PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION vs PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS INC. Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization is a recognized labor union in Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police (didn’t say what it was about the police). PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal. Issue: Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated. Held: Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution.

SIMON vs CHR A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days (up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA. Prior to their receipt of the demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to give way to the "People's Park". On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580. On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. In an Order, dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. Issue: Whether or not the CHR has jurisdiction: a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City; b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners for contempt; Held:

a) No. Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights violations.

Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless, significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead, that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the Commission, taking into account its recommendation." In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove discoursed vis-avis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

b) No, on its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to

cite or hold any person in direct or indirect contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify, the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess.

PADILLA, J., dissenting In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners. Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights

ERMITA MALATE HOTEL vs CITY OF MANILA Facts: On June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 4760. Petitioners filed a complaint citing the following provisions and questioned them for violation of due process:

1.) refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in the lobby in open view;

2.) prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old; 3.) usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also); 4.) making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and 5.) cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court issued preliminary injunction and petitioners raised the case to SC on certiorari. Issue: Is the ordinance compliant with the due process requirement of the constitution? Held: Yes. The Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. There is no violation o constitutional due process for being reasonable and the ordinance is enjoys the presumption of constitutionality absent any irregularity on its face. Taxation may be made to implement a police power and the amount, object, and instance of taxation is dependent upon the local legislative body. Judgment of lower court reversed and injunction lifted. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010 Facts:

President Noynoy Aquino issued executive order no. 1 which involves the investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption of the previous administration. By Virtue of this order, the truth commission was created as an ad hoc body tasked to investigate such cases. The PTC is different from the truth commissions in other countries which have been created as official, transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies Petitioners asked the court to declare such order unconstitutional as the truth commission usurps unto the powers and the duties of the supreme court. It thus violates the separation of powers since the it is also legislative in nature as it creates a new office and allocates funds for it.

Respondent answers that the President’s executive power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987 and settled jurisprudence that authorize the President to create or form such bodies.

They further argue that E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

Issue: a.) Whether or not petitioners have legal standing. b.) Is E.O. 1 constitutional? Held: Yes. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court. egislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators. Yes. It is violative of the equal protection clause. The Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. The failure of the executive order to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” only. Though the OSG enumerates several differences between the Arroyo administration and other past administrations, these distinctions are not substantial enough to merit the restriction of the investigation to the “previous administration” only. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, “Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.” The public needs to be enlightened why Executive Order No. 1 chooses to limit the scope of the intended investigation to the previous administration only. The OSG ventures to opine that “to include other past administrations, at this point, may unnecessarily overburden the commission and lead it to lose its effectiveness.” The reason given is specious. It is without doubt irrelevant to the legitimate and noble objective of the PTC to stamp out or “end corruption and the evil it breeds.” WHITE LIGHT CORP vs CITY OF MANILA Facts: On 3 Dec 1992, then Mayor Lim signed into law Ordinance no. 7774 entitled “An Ordinance prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila”. White Light Corp is an operator of mini hotels and motels who sought to have the Ordinance be nullified as the said Ordinance infringes on the private rights of their patrons. The RTC ruled in favor of WLC. It ruled that the Ordinance strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed by the Constitution. The City maintains that the ordinance is valid as it is a valid exercise of police power. Under the LGC, the City is empowered to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports. The CA ruled in favor of the City, Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 7774 is valid. Held: The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash

up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. SILAHIS INTERNATIONAL HOTEL, INC. vs. SOLUTA Facts: Loida Somacera (Loida), a laundrywoman of the hotel, stayed overnight at the female locker room at the basement of the hotel. At dawn, she heard pounding sounds outside, she saw five men in barong tagalog whom she failed to recognize but she was sure were not employees of the hotel, forcibly opening the door of the union office. In the morning, as union officer Soluta was trying in vain to open the door of the union office, Loida narrated to him what she had witnessed at dawn. Soluta immediately lodged a complaint before the Security Officer. And he fetched a locksmith. At that instant, men in barong tagalog armed with clubs arrived and started hitting Soluta and his companions. Panlilio thereupon instructed Villanueva to force open the door, and the latter did. Once inside, Panlilio and his companions began searching the office, over the objection of Babay, a union officer, who even asked them if they had a search warrant. A plastic bag was found containing marijuana flowering tops. As a result of the discovery of the presence of marijuana in the union office and after the police conducted an investigation of the incident, a complaint against the 13 union officers was filed before the Fiscal’s Office of Manila. RTC acquitted the accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court Petitioners argue that the search of the union office was reasonable under the circumstances, given that the hotel owns the room where the union holds office; the search was not without probable cause as it was conducted precisely due to reports received by petitioners that the union office was being used as a venue for illegal activities, particularly the sale and/or use of prohibited drugs, and the search was conducted with the consent and in the presence of union officer Babay. Petitioners contend that the court of appeals erred in granting respondent union officers damages. Issue: Whether respondent individual can recover damages for violation of constitutional rights. Ruling: Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code, allows so.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages: x x x x

In the present case, petitioners had, by their own claim, already received reports in late 1987 of illegal activities and Maniego conducted surveillance. Yet, in the morning of January 11, 1988, petitioners and their companions barged into and searched the union office without a search warrant, despite ample time for them to obtain one. The course taken by petitioners and company stinks in illegality. Petitioners’ violation of individual respondents’ constitutional right against unreasonable search thus furnishes the basis for the award of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. For respondents, being the lawful occupants of the office had the right to raise the question of validity of the search and seizure Article 32 speaks of an officer or employee or person "directly or indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Hence, it is not the actor alone who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. Such being the case, petitioners, together with Maniego and Villanueva, the ones who orchestrated the illegal search, are jointly and severally liable for actual, moral and exemplary damages to herein individual respondents in accordance with the earlier-quoted pertinent provision of Article 32, in relation to Article 2219(6) and (10) of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases, among others, (6) Illegal search and (10) Acts and action referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

Petition was Denied.

RUBI vs PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO Facts: Rubi and various other Manguianes in the province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat and to established themselves on a reservation at Tigbao in the province of Mindoro and to remain there, or be punished by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes are a Non-Christian tribe with a very low culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are peaceful, timid, primitive, seminomadic people. They number approximately 15,000 . The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, thry have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any for of municipal government. These reservations, as appears from the resolution of the Provincial Board, extends over an area of 800 hectares of land, which is approximately 2000 acres, on which about 300 Manguianes are confined. One of the Manguianes, Dabalos, escaped from the reservation and was taken in hand by the provincial sheriff and placed in prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on behalf of Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally deprived of their liberty. In this case the validity of section 2145 of the Administrative Code, reading: "With the prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board,” was challenged. ISSUE: Whether or not the said law is constitutional. HELD: By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code. Among other things, it was held that the term "non-Christian" should not be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term "non-Christian" it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. On the other hand, none of the provisions of the Philippine Organic Law could have had the effect of denying to the Government of the Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature, the right to exercise that most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police power, in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. when to advance the public welfare, the law was found to be a legitimate exertion of the police power, And it is unnecessary to add that the prompt registration of titles to land in the Philippines constitutes an advancement of the public interests, for, besides promoting peace and good order among landowners in particular and the people in general, it helps increase the industries of the country, and makes for the development of the natural resources, with the consequent progress of the general prosperity. And these ends are pursued in a special manner by the State through the exercise of its police power. The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor class legislation, and stated among other things: ". . . one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class." JOHNSON, J., dissenting: I dissent. The petitioners were deprived of their liberty without a hearing. That fact is not denied. I cannot give my consent to any act which deprives the humblest citizen of his just liberty without a hearing, whether he be a Christian or non-Christian. All persons in the Philippine Islands are entitled to a hearing, at least, before they are deprived of their liberty. MOIRE, J. dissenting

