ONE SHILLING NET

Author of·'Hitler and Itt

Dr.orro STRASSER

GERMANY ·IN A

DISUNITED WORLD

LIFESTREAM ,~ PUBLICATIONS

Lifestream Controversy Pam hletsEdited by Bernard L. Calmus.

No 1.

ON L IV I N G IN A DISUNITED WORLD

Under prevailing conditions, it is of imperative impor­tance to every citizen, man or woman, to achieve some idea inas objective a way as poss ible of the policy aimed at by thethree World Powers in relat ion to Germany, the key to thewhole complex situation in Europe and across the SevenSeas. Lifestream Cont roversy Series pre sent a first discus­sion pamphlet of immediate topicality and importance. in­viting opinion and comment fro m all readers.

This publication deals briefly wi th*Russian Policy.*\Vestern Policy.*Europe the Objective.*Coming Changes in the Balance of Pow er ."World Powers of T o-morr ow .*Strangled Germany.*French-German Rapprochement.*The European Federation and Afr ica.*Germany and the British Commonw ealth.

GERMANY

IN A

DISUNITED WORLD

Power, Ilk. a d.sola'ing pes,il.nc.,Pollutes whate '.,. i' touch••; and ob.di.nce,Bane of all genius , ..iTtu., freedom, ,ru,h.Makes.la.... of men, and of the human frameA mechanised automaton .

Sheney

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FIRST PUBLISHED OCTOBER 1947

Also by Dr . Strasser :

HI TLER AND IHISTORY IN MY TBIEMASARYKDEUTSCHE BARTHOLOMAEUSNACHTDEUTSCH LANDS ERNEUERUNGLA ALEMANIA DE MANANAL'AJGLE PRUSSlEN SUR L'ALLEMAGNE

BostonLondonZuerichZuerich

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Easrbourne, Sussex, England.

GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD

RUSSIAi\' POLICY

In order to form a reasonably reliable opinion of Russia's externalaims and before an interpretation of more recent developments can bemade it is necessary to consider the history of that country over manycenturies.

Stalin's astounding lucidity and candour while stating the aimsof Russia's foreign policy render the task considerably easier than itmight otherwise have been. The disclosure of these objectives wasalready made as far back as the summer of 1939, when negotiationsbetween the Soviet Foreign Office and the Anglo-French mediatorstook place, and the Hitler-Stalin pact was in process of ratification atthe same time. These aims were rehearsed again during November,1940, 'in Berlin, and subsequently Molotov's proposals were referredto by Hitler in his proclamation of June 22, 1941; finally Stalinsolemnly proclaimed similar aims between 1941 and 1944, and after.

Roughly these claims (some of which have already been realised)cover the complete domination over the Baltic and Baltic States­including the Finnish peninsula of Hangoe, and Aaland. In certaincircumstances, the whole of Finland is to become a republic withinthe Soviet Union. Access to the Atlantic is to be rendered possibleby the annexation of Northern Finland and, probably, Spitzbergen.A frontier on the western side of Russia, bordering on a weakenedor communistic Germany by the incorporation of Eastern Poland,with the remainder of that country under Russian supervision, or thetotal absorbtion of Poland into the U.S.S.R. as one of the Sovietrepublics. Annexation of Bukovina, Bessarabia and the Danubeestuary, tantamount to turning Rumania into a tributary state ofRussia. The occupation of the western Black Sea shores by annexa­tion of the Danubian delta and the Dobrudja or more indirectly byinaugurating a Soviet Republc of Bulgaria including those Greekterritories that were given to Greece after the Balkan wars. Accessto the Mediterranean to be achieved by annexing Constantinopleand Turkish Thraee or, in a more roundabout way, by annexing Greek1 hrace to Soviet Bulgaria, in which case, the Aegean coast fromSalonika to Dedeagash would belong to the U.S.S.R. (via Bulgaria)without annexing Constantinople and the Dardanelles. The perfectsolution of this problem in Russian eyes would- be to apportion Con­stantinople and Turkish Thraee to 3 Soviet Bulg-aria. with Russian

OTTO STRASSER

military base~ in the Da.rdanelles. Expansi~n?f the Ru ssian sphereof influence . m the Mediterranean by estabhshmg a Sovi et Republicin Yugoslavia, ~hereby Greece would bec?me ultimately isola ted fromthe rest of continental Europe; the Adriatic and the waters round the

~~i~~~:~i~Su::s~~~:~~~~~si~~o~~:~~~1 :~~~:~::~:7t~;~:~g::s~~:~:~~elusion of Greece later on. The entire eastern Mediterranean wouldthus be governed on behalf of the Kremlin.

