biondo, two tipes of liberla perfectionism

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considered relevant in a liberal political morality. I consider as “objective”the value of autonomy of those who are perceived as right-holders or “freeand equal members of society.” This value is objective in that it makes a

political claim “reasonable” and in that sense acceptable by free and equalmembers of society.2 However, I do not want to argue against a politicalinterpretation of liberalism in favour of a “comprehensive” version of it. Nordo I intend to argue that every possible form of liberalism is or should beconsidered “perfectionist.” My aim is more limited: It is to depict two dif-ferent types of liberal perfectionism and to bring to the fore their justifica-tions of coercive means.

Provided that liberalism considers government to be justified insofar as itrespects the rights of its citizens, I will explain how such a regime could be

justified by a perfectionist doctrine of political morality. In particular, myanalysis will deal with the issue of justification of norms that allow people“to do wrong” to themselves. I am aware of the fact that such a definitionof the term “liberalism” is too thin, since it does not distinguish betweendifferent theories that indicate diverse individual “rights.” On the otherhand, if I were to try to start with a precise account of the term “right” (i.e.,“right to do wrong”), or with a list of these claims, then I would need tooffer an ad hoc definition of the word “liberalism.” That we can accept aperfectionist liberal doctrine of political morality can be argued in two

steps.First, it is necessary to distinguish liberalism in this perfectionist versionfrom a paternalistic theory of political morality. I consider the paternalistictheory the opposite of the account of political morality endorsed by liber-als. By taking as paradigmatic J. S. Mill’s “Harm Principle” I argue that aliberal state is justified in coercing people only when their decisions are notentirely voluntary or cause harm to others. The enhancement of autonomyis the rationale for a certain perfectionist reading of liberalism, namely, theone provided by Raz in his Morality of Freedom. I argue, however, that his

account of political morality is not as liberal as may be thought. I thenprovide two distinct reasons for why a liberal government should care aboutautonomy, two ways of considering an autonomous choice as an object of value. The intention is to connect these vindications of the value of autonomous choice with two interpretations of the Harm Principle. Finally,I attempt to show why only one of these interpretations is consistent withliberalism and the rationale of the Harm Principle.

520 Francesco Biondo

© Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2005.

2

I infer this point from Rawls’ theses about “objective reasons” in political debates. Accord-ing to Rawls (1993, 123–4), slavery is “objectively” unjust because it cannot be accepted by “freeand equal persons.” I will use this account of “objectivity” in this sense without further scrutiny,even though we could wonder whether Rawls’ theses are too thin a form of “moral objec-tivism.”



Second, I wish to test this perfectionist interpretation of liberal theory byshowing under what conditions a perfectionist liberal can tolerate the con-sumption of drugs and other “harms to self.” I will argue that the use of

these substances must not be forbidden by the state even though it is clearthat it causes harms to the consumers. Indeed, their usage can be toleratedon the basis of liberal, perfectionist considerations.

1. The Distinction between Perfectionism and Paternalism

In order to be able to understand liberalism as a perfectionist moral theory,we must distinguish it from a paternalistic justification of policies, and showin what sense autonomy may be considered a value that must be enhanced

by public agencies, or, in other words, what we imply when we consider to be autonomous a state of affairs that should be pursued by the state.Concerning the first issue, what does a paternalistic justification of a

policy require?We can say with Arneson that “the paradigm of paternalism [. . .] is restric-

tion of people’s liberty against their will for their own good”3 (Arneson 1998,250).

Thus, it is necessary to show that supporting a perfectionist account of political morality is different from coercing other people to pursue a certain

good. In this way, I attempt to show why liberalism requires the govern-ment not to intervene (under certain conditions), even though the good, itscitizens’ well being, may be concerned.

