beyond physics: a case for far transfer
TRANSCRIPT
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer
Benjamin Robert Forsyth
Received: 10 November 2009 / Accepted: 13 September 2011 / Published online: 25 September 2011� Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2011
Abstract This is a case study of a physics undergraduate who claimed that he ‘‘uses
physics to understand other subjects.’’ This statement suggested that this student could
describe issues concerning the transfer of learning and especially instances of far transfer.
Detailed instances of far transfer have been difficult to replicate in lab settings. Therefore,
three interviews were designed to investigate this student’s claims about using physics to
understand other subjects as a means to better understand far transfer processes. Transfer in
this case study is defined as the personal construction of relations of similarity. Further-
more, I operationalize this definition of transfer via 12 aspects of transfer derived from the
work of several contemporary researchers who study the transfer of learning. As part of
this case study I also investigate the subject’s motivation for engaging in far transfer.
Directions for future research are discussed which includes the need to study the role of
personal epistemology in far transfer as well as a larger investigation of students who
transfer broadly across school subjects.
Keywords Transfer of learning � Far transfer � Physics � Philosophy �Epistemology � Motivation
Introduction
This case study attempts to address issues surrounding the transfer of learning.1 It is about
an undergraduate physics student named Bill (a pseudonym) who wanted to change majors
This research was conducted in fulfillment of the practicum requirement for the author’s doctoral program.
B. R. Forsyth (&)Department of Educational Psychology and Foundations, University of Northern Iowa,Cedar Falls, IA 50614-0607, USAe-mail: [email protected]
1 In this paper, transfer is defined as the personal construction of relations of similarity across activities(Lobato 2003). The definition will be discussed later in greater detail.
123
Instr Sci (2012) 40:515–535DOI 10.1007/s11251-011-9188-z
away from physics, but was reluctant to do so because he claimed that physics helped him
understand many other subjects like history, music, German, philosophy and the social
sciences. Although many of the examples that Bill explained during our discussions were
connected in some way to physics, the focus of this study is less about subject matter and
more about describing distant (far) transfer as it happens outside of carefully controlled
experiments.
Studies of transfer where individuals learn in one context and apply their learning to
another context have often shown that humans have difficulty in this task when the two
contexts are extremely disparate (see Detterman 1993 a particularly crushing analysis).
Therefore, when Bill claims that physics helps him understand subjects like history and
social studies better, it deserves to be looked into. What, if anything, is Bill really trans-
ferring? Is physics content helping Bill to understand other subjects any better? What
process does he use when he transfers between physics and other subjects? What motivates
him to look for these similarities across topics? This case study intends to contribute
toward clarifying these issues about the transfer of learning that have concerned educa-
tional researchers for many years.
A brief review of transfer
Transfer has played a central role in educational psychology since before the field was even
considered a formal subject. Barnett and Ceci (2002) explain that one reason transfer has
remained so important is because of its foundational role in assessments of learning. These
assessments often measure whether learning remains permanent and whether it can be
applied to novel contexts. Therefore, a sufficient understanding of transfer is required to
appropriately interpret these assessments.
Despite its importance, researchers are not in general agreement about how transfer
works, how often it occurs or how to improve it. This lack of agreement is based in part on
the difficulty in capturing transfer experimentally. In the words of Schoenfeld (1999):
Transfer is ubiquitous. We couldn’t survive if we weren’t able to adapt what we
know to circumstances that differ, at least in some degree, from the circum-
stances in which we learned it. Yet transfer is mysteriously absent from the
psychological laboratory; it seems to vanish when experimenters try to pin it
down (p. 7).
Researchers who are critical of transfer would whole-heartedly agree with the last
portion of Schoenfeld’s statement; that studies of transfer typically show low rates of
transfer. Furthermore, this lack of results has led some researchers to downplay the
ubiquity, importance and/or necessity of transfer (Hammer et al. 2005; Perkins and Grotzer
1997). However, they often assume that the rarity of observed transfer implies its use-
lessness which requires an assumption that research on transfer is definitive in its analysis
and that little is left to study on the topic. Considering the conflicting data from every-day
versus experimental observations, past research on transfer seems neither definitive nor
closed.
Several new theories about transfer (Barnett and Ceci 2002; Lobato 2003; Schwartz
et al. 2005) have been published over the last decade which attempt to address theoretical
and methodological deficiencies of previous transfer research. Short descriptions of these
researchers’ work follow below.
516 B. R. Forsyth
123
Barnett and Ceci
Barnett and Ceci (2002) propose a taxonomy of transfer that organizes past research and
directs future studies. The taxonomy decomposes instances of transfer into nine dimen-
sions. The first three—labeled (a) learned skill, (b) performance change, and (c) memory
demands—are called content dimensions which describe what is being transferred. The
first dimension (learned skill) varies from a learning a specific procedure to learning
general representations or principles. The second content dimension (performance change)
builds off of the first dimension by recognizing that learned skills can be in measured in
multiple ways. For example, a researcher who studies students’ long division (a learned
skill) may measure transfer of this skill based on performance changes in speed, accuracy,
or approach, or a combination of all three. Finally, the third content dimension accounts for
ways that transfer can be more or less difficult due to changes in the memory demands of
the task. For example, completing a long division problem with help from a book or ‘‘cheat
sheet’’ has less memory demands than performing the same task without these scaffolds
and transfer success will likely vary as these memory demands change.
The last six dimensions—labeled (a) knowledge domain, (b) physical context,
(c) temporal context, (d) functional context, (e) social context, and (f) modality—are
contextual dimensions of transfer that describe ‘‘when and where learning is transferred
from and to’’ (Barnett and Ceci 2002, p. 623). The authors explain that transfer difficulty
depends on how similar or different the target and base of a transfer problem is along each
dimension. Contextual dimensions with a high degree of similarity across the target and
base are labeled as ‘‘near transfer’’ whereas dimensions with a high degree of difference
across the target and base are labeled as ‘‘far transfer.’’ For example, Barnett and Ceci label
a transfer problem in biology involving a mouse and rat as a case of near transfer along the
dimension of knowledge domain whereas a problem involving science and art is labeled as
far transfer.
Although transfer is often dichotomized into categories of near and far transfer, Barnett
and Ceci prefer to view each contextual dimension as lying along a near-far transfer
continuum. This means that some amount of subjectivity remains within each proposed
contextual dimension. For example, in the knowledge domain, two researchers might
disagree about whether transfer from science to history is more distant than science to
economics. Nevertheless, the strength of Barnett and Ceci’s taxonomy is that transfer
distance is measured across multiple dimensions. Previous research allowed for transfer to
only be classified as either completely near or completely far whereas Barnett and Ceci’s
taxonomy allows researchers to explain across multiple contexts how distant a particular
instance transfer is.
