book review on social constructivism

8/7/2019 Book Review on Social Constructivism

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Review: [untitled]Author(s): Martin KuschSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 53, No. 210 (Jan., 2003), pp. 141-144Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3542810

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BOOKREVIEWSBOOKREVIEWSself-contained monograph on sociative logics that Sylvan ever came to complete,and it would have been good to see the complete Guidemore readily available. Thetreasure chest of Sylvan's as yet unpublished logic papers is still well filled - not tomention his writings on morals and on metaphysics. It is to be hoped that more ofthis material will soon be made available.UniversidadeSIoJudasTadeu,SaoPaulo ANDREFUHRMANN

SocialConstructivismandthePhilosophyofScience.BYANDREKUKLA.(London: Routledge,2000. Pp. xii + I70. Price ?I5.99.)

Andre Kukla's book is a critical discussion of various brands of 'social construc-tivism'. Unfortunately it fails to advance the debate on the issues it addresses. I shalltry to give a neutral summary before turningto my misgivings.One central aim of the book is to bring conceptual order into the debate overconstructivism. Accordingly, it introduces a series of different forms of construc-tivism. All constructivistsput special emphasis on human action: 'X is said to beconstructed if it's produced by intentional activity' (p. 3). The dependence of X onhuman action can be either causal or constitutive; on the latter view, 'what we call"facts about the world" are revealed to be facts about human activity' (p. 21).Constitutive constructivism, the main topic under investigation, can be classifiedfurther. 'Reasonable social constructivism' restrictsthe domain of constructed factsto social facts; 'scientific social constructivism'applies to scientificfacts; 'strongsocialconstructivism' covers scientific as well as everyday facts;and 'very strong social con-structivism' concerns all possible facts, including 'noumenal facts' (facts aboutKantian Dinge an sich) (pp. 24-31). The reader is also treated to 'logical' and'semantic' constructivism: the former claims that logical validity is always negoti-able, and the latter asserts the same for the meaning of all words (pp. 1I9, I36).Semantic constructivism is also characterized as the view 'that nature does notplace any normative constraints on which sentences we should accept as true'(pp. I37-8).Chs 5-I3 are concerned with arguments for and against scientific social consti-tutive constructivism.This doctrine, Kukla claims, cannot be defended on empiricalor a priorigrounds. The ultimate nature of reality, as either dependent on or inde-pendent of scientists' activity, cannot be determined by an empirical science likesociology (ch. 5). And Latour's a prioriargument is circular. This is Latour's sug-gestion: 'Since the settlement of a controversy is the causeof Nature's representation,not its consequence, we can never use this consequence, Nature, to explain how andwhy a controversy has been settled' (p. 44). Kukla is equally unimpressed with anumber of familiar arguments against scientific social constitutive constructivism.For instance, it will not do to say that constructivism is unable to handle thepragmatic success of science. This is because the constructivist might suggest thatbelief in the pragmatic success of science is itself socially constructed (p. 49).Kukla's own criticism of scientific constitutive social constructivism is presentedin chs II1-3. First, this constructivismis unable to explain why scientists ever resort

self-contained monograph on sociative logics that Sylvan ever came to complete,and it would have been good to see the complete Guidemore readily available. Thetreasure chest of Sylvan's as yet unpublished logic papers is still well filled - not tomention his writings on morals and on metaphysics. It is to be hoped that more ofthis material will soon be made available.UniversidadeSIoJudasTadeu,SaoPaulo ANDREFUHRMANN

SocialConstructivismandthePhilosophyofScience.BYANDREKUKLA.(London: Routledge,2000. Pp. xii + I70. Price ?I5.99.)

