beyond the 38th parallel north korean refugeesinsouthkorea
TRANSCRIPT
THE NEW SCHOOL
Beyond the 38th Parallel: North Korean Refugees in South Korea
by
Emily Hwang
Thesis presented to the Global Studies Program in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts
New York City
December 22, 2015
THESIS COMMITTEE:
Alexandra Delano, Associate Professor, Global Studies, The New School
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Alexandra Delano for her dedication as a professor and mentor to me throughout my semesters at The New School.
Thank you to Rachel Stine for your insight on working with North Korean refugees and Rachel
Lee for your support in securing funding for research in preparation for this project.
Lastly, thank you to my family and friends for lending your voices to this thesis by way of your survey responses and for your constant encouragement.
Table of Contents
I. INTRODUCTION II. CHAPTER 1// the past.
A. :: THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 1. Politics & Culture 2. The Emerging Black Market 3. Rise of a New Generation
III. CHAPTER 2// the present. A. ::REFUGEE EXPERIENCES
1. Means of Escape 2. Methods and Challenges in Integration 3. South Korea’s Response
IV. CHAPTER 3// the future. A. :BEYOND THE BORDER
1. Local Faith Communities 2. Ethnic Koreans 3. Moving Forward
V. References
Terms
Integration: According to UNESCO’s International Migration and Multicultural Policies, “Integration is a rather elusive concept. There are two basic interpretations: one refers to internal cohesion of a system; the second one designates the entry into the system of elements that had been part of the environment before, or the extension of the system to incorporate such external elements or units. The second meaning refers only to such entries and extensions that incorporate the new elements as parts that will contribute to the selfsustaining operations of the enlarged system.” Migration Policy states that, “There are two parties involved in integration processes: the immigrants, with their characteristics, efforts and adaptation, and the receiving society, with its interactions with these newcomers and their institutions. It is the interaction between the two that determines the direction and the ultimate outcome of the integration process. These two, however, are unequal partners. The receiving society, in terms of its institutional structure and the way it reacts to newcomers, has much more say in the outcome of the process.” Social Integration: According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, social Integration can be seen as a dynamic and principled process where all members participate in dialogue to achieve and maintain peaceful social relations. Social integration does not mean coerced assimilation or forced integration. Refugee: 1951 Refugee Convention which defines refugees as those "owing to a wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." Defector: North Korean refugees are most often called “defectors.” According to the dictionary, “a defector is a person who gives up allegiance to one state in exchange for allegiance to another, in a way which is considered illegitimate by the first state. More broadly, it involves abandoning a person, cause or doctrine to which one is bound by some tie, as of allegiance or duty.” They may be called defectors due to the fact that China, which is one of the main entryways for those escaping North Korea, does not give them refugee status but instead calls them “illegal economic migrants.” Defectors can be repatriated to North Korea if they are caught in China which is a disregard of the Convention on the Status of Refugees Article 33 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Unusual Punishment, both of which China has signed on to. Assimilation: (dictionary) The process by which a person or persons acquire the social and psychological characteristics of a group: “Waves of immigrants have been “assimilated” into the American culture.” Acculturation: (dictionary) cultural modification of an individual, group, or people by adapting to or borrowing traits from another culture; also : a merging of cultures as a result of prolonged contact. : the process by which a human being acquires the culture of a particular society from infancy.
Introduction
“I would like to shed my North Korean identity, erase the mark it has made on me. But I can’t. I’m not sure why this is so, but I suspect it is because I had a happy childhood. As children we have a need, as our awareness of the larger world develops, to feel part of something bigger than family, to belong to a nation. The next step is to identify with humanity, as a global citizen. But in me this development got stuck. I grew up knowing almost knowing of the outside world except as it was perceived through the lens of the regime. And when I left, I discovered only gradually that my is a byworld, everywhere, for evil. But I did not know this years ago, when my identity was forming. I thought life in North Korea was normal. Its customs and rulers
became strange only with time and distance.
Thus, I must say that North Korea is my country. I love it . But I want it to become good. My country is my family and the many good people I knew there. So how could I not be a patriot?
This is my story. I hope that it will allow a glimpse of the world I escaped. I hope it will encourage others like myself, who are struggling to cope with new lives their imaginations never
prepared them for. I hope that world will begin, finally to listen to them, and to act.”
Hyeonseo Lee, “The Girl with Seven Names: A North Korean Defector’s Story”
As of March 2014, there are approximately 26,483 North Korean refugees living in South
Korea, 40% of whom are children and young adults between the ages of 10 and 29. North 1
Korean refugees are referred to as “defectors,” or “ a person who gives up allegiance to one state
in exchange for allegiance to another, in a way which is considered illegitimate by the first
state.” In South Korea, defectors are referred to as Tal Buk Ja (탈북자), meaning one who
escaped from the North. However, they prefer to be called Sae Toe Min (새터민), meaning
person in a new land, indicating a desire to be considered a resident of South Korea and not
merely an escapee of the North.
The trials facing North Korean defectors in escaping the regime, gaining asylum and
1 Go, MyongHyun. "Resettling in South Korea: Challenges for Young North Korean Refugees." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 8 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
entry into a country that will acknowledge their refugee status, and integrating into the free world
are countless. If caught, they confront the severe dangers of forced repatriation, imprisonment,
time in labor or concentration camps, and even public execution. Many refugees enlist the help
of brokers to aid them in their journey across the Tumen River border into China, through
countries in Southeast Asia, and then to South Korea, but are at risk of being swindled or
trafficked. Furthermore, the journey to safety requires burdensome amounts of cash and may
take as long as 20 years, as some refugees find themselves imprisoned at various points in transit.
Once North Korean defectors reach South Korea, trauma, stress, and the guilt of leaving
family members behind pose as psychological barriers to integration. The rates for posttraumatic
stress disorder among North Koreans in South Korea are approximately 29.5% to 37.7%, with
percentages higher in women than in men. Drop out rates for North Korean refugee children 2
and college students are higher than that of South Korean students, thereby contributing to
difficulty in securing highpaying vocations. Refugees reported to experiencing workplace
discrimination, social isolation, as well as disillusionment in regard to future goals.
The South Korean government, along with local and international NGOs and religiously
affiliated groups, have provided North Korean refugees with financial, psychological, and
vocational support to aid in the process of cultural transition. However, as Park Jin, the
chairman of the South Korean National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification
Committee commented, “The settlement of North Korean defectors in the South is not something
that money alone can accomplish.” According to a Journeyman Pictures documentary on the
challenges of resettlement, what the country has yet to build is “a bridge to span fifty years of
2 Jeon, Hong, Lee, Lee, Han, and Min. "Correlation Between Traumatic Events and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among North Korean Defectors In South Korea." Journal of Traumatic Stress, Apr. 2005. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
division and hostility.” 3
The two nations’ history of conflict and current armistice status marked by ongoing
tension further complexes the issue of North Korean integration. I believe that due to the fact
that South Korean citizens daily confront with inescapable proximity the possibility of war with
neighboring North Korea, they experience an ambivalence toward the issue of reunification and
an accompanying divisiveness in fully addressing the needs of the North Korean refugee
community.
Through this thesis, I propose that local faith communities and ethnic Koreans
(individuals of Korean descent who live outside of the Korean peninsula) will be increasingly
essential in the construction of a theoretical cultural bridge.
Local faith communities have provided resources such as “psychological first aid,”
pastoral care, and structures for community building in various multicultural contexts around
the world for many years. North Korea is devoid of religious freedom and yet, a 2003 survey
revealed that nearly 70% of refugees claimed to be religious, with three quarters identifying as
Christian. Some churches in South Korea have special services dedicated to North Korean 4
refugees and others offer financial and support services. In my research uncovering the role of
religious institutions in the integration of North Korean refugees into South Korean society, I
was able to draw parallels to the narrative of ethnic Koreans, who have characteristically relied
on local faith communities to provide support through the process of migration.
In many ways, the struggles pertaining to unbelonging, lack of visibility, language
struggles, and dual identities of ethnic Korean youth mirror that of North Korean refugees. One
3 N. Korea's Brainwashed Defectors Can't Cope in the Outside World. Journeyman Pictures, 2007. Youtube. 4Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
may argue that all populations undergoing migration, diaspora, or cultural transition has threads
of commonality in their experiences. However, the shared nuances specific to the Korean
identity and the accompanying tension of contesting those particular set of values with that of a
foreign culture is what I believe link the narratives of these two seemingly contrasting
populations together.
The integration of North Korean refugees into South Korean society is unquestionably
linked to the conversation surrounding reunification, due to its potential increase in relevance
should the Korean peninsula merge into one entity. I will draw correlations between positive
perceptions towards reunification, unbiased attitudes toward the North Korean population, and
effort in integrative methods.
It is my belief that local faith communities can play a substantial role in resilience
building and integrative measures in diverse refugee communities, like that of North Korean
refugees. Furthermore, I propose that ethnic Koreans, who may or may not influenced by faith,
(according to the findings of an informal survey that will be further discussed in following
chapters) possess a nuanced understanding of biculturalism and migratory issues specific to the
Korean ethnicity and ability to see beyond politics into the hearts of North Korean refugees
afforded through the distance often required to observe a situation without personal bias.
Furthermore, the Western influenced individualist culture of ethnic Koreans contrasts with the
collectivist ideals of South Korean culture to provide a fluidity and transience regarding ingroup
and outgroups determinants, thereby allowing for increased levels of acceptance and appreciation
of diversity. I believe that both of these groups will increasingly essential to the integration of
North Korean refugees in the free world in the years to come.
CHAPTER 1// the past. :: THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA i. Politics & Culture ii. The Emerging Black Market iii. Rise of a New Generation i. Politics & Culture
“The greatest threat to the security of the people of North Korea comes from the government of North Korea.” Ari Fleischer
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is one of the most mysterious countries on
the planet. In order to understand the experiences of North Korean refugees and gain perspective
on their relevance to a broader political narrative, it is necessary to learn about the history of
conflict between North and South Korea. During the fourth century, the Korean peninsula was
united through a common national identity within the Chosun Dynasty, which ruled between
1392 and 1910. Korea belonged to China’s “tribute system,” which required it give gifts to the
Chinese court, acknowledging its superiority. Despite borrowing much of its culture and
language from China, Korea maintained an independent set of customs until the Cold War, when
Japanese forces colonized the peninsula. The current status of the Republic of Korea and the 5
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as two separate nations is a result of the Cold War.