Bransford and Schwartz
Bransford and Schwartz (1999) and Schwartz et al. (2005) posit that the types of tasks used
by past researchers of transfer is one reason that poor, or at least mixed, transfer results
occur. They call these transfer tasks ‘‘sequestered problem solving’’ (SPS) tasks. SPS tasks
consist of one-time tests that are isolated from any external sources of knowledge (Fortus
2002). In these tasks, researchers discourage participants to seek solutions to the problem
beyond the materials or information they are given. One example of the SPS technique
comes from Gick and Holyoak (1983). The researchers in this study asked participants to
solve a well structured medical problem based on a specific military analogy. Participants’
performance was strictly based on their use of the military analogy to solve the medical
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer 517
123
problem. Therefore, answers that did not use the military analogy were not under the same
amount of scrutiny. Consequently, less consideration was given toward the usefulness of
other possible solutions.
Bransford, Schwartz and colleagues are not necessarily saying that SPS tasks are
inherently bad or that they should never be used. Rather, they argue that SPS tasks are
usually too narrow to indicate transfer. They suggest that tests of transfer should look
to see how a participant seeks out extra information to solve a new problem. They call
this method for studying transfer the preparation for learning (PFL) approach. The PFL
approach is based on the idea that people not only use knowledge in a procedural and
conceptual way, but also in a way to gain more knowledge (Broudy 1977).
Lobato
Lobato (2003) developed a theoretical framework for studying transfer that reacts against
normative expert-oriented transfer studies that focus primarily on what participants
‘‘should’’ transfer rather than what they do transfer. She calls her framework actor-orientedtransfer wherein transfer is defined as ‘‘the personal construction of relations of similarity’’
(2003, p. 20).
Lobato’s actor-oriented perspective is useful because it allows transfer to be analyzed
even when what is transferred is considered ‘‘incorrect.’’ For Lobato, what matters is that
the one engaging in transfer (the actor) sees some amount of similarity across learning
experiences. By widening what counts as transfer there is less chance of missing moments
where initial learning extends across contexts. It also allows researchers to investigate
ways to correct transferred misconceptions as a result of misguided or poorly constructed
relations of similarity.
Definition of transfer
This case study adopts Lobato’s (2003) definition of transfer which states that transfer is
the personal construction of relations of similarity. However, I have adopted this definition
of transfer based on how well it synthesizes key ideas across all three perspectives
reviewed in this paper. First, it reflects a preference for measuring transfer based on
personal constructions of similarity even when these constructions are in opposition to
what theoretically should be transferred; an idea espoused by Bransford and Schwartz
(1999) as well as Lobato (2003). Similarly, it assumes that these relations of similarity
need to be given equal consideration when they are analyzed because a ‘‘wrong’’ relation is
still an instance of transfer. Furthermore, the definition is broad enough that instances of
transfer can be analyzed according to the content and context dimensions of Barnett and
Ceci’s (2002) transfer taxonomy.
Two extra dimensions of transfer
Defining transfer as a synthesis across three perspectives suggests two more ‘‘dimen-
sions’’ of transfer that should be added to Barnett and Ceci’s (2002) taxonomy.
I call these dimensions value, and intentionality of transfer. I discuss these dimensions
below.
518 B. R. Forsyth
123
Value
Often in transfer research, only positively valued transfer is considered (i.e., when a
learning experience is deemed helpful to a learner’s overall growth in understanding).
However, consistent with Lobato’s (2003) actor oriented perspective and Bransford and
Schwartz’ (1999) PFL approach, this case study evaluated instances of transfer even if its
value was negative or trivial.
Intentionality
The level in which transfer is active or passive is referred to as intentionality in this paper
and each of the three sets of researchers previously reviewed discuss this topic. Lobato’s
(2003) definition of transfer implies that transfer can be either active or passive and that it
is a dynamic process as opposed to a static application. Bransford and colleagues
(Bransford et al. 1999; Bransford and Schwartz 1999) also suggest that the most interesting
kind of transfer is the kind that is active and dynamic. Furthermore, Barnett and Ceci
(2002) define active transfer as transfer that is conscious. However, they are relatively
silent regarding passive transfer.
Although all three groups of researchers seem to be in agreement that active transfer is
preferred over passive transfer Pugh and Bergin (2006) suggest in their review of moti-
vational influences on transfer that the role of intentionality in transfer is in need of greater
conceptual clarity. To illustrate this need they provide an example of researchers’ over-
simplification of intentionality in Salomon and Perkins’ (1989) description of high-road
transfer, a kind of transfer equated with the process of ‘‘consciously formulated abstrac-
tions’’ (p. 118). At first glance high-road transfer seems to equate with ‘‘active transfer.’’
However, Salomon and Perkins break up their description of high-road transfer into two
types; a passive form called forward reaching transfer and an active form called backward
reaching transfer. In forward reaching transfer ‘‘a principle is so well learned in the first
place…that it simply suggests itself appropriately on late occasions’’ (pp. 118–119).
Backward reaching transfer, on the other hand, involves, ‘‘the deliberate formulation of an
abstraction’’ (p. 119). Therefore, not all meaningful ‘‘high-road’’ transfer is necessarily
active transfer and neither is passive transfer necessarily a lesser form of transfer as might
be supposed.
Twelve aspects of transfer
Based on Barnett and Ceci’s (2002) taxonomy, Lobato’s (2003) actor oriented transfer
perspective and Bransford and Schwartz’ (1999) PFL perspective, I identify 12 aspects of
transfer that operationalize the definition of transfer as the personal construction of rela-
tions of similarity in this case study (see Table 1). The first three aspects (Learned Skill,
Performance Change and Memory Demands) come directly from the content portion of
Barnett and Ceci’s taxonomy of transfer. The next six (Knowledge Domain, Physical
Context, Temporal Context, Functional Context, Social Context and Modality) come from
the context portion of Barnett and Ceci’s taxonomy. Value and Intentionality come from
Lobato (2003) and Bransford and Schwartz (1999), as well as ideas put forward by Pugh
and Bergin (2006) and Engle (2006). The final aspect (Relations of Similarity) comes
directly from Lobato’s definition that transfer is the personal construction of relations of
similarity. These ‘‘relations’’ should be capable of being graphically mapped and analyzed
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer 519
123
similar to the structural maps used by analogical reasoning theorists like Gentner (1983),
Holyoak and Thagard (1989), and Markman (1997).
Research questions
This study intended to observe what, how and why a student (Bill) transfers between
physics and other subjects. This was formally stated as a set of three questions:
1. Based on the definition that transfer is the personal construction of relations of
similarity, what particular instances of transfer does Bill identify between physics and
other school related subjects?
2. How does Bill transfer between physics and other subjects based on a definition of
transfer operationalized by 12 aspects of transfer?
3. Why does Bill engage in transfer between physics and other subjects?
Answering these questions via a case study will to add to researchers’ understanding of
transfer in several ways. First, it attempts to describe a form of far transfer (within the
knowledge domain, at least) that borders on creativity (Hakel and Halpern 2005). There is
less descriptive research on this type of transfer compared to more quantitative studies like
Reed et al. (1974), Gick and Holyoak (1983), or Brown and Kane (1988). Of the two
transfer studies that seem most similar to this study, one (Pugh 2004) covers the transfer of
physics, but focuses on the motivation behind transfer. The other (Wagner 2006) deals with
transfer within one subject (statistics) rather than across school subjects as is described
here.