Among the different interpretations of liberalism, a common opinion isthat it is a normative theory that requires governments to respect at least onemoral right (on the plurality of the term “liberalism” see Waldron 1998). Amoral right is considered a claim binding on political authorities even if itallows the right-holder to do something wrong, in this case towardshim/herself. This interpretation of the term “right” has a moral background

with a substantial political impact. This account of the term “right” is validonly insofar as we consider necessary the distinction between “giving somebody advice for his own sake” and “coercing somebody for his own sake.”The fact that it is our duty to advise somebody to do something does notimply that we must oblige him or her to do it. If we take as binding this

Two Types of Liberal Perfectionism 521


3 However, I consider paternalistic not only a restriction of someone’s liberty but even thesimple ineligibility of an action. On this distinction see Swanton 1992, 68–9. S. Clarke pointedout that Arneson’s definition of paternalism is too strict, as it conflates paternalism with coer-

cion. In fact, we may have paternalist interventions that are not coercive but that give incen-tives for a certain kind of behaviour. Thereby, as we will see later, even certain incentives arediscriminatory, since they impose a change of costs of certain goods through taxation in orderto push somebody towards a certain conception of individual well-being at the expense of others.



distinction, provided that certain conditions (e.g., that we are dealing withadult and responsible people) have been satisfied, then we must distinguish between moral guidance and coercive interference (Waldron 1993a, 85–7).

Such an account of political morality considers the autonomy of the right-holder to be of paramount importance, as far as his or her individual well- being is concerned, even against the morality of the majority. One of theclearest examples of this account is provided by Mill. In order to preventcases of enforcement of a particular morality through law, Mill formulatedhis well known “Harm Principle”:

the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. (Mill 1996, 13)

But even according to this principle, the state may restrict the domain of choice if a decision is not entirely voluntary. This is the rationale behindlegalising substances that cause harm only after making users aware of therisks they are running (ibid., 95–6).

At this point I hope I have made clear the link between liberalism andanti-paternalism through the notion of individual right as “right to dowrong.”

But how can we connect the rejection of paternalistic interventions with

a perfectionist justification of public policies? How is it possible to argue,despite a long critical tradition, that there is a perfectionism that is liberaland anti-paternalist?

In order to answer this question we must address the second issue: “Whydo we consider being autonomous a worthwhile state of affairs?” Let usreturn to Mill’s Harm Principle. This principle and the conception ofmoral rights outlined by Waldron rely on a particular justification of thevalue given to autonomous choices. To be autonomous, to choose auto-nomously, may be accepted as a worthwhile state of affairs for two dif-

ferent reasons4:

1) because it is morally required for any person to have a domain in whichhis or her decision is dominant over other conceptions of the good, andin which he or she is allowed to decide what is the best for him or her(Sen 1970; Feinberg 1986, 54);

2) because the object of the autonomous decision is good according tosome moral values.



4 The defence I present is one among many which draws a distinction between different con-ceptions of the term “autonomy.” A different distinction is made by Husak 1992, 83–5. He dif-ferentiates between formal and substantial autonomy. The first considers autonomous eachchoice made according to a superior order of preferences. The latter considers autonomous achoice according to the object of decision (i.e., the private life of the person or his body). I willnot discuss these distinctions here.



source of moral value. In this frame, the Millian theory is a type of “moralindividualism.” Raz rejects exactly this tenet, since “it disregards thedependence of people’s tastes and values on social forms, on conventions

and practises” (ibid., 426). What is relevant is not the mere fact that a choicestems from an individual’s will but the fact that the object chosen is worth-while according to a moral culture. Otherwise, we cannot understand the“genealogy” of our tastes and preferences, unless we agree with a form of moral subjectivism. Subjectivism, however, remains defective, since itcannot distinguish between trivial (which brand of underwear should I buy?) and non-trivial choices (which parties should I vote for?).

