bhutan and the great power tussle _ the diplomat

Image Credit: REUTERS/Adnan Abidi

Both China and India recognize Bhutan’sstrategic value, but their approaches arevery different.

At first glance, the Kingdom of Bhutan wouldnot seem to be a country that would factorheavily in the calculus of regional powers. Witha land mass smaller than that of the DominicanRepublic and with fewer people than Fiji, thislandlocked Himalayan country has nonetheless become increasingly important strategically toboth New Delhi and Beijing. The reason for this interest is not untapped mineral riches or a largeconsumer class, but Bhutan’s geographical location. As the Kingdom has only in recent yearsbegun to open itself up to the outside world (only legalizing television and the internet in1999 ), it finds itself caught up in a discreet but high stakes diplomatic battle being wagedbetween India and China.

The centerpiece of this issue is territory. Between China and Bhutan there are three territorialareas of dispute: The Jakarlung and Pasamlung valleys on the Bhutan-Chinese north-centralborder, and the Doklam plateau in Eastern Bhutan. While the two territories to the north areof interest to China due to their proximity to Tibet, as well as what it perceives as its “historicclaims” to the areas, the Doklam Plateau is what it covets most. That claim is of grave concern toNew Delhi. India’s Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS) aptly describes the strategic valueof the region:

“The Doklam Plateau lies immediately east of Indian defences in Sikkim. Chinese occupation ofDoklam would turn the flank of Indian defences completely. This piece of dominating groundnot only has a commanding view of the Chumbi Valley but also overlooks the Silguri Corridorfurther to the east.”

The Silguri Corridor (described by some analysts as a “Chicken’s Neck”) is a narrow stretch ofland that connects India’s northeastern states to the rest of India. If the Chinese were to gainpossession of the Doklam plateau, in the event of hostilities it would have the ability to essentially“cut-off” India’s land access to 40 million citizens in its northeast territories. In 1996, China wasbelieved to have come close to acquiring the plateau; as it was willing to renounce 495 squarekilometers of territorial claims in the northern valleys in exchange for the 269 square kilometersthat constitute much of the Doklam plateau. The likelihood of such an agreement being finalized

By Brian BenedictusAugust 02, 2014

Bhutan and the Great Power Tussle | The Diplomat http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/bhutan-and-the-great-power-tussle/

1 of 4 10/6/2014 11:58 PM

in the near future is slim, as the area is the constituency of Bhutan’s current PrimeMinister Tshering Tobgay.

India does maintain an advantage over China in that it has a deep and long-standing relationshipwith Bhutan, giving it a wide array of diplomatic options. In 1949, The Treaty of FriendshipBetween India and Bhutan was signed. Article 2 states that ”On its part the Government ofBhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to externalrelations.” India was Bhutan’s primary force in foreign affairs until 2007, when the treatywas altered during Bhutan’s transition from an absolute monarchy to a parliamentarygovernment, and the clause that provided India’s guidance on external affairs was not retained.Judging by recent visits of Indian officials to Thimpu, however, it would appear that India stillexpects to play a significant role in shaping Bhutan’s decision-making process in sensitive areas ofits foreign affairs. On August 9 last year, it was reported by the media in Bhutan that then IndianNational Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon and Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh came toBhutan to “congratulate the new Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay on assuming the office.” It isalso likely that the primary purpose of their visit was to brief the new prime minister on Bhutan’supcoming talks with China over territorial disputes that were to take place in two weeks later.

In addition to its lengthy diplomatic relationship, India is far and away Bhutan’s mostimportant economic and trading partner, accounting for nearly 60 percent of Bhutan’s exports,and 75 percent of its imports, as well as being a vital donor of economic aid to the country. Itis widely suspected that during last year’s election in Bhutan that the Indian government usedthis leverage by cutting subsidized gasoline and kerosene to the country in response to what itsaw as then Bhutan’s Prime Minister Jigme Thinley’s warming of relations with China, resultingin his government’s eventual defeat at the polls. Seeking to repair relations, India’s new PrimeMinister NarendraModi chose Bhutan as his first visit abroad, and came bearing gifts in the formof a fifty percent increase in aid and loans from the previous year, while Nepal and Bangladesh,two recipients of Indian aid, saw their funding decrease slightly. Modi’s visit also raised theprospects of moving forward on Bhutan’s 10,000MW initiative, in which the Indian governmentis to fund three hydroelectric projects that upon completion are expected to produce up to $1.7billion worth of electricity. This is expected to significantly boost the country’s GDP. The energysector also represents a very significant share of government revenues. While Indian policytowards Bhutan appears to consist primarily of economic carrots (and perhaps a subtle stickwhen necessary), China’s approach historically has been one that bears many similarities to itscurrent strategy in the East and South China Seas.