Method
At the time I met him Bill was an undergraduate sophomore physics major. I met him via a
friend working in the career services office. Bill wanted advice about possibly switching
majors. However, he was hesitant to do so because, in his words, ‘‘learning physics helps
me to better understand so many other subjects.’’ My friend referred Bill to me because he
thought that Bill could benefit from hearing about my own jump from physics as an
Table 1 Twelve aspects oftransfer
The first nine aspects of transferused in this study originate fromBarnett and Ceci (2002). The lastthree aspects are derivedprincipally from the work ofLobato (2003) and Bransford andSchwartz (1999)
Learned skill
Performance change
Memory demands
Knowledge domain
Physical context
Temporal context
Functional context
Social context
Modality
Value
Intentionality
Relations of similarity
520 B. R. Forsyth
123
undergraduate to educational psychology in graduate school. When Bill contacted me I
told him that I wanted to speak with him not only about switching majors, but to also
explore his claims about using physics to understand other subjects. With his consent, we
proceeded to meet.
Design
Rationale for a single case design
Before meeting with Bill I needed to make a decision about whether or not I would seek
out multiple participants to design a multiple-case study about far transfer or to keep the
study as a single-case design. In his book Case Study Research, Yin (2009) suggests five
appropriate rationales for conducting a single-case study. Two of these rationales are that
the identified case represents an extreme or revelatory example. As discussed earlier, far
transfer as a phenomenon represents the extreme case of transfer in general meaning that
opportunities to study it are less frequent. Furthermore, past researchers’ attempts at
studying far transfer, as noted by Barnett and Ceci (2002) and Bransford and Schwartz
(1999), have only been mildly successful. Therefore, the opportunity to investigate Bill’s
claims of far transfer as a single-case design is justified considering researchers’ past
difficulties with observing far transfer.
Protocol analysis
Bill and I met three times over a period of 2 months. The design of these three interviews
were guided by protocol analysis (Ericsson and Simon 1993). Within protocol analysis are
two types of approaches. The first, called a ‘‘concurrent protocol,’’ is used when a subject
engages in a task and concurrently provides a verbal report of the process. Assuming that
the tenets of protocol analysis are followed, the verbal report from a concurrent protocol
should provide an accurate reflection of processes within the subject’s short term memory.
The second approach, called a retrospective protocol, occurs when a subject performs a
task and then retrospectively reports to the researcher their memory of the task. Retro-
spective protocols are also capable of providing researchers with accurate traces of a
subject’s information processing, but the results can be even more susceptible to impair-
ment if the design is not carefully crafted.
Bill was asked to perform a concurrent protocol task in the second interview by
verbally reporting to me his process of filling out a concept map. However, the rest of
the information I obtained from Bill in the three interviews was based on a retrospective
protocol design. Because of this, I adhered to the following recommendations made by
Ericsson and Simon when designing the interviews. First, Bill was given explicit
instruction to recall as accurately as possible, to take his time when answering, and to
give as much information as he could even if he thought the information was small or
unimportant. Second, if Bill started to give quick responses to my questions I encouraged
him to take more time with his answer and to give more detail. Lastly, when eliciting
memories as opposed to inferences, I tried to make my questions as specific as possible
since Ericsson and Simon suggest that recall increases significantly under these
circumstances.
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer 521
123
Procedure
First interview
The goal of the first interview was to encourage Bill to give as much detail as possible about
how he connected physics to other subjects. Therefore, he was initially prompted to recount
to me what he meant about using physics to understand other subjects when he spoke with his
career advisor. From that point on, he was asked open-ended questions to help him elaborate
on the topic. I used statements and questions like: ‘‘Tell me more about that,’’ or, ‘‘What do
you mean when you say…’’ and, ‘‘Keep telling me about…’’ to steer Bill toward talking
about making connections between physics and other subjects and away from less relevant
topics. The purpose of using these broad questions also helped me avoid explicitly inserting
my own thoughts about how and when transfer works out of the interview.
Second interview
In the second interview I focused on a specific instance of transfer described by Bill in
the first interview about the relationship between a pre-Socratic philospher’s concept of
‘‘flow’’ and several basic principles in quantum mechanics (I describe this instance of
transfer in greater detail in the ‘‘Results’’ section). I focused upon this instance of transfer
because it showed the most promise of portraying all 12 aspects of transfer. The second
interview was held 3 weeks after the first interview.
During the second interview, we discussed the 12 aspects of Bill’s philosophy/physics
transfer in the following order.
1. Temporal Context
2. Physical Context
3. Functional Context
4. Social Context
5. Modality
6. Memory Demands
7. Intentionality
8. Knowledge Domain
9. Value
10. Learned Skill
11. Performance Change
12. Relations of Similarity
Relations of similarity To help me understand the Relations of Similarity aspect of
transfer, I asked Bill to make a concept map describing how features from his philosophy
portion of transfer was similar to features of his physics portion of transfer. In keeping with
concurrent protocol guidelines I asked Bill to verbalize his process has he filled the concept
map out. I also instructed him to use the concept map to describe as many relations of
similarity as possible and to take as much time as he needed.
Third interview
The third interview occurred 1 month after the second interview and its main purpose was
to explore at a more general level why Bill transfers across knowledge domains. Consistent
522 B. R. Forsyth
123
with the hour glass design of this study, the scope of information obtained during this
interview was intentionally broad and open ended. I opened the interview by asking him
the question: ‘‘Do you think the way you make connections between subjects is the same or
different from other people?’’ He was then given latitude to answer the question however
he felt was appropriate. The rest of the interview centered on questions generated by the
content of the previous interviews.
Triangulating the data
In order for single-case designs to possess construct validity it is vital that they incorporate
multiple converging sources of evidence (Yin 2009). This present study is no exception.
Patton (2002) recommends that this process of converging evidence can occur via data
triangulation, investigator triangulation, theoretical triangulation, and methodological tri-
angulation. In this study I achieved data triangulation by asking Bill to engage in both
concurrent and retrospective protocols through the interview process. To achieve inves-
tigator triangulation I received input from both a physicist and philosopher regarding Bill’s
statements about those two knowledge domains. Theory triangulation was achieved by
subjecting Bill’s claims to Lobato’s (2003) actor-oriented transfer, Barnett and Ceci’s
(2002) taxonomy for far transfer and Bransford and Schwartz’s (1999) PFL approach.
Finally, I have attempted to achieve methodological triangulation by conducting both a
top-down and bottom-up analysis of Bill’s claims. I report these analyses in the following
‘‘Results’’ section.
Results
I transcribed each interview and then analyzed them first according to a top down analysis
based on the 12 aspects of transfer and then via a bottom up analysis which focused on
addressing the third research question (i.e., why Bill engages in transfer). I first provide
short descriptions of what Bill said in each of the interviews followed by a report of the top
down and bottom up analyses.
