biological terrorism and security emd545b lecture #9
TRANSCRIPT
BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM AND SECURITY
EMD545b
Lecture #9
Biological TerrorismIntentional or threatened release of viruses, bacteria, fungi or toxins derived from living organisms to produce disease or death in humans, animals, or plants
Outline• Historical events
• Potential agents of bioterrorism
• Means of delivery
• Monitoring and detection
• Hazardous materials/emergency response
• Security issues
• Suspicious materials
• Discussion and comments
Historical Events
6th Cent. BC: Rye ergot, plant toxins
1300’s: Plague-infected corpses catapulted into defenders during Siege of Kaffa
1500’s: Strategic value of smallpox-laden blankets during Spanish conquest of Central and
South America
1700-1800’s: Smallpox-laden blankets repeatedly traded to North American Indians
More Recent Events WW II: Japan’s Unit 731
1940’s-1969: US offensive use research
1972: Biological Weapons Convention Treaty
1978: Assassination by KGB using ricin
1979-1982: “Yellow-rain” by Soviet Army in Afghanistan
1979: Accidental Soviet anthrax release at bioweapons facility in Sverdlovsk - ca. 80 cases, 60+ deaths
Most Recent Events
1984: Purposeful Salmonella contamination of food by Oregon religious cult - 700+ cases
1995: Sarin released in Tokyo subway religious cult
12 deaths, thousands exposed
1998: Vengeful use of radiolabeled saxitoxin stolen from Brown University laboratory
2001-2002: Anthrax distribution in/on US Mail
1995 Tokyo Subway Sarin Release by Aum Shinrikyo
Why BioWeapons?
• Fear and hysteria
• Overwhelm medical resources
• Can be lethal or cause severe incapacitation
• Delayed effects (but acute from toxins)
• Relatively easy to obtain, produce, and use
• Potential for secondary infections
• Multiple routes for exposure
• Compared to chemical and nuclear materials:– Very difficult to detect in field
The Perfect BW
• Highly pathogenic/toxic
• Highly infectious
• Incapacitation may be preferable to lethality
• Symptoms confused with non-BW diseases
• Transmissible by desired route of exposure
• Stable for packaging and delivery
• Easily harvested, selected, or created
• Vaccination/treatment only available to aggressor
Epidemiology of BW Attack
• Case chronology differences from natural epidemics
• Observations of signs/symptoms likely most sensitive surveillance means
• Reportable symptoms and diseases
Time
Factors for Disease Transmission
• Presence of pathogenic organism • Viable • Infectious dose (minimum [ ] and qty)• Susceptible host• Effective route of exposure
Potential Agents of Bioterrorism
• Bacterial agents• Viral Agents• Biological/biologically-derived toxins• Recombinant organisms
Bacterial Agents
• Single cell microscopic organisms typically with diameter 0.5 - 1.0 um
• Capable of causing disease by infection and/or producing toxins
• Spore forms often very
stable in environment
Anthrax• Bacillus anthracis (spore former)
• Cutaneous, inhalational, and ingestion forms
• Common among livestock and livestock product workers
• Spore-form very stable
• Flu-like illness, respiratory failure, shock, meningitis
• Highest CFR from inhalation (90-100%)
• Antibiotic treatment must
be early to be effective
• Vaccine available
Plague
• Yersinia pestis
• Transmitted by flea bites or aerosol droplets
• Wild rodents are natural reservoir
• Bubonic and pneumonic forms (“black death”)
• Swollen lymph nodes, rapid progressive pneumonia
• High case fatality rates
• Vaccine and antibiotic
therapies available
Tularemia
• Francisella tularensis (“rabbit fever”)• All routes of exposure, including vector• Low infectious dose• Fever, chills, headache, weight loss, pneumonia• Moderate case fatality rate untreated• Vaccine and antibiotic therapies
Brucellosis
• Brucella spp. (abortus, melitensis, ovix, others)• Zoonotic, primarily from infected mammals and
contaminated milk/other dairy products• Highly infectious by aerosolization• Variable symptoms, but many “flu-like”
Viral Agents
• Very small particles (ca. 0.02 - 0.2 um diameter)
• Not truly “living”
• Outer shell and DNA or RNA, but no organelles for metabolism or reproduction
• Rely exclusively upon host
cells - “parasites”
• Typically very short lived
outside of host or vector
Smallpox• Variola major
• Highly contagious by aerosols
• Moderately high case fatality rate (~30%)
• Incapacitating malaise, fever, vomiting, lesions and pustules
• WHO initiative claims eradication (except for stored specimens in US and Russia)
• Quarantine essential
• Vaccine available
Viral Equine Encephalites
• Venezuelan, Western, and Eastern
• Vector & aerosol transmission (vector primary in nature)
• Fever, headache, malaise, nausea/vomiting, neurological damage from encephalitis
• Highly incapacitating, high lethality
(CFR for EEE 50 - 75%)
• Experimental vaccines
• Palliative care only
Viral Hemorrhagic Fevers• e.g., Marburg, Ebola, Congo-Crimean
• BL4 agents
• Poorly understood, difficult to work with
• Arthropod vectors, contact, possible aerosol routes