Andre Kukla's book is a critical discussion of various brands of 'social construc-tivism'. Unfortunately it fails to advance the debate on the issues it addresses. I shalltry to give a neutral summary before turningto my misgivings.One central aim of the book is to bring conceptual order into the debate overconstructivism. Accordingly, it introduces a series of different forms of construc-tivism. All constructivistsput special emphasis on human action: 'X is said to beconstructed if it's produced by intentional activity' (p. 3). The dependence of X onhuman action can be either causal or constitutive; on the latter view, 'what we call"facts about the world" are revealed to be facts about human activity' (p. 21).Constitutive constructivism, the main topic under investigation, can be classifiedfurther. 'Reasonable social constructivism' restrictsthe domain of constructed factsto social facts; 'scientific social constructivism'applies to scientificfacts; 'strongsocialconstructivism' covers scientific as well as everyday facts;and 'very strong social con-structivism' concerns all possible facts, including 'noumenal facts' (facts aboutKantian Dinge an sich) (pp. 24-31). The reader is also treated to 'logical' and'semantic' constructivism: the former claims that logical validity is always negoti-able, and the latter asserts the same for the meaning of all words (pp. 1I9, I36).Semantic constructivism is also characterized as the view 'that nature does notplace any normative constraints on which sentences we should accept as true'(pp. I37-8).Chs 5-I3 are concerned with arguments for and against scientific social consti-tutive constructivism.This doctrine, Kukla claims, cannot be defended on empiricalor a priorigrounds. The ultimate nature of reality, as either dependent on or inde-pendent of scientists' activity, cannot be determined by an empirical science likesociology (ch. 5). And Latour's a prioriargument is circular. This is Latour's sug-gestion: 'Since the settlement of a controversy is the causeof Nature's representation,not its consequence, we can never use this consequence, Nature, to explain how andwhy a controversy has been settled' (p. 44). Kukla is equally unimpressed with anumber of familiar arguments against scientific social constitutive constructivism.For instance, it will not do to say that constructivism is unable to handle thepragmatic success of science. This is because the constructivist might suggest thatbelief in the pragmatic success of science is itself socially constructed (p. 49).Kukla's own criticism of scientific constitutive social constructivism is presentedin chs II1-3. First, this constructivismis unable to explain why scientists ever resort? The Editorsof ThePhilosophicalQuarterly,2003? The Editorsof ThePhilosophicalQuarterly,2003

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BOOKREVIEWSto defending their theories against apparent empirical disconfirmation. If construc-tivism were correct, it would be much more plausible for scientists simply to denythat any disconfirmation had surfaced. After all, for the constructivists,'there is noindependent fact of the matter whether an apparentdisconfirmation has occurred'(p. 84). The second difficultyis 'the problem of the two societies'. Constructivism hasno good answer to the metaphysical question of how it is possible for two societiesto constitute incompatible facts about the same objects. How can, say, the moonbe both a piece of cheese and a piece of rock? The third stumbling-block is 'theproblem of the two eras', a temporal version of the problem of the two societies:'Suppose that at time tl, we construct the fact X0 that X occurs at an earlier time to;then, at a later time t2,we construct the fact -X0 that X doesn'toccur at to.Then itseems to follow that X0is true (because that fact was constructed at tl) and that -X0 istrue (because thatfact was constructed at t2)'(p. 107). Kukla insists that only newthinking about time and facts will enable us to solve this problem. PaceHacking,Kukla is pessimisticabout the prospects of such new thinking (p. IIo).At several points in his book Kukla insists that epistemic and ontologicalrelativism are doctrines distinct from constructivism. Hence he marshals separatearguments against relativism. His line against epistemic relativism is the classicalone: if relativistsproclaim relativism to be absolutely warranted, then they refutethemselves. But if they propose relativism merely as relatively warranted, then theabsolutist need not worry. Moreover, the claim that relativism is merely relativelywarranted is itselfonly relativelywarranted. And so on, adinfinitum(p. 131).This leaves logical and semantic constructivism. As Kukla sees it, both collapseinto 'blanket irrationalism', that is, the view according to which there are noepistemic constraints on opinion or discourse (p. 119). If all rules of logic are alwaysup for social negotiation, then they cannot force anyone to accept any argument.And if, as allegedly Barnes, Bloor and Collins hold, all words lack meaning, then nosentence has any determinate meaning, and 'you can say anything at any time'(p. I47). It is clear then that semantic constructivism is tantamount to the claim thatour epistemic practices are completely 'divorced from what may or may not happenin the world' (p. I36).

This is an unconvincing book. It is badly argued, and fails to engage with most ofthe central contemporary literature on its topic. For Barnes the most recent publica-tion used is from 1982, for Bloor from 1983, for Latour from 1986 and for Shapinfrom I982. Many of the issues looked at by Kukla (i.e., facts, relativism,versions ofconstructivism)have been discussed extensively in the journal SocialStudiesof Science,but merely three papers from thisjournal are cited. Key contributors to debates overconstructivism (e.g., Fish, Fuller, Giere, Gross, Haack, Jardine, Levitt, Lynch,MacKenzie, Schaffer, Slezak, Weinberg, Wolpert, Yearley) or important back-ground figures for these debates (Douglas, Fleck, Garfinkel, Hesse, Schiitz, Winch)appear nowhere in the book. Because Kukla has not done his homework, he hasmade his task exceedingly easy for himself. For instance, he discusses the 'strongprogramme' of the Edinburgh School on the basis of an eleven-line quotation fromBloor and an early programmatic paper by Bares and Bloor. He is quick to dismissthe programme as 'vague' (p. 11). One wonders whether the same verdict could have? The Editorsof ThePhilosophicalQuarterly,2003