From 1910 to the end of World War II in 1945, the Korean Peninsula was Japanese
territory. Following Japan's defeat, Korea was divided into the Communist North under the
influence of the Soviet Union and a democratic South under the influence of the U.S at the 38th
5 "Korean History and Political Geography." Asia Society. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Dec. 2015.
parallel, a line of division that was arbitrarily drawn by foreign forces. Kim Il Sung, a former
member of the Manchurian Guerrilla Army, came into power in North Korea and Syngman Rhee
was appointed the first president of South Korea by the U.S.
On June 25, 1950, 75,000 North Korean soldiers invaded South Korea, commencing the
Korean War, which was viewed by the international community as a war against international
communism itself. The casualty toll for the war has been reported to be 54, 246, including South
Korean, North Korean, American, and Chinese soldiers. On July 27, 1953, a ceasefire was 6
signed by both countries, making way for the establishment of a 2.5 mile wide demilitarized
zone (DMZ) running along the 38th parallel of the peninsula, separating North and South Korea.
The DMZ measures at 2.5 miles wide and consists mainly of mountainous land, signifying a
“buffer zone, offlimits to large troop concentrations and to heavy weaponry like tanks and
artillery.” The Military Demarcation Line (MDL) runs down the center of the DMZ and is one 7
of the most dangerous places in the world in that any individual who attempts to cross it would
likely get shot. 8
The armistice did not officially end the war and in fact, the two countries are technically
still at war today. In 1968, North Korean soldiers crossed the DMZ in an attempt to assassinate
former president Park Chung Hee. The incident was followed by a second attempt in 1973. In
1983, North Korea proved to be responsible for a bombing at a wreathlaying ceremony in
Burma where South Korean government officials were present. Among the casualties from the
bombing was Lee Bum Suk, South Korea’s former foreign minister. Throughout the 1990s and
2000s, minor skirmishes have resulted in an escalation of tension and hostility between the two
6 Korean War Fast Facts CNN.com." CNN. Cable News Network, 3 July 2015. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. 7 O'Neill, Tom. "Korea's DMZ: Dangerous Divide National Geographic Magazine." 8 O'Neill, Tom. "Korea's DMZ: Dangerous Divide National Geographic Magazine."
nations. More recent occurrences include a naval accident which accounted for the deaths of
four South Korean sailors in June 2002 and a threat to declare “allout war” by the North 9
Korean government earlier this year, accompanied by the launching of “a 14.5 mm antiaircraft
shell across the DMZ” and land mines that “seriously injured two South Korean soldiers.” 10
Despite their proximity, the two nations have developed at divergent paces on both
economic and social fronts. In the 62 years since the Korean War, South Korea has experienced
rapid economic growth under a Western influenced model of democracy and system of
technologically enhanced commodity production aimed at foreign trade. Additionally, lingering
Confucianist values that promote materialism, competition due to high population density, and a
culturally embedded idolization of perfectionism and achievement contributed to South Korea’s
emergence as an international hub of innovation. Currently, South Korea is ranked 15th in the
world by nominal GDP and 12th in purchasing power parity. It has transitioned from a 11
developing country to a highincome economy in record time.
Meanwhile, North Korea or the Democratic Republic of Korea has distanced itself from
the international communist movement, instead adopting its own ideology of national
selfreliance called “juche.” In 1992, a popular political campaign within North Korea was
“Socialism in Our Style,” which demonstrated the government’s disinterest in the practices or
influences of China or the Soviet Union and insistence on establishing a system of Communist
government entirely distinct from that of its predecessors. North Korea’s political tract
combines “extreme nationalism, Stalinism, Confucian dynasticism, even myths of racial purity.”
9 Tran, Mark. "North and South Korea: A History of Violence." The Guardian. N.p., 20 May 2010. Web. 15 Dec. 2015. 10 Lah, Kyung, and KJ Kwon. "Tired of Conflict: Life near the Korean DMZ."CNN. Cable News Network, 31 Aug. 2015 11 "The World Factbook." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, n.d. Web. 16 Dec. 2015.
(pg 12) Having an understanding of Korean blood as pure inevitably results in a paranoia and 12
disdain for any association or assimilation of a culture outside of its borders. North Korea’s
obsession with racial purity can be demonstrated in the propaganda that is slapped across public
spaces, currency, and schoolbooks, which idolizes metaphoric depictions of pure compliance
with the ideology of the state in juxtaposition with the seemingly obstructed political
perspectives of foreign, particularly Western, influences. North Korea views itself as a socialist
state but is identified by the international community as a totalitarian dictatorship, which is
described in the dictionary to be “a form of government in which the political authority exercises
absolute and centralized control over all aspects of life, the individual is subordinated to the
state, and opposing political and cultural expression is suppressed. “ North Korea’s 13
governmental structures support the erection and maintenance of a system of leadership that
assigns Godlike authority to those in power, thereby confirming this perception.
Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s first leader, was born on April 15, 1912 in Pyongyang as
Kim Sŏngju. He grew up in a Christian home and was educated by Christian missionaries, later
bypassing the SovietKorean and Korean Communist Party to join the faction Manchurian
Guerrilla Army. Originally, he was not a politician and came to power in the North by chance.
However, he created for himself a personal deified identity as the “Great Leader” of North Korea
by taking Confucianist ideas and replacing them with Communist terms, leading with claims of
his unshaken willingness to die for the nation (충성) and introducing a political platform in favor
of AntiJapanese and AntiAmerican attitudes and national reunification. Following Kim Il
Sung’s death, his son, Kim Jong Il, came to power. During Kim Jong Il’s reign, former South
12 Stephen Haggard, and Marcus Noland. Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2011. Print. 13 "Totalitarian Dictatorship." The Free Dictionary. Farlex, n.d. Web. 22 Dec. 2015.
Korean president Kim Dae Jung established a foreign policy known as the Sunshine Policy
through which the South Korean government provided unconditional aid, as well as increased
military and economic cooperation with North Korea. Despite the fact that Kim Dae Jung won
the Nobel peace prize in 2000 for his contribution in engaging North and South Korea in
peaceful dialogue, the success of the Sunshine Policy in promoting diplomatic relations within
the Korean peninsula is highly contested to this day. 14
The current leader of the DPRK is Kim Jong Un, who was supposedly educated in
Switzerland and fashions himself as the reincarnate of his grandfather, Kim Il Sung. The
birthdays of all three of these men, Kim Il Sung (April 15), Kim Jong Il (February 16), and Kim
Jong Un (January 8) are national holidays in North Korea, which are celebrated with the
distribution of food so citizens learn to associate wealth and provision with the leaders and place
their trust accordingly. 15
North Korea’s social classification system, known as songbun, sorts the population into
classes determined by their loyalty to socialist ideologies. The Kim family and national party
members head the social hierarchy. Following the Kim dynasty, the songbun system designates
war heroes, party members, and military officials as next in line of status and significance. Next,
are individuals who are university educated and can afford to live in the capital city of
Pyongyang, then members of the working class including farmers and industrial workers, and all
other citizens. This system of social organization accounts for massive inequalities, particularly
for vulnerable and marginalized members of the population, as it erases all possibility of social
mobility.
14 Popeski, Ronald. "Sunshine Policy Failed to Change North Korea: Report."Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 18 Nov. 2010. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. 15 North Korean Politics and Culture, Hanyang University International Summer School, Immanuel Kim
Translated over the realm of human rights, the bizarre political ideology of North Korea
is the center of international controversy. In February of this year, the United Nations published
a 36 page initial report and 373 page report of detailed findings regarding human rights and
medical issues in North Korea. Continued poverty in the country has resulted in a systematic
lack of medical service and perpetually high mortality rates. A 2008 Census report stated that
life expectancy for North Koreans has declined since the 1990s at 65.5 for men and 72.7 for
women, which is 11 years less than that of South Koreans. North Korea suffers from food 16
shortages, a lack of medical supplies, unreliable sanitation systems, and citizens who use drugs
such as “ice” (methamphetamine) to selfmedicate. Only 6% of North Korea’s budget went to
healthcare in 2008, according to the World Health Organization, demonstrating the national 17
government’s disregard for the basic needs of its citizens.
Despite severe developmental challenges, or perhaps because of them, the citizens of
North Korea are increasingly taking the reigns on their circumstances, particularly in regard to
the market economy.
ii. The Emerging Black Market
Yeonmi Park is a North Korean defector and Human Rights activist. Her father was a
businessman, but was later arrested for being involved with illegal trading activities. She and her
mother escaped the country following his arrest in 2007. She recalls that as a child, she watched
her mother’s friend get executed for selling pirated DVD’s. This left an understandably deep
16 Haub, Carl. "North Korea Census Reveals Poor Demographic and Health Conditions." PRB. Population Reference Bureau, Dec. 2010. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. 17 Branigan, Tania. "North Korean Health System Crumbling as Shortages and Sanctions Bite." The Guardian, 23 Apr. 2014. Web. 15 Dec. 2015.
impression on her as she began to question the nature of a ruler and government she had been
taught to worship. These thoughts became more relevant when she was exposed to foreign films
and books such as “Titanic” and “Animal Farm.” As cited in Park’s recent interview with The
Washington Post, she claims that “Titanic opened my eyes to see that people can live differently,
and there is something else out there; the black market gave me an opportunity to be exposed to
the outside world, and Animal Farm set me free from brainwashing.” 18
The private market exposed a new generation of North Koreans to food, clothing, and
media from South Korea and other foreign nations. Essentially, these citizens have defied the
logic of the regime, whose aim is to proliferate a paranoia about the dangers of Western
influenced media. Access to technology despite government censorship depletes the power of 19
the regime and usurps the ruler of his power to exert complete control over the thoughts and
images influencing his subjects. According to Heung Kwang Kim, a North Korean defector and
former computer science professor at a university in the capital, 3.5 million computers and 1.5
tablets currently exist in the country. 1 in 50 North Koreans have access to some kind of
computing device and 3 million to cell phones. He claims that although the use of such devices
is prohibited, the awareness of their existence cannot be unlearned. Organizations such as the 20
North Korea Strategy Center have become one of the largest in smuggling data into the country,
moving nearly 3,000 USB drives with foreign movies, music, and ebooks across the border every
year. Founder Kang Cholhwan believes this exposure reverses the brainwashing known to
prevail within the citizens of this nation as a result of propaganda campaigns. “And when this
18 "Ossowski, Yaël. "Long Live the North Korean Black Market." The Canal. The Panam Post, 20 Nov. 2014. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. 19 Park, Yeon M. "Yeonmi Park: The Hopes of North Korea's 'Black Market Generation'" Washington Post. The Washington Post, 25 May 2014. Web. 04 Dec. 2014. 20 North Korean Defector: 'Bureau 121' Hackers in China." CNN. Cable News Network, n.d. Web. 15 May 2015.
happens, it starts a revolution in their minds” he claims. However, Kang’s effort should not be
mistaken to be entirely altruistic. The value of a USB stick stocked with foreign films is
equivalent to “a month’s food budget for most middleclass North Korean families.” It seems 21
smugglers are motivated by profit just as much as they are motivated by politics. Nevertheless,
such efforts open up a channel of unregulated communication, allowing for foreign media
influence to penetrate the wall of isolation that separates North Korea from the rest of the world.