Description of the interviews
Interview one
I hoped that Bill would be able to describe in detail at least one to three instances of what
he meant by ‘‘using physics to understand many topics.’’ He exceeded my expectations by
describing six examples. His first example regarded a connection between free will and
Newtonian mechanics which is a fairly well known argument often referred to by physi-
cists as ‘‘Laplace’s demon.’’ In this argument the deterministic nature of Newtonian
mechanics is extrapolated to mean that if one knew all the exact forces and positions upon
every object in the universe (along with the power to analyze all these data) then this
person would know the unalterable fate of the universe as well all who live in the universe.
After describing Laplace’s demon, Bill then explained how the process of studying
physics was like studying German. He explained that physics could be seen as a new
language and that much of the computational homework in physics was like practicing
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer 523
123
grammar. Bill also admitted that his description of this relationship between physics and
German was his least developed out of the six instances he described.
Next, Bill described a ‘‘thesis statement’’ that he developed in an Introduction to Phi-
losophy course that linked two ideas of a pre-Socratic philosopher named Heraclitus with
several principles in quantum mechanics. The ideas mentioned by Bill about Heraclitus
had to do with the philosopher’s concept of flow and his use of a river metaphor. In
particular, Bill mentioned Heraclitus’ saying that ‘‘all things flow’’ and that ‘‘you cannot
step in the same river twice.’’ Bill felt that physicists would likely agree with Heraclitus’
statements because ‘‘quantum theory [is] more inclined to agree that all is moving and
tumultuous rather than orderly and stagnant…like Newtonian mechanics.’’ Bill’s expla-
nation of how Heraclitus’ concept of flow related to quantum mechanics was fairly broken
at times and he seemed to recognize this inadequacy because he frequently apologized for
his description. Nevertheless, he managed to explain that quantum mechanical principles
like wave-particle duality, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, the probabilistic nature of
reality, and matter-energy unification related to Heraclitean concepts like constant change
and process reality.
After explaining his link between Heraclitus and Quantum mechanics, Bill described his
opinion that the movement from Newtonian to Quantum mechanics in the field of physics
is similar to the shift in the social sciences from positivist to post-modernist thinking. Bill’s
comparison followed a fairly superficial analogy regarding the fact that both Quantum
mechanics and post-modernism were major paradigms shifts from Newtonian mechanics
and positivism, respectively. Although he successfully identified the similarities between
the two paradigm shifts he oversimplified the process of replacement of one academic
paradigm over another. For example, although quantum mechanics is seen as the dominant
paradigm in physics, Newtonian mechanics still remains useful in the sub-atomic realm.
Furthermore, in the social science comparison, positivism still maintains a place in the
social sciences despite a contemporary shift toward post-modernism. In neither the physics
nor social science case has the newer academic paradigm rendered the previous paradigm
completely irrelevant.2
Next, Bill explained that he often thought about how scientists and mathematicians
often describe what they feel is ‘‘beautiful’’ in terms similar to the way musicians describe
beauty. That is, that many musicians, similar to mathematicians and scientists seek aes-
thetic properties in their work that possess the ability to combine simplicity with ‘‘a sense
of high order… structure.’’
The last connection that Bill described in the first interview had to do with the idea that
human cognition can be modeled like a complex physics problem. Although Bill seemed
very enthusiastic about this topic he was fairly inarticulate when asked to delineate how the
modeling process across mind and matter shared commonalities. He said that reading
Douglas Hofstadter’s book Godel, Escher, Bach (1999) influenced his thoughts about this
topic and that before reading this book he saw the mechanics of the mind and the
mechanics of the physical world as two separate universes; each with their own set of rules.
2 Bill’s transfer between the physical and social sciences falls in line with Sokal and Bricmont’s (1998)accusation that social scientists’ too often over-generalize ideas in the physical sciences which they see as agross misuse of these concepts. Regardless, if Sokal and Bricmont are correct in their assumption that socialscientists are incorrectly using ideas generated in the hard sciences, their book provides an excellentexample of human’s ability to engage in far transfer as does Bill’s present example.
524 B. R. Forsyth
123
Interview two
In this interview I focused on just one of the six examples discussed in the first interview,
which concerned Bill’s connection between quantum physics and Heraclitus’ concept of
flow. I investigated all 12 aspects of transfer in connection with this example. However,
some aspects were discussed in greater detail than others. In order to investigate the
‘‘Relations of Similarity’’ aspect, Bill filled out a concept map. I provide a more thorough
discussion about the results of this activity in the section providing the top down analysis.
Interview three
Very little of the third interview was useful in regards to learning about the 12 aspects of
transfer, but it was nonetheless helpful in exploring why Bill constructs relations of sim-
ilarity in the way that he does, which was the original focus of the third interview. A theme
in Bill’s reasoning during this interview centered on a professed epistemology that all
knowledge, no matter which academic discipline it originates in, is highly connected. This
interview was also used to gain greater insight about the non-isomorphic concept map that
Bill created in the second interview.
Top down analysis: The 12 aspects of transfer
Table 2 provides a synopsis of the claims that I make describing the kind of transfer that
Bill is engaged in based on the 12 aspects of transfer. Despite the unevenness of evidence
of each aspect, I based all claims on the responses that Bill gave me from the interviews.
I discuss them below in the same order as they appear in the table.
Learned skill
Barnett and Ceci (2002) characterize ‘‘learned skill’’ as a description of how general or
specific the content is that transfers and Bill’s responses often appeared to reflect transfer
that was fairly general in nature. To investigate this aspect of transfer, I asked Bill what he
thought changed in his mind as a result of making a connection between quantum
mechanics and Heraclitus’ concept of flow. He responded, ‘‘I think that I have a better
picture, I guess… The more ways you can think about it or picture it, the better picture you
get of what exactly it is.’’
Bill’s explanation of a gaining a ‘‘better picture’’ connotes a change in mental repre-
sentation, but this representation appears to be at a very high level of abstraction (between
entire academic disciplines and all encompassing world views). In fact, unless encouraged
to do otherwise, most of his initial inclinations were to describe learned skills at fairly
abstract levels.
Performance change
Bill was asked what he thought he could do better as a result of transferring between
physics and philosophy. He responded that thinking across disciplines gave him a ‘‘better
way to think about [the content].’’ This response could be interpreted to mean that Bill
views transfer as a means of improving the accuracy of his ideas. However, in other
statements, Bill seemed more concerned with gathering new ways of thinking about ideas
than being correct about them. For example, in the second interview Bill suggested that
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer 525
123
transfer between physics and philosophy had more of an effect on the topics he chose to
focus on rather than how he performed specific tasks:
Philosophy could only help me with doing physics in that doing philosophy might
change how I’m approaching what I want to look at. Like, it might influence what
area of physics I’m looking at, but I don’t think it would affect the practice…
As Bill recognized more connections between physics and philosophy he said that he
focused his philosophy studies more toward metaphysics and ontology and less on ethics
because he ‘‘didn’t see as much connections [between physics and ethics].’’ However, Bill
gave no specific matching example describing how his study of philosophy affected the
kinds of topics he focused on in physics.