Much in the same vein as its territorial claims in the Pacific maritime, for a period of time Chinaasserted that its claims over territory in Bhutan were based on historical merit. Shortly after itsestablishment, the People’s Republic of China published a map in A Brief History of China,depicting a sizable portion of Bhutan as “a pre-historical realm of China.” That represented a stepfurther back in time than Beijing’s current mantra of stating that many of its current disputedterritorial claims have been a part of China “since ancient times.” In 1960, the Chinese leadershipissued a statement was cause for concern in Bhutan:

“Bhutanese, Sikkimese and Ladakhis form a united family in Tibet. They have always beensubject to Tibet and to the great motherland of China. They must once again be united andtaught the communist doctrine.”

Bhutan responded by closing off its border, trade, and all diplomatic contacts with China. It


2 of 4 10/6/2014 11:58 PM

followed this with the creation of the Bhutanese Royal Army in 1963. In 1966, near the tripoint ofBhutan, Chumbi Valley, and Sikkim, Tibetan grazers entered pastures near the Doklam plateauaccompanied by Chinese PLA soldiers, an action that in many ways mirrors the recent HD-981 oilrig incident in which the yak herder (HD-981) was led into disputed waters “to drink” whileescorted by military personnel. Border negotiations finally began in 1972, with India playing asupporting role for Bhutan. As leadership in Beijing grew more confident, it sought to excludeIndia from negotiations, succeeding in this in 1984. Beijing preferred to use its growing economicand military clout over its much smaller neighbor, a strategy that it is still practiced today inChina’s refusal to enter territorial or security negotiations with regional alliances or organizationssuch as ASEAN.

More recently, it could be argued that China’s first foray into “salami slicing” tactics took placenot in the disputed maritime regions but in the disputed border regions with Bhutan. In 1988, thePLA crossed into Bhutan and took control of the Chumbi valley, near the Doklam Plateau. It hasalso been reported that the Chinese military has repeatedly entered into northeastern Bhutanthrough the Sektang and Pang La regions, setting up military camps and carrying out patrols. In asimilar fashion, PLA troops have reportedly taken to periodically threatening Royal BhutanGuards on the Doklam Plateau that they were standing on Chinese soil, followed by seizing theirposts for hours or days at a time in a repeated fashion. These actions appear to be aimed at bothshowing Beijing’s resolve and seeking to lower that of Bhutan’s. In April of last year, Zhou Gang, aformer ambassador to Delhi, was sent to Bhutan as a special envoy of the Chinese governmentcarrying with him a blunt message: If you want to settle the boundary dispute with us, allow us toopen our mission here. While India has elected to maintain its close ties with Bhutan largely byusing a soft power approach, China appears to be using methods not unlike those it has preferredin its South and East China Seas disputes: Constant harassment and periodic occupation ofterritories with the goal of wearing down its opponents.

Currently as it stands, it would appear that India has the ear of Thimpu. The day following Modi’svisit to Bhutan, Tobgay quelled Indian concerns by stating that his country would not allow Chinato open an embassy in his country. In an interview with New Delhi television, Togbay stated, “Wedon’t even have diplomatic relations! How can you open an embassy without diplomaticrelations?” Perhaps most importantly, India appears to have the trust of the people of Bhutan aswell. A Bhutanese associate of this writer shared his thoughts on the current situation involvinghis country, and eloquently conveyed the general perception of Bhutanese:

“Bhutanese are more comfortable with India. No one should have any doubts about that. Ifthere has been some contact with China by the Bhutanese, it is merely an assertion of ourindependence and a desire to maintain cordial relations with all our neighbors, withoutdistinction. Bhutanese are a friendly people – we like to be friends with everybody. We haveborder issues with China and it is clear in my mind that Bhutan cannot resolve those issues bybeing antagonistic towards them. The historical, cultural, and economic links between Bhutanand India are so entwined and formidable that it will be near impossible to sever this mutuallybeneficial relationship. I think both Bhutan and India realize this.”

It would seem that if China wishes to resolve the territorial disputes with Bhutan peacefully, it hasa long road yet to travel.

Brian Benedictus is a Washington D.C.-based foreign policy analyst specializing in East Asiansecurity issues and is also an Asia-Pacific Desk analyst for Wikistrat. Brian blogs at


3 of 4 10/6/2014 11:58 PM

warm-oolong-tea.


4 of 4 10/6/2014 11:58 PM

bhutan and the great power tussle _ the diplomat

Documents