The manguianes have committed no offenses and are charged with none. It does The Attorney-General argues that the treatment provided for the Manguianes is similar to that accorded the Indians in the United States, and reference is made all through the court's decision to the decisions of the United States Supreme Court with reference to the Indians. It is not considered necessary to go into these cases for the simple reason that all the Indians nations in the United States were considered as separate nations and all acts taken in regard to them were the result of separate treaties made by the United States Government with the Indian nations, and, incompliance with these treaties, reservations were set apart for them on which they lived and were protected form intrusion and molestation by white men. Some these reservations were larger than the Islands of Luzon, and they were not measured in hectares but in thousands of square miles. In fact, citing the case of U.S. vs crook, which involved the detention by the U.S. of Indians for a similar reason as the law at issue in the case at bar, the court declared that the Indians were illegally held by authority of the United States and in violation of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and ordered their release from custody. LIBANAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN Facts: Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was a former member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 elections. He was charged in conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude Docena (Respondent), a qualified replacement of a deceased member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body. In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution suspending their respective public position and office for ninety (90) days. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if executed shall affront the petitioner s right for due process; [2] the suspension would assault his covenant to the people of Samar as their vice-governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension no longer exist. Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. Issues: Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is valid? Held: Yes. The Court ruled that the term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged. The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public office is "a public agency or trust,"and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provisionwhich petitioner invokes. Hence, SC dismissed the petition. SANDIGANBAYAN decision is affirmed ORQUIOLA vs TANDAND SORA DEVELOPMENT Facts: Pura Kalaw Ledesma owned a parcel of land adjacent to those owned by Herminigilda located in Tandang sora Quezon city/ Hermingilda sold her 2 parcels of land to Mariano Lising who then registered both lots in the name of M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots.1âwphi1.nêt Certain portions of the subdivided lots were sold to third persons including herein petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola. Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed a complaint against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for allegedly encroaching upon her land. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw

Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of Lot 689 made by Ledesma in favor of said corporation. Trial continued for thirty years. The trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally liable for encroaching on plaintiff’s land. By virtue of which, the Deputy Sheriff of Quezon City directed petitioners, through an alias writ of execution, to remove the house they constructed on the land they were occupying. A writ of demolition was issued subsequently. Petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for prohibition with TRO. Petitioners alleged that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for value; hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded in the civil case, the writ of demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law. The Court of Appeals dismissed the case, Hence, this petition. Issue: a) whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners; and b) whether petitioners were innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith Held:

a.) No. Petitioners argue that the court erred when it relied heavily on the court’s ruling in Vda. de Medina vs. Cruz in holding that petitioners are successors-in-interest of Mariano Lising, and as such, they can be reached by the order of execution in Civil Case even though they were not impleaded as parties thereto. It is submitred that Medina is not applicable in this case because the circumstances therein are different from the circumstances in the present case.

In this case petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case. The right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners is based on a fully recognized Torrens title. Petitioners in this case acquired the registered title in their own names. This differs from the medina case where the ownership is not by virtue of torrens title but rather as issued by the Spanish government.

where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered property need not go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. It is our view here that the petitioners, spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the Torrens system.

b.) Yes. This is the first time that petitioners have raised this issue. As a general rule, this could not be done.

Nevertheless, the court deem it proper that this issue be resolved in this case, to avoid circuitous litigation and further delay in the disposition of this case.

Petitioners are indeed builders in good faith. Petitioner spouses acquired the land in question without knowledge of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. Shortly afterwards, they built their conjugal home on said land. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City tried to execute the that they had notice of private respondent’s adverse claim. The institution of Civil Case cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties. As builders in good faith and innocent purchasers for value, petitioners have rights over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any case thereon. Consequently, private respondents should have impleaded them in Civil Case. Since they failed to do so, petitioners cannot be reached by the decision in said case. Petition is granted

DELOSO vs SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts: Deloso was the elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in 1971. Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law in relation to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five (5) tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals. The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. While the other case involving the tractors were included in 5 informations for violation of Anti-Graft Law with the sandiganbayan. Petitioner was suspended pendent elite from his position as governor in 1989 (he was elected governor 1988) Hence he filed this instant petition. Issues: Whether or not the suspension was proper. Held: No, regular term of a governor is only 3 years. He was, however, ordered suspended from performing his duties as governor by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of the criminal charges filed against him. The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may be suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct possibility. Under these circumstances the preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes unreasonable thus raising a due process question. With this being so, there is injustice inflicted on the people of Zambales. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as governor. The protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted. We previously ruled on the issue as to whether the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period of 60 days, provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (Republic Act 2260) is illegal and void. The preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the constitution. The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period can not be sanctioned. We rule that henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The suspension was lifted. JAVIER vs COMELEC Facts: Javier (petitioner) and Pacificador (respondendt), a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. On the eve of the elections, several followers of the petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the Pacificador’s men. Seven suspects, including respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial for these murders. Despite this event, respondent won the elections. The petitioner filed a case arguing that the proclamation was void because made only by a division and not by the Commission on Elections en banc as required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on the strength of his proclamation, the private respondent took his oath as a member of the Batasang Pambansa. While the case was pending, the petitioner was gunned down in cold blood and in broad daylight. The nation, already indignant over the obvious manipulation of the presidential elections in favor of Marcos, was revolted

by the killing, which flaunted a scornful disregard for the law by the assailants who apparently believed they were above the law. Batasang Pambansa was subsequently abolished after the revolution and the case was dismissed due to the disappearance of the division in issue. Issue: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador. Held: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor.

ArticleXII-C, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution expressly provides that:

“The COMELEC may sit en banc or in three divisions.All election cases maybe heard and decided by divisions

except contests involving members of theBatasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc.”. the

decision of the second division alone regarding the protest was invalid.

The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded “the cold neutrality of an impartial judge” as the

indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not

only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision

will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are

violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go

to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such

confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls

the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor

approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only

to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also

extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions

and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The

judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of

the established facts and the pertinent law.

Wherfore, the court held that, were it not for the supervening events that have legally rendered it moot and

academic, this petition would have been granted and the decision of the Commission on Elections dated July 23,

1984, set aside as violative of the Constitution. (the supreme court decided on the case despite the fact that the

constitutional body in issue no longer existed.)

GALMAN vs SANDIGANBAYAN

Facts:

Aug. 21, 1983 Ninoy Aquino was assassinated while inside the premises of the Mla Intl Airport. 3 hours after

the incident, the military investigators reported that the man who shot Aquino was a communist-hired gunman.

the latter was gunned down in turn by the military (a few days later, said gunman would be identified as

Rolando Galman)

Marcos established a Fact Finding Board (the Agrava Board) to investigate the case

After 125 days of hearing the testimonies of 194 witnesses recorded in transcript, the Agrava Board came up

with a minority and majority report, both contending that the killing was not a communist plot but a military

conspiracy.

Minority report – 6 persons who were at the service stairs as plotters, and Gen. Luther Custodio was

essential to the implementation of the plan

Majority report – 26 persons headed by gen Fabian Ver, all acting in conspiracy with one another in the

premeditated killing of Ninoy

Saturnina Galman and Reynaldo Galman together with 29 other petitioners, charged the Tanodbayan and the

Sandiganbayan of serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in the miscarriage of justice for want

of due process of law; the argued that there was failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the prosecution to

present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias proceedings before the Sandiganbayan

and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal.

They prayed for a TRO, a nullification of the proceedings and a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an

unbiased prosecutor

A 9-to-2 vote of the SB granted the TRO while later on the same 9-to-2 ratio dismissed the petition and lifted

the TRO

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration based on the lack of legal ground for the dismissal

All of the accused were acquitted while even though Galman was not on trial, he was, in effect, convicted as the

assassin of Ninoy

The Mla Times published an article entitled “Aquino Trial A Sham”, which had for its context the revelations of

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera that the graft court were convinced by Marcos to whitewash the criminal

cases

SC appointed a 3-member commission (Vasquez Commission) to hear and receive evidence of the charges of

collusion and pressure

The Vasquez Commission submitted its report with an affirmation of the “secret meeting” held in Malacañang,

wherein Marcos ordered Justice Pamaran to handle the case (without raffling the case first) and for the entire

tribunal to have all of the accused acquitted

Issue

a.) Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the charges against them.

b.)Whether or not a call for a re-trial of the case would be tantamount to double jeopardy.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and fair opportunity to prosecute

and prove their case which grossly violates the due process clause. There could be no double jeopardy since

legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment,

(d) a valid plea having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the

express consent of the accused. The lower court that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as

it was ousted of its jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the first

jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing and trial before the

lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a

second jeopardy.

The court further contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President ordered

the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which was undertaken with due

pressure to the judiciary. The court’s decision of acquittal is one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in

observing due process during the trial therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy

cannot be invoked. More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion

between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined verdict of the accused.