Considered from the viewpoint of world politics, Ru ssia 's aimsconcerning Asia are even more far-reaching: Access to th e Indi anOcean by directly or indirectly annexing Iran. Annexation or do mina­tion of Afghanistan and Beluchistan so as to expand Russia's posit ionon the shores of the Indian Ocean and to gain a direct influence onHindustan, The strengthening of Russian influence in Mongo lia andChina by giving active support to the communist government in NorthChina in its fight against Chungking. Extension of ancient clai ms inManchuria, and the affiliation of the latter to the North Chinese So vietRepublic. A demand for participation in the political and econo micreconstruction of Malaya and the Dutch East Indies which migh t beattained by Soviet propaganda against ., western imperialism." Th eannexation of the southern end of Sakhalin Island and the K uril Islandsin order to strengthen Russia's maritime position in the P acific . In­fluence on the future political and economic development of Kor ea andJapan by the inauguration or backing of a government with com"munistic trends.

It is obvious that these aims conflict with the interests of th ewestern democracies. Russia's proposed outlet to the Atlantic docsnot aim primarily at continental Europe, but at the United Ki ng domand at the U.S.A., whose domination of the Atlantic Region will becontested in days to come by a strong Russia to a far greater extentthan it ever was in past epochs by Spain and Portugal, late r by theNetherlands and France and lastly by Germany .

If Russia achieves her demands in the Eastern Mediterranea n,the British Empire will have waged war against Italy to no purpo se,since the Suez Canal, so vital to the welfare of Great Britain, will beincreasingly endangered and more than ever it was by France , Italyor Germany.

Russia as the strongest power in the Baltic, in the Tatra Moun­tains of Poland, in the Carpathians, in the Danubian area, in Austria,and in the Balkans, means that all Europe may be satellite to a R usso­Siberian world and that Anglo-Saxon influence on Europe will suffera marked decline .

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GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WOItLD

Should Russia get into the Persian Gulf, she would not only bemistress of the entire political and economic situation in the Near andMiddle East, but would influence developments in the vast territoriesround the Indian Ocean and above all, Hindustan and the entire Arab

world.In addition to these aims of Russian foreign policy, which are

automatically directed against the United Kingdom and the BritishCommonwealth, there are others which aim directly or indirectly atthe U.S.A. Some of these aims emerge when we consider the pressureof Russia on China, Mongolia and Manchuria and, to a certain extent,on Korea and Japan. We cannot over-estimate the importance whichthe fulfilment of these aims would have on the political and economicdevelopment of such vast territories with their thousand millioninhabitants.

WESTERN POLICY

The foreign policies of Great Britain and the U.S.A., on the otherhand, are by no means as clear-cut and methodical as those outlinedby Stalin, who is following in the footsteps of Ivan IV, surnamed TheTerrible, Peter the Great, General Skobeleff and Count Amur.

The lack of any unmistakable Anglo-Saxon policy is partly dueto the incomplete agreement between the interests of one country andthe other, though, for the moment, both London and Washington areat pains to emphasise the close conjunction of their policies. But thatthere are differences of interests between the United Kingdom and theU.S.A. is undeniable, for economic rivalry certainly does exist tosome degree, while the complex problem of preserving the BritishEmpire intact occupies an even vaster field. We have to rememberthat American industry has undergone enormous expansion in recent

~:a~~a~n~i~~~~:~~~~n~~a¥~~e:~:~::i~vi~~~:r~~t:,Btr~;is~'~:;i::r::e~h~~new markets for her industrial products may be acquired. GreatBritain, on the other hand, as a consequence of economic difficulties athome, has a vital interest in keeping the Empire markets. Moreover,India and other British interests are not only identical with economic,hut also with political problems. Most Americans are disinclined tocountenanae British imperialism in vast overseas territories, or atleast anxious not to support it actively.

This lack of harmony between Great Britain and the U.S.A. madeitself felt during the war and has been evident in post-war days asregards. Germany and Europe in general.