Memory demands
Due in part to the nature of the study Bill mostly described transfer that required recall and
recognition rather than simple execution as described by Barnett and Ceci (2002). He did,
however, discuss the influence of ‘‘simple execution processes’’ such as rote learning
toward his ability to transfer. When asked in the first interview to describe how his
introductory German class related to learning physics, Bill admitted that he did not actually
Table 2 A description of Bill’s patterns of transfer based on the 12 aspects of transfer
Aspect of transfer Claim
Learned skill Representations and principles are the primary skills that Bill describes he is learning
Performancechange
Most descriptions of transfer involve changes in accuracy
Memory demands Both recall and recognition are involved in Bill’s descriptions of transfer
Knowledgedomain
Bill transfers between both near and far knowledge domains
Physical context Bill thinks about topics for transfer both in- and outside of school. Bill describes in theinterviews instances of both near and far transfer across the physical context, but it ismost often near transfer because the physical context changes very little
Temporal context Descriptions of transfer events span from eighth grade to the present. Most descriptionsof transfer in the interviews are recent events
Functionalcontext
Bill’s reasons for transfer are almost always academic in origin
Social context Both near and far transfer cases across a social context are discussed in the interviews.Often the original identification of a relation involved in transfer is generated in aclassroom or study group but the relation matures while Bill is alone or in a non-academic group of friends
Modality Bill describes transferring from a reading in a book to an oral explanation intended fora class. Barnett and Ceci (2002) classify this type of transfer to lie near the middle ofthe near/far transfer continuum
Value Content described by Bill is ‘‘correct’’ according to a consulted physicist andphilosopher, but the methods for thinking about the ideas are done in a novice manner
Intentionality Bill claims both active and passive transfer at different times. Instances of transferappear more active as the difference in knowledge domains across the target and baseincrease
Relations ofsimilarity
Relations appear non-isomorphic
526 B. R. Forsyth
123
find too many connections across the two topics except for a fairly superficial association
that learning vocabulary and grammar in German was similar to learning the symbols and
basic concepts in physics. His reasoning, however, about why he could find so few con-
nections between the two subjects was attributable to his German class’ focus on rote
learning:
…[I]n German I haven’t been that stimulated…That’s the class where I don’t really
think too hard. It’s harder to make connections because I’m not thinking at the level
that I do in other classes…[W]hen I go into German, it’s more of a kind of automatic
sort of remembering and recalling and spitting back the information that I have
learned before.
In this quote Bill suggests that more than one level of learning can occur and that the
deeper level of learning is required to transfer across knowledge domains. Later, he
explained that his connections between quantum mechanics and Heraclitus’ river fragment
would not have been possible if he were attempting to learn in his philosophy class at a rote
learning level. Bill’s comments seem to suggest that greater memory demands (at least
greater than learning for simple execution) foster more distant transfer.
Knowledge domain
Over the course of three interviews Bill discussed transfer from physics to philosophy,
German, music, psychology and sociology. He also mentioned having conversations with
his girlfriend about transferring (i.e., constructing relations of similarity) between literature
and philosophy and between music and mathematics. All of these instances qualify as far
transfer based on knowledge domain.
Physical context
Transfer according to the physical context refers to the change in one’s surroundings from
the target to the base. For Bill, most of his initial learning occurred in the classroom and the
subsequent transfer also occurred in a classroom. Therefore, most of the instances of
transfer that he described would qualify as near transfer according to physical context.
However, Bill claimed to do a lot of subsequent thinking about the examples he described
in the interviews outside of the classroom. This suggests that for Bill transfer was often
generated in the classroom, but matured elsewhere.
Temporal context
Classical transfer tasks are generally well defined with a set amount of time required for
solving transfer problems. However, assessing the temporal context for Bill’s examples is
more complex due to the number of learning events that span across multiple time periods.
For example, when asked to describe his thesis statement regarding the use of quantum
mechanics principles to interpret Heraclitus’ river fragment Bill referred to a physics idea
that he had initially learned in eighth grade about combining space and time into space–
time. On the other hand, Bill had only known about Heraclitus for several weeks before
developing his thesis. This means that from the time he first learned about space–time in
eighth grade to transferring this idea toward his understanding of Heraclitus, Bill’s period
of transfer occurred over a span of 5–6 years. Alternatively, I could rate Bill’s period of
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer 527
123
transfer at a period of several weeks based on the fact that he had only received 3 weeks of
instruction in philosophy before transferring between physics and philosophy.
Functional context
Functionally, Bill was often academic about what he transferred, but he did not always do
it for a grade in a class. Bill’s process of thinking about how quantum mechanics related to
ideas in Heraclitus’ river fragment is an excellent example of this. In the first interview Bill
started to tell me about how his philosophy class had assignments to write thesis
statements:
We were talking about Heraclitus…who was a pre-Socratic philosopher who’s most
famous fragment had a lot about how all things flow…[and] about a river where if
you’re standing in the river it’s not the same river at any given time you are standing
in it…I had this thesis statement that I was arguing that Heraclitus’ view that all
things are a process is superior because…quantum theory would be more inclined to
agree that all is moving and tumultuous rather than so orderly and stagnant. It was
my first connection that I had come up with on my own.
Bill was required by his philosophy course to think about and make thesis statements,
but he also appears to claim a kind of ownership in the idea (albeit very vague) even before
his philosophy course required him to think about them. He appears to be very purposeful
in seeking out these ‘‘connections.’’
Social context
To investigate social context, I asked Bill where he usually was when ‘‘a lot of growth’’
happened in developing connections between distant topics. He said that many ideas he had
were generated in classroom discussion, but that the development, or maturation, of those
ideas often developed while reading or thinking to himself:
I found that being in the presence of others was more conducive to good thought.
Every once in a while I’d kind of get something just sitting and reading at home, but
a lot of the real breakthroughs would happen in class…When I’m discovering new
things or actually coming up with new ideas, it would be when I was just alone with
the book, like reading the [river] fragments…
Although Bill claims to get ‘‘breakthroughs’’ more often in a class setting, he also
claims that insightful ideas are often already in his mind, only less formed. Therefore
some evidence suggests that Bill engages in both near and far transfer across the social
context.
Modality
Bill provided little information regarding transfer modality, or format, beyond what he
already discussed while talking about the functional and social aspects of his transfer.
Modality changes that he did mention were first reading about topic and then discussing the
topic in a class. In Barnett and Ceci’s (2002) description of modality they classify Bill’s
description (i.e., book learning to an oral exam) to lie somewhere along the middle of the
near/far transfer continuum. In other words, transfer between reading in a book and then
528 B. R. Forsyth
123
discussing the reading in a class is more distant than near transfer but it is not the most
extreme example of far transfer.