It is clear that the two accounts are different and often conflicting. Thefirst considers an autonomous choice as worthwhile because of the domain

of that choice (e.g., the individual’s private sphere). My choice therefore hasa certain value, even though it is considered irrational, wrong, or harmfulfor me, because it is mine in the sense that I am responsible for it and assuch enables me to grow through my mistakes. The second, by contrast,states that an autonomous choice is worthwhile only if the object chosen isgood. The difference between these two conceptions brings about two con-flicting theses concerning the harm principle and the role of coercion in aliberal, perfectionist theory.

2. The Harm Principle and Conceptions of Autonomy

I have tried to distinguish between two different accounts of the value of autonomy. I would now like to show which liberal theory is preferable inorder to clarify in what sense liberalism can be considered a political moral-ity that takes into account the value of autonomous decisions, and in whatways it justifies the use of coercion.

In order to answer these questions, it will be helpful to return to Mill’sHarm Principle and to its interpretations. These differ according to the

person they consider as the duty-bearer of Mill’s principle. The first inter-pretation considers the government as the only duty-bearer. The person whochooses what is good for him simply enjoys a “right to do wrong.” Thesecond, by contrast, considers the individual chooser a duty-bearer too, inthat he is not allowed to harm himself.

Which interpretation of Mill’s principle should a perfectionist-liberaltheorist endorse? Is it possible to produce such a justification for publicpolicies?

Perfectionism as a theory that considers individual autonomy as a value

because of the domain of a certain choice accepts the first interpretation of the Harm Principle. To that extent it is perfectly compatible with liberalism, because the government is considered as the sole duty bearer. The individ-ual, on the other hand, simply enjoys what I have called “a right to dowrong.”





By contrast, a theory that interprets the Harm Principle as a requirementthat is binding even on the agent himself is less liberal and morepaternalistic.

Surprisingly for a liberal theorist, who should be committed to anti-paternalism, an example of such a theory is provided by Raz in thefollowing:

My discussion will revolve round the somewhat wider principle which regards theprevention of harm to anyone (himself included) as the only justifiable ground forcoercive interference with a person.7 (ibid., 412–3)

In this extract the relationship between the Razian vindication of the valueof autonomy and Raz’s interpretation of the Harm Principle becomes clear.

We have seen that, according to his theory, an autonomous choice has avalue only because the object of this choice is good. Consequently, if thechoice has no value at all, then the state will have the right to restrict theautonomy of the person to cause harms to him/herself.8 Moreover, Razargues that we should interpret the term “harm” in the sense of the damagea person can do “in a way which affects his future well-being” (ibid., 414).In this interpretation, then, in order to protect a person’s well-being, eventhough we consider autonomy as a relevant part of that state of affairs, weshould restrict people from harming themselves. Still, it is difficult to main-

tain this interpretation on liberal grounds, as it involves a coercive form of perfectionism.

Who decides whether or not a particular decision on how to lead one’slife constitutes harm to oneself? Why are other people better suited to decidewhat is best for me? This conflicts with one of the reasons I have providedof why liberals should care about autonomy, namely, that people grow onlythrough errors and debate. This point is made clear by Waldron: “The stateinsults its citizens by doing their moral calculations for them, and using theresults as a justification for making the citizen’s own calculations easier than

they should be” (1989, 1152).In my line of reasoning, this “insult” is not due to a violation of certain

“natural rights to self-ownership” (“I am my body’s keeper”), but to a par-ticular reading of the “best judge principle.”9 Individuals are considered the best judges of their well-being, not because they have the right to disposeof themselves as they want to, but because it is the best way to let themgrow, to make them develop their moral capacities, their abilities to form aplan of life in a responsible way. It may be argued that I am giving a partialportrait of Raz’s theory, as he does not explicitly say that it is good that the



7 We could even wonder what remains of Razian theses in the notion of right as “right to dowrong” expressed in Raz 1979, 266–7.8 This link between the Razian defence of autonomy and his interpretation of the Harm Prin-ciple is shown by Regan 1989, 1083.9 On the “best judge principle” see Goodin 1995, 119–31.



state obliges anybody to refrain from harming himself. On the contrary, herecognises that this intervention must not take the form of coercion.10

