bieling-comparative analysis of capitalism

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Capital & Class2014, Vol. 38(1) 31–43

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DOI: 10.1177/0309816813513086c&c.sagepub.com

Comparative analysisof capitalism from aregulationist perspectiveextended by neo-Gramscian IPE

Hans-Jürgen BielingUniversity of Tübingen, Germany

AbstractOver time, the comparative analysis of capitalism has moved beyond the strictconfines of the narrow varieties of capitalism (VoC) framework. In this sense, it ispossible to observe an emergent post-VoC discussion that goes beyond the staticdesign and methodological nationalism that can be found in a strictly comparativeand institutionalist account of capitalism. So far, however, the post-VoC discussionhas been barely able to address important politico-economic and societal themesand issues. For the most part, assertions about time-diagnostic characterisations ofthe current state of capitalism, the causes and processes of specific crisis dynamicsinherent to this current form of capitalism, and the asymmetrical forms of internationalnetworks or formative transnational power relations, remain weak or chaotic. Inorder to overcome these existing deficiencies, this paper argues from an analyticalperspective that situates itself in regulation theory and allows itself to be characterisedas an extended neo-Gramscian international political economy (IPE) approach.

KeywordsNeo-Gramscian IPE, regulation theory, post-VoC discussion, transnationalhegemony

Introduction

For some time now, in scientific as well as in political discussions, the word ‘capitalism’has been used in a relaxed manner. The reasons for this are multifaceted. They lie in part

Corresponding author:Hans-Jürgen Bieling, University of Tübingen, Germany.Email: [email protected]

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32 Capital & Class 38(1)

in developments within the subject area of international political economy (IPE) and inthe public debate over the causes and implications of the financial crisis. They also lie inthe fact that the term ‘capitalism’ is no longer automatically associated, for example, witha socio- and system-critical Marxist analysis in connection with a socialist economic

programme. In the last few years, many authors have more or less explicitly allied them-selves with the ‘varieties of capitalism’ (VoC) approach (cf. Hall and Soskice 2001). Thatis to say, they have oriented themselves to an analytical perspective that is not a prioricategorised as critical of capitalism, but rather, which claims that the existence of differ-ent national models of capitalism is fundamentally given, though it is institutionally andregulatorily manageable as long as the model’s international competitiveness is notimpaired.

The conditionality of international competitiveness means that the VoC approachhas admittedly contributed substantially to the revival of theoretical discussions of capi-

talism (see also Hartmann in this special issue on competition). However, given the pri-macy of economic performance, it was only to a limited extent able to account forexploitation mechanisms, power relations, conflicts and contradictions; in short, for thesocial character of specific capitalist formations. This point is further strengthened by thefact that VoC is marked by a very ‘lean’ societal theory and a deficient politico-economicanalytical framework. Above all, the dimensions that national capitalist models have incommon (cf. Streeck 2010; Bruff 2011), or the patterns of transnational reproductionthat structure or mesh the development of national models with one another (cf. Bohleand Greskovits 2009; Bellofiore et al. 2011) are not adequately considered. With regard

to this, a post-VoC discussion in the broader comparative capitalisms (CC) literature hasbegun to unfold, which goes beyond the static design and methodological nationalismthat can be found in a strictly comparative and institutionalist discussion of capitalism.

Despite an expanded research agenda and due to persistent institutional restrictions,the post-VoC discussion is barely able to address important politico-economic and soci-etal themes and issues (Jessop 2013). For the most part, assertions about time-diagnosticcharacterisations of the current state of capitalism, the causes and processes of specificcrisis dynamics inherent to this current form of capitalism, and the asymmetrical formsof international networks or formative transnational power relations remain weak or

chaotic. In order to overcome these existing deficiencies, this paper will argue from ananalytical perspective that situates itself in regulation theory and allows itself to be char-acterised as an extended neo-Gramscian IPE approach. Before the central reflections andthe fundamental assumptions of regulation theory and the neo-Gramscian extension andreformulation are posed, the development and the current state of the comparative andinstitutionalist discussions of capitalism will be outlined.