In fact, Thor Halvorseen who is the founder and president of the Human Rights Foundation in
New York City which delivers “bootleg DVDs, educational pamphlets and USB drives from
South Korea into North Korea via hydrogen balloon drops” insists that film is the most 22
powerful medium through which ideas of freedom can be transmitted globally. Just as the
United States ardently pursued to penetrate the Iron Curtain with American film, literature, and
radio during the Cold War, many organization like the Human Rights Foundation are aiming to
do the same. Hollywood films, even unoriginal romantic comedies, have potential to seriously
threaten totalitarian rule with their tales of desire and the triumph of the individual. Furthermore,
specific genres are gaining particular traction in black markets. Demands are increasingly high
for crime novels and thrillers, most of which are from Japan and which are available for illicit
rental by the hour. It is only recently that the interest in “subversive books” has drawn the
attention of North Korean customers, most of whom are students. Formerly, illegal literature
including classics in international politics and economics mainly attracted audiences comprised
21 Greenberg, Andy. "The Plot to Free North Korea With Smuggled Episodes of ‘Friends’." Wired.com. Conde Nast Digital, 1 Mar. 2015. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. 22 Crocker, Lizzie. "North Korea’s Secret Movie Bootleggers: How Western Films Make It Into the Hermit Kingdom." The Daily Beast. Newsweek/Daily Beast, 22 Dec. 2014. Web. 11 May 2015.
of writers and journalists, but now they are mostly university students, indicating a new wave of
enlightenment in the rising generation.
iii. Rise of a New Generation
There is hope of an impending political and cultural shift within North Korea with the
emergence of the “Jangmadang” generation, otherwise known as the Black Market Generation,
equivalent in age to the millennials of the U.S. In their 20’s and 30’s, the members of this 23
generation hold no true devotion to the Kim dynasty. Former generations were brainwashed
with strategic propaganda to worship a system of economic selfreliance and communism, but
the Godlike image of Kim Il Sung has since faded from the memories of young North Koreans,
who have unprecedented access and exposure to markets and technology. 24
The possibility for political revolution within North Korea is marred by a number of
opposing forces. Limitation of travel due to the nation’s geopolitical monitoring system
organized according to songbun, lack of access to communication, and excessive government
surveillance put immense pressure on any citizen with social, economic, or political aims that are
not aligned with those of the state. However, the emergence of the black market economy in it
of itself is a testament to the small but powerful cultural shifts that are undoubtedly occurring
within North Korea. The capital city of Pyongyang experiences development at a significantly
different rate than a mountainous province that falls in the outskirts of the peninsula, but
economic progress is inevitably moving out from urban centers toward the periphery.
Researchers and social scientists who have lived in North Korea for upwards of ten years
23 "History of North Korea Liberty in North Korea." History of North Korea. Liberty in North Korea, n.d. Web. 2 Dec. 2015. 24 "A Changing North Korea Liberty in North Korea. Liberty in North Korea, n.d. Web. 2 Dec. 2015.
comment on the increased number of opportunities to participate in the private market and the
the rise of technological devices and automobiles in the capital. The significance of these
developments lies in their potential to familiarize the North Korean people with a mindset of
consumer agency that is individualized. With the veil lifted from the eyes of many young North
Koreans through technology and foreign media to the possibilities that lie across the border,
there is potential for the activation of desire and curiosity, alongside ideas surrounding human
rights, individualism, selfdetermination, personal liberty, and freedom. With the increase in
numbers of North Koreans leaving the country and seeking asylum in neighboring countries,
mainly South Korea, it can be induced that the border surrounding the DPRK is more porous that
anticipated. In the following chapter, I will discuss the factors that lead a North Korean to risk
their lives to escape the regime, methods and struggles in transit, and South Korea’s response as
it receives and supports North Korean refugees.
CHAPTER 2// the present. ::REFUGEE EXPERIENCES i. Means of Escape ii. Methods and Challenges in Integration iii. South Korea’s Response i. Means of Escape
“When we escaped North Korea, we wanted food. But when we went to South Korea, we wanted
freedom.” Eunsun Kim A North Korean Refugee 25
Regardless of a defector’s intent in escaping the North Korean state whether they were
on the brink of starvation or simply found themselves in neighboring China while engaging in
black market activities and decided to stay leaving the country permanently is seen as an act of
political dissent and can result in severe punishment.
In the book “Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea,” which is 26
written by economists Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, one is exposed to the critical role of
the aforementioned black market economy in defining refugee experiences prior to defection.
North Korean refugees living in South Korea with a median age of 43 were inquired about what
percentage of their household income came from “private business activities at the time they left
North Korea.” Nearly half of the surveyed individuals reported that “all of their income came
from private business activities” while twothirds reported that half or more of their income came
from these activities. Though quantitative inferences can not be drawn regarding the correlation
25 Eunsun Kim A North Korean Refugee. Perf. Eunsun Kim. SVT/NRK Show "Skavlan", 2013. Youtube. 26 Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland. Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2011. Print.
between private market activity and defection, corresponding trends in the increasing power of
the black market and resulting economic selfsufficiency, rise in foreign influence and travel
outside of North Korean border can be identified. Most North Koreans who participate in the
private market are women, due to the fact that men work at state commissioned jobs and are not
able to participate as actively. As a result, reports show that a recordbreaking 83% of the 292
defectors to come to South Korea within the first three months of 2015 were female. 27
The journey from North to South Korea is an extremely dangerous one. If caught,
consequences for defectors include forced repatriation, imprisonment, time in labor or
concentration camps, and even public execution. Thus, refugees leave with the knowledge that
their hunger, curiosity, or desire for freedom is costly, not only to themselves but to the family
members and friends they leave behind, who may be subject to interrogation and punishment if
knowledge of the national crime reaches authorities.
As the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separates North and South Korea is heavily
guarded, despite the ease of transit in crossing the border this way, it is not an option as a means
of escape. Instead, defectors typically cross the Tumen River border to the North into China , 28
but they must then travel to other countries in Southeast Asia including Laos, Thailand, or
Myanmar and then to Thailand, where they can seek asylum at a South Korean embassy before
going to South Korea. Due to China’s notoriously harsh stance toward defectors and its history
of forced repatriations, North Koreans resort to this roundabout and clandestine journey to
freedom, which leave many stranded for months and years at various points in transit. China was
criticized to be “in violation of its obligations under international human rights and refugee law
27 Pearson, Jumin Park and James. "It Now Costs $8,000 per Person to Defect from North Korea." Business Insider. Business Insider, Inc, 21 May 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 28 "Crossing Heaven's Border." PBS. PBS, 30 June 2009. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
over its treatment of North Korean refugees” in a 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry 29
report on human rights in the DPRK, but amendments to refugee law will not occur overnight.
As an article from the Council of Foreign Affairs states, China still is North Korea's “most
important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food, arms, and energy.” 30
The 3,000 mile endeavor not only requires extraordinary amounts of physical and
emotional endurance, but equally burdensome measures of cash. A recent Business Insider
article notes that in the past 3 and a half years since Kim Jong Un’s rise to power, defecting has
become much more dangerous and expensive. With enhancements in intelligence and
technology to track citizens, the stakes are higher for brokers, typically Chinese Koreans who
guide defectors to and through China for steep fees that have increased to $8,000. Nonprofit 31
organizations like U.S. based Liberty in North Korea (LINK), which has led 405 defectors to
safety to date and operates on a transparent, donation based model, name lower, perhaps more
reasonable prices. LINK, in particular, claims that it costs $3,000 to not only rescue a North
Korean, but also provide them with “resettlement assistance and empowerment.” The 32
discrepancy in fees exemplifies a high level of corruption in broker dealings, and yet, it remains
the primary method that refugees rely on in their journey to freedom. According to surveys
conducted on North Korean refugees living in South Korea and China on methods of escape,
52% paid for assistance “such as bribing an official or eliciting the help of brokers,” 46% of
respondents escaped “with the help of family or friends” and 2% reported to receiving help from
29"UN Report Criticizes China for Treatment of North Korean Refugees Amid Worsening Situation." UN Report Criticizes China for Treatment of North Korean Refugees Amid Worsening Situation. Congressional Executive Commission on China, 19 Mar. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 30 Xu, Beina, and Jayshree Bajoria. "The China North Korea Relationship." Council on Foreign Relations, 22 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 31 Park, Jumin, and James Pearson. "It Now Costs $8,000 per Person to Defect from North Korea." Business Insider. Business Insider, Inc, 21 May 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 32 "Refugee Rescues." Liberty in North Korea, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
an NGO or missionary group. It’s important to note here that a related surveybased study
makes relevant claims that “if North Koreans are caught and repatriated to North Korea while
residing in the border areas, they usually face relatively light sentences such as several days or
weeks in the labor camp, since the need for survival under the food crisis is understood in North
Korea. Yet when they are caught on the way to South Korea, and their association with South
Korean missionaries is revealed, it is considered a political act, and the sentence far exceeds
several weeks in the labor camp and might put their family members in North Korea in danger as
well.” Thus, the intensified repercussions of affiliating with a religious group could be a factor 33
for the statistically disportionate methods of escape.