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BOOK REVIEWSbeen upheld in the light of the recent book-length elaboration of the 'strong pro-gramme' (Barnes,Bloor and Henry, ScientificKnowledge:a SociologicalAnalysis,London:Athlone, I996). Again, much of Kukla's criticism of constitutive constructivism istargeted at Latour and the idea that scientists create facts. Although I have littlesympathy for Latour's new metaphysicsmyself, any proper and fair treatment of thisissue must surely now be conducted in the light of Latour's extensive discussions ofthe topic in his papers of the 99gos,conveniently collected in his Pandora'sHope:EssaysontheRealit ofScienceStudies(HarvardUP, I999).Kukla's superficial scholarshipis inseparablefrom the weakness of his arguments.His criticisms of constitutive social constructivism, for example, all operate withnotions of fact, truth and objectivity that are not shared by his opponents. While heindeed manages to refute some positions or other, these positions are of his ownmaking. On relativism, for example, on the one hand he fails to notice thatepistemic relativismis, for social constructivists,a heuristic of research rather than asubstantial truth. Hence they will not be moved by his insistence that any argumentfor epistemic relativism can only be a relative argument. On the other hand, evenifsocial constructivists did take epistemic relativism to be more than a heuristic, theywould not have to worry much about Kukla's argument. The relativityof relativismis a problem only when looked at through the absolutist'seyes. As for his concernswith disconfirmationof theories, his argument here would go through only if socialconstructivistsheld that all scientists are social constructivists. But this is not part ofany social constructivist credoI have ever come across.

Lest my criticisms sound as abstract as Kukla's own, I shall exemplify them forone chapter. 'Semantic constructivism',by Kukla'sdefinition, is the thesis that sincesentences and beliefs can have no (empirical) content, they cannot be subject toempirical constraints. Kukla suggests that Barnes, Bloor and Collins 'all argue thattherecannotbe an epistemic enterprise that takes nature into account' (p. 136). Hereferences this claim 'Barnes 1982,Bloor I983, Collins 1985', two book-length studiesand a lengthy article. I cannot find the mentioned claim in any of these publications.We are also told that 'Barnes, Bloor and Collins are all semantic constructivistsonthe basis of the Kripkean conclusion that sentences have no determinate empiricalcontent' (p. I38). This is a curious claim, since the first two publications mentionedwere written before the publication of Kripke's Wittgensteinon Rules and PrivateLanguage,and Collins' book never refers to Kripke'swork. Collins discussesmeaningand empirical content in terms of Goodman's new riddle of induction and Hesse'snetwork model of language, neither of which gets even a mention in Kukla's dis-cussion. Goodman's new riddle and Hesse's networks also loom large in Barnes' andBloor's work. Nor does Kukla prove himself acquainted with Bloor's recent bookWittgenstein,RulesandInstitutions(London: Routledge, I997), a work in which Bloorelaborates the differencesbetween his own and Kripke'sviews.

If Kukla had exercised minimal scholarship, he would have noticed that hissemantic constructivist is a straw man. It is true that Barnes and Bloor deny theexistence of 'fixed extensions'. But to deny such extensions is not tantamount tosaying that one can mean anything by any word. Rather it is to insist that semanticconstraints do not come from Fregean senses but from 'the local circumstances that? The Editorsof ThePhilosophicalQuarterly,2003

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impinge upon us: our instincts, our biological nature, our sense experience, ourinteractions with other people, our immediate purposes, our training, our anti-cipation of and response to sanctions, and so on' (Bloor, Wittgenstein,Rules andInstitutions,pp. 19-20). Collins' views on meaning are also completely different fromwhat Kukla suggests. For Collins, the constraints on the use of words are holistic:'We can account for the stabilityof greenby noting its embeddedness in the whole ofour culture' (ChangingOrder,Univ. of Chicago Press, 1993, p. I7). Clearly, nothingin these pronouncements licenses the inference that since our beliefs have nodeterminate content, there cannot be an epistemic enterprise that takes nature intoaccount.A careful, well informed and intelligent critique of social constructivismwould bemost welcome. Unfortunately, this book does not fit that description. Kukla suggeststhat his book might serve as a primary text for graduates and advanced under-graduatesstudying constructivism(p. x). I shudder at the thought that his wish mightcome true.