Value
To test the value of Bill’s transfer I had him explain what he understood about Heraclitus
and his river fragment, as well as his understanding of quantum mechanics, and then to tell
me where he saw the similarity between the two. This allowed me to check if what he
learned in both subjects was ‘‘correct’’ and if what he transferred taught him something
new that was ‘‘correct.’’ Bill’s explanation on Heraclitus was shorter than the response he
gave regarding quantum mechanics. As an informed outsider to both disciplines Bill’s
descriptions appeared accurate at the surface level. However, in order to obtain a more
thorough evaluation of the value of Bill’s transfer I provided two experts in the fields of
physics and philosophy with copies of Bill’s statement and asked them to assess its
accuracy according to their respective knowledge domains.
Physics value To check Bill’s descriptions of ideas from quantum mechanics I asked an
Assistant Professor of Physics to look over Bill’s statement. The physicist’s assessment
was that Bill’s descriptions were accurate. However, the physicist also felt that Bill thought
about physics in a ‘‘novice way’’ due to the fact that he did not use mathematics to describe
his physics. For this physicist, quantum mechanical descriptions cannot be accurately
described without mathematics.
Philosophy value Bill said that when he tried to describe his connection between
quantum mechanics and Heraclitus’ philosophy to his instructor, she questioned him on the
validity of some of his statements. Bill could not remember the specific details about the
problems with his thesis statements, but he said that this instructor felt that his argument
‘‘was not in the form that it needed to be.’’ Therefore, when I consulted with a Professor of
Philosophy about Bill’s philosophical statements I asked him to assess both the form and
content. Similar to the criticism of the physicist, the philosopher explained to me that Bill’s
philosophical reasoning revealed novice tendencies. He said that although the content
about Heraclitus was accurate, Bill’s ‘‘mode of reasoning’’ could have been logically
stronger.
Intentionality
In his descriptions about how he generally transfers, Bill talked often about times when
‘‘connections would just pop in [his] head’’ and other times where he would have to work
at it. I interpreted his comments to mean that Bill engages in both passive and active
transfer, or, in the terminology of Salomon and Perkins (1989), both forward reaching and
backward reaching transfer. Furthermore, his comments indicated a potential relationship
between his level of intentionality based on the relative amount of similarity in the two
knowledge domains he was transferring between. I make this interpretation based on when
he said that he had to ‘‘work harder,’’ or in other words actively transfer, ‘‘when the two
subjects were further apart, like in physics and philosophy, than when they are closer
together, [as in the case of] transferring between physics and chemistry.’’
Even when Bill described passive transfer (when connections just popped in his head),
he was adamant about characterizing it as ‘‘not a surprise.’’ In other words, he does not
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer 529
123
think that it is strange for new connections to present themselves in his mind because he
feels that all knowledge domains are inherently connected in some way. It is possible that
the amount of passive transfer Bill engages in is higher because of his epistemological
belief that all knowledge domains possess a high degree of integration.
Relations of similarity
As part of the second interview Bill filled out a concept map so that I could have a graphic
record to accompany his verbal record of the similarities he saw between quantum
mechanics and Heraclitus’ concept of flow. The more connections he could graphically
represent were initially meant to support my confidence that what he called ‘‘making
connections’’ was a legitimate type of transfer rather than a collection of trivial associa-
tions. The concept map was useful in this regard and it increased my confidence that Bill
was engaged in a legitimate form of transfer. However, the mappings that Bill produced
were often homomorphic (i.e., mappings of one item to many items) rather than isomorphic
(i.e., one-to-one mappings). For example Bill linked the concept of ‘‘constant change’’
under the topic ‘‘Heraclitus’ Flow’’ to three different concepts under the topic ‘‘Quantum
Mechanics’’ labeled, ‘‘matter-energy is always moving’’, ‘‘wave-particle duality’’, and
‘‘uncertainty principle.’’ According to established analogical reasoning models Bill’s
homomorphisms are problematic (Gentner 1983; Holyoak and Thagard 1989; Markman
1997). However, Krawczyk et al. (2005) assert that what may appear to be homomorphic
mappings could actually just be multiple one-to-one correspondences. Furthermore,
Markman (1997) reports that when creating concept maps for the purpose of establishing
relations of similarity (like the one that Bill filled out), people sometimes appear to violate
the one-to-one constraint, but when they are asked to make inferences from the concept
map they hardly ever break the constraint. Unfortunately, I never asked Bill to make
inferences from his concept map. However, he did discuss his confidence about the
accuracy of the concept map. He said he felt that the mappings he made were not abso-
lutely correct. Rather, he was willing to change how he related the two ideas if his
understanding were to change. Therefore, Bill’s diagramming exercise appears to have
been a work in progress and perhaps this is one reason that the one-to-one constraint
seemed so relaxed.
Bottom up analysis: Bill’s epistemology and interest
Bill feels that all academic disciplines can be ‘‘boil[ed] down to one basic underlying
principle of ‘the all.’’’ His personal epistemology is that all parts of knowledge are con-
nected and that the more general an idea is, the more easily it should connect to other
points of knowledge. Another part of his epistemology is that the only barrier mankind has
to finding these connections is a ‘‘computational’’ one. He feels that the mind’s limited
capacity is the reason that we do not see more connections between disparate ideas, but that
if we had the mental processing power, we could find similarity everywhere. The validity
of Bill’s ideas are certainly up for debate, but they seem to do an adequate job of
explaining why he transfers so much between different academic subjects.
Bill does not necessarily believe that all ideas are equally generalizable and he tends to
avoid situations where he gets caught up in the ‘‘nitty–gritty’’ of the disciplines. This is the
reason he gives for both being attracted to physics as well as ultimately being turned off by
it. He likes physics for the fact that it attempts to create one grand unifying theory, but that
the actual practice of it becomes, too ‘‘particular’’:
530 B. R. Forsyth
123
I went into physics not looking to be a practical physicist. I wanted physics to be an
end in itself… Not to sound [like a] stereotypically frustrated math student or any-
thing, but having to learn [the math] just didn’t seem, it just wasn’t the glamorous big
question.
I asked Bill why he thought he held such an integrative perspective about the nature of
the universe. He described several factors he thought were involved including the way he
was raised and because he paid more attention in school. However, he also mentioned in
each interview details about a series of books that he read on his own time before coming
to college. These books were The Elegant Universe (Greene 1999), A Brief History of Timeby Hawking (1988), and Hofstadter’s (1999) Godel, Escher Bach. All of these books
resonate strongly with the organicistic, inclusive, and integrative views that Bill seems to
hold about the nature of knowledge and the power of physics when it comes to describing
nature on a broad scale.
Although Bill feels that all disciplines of knowledge are only artificially fragmented he
also feels that mankind may never be able to put them all together into one whole. I asked
him why he then consistently attempts to find connections between them. The following
conversation was very insightful into the personal struggle he has with his own episte-
mology. The ‘I’ stands for me the interviewer and the ‘B’ stands for Bill:
B: I guess deep down I probably do believe that there is a nice smooth explainable
connection between everything but often I think that being a single entity within as
part of the very thing that we’re trying to understand may make it impossible to
understand it…I do go in and out. Like, sometimes I’ll be really curious into certain
topics and thinking about a lot of things and then sometimes my brain will get a little
bit flustered and then decide to just stick with one thing for a little while so I can
coast for a little while and maybe I’ll relax for a little while and maybe read a few
books and start thinking about it again…It brings purpose, kind of, even if it might be
futile or imagined or anything like that…I: So, why do you think some people don’t find this kind of stuff to be fun?
