black hat briefings 2000: strategies for defeating distributed attacks

45
Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team, BindView Corporation

Upload: kellsie

Post on 18-Feb-2016

33 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

DESCRIPTION

Black Hat Briefings 2000: Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks. Simple Nomad Hacker Nomad Mobile Research Centre Occam Theorist RAZOR Security Team, BindView Corporation. About Myself. http://www.nmrc.org/ - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

TRANSCRIPT

Black Hat Briefings 2000:Strategies for Defeating Distributed AttacksSimple NomadHackerNomad Mobile Research Centre

Occam TheoristRAZOR Security Team, BindView Corporation

About Myself http://www.nmrc.org/ Currently Sr. Security Analyst for

BindView’s RAZOR Team, http://razor.bindview.com/

About This Presentation Assume basics

– Understand IP addressing– Understand basic system administration

Tools– Where to find them– Basic usage

Terminology A “Network” point of view

Background Originally developed during 1999 Concepts first discussed last October Many concepts can be found in DDOS

software today

Attack Recognition Basics Pattern Recognition

– Examples: • Byte sequence in RAM• Packet content in a network transmission• Half opens against a server within a certain time

frame– Considered “real-time”

Attack Recognition Basics Cont. Effect Recognition

– Examples• Unscheduled server restart in logs• Unexplainable CPU utilization• System binaries altered

– Considered “non” real-time

Attack Recognition Problems Blended “pattern” and “effect” attacks Sniffing attacks Decoys and false identification of attack

source

Attack Recognition Problems Cont. Current solutions are usually “pattern” or

“effect”, no real-time global solutions Existing large scale solutions can easily be

defeated

Common Thwarting Techniques Rule-based systems can be tricked Log watchers can be deceived Time-based rules can be bypassed

What is Needed The “Overall Behavior Network/Host

Monitoring Tool” (which doesn’t exist)

What Do We Do? “Trickle Down Security”

– Solutions for distributed attacks will introduce good security overall

Off-the-shelf is not enough Learn about attack types Defensive techniques

Changing Attack Patterns More large-scale attacks Better enumeration and assessment of the

target by the attacker

Two Basic Distributed Attack Models Attacks that do not require direct

observation of the results Attacks that require the attacker to directly

observe the results

Basic Model

Server AgentClient

Issuecommands

Processescommandsto agents

Carriesout

commands

More Advanced Model

TargetAttacker

Forged ICMPTimestamp Requests

ICMP TimestampReplies

SniffedReplies

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Firewall

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Attack Node

Attack Node

Attack Node

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Master Node

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Attack Node

Attack Node

Attack Node

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Attacksor

Probes

Master Node

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Attack Node

Attack Node

Attack Node

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Attacksor

Probes

Replies

Master Node

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Attack Node

SniffedReplies

Attack Node

Attack Node

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Attacksor

Probes

Replies

Master Node

Even More Advanced Model

Target

Attack Node

SniffedReplies

Attack Node

Attack Node

Firewall

UpstreamHost

Attacksor

Probes

Replies

Master Node

ICMP Sweeping a network with Echo Typical alternates to ping

– Timestamp– Info Request

Fun with ICMP Advanced ICMP enumeration

Host Enumeration# ./icmpenum -i 2 -c xxx.xx.218.0xxx.xx.218.23 is upxxx.xx.218.26 is upxxx.xx.218.52 is upxxx.xx.218.53 is upxxx.xx.218.58 is upxxx.xx.218.63 is upxxx.xx.218.82 is upxxx.xx.218.90 is upxxx.xx.218.92 is upxxx.xx.218.96 is upxxx.xx.218.118 is upxxx.xx.218.123 is upxxx.xx.218.126 is upxxx.xx.218.130 is upxxx.xx.218.187 is upxxx.xx.218.189 is upxxx.xx.218.215 is upxxx.xx.218.253 is up

Nmap Ping sweeps Port scanning TCP fingerprinting

Fun with Nmap Additional features

Addition Probes Possible security devices Sweep for promiscuous devices

Network Mapping Determine network layout Traceroute

Network Mapping

cw

swb

Internet Routers

Network Mapping

cw

swb

Internet Routers

Network Mapping

Firewall

DMZ

cw

swb

VPN

Internet Routers

Network Mapping

Firewall

DMZ

www

ftp

cw

swb

VPN

Internet Routers

Network Mapping

Firewall

DMZ

www

ftp

cw

swb

VPN

Internet Routers

Network Mapping

Sun

LinuxFirewall

NT

Hosts Inside DMZ

www

ftp

cw

swb

VPN

Internet Routers

Network Mapping

Sun

LinuxFirewall

NT

Hosts Inside DMZ

www

ftp

cw

swb

VPN

Internet Routers

Linux 2.0.38xxx.xx.48.2

AIX 4.2.1xxx.xx.48.1

Checkpoint Firewall-1Solaris 2.7xxx.xx.49.17

Checkpoint Firewall-1Nortel Extranetxxx.xx.22. 7

Cisco 7206204.70.xxx.xxx

Nortel CVX1800151.164.x.xxx

IDS?

Defensive Techniques Good security policy Split DNS

– All public systems in one DNS server located in DMZ

– All internal systems using private addresses with separate DNS server internally

Drop/reject packets with a TTL of 1 or 0

Defensive Techniques Cont. Minimal ports open Stateful inspection firewalls Modified kernels/IDS to look for fingerprint

packets

Defensive Techniques Cont. Limit ICMP inbound to host/destination

unreachable Limit outbound ICMP

DMZ Server Recommendations Split services between servers Current patches Use trusted paths, anti-buffer overflow

settings and kernel patches Use any built-in firewalling software Make use of built-in state tables

Firewall Rules Limit inbound to only necessary services Limit outbound via proxies to help control

access Block all outbound to only necessary traffic

Intrusion Detection Systems Use only IDS’s that can be customized IDS should be capable of handling

fragmented packet reassembly IDS should handle high speeds

Spoofed Packet Defenses Get TTL of suspected spoofed packet Probe the source address in the packet Compare the probe reply’s TTL to the

suspected spoofed packet

Questions, etc. For followup:

– http://razor.bindview.com/– [email protected]

References:– David Dittrich’s web site http://staff.washington.edu/dittrich/ – "Network Cat and Mouse", SANS Network Security '99, New Orleans; security presentation,

http://www.sans.org – "The Paranoid Network", SANS 2000, Orlando; security presentation, http://www.sans.org – NMap, http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ – Icmpenum, http://razor.bindview.com/tools/ – Martin Roesch’s web site http://www.clark.net/~roesch/security.html – “Strategies for Defeating Distributed Attacks”,

http://razor.bindview.com/publish/papers/strategies.html – “Distributed Denial of Service Defense Tactics”,

http://razor.bindview.com/publish/papers/DDSA_Defense.html

Late Breaking News HackerShield RapidFire Update 208

– With SANS Top Ten checks, including comprehensive CGI scanner– http://www.bindview.com/products/hackershield/index.html

VLAD the Scanner– Freeware open-source security scanner, including same CGI checks as

HackerShield– Focuses only on SANS Top Ten– http://razor.bindview.com/tools/index.shtml

Despoof– Detects possible spoofed packets through active queries against suspected

spoofed IP address– http://razor.bindview.com/tools/index.shtml