Trajectories of comparative and institutionalistanalysis of capitalism: From the VoC approach to

the post-VoC discussionThe VoC approach addresses the situation that, regardless of globalisation, differentforms of national capitalist models continue to reproduce themselves. The beginnings ofthese ‘models’ go far into the past: indeed, the initial stages of the Industrial Revolution







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and the accompanying political and institutional conflicts shaped their central character-istics significantly. Thus it is not surprising that specific conceptions of comparativepolitical economy should have begun to develop in the early times of capitalism. As isoften shown in overview articles (cf. Lütz 2006: 27), contemporary discussions look back

to a substantial and stimulating heritage (see also Bruff & Hartmann in this specialissue). Ultimately, it is Michael Albert’s (1992) study of ideal types of models of capital-ism – the Rhenish and neo-American ones – on which the VoC approach strongly builds.In principle, Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001) adopt Albert’s dichotomy of capitalistmodels; however, they do not derive their different varieties from a concrete regionallocation. Instead, they speak more generally of coordinated market economics (CMEs)and liberal market economics (LMEs).

Essentially, the VoC approach is a firm-centred perspective in two regards: first, polit-ico-economic change is mainly seen as a product of managerial investment, innovation

and other modernisation concepts; and second, the set of specific institutional arrange-ments is mainly analysed by focusing on the development potentials of these businessactivities. This is also underlined by the five areas which, from the VoC viewpoint,mainly determine the specifics of national models of capitalism and their comparativeeconomic performance. These five areas include industrial relations, the vocational sys-tem, the corporate governance system, inter-firm relations (especially between corpora-tions, suppliers and distribution companies), as well as intra-firm relations (that is, themeans that firms use to encourage loyalty and to reward their employees). These areasillustrate the point that VoC addresses mainly the institutional preconditions and con-

textual conditions of business processes. The term ‘institution’ is used broadly: it includesin principle not only formal, but also informal rules, conventions and practices of soci-etal reproduction. The often very limited conception of political economy as the interac-tion between markets and states is unmistakably broken up and expanded; at least to theextent that in addition to market-based competition and to state regulation, other mul-tifaceted forms of cooperation, including specific corporate organisational structures,corporate negotiation systems and civil society networks, are considered to have animpact on the national and international political economy.

Ultimately, the potential provided by this extension remains unexhausted. This is due

to the fact that the VoC approach is primarily located in the overall discussion of com-petitiveness. Without doubt it can take credit for questioning the modernisation theoryassumption of the existence of one single superior path of development or a ‘best prac-tice’ model, which all other models have more or less to follow. In contrast, the VoCapproach directs attention towards the fact that the economic performance of nationalvariants of capitalism is defined through the interaction and coherence between differentfields and particular institutional arrangements. However, since many other dimensionsand aspects that do not allow themselves to be classified as moments of competitivenessor performance are left out, the VoC discussion falls short. This is also expressed by othercriticisms in which other specific deficits and problems of VoC are clearly shown (Radice2000; Streeck 2010: 27): for example, a functionalist bias (Becker 2007: 268); a simpli-fied or under-complex understanding of societal change (Kang 2006: 15); a half-heartedbreak with neoclassical economics; a firm-centred and rationalist interpretation ofactions made by central actors (Bruff 2011); a stylised differentiation between two ideal








types, liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies (CMEs),which is often not helpful for understanding existing variances between and also withindifferent models of capitalism (Wagner and Lillie 2013); and a methodologically nation-alist mode of comparison that often is not able to think of trans- or supranational insti-

tutional arrangements as constitutive elements of capitalist models (see also Hürtgen inthis special issue).