B: …I don’t really know why exactly, but I think that everyone tends to get those
thoughts, but maybe some people just brush it off…I’m definitely a person of phases
and I like to dabble really heavily into something for a short amount of time and then
go to the next thing and…in the end I keep coming back…
World hypotheses and personal epistemology
Bill’s comments about preferring ‘‘universals over particulars’’ or viewing all knowledge
as converging toward one underlying principle or feeling uncomfortable with the analytical
nature of physics homework may all allude to one personal epistemology organized at a
high order. Epistemology at this level is often referred to as a ‘‘worldview,’’ and, according
to Koltko-Rivera (2004) in his review of research on worldviews in psychological litera-
ture, there have been many kinds of worldviews proposed. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to compare Bill’s epistemic statements to all of the proposed worldviews that are
available to researchers. However, a potentially useful set of worldviews for interpreting
Bill’s collection of personal epistemologies could be via Pepper’s (1942) WorldHypotheses.
In his book Pepper describes four different highly organized systems of thought for
interpreting events in the world (hence their appellation as ‘‘world’’ hypotheses). Of these
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer 531
123
four world hypotheses, Bill’s personal epistemology seems to fit best with Pepper’s
worldview called ‘‘organicism.’’ In organicism preferential treatment is given to knowl-
edge that is integrative rather than dispersive. Causality is described as a series of internal
purposes whereas linear descriptions of cause and effect are downplayed. Furthermore,
holistic (i.e., synthetic) explanations are the primary means of describing the world
whereas reductionistic (i.e., analytic) explanations maintain a secondary role.
If Bill holds an organicistic worldview, his desire to transfer across seemingly disparate
knowledge domains can be explained via an epistemological preference to integrate
knowledge rather than compartmentalize it. A preference for organicism may also explain
why he feels so much conflict with remaining a physics major. Although Bill’s episte-
mology is compatible with some goals of physics (e.g., achieving a grand unifying theory
of forces) it is often incompatible with the highly reductionistic methods for achieving
these goals. My interviews with Bill suggest that the role of epistemology at the worldview
level on transfer needs further investigation.
Intercontextuality and transfer
In a paper outlining a situative theory of transfer, Engle (2006) suggests that transfer is
more likely to occur when an individual sees two contexts as linked together. She calls this
state of linked contexts ‘‘intercontextuality.’’ Furthermore, she calls the efforts of teachers
and students to formally create intercontextuality ‘‘framing.’’ In her article, Engle proposes
two ways that teachers and students can frame their learning and transfer contexts so that
intercontextuality will occur. The first is via time and the second is via participation. Bill
provides some evidence that suggests he knows how to effectively frame his learning and
transfer according to time and participation whereas the students around him have not
learned to do so.
Evidence for framing time to promote intercontextuality A student can create intercon-
textuality between a learning and transfer context by recognizing that what they are
currently learning is both related to what they have learned in the past and also has the
potential to prepare them for future learning (cf. Bransford and Schwartz 1999). Bill
showed several times in his interviews that he relaxes the constraints of his learning so that
they are framed as ‘‘ongoing activities rather than as temporally bounded events’’ (Engle
2006, p. 457). For example, Bill explained to me at the beginning of our first interview that
he felt that learning physics ‘‘was a base for everything else [he] could learn.’’ This
statement can be interpreted to mean that Bill framed his physics learning as a preparation
for future learning. To further illustrate this point he later explained to me how his thinking
about philosophy was affected by his past physics learning and that his current learning in
philosophy simultaneously expanded his past understanding of physics:
[L]ately I’ve been getting more of an enthusiasm for philosophy and…I have had this
idea in my mind that philosophy was a little bit silly without physics, but at the same
time I thought that physics couldn’t really mean that much to us without philosophy.
From this example it appears that Bill frames his learning experiences as temporally
connected events. Furthermore, considering Bill’s ability to transfer across these contexts,
Engle’s theory regarding the influence of appropriately framing time for fostering transfer
seems supported.
532 B. R. Forsyth
123
Evidence for framing participation to promote intercontextuality Engle also recommends
that framing how students view their participation in their own learning can be done in
such a way that intercontextuality and transfer are promoted. This is done by helping
students to see themselves as authors in an ongoing intellectual conversation rather than as
passive recipients of others’ knowledge and this idea seems to fit well with Lobato’s (2003)
actor-oriented transfer perspective. According to Engle, students who frame their learning
as an author rather than as a passive recipient of knowledge will be more willing to share
and revise their ideas with audiences that go beyond the student–teacher relationship.
Furthermore, the more ownership that students take in the ideas they create the more likely
they will want to transfer them to new contexts.
Throughout our interviews together, Bill seemed very comfortable with framing his
participation in learning as an author who was willing to both comment on and revise his
current understanding. In fact he often reminded me, without cueing him, that the thoughts
he had about all the different subjects we talked about were still being worked out in his
mind. He tried to explain that his current ideas were useful only insofar as they could be
reevaluated according to some new learning to help him gain a deeper understanding. Also,
the fact that Bill was willing to share his current ideas with me through a series of
interviews despite his claim that they were ‘‘incomplete’’ shows his willingness to engage
in generative discussions beyond the student–teacher relationship. In short, Bill’s partici-
pation in his own learning and his apparent inclination to transfer his ideas across contexts
aligns well with Engle’s ideas regarding the role of intercontextuality as a mechanism for
transfer.
Discussion
Bill engages in a type of transfer that he believes improves the accuracy of his repre-
sentation of knowledge. It is based on an epistemology that all knowledge can be organized
holistically. He can explain examples of transfer that involves disparate knowledge
domains, and he engages in this transfer at home and in school. However, the content of
what he transfers remains fairly academic regardless of where he is. He is also capable of
transferring ideas that span across long periods of time. He shows evidence of using groups
of people to help him generate topics that can be transferred, but his ideas often mature
during personal reflection. Much of what he transfers is accurate although perhaps not
extremely deep. Lastly, he is willing to create relations between what he transfers that do
not appear isomorphic.
Scientific and educational contributions
This study approaches transfer based on ideas from scholars like Barnett and Ceci (2002),
Bransford and Schwartz (1999), and Lobato (2003). These theories attempt to approach
transfer from a more situated and educationally relevant perspective rather than the SPS
studies conducted in the previous generation of cognitive research on transfer. This study is
also particularly unique to the transfer literature because it attempts to describe instances of
far transfer. Far transfer has been an elusive realm in the study of transfer because it occurs
less frequently and is harder to identify. Therefore producing it in a controlled setting has
often proven to be difficult. Because of this difficulty, it seemed appropriate to conduct a
case study that could give a much more qualitative description of far transfer at an indi-
vidual level.