The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by the court was set aside and rendered the

decision of acquittal of the accused null and void. An order for a re-trial was granted. PP vs. Castillo Panganiban: FACTS: Castillo stabbed Velasco with a fan knife on his left chest which led to the latter’s death. A criminal case for murder was filed against Castillo in the RTC of Quezon City. The RTC, appreciating the direct testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution positively identifying the accused as against the latter’s alibi, convicted Castillo for the crime of murder. Castillo appealed in the SC declaring that the trial judge was biased against him. He averred that the trial judge propounded questions to the witnesses which were within the prerogative of the prosecution to ask. Castillo alleged that the trial judge took over from the prosecution and asked questions in a leading manner. The trial judge was alleged also to have interrupted the cross-examination to help the witness give answers favourable to the prosecution and asked questions which pertained to matters of opinion and allusions of bad moral character. All of which could not have been objected by the defense since the same have been ventilated by the trial judge. ISSUE: Was the Judge impartial? HELD: No. It is the judge’s prerogative and duty to ask clarificatory questions to eek out the truth. After careful examination of the records, it appears that the assailed questions by the judge were merely clarificatory in nature. Allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of a judge’s queries is determined not by their quantity but by their quality and in any event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning. Upon evaluation, even if all questions and answers propounded by the judge were eliminated, the appellant would still be convicted. The Sol-Gen was correct when he said that there was no showing that the judge had an interest, personal or otherwise in the prosecution of the case at bar. He is therefore presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner that preserves that idea of “cold neutrality of an impartial judge”.

Tejano vs. Ombudsman

Chico-Nazario

The Facts

The instant petition stemmed from the report of Philippine National Bank (PNB) Resident Auditor Alexander A. Tan, dated 15 October 1992, on his investigation regarding an alleged unfunded withdrawal in the amount of P2.2 million by V&G Better Homes Subdivision (V&G) under Savings Account No. 365-5355-6-4.

The report implicated Vice President Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., the petitioner herein, Executive Officer Emilio Montesa, and Supervising Branch Teller Jane Rita Jecong, all of the PNB, Cebu City Branch, including Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G, as persons involved in the irregular withdrawal of P2.2 million of PNB funds.

In a resolution dated 29 March 1993, Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton recommended the filing of the proper information for violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against petitioner Cayetano A. Tejano, Jr., Juana dela Cruz and Vicente dela Cruz of V&G. The resolution was approved by Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez.

The resolution was thereafter referred for review to Special Prosecutor III Orlando I. Ines of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

In a Memorand[7] dated 25 October 1994, Ines affirmed the resolution of Graft Investigation Officer Edgardo G. Canton.

On 28 October 1994, Deputy Special Prosecutor Jose De G. Ferrer recommended the approval of the memorandum of Special Prosecution Officer Ines.

On 08 November 1994, Aniano A. Desierto, then the Special Prosecutor, concurred in the approval of Ferrer.[8] Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez concurred thereto on 11 November 1994.

Subsequently, on 24 November 1994, an Information for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed before the Sandiganbayan, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 21654.

On 10 December 1999, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto, who earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation as Special Prosecutor, disapproved the recommendation for the dismissal of the case with the marginal note “assign the case to another prosecutor to prosecute the case aggressively.”

Petitioner thus filed the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from taking further action in Criminal Case No. 21654.

ISSUE: Was Due process observed?

HELD:

This Court has been consistent in holding that it will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers, and respect the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.” Such discretionary power of the Ombudsman is beyond the domain of this Court to review, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction of the latter.

Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[16]

Ombudsman Desierto, in this case, committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner attributes partiality on the part of Ombudsman Desierto for having participated in the reinvestigation of the instant case despite the fact that he earlier participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the same when he was a Special Prosecutor by concurring in the recommendation for the filing of the information before the Sandiganbayan.

Having participated in the initial preliminary investigation of the instant case and having recommended the filing of an appropriate information, it behooved Ombudsman Desierto to recuse himself from participating in the review of the same during the reinvestigation. He should have delegated the review to his Deputies.

Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan FACTS: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formalcomplaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on thecomplaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approvedby the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone.

(1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of AmityTrading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets andLiabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. HELD: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.

JANE CARAS y SOLITARIO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

FACTS: On January 5, 1992, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Chu Yang T. Atienza to apply on account or for value PCI Bank, Commonwealth Ave. Branch Check No. 017744 dated March 18, 1992 payable to the order of CASH in the amount of P14,125.00 Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check when presented for payment was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Chu Yang T. Atienza the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.

When arraigned on August 16, 1993, accused Caras pleaded “not guilty”. Thereafter, trial proceeded.

The evidence for the prosecution tends to show that on or about February 18, 1992, up to May 31, 1992 at Quezon City, accused Jane Caras obtained from complainant Chu Yang T. Atienza on installment various gift checks and purchase orders from Uniwide Sales and in payment thereof, the accused issued to the complainant the following checks drawn against Philippine Commercial Bank.

When the checks were presented for deposit or encashment, they were all dishonored for the reason “Account Closed”. Despite repeated verbal and written demands made on her to replace the dishonored checks with cash, she failed and refused to do so.

Attienza then filed a ccriminal case for violation of BP 22. The Lower court found Caras guilty of 15 counts of BP 22.

Caras now appeals averring that she was not afforded due process because there was no notice of dishonour which could have precluded a criminal prosecution.

ISSUE: Was there a violation of the right of the accused to be informed?

HELD: Yes. There is no mention of when the demand to pay was made, whether before or after the checks were dishonoured so that within 5 banking days from receipt of such notice she could pay the check fully or make arrangements for such payment.

The testimony of Panuelos, the branch manager of PCI Bank where petitioner maintained her checking account indicates that the bank also failed to send notice to the petitioner for her to pay the value of the checks or make arrangements for their payment within 5 days from the dishonour of the said checks. The absence of notice of dishonour necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminat prosecution. Accordingly, procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonour ne actually served on the petitioner.

The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonour is a clear ground for her acquittal.

Mariveles Shipyard vs. CA

Quisumbing:

FACTS: Sometime on October 1993, Mariveles Shipyard Corporation engaged the services of Longest Force

Investigation and Security Agency, Inc. to render security services at its premises. Pursuant to their agreement,

Longest Force deployed its security guards, the private respondents herein, at the petitioner’s shipyard in

Mariveles, Bataan.

According to petitioner, it religiously complied with the terms of the security contract with Longest Force,

promptly paying its bills and the contract rates of the latter. However, it found the services being rendered by

the assigned guards unsatisfactory and inadequate, causing it to terminate its contract with Longest Force on

April 1995. Longest Force, in turn, terminated the employment of the security guards it had deployed at

petitioner’s shipyard.

On September 1996, private respondents filed a case for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages pursuant to

the PNPSOSIA-PADPAO rates, non-payment of overtime pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day, service

incentive leave pay, 13th month pay and attorney’s fees, against both Longest Force and petitioner, before the

Labor Arbiter. The case sought the guards’ reinstatement with full back wages and without loss of seniority

rights.

Longest Force admitted that it employed private respondents and assigned them as security guards at the

premises of petitioner rendering a 12 hours duty per shift for the said period. It likewise admitted its liability as

to the non-payment of the alleged wage differential in the total amount of P2,618,025 but passed on the liability

to petitioner

The petitioner denied any liability on account of the alleged illegal dismissal, stressing that no employer-

employee relationship existed between it and the security guards. It further pointed out that it would be the

height of injustice to make it liable again for monetary claims which it had already paid. Anent the cross-claim

filed by Longest Force against it, petitioner prayed that it be dismissed for lack of merit. Petitioner averred that

Longest Force had benefited from the contract; it was now estopped from questioning said agreement on the

ground that it had made a bad deal.

The Labor Arbiter rendered judgment that Longest Force and Mariveles Shipping be jointly and severally liable

to pay the money claims of the complainants. Petitioner appealed the foregoing to the NLRC. The labor tribunal,

affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but this was denied by the

NLRC.

The petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari assailing the NLRC judgment for having been

rendered with grave abuse of discretion with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals denied due course to

the petition and dismissed it outright.

ISSUE: Was the petitioner denied Due Process?

HELD: No the petitioner was not denied due process.. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be

heard. In administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a

reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Not all cases require a trial-type hearing.

Due process with the Labor Arbiters is satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit their

position papers to which they are supposed to attach all the supporting documents or documentary evidence

that would prove their claim, in the event that LA determines that no formal hearing would be conducted or

that such hearing was not necessary.

The petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side in several hearings conducted before the LA and

in the position papers and other supporting documents that it had submitted. Due process was observed.

