suffer discrimination at the handsof white Americans; to be black in America is to be deprived of oppor-tunity, to be denied equal protection of the law, and to be devoid ofhope. Believing that the preceding is an accurate description of thecondition of the black man in the United States, Floyd McKissick haswritten 3/5 of a Man to expose to white America the rampant racismexisting within it, and to warn of impending disaster unless the blackcommunity is liberated and social equality becomes a practical realityrather than a theoretical ideal.

McKissick traces racial discrimination in this country from thefirst appearance of the black man on this continent. As early as 1569the English legal system rejected the idea that men could be enslaved,resolving "[t]hat England was too pure an Air for Slaves to breathin." ' However, it was only forty years later that the roots of slaverywere planted in America when the first Negroes were brought toJamestown as slaves. When they first reached the colonies, theirstatus depended more on their religion than on their color 2 (whichperhaps explains the author's rejection of religion as a viable check ondiscrimination) .3 When religious distinctions were obliterated in 1730,race became the paramount factor determining status.4

A history of the treatment of the black man in early Americasupports McKissick's argument that

[t]he slavery in the United States was probably the mostoppressive form of slavery the world has ever seen. In everyother slaveholding culture, the slave had a few basic rights:he was already recognized as a human being-however unfor-tunate or servile.'

One writer has vividly described the totality of the oppression:

The American colonies devised one of the most rigidsystems of slavery. The logic of the law dictated this result.

t Articles Editor, University of Pennsylvania Law Review.1 1 H. CATmTRALL, JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE

NEGRO 9 (1968) (quoting 2 Rushworth 468 (1569)).2 Alpert, The Law of Slavery: It Did Happen Here, 55 A.B.A.J. 544, 545 (1969).

3 F. McKIssicK, 3/5 OF A MAN 24-25 (1969) [hereinafter cited as McKissicK].4I d. 24.6 Id. 35.

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If the man were a slave and the property of another, thisproperty interest had to be recognized in all of its implications.The innocent legal relation, however, was not formulatedin toto at any one time. It was gradually devised out ofnecessity because, if any one block were not added, the wholestructure would have collapsed of its inherent illogic.'

For McKissick, the crowning degradation was the constitutional pro-vision which provided the source for the title of the book:

Representative and direct Taxes shall be apportioned amongthe several States which may be included within this Union,according to their respective Numbers, which shall be deter-mined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, includ-ing those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and exclud-ing Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.'

While white Americans congratulate themselves on the stridestoward equality that have been made, McKissick chastises them fortheir continuing racism and economic exploitation. In a mannerreminiscent of Karl Marx, when he predicted the world-wide revolutionof the proletariat, the author foresees a universal movement amongblack and colored people to resist and destroy capitalism and its con-comitant exploitation and racism.'

According to McKissick, such a revolution would be justifiedbecause the government has consistently neglected the black man.When it has acted, it has done little more than provide ceremoniousgestures-pomp and circumstance designed to mislead the Negro intobelieving that he has made progress. What surprises him is not thata revolution may be imminent, but that it has been so long in coming.'He believes that since the Emancipation Proclamation, the govern-ment has consistently miscalculated the measures necessary to securefor the Negro his rightful place in American society. Examples ofthe mistakes he sees include the failure to provide forty acres and amule for every freed slave as promised ;' the failure to enforce thedesegregation decision of the Supreme Court in 1954; "1 the failure tosend voter registrars south to enforce the Voters Rights Bill of 1965 ;12

and the complete failure to understand the significance of the 1963march on Washington, which, in his opinion, was the culmination

6 Alpert, supra note 2, at 546.7 U. S. CosT. art. 1, §2, cl. 3 (1789).s McIussIcK 27-28.

O "It is remarkable that the era of nonviolent protest has lasted so long." Id. 136.10d. 36.

11 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; see McKissicK 36.12 Mclissicx 37.

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of years of suffering and toil that marked the beginning of theblack revolution.'3

When he vilifies white America for its racism and failure tocombat it, McKissick includes the courts as part of white America.Having reminded the reader of the infamous Dred Scott decision ofMr. Chief Justice Taney,'4 which he describes as a "constitutional studyin hypocrisy, weakness, and gutlessness," he proceeds to characterizethe Slaughterhouse Cases' and the Civil Rights Cases'6 as violativeof the duty of the Supreme Court to use the Constitution in "its high-est sense-using it to attack the most pervasive evils of the society." 1'Referring to the separate but equal doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson,"later rejected in Brown v. Board of Education,"0 he makes the followingcriticism:

The court system has repeatedly been used to advance theracism of America and to prevent Blacks from obtaining thepower that is rightfully theirs.