As we will see in later chapters, the role of NGO and FBO (faith based organizations) is
more evident in the resettlement process once refugees reach South Korea. Still, a number of
organizations dedicated to aiding defectors trapped in China have developed in recent years.
This Asian “underground railroad” involves a large and diverse network of activists,
humanitarians, traffickers, and missionaries with varying methods and strategies but similar aims
in providing defectors with safe passage to South Korea, the United States, and other countries.
Joseph Kim, a North Korean defector turned New York City based college student, disclosed in a
recent interview with the Guardian that while in China, he was advised to seek out a Christian 34
church for food and support. South Koreanbased, largely Presbyterian churches provide
financial and logistical support to underground networks in China which hide defectors and
provide escape routes. One such religiously based organization, called 318 Partners Missions
Foundation, was founded by a KoreanAmerican businessman named Steve Kim, in order to
33 Choo, H. Y. "Gendered Modernity and Ethnicized Citizenship: North Korean Settlers in Contemporary South Korea." Gender & Society 20.5 (2006): 576604. Web. 34 Pilkington, Ed. "Christianity Was the Only Way Out, Says North Korean Defector." The Guardian, 18 Oct. 2015. Web.
rescue trafficked North Korean women. The issue of trafficking is a significant one, considering
the lucrative market for brides among Chinese men, 30 million of whom are predicted to be
without female counterparts by the year 2020. According to a testimony by Steve Kim at the 35
Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing, traffickers work with brokers to trap women in
inner provinces of China, where they are often sold to farmers or brothels but are unable to report
any crimes committed against them for fear that they will be repatriated back to North Korea.
This all goes to say that escaping the North Korean state in search of safety is a
challenging and lifethreatening endeavor that could take decades. The traumas associated with
the everpresent threat of repatriation, trafficking, violence, and imprisonment, along with the
psychological guilt of leaving one’s family behind in the process of transit will often leave
refugees in vulnerable states even after successful defection. Once North Korean refugees
arrive in South Korea, they are faced with additional trials associated with integrating into the
free world.
ii. Challenges and Methods in Integration
“South Korea is a statusoriented, conservative society—as is North Korea, although the status measures are quite different. In the South it’s not what position you hold in the ruling political party that matters but what schools you attended, what degrees you obtained, where you live, where you work, and what your family background is. Defectors bitterly joke that they left one class society in the North and now find that South Korea is equally class conscious, and the
defectors are not members of a favored class.” Kongdan Oh, Brookings Institution 36
According to the Ministry of Reunification, there are 26,483 North Korean refugees
living in South Korea as of March 2014, 40% of whom are children and young adults between
35 "Escaping North Korea: The Plight of Defectors." The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing (TLHRC) (n.d.): n. pag. 23 Sept. 2010. Web. 10 Dec. 2015. 36 Oh, Kongdan. "Embracing North Korean Defectors: The "Small Unification" of Korea." The Brookings Institution, 09 June 2010. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
the ages of 10 and 29. In South Korea, defectors are referred to as Tal Buk Ja (탈북자), 37
meaning one who escaped from the North. However, they prefer to be called Sae Toe Min
(새터민), meaning person in a new land, indicating a desire to be considered a resident of South
Korea and not merely an escapee of the North.
Once North Koreans arrive in South Korea after a 3,000 mile journey, they are required
to spend approximately three months in a governmental resettlement program called “Hanawan,”
designed to aid them in the transition to South Korean society. Hanawon Resettlement Center,
or “The Office for Resettlement Assistance to NK Defectors” was opened in July of 1999.
“Hana,” means “one” in Korean, and “hanawon” translates to “institute of oneness.” Due to the 38
recent uncovering of North Korean agents who were found to have passed through the
resettlement program posing as refugees, defectors are first “grilled by intelligence agents trying
to weed out spies.” After initial interrogations with the National Information Agency and 39
Police Bureau, refugees are provided with shelter and basic social adjustment training. Initially
designed to last a year, the Hanawon program was shortened to 3 months and provides courses in
“stabilizing emotional and health conditions, enhancing the understanding about South Korean
society or narrowing the cultural gap, job consulting and training, and guiding the settlement
policies and procedures.” This includes medical treatment, provision of a bank account and 40
social security number, classes on how to function in a capitalist society, and language courses.
Although Korea shares a language, distinct differences in accents and usage exist due to the
development of the two nations as separate entities over the past 60 years. During their stay at
37 Go, MyongHyun. "Resettling in South Korea: Challenges for Young North Korean Refugees." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 8 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 38Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 39 Glionna, John M. "A Rare Look inside the Hanawon Center for North Korean Defectors." Los Angeles Times, 09 July 2009. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 40Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Hanawan, North Korean refugee will receive lessons on the South Korean accent. They will also
learn basic English words used in South Korea and computer skills.
Depending on individual preferences and aptitudes, refugees will then be transferred to
varying regions of the country to live in their own apartments or houses with resettlement money
provided by the government, and possibly a job. Within their regions, they are liable to
“protective care service to be given by 3 different protection officers” who oversee practical
matters related to housing, vocation, and security. Local centers called “Hanacenters,” 30 of
which exist across South Korea, are designated to maintain contact with them for a yearlong
period, providing advising and support. Similarly, the Regional Consortium of Cooperative
Networks, which is financed by the Ministry of Unification, plays a significant role in areas
where over 100 refugees are located by providing much needed resettlement resources. 41
Certainly, refugees are in much need of support. Trauma, stress, fears related to safety,
and the guilt of leaving family members behind are all factors in potentially leading defectors to
depression, alcoholism, even suicide. The rates for posttraumatic stress disorder among North
Koreans in South Korea are approximately 29.5% to 37.7%, with percentages higher in women
than in men. Alongside PTSD, depression, anxiety, as well as physical traumas are possible 42
obstacles in integration. One study conducted at the Yonsei University College of Medicine in
Seoul, South Korea deduced that male survey respondents were “more vulnerable to alcohol 43
problems” and had higher depressive tendencies than did female respondents. An interesting
note is that in this study, male North Korean refugees showed a higher level of interpersonal
41Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 42 Jeon, Hong, Lee, Lee, Han, and Min. "Correlation Between Traumatic Events and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among North Korean Defectors In South Korea." Journal of Traumatic Stress, Apr. 2005. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 43 Jeon, Yu, Cho, and Eom. "Traumatic Experiences and Mental Health of North Korean Refugees in South Korea." Psychiatry Investigation, 31 Dec. 2008. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
warmth than male South Koreans, which could indicate a need for social support that could be
left unmet by modern cultural standards and gender norms.
An ethnographic study conducted on the social exclusion and psychological adjustment
of North Korean adolescents proposed that the “emphasis on cultural homogeneity in South
Korea’s culture and negative perceptions of North Koreans” contributed to integrative barriers
including social isolation. This particular study surveyed teenaged North Korean refugees 44
living in group homes because they had been separating from their families. It explored the
potential challenges for young defectors resulting from the fact that cultural biases are most
prevalent in school and work settings. The roles of such concepts as hybridity, defined as
“cultural forms that emerge in the midst of migration, diaspora, transnationalism, and globalism”
in the shaping of identity and liminality, describing a sense of “ambiguity or disorientation, as
(North Korean refugees) find themselves belonging to neither the culture they left behind nor the
culture in which they are presently situated” is explored. 45
‘‘I am very dark skinned ... and short...saying weird things. So I stood out.’’ Jaehoon,
survey respondent and North Korean refugee
Young defectors reported feeling isolated from their peers at school due to the differences
in their appearance and speech. Some claimed to miss their North Korean friends and the
proximity and familiarity of neighbors in their hometown, in comparison to the independence
they felt in South Korea. One participant described South Korean teens as “slaves to digital
devices” and missed the natural beauty devoid of technology they enjoyed back home. They
44 Kim, M., Hong, Ra, and K. Kim. "Understanding Social Exclusion and Psychosocial Adjustment of North Korean Adolescents and Young Adult Refugees in South Korea through Photovoice." Qualitative Social Work, 25 Feb. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 45 Kim, M., Hong, Ra, and K. Kim. "Understanding Social Exclusion and Psychosocial Adjustment of North Korean Adolescents and Young Adult Refugees in South Korea through Photovoice." Qualitative Social Work, 25 Feb. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
found the academic pressure characteristic of the South Korean educational system difficult to
keep up with and observed that outward expressions of wealth and status were seen as displays
of power while the poor were discriminated against. Additionally, teenaged North Korean
refugees reported feeling upset at the lack of young people willing to give up their seats for
elderly passengers on the subway, let alone care for their aging parents, which was standard in
the DPRK. Prior to resettlement, many refugees dreamed of living in South Korea. Now that
they had achieved that dream, they found it difficult to plan next steps, but “all wanted to support
their group home and the North Korean refugee community.”
School dropout and youth unemployment rates are higher among young North Korean
refugees than South Korean teens, which in turn translates to increased difficulty in attaining
future professional employment. According to a statistical analysis on North Korean refugee 46
youth, “3.5% of elementary students, 12.9% of middle school students, and 28.1% of high school
students drop out of formal education,” rates that are much higher than that of South Korean
students (0.8% in middle school and 1.8% in high school). Despite governmental support, 47
many North Korean refugees find it difficult to secure highpaying jobs due to a number of
additional factors. South Korean labor market reserves lowlevel jobs such as dishwashing and
cleaning for women, while typical jobs for men require skills including computer literacy and
English proficiency. A lack of skills and education prevent men in particular from attaining
professional jobs and women from advancing into careers that can secure financial
selfsufficiency. This challenge is further exacerbated by the fact that the government will
46 Go, MyongHyun. "Resettling in South Korea: Challenges for Young North Korean Refugees." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 8 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 47 Choi, Sheena. "Ethnic Brethren and the National “Other”: North Korean Youths in South Korea." Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration (n.d.): 5157. Oct. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2015.
subsidize a refugee’s undergraduate university education, but not their graduate degree.