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: The case stemmed from the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of the court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order '"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized in leading newspapers. Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the Issue involved in proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges." Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression. Held: There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety of

contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice." Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the society. Roque vs. Ombudsman FACTS: Roque and Mabanglo were Schools Division Supernitedent of DECS. Roque was assigned in Koronadal, South Cotabato while Mabanglo was assigned in Tagum, Davao Province until their compulsory retirement. The Commission on Audit conducted an audit on the P9.36 million allotment released by the DECCS Regional Office No. XI to its division offices. In the course of the audit, the COA, through Soriano and Enriquez found some major deficiencies and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Violations of COA Circular No. 78-84 and 85-55A, DECS Order No. 100 Section 88 of PD 1445. Complaint affidavits were filed before the Ombudsman in Mindanao against Mabanglo on May 7, 1991 and Roque on May 16, 1991. On June 11, 1991 the Ombudsman ordered a preliminary investigation. On March 18, 1997 (6 years later), the complaint against Mabanglo was resolved by the Ombudsman recommending that respondents were probably guilty of the offenses charged. The same was approved by Ombusman Desierto on September 19, 1997. On April 30, 1997(6 years later), the Ombudsman in Mindanao recommended the filing of cases against ROque for the offenses abovementioned. The same was approved by Ombudsman Desierto on August 22, 1997. ISSUE: Was there undue and unjustifiable delay? HELD: Yes. The delay of 6 years was unjustified. RA 6770 mandates that the Ombudsman must act promptly on complaints before him. Moreover, it violated the constitutional provision on the speedy disposition of cases. Although the respondents attempted to justify the six months needed by Ombudsman Desierto to review the recommentdation of Deputy Ombudsman Gervasio, no explanation was given why it took almost six years for the latter to resolve the Complaints. Angchangco vs. Ombudsman: The inordinate delay of more than 6 years by the OPmbudsman in resolving the criminal complaints against the petitioner to be violative of his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and a speedy disposition of the cases against him, thus warranting the dismissal of said criminal cases. Ang Tibay vs. CIR Facts: There was agreement between Ang Tibay and the National Labor Union, Inc (NLU). The NLU alleged that the supposed lack of leather material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharge all the members of the NLU, from work. And this averment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather. That National Worker's Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, which was alleged by the NLU as an illegal one. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said motion. Issue: Whether or Not, the motion for new trial is meritorious to be granted. Held: To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the

entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103. As laid down in the case of Goseco v. CIR, the SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable. The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can injusticiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support thereof; (2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) The decision must have something to support itself; (4) The evidence must be substantial; (5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate; (7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render itsdecision in such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth. So ordered.

DUMLAO vs. COMELEC

FACTS: Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya. He has retired from his office and he has been receiving retirement benefits therefrom. He filed for reelection to the same office for the 1980 local elections. On the other hand, BP 52 was passed (par 1 thereof) providing disqualification for the likes of Dumlao. Dumlao assailed the BP averring that it is class legislation hence unconstitutional. His petition was joined by Atty. Igot and Salapantan Jr. These two however have different issues. The suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayer’s suit assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign and the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office. In general, Dumlao invoked equal protection in the eye of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the there is cause of action.

HELD: The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this case for this case would never have been merged. Dumlao’s cause is different from Igot’s. They have separate issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so that it’d be eligible for judicial review. There are standards that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case. In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met. The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the filing of complaints against them and after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them from office as null and void.

The assertion that Sec 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.

Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official (Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.

THE CONFERENCE OF MARITIME MANNING AGENCIES, INC., ET AL. vs. POEA

G.R. No. 114714 April 21, 1995

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., was an incorporated association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in behalf of their respective foreign shipowner-principals. POEA issued GOVERNING RESOLUTION NO. 01 SERIES OF 1994, which povides in part, that in case of death of the seaman during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of US$50,000 and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment In case of death of the seaman during the term of his Contract, the employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of US$50,000 and an additional amount of US$7,000 to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four children at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. POEA Administrator Felicisimo Joson informed all Filipino seafarers, manning agencies, ship-owners, managers and principals hiring Filipino seafarers, that Governing Board Resolution No. 01 adjusted the rates of compensation and other benefits. For this reason, Conference Maritime et al. filed a petitition to annul Resolution No. 01 on the grounds that: (1) The POEA does not have the power and authority to fix and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino seamen working in ocean-going vessels; (2) that POEA violated the standards for the exercise of the power to fix rates; (3) resolution was unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection and non-impairment of obligation of contracts. POEA contended that the petition was without merit because the issuance of the resolution was a valid exercise of the POEA's rule-making authority or power of subordinate legislation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not POEA had valid rule-making power.

HELD:

Yes. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section 4(a) of Executive Order No. 797, stating that the governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA). Similar

authorization had been granted the National Seamen Board, which, as earlier observed, had itself prescribed a standard shipping contract substantially the same as the format adopted by the POEA

ISSUE:

Whether or not there has been valid delegation of legislative power.

HELD:

Yes. The principle, of non-delegation of powers is applicable to all the three major powers of the Government. In the case of legislative power, such occasions have become more and more frequent, if not necessary. This had led to the observation that the delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation the exception. The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular fields assigned to them. With the proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the "power of subordinate legislation."

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules. These regulations have the force and effect of law.

The power of the POEA, in requiring the model contract is not unlimited as there is a sufficient standard guiding the delegate in the exercise of the said authority. That standard is discoverable in the executive order itself which, in creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, mandated it to protect the rights of overseas Filipino workers to "fair and equitable employment practices. While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. This is the principle of subordinate legislation. The challenged resolution strictly conformed to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was violation of equal protection clause.

HELD:

None. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation based on reasonable classification. And for the classification to be reasonable, it (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.

There can be no dispute about the dissimilarities between land-based and sea-based Filipino overseas workers in terms of, among other things, work environment, safety, dangers and risks to life and limb, and accessibility to social, civic, and spiritual activities.

ISSUE:

Whether or not obligations to a contract may be impaired.

HELD:

Yes. Social justice is identified with the broad scope of the police power of the state and requires the extensive use of such power.

The constitutional prohibition against impairing contractual obligations is not absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness . It is restricted to contracts with respect to property or some object of value and which confer rights that maybe asserted in a court of justice; it has no application to statutes relating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislative powers of the State and involving the public rights and public welfare of the entire community affected by it. It does not prevent a proper exercise by the State of its police power by enacting regulations reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, morals; comfort, or general welfare of the community, even though contracts may thereby be affected, for such matters cannot be placed by contract beyond the power of the State to regulate and control them. The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general, well-being of the community may require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. And under the Civil Code, contracts of labor are explicitly subject to the police power of the State because they are not ordinary contracts but are impresses with public interest.

The challenged resolution and memorandum circular being valid implementations of E.O. No. 797, which was enacted under the police power of the State, they cannot be struck down on the ground that they violate the contract clause. To hold otherwise is to alter long-established constitutional doctrine and to subordinate the police power to the contract clause.

The petition was DISMISSED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO G. JALOSJOS

G.R. Nos. 132875-76

February 3, 2000

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS:

Romeo F. Jaloslos was a member of Congress who was confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts, which was pending appeal. Jalosjos filed a Motion to Be Allowed to Discharge Mandate as Member of House of Representatives. He argued that his re-election being an expression of popular will cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to any right or interest — not even the police power of the State. He claimed also that to deprive the electorate of their elected representative amounts to taxation without representation. In addition, Jalosjos also mentioned that to bar him from performing his duties amounts to his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandates entrusted to him by the people and the electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte wants their voice to be heard. Jalosjos prayed that a co-equal branch of government to respect the mandate of Congress. Finally, Jalosjos reasoned that temporary detention does not necessarily curtail the duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate and he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail. Jalosjos prayed that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including

attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense. Jalosjos claimed that he should be exempted from statutes and rules, which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Jalosjos should be released from jail.

HELD:

No. All top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule.

Jalosjos argued that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution. However, Jalosjos had not given any reason why he should be exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not merely authorized by law; it has constitutional foundations. Reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos will not extricate him from his predicament. In the above-quoted ruling, the case involves the administrative removal of a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. It does not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressman unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after final conviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves as an example and warning to others. A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of the administration of justice. It is the injury to the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not the injury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, the accused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is risk of his absconding.

The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of confinement. It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellant's arrest was issued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in the House of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrender voluntarily to the authorities. This can not be countenanced because, aside from its being contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockery of the aims of the State's penal system. Jalosjos argued that on several occasions the RTC Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City Jail for official or medical reasons. He was also allowed/permitted to leave the prison premises. But there is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to a member of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meeting for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him free man with all the privilege appurtenant to his position. Such a situation not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes of the correction system.

Jalosjos also claimed that the concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty to discharge his mandate and that he has always complied with the conditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail. But he has been receiving his salaries and other monetary benefits. Jalosjos had been discharging his mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with the restraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee, accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to perform these acts. When the voters of his district elected Jalosjos to

Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was equal protection.

HELD:

Yes. The Constitution guarantees that no person shall be denied the equal protection of laws. This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The organs of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person. Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. Jalosjos claimed that the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are validly restrained by law. The election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class. Imprisonment is the restraint of a man's personal liberty; coercion exercised upon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class.It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes an individual's status in society. Prison officials have the job of preserving the security as well as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require the curtailment and elimination of certain rights.