I could reply, however, that Raz’s clarification does not suffice for several

reasons.If autonomy is what a government should promote, and if that value isimportant only when we can choose between worthwhile options, why doesRaz accept only non-coercive measures? He could argue that it is necessaryin order to prevent the “dangers inherent in the concentration of powers” if a form of coercive perfectionism were followed (Raz 1986, 427). But whatdoes this suggest? Is there anything wrong in the concentration of power, if that concentration is exercised in the pursuit of making available goodoptions? We might reply that it is, since this concentration brings about the

risk of taking into account, unfairly, some claims at the expense of others.Raz is aware of these risks and he tries to come up with a non-coercive per-fectionist doctrine of political morality. Repugnant options must not becurbed by coercion. However, this attempt is endangered by Raz’s defenceof the value of autonomy and his interpretation of the Harm Principle.Indeed, even if the state is not justified in using coercion to prevent itsmembers from harming themselves, it is not clear why it should not pro-hibit certain forms of conduct, instead of giving incentives to change them.If it is because society is fairer in this way, in the sense that government has

less power since it can only provide incentives rather than sanctions, Razshould admit that this point is morally irrelevant. If we accept the assump-tions, for example, that an autonomous decision is worthwhile only becauseof the object chosen, and if we are sure that to coerce somebody is the onlyway to make him or her pursue good options, why should we care aboutfairness? By contrast, if we are concerned with issues of fairness, or withproblems of concentration of powers, we must change our account of thevalue of an autonomous choice. In this case a choice is to be consideredworthwhile, inter alia, if it is seen as a preference to be respected because of

the domain that it involves (“it is my well-being, not yours!”). If we acceptthis vindication of the value of autonomy, then it is clear why an interven-tion that aims at altering that choice should be considered as paternalistic,and even discriminatory and unjust. Razian perfectionism, insofar as it tol-erates an intervention to change an object insofar as it is harmful for thechooser, can thus be blamed as discriminatory.

S. Wall (1998, 199–202) rejects this thesis on the basis of three arguments.First of all, he considers the prohibition of changing opportunity costs as a



10 “The availability of repugnant options, and even their free pursuit by individuals, does

not detract from their autonomy. Undesirable as these conditions are, they may not be curbed by coercion”: Raz 1986, 419. Macedo 1990, 208–12; Galston 1991, 178–9; Nussbaum 1998; DeMarneffe 1999; Kraut 1999; Chan 2000, 14–6 provide other accounts of non-coercive perfec-tionist theories. Perfectionist “liberal” theories, which discourage the pursuit of some danger-ous or harmful choices, are provided by Haksar 1979, 290–4; Hurka 1993, 156–8; Wall 1998,219–26.



tenet that leads “straight to anarchism.” This reflects the justification of anyauthority whatsoever to decide against someone’s will. Second, he pointsout that to make an option more eligible does not mean to make it manda-

tory. Even if we consider taxation a form of coercion, we must admit thatwhen the government collects taxes it does not invade our autonomy insofaras tax revenues are used “to promote the common good.” Third, he makesclear that to forbid taxation in order to minimize coercion is wrong becauseit implies that the exercise of autonomy is all that counts in political moral-ity. By contrast, “it is not an autonomous life that is ultimately valuable, butrather an autonomous life of valuable pursuits” (ibid., 202). However, I believe that these three arguments against a non-discriminative perfection-ism are problematic. In relation to the first argument, the type of perfec-

tionism I advocate rejects state intervention not because it considersindividual choices as sovereign, but because they are taken as necessary forenabling people to grow. As we shall see, there is still ample space forauthoritative decisions that concern issues of fairness. The second argumentrelies on the assumption that it is always possible to find “a common good.”I do not deny it, I simply point out that this notion must be limited to thepublic sphere and it must not involve individual choices concerning per-sonal well-being in the private sphere. Finally, the third argument is validprovided that the Razian defence of autonomy is accepted. In the frame of