This decision was particularly insidious in view of theracist social structure of America. For in a racist society inwhich one race is in control, "separate but equal" can neverbe a reality. It is apparent that the decision . . . was in-tended to provide time.2"

Regarding Brown itself, he writes:

The Supreme Court took fifty-eight years from the firstmistaken decision to decide that the doctrine of "separate butequal" was invalid and unworkable. It took the SupremeCourt fifty-eight years to understand what "separate" meant;it took that long for it to discover what "equal" meant. Ittook the Supreme Court fifty-eight years to recognize itsresponsibility to America.2'

That those decisions could easily have been avoided greatly dis-turbs the author. The universal civil and human rights attributableto the Constitution of the United States and the Declaration of Inde-pendence transcend racism, and:

13 Id.

1460 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).1583 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).16 109 U.S. 3 (1883).17 McKissicr, 71.1s 163 U.S. 537 (1896).19 347 U.S. 483 (1954).20 Id. 74-75.21Md 78.

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If interpreted justly, in full awareness of . . . conditions,and if applied in a consistent fashion, the Constitution can beconverted into a document of liberation for Black America.'

Although he is satisfied with some of the recent decisions ofthe Court,' McKissick advocates overall changes in the judicial systemto foster equal protection. Examples of such changes include hissuggestion that the judiciary abandon the rule of construction avoidingthe decision of constitutional issues if it is possible to dispose of acase on other grounds, and that it substitute the principle of decidingconstitutional issues first, especially when the thirteenth and four-teenth amendments are involved. He further recommends that all casesinvolving the Bill of Rights or the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-ments be advanced on the docket.2 4

Objections to both of these suggestions are understandable. TheCourt's reluctance to decide constitutional issues when there are alterna-tive grounds available is predicated on a valid belief that the sweepingeffect of constitutional decisions should not be underestimated, and thefacts of an individual case often make it inappropriate for establishinga general law. Such a principle would also encourage inventive plain-tiffs to conjure up colorable constitutional issues on which the courtswould be forced to expend much time and energy, whereas a casemight be disposed of more simply with the same result on othergrounds. Bona fide claims would be lost amidst the deluge. Similarly,the idea of accelerating cases involving specific constitutional provi-sions requires an extensive screening process if the implementationof the policy is not to engulf the dockets of the courts with a multitudeof constitutional suits. This procedure would postpone decisions oncrucial issues rather than accelerate them.

But the most valid criticism one can make of McKissick's viewof the judiciary is that he places the burden of social reform on thewrong shoulders. The judiciary can prevent overt discrimination-atleast in those cases before it-but it cannot serve as the architect ofeconomic reform. And economic reform is really the crux of the prob-lem of inequality. Little more than six years ago, President John F.Kennedy described the birthright of a Negro child:

The Negro baby born in America today, regardless ofthe section of the nation in which he is born, has about one-half as much chance of completing high school as a white babyborn in the same place on the same day, one-third as muchchance of completing college, one-third as much chance ofbecoming a professional man, twice as much chance of becom-

22 id. 55.23E.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).24 McKissIcK 55.


ing unemployed, about one-seventh as much chance of earning$10,000 a year, a life expectancy which is seven years shorter,and the prospects of earning only half as much.2 5

Although he was an advocate of civil rights legislation, and anavid supporter of court decisions reducing the level of discriminationin the country, the late Senator Robert F. Kennedy realized that lawsand courts are inadequate to eradicate poverty:

The dilemma of poverty faced by the society and thepolity is the gap between expectations and reality. Greatexpectations were the creation, not of idle political promises,but of the country itself and its history.

National action is not enough because the law is notenough. The right defined by law is not enough whether itconcerns education or civil rights. We have a new civil rightslaw, and many of us live in states that have additional publicaccommodation and fair employment laws. But a decade ofpainful struggle for compliance must make us all wonderwhether mere submission to the process of law is enough.26

No one can accuse McKissick of not knowing what the problems are.

He surely subscribes to Robert Kennedy's description of Negro unrest:

"The essential cause is poverty . . 27

But his solutions are too simple, as exemplified by his statement:I contend, however, that every time a Black Man is refusedservice, assistance, or advice simply on the basis of his Black-ness, a constitutional right is violated."