Apart from the non-committal stipulations of the Atlantic Charter,the Anglo-Saxon powers confined their political aims merely to the

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idea of" unconditional surrender" unless we are to consider BrendanBracken's pronouncement at the Quebec Conference in Augu~t, 1943,as a denial of this aim when he said: .. We must bomb a nd burn andruthlessly destroy in every way available to us the people re spo nsiblefor this war." Already, in the case of Italy, the phrase a bout un­conditional surrender proved both ineffectual and eve n dangerous.Because of persisting in the use of this slogan, the Anglo-Saxon powerslost precious weeks and missed the opportunity of contacting in timethe non-fascist majority of the Italian people. As early as November1945, London and \\rashington, when the armistice ter ms wet~announced, had to admit that the conditions which shou ld have led tounconditional surrender had never actually existed, and that in theinterlude between the Atlantic Charter and the end of the war theseconditions had become legally invalid. As to Germany a nd theGerman people, the lack of a constructive foreign policy on the partof the Anglo-Saxon powers proved even more disastrous tha n in th ecase of Italy. It is not an exaggeration to say that the abse nce of anyconstructive policy prolonged the conflict for one or two yea rs , and hasdeferred a real peace for as many decades.

Naturally, both London and Washington have ideas of their owna to what form the future policy in relation to Germany an d Europewill assume; but the conceptions differ from one another, are ofte n dia­metrically opposite, or even contradictory within the mse lve s. Theintrinsic incongruity of the policy adopted by the Anglo-Saxon powersin relation to Germany cannot better be illustrated than com par ing theAtlantic Charter with the Potsdam declaration. Everything, f rom th epolicy of annihilation of Morgenthau and Vansittart to that of reco ncilia ­tion advocated by Hoover, and Beveridge, seems to emerge.

Though the policies of the two Anglo-Saxon powers are no t th esame, we can draw some inferences as to their aims from a st udy ofprevailing opinion, the histories of the two countries, and the inter est swhich both have at heart.

Great Britain is aware that her political power has bee n co n­siderably shaken by the wars of 1914-18 and 1939-45, that he r influen ceon the world at large has diminished enormously, in spite of th e factthat in both wars she emerged victorious. It is quite comprehensi blethat this and the enormous sacrifices she made in both confl ict s haveleft a feeling of bitterness towards Germany and a determina tion tomake impossible a repetition of such d trial. Another wa r on the sa mescale would weaken Britain's position as a world power to a n evengreater degree. Moreover, the United Kingdom wishes to seek com­pensafion for the losses she has sustained, especially in the P acific andIndian Oceans; furthermore, she has suffered both politically and

GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD

economically in North and South America, and naturally wants to im­prove her political and economic position in Europe.

If these assumptions prove true, which they are very likely to be,then the objective Great Britain has in mind is to prostrate Germanyto such an extent that she will never again be a menace to the UnitedKingdom whilst not destroying her completely as a political, economicand cultural unit. In relation to the other two Great Powers, Britainis in a relatively weak position and she will, therefore, deem it ex­pedient to establish the closest bonds of friendship between herselfand those countries whose economic and political interests run parallelwith her own. The South African Prime Minister, General Smuts, hasgone so far as to suggest the incorporation of certain western Europeanstates into the British Commonwealth, and London is endeavouring tocreate friendly relations with all countries who arc likely to acceptBritish leadership in Europe.

But these feelers on the part of Great Britain encounter fierceopposition from Moscow and toa certain extent from other quarters;there is Franco's Hispanidad idea and even de Gaulle's dream of agreat French power in the Orient and on the Rhine. Great Britain isto-day more interested in Europe than she has ever been before. Shecannot permit the extension of Soviet influence farther than theElbe, though had America given timely support, the Russian boundarywould have been fixed more to the east, on the banks of the Oder orthe Vistula.