a different type of defence, this argument loses its force.I must make clear, however, that with this criticism of Raz’s position I donot intend to suggest that all form of incentives must be rejected as unfair.According to my interpretation of liberalism as a perfectionist non-paternalistic doctrine, incentives are not justified when they are providedfor the good of the recipients, if they are responsible and adult. They arenonetheless justified and fair in other circumstances, such as in cases of limited powers of reasoning or imperfect information. In these cases thereis no struggle between conflicting conceptions of the good, but simply a

problem of coordination, efficiency, or knowledge that can be resolvedwithout treating anybody unfairly. Take for example the use of naturalresources and related incentives. Each community may consider it to be fair, just, and mandatory to give others an equal amount of natural resources.On the other hand, the question remains open as to whether the dissemi-nation of self-harmful practices is an issue of distributive justice, since thisconduct (e.g., the use of certain drugs) may bring about disastrous collec-tive results that cannot be covered by individual insurance.

The second issue is concerned with the source of value for different

options in liberal societies. Suppose we accept intervention in order tochange or enrich an individual’s set of worthwhile options. We then face theissue of justifying some habits and discouraging others in a situation of moral disagreement. Why should I accept your authority in making mechange my behaviour if I think that it is concerned only with my well-being?





In other words, the problem remains of the impairment of my moral capac-ities to form a life plan. In response, Raz would argue that the argumentaccording to which an autonomy-based morality should forbid, on the basis

of fairness, giving incentives to certain behaviour (since what is concernedis only the pursuit of contestable conceptions of well-being) is fallacious andmust be rejected:

Conflicts between morality and the agent’s well-being [. . .] are only accidental andoccasional. Given that the well-being of the agent is in the successful pursuit of worthwhile goals, and the value depends on social forms, it is of value that it con-tributes to the constitution of the agent’s personal well-being just as much asit defines moral objectives. The source of value is one for the individual and thecommunity. (1986, 318)

Thus, moral disagreement seems not to be a necessary condition for a liberalstate, since the source of what is worthwhile for both the individual and thecommunity is the same. Raz’s point seems to be: “Forget about moral dis-agreement! We cannot morally argue anything unless we already agree onwhat is good.” But, in this case, Raz casts strong doubt on the liberal rootsof his theory. Faced by the recurrent circumstance of moral disagreement,he tries to solve this problem by claiming that the right position, for boththe individual and the community, has the same source.11 However, this

claim makes the rejection of a coercive perfectionist so feeble that it is notclear why a government should not simply prohibit wrong behaviour byenforcing the only “objective” morality. What is objective in this case is thevalue of an autonomous choice determined by the object chosen. But then,the danger of concentrating power in the hands of the government might be a fair price to pay for realising a good that comes from the same sourcefor both the individual and the society. On the other hand, a choice may beconsidered objectively worthwhile in the sense that it must be respected, not because of the object chosen but because of the domain involved (i.e., per-

sonal well-being).It may be objected to my criticism that it gives a “conventionalist” accountof Raz’s theory of morality, whereas Raz himself affirms that “convention-alism is essentially conservative. The social dependence of value is not. Itallows for a radical criticism of social practises” (Raz 1999, 211). Still, thisstatement by Raz does not deny the claim about the same source of value



11 The rejection of moral individualism is expressed by Raz, also when he explains that the useof paternalist coercion is justified only insofar as “it comes from the hands of someone rea-

sonably trusted by the coerced”: Raz 1996, 122. In this passage, Raz first assumes what is pre-cisely at stake: that it is reasonable for a person to trust the government as far as his or herpersonal well-being is concerned. This is what a liberal and an anti-paternalist such as Milldenies: Even if the intervention is done for my sake, it is not justified because it treats me as a baby. I do not however claim that Raz’s thesis is mistaken, but only point out that it is not theonly “perfectionist” one, and that it is only arguably “liberal.”



both for the individual and the community, which is exactly what a liberalsuch as Mill would reject. According to Mill, the sources of values are dif-ferent and they may even conflict, that is, what the community thinks is my

well-being may not be accepted by me. Moreover, a liberal may claim thatthis conflict contributes positively to our moral consciousness, and this isexactly what Raz seems to deny when he criticises moral individualismwhile arguing for the “social dependence thesis.”