Although one cannot dispute his goal, he can severely criticizeMcKissick's undue reliance on the courts. Even when the SupremeCourt "outlaws" discrimination, as in Browi, there is a large gapbetween the decision and its enforcement. If the Supreme Court wereto rule tomorrow that "[a] 11 discrimination of any kind based on raceis illegal," it would do little to cushion the plight of the Negro. Becausethe Court can only act in the individual case before it, and becauseit has no enforcement power, its power to reconstruct society is quitelimited. The Supreme Court and all lower courts can and shoulddeter overt discrimination, but without a redistribution of capital, theposition of the black man will not greatly improve.

2SQuoted in R. KENNEDY, THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 15 (1964).261d. 17-18.271d. 10.28 McKIssIClC 83.

[Vol.l17

BOOK REVIEWS

It would be unfair, however, to imply that McKissick views thelegal system as the sole answer to the problems of the Negro. Herealizes that a general overhaul in the philosophy of the nation isneeded, and recognizes that the white community must relinquish someof its power, money, and resources to the blacks. As part of the re-linquishment, he recommends that land be ceded to the nation ofIslam for creation of an independent black state, and that ownershipof land in Harlem, Bedford-Stuyvesant, and other predominantlyNegro areas be transferred to the black residents of each community,who would then operate all facilities and services themselves. Addi-tional suggestions include the subsidization of those black people whowant to live and work in Africa, and the establishment of blackuniversities.

One can easily quarrel with many of the proposals, but theimportance of the book lies not so much in the solutions offered as inthe communication of a mood" composed of two feelings. First,a feeling of pride has been born in the black community-pride inblack history, black heritage, and black leaders, both past and present.The book introduces men like W. E. B. DuBois, founder of theNiagara movement (forerunner of the NAACP); Marcus Garvey,founder of the Universal Negro Improvement Association; and dis-cusses contemporary leaders including the Honorable Elijah Muham-med, the late Malcolm X, Muhammed Ali, and the late Dr. MartinLuther King, Jr. For the author, black history and racial pride arethe beginnings of "black nationalism" and group identification whichare prerequisites to survival.

Growing unrest and impatience with delays in social progresscomprise the remaining element of the mood. Eldridge Cleaver,Stokely Carmichael, and H. Rap Brown are not mavericks; they rep-resent a sence of urgency that exists today among blacks. Inherent inthis urgency is a rejection of supposed half-hearted measures that domore to salve the conscience of the legislators than to alleviate suffering.For McKissick, the creation of the Office of Economic Opportunity,the passage of the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, and the passage of theVoter Rights Bill of 1965 represent piecemeal solutions intended onlyto buy time and ease the guilty conscience of the nation.30 Failure onthe part of political leaders to recognize the immediacy and urgencyof the feelings of the black people can only result in bloodshed.

29

The mood of this book makes it a must for all Americans. The moodreveals the depth of the anguish and anger in the Black community. I hopeWhite America understands the mood. If we do, then we will know that teargas and armed might are no answer to our problems.

IV. 0. Douglas, Foreword to McKIssicK at 9.

3o McKissicK 34-35

1969]

[Vol.117

BOOKS RECEIVED

ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT. Second Edition. By Herbert R. Baer.

Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1969. Pp. xiv, 653. $25.00.

AFRICAN PENAL SYSTEMS. Edited by Alan Milner. New York: Frederick A. Prager,1969. Pp. vii, 501. $12.00.

ANNUAL SURVEY OF COMMONWEALTH LAW 1966. By H. W. R. Wade. London:Butterworth & Co., 1967. Pp. vii, 873.

ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN JAPAN. By Hiroshi Iyori. New York: Record Press,1969. Pp. iii, 265.

BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH. By Richard Hammer. New York: The MacMillan

Co., 1969. Pp. vii, 305. $6.95.

THE BOOM IN GOING BUST. By George Sullivan. New York: The MacMillanCo., 1968. Pp. v, 215. $5.95.

BRITAIN'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS. By Richard E. Caves & Associates. Washington:The Brookings Institution, 1968. Pp. vii, 510. $7.50.

THE CASE THAT WILL NOT DIE: COMMONWEALTH VS. SACCO AND VANZETTI. ByHerbert B. Ehrmann. Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1969. Pp. ix, 576. $12.50.

CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE. By M. L. Friedland.Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1968. Pp. v, 568. $20.00.