The motion was DENIED.

Separate Opinion

GONZAGA-REYES, J., concurring opinion;

I concur in holding that the motion is bereft of any legal merit.

The Bill of Rights provides that all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong , shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. This constitutional provision denying the right to bail for offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong is reiterated in Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial court found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of statutory rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua . The trial court's judgment of conviction imports that the evidence of guilt of the crime charged is strong. Unquestionably, the continued incarceration of accused-appellant is a valid and constitutionally mandated curtailment of his rights to provisional liberty pending appeal of his conviction.

Neither may the constitutional provision granting immunity from arrest to legislators provide legal justification for accused-appellant's motion. To allow accused-appellant to attend legislative sessions would constitute an unjustified broadening of the privilege from the arrest bestowed by the Constitution upon members of Congress. Under the 1987 Constitution, the privilege includes arrests for crimes punishable by

imprisonment of six years or less. Despite the expansion of the privilege, the rationale for granting members of Congress immunity from arrest remained the same — to ensure that they are not prevented from performing their legislative duties. It was never the intention to shield a member of Congress from the consequences of his wrongdoing. A member of Congress could only invoke the immunity from arrest for relatively minor offenses, punishable at most by correctional penalties. Jalosjos, having been convicted of statutory rape which is punishable by reclusion perpetua , an afflictive penalty, was obviously not entitled to the privilege of parliamentary immunity.

Under the factual circumstances of this case, the applicability of this privilege from arrest to accused-appellant is already moot and academic. The constitutional provision contemplates that stage of the criminal process at which personal jurisdiction is sought to be acquired over the accused by means of his arrest. Accused-appellant is no longer at the point of merely being arrested. As a matter of fact, he has already been arrested, tried and convicted by the trial court.

Accused-appellant's contention that his re-election constitutes a renewal of his mandate and that such an expression of the popular will should not be rendered inutile by even the police power of the State is hollow. The doctrine of forgiveness or condonation cannot apply to criminal acts which the re-elected official may have committed during his previous term. The administrative liability of a public officer is separate and distinct from his penal liability. Since the Constitution itself provides for the immunities from the general application of our criminal laws which a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may enjoy, it follows that any expansion of such immunities must similarly be based upon an express constitutional grant.

HARRY S. STONEHILL ET AL. vs. HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO ET AL.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967

CONCEPCION, C.J.:

FACTS:

Upon application of the officers of the government, several judges issued, on different dates a total of 42 search warrants against Stonehill and/or the corporations of which they were officers to search the persons named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit: books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins, thee subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense, or used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense, which was described in the applications in violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code. Stonehill alleged that the search warrants were null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because (1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law. Stonehill filed with the Supreme Court this action for certiorari , prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search warrants in question. The prosecutors alleged that the contested search warrants are valid and that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Stonehill in his personal capacity had standing to question the validity of the search warrants issued against the corporation.

HELD:

As regards the items seized from the corporation, Stonehill had no cause of action for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of Stonehill. It is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. The Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants . Such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrants were valid.

HELD:

No. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. No specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. It was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted. SC deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court by providing in that "a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense. The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized. Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal .

The position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of

the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.

The warrants for the search of three (3) residences of Stonehill were null and void and that the searches and seizures therein made were illegal.

Separate Opinion:

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution.

All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were consequently illegal.

The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People was declared abandoned

The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners arweree expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal.

I do not share the reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. All the search warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and seizures made were therefore unlawful. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

Stonehill had the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family residences. Excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the "office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners. Ownership of matters seized gives " standing. " Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure regardless of their location at the time of seizure.

Control of premises searched gives "standing." Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress.

Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant is primarily directed against said person gives " standing. "

Stonehill et al. had full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences, as long as the documents were personal papers of Stonehill and were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control. Stonehill likewise hadave clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search warrants.

GIL V. MANLAVI vs. JUDGE EUSTAQUIO Z. GACOTT, JR.

A.M. No. RTJ-95-1293 May 9, 1995

QUIASON, J.:

FACTS:

Gil Manlavi was a senior police officer. Manlavi arrested without a warrant the accused who was caught with illegally caught assorted fish with the use of explosives, weighing more or less 8,000 Thousand Kilos. The accused moved to quash Criminal Case on the ground that the evidence of the prosecution was the product of a warrantless and illegal search and seizure. Manlavi contended that the confiscation of the fish in the absence of a search warrant was allowed under Circular No. 130 (s. 1967) of the Office of the President. Judge Gacott granted the motion on the ground that the search and seizure was not covered by a search warrant, and that the search warrant presented in court was issued after the fact. The accused moved also to quash the other Criminal Case on the ground that the information failed to charge the offense of illegal possession of fish caught by explosives for its failure to allege the element "for profit." The City Prosecutor admitted the omission in the information of the phrase "for profit" but he claimed that said omission was a mere technicality. Judge Gacott granted the Motion on the ground that the information area fatally defective, because it failed to allege two essential elements: (1) that the accused had knowledge that the fish were illegally caught with the use of explosives; and (2) that they intended to dispose of or sell the fish for profit. The prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the order but it was denied. For this reason, Manlavi filed this administrative charge against judge Cagott with partiality, miscarriage of justice and knowingly rendering an unjust decision in connection with the dismissal of the above-mentioned Criminal Cases. Judge Gacott denied the charges against him and asserted that his orders were supported by law and evidence. He moved for the dismissal of the instant complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judge should be held administratively liable for the dismissal of the cases. HELD:

No. The arresting officers failed to show compliance with the procedure prescribed by the very circular they invoke. The information suffered from infirmity for failure to allege the element "for profit." It is true that the provision prohibits the separate acts of possessing, dealing in, selling or disposing of illegally caught fish and aquatic products, but said acts must not only be done "knowingly" but also "for profit," an essential element of the offense. The accused moved for the quashal of the criminal cases after their arraignment. As a rule, an accused can move for the quashal of the information on any ground before arraignment. However, the rule admits of some exceptions such as where there is no offense charged, for what controls is not the designation of the offense charged in the information but the allegations of the constitutive elements of the offense. Any ambiguity in the information shall be resolved in favor of the accused.

Well-settled is the rule that the acts of a judge which pertain to his judicial capacity are not subject to disciplinary power, unless when they are committed with fraud, dishonesty, corruption or bad faith.

The complaint was DISMISSED.

CYNTHIA D. NOLASCO ET AL. vs. PAÑO ET AL.

G.R. No. L-6980

October 8, 1985

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:

Lt. Col. Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño, Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The Search Warrant was issued in proceedings entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mila Aguilar-Roque, Search Warrant No. 80- 84 for rebellion. Lt. Col. Saldajeno and his witness S/A Dionicio A. Lapus were examined under oath by Judge Paño. The latter deposed that to his personal knowledge, there were kept in the premises to be searched records, documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the National Democratic Front, including support money from foreign and local sources intended to be used for rebellion. The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all. According to the Return, the search was made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang. AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged before the Quezon City Fiscal's Office (upon complaint filed by the CSG against petitioners for Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion/Subversion. The CITY FISCAL filed an Information for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 33 (Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents) against petitioners before Branch 42 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City (the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE), respondent Judge Antonio P. Santos. The CSG filed an MR with the CITY FISCAL, praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with Subversion. The Motion was denied. CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying that the CSG be allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles. Nolasco raised the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant but Judge Paño admitted the Amended Return and ruled that the seized documents shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal. Nolasco filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE, praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them on the ground that the proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. The motion was denied on the ground that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the search warrant was valid.

HELD:

No. Section 3, Article IV of the Constitution, guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. It also specifically provides that no Search Warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

It is evident that the Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not particularized. It is an all- embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. Search warrants of general description are considered null and void for being too general.

The lack of particularization is also evident in the examination of the witness presented by the applicant for Search Warrant. The questions propounded by the Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently

searching to establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.

Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant. Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time; that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible effective results in the interest of public order

The Search Warrant No. 80-84 by Judge Paño was annulled and set aside and the CSG was enjoined from introducing evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring and dissenting:

The questioned search warrant has correctly been declared null and void in the Court's decision as a general warrant issued in gross violation of the constitutional mandate that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall not be violated.

All the articles thus seized fall under the exclusionary rule totally and unqualifiedly and cannot be used against any of the three petitioners. The Court has held that "in issuing a search warrant the judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumptions of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.