Additionally, refugees face hiring and workplace discrimination. A 2014 survey based study
conducted by the Ministry of Unification in partnership with Korea Hana Foundation One and
based on the responses of 12,777 refugees older than 15 showed that one in four refugees had
experienced discrimination in the past year. 68.6% of respondents claimed that “different speech
and methods of communication” was a factor in discrimination, along with 42% who attributed
“negative perceptions of refugees” and 19.2% who stated that a “lack of skill compared to South
Koreans” was a determinate in discriminatory attitudes. They were also found to be working
more hours (an average of 47 hours per week) than South Koreans (44.1 hours per week), but
earning lower wages (1,471,000 won or US$1,340) than their South Korean counterparts
(2,231,000 won (US$2,040). Furthermore, North Korean refugees tended to hold more
shortterm employment and day labor positions. According to the Guardian, the chances of 48
joblessness is 6 times higher for a North Korean refugee than a South Korean. 49
With economic selfsufficiency being a pressing issue for many North Korean refugees,
some have gone to extreme ends in order to secure financial security. One result of this
challenge is the rise of “celebrity refugees” or defectors who share accounts of their lives to the
public in exchange for large amounts of money. Initially, refugees were provided small stipends
to mitigate travel costs when being interviewed. An official from the South Korean ministry of
unification claimed that fees vary depending on the quality of information being provided, but
now range from $50$500 an hour. As the public demand to hear sensational stories of the Kim
regime intensified in recent years, a number of refugees resorted to fabricating segments of their
48Son, Wonje. "Survey: North Korean Refugees Report Discrimination, Lower Earnings." : North Korea : News : The Hankyoreh. N.p., 10 Feb. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 49 McCurry, Justin. "The Defector Who Wants to Go Back to North Korea." The Guardian, 22 Apr. 2015. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
experiences to receive media attention and financial repercussions. Shin Donghyuk, refugee
and author of “Escape from Camp 14” who formerly testified before the United Nations general
assembly about human rights abuses occurring within the borders of his home country, revealed
earlier this year that the gruesome details that he shared about his life in a North Korean prison
camp were only partially true. The added caveat to omissions, additions and distortions of truth 50
within refugee stories is that it sensationalizes the experience to the point that there seems to be
no base in reality and as a result, the public loses a sense of true connection and empathy. The
ordinary repression of the North Korean state “doesn’t seem like a big deal when others are
claiming to have had family members executed for watching South Korean soap operas.” 51
iii. South Korea’s response
Under current president Park GeunHye’s leadership, the South Korean government, in
partnership with the United Nations General Assembly, sponsored a resolution condemning
human rights violations occurring in North Korea earlier this year. The resolution was supported
by 112 nations around the world. 52
Aside from the Hanawon Resettlement Center, the South Korean government provides
refugees with a base stipend of ₩6 million (about $5,600), along with bonuses to individuals over
the age of 60, single parents, and the physically handicapped. Additionally, “defectors can
receive incentive payments or subsidies (up to ₩24.4 million, about $22, 900) when they attend
50 Sanghun, Choe. "Prominent North Korean Defector Recants Parts of His Story of Captivity." The New York Times. N.p., 18 Jan. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 51 Fified, Anna. "This Journalist Didn’t Just Interview North Korean Defectors, He Followed Them on Their Escape." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 June 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 52 "South Korea: Act to Save North Korea Refugees." Human Rights Watch. N.p., 24 Nov. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
job training, find employment and acquire certifications.” Due to the issue of defectors 53
circulating governmentsubsidized funds to brokers, these bonuses are awarded in portions.
Although the financial support of the government is abundant, one criticism is that an analysis of
the effectiveness of programs and a congruent coordination between private and public
integration efforts is lacking. 54
Governmental institutions such as “Foundation for North Korea” provided personal
financial advising, loans, medical treatment, psychological care, and educational opportunities to
individuals who have completed regional training. Additionally, NGOs operating from South 55
Korea, Japan, the U.S., and Europe have provided support to North Korean refugees in the form
of assistance in the underground railroad and advocacy. Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean
Humanitarian Rights, Commission to Help North Korean Refugees, Durihana, and Helping
Hands Korea, are South Korea- based NGO organizations, the latter two of which are Christian
based, that provide programs in food aid, advocacy, mentorship, and youth development among
the refugee community. 56
In addition to government sponsored aid, religiously affiliated groups, and local NGOs,
alternative methods of bridging cultural gaps have also been implemented by South Korean
citizens. In response to the need among newly arrived North Korean refugees to learn linguistic
nuances more akin to the South, a new smartphone app called “Univoca,” short for “unification
vocabulary” was created. The term “unification vocabulary” is a controversial one in it of itself,
in that it alludes to the vision of the Korean peninsula as one unified nation. Perhaps the act of
53Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 54Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 55Suh, YouKyung, and Kyung Hee. "Some Problems of South Korean Government's Current Integrating Policies Regarding North Korean Defectors and Its Future Options." (n.d.): n. pag. Web. 56 Kim, Jungin. "A Study of the Roles of NGOs for North Korean Refugees' Human Rights." Taylor & Francis. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 10 Mar. 2010. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
working toward methods of effective integration of North Korean refugees is a political
statement in itself in that it testifies to one’s support of a unified Korea, a point I will further
contend in the following chapter. Cheil Worldwide, the South Korean firm that devised the
“Univoca” app, did so by showing a South Korean grammar textbook to a group of young
defectors and had them select unfamiliar words. The app works by allowing users to take photos
of a word and get a North Korean translation and additionally, offers advice on simple tasks such
as ordering a pizza and even includes a list of dating terminology. South Korean lexicographer
Han YongWoo is currently working on the first unified Korean dictionary, as are other
linguistic experts who see the potential hidden in language to bridge the cultural barriers between
the two nations. 57
Many South Koreans have mixed responses to the population of North Korean refugees
living in their country. Inferences can be drawn from recent polls on the perceptions of South
Koreans on reunification. The latest Asan poll from January 2015 displays an 80% majority in
favor of a reunified Korea, but “younger people are less interested in the subject and also less
interested in paying an additional tax to support reunification.” 58
According to a Journeyman Pictures documentary on the challenges of resettlement, “it is
widely recognized that the South Korean government needs to do more for their new citizens…
the government always seems to be playing catchup.” Kim HyonUk, leader of the Catholic 59
Lay Apostolate Council of Korea claims that “the South Korean government has been guilty of
neglecting its duty. We have been silent too long– we have forgotten about it too long.” 60
57 Strother, Jason. "Korean Is Virtually Two Languages, and That's a Big Problem for North Korean Defectors." Public Radio International. N.p., 19 May 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 58 Feffer, John. "Korean Reunification: The View From the North." The Huffington Post. 16 June 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 59 Oh, Kongdan. "Embracing North Korean Defectors: The "Small Unification" of Korea." The Brookings Institution, 09 June 2010. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 60Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Its immediate plans involve opening up more localized centers as extensions of Hanawon
and offering more intensive vocational training to refugees. Another idea is to incentivize hiring
refugees, particularly within small businesses that may have difficulty finding employees.
However, as Park Jin, the chairman of the South Korean National Assembly’s Foreign
Affairs, Trade, and Unification Committee poignantly commented, “The settlement of North
Korean defectors in the South is not something that money alone can accomplish.” According to
the aforementioned documentary, what the country has yet to build is “a bridge to span fifty
years of division and hostility.” 61
In the next and final chapter, I will discuss the potential within two groups, ethnics
Koreans and local faith communities, to contribute to building a cultural bridge of integration for
North Korean refugees living in South Korea.
61 N. Korea's Brainwashed Defectors Can't Cope in the Outside World. Journeyman Pictures, 2007. Youtube.
CHAPTER 3// the future. :BEYOND THE BORDER i. Local Faith Communities ii. Ethnic Koreans iii. Moving Forward i. Local Faith Communities
The potential role of local faith communities (LFCs) in the development of resilience
through humanitarian crises, particularly in respect to “disaster risk reduction, emergency
response, and facilitating transitional and durable solutions,” is a largely neglected area of study
Yet, LFCs have provided resources such as “psychological first aid,” pastoral care, and 62
structures for community building in various multicultural contexts around the world for many
years. According to a refugee evaluation response collected by the United Nations High
Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR) regarding the coping strategies in the face of crisis made
available through religion, “sometimes (refugees’) belief in God is more therapeutic than other
interventions and they can better express their issues through their religion through their
spiritual beliefs we can help them find solutions.” (Ager, Fiddian Quasmiyeh)
In Ghana and Liberia, UNHCR reports demonstrated that a method through which
refugees established bonds with host communities was a shared understanding of religious
beliefs and the act of communal prayer, emphasizing the potential in spiritual rituals to bridge
crosscultural barriers. On a psychosocial level, prayer as a spiritual practice provides refugees
with immense benefits through the ability to see “their own role in the story of God in the world”
62Ager, J., E. FiddianQasmiyeh, and A. Ager. "Local Faith Communities and the Promotion of Resilience in Contexts of Humanitarian Crisis." Journal of Refugee Studies 28.2 (2015): 20221. Web.
which in turn, builds a “deep well of resilience that fosters hope and may mitigate the damaging
effects of trauma” (Holton, 2010: 71). Additionally, the UNHCR notes that recent surveys
conducted by the Organization for Refugee, Asylum and Migration prove that faith based
organizations had “views on providing services to lesbian, gay, transgender and intersex asylum
seekers and refugees” that were no better or no worse than secular organizations (Survey
response, UNHCR), further strengthening the argument that local faith communities can play a
substantial role in resilience building and integrative measures in diverse refugee communities.
Although religious freedom does not exist in North Korea, a 2003 survey revealed that
nearly 70% of refugees claimed to be religious, with three quarters identifying as Christian. 63
According to a survey conducted in March 2000, 66.2% of defectors were Christian when they
arrived at Hanawon Resettlement Center and there is “an entire floor of the education building at
Hanawon… devoted to religious education.” Some churches in South Korea have special 64
services dedicated to North Korean refugees and others offer financial and support services.