Over the last few years, the points of critique listed above have been noted within VoCcircles, productively approached, and through conceptual innovation, mitigated andrebutted. The functionalism reproach was weakened since it was clarified that VoC onlyseeks to explore the effects of institutional arrangements and their current societal sup-port, not the beginnings of their creation (Hall and Thelen 2009: 14). In response to thecharge about the conceptualisation of societal and institutional change, it has been madeclear that through a stronger focus on social power relations, societal conflicts and infor-

mal institutionalisation aspects, some dynamics of change can be explained in a moresophisticated manner (Hancké et al. 2007; Deeg & Jackson 2007; Hall & Thelen 2009:17). Moreover, growing criticisms of the VoC perspective’s methodological nationalism(Peck & Theodore 2007; Bohle & Greskovits 2009) have led to a greater acknowledge-ment of the similar and overreaching elements of global capitalism. What all of this means– theoretically and conceptually – for VoC and CC research more broadly is, however, stillunderdetermined. Up until now, the post-VoC discussion has not been up to the task ofdynamising the static comparative perspective and taking into account capitalistic phe-nomena that cross national borders (for a different view, see May and Nölke 2013).

Theory and critique of political economy: TheFrench Regulation School

One theoretical perspective that is headed in this direction and can help to solve some ofthe problems in the (post-)VoC discussion is the French Regulation School. Even thoughits development began in the 1970s, and even though a number of comparative regula-tion theory analyses have since been laid out, the Regulation School has still not receivedprominent attention in the comparative capitalisms debate. This could be because of its

capitalism-critical impulse, which causes discomfort for status-quo-oriented institution-alist analyses of capitalism. However, this impulse varies within regulation theory. Somerepresentatives, including Robert Boyer (2005) and Bruno Amable (2003), pursue simi-lar questions to those pursued by CC scholars, and are more focused on and interestedin the comparative performance of different national models of capitalism – albeit withdue regard to macroeconomic constellations. In other regulation theory studies, espe-cially in the earlier works of Alain Lipietz (1992) and Michel Aglietta (2000), the prob-lem- and performance-biased approach played a lesser role. Instead, the focus is on(socio-) economic upheavals and crisis processes, the articulation of societal conflicts and

contradictions, and the institutional and regulatory treatment of these aspects (see alsoBecker & Jäger 2013). In this sense, many regulation theory scholars are particularlyinterested in comprehending how and why capitalist societal formations, despite inher-ent contradictions and moments of crisis, still have proven themselves to be capable ofstability and change.








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The answer to this question is, generally, that capitalist formations are not just char-acterised by the dynamics of economic accumulation, but also by non-economic, insti-tutionally stabilising forms of regulation. The mode of operation of these regulatoryforms is designed to combat the inherently crisis-prone and structurally unstable nature

of capitalist accumulation (see also Jessop in this special issue). Hence, the mutuallydependent key categories of regulation theory are the ‘regime of accumulation’ and the‘mode of regulation’. According to Alain Lipietz (1985: 120), the regime of accumula-tion refers to the macroeconomic mode of systematic ‘distribution and reallocation ofsocietal values that has over a long period of time generated a specific correspondencebetween changes in production conditions … and changes in the conditions of finalconsumption’. The constitutive relevance that non-economic – i.e. social, institutionaland political circumstances – have for the process of capitalist reproduction is includedhere. At the same time, these aspects of the accumulation process constitute a specific,

institutionally stabilised structure of societal regulation within the framework of thecapitalist valorisation process that allows the contradictions and conflicts inherent in thesystem to be processed. Hence the concept of regulation is designed to be comprehen-sive. It takes into account the labour relation (reproduction of working power, socialsecurity, family relations, school, lifestyle, forms and norms of consumption), the capitalrelation (relocation of capital, the forms of competition and cooperation, forms of enter-prise organisation), the money relation (meaning and mode of operation of capital,credit and insurance markets), and also the legal, ideological and economic dimensionsof state intervention as well as international regimes.

In addition to the accumulation regime and the mode of regulation, scholars workingwith the Regulation School approach from time to time refer to two other analyticalconcepts. The first concept is the ‘technological’ or ‘industrial’ paradigm. This focuses onthe concrete, material dimensions of capitalist accumulation, including forms of produc-tion and labour organisation that are influenced by specific key technologies. The devel-opment and configuration of production and labour organisation is regarded as theproduct of competing interests and expectations, or, in short, social conflicts and powerrelations. At the same time, forms of production and labour organisation have their ownsocietal implications by influencing social structures and political actors’ means of action.