I end this first section by summarizing my points about Razianperfectionism.

The only vindication of the value of an autonomous choice which is con-sistent with liberalism (that is, which recognises the right of a person “to dowrong”) is the first mentioned above: namely, that each person must have

a domain in which his or her decision is dominant over other conceptionsof good. The second vindication, that provided by Raz, is inconsistent withthe commitment of a liberal government to restrain from a paternalistic jus-tification of policies. Indeed, Raz’s vindication relies on a monist theory of the source of value which applies for both the individual and the society.For if the source of value is the same for both the individual and the society,why do we not prohibit people from doing wrong to themselves? In otherwords, if we know that there is only one form of good to be achieved, theliberty to do wrong becomes problematic and indeed unreasonable. This is

not Raz’s position since he rejects coercive forms of perfectionism, but hemust then admit that there is value also in the domain of the choice to bemade and not only in the object chosen. In other words, his perfectionismand his interpretation of the Harm Principle bring us to reject a central moraltenet of liberalism, namely, the value of individual choice in matters con-cerning personal well-being. Moreover, disagreement between conceptionsof individual well-being (what one thinks is good for oneself) and social orobjective morality may be considered a condition of autonomy. In this case,Raz’s attempt to provide “a doctrine of freedom the core of which is the pro-

motion of the conditions of autonomy” (Raz 1986, 420) fails because he doesnot recognise one of these conditions: the existence of different conceptionsof individual well-being. Based on this criticism, I argue that it is possibleto find a link between the two interpretations of the Harm Principle pro-vided above and the two ways of vindicating the value of an autonomouschoice. Liberalism rests upon the interpretation of the Harm Principle thatconsiders the individual as free “to do wrong,” and requires the state torespect autonomy as the freedom its citizens have to lead their own life,regardless of whether their lifestyle is considered wrong. However, Razian

vindication of the value of an autonomous choice is not convincing if itallows people to choose wrong, as it does not recognise any value in such achoice, because it considers the source of value for the community and theindividual to be unique. As a result, Raz’s attempt to vindicate the value of autonomy on the basis of both its instrumental and intrinsic value fails. In





the case of types of behaviour that harm the agent, these two componentsof the value of autonomy become conflicting, and the Razian attempt tosolve this problem by limiting his perfectionist account to a non-coercive

form seems to be an ad hoc solution.

3. Perfectionism and Harm to Self

In the second section of this paper I would like to evaluate the plausibilityof a Millian perfectionist version of liberalism by means of a test case. Theissue at hand runs as follows: According to the Harm Principle, people arefree to do whatever does not cause harm to others. Does this endorse a policythat tolerates “harm to self,” as in dangerous sports or in the legalisation of

substances that are harmful to health?12

If it is the case that a perfectionist theory allows “harm to self,” then onecould legitimately claim that it is possible to be a perfectionist liberalwithout succumbing to paternalism in preventing someone from harminghim or herself.

In order to substantiate this claim I would like to return to the Harm Prin-ciple. Is this principle binding in all possible cases?

This is hardly the case, since we consider this principle valid only whenit concerns “adult and responsible people.” In other words, this principle

must be integrated with what D. Regan calls an “indicator rule,” which tellsus exactly when we are dealing with adult and responsible people. Such anindicator rule “makes reference to facts which do not matter ultimately[. . .] but which indicate [. . .] the existence of facts which do matter ulti-mately” (Regan 1989, 1007–8). In our case this rule indicates a circumstance(being adult and responsible) that is relevant insofar as it refers to a matterof ultimate value (the development of our moral capacities).