As to the policies of the United Slates of America, the two worldwars having enormously augmented her power, her ambitions haveincreased concommitantly and will continue on the same lines indecades to come. Since American imperialistic aims lie almost ex­clusively in the Pacific Ocean, European affairs are not of quite thesame interest to her. America certainly regards Europe as a potentialeconomic rival and storm centre, but otherwise the continent is con­sidered just a nuisance. We need but read Bernard Baruch's reportof June 22, Hl45, on the economic situation in Europe to perceive thatGermany in particular, and Europe as a whole, are of no concern tothe United States except insofar as either might become economicrivals or danger areas. As the national and imperialistic tendencies ofAmerica make themselves increasingly felt, the deeper her indifference[0 internal European problems becomes. The U.S.A. engages in thestruggles between Great Britain and the Soviet Union for economicspheres of interest in Europe indirectly and almost reluctantly, and itgoes without saying that the extent of America's participation in thisduel largely depends on her general attitude towards Russia. TheMarshall Plan, in this connection, is much more 13 step egainstRussia. than a step for Europe.

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, EUROPE THE OBJECTIVE

From this discussion of the position, it becomes ext remely clearthat, in consequence of the attitude adopted by the thre e Great Powerscontinental Europe has ceased to be an active polit ica l force an~is, for the time being, no more than a political objective for the U.S.A.the Soviet Union and the British Commonwealth. Th is is due in alarge degree to their contending with one another for decisiv e positionsin the world and especially in the Pacific and Indian Ocea ns, and notbecause of their immediate intentions with regard to Euro pe's difficult iesas such!

As already stated, the policy of the u.s.A. is not directly concernedwith the solution of European questions. Her interests are more ex­tensive and more momentous in 'cha racter. Besides gaini ng a n incon­testable preponderance in the Americas, she is concerned with thePacific so that even the Atlantic plays but a subordinate part in herschemes. Rivalry in the Pacific does not touch upon European problemsproper-apart from those connected with the sometime Fre nch, Dutchand Portuguese possessions there. Even so, these possessions servemerely as objects for compensation to the three world powe rs in theirstruggle of interests in the Pacific.

The important and strong position of the British Commonwealthin and around the shores of the Pacific and above all in India, Australiaand New Zealand, makes it highly probable that, desp ite all rivalries,the United States will continue to lend her support to Gre at Britainwhile pursuing her own political aims. The relationship bet ween theAnglo-Saxon powers is altogether different from their con nec t ions withRussia. Ever since the conquest of Bokhara, Khiva and K hokand in1873-76, and her intrusions into Mongolia and Manchuria which werestopped in 1\105 by the battles of Port Arthur and Mukden , Ru ssiahas never concealed the fact that she considers herself the predominantGreat Power in Asia and intends to push her way to the India n Oceanand play an appropriate part in Pacific affairs. In pursuance of thisold-time policy, the Soviet Union strives to strengthen her position inthe Pacific by developing the far-eastern regions of Russ ia . fromVladivostok to Kamchatka and to the Baikal Sea, and has therebycreated effective preliminary conditions for making further claims.

It is to the advantage of the Soviet Union to stimulate confidencein her anti-capitalist policy on the part of the Asiatic peoples, who arelikely to trust her more than they do the Anglo-Saxon power s repre­senting old-time imperialism. Communist propaganda is, th erefore,rife throughout Asia. But Russia's most mighty instrument in theFar East is the communist government in North China, which sheherself has set up and which she supports with a view to ga ining her

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GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD

~::t i~a:he:e:a~r;:fJ~ons~:ren~~~e:e~r~yC~~::i:,~o;if~u~~st~:;::~:~weapons and by leavmg behind the heavy armament of the RUSSian armyof occupation there.

The Anglo-Saxon powers, led by the U.S.A., rely upon that part

~f i;~::t~h~~n~~e~~:~r~:~h';C~~:;::~~i~~p~~:~nt~e~a:~S:e:e~a~;~communist faction strongly opposed to the government. This,natural!y, creates more difficulties than are experienced in the homo­geneous Yenan government of the North Chinese communists. Apartfrom the loyalty of the Christian Philippines, Chiang Kai-Shelc's Chinais the sole asset which the Anglo-Saxon powers possess in the FarEast. For the rest, their position depends entirely on the effective­ness of their foreign policy, and, in the final analysis, their militarypower in that part of the world.

As was shown by the resolutions of the Cairo conference in 1943,both the United States and Great Britain are resolved to reinstate thestatus quo in the Pacific and Indian Oceans which was favourable tothemselves and the Chinese, probably with some rectifications, suchas the incorporation of Dutch East India and French Indo-China intothe Anglo-Saxon sphere of interest and power, by bringing back NorthChina and Manchuria into Chiang Kai-Shek's government, and bystrengthening America's strategical position in the Pacific in takingover Japanese, and perhaps other, naval bases in that ocean.