THE CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO URBAN RENEWAL; REVISED EDITION. By Carl G. Lindbloom& Morton Farrah. West Trenton, New Jersey: Chandler-Davis Publishing Co.,1968. Pp. ix, 177. $2.00.

CENSORSHIP OF THE MOVIES. By Richard S. Randall. Madison: The University ofWisconsin Press, 1968. Pp. vii, 280. $7.95.

CITIZEN POLITICS. By James David Barber. Chicago, Ill.: Markham PublishingCo., 1969. Pp. ix, 199. $5.95

CIvIL DISOBEDIENCE: THEORY AND PRACTICE. Edited by Hugo Adam Bedau. NewYork: Pegasus, 1969. Pp. vii, 282. $1.95 paperbound.

CIn. PROCEDURE IN FRANCE. By Peter Herzog with Martha Weser. The Hague,The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1967. Pp. xli, 646. $20.16.

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE POWER To DESTROY. By Merryle Stanley Rukeyser.New York: Delacorte Press, 1968. Pp. xi, 220. $7.50.

COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: CASES AND

MATERIALS. By Donald B. King, Calvin A. Kuenzel, T. E. Lauer, Neil 0. Little-field & Bradford Stone. New York: Matthew Bender, 1968. Pp. iii, 20-23.

COMPETITION AND CONTROLS IN BANKING: A Study of the Regulation of Bank Com-petition in Italy, France and England. By David A. Alhadeff. California:University of California Press, 1968. Pp. ix, 384. $10.00.

(1212)

BOOK RECEIVED

COMPOSITIONS IN BANKRUPTCY: A Comparative Study of the Laws of the E.E.C.Countries, England and the U.S.A. By John J. H. Dalhuisen. Netherlands:A. W. Sijthoff, 1968. Pp. i, 158.

THE CONSTITUTION RECONSIDERED. Edited by Conyers Read. New York: Harper &Row. Pp. viii, 454. $3.75 paperbound.

CONSTITUrrTIONM LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES. By B. JamesGeorge, Jr. New York: Practising Law Institute, 1969. Pp. 413. $10.00.

CORPORATE COUNSEL'S ANNUAL-1968. By Harold Friedman & Herbert S. Schlagman.New York: Matthew Bender, 1968. Pp. iii, 877.

CRIME AND THE LEGAL PROCESS. By William J. Chambliss. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968. Pp. vii, 447. $7.95.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE. By Abraham S. Blumberg. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, Inc.,1968. Pp. vii, 206. $5.75.

DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME CoURT: 1967-68 TERM. By the EditorialStaff, United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers' Edition. Rochester, N. Y.:The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company, 1968. Pp. xxxv, 412.

DELINQUENTS AND NONDELINQUENTS IN PERSPECTIVE. By Sheldon & Eleanor Glueck.Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1968. $8.50.

DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN POLITICS. By Edward C. Smith & Arnold J. Zurcher.New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1968. Pp. v, 434. $2.50 paperbound.

DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A Preliminary Inquiry. By Kenneth Culp Davis. BatonRouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969. Pp. xii, 233. $8.50.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF A LEGAL AND SOCIAL POLICY. By Jay A.Sigler. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1969. Pp. x, 264. $9.75.

DRUGS ON THE COLLEGE CAMPUS. By Helen H. Nowlis. Garden City, New York:Anchor Books, 1969. Pp. xvi, 144. $.95 paperbound.

EMPIRICAL DEMOCRATIC THEORY. Edited by Charles F. Cnudde & Dean E. Neubauer.Chicago, Ill.: Markham Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. i, 534.

THE END OF OBSCENITY. By Charles Rembar. New York: Random House, 1968.Pp. xi, 528. $8.95.

ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. By Robert S. Summers. California: University ofCalifornia Press, 1968. Pp. vii, 307. $6.50.

ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PHLosoPHY. By Morris Ginsberg. Maryland:Penguin Books Inc., 1968. Pp. vii, 384. $2.95 paperbound.

FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PREss. By Paul C. Reardon & Clifton Daniel. Washington,D. C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1968. Pp.181. $4.50.

FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING. By William H. Painter. Charlottesville,Va.: The Michie Company, 1968. Pp. xiii, 627. $30.00.

19691


FEDERAL-STATE-LocAL FISCAL RELATIONSHIPS: Symposilm. Princeton: Tax Institu-tion of America, 1968. Pp. v, 502. $12.50.