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer 533
123
This study contributes to a research tradition of improving transfer between in-school
and out-of-school learning. Pugh (2004) presents a comparison between two seventh grade
science students who get equally good grades, but one uses the ideas at home whereas the
other does not. Pugh’s study describes the value of the type of transfer that Bill is engaged
in. Bill actively transfers what he learns in school to out-of-school settings which frames
how he looks at the world in general. Understanding how students like Bill and the student
in Pugh’s research transfer what they learn is a topic that should be of great interest to
educators and researchers.
Steps for future research
The role of personal epistemology in far transfer is a topic that needs future research.
Furthermore, the connections between motivation and transfer also need to remain a focus
of research. If personal epistemology and motivation are to be used as factors to describe
how certain students engage in far transfer, they will need to be separated out and more
clearly defined. Other researchers have already begun investigating these relationships
(Pepper 1942; Pugh and Bergin 2006; Schommer-Aikins et al. 2003; Spiro et al. 1996) and
future research should try to build from their foundation.
Future research on far transfer should also look at students with primary interests in
subjects beyond physics. Bill seemed to put the discipline of physics in a special position
amongst knowledge domains, but he also suggested many other academic disciplines could
possess the same qualities for a student that had different interests:
…[L]ately I’ve been looking at social and economic ways to see things. I’ve been
seeing the way things are in that view and I can see that if you were into that, you
could see it as the dominating way to see everything.
References
Barnett, S. M., & Ceci, S. J. (2002). When and where do we apply what we learn? A taxonomy for fartransfer. Psychological Bulletin, 128(4), 612–637.
Bransford, J. D., Brown, A. L., & Cocking, R. R. (1999). How people learn: Brain, mind, experience, andschool. Washington, DC: National Academy.
Bransford, J. D., & Schwartz, D. L. (1999). Rethinking transfer: A simple proposal with multiple impli-cations. In A. Iran-Nejad & P. D. Pearson (Eds.), Review of research in education (Vol. 24,pp. 61–100). Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association.
Broudy, H. S. (1977). Types of knowledge and purposes of education. In R. C. Anderson, R. J. Spiro, &W. E. Montague (Eds.), Schooling and the acquisition of knowledge (pp. 1–17). Hillsdale, NJ:Erlbaum.
Brown, A. L., & Kane, M. J. (1988). Preschool children can learn to transfer: Learning to learn and learningfrom example. Cognitive Psychology, 20, 493–523.
Detterman, D. K. (1993). The case for prosecution: Transfer as an epiphenomenon. In D. K. Detterman &R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), Transfer on trial: Intelligence, cognition, and instruction (pp. 1–24). Norwood,NJ: Ablex Publishing Company.
Engle, R. A. (2006). Framing interactions to foster generative learning: A situative explanation of transfer ina community of learners classroom. Journal of the Learning Sciences, 15(4), 451–498.
Ericsson, K. A., & Simon, H. A. (1993). Protocol analysis: Verbal reports as data (revised ed.). Cambridge,MA: MIT Press.
Fortus, D. (2002). A review of the transfer literature (pp. 1–38). Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan.Gentner, D. (1983). Structure mapping: A theoretical framework for analogy. Cognitive Science Society, 7,
155–170.
534 B. R. Forsyth
123
Gick, M. L., & Holyoak, K. J. (1983). Schema induction and analogical transfer. Cognitive Psychology, 15,1–38.
Greene, B. (1999). The elegant universe: superstrings, hidden dimensions, and the quest for the ultimatetheory. New York: WW Norton.
Hakel, M. D., & Halpern, D. F. (2005). How far can transfer go? In J. Mestre (Ed.), Transfer of learningfrom a multidisciplinary perspective (pp. 357–370). Greenwich, CT: Information Age Publishing.
Hammer, D., Elby, A., Scherr, R. E., & Redish, E. F. (2005). Resources, framing, and transfer. In J. Mestre(Ed.), Transfer of learning: Research and perspectives [working title]. Greenwich, CT: InformationAge Publishing.
Hawking, S. (1988). A brief history of time. From the big bang to black holes. Toronto: Bantam Books.Hofstadter, D. (1999). Godel, Escher, Bach: An eternal golden braid. New York: Basic Books.Holyoak, K. J., & Thagard, P. (1989). Analogical mapping by constraint satisfaction. Cognitive Science
Society, 13, 295–355.Koltko-Rivera, M. E. (2004). The psychology of worldviews. Review of General Psychology, 8(1), 3–58.Krawczyk, D., Holyoak, K., & Hummel, J. (2005). The one-to-one constraint in analogical mapping and
inference. Cognitive Science Society, 29, 797–806.Lobato, J. (2003). How design experiments can inform a rethinking of transfer and vice versa. Educational
Researcher, 32(1), 17–20.Markman, A. B. (1997). Constraints on analogical inference. Cognitive Science Society, 21, 373–418.Patton, M. Q. (2002). Qualitative research and evaluation methods (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Pepper, S. C. (1942). World hypotheses: A study in evidence. Berkeley: University of California Press.Perkins, D., & Grotzer, T. A. (1997). Teaching intelligence. American Psychologist, 52, 1125–1133.Pugh, K. J. (2004). Newton’s laws beyond the classroom walls. Science & Education, 88, 182–196.Pugh, K. J., & Bergin, D. A. (2006). Motivational influences on transfer. Educational Psychologist, 41(3),
147–160.Reed, S. K., Ernst, G. W., & Banerji, R. (1974). The role of analogy in transfer between similar problem
states. Cognitive Psychology, 6, 436–450.Salomon, G., & Perkins, D. (1989). Rocky roads to transfer: Rethinking mechanisms of a neglected phe-
nomenon. Educational Psychologist, 24(2), 113–142.Schoenfeld, A. (1999). Looking toward the 21st century: Challenges of educational theory and practice.
Educational Researcher, 28(7), 4–14.Schommer-Aikins, M., Duell, O., & Barker, S. (2003). Epistemological beliefs across domains using
Biglan’s Classification of Academic Disciplines. Research in Higher Education, 44(3), 347–366.Schwartz, D. L., Bransford, J. D., & Sears, D. (2005). Efficiency and innovation in transfer. In J. P. Mestre
(Ed.), Transfer of learning from multidisciplinary perspective (pp. 1–51). Greenwich, CT: InformationAge Publishing.
Sokal, A., & Bricmont, J. (1998). Fashionable nonsense: Postmodern intellectuals’ abuse of science.New York: Picador.
Spiro, R. J., Feltovich, P., & Coulson, R. (1996). Two epistemic world-views: Prefigurative schemas andlearning in complex domains. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 10, S51–S61.
Wagner, J. F. (2006). Transfer in pieces. Cognition & Instruction, 24(1), 1–71.Yin, R. K. (2009). Case study research: Design and methods (4th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Beyond physics: A case for far transfer 535
123