The second concept is that of a ‘hegemonic bloc’: this clarifies which alliances result fromthese structures. It tries to make explicit that within the overall ‘historical bloc’ – that isthe entire, historically specific formation of capitalist societies – the relationship andinteraction between the regime of accumulation and the mode of regulation (or, as it ismore generally formulated, between the economic and political institutional dimensionsof capitalist development) is mediated by social networks or civil society coalitions thatorganise the processes of political consensus generation and compromise finding.

The aforementioned analytic conceptions underline that the fact there are inter-sections and meeting points between regulation theory and the (post-)VoC debate inCC scholarship (see also Kannankulam & Georgi in this special issue). At the sametime, the differences between the two should not be ignored. Firstly, regulationtheory is more ambitious as a social theory in that it explores the dynamics and dif-ferences between different societal dimensions, including social, political and cul-tural structures, before it addresses the institutional arrangements through which








these structures are reproduced or changed (see the recent Capital & Class specialissue on regulation theory [Dannreuther & Petit 2013]). In comparison to especiallythe actor-centred and rationalistic orientation of VoC, regulation theory is alsointerested in analysing societal power structures, which are themselves discursively

confirmed or questioned through cultural-political and political-ideological hegem-onic struggles carried out in civil society. Secondly, regulation-theoretical research isbased on a broader understanding of the economic, which – critical of business-centred and equilibrium theory concepts – leads to a Keynesian or neo-Marxistmacroeconomic perspective. Production relations are therefore understood to beforms of specific social power and appropriation relations. Occasional references arealso made to reflections made by Nicos Poulantzas (1975: 21), who analysed con-crete capitalist formations as an ensemble of different, partially also non-capitalisticproduction relations that are, however, capitalistically dominated. Poulantzas also,

by maintaining the primacy of production relations vis-á-vis productive forces, ques-tioned the allegedly neutral character of technological innovation. Third, regulationtheory distinguishes itself through its double comparative perspective. In contrast tomainstream scholarship, which only analyses different capitalist models in space, i.e.through international comparison, regulation theorists are also interested in inter-temporal differences and changes. Historically, regulation theory identifies and dif-ferentiates between particular capitalist models such as Fordism, high-tech capitalismor financial market capitalism, and so on, which have all been characterised by spe-cific patterns of capitalist accumulation and regulation (Grahl & Teague 2000;

Aglietta et al. 2002).This last point in particular shows that regulation theory takes the post-VoC discus-sion further, in that it is focused on the societal effects of capitalist accumulation, pro-duction and labour organisation. Regulation theory offers a framework for analysis andinterpretation that endogenises the dynamics and changes within capitalist models andis therefore also able to reckon with social changes within formally unchanged institu-tional settings. The social character of specific institutional arrangements is exploredmore explicitly up to the point that, in contrast with VoC and indeed most CC research,regulation theory, even if just limited to Europe, is not just limited to the differentiation

of two variants but includes many specific variants (cf. Amable 2003).Despite these principally advantageous analytical options, some difficulties and prob-lems remain. For instance, regulation theory also runs the risk of suffering from animplicit functionalism, as the mode of regulation is primarily observed through the wayin which it stabilises the accumulation regime. This tendency is admittedly much moreapparent when individual research adopts a socio-technological and regulatory problem-solving perspective that barely asks how societal contradictions and crises escalate andarticulate specific power structures and conflicts. However, it is not just the functionalistbias that makes regulation theory and CC research close to one another. They also sharethe problem that their analytical perspective is ontologically influenced by a dichoto-mous view of nation-state/world market relations (cf. Bieling & Deppe 1996a: 487;contributions to Brand & Raza 2003). Therefore, it is difficult for both to grasp theinternational and transnational dynamics of capitalistic development that have gainedimportance in the context of globalisation.