On the other hand, Russia will take all precautions to frustratethese designs. Moscow will, of course, try to achieve this aim withoutrecourse to arms; she has merely to profit by the strength of her positionwhich is in the main due to the North China government and.. independent" Manchuria. Even more effective than her strategicaland economic resources in Asia and the Far East, is the psychologicaleffect of her propaganda on the Asiatic peoples who at present comewithin the sphere of Anglo-Saxon influence. India offers a fertile soilfor such propaganda. Nehru, as is wel! known, is sympathetic to theSoviet Union, and Moscow has been very clever in her propagandaand political tactics ',with regard to the iIndian problem jshe hassucceeded in making even the non-communist elements friendly towardsher. As soon as self-government throughout India has had time todevelop, this friendship will be fostered by economic and politicalrelations between the two countries. Should a pro-Zionist policymaterialise in Palestine, the Arabs and the Mohammedans of Indiawould automatical!y throw in their lot with Moscow and Russianinfluence in Hindustan and throughout the whole Arab world would bespeeded up and intensified. If communist propaganda among themasses of Indonesia' and above all among the populations of the

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Malayan peninsula and the D utc h Eas t Indie s pr oves successful, theRussians will certainly ma ke the Angl o-S a xon positi on intolerable inthese regions. May not Ja pan, too, in the end , yield to Russiancommunist tendencies rather than to th e dem ocr ati c t rends of theAnglo-Saxon world ?

From all these considerations and reflec tions we may draw theconclusion that the Sov iet Union has so many trump ca rds to playin the Far East that she will always be ab le to enforce her will onthe Anglo-Saxon powers, who may have to make concess ions in Europein exchange for a more lenient policy in Asia. In add itio n, there existso many pro -Russian undercurrents in the territories wh ich com e underAnglo-Saxon influence that these powers wou ld find it extremely difficultto sile nce R ussian objections by force of ar ms.

From all this there emerges quite clearly the fact that Europewill be treated as an objective for haggling betwee n the Anglo-Saxonpowers and the Soviet Union, and that R ussi a's positi on is and willremain for many years to come, so strong that she will play a morepromi nent part in Eu rope than her actua l pote ntial on the continentand the Atlantic warrant. Consequently, all of eastern Europe asfar as a line from Lubeck to Trieste will stay, direc tly or indirectly,under Russian influence if not mandate, an d this mean s, to all intentsand purposes, 60 per cent. of European territo ry and 40 per cent. ofher populat ion .

It is only natural that the Anglo -Sa xo n powers will in these cir­cumstances try to secure for themselves an ap propriate portion ofinterests in Europe, but the extent must de pe nd on the degree ofcollaboration between the two governments and on th eir respectiveattitudes towards Russia. The border-line between th e Russian andAnglo-Saxon spheres of interest will not on ly depend on the efficiencyof Anglo-Saxon collaboration, but also whether the re will be an Anglo­Saxon zone or whether Great Britain and the U nite d S tates will actseparately, and whether there will be an additional Fr ench sub-sphereof interest.

The situation is a co mplicated one an d is not in th e least clarifiedby the French political attitude. It is truly ext rao rd ina ry to see howFrance overestimates her strength and still considers he rself to be oneof the Great Powers. She is continually interfering betw een the Anglo­Saxon powers and Russia in the expectation of gaining distinct nationaladvantages. It is tragically comic to imagine that a count ry likeFrance, which is militari ly and economically ba nkr upt and politicallyundermined, should in these days try to assume the ma ntle of a GreatPower by wrenching away portions of the Belgia n and Germ an bodyin order to bolster up her own debility . Neither Russ ians nor Americanstake these presumptuous endeavours on the part of F rance seriously,

GERMANY IN A DISUNITED WORLD

though the Great Powers are willing to concede little gifts to win thefavour of Paris.

A sober analysis of Europe's political position during this post­war epoch, leads to the conclusion that she has lost her position as asignificant item in the political world and that she will remam dividedinto two or perhaps three separate spheres of influence until a newinternational struggle upsets this uneasy equilibrium.

Eastern Europe, partly annexed by Russia, and the Balkans willform the zone of Soviet influence.