What, then, should this rule indicate? Only the circumstances in which aperson is considered capable of producing a life plan and judging what is

best for her or him. This rule is necessary in order to implement the HarmPrinciple. According to this principle, the right-holder is only the adultperson who is responsible for his or her choices. Thus, the indicator rule pro-vides us with a criterion for “autonomous choice,” that is, it indicates thenecessary conditions for making such a choice. The indicator rule gives usthose normative elements (e.g., which agent’s intellectual skills should be



12 The connection between the exercise of dangerous sports and the consumption of drugs isprovided by Husak 1992, 107, 133–4. This connection is relevant insofar as many dangerous

sports, such as mountaineering, are tolerated even though they are as dangerous as takingdrugs. One of the arguments that can be provided for distinguishing between these types of conduct is that the first has a value in itself and the second does not. However, this point con-flicts with the Millian argument that there is always disagreement on what private conduct isvaluable or not, and that this disagreement is in itself good. We cannot therefore accept that amoral stipulation concerning private conducts should be enforced through law.



considered relevant, such as the Rawlsian “two moral powers”) and descrip-tive characteristics (e.g., the agent’s age) for judging the autonomy of aperson even if the object of his or her choice does not fit with other values

shared by society. In other words, the indicator rule helps us to find a crite-rion for free agency in defining its conditions and its agent.However, this does not suffice as a perfectionist justification of a norm

that tolerates the exercise of dangerous sports or that legalises the use of substances that cause harm to consumers. Nothing is said as to why thisnorm can be considered part of a perfectionist but non-coercive policy of aliberal state. This justification needs a perfectionist premise, namely, the nor-mative judgement that “liberal government should use its power in orderto enhance and protect individual autonomy.”

Why, then, should a Millian perfectionist liberal allow people to useharmful substances or to take part in dangerous sports? Because accordingto the indicator rule these people are considered capable of forming theirown conception of personal well-being. Moreover, based on the assumptionthat people can grow through their errors rather than through coercion, wehave shown that autonomous choices are valuable because of the domaininvolved, and not only because of the object chosen. On these grounds, it isnecessary that people be allowed to choose wrong in order to develop theirmoral agency, which is precisely the relevant value for the liberal perfec-

tionist. As we have seen, Raz by contrast rejects this defence of the value of autonomous choice, a rejection that provides the theoretical basis for his par-ticular interpretation of the Harm Principle. It then becomes clear why thecase of norms that allow people to harm themselves is relevant even forRazian perfectionism. Indeed, according to the interpretation providedabove, Razian perfectionism could not accept these norms unless he arguedthat the citizen is allowed to use harmful substances or taking part in dan-gerous sports due to the fact that we live in a moral community that con-siders these types of conduct as non-harmful. This however seems to be an

ad hoc solution, since it assumes what a society regards as harmful withoutconsidering possible disagreements about what is harmful and what is not.Thus, pace Raz, the result is a perfectionist theory that may be coercivetowards some citizens (those who do not accept the notions of well-beingthat are part of social morality).

Concerning the legalisation of the consumption of substances that causeharm to self through the stipulation of “indicator rules,” two points must bestressed.

First, the argument I provide does not imply that the users of these sub-

stances are not responsible for endangering relevant values like health,13

orthat they do not have to pay any form of insurance against the risks that



13 For the sake of the argument, I assume that health is a relevant value, since governments arerequired to guarantee a minimum level of care for everybody.



they are running. If this were the case, they would break rules of fairness,that is, of how the burdens of social co-operation must be distributed.According to the perfectionist liberal doctrine I presented, then, we should

justify a government that gives incentives or discourages some habits forenhancing individual autonomy, where these policies are part of a strategyintended to reduce externalities such as high levels of demand for publichealth services. In other words, these incentives should be a matter of fair-ness and not an issue of implementation of a particular value (i.e., individ-ual health, constant training, permanent education) that must be considered binding for everybody and that must be pursued in any domain of aperson’s life.