CambridgeUniversity MARTIN KUSCH

Doing Thingsfor Reasons. BY RUDIGERBITTNER.(Oxford UP, 200I. Pp. xi + 204. Price?35-00.)

In this refreshinglyradical and provocative book, Bittner presents an account of thereasons for which agents act, an account which flies in the face of the presentlyconventional view of rational agency. Two claims are central to the conventionalview. First, reasons are causal conditions of action, located in (e.g., beliefs, desires,intentions), or intimately connected to (e.g., contents of beliefs/desires/intentions),the minds of agents. Secondly, reason explanations are teleological explanationsregulated by normative constraintswhich make some degree of good rational senseof actions. Bittner denies both claims. First, he argues that reasons are worldly factsin response to which agents can act. A reason for bringing an umbrella is the factthat there is danger of rain. A reason for punching your colleague is the fact that heinsulted you. Neither fact causes your action, although both explain it by locating itas part of your personal history. Secondly, Bittner argues that reason explanationsare non-teleological explanations without normative implications. Reason explana-tions form a distinctive pattern of historical explanations which explain actions bylocating them among things happening. Bittner thinks we are good at spotting goodhistorical explanations. Yet he denies that such explanations entail the existenceof law-like relations between reasons and actions. They do not support the kind ofcounterfactuals on which claims of causation and law are based. Nor are thereconstraints, normative or teleological, on the facts that can be reasons. A reason fortorturing the dying baby is what it is like to observe its agony. Thus Bittner thinksthoroughly evil and pointless actions are performed for reasons. A reason for run-ning across the street is the likelihood of missing the train by walking slowly. ThusBittner accounts for apparentlyteleological explanations without citing the apparent

impinge upon us: our instincts, our biological nature, our sense experience, ourinteractions with other people, our immediate purposes, our training, our anti-cipation of and response to sanctions, and so on' (Bloor, Wittgenstein,Rules andInstitutions,pp. 19-20). Collins' views on meaning are also completely different fromwhat Kukla suggests. For Collins, the constraints on the use of words are holistic:'We can account for the stabilityof greenby noting its embeddedness in the whole ofour culture' (ChangingOrder,Univ. of Chicago Press, 1993, p. I7). Clearly, nothingin these pronouncements licenses the inference that since our beliefs have nodeterminate content, there cannot be an epistemic enterprise that takes nature intoaccount.A careful, well informed and intelligent critique of social constructivismwould bemost welcome. Unfortunately, this book does not fit that description. Kukla suggeststhat his book might serve as a primary text for graduates and advanced under-graduatesstudying constructivism(p. x). I shudder at the thought that his wish mightcome true.

CambridgeUniversity MARTIN KUSCH

Doing Thingsfor Reasons. BY RUDIGERBITTNER.(Oxford UP, 200I. Pp. xi + 204. Price?35-00.)

In this refreshinglyradical and provocative book, Bittner presents an account of thereasons for which agents act, an account which flies in the face of the presentlyconventional view of rational agency. Two claims are central to the conventionalview. First, reasons are causal conditions of action, located in (e.g., beliefs, desires,intentions), or intimately connected to (e.g., contents of beliefs/desires/intentions),the minds of agents. Secondly, reason explanations are teleological explanationsregulated by normative constraintswhich make some degree of good rational senseof actions. Bittner denies both claims. First, he argues that reasons are worldly factsin response to which agents can act. A reason for bringing an umbrella is the factthat there is danger of rain. A reason for punching your colleague is the fact that heinsulted you. Neither fact causes your action, although both explain it by locating itas part of your personal history. Secondly, Bittner argues that reason explanationsare non-teleological explanations without normative implications. Reason explana-tions form a distinctive pattern of historical explanations which explain actions bylocating them among things happening. Bittner thinks we are good at spotting goodhistorical explanations. Yet he denies that such explanations entail the existenceof law-like relations between reasons and actions. They do not support the kind ofcounterfactuals on which claims of causation and law are based. Nor are thereconstraints, normative or teleological, on the facts that can be reasons. A reason fortorturing the dying baby is what it is like to observe its agony. Thus Bittner thinksthoroughly evil and pointless actions are performed for reasons. A reason for run-ning across the street is the likelihood of missing the train by walking slowly. ThusBittner accounts for apparentlyteleological explanations without citing the apparent? The Editorsof 7hePhilosophicalQuarterly,2003? The Editorsof 7hePhilosophicalQuarterly,2003

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