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National development paths from a neo-Gramscian IPE perspective

In order to solve this problem, which is in part due to the historical development of regu-

lation theory, it helps to expand and transnationalise the regulation theory perspectivewith the help of neo-Gramscian IPE. In doing this, one should take into account the factthat neo-Gramscian IPE is less a clearly defined theory than an ensemble of specificallyarranged or at least combinable theory fragments. One could roughly divide neo-Gramscian IPE into three strands of thought (Bieling 2011): Robert Cox’s (1987) criti-cal-realist perspective, the transnational perspective of the ‘Amsterdam School’ (Overbeek2004), and the constitutionalist perspective, which was most notably developed byStephen Gill (2002, 2003). As the name suggests, neo-Gramscian IPE mostly addressesquestions of international and, if necessary, also comparative political economy. Neo-

Gramscianism can thus bring certain aspects into the discussions that are almost com-pletely left out by regulation theory. Not least, neo-Gramscian concepts can help toproductively overcome the aforementioned deficits or dangers with which regulationtheory discussions are faced, including the functionalist problem-solving bias and thenation-state/world market dichotomy.

In order to illustrate this potential, it is necessary to look at the basic principles ofneo-Gramscian IPE (Bieling & Deppe 1996b; Bieler & Morton 2006). Its foundationsare based on the thoughts of many classical thinkers such as Karl Marx, Fernand Braudel,Karl Polanyi and Max Weber, but most importantly on the theoretical reflections of the

Italian politician and philosopher Antonio Gramsci. Some of the concepts he developed– for instance, ‘hegemony’, ‘historical bloc’, ‘civil society’, ‘passive revolution’ – create thecornerstones of a research programme whose analytical perspective is defined by specificcharacteristics.

The first characteristic is a comprehensive understanding of international or transna-tional hegemony based on sophisticated historical and social theory. Neo-Gramscian IPEunderstands hegemony as a consensually supported modus of transnational developmentthat goes beyond the relationship between states (Cox 1983: 171). Here, not only theprocesses of economic penetration and interdependence, but also the transnationaldimensions of social relationships, including corresponding forms of the discursive, cul-tural and politico-institutional organisation of dominance and consensus, come intoview. A second characteristic of neo-Gramscian IPE is a particular understanding of thestate. Accordingly, the state represents a specific institutionalised arena of social (class)struggles (Cox 1987: 19), whose mode of operation is dependent on societal power rela-tions and socioeconomic, cultural, and ideological structures of reproduction. The con-nection between the governmental practices of official state apparatuses and theireveryday legitimation is supported in this regard via consensus generation and the pro-cesses of compromise finding in civil society. In order to underline this, neo-GramscianIPE often uses the concept of state-civil society-complexes.

Third, the sustainability of international and transnational hegemony structures is not just the product of the interaction between state and civil society, but should also be under-stood as a product of the given conditions of socioeconomic (re)production. Moreover, theattractiveness and partial international generalisation of a capitalist development model is








dependent on the productive potential of the socioeconomic conditions of (re)production.Conceptually, neo-Gramscian IPE allows for the identification of such a developmentmodel in a national or transnational context when it speaks of the (trans)national ‘historicalbloc’. Such a bloc exists when, within a historical constellation, a relatively coherent inter-

action between economic accumulation, political and institutional regulation, and dis-courses in civil society is present. Fourth, the emergence of national or transnational‘historical blocs’ is contingent to the extent that it depends on the ability of social andpolitical actors to universalise their interests in the form of generally accepted ideas, norms,rules, and institutions. Neo-Gramscian IPE interprets this process of proliferation and gen-eralisation of hegemony as a ‘passive revolution’ (Morton 2010). This relates to a transfor-mation of societal structures that can come from outside and/or from above. A ‘passiverevolution’ is, therefore, to be understood as a kind of deep change that happens withoutfully being realised and put into practice ‘from below’.