The concern with church groups and religiously affiliated humanitarian groups is a
seemingly manipulative tendency to take advantage of individuals in crisis for the purpose of
conversion. Some refugees state that “Christianity was the only way out” in navigating the 65
aforementioned “Asian Underground Railroad” to reach South Korea, while others note the
vague parallels between monotheism and North Korean juche ideology, which prioritizes 66
absolute loyalty to its deified leadership and total devotion to the state and adherence to its laws.
An example lies in the Ten Principles, North Korea’s essential creed of totalitarianism, which
63Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 64Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 65 Pilkington, Ed. "Christianity Was the Only Way Out, Says North Korean Defector." The Guardian, 18 Oct. 2015. 66 Kang, JiMin. "From Kim to Christ: Why Religion Works for North Koreans."North Korea News. N.p., 25 Sept. 2013. Web. 17
demands its citizens to “take the authority of the respected comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong
Il and of the Party the absolute one.” 67
However, it seems church attendance and involvement does not necessarily indicate
religious conversion or an adoption of new theological principles. When churchgoing North
Korean refugees were surveyed on the reason they attended religious services in a recent study,
“69.4% cited peace of mind, 41.8% living a moral life, 35.7% to have a relationship with South
Koreans and 21.4% to get useful information about settling in South Korea.” A related 68
ethnographic research study on religious conversion claims that “a preoccupation with ideas was
not germane to... religious turnabout.” Instead, “a preoccupation with the self, and a state of
emotional turmoil rooted in the particular circumstances of the person’s life, dominated the
process.” This demonstrates that the particular theology or practices of a religion were less
important to converts than the role that religion played in the lives of individuals seeking a
religious community for a number of practical and personal reasons. Across the board in surveys
with Christian, Orthodox Jew, Hare Krishna devotees, and Baha’i converts, the most important
aspect of the experience was the “confirmation of their own selves through a promise of
everlasting acceptance.” 69
Indeed, one of the greatest needs of the North Korean refugees is social acceptance as
they grapple with transitions in perspective and identity, along with practical support in
integration. Yosep (Joseph) Cho is a Seoul based senior pastor of Muldaedongsan Church,
which provides resettlement and church services to North Korean refugees living in South Korea.
Cho runs a private school called Saeil (New Work) Academy on the third floor of his church,
67 "The Party's 10 Principles, Then and Now." North Korea News. N.p., 11 Dec. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 68 Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 69 Ullman, Chana. "Haven of Last Resort." The Transformed Self (1989): 125. Web
where he aids refugee students who aim to take the college entrance exam. According to Cho,
“although the (South Korean) government helps the students get into colleges in South Korea,
once they in it is very difficult for them to keep up.” Therefore, the school, which is run by
volunteer instructors, all of whom are Christian, provides free private tutoring to students, as
well as emotional support. One student from Saeil Academy was recently accepted to medical
school at Korea University, one of the most competitive and prestigious universities in South
Korea. In this case, the role of the Christian church in embracing and equipping North Korean 70
refugees to survive and thrive within South Korean culture has proved to be highly effective.
Aside from refugee populations, immigrant communities have also sought out the social
and economic incentives provided by religious institutions. A population with similar struggles
of cultural integration and parallel narratives of utilizing faith based communities throughout the
process of diasporic transition is that of ethnic Koreans or individuals of heritage living outside
of the Korean peninsula.
ii. Ethnic Koreans [Korean Diaspora]
“The word “diaspora” originates from the Greek verb speiro, meaning “to sow,” and the preposition dia, meaning “over.” The ancient Greeks used this word to mean migration and
colonization...Eventually, however, the meaning of a diaspora changed to become quite negative, to describe a forced dispersion of people out of their homeland to their countries of exile.” 71
Inbom Choi
The Overseas Koreans Foundation Act, which was passed by the South Korean National
Assembly in 1998, defines overseas Koreans to be “all persons of Korean origin, regardless of
70 "Pastor: Young N. Korean Defectors Can Bridge the Gap." North Korea News. N.p., 03 Sept. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 71Choi, Inbom. "Korean Diaspora in the Making: Its Current Status and Impact on the Korean Economy." Institute for International Economics, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
their nationality, who reside in foreign countries.” An estimated 7.2 million ethnic Koreans live
in 175 countries outside of the Korean peninsula, with 3 million living in China, 2 million living
in the U.S., and a little less than million living in Japan. Overseas Koreans live in Canada,
Australia, and the UK, raising the number of Koreans in the English speaking world to 2.5
million, as well as in countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brazil. Following a 2010
bill extending voting rights to Koreans living outside of the peninsula, 2.8 million also hold
suffrage rights in South Korea.
According to a George Washington University study on the politics of diaspora
management, “the relationship with...overseas Koreans is a topic of increasing importance for 72
South Koreans since...it is directly relevant for Korea’s overall nationbuilding project” and is
linked to “debates about military services, adopteebirth parent reunions, NorthSouth relations,
and the reintegration of North Korean defectors.” It seems this interest is mutual, as research
shows that “overseas ethnic Koreans communities...try to maintain their ties with their
homeland,” and they are effective in doing so, as demonstrated by the 2,000+ Korean ethnic 73
enclaves that exist around the world. The formation of these diasporic communities exhibit a
strong intention to maintain fundamental cultural values, which binds the ethnic Korean
community with “an ethic of empathy and solidarity.” 74
A fundamental aspect of Korean ethnic communities in the United States is religion,
particularly Christianity. Approximately “three quarters of the Korean population in the U.S.
72 Mylonas, Harris. "The Politics of Diaspora Management in the Republic of Korea." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies (2009): n. pag. Web. 5 Dec. 2015. 73 Mylonas, Harris. "The Politics of Diaspora Management in the Republic of Korea." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies (2009): n. pag. Web. 5 Dec. 2015. 74 Mylonas, Harris. "The Politics of Diaspora Management in the Republic of Korea." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies (2009): n. pag. Web. 5 Dec. 2015.
regularly attend church services, either Protestant or Catholic.” A recent qualitative study on 75
multigenerational Korean Protestant churches claims that, “25% of nonChristian Korean
immigrants affiliate with Korean churches after arriving in the United States.” According to Min
(1992, 1371), “many probably began attending the ethnic church primarily because it met their
practical needs associated with immigrant adjustment.” Smith (1978, 1175) states that migration
itself is “often a theologizing experience.” Through its provision of practical services which are
attractive even to a nonbeliever, “fellowship, maintenance of cultural tradition, social services,
and social status and positions.” 76
The ethnic church serves a significant purpose in providing a sense of community to
immigrants, who are particularly vulnerable to experiencing the emotions characteristic of
sociocultural adaptation and an accompanying sense of marginalization, while “other voluntary
ethnic associations, which meet less frequently, often have specific requirements for membership
based on school, age, or occupation.” An ethnic Korean church has also become an institution
integral to maintaining cultural tradition by providing language classes or traditional problem.
For many Korean American children and adolescents, “Christianity and Koreanness often
become very closely associated in their lives.” Additionally, the church provides opportunities 77
for social status and recognition amidst the downward mobility characteristic of immigration.
Choi notes that “this function is more significant for Korean male immigrants, for whom holding
a staff position in the church is positively correlated with mental health.”
75 "Korean Americans Cultural Commonalities." (n.d.): n. pag. Web. <https://www.library.ca.gov/services/docs/korean.pdf>. 76 Hynes, Eugene, R. Stephen Warner, and Judith G. Wittner. "Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration."Contemporary Sociology 28.4 (1999): 442. Web. 77 Chai, Karen J,. "Competing for the Second Generation: English Language Ministry at a Korean Protestant Church." Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration (n.d.): 295328. Web.
However, there are differences in the role that ethnic churches play in the lives of
firstgeneration immigrants (that is, an immigrant who was born in South Korea and relocated to
another) and second generation immigrants (the children of first generation immigrants). While
first generation churchgoers within a Korean Protestant church prioritized “traditional and
rituals, preserving hierarchy, and financially supporting the church,” second generation believers
were “less concerned with formal structures and processes and instead stressed Christian ethics
and evangelism” which more individualistic views of Christianity as “accepting Jesus Christ as
one’s personal savior.” Herein lies a connection to the various roles that faith can play in the 78
psychosocial well being of an individual, particularly one affected by trauma. In fact, as the
benefits of faith to individual psychosocial wellbeing can be categories in two ways: intrinsic
beliefs or ideas, which parallel the focus of second generation Korean Americans and extrinsic
behavior and rituals, which most closely characterize first generation Korean American
Christians.
Do ethnic Koreans, many of whom hold psychological and political ties to their home
countries play a role in the resettlement of North Koreans in South Korea? Rachel Stine, a
development worker based in South Korea and former teacher at the Mulmangcho School, an
alternative academy for North Korean refugee youth, certainly thinks so. She claims that 79
“gyopos” (교포), a term used in South Korea to describe individuals of Korean heritage living
outside of the country, will be increasingly useful in the coming years to North Korean refugees
because they have the cultural understanding and language capacity of a native, but they have
78 Chai, Karen J,. "Competing for the Second Generation: English Language Ministry at a Korean Protestant Church." Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration (n.d.): 295328. Web. 79 Mulmangcho School. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. <https://www.facebook.com/mulmangchoschool/info/?tab=page_info>.
also been exposed to uniquely Western perspectives and have faced similar migratory struggles.
80
According to an ethnographic case study on the cultural challenges of Korean American
students in classroom settings, young ethnic Koreans experience great ambiguity and
contradiction in reconciling their bicultural and bilingual identities. The study highlighted the
experience of one elementary school student of Korean American heritage named Min, for whom
“being bicultural meant that he needed to adjust to American culture while maintaining his
Korean identity… but the process had not been without ambiguity or contradiction when Min
could not feel the total sense of belonging to any one culture.” Some of the struggle in the 81
classroom context arose as a result of a the implicit impression that “what Min needed to do was
to blend into the existing cultural environment as much as possible.” As a result, Min never rose
his hand or gave his opinion in the classroom unless directly asked.