Western Europe will come under Anglo-Saxon influence.Germany and also Austria will figure as a kind of condominion,

under the a-gls of the Anglo-Saxon powers and Russia, each of whichwill continually endeavour to g-ain the upper hand both economicallyand politically.

A NEW DIVISION OF THE GLOBE

The most revolutionary result of this last war which centred notonly in Europe but also in eastern Asia, is that only three great powershave survived it: the Soviet Union, the U.S.A. and the British Common­wealth. A careful estimate of their respective strength shows a ratioof approximately 2: 2: 1.

The features which characterise the second world war and itssequel are: Europe is no longer a continent of world significance inthe political field; the Mediterranean and the Atlantic have forfeitedtheir importance; the three surviving Great Powers have their eyesfixed on the Pacific and the Indian Oceans.

The intrinsic factors which goo to make up a great power arevastness of space, great industrial production, density of population,and biological freshness. All former conceptions of power and spacehave been annulled by the gigantic development of industry andaviation. An empire whose dimensions are not wide enough to preventcomplete destruction by air-raids, is no great power at all. Neitheris an empire to be considered as a great power if it cannot produce atleast 3,000 airplanes and 5,000 tanks a month. But this only appliesto present conditions. for we do not know yet how atomic energy willhe used and whether other surprises in technical evolution are still instore for us. It might, therefore, be added that an empire whichis unable to keep up with new inventions and developments is not aworld power in the true sense of the term.

The three extant world Powers will partition not only Europe hutthe whole planet into three spheres of interests. This tri-partite division

:~:i~:a~: ~~ta:~:s~:~~~e~:;::~~,a~~tw;;~~:e :~l~I~~C~i:,~s'ce~:%~~

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economic war and more especially a propaganda crusade to wi n overthe lesser independent states to the respective spheres of power. Thu s,for the present, any hope of constituting a Utopia on this ear th, aUtopia for which all war-weary spirits yearn, is nut of the quest ion .A letter written by Benjamin Franklin seven years before the Revolu­tion in France and fourteen years before Napoleon set out to co nque rthe world, may serve as a warning to those who imagine that the Grea tPowers will abjure imperialism. This missive was written to RobertLivingstone from Paris in the year 1782. .. T he ideas of aggrandize­ment by conquest are out of fashion. The wise here thi nk Francegreat enough, and its ambition at present seems to be only that of justiceand magnanimity towards other nations, fidelity and utility to itsAllies." The old adage that the possession of power engenders adesire for even greater power is all too true, and is a foible of humannature.

This does not imply that the three world Powers will reject theUnited Nations Organisation behind which they can conceal their.. imperialistic barrenness" so as to lull the smaller states into anillusion of independence. In reality this is merely an instrument inthe hands of the three world Powers, though France and China havebeen courteously allowed to make use of it. The C.N.O. serves theinterests of the present three world Powers more exclusively than theLeague of Nations served those of previously existing powers. Thisis proved by the fact that the organisation does not even theoreticallyacknowledge the integrity of the lesser states, and it grants the" BigFive" the unconditional right of veto. Nevertheless, this organisa tio n

;~~::~:: =;~~~u~h-:::~~~e~e~t:~~S~Oj~~;~:~~:st~a~uue:t~n~:t7~n:~~~~But the configuration of the re-distributed Earth will take ap pr oxi­

mately the following contours: The United States of America cla imabsolute dominion, both economically and politically, over the wholeof the Americas and consider themselves entitled to recognition as th emain Power in the Pacific, while sharing the Atlantic with Great Brit ain .The United Kingdom and the Commonwealth concentrate on the Indi anOcean, while playing a subordinate role in the Pacific, and participa t ingin the Atlantic sphere of interest with the U.S.A. Western Europe a ndthe Mediterranean are to become more influenced by the policies of GreatBritain now than they were before. The U.S.S.R. exercises undisputedsway over all the lands between Elbe (perhaps the Rhine!) and Amur ,with advance-posts in western Europe, the Near and Middle Eas t a ndin the direction of China and Hindustan, The three world Po wers willcompete strenuously for France, Belgium, the Netherlands a nd alltheir colonies. Great Britain may aim at welding these States into awestern camp which will act in collaboration with herself in the econ omic

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and political field. In 1940, Churchill enunciated the idea of incor­por .'1ting France into the British Commonwealth, and General Smutsreiterated a kindred notion in 1943, and after the war. The Chineseproblem, the Indian question, and the ever-recurring European con­troversy will remain matters for aggressive discussion for some whileyet between the three world Powers!