THE FRANK MURPHY STORY: His Years in Florida Prisons, His Rehabilitation andHis Conquest of Alcoholism. By Frank Murphy as told to Thomas Helm. NewYork: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1968. Pp. i, 312. $6.50.

A FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION. By Thomas M. Franck & Edward Weisband. NewYork: University Press, 1968. Pp. v, 239. $7.95.

FRONTIERS OF CIvIL LIBERTIES. By Norman Dorsen. New York: Pantheon Books,1968. Pp. vii, 420. $8.95.

GAMBLING AND ORGANIZED CRIME. By Rufus King. Washington, D. C.: PublicAffairs Press, 1969. Pp. viii, 239. $6.00.

GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW. By John Marshall. New York: De Capo Press, 1968.Pp. v, 587. $15.00.

A HANDBOOK OF LANDLORD-TENANT PROCEDURES AND LAW, WITH FORMS. SecondEdition. By Nancy E. LeBlanc. New York: MFY Legal Services, Inc., 1969.Pp. 70.

HELP FOR TODAY'S TROUBLED MARRIAGES. By Esther Oshiver Fisher. New York:Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1968. Pp. vii, 288. $6.95.

HONESTY AND COMPETITION: False-advertising law and policy under FTC adminis-tration. By George J. Alexander. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968.Pp. ix, 315. $10.00.

IDENTIFICATION AND POLICE LINE-UPS. By William E. Ringel. New York: GouldPublications, 1968. Pp. vii, 211. $5.00.

THE IMPACT OF NEGRO VOTING: The Role of the Vote in the Quest for Equality.By William R. Keech. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1968. Pp. vi, 113.

THE INFORMATION MACHINE: The United States Information Agency and AmericanForeign Policy. By Robert E. Elder. New York: Syracuse University Press,1968. Pp. vii, 356. $10.00.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS: Materials for an Introductory Course, Volumes I,II, and Supplement. By Abram Chayes, Thomas Ehrlich & Andreas F. Lowen-feld. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown & Co., 1968. Pp. xxiii, 704.

INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. By John Carey. New York:Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968. Pp. vi, 116.

AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL SYSTEMS. Edited by Duncan M. Derrett. New York:Frederick A. Prager, 1968. Pp. vii, 203. $6.00.

JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS. By Stanley I. Kutler. Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1968. Pp. vii, 178. $5.95.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF JOHN MARSHALL. By Robert K. Faulkner. New Jersey:Princeton University Press, 1968. Pp. vii, 307. $10.00.

LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCESS. By Harry H. Wellington. Connecticut: Yale Uni-versity Press, 1968. Pp. vii, 409. $10.00.

LABOR LAW. By Sidney Fox. New York: Gould Publications, 1968. Pp. i, 124.$4.00.

[Voi.117

1969] BOOK RECEIVED 1215

LABOR RELATIONS LAW: Cases anzd Materials, Fourth Edition. By Russell A. Smith,Leroy S. Merrifield & Theodore J. St. Antoine. New York: Bobbs-MerrillCo., Inc., 1968. Pp. v, 1196. $17.50.

LAW AND POLICY MAXING FOR TRADE AMONG "HAVE" AND "HAvE-NoT" NATIONS.

By John Carey. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968. Pp. i, 118.

LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA. By Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. Pp. xi, 207. $5.95, $2.45 paperbound.

LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT. By James Marshall. New York: Doubleday &Company, Inc., 1969. Pp. xiv, 138. $1.45 paperbound.

LAW AND SoCIETY: A Sociological View. By Edwin M. Schur. New York: RandomHouse, 1968. Pp. vii, 293. $6.95, $2.95 paperbound.

LAW FOR THE SEA'S MINERAL RESOURCES. By Louis Henkin. New York: Inst. forthe Study of Science in Human Affairs of Columbia University, 1968. Pp. i, 75.

LAW, LIBmERTY AND PSYCHIATRY. By Thomas S. Szasz, M.D. New York: Mac-millan Co., 1968. Pp. vii, 281. $2.45 paperbound.

LAW, PoWER, & THE PURSUIT OF PEACE. By Eugene V. Rostow. New York, N. Y.:Harper & Rowe, 1968. Pp. xviii, 125. $5.00.

LAWYERS AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST. By Michael Zander. London: Weidenfeld andNicolson, 1968. Pp. vii, 342. 70 shillings.