Min’s mother claims that his teachers, the majority of whom are white, rarely have
anything negative to say about him. She states that “most teachers seem to have a pretty positive
image of Asians… but they don’t know much about us,” lending credibility to the claim that
Asian Americans are an “invisible minority.” Min also experienced a conflicted attitude in 82
regard to his willingness to learn and practice the Korean language. Interviewed Korean parents
expressed a strong desire for their children to learn Korean as a way to maintain their ethnic
identity. In certain families, a child’s ability to speak Korean determined whether or not
intergenerational communication would be possible. However, as the study claims,
80 Ying, Loke Shi. "Minimalistic Visualizations Explain Differences In Eastern And Western Cultures." DesignTaxi, 30 Sept. 2013. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 81 Godina, Heriberto, and Jeonghee Choi. "Korean American Cultural Differences in Classroom Literacy Activities: Observations from an Ethnographic Case Study." Journal of Multicultural, Gender, and Minority Studies (2009): n. pag. Web., 82 Yancy, George, and Haekwon Kim. "The Invisible Asian." The New York Times, 08 Oct. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
“languageminority children encounter powerful forces for assimilation as soon as they enter the
Englishspeaking world of the classroom… and may be driven to learn English at the expense of
losing their home languages.” In many ways, the struggles pertaining to unbelonging, lack of
visibility, language struggles, and dual identities of ethnic Korean youth mirror that of North
Korean refugees. One may argue that all populations undergoing migration, diaspora, or cultural
transition has threads of commonality in their experiences. However, the shared nuances
specific to the Korean identity and the accompanying tension of contesting those particular set of
values with that of a foreign culture is what I believe link the narratives of these two seemingly
contrasting populations together. Ethnic Koreans not only undergo similar processes of cultural
transition, they also adopt a certain level of Western influenced individualism.
South Korean culture is collectivist, promoting the goals of harmony, interdependence,
avoidance of open conflict, and sharp distinguishing between ingroups and outgroups. These
values contrast sharply with those of Western culture, which are more individualistic in nature
and centered around independence, acceptance of confrontation, and definition of self apart from
a group. The traits that distinguish a member of an ingroup from a member of the outgroup, or
in more simple terms, “the other,” can vary, but the exclusivity and even hostility toward a
nonmember make it notoriously difficult to penetrate and gain complete acceptance into an
ingroup within a collectivist culture. Meanwhile, the fluidity and transience of values
characteristic of the immigrant experience make it much more difficult for ethnic Koreans to
retain stringent standards regarding ingroup and outgroups determinants, thereby allowing for
increased levels of acceptance and appreciation of diversity.
To test the engagement of ethnic Koreans, specifically Korean Americans, of the North
Korean human rights issues and integration issues faced by North Korean refugees in South
Korea, I conducted an informal, online survey and sent it to my community of friends of Korean
origin through social media platforms. The survey was entirely voluntary and anonymous. Of
the 126 survey respondents, 79.37% (100) were between the ages of 1825, 35.71% (45) were
Koreanborn American citizens and 39.68% (50) were American citizens of Korean heritage for
a combined 75.39% with current citizenship based in the U.S. 89.68% (113) identified to be
Christians. Therefore, the population accounted for is predominantly comprised of young,
secondgeneration ethnic Koreans who identify as Christian.
Respondents were asked a series of questions to gauge their interest and engagement in
North Korean human rights and the issues surrounding integration among North Korean refugees
in South Korea. Alongside these questions, I asked questions surrounding faith as a way to
measure if there was a correlation between fervor of religious practice with engagement in issues
pertaining to North Korea. When asked how relevant they believed human rights issues in North
Korea to be, 53.17% (67) of total survey respondents stated “very relevant” while 30.16% (38)
stated “relevant” for a combined percentage of 83.33% reporting high levels of engagement.
Similarly, when asked how relevant a cause they believed efforts in integration for North Korean
refugees in South Korea to be, 44.44% (56) of total respondents answered “very relevant” and
38.89% (49) answered “relevant” for a combined total of 83.33% engaged participants.
87.3% of surveyed respondents claims that their religious beliefs had at least “somewhat”
of a bearing on their engagement with North Korea related issues, with 34.92% (44) stating that
it held “very much” of a bearing. However, I discovered that personal engagement did not
immediately transfer to a willingness to be directly involved in relief measures related to these
causes. When asked to gauge their level of interest to work on North Korean human rights or
refugee issues if given the opportunity, 69.85% claimed that they were at least interested, with
29.37% stating that they were “very interested.”
Perhaps the most significant finding of the survey was uncovered through the question of
whether or not respondents supported North and South Korea’s reunification, to which 67.46%
(85) answered yes, 3.97% (5) answered no, and 28.57% (36) answered that they were not sure.
However, of the 70 Koreanborn American citizens, American citizens, and Korean born
foreign citizens (ethnic Koreans) who took the survey, 81.43% of whom cited their faith to be
“very important” in their daily lives and 77.14% of whom were between the ages of 1825, 100%
were in favor of reunification. This indicates an overwhelmingly optimistic attitude held by
ethnic Korean young adults, the majority of whom hold strong commitments to their faith,
toward a unified Korea, which is arguably influenced by distance and perhaps a lack of
awareness into the implications of such a move. Yet, it sets this population apart as one holding
a unanimously supportive position in favor of reunification within an issue characterized by
conflict and controversy.
iii. Moving Forward “Reunification, when it happens, and it will happen, may be less turbulent if the ordinary
people of North and South can at least have some contact, be permitted to have family vacations together, or attend the weddings of nephews and nieces. The least that could be done for
defectors is to ensure that they know, when they risk everything to escape, that they will not be lost for ever to the people they left behind, that they have supporters and wellwishers the world
over, that they are not crossing the border alone.” The Girl with the Seven Names
This past summer, I was fortunate to study in South Korea and conduct some
ethnographic research in preparation to write this thesis on a grant from my university. I took a
course on North Korean politics and culture and another on research methods in social work,
while attending meetings for a nonprofit organization called Catacombs or Helping Hands
Korea. Helping Hands Korea is a Seoulbased Christian organization that was founded in 1990
by an American man named Tim Peters. Every week, I attended meetings where 810 people
including high school students with aspirations to become international diplomats, American
English teachers with a special interest in refugee issues, missionaries, and South Koreans who
had served as reunification activists for many years would gather. Some nights, we would
package seeds to be smuggled across the border to North Korea. Other nights, we would pray
for the individuals making their way to safety via the “Underground Railroad” and discuss
current events related to the Hermit Kingdom. During one meeting, we each shared about our
personal backgrounds and connection to the North Korean people. One ethnically Korean high
school student, who had been born in the U.S. but immigrated with her parents to South Korea to
attend school, shared that through her elementary and middle school education, she was taught to
have a negative perspective on North Korea. The North Korean government was presented in
her South Korean history books and classes to be a political enemy and its citizens deserving of
pity but also suspicion. Considering the two nations’ history of tension and even recent accounts
of conflict, it isn’t difficult to imagine why South Korean students are educated with these
particular perspectives.
Outside of the classroom, the ongoing “semiwar” between the two countries affects the 83
personal lives of young South Koreans. An example is compulsory military service for males
between the ages 2030. Of the 27 countries in the world that require military service of its
citizens, South Korea has one of the longest conscriptions at 21 months. South Korean men are
separated from their educational trajectories, careers, and loved ones during this time and are
pushed physically and psychologically, sometimes to a dangerous level, as proven by recent
“suicides, mass shootings and, most alarming of all from the viewpoint of the top command, the
torture murder of a young soldier whose comrades literally bullied him to death.” On a societal 84
level, gender binaries are reinforced through the hierarchical and disciplinary military structure.
As one article claims, “without having service in the military, a 20 or 30 somethingyearold
man is rarely accepted as a “man.” Kim KwangSik, an expert in behavioral science at the 85
Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, was recently quoted to say that “soldiers basically have a
negative idea about enlistment.” He claimed there was serious cause for worry regarding the
“building tensions when faced with military confrontation with North Korea,” considering the 86
psychological instability of unwilling soldiers who are forced to serve in the South Korean army.
The realities faced by South Korean citizens, who daily confront with inescapable
proximity the possibility of war with neighboring North Korea, is fundamental to consider, as it
lends validity to the ambivalence with which South Koreans respond to the needs of the North
Korean refugee community. The medical and psychological services that the government
83 "Flight or Fight: Conscription Misery in South Korea." South China Morning Post. Post Magazine, 18 Jan. 2015. Web. 17 84 Kirk, Donald. "South Korean Armed Forces Face Enemy Within: Suicides And Murder." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 85 Kim, Stella. "A Dreaded Rite of Passage: South Korea’s Mandatory Military Service." Brown Political Review. N.p., 1 Dec. 2013. Web. 17 Dec. 2015./ 86 Kirk, Donald. "South Korean Armed Forces Face Enemy Within: Suicides And Murder." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
provides to this population are ultimately reimbursed by South Korean citizens, further
narrowing the degree to which North Korean defection benefits the South Korean people.
This complex struggle does not have to be, and perhaps was never meant to be,
contended with and resolved exclusively within the community of those directly affected and
inhabiting the Korean peninsula. Existing examples of individuals and organizations from
around the world who have responded to the needs of the refugee population in an effective
manner include Southern California based Liberty in North Korea. Founded in 2004 at Yale
University’s Korean American Students Conference by Paul Kim and Adrian Hong, this
organization leads awareness tours across the U.S., collects donations to fund rescue missions,
and aids refugees in the resettlement process in South Korea. In a recent article by Rachel Stine,
LINK was commended for their positive portrayal of refugees, whom the organization is careful
not to present as “PTSDaddled welfare addicts” but as “survivors, each with a unique
personality and distinct career path.” In turn, donors to the organization, who contribute to
LINK’s impressive annual income of 1.5 million USD, are encouraged to give “not out of pity,
but with the knowledge that North Koreans can successfully integrate into the modern economy
and contribute positively to their neighborhood.” Hope, it seems, can be very powerful. 87
The case for full attention and efforts toward reintegrative methods for North Korean
refugees is stronger than ever. Andrei Lankov, a scholar of Korean studies at Kookmin
University in South Korea and the author of the book “The Real North Korea: Life and Politics
in the Failed Stalinist Utopia,” speculates that there are three possible scenarios for the future of
North Korea: the successful uprising of a communist dictatorship without political freedom but
87 Stine, Rachel. "The Stereotype of the Damaged North Korean Is Demeaning."The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 15 Dec. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
economic security, an uprising and regime collapse followed by Chinese intervention, and lastly,
the same collapse with South Korean intervention and essential integration, much like what
happened in Germany 25 years ago. Having grown up in the Soviet Union and studied at Kim Il
Sung University in Pyongyang, Lankov considers the third option to be most likely. Pastor
Yoseph (Joseph) Cho of Muldaedongsan Church in Seoul, who has worked with North Koran
refugees for over 20 years, holds similar beliefs. He predicts that “the current North Korean
regime will collapse in three or five years” due to the fact that it is “an unsustainable regime; the
trend in history is that authoritarian regimes and totalitarian regimes are just no longer viable.” 88
In the case that the Korean peninsula is most likely headed toward reunification, the
undivided support of a population with positive views of a unified Korea and unbiased
perspectives on North Korean refugees, such that of ethnic Koreans, is needed. I see potential
for ethnic Koreans, who may or may not be motivated by faith according to my informal survey
and/or work through religious institutions to provide effective service, to play a major role in
bridging existing gaps in integration. It is my belief that this population’s nuanced
understanding of biculturalism and migratory issues specific to the Korean ethnicity and ability
to see beyond politics into the hearts of North Korean refugees, afforded through the distance
often required to observe a situation without personal bias, will be increasingly integral in the
years to come.