• Natural epidemics with severe consequences - marked by fever, malaise, headache, internal hemorrhaging, multi-organ failure
• Seriously incapacitating
• Very high CFRs: 25 - 90%
• Palliative care only
Biological Toxins
• Any toxic substance or compound produced by an animal, plant, or microorganism
• Typically high MW proteins or toxic chemicals
• Hazardous by most routes of exposure - contact facilitated by dermal penetrants like DMSO
• Range of effects from tissue necrosis to nervous system interruption
• Most are readily inactivated by heat, steam, or common chemicals
Comparative Toxicity
Agent LD50 (ug/kg) Source
Botulinum toxin 0.001 Bacterium
Tetanus toxin 0.002 Bacterium
Diptheria toxin 0.10 Bacterium
Ricin 3 Plant (Castor bean)
a-Conotoxin 5 Cone snail
Saxitoxin 10 Marine dinoflagellate
Sarin 100 Chemical/nerve agent
T-2 toxin 1,210 Fungal mycotoxin
Delivery and Release
• Acquisition/production in sufficient quantity/concentration to achieve desired outcome
• Stability under storage conditions • Packaging • Actual delivery and release• Exposure
Routes of Exposure
• Airborne - inhalational
• Food/water supplies - ingestion
• Contact - dermal
• Vector - percutaneous
Sources of BW Agents
• Field, clinical, and veterinary samples
• Type culture collections
• Commercial distributors
• Foreign laboratories and suppliers
• Museums and universities
• Genetically engineered (rDNA) or selected
Monitoring and Detection• Comparison vs. chemical, explosive, and radioactive
• Medical signs and symptoms - healthcare providers become first line of surveillance
• Laboratory analysis– Antibody titers
– Cultures
– DNA fingerprinting
• Field tests
• Future/emerging methods (GC/MS, semi-conductors)
HAZWOPER
• OSHA standard (29 CFR Part 1910.120)• “Hazardous waste operations and emergency
response”• Comprehensive requirements for written safety
programs, training, protective equipment, field exercises, medical surveillance, and at least annual re-certifications
HAZWOPER/Emergency Response
• First responders• Incident commander and IC system• Site/scene health and safety officer• Technician-level responders• Potential crime scene investigation issues• Other specialists as-needed
HAZWOPER/Emergency Response
• All-hazards approach – Biological, chemical, and radiological
• Site/perimeter controls• Work zones• Decontamination systems
Knowledge and Information • Incident/facility information • Eyewitnesses critical• On-going process• Monitoring and predictions where possible• Weather and local environmental factors
HAZMAT Ensemble Levels
D Safety shoes and glasses/goggles, work gloves, and work clothing
C Above plus more enclosing garments, and air purifying respirator
B Above plus even more enclosing garments, and upgrading of respiratory protection to self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA)
A Fully encapsulating garments, SCBA
Low
High
HAZMAT Ensembles
A
BC
D
Key Selection Factors for Protective Clothing
• Contaminants and concentration• Consequences of equipment failure• Permeation/penetration resistance• Anticipated duration of use• Exposure type (e.g., incidental contact, immersion)
• Anticipated work activities (e.g., dexterity, tactility)
• Cost, size, availability, manufacturer’s differences
Personal Protective Equipment • Low on controls hierarchy• Advantages• Disadvantages
– No one ensemble
– Selection criteria
– Training
– Formal “fitting” process
– Maintenance and inspection
– Periodic review
Medical Interventions
• e.g., pre-exposure immunizations, blocker administration, and immediate post-exposure treatment
• Excellent protection but for only very limited suite of exposures
• Duration of protection highly variable• Potential contraindications of treatment• Timing of administration critical
Biosecurity Issues• “Select Agents” transfer rule • Revisions now include “possession”• Basic requirements:
– Registration of entity and individuals possessing, using, storing, etc. “select” biological agents and toxins
– Inventory controls
– Physical security of storage and use
– Periodic inspections
– Emergency procedures and notifications
– Individual background/security clearances
Related Security Issues
• Building perimeter controls and access• Public vs. non-public areas • Mechanical equipment and HVAC intakes
– Collateral benefits of modern filtered HVAC systems
• Identify and report strangers/suspicious persons
Suspicious Materials
• Mail, packages, objects
• Return address, condition, and appearance (leaking, discoloration, odor, etc)
• Expected or unexpected? Verify source if possible.
• Follow recommended procedures.
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Sources for More Information
• US Government:
Occupational Safety and Health Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Federal Emergency Management Agency
Federal Bureau of Investigation/Department of Justice
• Advisory Groups:
American Biological Safety Association
American Industrial Hygiene Association
American and International Red Cross
Discussion and Comments