Second, the indicator rule provides only a prima facie reason restraining

governments from enforcing some conceptions of well-being or forbiddingothers. What is relevant in considering an indicator rule as binding primafacie is the circumstance that if we have elements which deny that thechooser x was not autonomous in the act y, or that the use of some sub-stances made him or her unable to choose autonomously because of somesort of addiction, then we can override his decision and we may even decideto forbid the commerce of those drugs. This perfectionist reading of liberal-ism takes for granted the Millian proviso about the limits of individualchoice, namely, that we are not allowed to sell ourselves as slaves (Mill 1996,

101).14

This is a legitimate point because it is contradictory to defend autono-my and at the same time give people the opportunity of not beingautonomous at all, for example, through the use of addictive substances.

Two additional remarks must be made. First, the Millian proviso does notallow the government to forbid any types of conduct that are likely to reduceour autonomy (such as the use of certain substances, or taking part in sportsthat can cause severe, irreversible damage). In fact, the argument aboutthe probability of certain consequences is fallacious, since it proves eitherinsufficient or too demanding. It is insufficient because it does not tell us

which “likelihood” of becoming non-autonomous should lead to forbiddinga certain conduct (is a 10% probability of being severely harmed enough toprohibit a particular kind of behaviour?), and it does not indicate ways todetect such a thing (which variables determine from certain types of behavi-our certain consequences?). Conversely, it is too demanding, since, providedthat we arrive at such a definition, we still have to decide which types of conduct, among the ones that may cause irreversible damages, should be pro-hibited. Supposing that taking part in a certain sport (e.g., mountaineering)



14 Husak 2000, 66–70 contests both the evidence according to which the typical drug userssuffer severe damage to their mental capacities, and the moral principle that considers the con-sumption of drugs a reduction of personal autonomy. See also Husak 1992, 120–9. I preferhowever to leave the question open, since I do not contest the Millian proviso but simply pointout its illegitimate application on the issue of drug prohibition.



is as dangerous as taking certain types of pills, according to this principle bothkinds of conduct should be banned. Second, such a Millian conception of autonomy requires the state to respect people’s rights, even though they may

be misused. This conception of individual rights, the so-called “right to dowrong,” implies that the government is not justified in coercing adults andresponsible people to “be free,” for example, by banning any possible trade-off among different objects of values, such as health, religious commitments,or even dangerous sports.15

In conclusion, the test case of the legalisation of harmful substances or thepursuit of dangerous sports, shows clearly the practical consequences of aninterpretation of liberalism as a perfectionist political doctrine.

This interpretation distinguishes between different forms of perfection-

ism, where only a non-coercive form that considers a choice autonomouseven if the object chosen is not good is a suitable perfectionist interpretationof liberalism. This conception considers the goal of the public policies to treateach person as a free and equal member of society. Other interpretations,such as Raz’s, do not provide a satisfactory distinction between a non-coercive perfectionist theory and a paternalistic justification of norms thatis concerned with individual well-being.

Moreover, this interpretation justifies state intervention for enhancingautonomy in the form of incentives or disincentives, provided that issues of

individual well-being are not concerned, and without taking coercive meas-ures. Thus, it bridges the gap between state intervention and coercion.Therefore, the government could help citizens to maintain the conditions of autonomy (such as being healthy), but it should not prohibit individualsfrom making trade-offs between these conditions and other values (such asexcitement), as in the case of the use of non-addictive “recreational drugs”or in the pursuit of dangerous sports.

University of Palermo

Department of Law and PoliticsPiazza Bologni 8

90134 PalermoItaly

E-mail: [email protected]

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15 Mendus 1989, chap. 3 considers Millian perfectionism “illiberal” insofar as it prohibits typesof conduct that are not worthwhile. Here, I do not criticise Mendus’ interpretation; I simplypoint out that other readings of Millian perfectionism are plausible.



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biondo, two tipes of liberla perfectionism

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