The majority pronouncement that "as an incident to Mila Aguilar- Roque's arrest, her dwelling at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City could have been searched, even without a warrant, for evidence of rebellion is patently against the constitutional proscription and settled law and jurisprudence. Suffice it to add and stress that the arresting CSG Group themselves knew that they needed a search warrant and obtained the void warrant in question. The exception of Rule 126, sec. 12 which allows a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully arrested is absolutely limited to his person, at the time of and incident to his arrest and to dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." Such warrantless search obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest. In this case, Aguilar-Roque was arrested on board a public vehicle on the. To hold that her dwelling could "later on the same day" be searched without warrant is to sanction an untenable violation, if not nullification, of the cited basic constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the judgment insofar as it annuls and sets aside Search Warrant. In addition I wish to state the judge either did not fully know the legal and constitutional requirements for the issuance of a search warrant or he allowed himself to be used by the military.

I do not agree with the ponencia that personalities seized may be retained by the CSG for possible introduction as evidence in Criminal Case before Special Military Commission No. 1 for the reasons that their retention cannot be justified by the provisions of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

But I cannot agree with the statement that not all the things seized can be ordered returned to their owners. He refers to "the subversive materials seized by the government agents." Who will make the determination?

Certainly not the military for it is not competent to do so aside from the fact that it has its own peculiar views on the matter. I say return everything to the petitioners.

CUEVAS, J., concurring and dissenting

I fully agree with the pronouncement in the majority opinion nullifying Search warrant No. 80-84 as it does not specify with requisite particularity the things, objects or properties that may be seized hereunder.

I, however, regret being unable to concur with the dictum justifying the said search on the basis of Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the aforequoted provision the same must be limited to and circumscribed by, the subject , time , and place of said arrest. As to subject , the warrantless search is sanctioned only with respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to "dangerous weapons" or "anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense." With respect to the time and place of the warrantless search allowed by law, it must be contemporaneous with the lawful arrest. Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested. The search must be incident to the arrest. The search must be made at the place of the arrest, otherwise, it is not incident to the arrest. And if the purpose of the officers in making their entry is not to make an arrest , but to make a search to obtain evidence for some future arrest, then search is not incidental to arrest. It is undisputed is that the search was made in a place other than the place of arrest and, not on the occasion of nor immediately after the arrest . It cannot be said, therefore, that such a search was incidental to the arrest of the petitioners. Not being an incident of a lawful arrest, the search of the premises at 239B Mayon St., Quezon City WITHOUT A VALID SEARCH WARRANT is ILLEGAL and violative of the constitutional rights of the respondent. The things and properties seized on the occasion of said illegal search are therefore INADMISSIBLE in evidence under the exclusionary rule.

CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN

G.R. No. 107383

February 20, 1996

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS:

Cecilia Zulueta was the wife of Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The case was filed with the RTC Manila, which, after trial, rendered judgment for Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties and ordered Zulueta to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the items seized by Zulueta may be used aginst Dr.Martin.

HELD:

No. There is no question that the documents and papers belonged to Dr. Martin, and that they were taken by his wife without his knowledge and consent. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public safety or order requires otherwise. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

The petition for review was DENIED for lack of merit.

DR. ERNESTO I. MAQUILING vs. PHILIPPINE TUBERCULOSIS SOCIETY, INC.

G.R. No. 143384

February 4, 2005

TINGA, J.:

FACTS:

Dr. Maquiling was an employee of Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc. (PTS). Dr. Maquiling received a memo from the PTS OIC-Executive Director Soriano directing him to submit within five (5) days from notice a written explanation on the delay GSIS remittances; the reported deficit of P7.3 million appearing in our financial statement for 1990; the expenses he approved and incurred in connection with the Dale Carnegie and Silva Mind Control Seminar; the P3.7 million miscellaneous expenses appearing in our financial statement; and his reasons for renewing service contract with Ultra.

Dr. Maquiling, was dismissed from service as Deputy Executive Director after serving PTS for twenty-three (23) years. Dr. Maquiling filed a complaint against PTS for reinstatement or, in the alternative, for payment of full backwages and separation pay in accordance with Article 279 of the Labor Code. After PTS failed to appear despite having requested for several postponements, Dr. Maquiling was allowed to present his evidence ex parte consisting of his testimony on direct examination and documentary proofDr. Maquiling moved for submission of the case for resolution, which motion was granted. Dr. Maquiling submitted his explanatory letter. Dr. Maquiling had a thirty (30) minute conversation with Soriano. No further related proceedings were undertaken before Dr. Maquiling received a letter-notice informing him that the PTS Executive Committee approved Soriano’s findings and recommendations calling for his dismissal effective immediately, without any retirement benefits. The termination of Dr. Maquiling’s employment was allegedly due to loss of trust and confidence. It was alleged that PTS terminated his services without any retirement benefit for gross mismanagement, for acts inimical to the interest of PTS, and also for reason that PTS has lost its trust and confidence in him. Despite Soriano’s instruction for him not to report for work, Dr. Maquiling manifested, through a letter to the OIC-Executive Director, his intention to continue performing his duties as Deputy Executive Director. Dr. Maquiling continued to report for work at the PTS daily. In the meantime, he elevated his case to the PTS Board of Directors through a memorandum, which sought to point out the illegality of his dismissal from office and prayed for a resolution upholding his position. Dr. Maquiling, protesting non-payment

of his salary, wrote the OIC Finance Department and formally demanded the release of his earned wages. PTS reacted through Soriano by informing Dr. Maquiling that there are no wages forthcoming inasmuch as the latter’s service had been terminated for cause. In an effort to exhaust the remedies within PTS, Dr. Maquiling wrote the President of PTS a letter that if the Board does not act on the Memorandum within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter, such omission will mean confirmation of Soriano’s notice of his alleged termination from the service a Dr. Maquiling stopped reporting for work at the PTS in the. Then Dr. Maquiling filed his complaint with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision ordering PTS to immediately reinstate Dr. Maquiling to the position of Deputy Executive Director or its equivalent in rank and pay, without loss of seniority rights inclusive of all benefits attached to said position at the time of his dismissal, and to pay Dr. Maquiling backwages computed from the time of his dismissal until his actual reinstatement but not to exceed three (3) years at the rate of thirteen thousand nine hundred pesos (P13,900.00) per month or three hundred seventy-eight thousand seven hundred seventy-five pesos (P378,775.00). the Labor Arbiter likewise ordered PTS to pay Dr. Maquiling moral damages, exemplary damages and to pay attorney’s fees. Upon appeal by PTS to the NLRC, the Commission upheld the decision of the labor arbiter and dismissed the appeal. PTS appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decisions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter by declaring that the dismissal from employment as legal and valid. It, however, ordered PTS to pay Dr. Maquiling damages or indemnity for violation of his right to procedural due process and separation pay in the interest of social justice. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not PTS validly dismissed Maquiling. HELD: No. With respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not suffice. But as regards a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal.

SC held that Dr. Maquiling was indeed validly dismissed for just cause. However, PTS was remiss in its duty to observe procedural due process in effecting the dismissal of Dr. Maquiling. Under this second requirement, two notices must be sent to the employee who is the subject of an investigation for acts, which may warrant his eventual dismissal from employment.

The notices required before an employee may be validly dismissed are: (a) A written notice served on the employee specifying the grounds for termination and giving the employee reasonable opportunity to explain his/her side; (b) a hearing or conference wherein the employee, with the assistance of counsel if so desired, is given opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut evidence presented against him/her; and (c) written notice of termination served on the employee indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established to justify termination.

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute elements of due process in cases of employee’s dismissal. The requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the employer’s intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal. Upon the other hand, the requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer’s charges against him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected.

Clearly, the first notice must inform outright the employee that an investigation will be conducted on the charges particularized therein, which, if proven, will result to his dismissal. Such notice must not only contain a plain statement of the charges of malfeasance or misfeasance but must categorically state the effect on his employment if the charges are proven to be true. This notice will afford the employee an opportunity to avail all defenses and exhaust all remedies to refute the allegations hurled against him for what is at stake is his very life and limb his employment. Otherwise, the employee may just disregard the notice as a warning without any disastrous consequence to be anticipated. Absent such statement, the first notice falls short of the requirement of due process. It is worthy to note that the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals all agree in concluding that procedural due process in the instant case was not observed. It must be noted that the first notice was a mere instruction to explain the matters enumerated therein. It did not apprise Dr. Maquiling of any investigation to be conducted or being conducted that will warrant his dismissal from service if found guilty of charges specified therein. Thus, such notice fell short of the requirement of law that an employee must

be afforded the benefit of the two-notice rule in dismissal cases that will allow the employee to substantiate the charges specified in the notice with full knowledge at the outset that the investigation to be conducted may result in his dismissal or suspension from employment.