Russia's political and economic ambitions are naturally turnedtowards China and India, while, in addition, there are Afghanistan,Iran, and the whole of the Arab community to be considered. Affairsare yet more complicated by other disputed points among the threeworld Powers. There is the economic struggle for South America,Africa and Indonesia; the control of airways, monopolies of rawmaterial such as oil and rubber, and many other moot points resulting­from the relations between the lesser states with one another and withthe world Powers.

COMING CHANGESIN THE BALANCE OF POWER

If the victorious Powers hope that the political situation throughoutthe world is going to remain as it is at present, they will be grosslymistaken. Stability is against every law of nature, which only knowsnever ending change, a rise and decline. Even if during the next fewdecades, the three world Powers are or seem to be strong, they willnever be strong enough to stay the shifting of the balance of poweramong themselves or among the lesser states owing to the compre~

hensible or incomprehensible inter-action of dynamic factors.The alterations in the balance of power which are bound to come

sooner or later among the great Powers themselves and in their rela­tions to other smaller powers must be taken into account, Alreadynow, three years after the war, despite propaganda which still obscuresthe clear-sighted vision of actual conditions, certain facts lead to theacknowledgment that many a change is taking place in the internaland external affairs of each of the three great Powers and conclusionsmay be drawn from this.

In the United States, it is not so much the usual whirligig con­nected with the election of a new president every four years (1948,1952) which causes some uncertainty in the political aspect of homeaffairs, but the increasing gravity of the economic and financial situa­tion which might well drive America into imperialistic activities andtactics. 'In the course of two world wars, industrialisation in theU.S. has taken on fantastic proportions, so that the capacity of pro­duction far exceeds the capacity to consume. Hence it may beassumed that either her production must be reduced to the level of

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consumption or the United States will have to raise her export tradeto unprecedented heights. Public opinion under pressure from thebest organised group composing the working classes, has to be kept inmind, for on these classes the United States government largely de­pends. Therefore, any substantial decrease in production is unthink­able. There is only one way out of existing economic difficulties: toraise the level of exports of American goods and to find markets inforeign countries. But the urgencies of war productions were notconfined to the U.S.A. alone; almost every country in the world hadto spur on the workers to greater and greater efforts; even the com­plete elimination of the industrial life of both Germany and Japan hashad little effect on the general industrial situation. Thus we have afrenzied competition for the world markets on the part of all threegreat Powers. The disadvantage to the expansion of U.S. marketslies in the fact that economic endeavour is hampered by the lack ofstate subsidies and that wages are excessively high, far higher thanin England for instance, and many times higher than in the U.S.S.R.To compensate herself for these disadvantages, the United States isobliged to bring financial and political pressure to bear by the grantingof loans, and money-lending naturally breeds contempt and hostility.Being fully aware that in the long run such a policy will provoke thewhole world against her, the U.S.A. is supporting her imperialisticpolicy by the creation of an effective military arm.

After two world wars whose aims were to abolish militarism onceand for all, the U.S.A. have secured the sanction of government andcongress to build a navy far stronger than all the navies in the worldput together; moreover, she intends to have the best air-fleet fo rdecadesto come. In addition, the United States lay claim to a large numberof strategic bases all over the world which are declared to be indis­pensable to the security of the country; the Pacific, the Far East, theNear East, Africa and Europe all come into the category of Americandemands,

The crisis which the capitalist system is undergoing in America'sdemocracy must inevitably lead to the use of imperialistic methods,whose repercussions will, of necessity, make themselves felt in the wholeof the political structure of the United States. The financial situationwhich is growing even more acute in the States, must also lead tostronger imperialism. National debt amounts to over 300,000 milliondollars and the payment of interest alone exceeds the whole pre-warbudget. Then there are the immense costs of military demobilisationand remobilisation, the conversion of industry, the foreign loansgranted for political reasons- all these items will aggramte in largemeasure the already thorny financial tangle. It is possible that in­fluential capitalist circles in America will attempt to devaluate the dollar

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to escape from the dilemma, and this will mean the annihilation of the. middle classes on whom the stability and prosperity of the United States

relies to a great extent. The process of doing away with the middleclasses had already begun during the war, and it will be acceleratedby the introduction of various state measures as, for instance, the taxesregarding public welfare; moreover, there is an urgent need to centraliseproduction to cheapen articles for consumption. As a sequel to thisprocess, true democracy will suffer a decline, for the middle classes anda healthy democracy are inseparable.