Finally, the fifth characteristic is that neo-Gramscian IPE, in order to disassociateitself from ‘problem-solving theories’, likes to explicitly refer to itself as ‘critical theory’(Cox 1981: 128). It aims to identify the contradictions inherent in given power relationsand to analyse the processes of their political and societal articulation. Here, as with regu-lation theory, societal crisis processes and phases of change are very important becausethey open up the possibilities for the reorganisation of society. If and how such crises (ofhegemony) are confronted, the question of whether it is done in an emancipatory,nationalistic, or authoritarian-repressive, etc. way (Polanyi 1977), tends to be left open.Crises are potential turning points in which different forms of criticism are articulated

and which, with regard to all concessions to given political economic, institutional, andsociocultural circumstances, may be put into effect in political practice.The outlined characteristics indicate that there is a certain elective affinity between

neo-Gramscian IPE and regulation theory, which can be seen in a similar understandingof the interaction between economy, politics and society. A few considerations maybriefly illustrate this. First, in both perspectives the capitalist economy is based on socialrelations of production, which are connected with one another through an ensemble ofexternal market relationships. What makes the term ‘social relations of production’unique is the fact that the economy itself is understood to be a field of social forces, or a

terrain for societal conflicts shaped by political, institutional, and cultural influences,and penetrated by manifold power relations.Second, both regulation theory and neo-Gramscian IPE assume that capitalist devel-

opment is defined by specific national and international patterns of reproduction whichare disrupted and put into question during periods of crisis and fundamental change. Incontrast to regulation theory, neo-Gramscianism focuses more on the international con-text. The advanced national capitalist models are of interest insofar as they bring forwardthe transnational and international creation of hegemony (Cox 1987). Third, the theo-ries are similar to one another in their view of societal conflicts. For both, the characterof social conflicts is mainly but not exhaustively defined through the contradictions ofcapitalist accumulation, i.e. the relationship between capital and labour. In this sense,other relations of power and dominance, including differences in gender or ethnicity,have a constitutive meaning for the process of capitalist accumulation as they affect thecapital-labour relation, as well as for hegemonic struggles, because gender or ethnic







Bieling 39

groups could specifically articulate themselves in support of concrete political projects inthe arenas of civil society.

The outlined similarities, or at least the complementary viewpoints, make it possibleto correct the deficits in regulation theory with the help of neo-Gramscian IPE. The lat-

ter can especially attenuate the implicit functionalism and problem-solving bias in theregulation theory perspective, because it accentuates societal contradictions, distribu-tional conflicts, and hegemonic struggles. Beyond that, neo-Gramscian IPE provides atheoretical component, with its concept of a ‘transnational historical bloc’, that can helpto correct the regulationist fixation on the nation-state. This is not meant to allege thatthe perception of specific national capitalist development models is obsolete becausethey do not merge with one another at the international level. However, it points outthat national models of development are shaped by international and transnational soci-etal links which are constituted by trade, production and credit relations, their institu-

tional and legal embedding, and manifold discussions and cooperative arrangements intransnational civil society (Beckmann et al. 2003).

The national capitalist models are exposed to external influences to the extent thatthey reproduce themselves through regional and global integration dynamics (e.g. seeBieler [2012] on the differences between small European countries). In this sense, neo-Gramscian IPE on the one hand refers to overreaching processes, but on the other handalso considers the continuing existence of specific national paths of capitalist develop-ment. Considering these specific paths of development, one can ideally differentiatebetween the liberal-oriented states of the Lockean ‘heartland’ and the so-called Hobbesian

‘contender states’ (van der Pijl 2006: 6) or between ‘hyper-liberal forms of state’ and‘state-capitalist’ organisation models (Cox 1987: 286). Within the ideal-typical differen-tiation, the organisation patterns of given capitalist models are empirically specified. Theactual variances between capitalist paths of development, however, can conceptually onlybe insufficiently analysed. This opens the possibility not only that regulation theoryconcepts can be expanded through neo-Gramscianism, but also that neo-Gramscian IPEcan be supported with regulation theory. On the one hand, the conception of the accu-mulation regime sharpens the view of macroeconomic regularities and the correspondingforms of economic-political, financial-political and monetary-political regulation. On

the other hand, the concept of the mode of regulation is suitable for analysing the spe-cific institutional qualities of transnationally moulded, yet still nationally particularlyimplemented reorganisation processes.