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS IN THE U.S. SENATE. Edited by Lawrence K. Pettit &Edward Keynes. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1969. Pp. i, 310. $4.50paperbound.

THE Lmrrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION. By Herbert L. Packer. California: Stan-ford University Press, 1968. Pp. vii, 385. $8.95.

LITTLE GROUPS OF NEIGHBORS: The Selective Service System. By James W. Davis,Jr. & Kenneth M. Dolbeare. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. vii,276. $5.95.

MATERIALS ON REORGANIZATION, RECAPITALIZATION AND INSOLVENCY. By Walter J.Blum & Stanley A. Kaplan. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1969. Pp. vii,868. $13.50.

A METHODOLOGICAL PRIMER FOR POLITICAL SCIENTISTS. By Robert T. Golembiewski,William A. Welsh & William J. Crotty. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1968.Pp. v, 484. $8.50.

THE MIxED COURTS OF EGYPT. By Jasper Yeates Brinton. Connecticut: Yale Uni-versity Press, 1968. Pp. vii, 305. $12.50.

MODEL RULES FOR JUVENILE COURTS. By the Council of Judges of the National Coun-cil on Crime and Delinquency. New York: National Council on Crime andDelinquency, 1969. Pp. xii, 91. $3.00.

MOMENT OF MADNESS: The People vs. Jack Ruby. By Elmer Gertz. New York:Follett Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. v, 564. $6.95.


THE MOONEY CASE. By Richard H. Frost. California: Stanford University Press,1968. Pp. vii, 563. $12.50.

THE NEW AGE OF POLITICAL REFORM: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE, THE CONVENTION

AND THE PARTY SYSTEM. By Alexander M. Bickel. New York: Harper & Row,1968. Pp. i, 84. $1.25 paperbound.

NoN-PROLIFERATION TREATY: FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL. By MasonWillrich. Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 1969. Pp. xii, 341. $7.50.

NORMS AND ACTIONS. Edited by R. Treves & J. F. Glastra van Loon. The Hague,Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. Pp. i, 294.

THE OBLIGATIONS OF THE LAWYER TO His PROFESSION. By Whitney North Seymour.New York: The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1968.Pp. vii, 34.

OBSCENITY AND PUBLIC MORALITY. By Harry M. Clor. Chicago, Illinois: TheUniversity of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. xii, 278. $9.50.

THE OMBUDSMAN. By Donald C. Rowat. Canada: University of Toronto Press,1968. Pp. v, 384. $2.95 paperbound.

THE ORACLES OF THE LAW. By John P. Dawson. Ann Arbor: The University ofMichigan Law School. Pp. v, 520. $15.00.

PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES. By Paul Leicester Ford.

New York: De Capo Press, 1968. Pp. v, 451. $15.00.

PATTERNS OF POLITICS AND POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN LATIN AMERICA. By Harry

Kantor. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1969. Pp. xiii, 742.

POLICE POWER: POLICE ABUSES IN NEW YORK CITY. By Paul Chevigny. New York:Pantheon Books, 1969. Pp. xxi, 298. Notes and bibliography. $6.95.

POLITICAL ANALYSIS & PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL SCIENCE. By

Joyce M. Mitchell & Wm. C. Mitchell. Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally & Co., 1969.Pp. xxv, 674.

THE POLITICS AND DYNAMICS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. By Moses Moskowitz. NewYork: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1968. Pp. v, 283. $7.50.

THE POLITICS OF THE BARRIOS OF VENEZUELA. By Talter F. Ray. Berkeley, Cali-fornia: The University of California Press, 1969. Pp. xvi, 179. $7.00.

THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND THE BAR. By Richard A. Watson & RondalG. Downing. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1969. Pp. vii, 393. $10.00.

POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY. By Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan. NewYork: Matthew Bender, 1968. Pp. iii, 1128. $14.50.

PREJUDICE, WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION: Causes and Consequences of the Evacuationof the Japanese Americans in, World War II. By Jacabus tenBroek, Edward N,Barnhart & Floyd M. Matson. California: University of Cal. Press, 1968.Pp. v, 408. $225 paperbound.

PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON SALES AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS. By Robert J.

Nordstrom & Norman D. Lattin. American Casebook Series. St. Paul, Minn.:West Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. xxv, 729.

PRODUCT SAFETY IN HOUSEHOLD GOODS. By F. Reed Dickerson. Bobbs-Merrill Co.,Inc., 1968. Pp. iii, 190. $7.50.