The Serrano ruling awarded full backwages and separation pay to the employee who was dismissed for just cause but without the observance of the procedural due process requirement. However, in Agabon v. NLRC, SC modified the Serrano ruling and awarded nominal damages, service incentive leave and thirteenth month pay to the petitioners in the said case. This case clarified the criticisms and answered the questions created by the Serrano ruling. The Agabon doctrine enunciates the rule that if the dismissal is for just cause but statutory due process was not observed, the dismissal should be upheld. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the dismissal. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the procedural requirements of due process. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due process violation of the employer. The violation of the petitioners’ right to statutory due process by the private respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.

Dr. Maquiling argued that PTS should have considered his twenty-three (23) years of service in the institution before he was dismissed from service. Such ratiocination is not quite convincing. Although length of service may be considered in reaching a decision in employment termination cases, the same alone is not controlling for other considerations must be taken into account such as the nature of the position he was holding, performance of an employee, quality of work, character and work attitude. Worth stressing is the fact that Dr. Maquiling is holding a managerial position being a Deputy Executive Director. Hence, trust and confidence is an essential factor in determining his eligibility to continue holding his position. The crucial nature of his position in PTS is exacting as to such qualification which cannot be outweighed by any length of service he earned.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals was MODIFIED pursuant to the Agabon ruling as the latest jurisprudential rule on the matter. SC ordered PTS to pay Dr. Maquiling nominal damages.

BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER ET AL. vs. CA AND RAMON LABO, JR.

G.R. No. 107566

November 25, 2004

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS:

Oseo C. Hamada was the president and general manager of the Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., which publishes the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper published and circulated in Baguio City and other provinces within the Cordillera region. He was also the business manager of said newsweekly. Cecille Afable was Baguio Midland Courier’s editor-in-chief and one of its columnists who ran the column “In and Out of Baguio”. Ramon L. Labo, Jr., was among the mayoralty candidates in Baguio City. Prior to this, in 1984, Labo had already embarked on a political career by running for a seat in the former Batasang Pambansa. As part of the campaign propaganda for Labo in the 1984 local elections, political ads appeared in the various issues of Baguio Midland Courier and campaign paraphernalia were printed by Baguio Printing and Publishing Co. Afable wrote in her column a series of articles dealing with the candidates for the various elective positions in Baguio City. In said articles, she mentioned that Labo wanted to put an advertisement in the Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. She also used “Dumpty in the egg” to refer to a candidate and that Labo should settle his small debts like the insignificant amount of P27,000. Labo claimed that Afable’s column were tainted with malice. So Labo filed separate criminal and civil actions for libel against Baguio Midland et al. The DOJ dismissed the criminal case due to

insufficiency of evidence and the civil suit was raffled to RTC Baguio City. In the civil case, Labo alleged that in her columns, Afable made it appear that Labo could not comply with his financial obligations. Labo also claimed that the articles were written solely for the purpose of destroying his reputation, integrity, and personality and that said articles were false, untrue, libelous, and published with evil intent. Baguio Midland and Afable filed separate motions to dismiss upon the ground that there was failure to comply with the requirement of referral of certain disputes to the barangay conciliation process before they are filed in court. The RTC denied the motions to dismiss on the ground that the requiremnt was not applicable it pertained only to actions involving natural persons. During the trial, Baguio Midland denied that Afable’s articles were libelous. They also claimed that Labo still owed them a sum of money for the political ads and campaign. Baguio Midland asserted that Afable’s write-ups were fair comments on facts and reports that were of public interest as private respondent was a mayoralty candidate at that time. Afable denied that the statements were libelous. She contended that the contents of her column were protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press and that the same were privileged as they dealt with a public figure. The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of merit as the article in question was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity, reputation, and honesty of private respondent who was a candidate for local elective office at that time. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC on the ground that the Labo was, at the time the article in question was published, not a public official but a private citizen seeking an elective office and Afable’s article was intended to impeach his honesty, virtue or reputation and to make him appear in the eyes of the public as unfit for public office. CA also declared that the malicious nature of the article may be deduced from the fact that it was published a few days before the scheduled local elections and from the style and tone of writing employed by Afable. Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration but these were denied. Hence, this petititon.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the article was defamatory.

HELD:

No. Concededly, private respondent was not yet a public official at the time the 10 January 1988 article was published. Nevertheless, this fact does not remove said article from the mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of expression provision of the Constitution. This Court had recognized the public’s right to be informed on the mental, moral, and physical fitness of candidates for public office. It is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast and the advantages derived are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public welfare, although at times such injury may be great. In such a case, the occasion gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent: any one claiming to be defamed by the communication must show actual malice or go remediless. The privilege extends to a great variety of subjects including matters of public concern, public men, and candidates for office.

The rule, however, only applies to fair comment on matters of public interest, fair comment being that which is true, or which if false, expresses the real opinion of the author based upon reasonable degree of care and on reasonable grounds. The principle does not grant an absolute license to authors or writers to destroy the persons of candidates for public office by exposing the latter to public contempt or ridicule by providing the general public with publications tainted with express or actual malice. In the latter case, the remedy of the person allegedly libeled is to show proof that an article was written with the author’s knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. While the law itself creates the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, nevertheless, the privileged character of a communication destroys said presumption. The burden of proving actual malice shall then rest on Labo. Labo was unable to prove that Afable’s column was tainted with actual malice. The records are replete with evidence that Labo incurred an obligation which had remained unpaid until the time the questioned article was published. The minuscule difference in the amount fails to establish reckless disregard for truth on the part of petitioners. Mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy.

Afable’s article constitutes a fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with the character of Labo who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City. Considering that Labo assured his would-be constituents that he would be donating millions of his own money, Afable’s column with respect to private respondent’s indebtedness provided the public with information as regards his financial status which was still unbeknownst to them at that time. Indeed, the information might have dissuaded some members of the electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but such is the inevitable result of the application of the law. The effect would have been adverse to the private respondent but public interest in this case far outweighs the interest of private respondent.

The petition is GRANTED and the Decision CA was REVERSED and SET ASIDE and RTC’s Decision was AFFIRMED.

THE UNITED STATES vs. FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-12592

March 8, 1018

MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS:

In the 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his removal. Thirty-four citizens signed the petition. One of the petitioner, Polintan, visited the justice of the peace who told her that he would draw up complaint for P5 and afterwards take P3 which she paid and also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from her two chickens. In addition, Sunga claimed he went to see the justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the trial, and the justice of the peace told him that if he wished to win he must give him P50. For failure to give said amount, he lost the case. the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50. Quiambao, for his part, claimed that on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where the justice secretly gave him P30 and the complaint was shelved. The petition was referred to the judge of first instance for investigation, proper action, and report. The justice of the peace Punsalan denied the charges. The investigating judge recommended to the Governor-General to remove the justice of peace from his position. The justice of the peace filed a motion for a new trial claiming that the charges were filed for personal reasons. The judge of first instance reversed its previous recommendation and ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan. For this reason, justice off peace Punsalan filed a criminal action against Polintan et al. He alleged that they wrote, signed, and published a writing, which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the peace with deliberate purpose of attacking the virtue, honor, and reputation of the justice of the peace and thus exposing him to public hatred contempt, and ridicule. The trial court found Polintan et al. guilty. Polintal et al. filed a motion for a new trial but it was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the allegations against the judge were libelous.

HELD:

No. The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Completely liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts.

Only thus can the intelligence and the dignity of the individual be exalted. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them. Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, though, as an incidental result, it may afford immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.

Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by proof of malice. A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable. The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of the privilege.

In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. The ultimate test is that of bona fides.

In this case, the particular words set out in the information might well be considered libelous per se. Generally, words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. Express malice has not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed was apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. There was no abuse the privilege. No undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.

SC found Polintan entitled to the protection of the rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of punishing them for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, SC commended them for their good citizenship.

SC acquitted Bustos et al.

Separate Opinion

CARSON, J., concurring:

The Attorney-General was entirely correct when he said that this case is substantially identical with United States vs. Bustos. But the doctrine of the prevailing opinion in the former Bustos case hag long since been abandoned by SC; and it would make for the more efficient administration of the Libel Law in these Islands.

DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN ET AL. vs. HON. RONALDO PUNO ET AL.