Conclusion and perspectives

The ideas developed in this paper should have made clear that a partially reformulatedregulationist perspective extended by neo-Gramscian IPE can help to overcome the defi-cits in the comparative analysis of capitalism left by the post-VoC discussion. The insti-tutionally biased, often rather static and methodologically nationalist comparativeanalysis can be corrected in several ways: through the analysis of the material, discursiveand institutional relations of power and dominance; through a double comparative per-spective that focuses on societal contradictions, crises and conflicts as well as on processesof change and transformation not only in space but also in time; and through








consideration of supranational and transnational dynamics that increasingly structureand reshape the development and characteristics of national models. These all help tomake comparative analysis of capitalism more dynamic, and to contextualise it in inter-national and societal terms.

The last of those aspects as listed above includes bringing issues and concepts criticalof dominance and capitalism back into the discussion. However, the critical expansionand increase in complexity of the analytical perspective also brings new problems. Thesearise not least from the holistic analytical perspective, which at best gives a rough guid-ance for how the characteristic features and interaction patterns between economics,politics and society, as well as the implicit power structures, can be empirically unscram-bled. This is worsened by the elasticity of Gramscian categories; but nevertheless, thiselasticity may possibly help to resolve the problems at the same time. For eventually, theelasticity clarifies the fact that Gramscian categories almost always need a context-

dependent specification and operationalisation with respect to the concrete object ofstudy. How this might be done in the context of European integration has been shownto some extent through comparative analyses of industrial relations, labour markets, andwelfare states or public infrastructure (see Beckmann 2007; Bieling & Deppe 1997;Bieling et al. 2008).

However, up until now the attempts to implement a regulationist perspective extendedby neo-Gramscian IPE in practical research have exhibited some difficulties. While thesupranational and transnational influences on national models of capitalism can beexplored relatively well as long as they concern economic, institutional, or legal pro-

cesses, the discursive-ideological and more sociological aspects of power and authority,i.e. the central aspects of neo-Gramscian analysis, have proved to be more difficult toinvestigate empirically. Depending on the object of study and question, these difficultiesare sometimes rather substantial. Eventually, however, for all those interested in a con-temporary critical and comparative analysis of capitalism, there is no other option but tosearch for ways with which to overcome them.

Acknowledgements

A previous, German-language version of this article – entitled ‘Vergleichende Kapitalismusanalyse

aus der Perspektive einer neo-gramscianisch erweiterten Regulationstheorie’ – was published inBruff I, Ebenau M, May C, Nölke A (eds.) (2013) Vergleichende Kapitalismusforschung: Stand,Perspektiven, Kritik (Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot). In revising an earlier draft, I have hadthe benefit of comments from the editors, particularly from Ian Bruff.

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Wagner I, Lillie N (2013) Institutionalismus und räumliche Desintegration in der VergleichendenKapitalismusforschung: Arbeitsbeziehungen an der EZB-Baustelle Frankfurt. In Bruff I,Ebenau M, May C, Nölke A (eds.) Vergleichende Kapitalismusforschung: Stand, Perspektiven,Kritik . Münster: Westfälisches Dampfboot.

Author biography

Hans-Jürgen Bieling is a professor of political economy and economic didactics at the Departmentof Political Science, Eberhard Karls University Tübingen, Germany. His recent publicationsinclude Theorien der Europäischen Integration, 3rd ed. (VS 2012, as co-editor), InternationalePolitische Ökonomie. Eine Einführung 2nd ed . (VS 2011), and Die Globalisierungs-undWeltordnungspolitik der Europäischen Union (VS 2010).






bieling-comparative analysis of capitalism

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