[VoI.117

BOOK RECEIVED

PSYCHIATRY FOR LAWYERS. By Andrew S. Watson, M.D. New York: InternationalUniversities Press, Inc., 1968. Pp. vii, 326. $10.00.

PUBLIC CONTROLS FOR NONPUBLIC SCHOOLS. Edited by Donald A. Erickson. Chicago,Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1969. Pp. 5,230.

REAL ESTATE LAW, Fifth Edition. By Robert Kratovil. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.:Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969. Pp. vii, 380.

THE RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. Edited by Karl W. Deutsch & StanleyHoffman. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. iii, 280.

RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND CONSCIENCE: A Constitutional Inquiry. By Milton R.Konvitz. New York: The Viking Press, Inc., 1968. Pp. vii, 116. $4.50.

THE ROLE OF THE LAWYER IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES. By Andre6 M. Donner.Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1968. Pp. vii, 89. $3.50.

SCIENCE AND JUSTICE. By Sanford J. Fox. Maryland: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968.Pp. ix, 121. $6.95.

SELECTED ARTICLES ON FEDERAL SECURITEs LAW. Chicago: Section on Corporation,

Banking and Business Law of the American Bar. Pp. iii, 985. $12.00.

SICKNESS AND SOCETY. By Raymond S. Diff, M.D. & August B. Hollingshead, Ph.D.New York: Harper & Row, 1968. Pp. ix, 390. $12.50.

SPENDING IN THE AMERICAN STATES. By Ira Sharkansky. Chicago: Rand McNally& Co., 1968. Pp. vii, 170.

STANDARDS RELATING To TRIAL BY JURY: American Bar Association Project onMininum Standards for Criminal Justice. Chicago: American Bar Association.Pp. v, 180. $2.00.

STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION, Fifth Edition. By Jerome R. Hellerstein. St. Paul,Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1969. Pp. xl, 713.

STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. By Charles L. Black, Jr.Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969. Pp. ix, 98. $3.95.

THE STRUCTURE OF ImPARTIALITY. By Thomas M. Franck. New York: The Mac-millan Co., 1968. Pp. i, 344. $8.95.

SYNDICATE WIFE: The story of Ann Coppola-tthe hatcheck girl who married a MafiaPotentate, then turned Federal witness against him. By Hank Messick. NewYork: Macmillan Co., 1968. Pp. i, 207. $5.95.

THE TASKS OF PENOLOGY: A Symposium on Prison and Correctional Law. Editedby Harvey S. Perlman and Thomas B. Allington. Lincoln: University ofNebraska Press, 1969. Pp. viii, 241. $7.95.

THRFE-FIFTHS OF A MAN: By Floyd McKissick. New York, New York: TheMacillan Co., 1969. Pp. 207. $4.95.

TOWARDS A GLOBAL FEDERALISM. By William 0. Douglas. New York: UniversityPress, 1968. Pp. ix, 177. $7.95.

1218 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.117

TRAFFIC AND THE POLICE. By John A. Gardiner. Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity Press, 1969. Pp. vii, 176. $6.00.

THE TRANSITION FROM SCHOOL TO WORK: A Report Based on the Princeton Man-power Symposium. Princeton, N. J.: Industrial Relations Section, PrincetonUniversity, 1968. Pp. viii, 282.

TRIALS OF A PHILADELPHIA LAWYER. By Laurence H. Eldredge. New York: J. B.Lippincott Co., 1968. Pp. vii, 257. $5.95.

THE USES OF THE SEAS. By Edmund A. Gullion. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,1968. Pp. vii, 202. $4.95, $2.45 paperbound.

THE VANISHING RIGHT TO LIVE. By Charles E. Rice. New York: Doubleday &Co., 1969. Pp. i, 200. $4.95.

VENTURING TO Do JusTiCE. By Robert E. Keeton. Cambridge: Harvard UniversityPress, 1969. Pp. v, 183. $6.95.

VOTING AND NONVOTING. By Kurt Lang & Gladys Engel Lang. Waltham, Mass.:Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1968. Pp. v, 172. <

WATER LAW, PLANNING & POLICY: Cases and Materials. By Joseph L. Sax. NewYork: Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1968. Pp. vii, 520.

THE WHEELS: The State of Connecticut vs. Patrick G. Finno. New York: TheMacmillan Co., 1968. Pp. ix, 366. $7.95.

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