88 "Pastor: Young N. Korean Defectors Can Bridge the Gap." North Korea News. N.p., 03 Sept. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Works Cited
Ager, J., E. FiddianQasmiyeh, and A. Ager. "Local Faith Communities and the Promotion of Resilience in Contexts of Humanitarian Crisis." Journal of Refugee Studies 28.2 (2015): 20221. Web.
Branigan, Tania. "North Korean Health System Crumbling as Shortages and Sanctions Bite." The Guardian, 23 Apr. 2014. Web. 15 Dec. 2015.
Chai, Karen J,. "Competing for the Second Generation: English Language Ministry at a Korean Protestant Church." Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration (n.d.): 295328. Web.
Choi, Inbom. "Korean Diaspora in the Making: Its Current Status and Impact on the Korean Economy." Institute for International Economics, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Choi, Sheena. "Ethnic Brethren and the National “Other”: North Korean Youths in South Korea." Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration (n.d.): 5157. Oct. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2015.
Choo, H. Y. "Gendered Modernity and Ethnicized Citizenship: North Korean Settlers in Contemporary South Korea." Gender & Society 20.5 (2006): 576604. Web.
Crocker, Lizzie. "North Korea’s Secret Movie Bootleggers: How Western Films Make It Into the Hermit Kingdom." The Daily Beast, 22 Dec. 2014. Web. 11 May 2015.
"Crossing Heaven's Border." PBS. PBS, 30 June 2009. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. "Escaping North Korea: The Plight of Defectors." The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission
Hearing (TLHRC) (n.d.): n. pag. 23 Sept. 2010. Web. 10 Dec. 2015. Eunsun Kim A North Korean Refugee. Perf. Eunsun Kim. SVT/NRK Show "Skavlan", 2013.
Youtube. "Facebook." Mulmangcho School. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
<https://www.facebook.com/mulmangchoschool/info/?tab=page_info>. Feffer, John. "Korean Reunification: The View From the North." The Huffington Post.
TheHuffingtonPost.com, 16 June 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. Fified, Anna. "This Journalist Didn’t Just Interview North Korean Defectors, He Followed Them
on Their Escape." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 June 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
"Flight or Fight: Conscription Misery in South Korea." South China Morning Post. Post Magazine, 18 Jan. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Glionna, John M. "A Rare Look inside the Hanawon Center for North Korean Defectors." Los Angeles Times, 09 July 2009. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Go, MyongHyun. "Resettling in South Korea: Challenges for Young North Korean Refugees." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 8 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Godina, Heriberto, and Jeonghee Choi. "Korean American Cultural Differences in Classroom Literacy Activities: Observations from an Ethnographic Case Study." Journal of Multicultural, Gender, and Minority Studies (2009): n. pag. Web.
Greenberg, Andy. "The Plot to Free North Korea With Smuggled Episodes of ‘Friends’." Wired.com. Conde Nast Digital, 1 Mar. 2015. Web. 16 Dec. 2015.
Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland. Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2011. Print.
Haub, Carl. "North Korea Census Reveals Poor Demographic and Health Conditions." PRB. Population Reference Bureau, Dec. 2010. Web. 16 Dec. 2015.
"History of North Korea Liberty in North Korea." History of North Korea. Liberty in North Korea, n.d. Web. 2 Dec. 2015.
Hynes, Eugene, R. Stephen Warner, and Judith G. Wittner. "Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration." Contemporary Sociology 28.4 (1999): 442. Web.
Jeon, Hong, Lee, Lee, Han, and Min. "Correlation Between Traumatic Events and PosttraumaticStress Disorder Among North Korean Defectorsin South Korea." Journal of Traumatic Stress, Apr. 2005. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Jeon, Yu, Cho, and Eom. "Traumatic Experiences and Mental Health of North Korean Refugees in South Korea." Psychiatry Investigation, 31 Dec. 2008. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Kang, JiMin. "From Kim to Christ: Why Religion Works for North Koreans." NK News North Korea News. N.p., 25 Sept. 2013. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Kim, Jungin. "A Study of the Roles of NGOs for North Korean Refugees' Human Rights." Taylor & Francis. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 10 Mar. 2010. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Kim, M., Hong, Ra, and K. Kim. "Understanding Social Exclusion and Psychosocial Adjustment of North Korean Adolescents and Young Adult Refugees in South Korea through Photovoice." Qualitative Social Work, 25 Feb. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Kim, Stella. "A Dreaded Rite of Passage: South Korea’s Mandatory Military Service." Brown Political Review. N.p., 1 Dec. 2013. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Kirk, Donald. "South Korean Armed Forces Face Enemy Within: Suicides And Murder." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
"Korean Americans Cultural Commonalities." (n.d.): n. pag. Web. <https://www.library.ca.gov/services/docs/korean.pdf>.
"Korean War Fast Facts CNN.com." CNN. Cable News Network, 3 July 2015. Web. 16 Dec. 2015.
Lah, Kyung, and KJ Kwon. "Tired of Conflict: Life near the Korean DMZ." CNN. Cable News Network, 31 Aug. 2015. Web. 16 Dec. 2015.
McCurry, Justin. "The Defector Who Wants to Go Back to North Korea." The Guardian, 22 Apr. 2015. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Mylonas, Harris. "The Politics of Diaspora Management in the Republic of Korea." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies (2009): n. pag. Web. 5 Dec. 2015.
N. Korea's Brainwashed Defectors Can't Cope in the Outside World. Journeyman Pictures, 2007. Youtube.
"North Korean Defector: 'Bureau 121' Hackers in China." CNN. Cable News Network, n.d. Web. 15 May 2015.
Oh, Kongdan. "Embracing North Korean Defectors: The "Small Unification" of Korea." The Brookings Institution, 09 June 2010. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Oh, Kongdan. "Embracing North Korean Defectors: The "Small Unification" of Korea." The Brookings Institution, 09 June 2010. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
O'Neill, Tom. "Korea's DMZ: Dangerous Divide National Geographic Magazine." Korea's DMZ: Dangerous Divide National Geographic Magazine. National Geographic, July 2003. Web. 16 Dec. 2015.
Ossowski, Yaël. "Long Live the North Korean Black Market." The Canal. The Panam Post, 20 Nov. 2014. Web. 16 Dec. 2015.
Park, Jumin, and James Pearson. "It Now Costs $8,000 per Person to Defect from North Korea." Business Insider. Business Insider, Inc, 21 May 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Park, Yeon Mi. "Yeonmi Park: The Hopes of North Korea's 'Black Market Generation." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 25 May 2014. Web. 11 May 2015.
"The Party's 10 Principles, Then and Now." North Korea News. N.p., 11 Dec. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
"Pastor: Young N. Korean Defectors Can Bridge the Gap." North Korea News. N.p., 03 Sept. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Pearson, Jumin Park and James. "It Now Costs $8,000 per Person to Defect from North Korea." Business Insider. Business Insider, Inc, 21 May 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Pilkington, Ed. "Christianity Was the Only Way Out, Says North Korean Defector." The Guardian, 18 Oct. 2015. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.
Popeski, Ronald. "Sunshine Policy Failed to Change North Korea: Report." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 18 Nov. 2010. Web. 16 Dec. 2015.
"Refugee Rescues." Liberty in North Korea, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. Sanghun, Choe. "Prominent North Korean Defector Recants Parts of His Story of Captivity."
The New York Times. N.p., 18 Jan. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. Son, Wonje. "Survey: North Korean Refugees Report Discrimination, Lower Earnings." : North
Korea : News : The Hankyoreh. N.p., 10 Feb. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. "South Korea: Act to Save North Korea Refugees." Human Rights Watch. N.p., 24 Nov. 2015.
Web. 17 Dec. 2015. Stine, Rachel. "The Stereotype of the Damaged North Korean Is Demeaning." The Huffington
Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 15 Dec. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14
July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. Strother, Jason. "Korean Is Virtually Two Languages, and That's a Big Problem for North
Korean Defectors." Public Radio International. N.p., 19 May 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. Suh, YouKyung, and Kyung Hee. "Some Problems of South Korean Government's Current
Integrating Policies Regarding North Korean Defectors and Its Future Options." (n.d.): n. pag. Web.
Tran, Mark. "North and South Korea: A History of Violence." The Guardian. N.p., 20 May 2010. Web. 15 Dec. 2015.
"UN Report Criticizes China for Treatment of North Korean Refugees Amid Worsening Situation." UN Report Criticizes China for Treatment of North Korean Refugees Amid Worsening Situation. Congressional Executive Commission on China, 19 Mar. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
"The World Factbook." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, n.d. Web. 16 Dec. 2015.
Xu, Beina, and Jayshree Bajoria. "The China North Korea Relationship." Council on Foreign Relations, 22 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Yancy, George, and Haekwon Kim. "The Invisible Asian." The New York Times, 08 Oct. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.
Ying, Loke Shi. "Minimalistic Visualizations Explain Differences In Eastern And Western Cultures." DesignTaxi, 30 Sept. 2013. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.