G.R. No. 190259

June 7, 2011

ABAD, J.:

FACTS:

On November 23, 2009, 57 men and women were killed on their way to file certificates of candidacy in Maguindanao, including some news reporters. For this reason, then President Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and PNP to undertake such measures to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence. Later, Arroyo issued AO 273 transferring supervision of the ARMM from the Office of the President to DILG. Then the President issued Administrative AO 273-A amending the former, by delegating instead of "transferring" supervision of the ARMM to the DILG. Hence, Ampatuan filed this petition for prohibition under Rule 65 claiming that the issuances encroached on the ARMM’s autonomy. He alleged that the proclamation empowered the DILG Secretary to take over ARMM’s operations and seize the regional government’s powers, in violation of the principle of local autonomy under RA 9054 and the Constitution. Ampatuan also claimed that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. The deployment of troops and the taking over of the ARMM constituted an invalid exercise of the President’s emergency powers. Ampatuan asked that Proclamation 1946 as well as AOs 273 and 273-A be declared unconstitutional and that respondents DILG Secretary, the AFP, and the PNP be enjoined from implementing them. The OSG, on the other hand, insisted that the President issued Proclamation 1946 not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places pursuant to her "calling out" power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to exercise this power rested solely on her based on intelligence reports and such best information as are available to her to suppress and prevent lawless violence wherever and whenever these reared their ugly heads. OSG also claimed that the President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary without authorizing a take over of the ARMM. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Proclamation 1946 and AOs 273 and 273-A violate the principle of local autonomy the Constitution and the Expanded ARMM Organic Act.

HELD:

No. the DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took Ampatuan into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor assumed the vacated pursuant to the rule on succession found in RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly as Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.

The deployment of the AFP and PNP is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same. The President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution.

While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment. If Ampatuan fails, by way of proof, to support the assertion that the President acted without factual basis, then this Court cannot undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings. The factual necessity of calling out the armed forces is not easily quantifiable and cannot be objectively established since matters considered for satisfying the same is a combination of several factors which are not always accessible to the courts. In many instances, the evidence upon which the President might decide that there is a need to call out the armed forces may be of a nature not constituting technical proof. The President, as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all.

Ampatuan failed to show that the declaration of a state of emergency in the Provinces of Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and Cotabato City, as well as the President’s exercise of the “calling out” power had no factual basis. The imminence of violence and anarchy at the time the President issued Proclamation 1946 was too grave to ignore and she had to act to prevent further bloodshed and hostilities in the places mentioned. Progress reports also indicated that there was movement in these places of both high-powered firearms and armed men sympathetic to the two clans. Thus, to pacify the people’s fears and stabilize the situation, the President had to take preventive action. She called out the armed forces to control the proliferation of loose firearms and dismantle the armed groups that continuously threatened the peace and security in the affected places. The presence of troops in those places is still necessary to ease fear and tension among the citizenry and prevent and suppress any violence that may still erupt, despite the passage of more than a year from the time of the Maguindanao massacre.

The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.

DOMINADOR C. BALDOZA vs. HON. JUDGE RODOLFO B. DIMAANO,

A.M. No. 1120-MJ

May 5, 1976

ANTONIO, J.:

FACTS:

The employees of the Municipal Mayor wanted to examine the criminal docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated report on the peace and order conditions of Taal, Batangas. Judge Dimaano allowed the employees to open and view the docket books of the judge under certain conditions and under his control and supervision. The employees were aware of the rules and conditions imposed by the judge when they went to his office to view his docket books for the purpose mentioned in their communication. They agreed that they were amenable to such rules and conditions, which the judge may impose. The judge justified the regulation that although court records are among public documents open to inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and how they may be inspected. He also asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to prevent an improper use or inspection of its records. And the furnishing of copies therefrom may be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public scandal. The judge claimed that to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the right to free access, might do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal. Disorder and chaos might result defeating the very essence of their request. For this reason, the Municipal Secretary of Taal filed a

verified letter-complaint charging Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano of the same municipality with abuse of authority. The case was referred to Judge Riodique for investigation and report. At the preliminary hearing, Taal Mayor Caniza filed a motion to dismiss the complaint to preserve harmony and cooperation among officers in the municipality. The Investigating Judge denied the motion. After formal investigation, he recommended the exoneration of Judge Dimaano on the ground that there was no showing of abuse of authority on the part of the judge.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was abuse of authority on the part of judge Dimaano.

HELD:

None. The Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a democracy. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. The access to public records predicated on the right of the people to acquire information on matters of public concern. Undoubtedly in a democracy, the public has a legitimate interest in matters of social and political significance. However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.

After a careful evaluation of the recommendation, SC found that the respondent did not act arbitrarily in the premises. As found by the Investigating Judge, the judge allowed the complainant to open and view the docket books of respondent certain conditions and under his control and supervision. It has not been shown that the rules and conditions imposed by the judge were unreasonable. Citing the case of Sabido v. Ozaeta, SC stated that while the Register of Deeds has discretion to exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine or copy the records in his office may exercise their rights, such power does not carry with it authority to prohibit.

The case against Judge Dimaano was dismissed.

SSSEA vs. CA

G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989 CORTES, J:

FACTS:

SSS filed with the RTC of QC a complaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.

WHY THE STRIKE? SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:

1. implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues;

2. payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay;

3. conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and

4. payment of the children's allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices

RTC issued a temporary restraining order pending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal. Subsequent MR was also denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right to strike? YES.

HELD:

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].

Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.

On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government employees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress."

Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlled corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."

The instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED.

PNB vs. REMIGIO G.R. No. 78508 March 21, 1994

VITUG, J.:

Private respondent obtained from petitioner a P65,000.00 loan secured by a real estate mortgage. Respondent defaulted; hence petitioner bank extrajudicially foreclosed on the mortgage, and it acquired the encumbered

assets for the sum of P87,082.00. The sheriff's sale was registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Isabela only on 11 October 1972.

Petitioner bank invited private respondent to repurchase the foreclosed property for P87,082.00 plus interest and other charges. Before that, one day after the foreclosure sale, private respondent already had paid an initial P10,000.00 to redeem the property. On 21 October 1972, P.D. No. 27 was enacted into law that mandated an agrarian reform. Pursuant thereto, an "Operation Land Transfer Program" was launched; among the areas it covered were the parcels of land in dispute.

Private respondent offered to buy the foreclosed property for P284,000.00 and a Deed of Promise to Sell was executed between petitioner bank and private respondent. Private respondent, through counsel, inquired why he was still being made to buy the property for P284,000.00 when, in truth, he had already paid P40,000.00 of the P87,082.00 previously offered by petitioner for the redemption of the property. There was no reply or response from petitioner.

Private respondent, instituted an action for "Annulment of Foreclosure Deed, Breach of Contract, Sum of Money and Damages" at the CFI, Echague, Isabela, against petitioner bank and its Branch Manager Leuterio Genato. While the case was pending, petitioner bank additionally received from the Land Bank of the Philippines P26,348.12 in cash and P160,000.00 worth of Land Bank Bonds in payment of the foreclosed property.

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of petitioner bank. Private respondent went to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court ordering to set aside the decision and a new one entered declaring the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties to be without force and effect; ordering the defendant bank to release the properties and the plaintiff to transfer the rights to the tenants-beneficiaries in favor of the Land Bank of the Philippines; declaring the deed of promise to sell executed by the plaintiff and the defendant bank rescinded; ordering the defendant bank and the Land Bank of the Philippines to recalculate the amounts of payments due for the transfer of the subject properties in accordance with this Decision subject to the provisions of P.D. No. 27 and in accordance with the mechanics of the Operation Land Transfer; and annulling the order of the lower court for the plaintiff to pay the defendant the expenses of litigation and attorney's fees.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON P.D. 27 violated the non-impairment clause of the constitution?

HELD:

We are aware that a ruling that lands covered by P.D. No. 27 may not be the object of the foreclosure proceedings after the promulgation of said decree on October 21, 1972, would concede that P.D. No. 27 had the effect of impairing the obligation of the duly executed mortgage contracts affecting said lands. There is no question, however, that the land reform program of the government as accelerated under P.D. No. 27 and mandated by the Constitution itself (Art. XIV, Sec. 12), was undertaken in the exercise of the police power of the state. It is settled in a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court that the Constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the state (citations omitted). One limitation on the contract clause arises from the police power, the reason being that public welfare is superior to private rights (citation omitted). The situation here, is like that in eminent domain proceedings, where the state expropriates private property for public use, and the only condition to be complied with is the payment of just compensation. Technically, the condemnation proceedings do not impair the contract to destroy its obligations, but merely appropriate or take for public use (citation omitted). As the Land Bank is obliged to settle the obligations secured by the mortgage, the mortgagee is not left without any compensation.

PEOPLE vs. AYSON G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989

NARVASA, J.:

Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That

investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos’ written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

ISSUE: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as evidence the admission and statement of accused? NO.

HELD:

No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a different crime charged- not present in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself.” It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must claim it and could be waived.

The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under custodial investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of the right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self incrimination and custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the statements were obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted in court.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused include:

1. he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right.

2. nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him.

3. any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of constitutional rights."