Another and more serious issue which will exercise an importantinfluence On the development of home policy in the United States, isthe menace of depopulation and racial conflict. After the greatpioneering epoch and the progressive growth of industrialisation andmechanisation, the general standard of life rose to a high level whichallured the individual as much as it corrupted the community. Therise in the standard of life was followed by a steady decrease in thebirth-rate ; and despite the boast about her magnificent youth, theU.S.A. is on the verge of relying on immigration rather than on pro­creation if an increase of population is to be secured. Since, forpolitical and economic reasons, immigration to the United States hasbeen rigorously restricted, American manpower cannot be expectedto increase in coming decades. The racial problem in America isanother headache. For while the white population is about stationary,the negro population is increasing pro ratio. Though the U.S.A.emphasises that she is a" white and Christian nation," the fact re­mains that her population is neither pure white nor pure Christian. Thestatistical data furnished by the World Almanac (1942) prove that onlyfifty-six million out of a population of one hundred and thirty-threemillion belong to any denomination at all not excepting the Jews. Inother words, the majority of the inhabitants arc not Christians. Theassurance that the population is mainly white has a better showingthan the question of Christianity, for 90 per cent. of the populationdo belong to the white races, whereas there are only 10 per cent.coloured people and these are almost exclusively neg-roes. But thepercentage of negro births is far in excess of those of the whites; inaddition the negroes of the South have emigratedjn masses to theNorth and East because of the development of industry in these areas,and the consequences are not predictable. History has not even nowpronounced her verdict in the quarrel between Jefferson Davies andLincoln. and the negro question will rise in importance from year to

~:a:~e l~~ ~:e t:n:~~~~u::en ~:::a;m;~~i;se C~~~d:n~~~: t~;i~o:~~t;fassimilation, i.e., the total absorption of the coloured peoples into thepolitic-al system. has not been vindicated.

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,'ext let us examine conditions in Great Britain. Here thesymptoms of internal change are even more blatant than in the U.S.A.The sensational defeat of the Churchill government in the generalelection of May, 1945, and the victory of the Labour Party, are clea rpointers to the fact that public opinion in the U.K. had undergone amost significant transformation. First of all there are the structuralchanges in Britain's economic life and, whatever may be the fate ofthe Labour administration, the days of unlimited capitalism in theBritish Isles are numbered. The crisis which led to the overthrowof the Churchill government and which showed that there was a funda­mental change in public opinion, cannot be solved by a mere remodelli ngof the Civil Service 01 even by slight modifications in the existingsystem. •

Financially Great Britain is incomparably worse off than the UnitedStates of America. Had it not been for the political and financial aidgiven by America, the Sterling would have been devaluated by at least50 per cent. With her loss of foreign credit after the recent war, herenormous burden of debt, the pauperisation of her people at home, theUnited Kingdom now faces a financial crisis which verges on catas­trophe. The American loan mitigated this long term emergency, it istrue, but owing to the conditions which accompanied that loan, thefinancial position is bound to become more unfavourable. The economicsituation has deteriorated so fundamentally that there seems littlelikeli­hoodofimprovement. Thisappliesahovealltothemerchantnavyandto trade in general. In addition tu considerable losses due to sub­marine warfare, Great Britain has a formidable competitor in the U.S.A.For the first time in her history she takes second place as to her navyand her merchantmen. Whereas before the war the British fleet ofmerchantmen was in a ratio of 3: I as compared with that of the U.S.A.,the ratio has now become inverted to 1:2. We have reasonable causeto presume that the Americans will make full use of this superiority.This means that Great Britain will lose the carrying of Americanexport which before the war amounted to 90 per cent. and also willhave to accept American comoetition in the world markets on a moredeadly scale than ever.

The industrial position is even more unfavourable. During the1939-45 war, Canada, India, Australia and South Africa developed theirindustries to so vast an ext~nt that .<?reat Britain has lost outlets inthose markets, and now faces competition on the part of her own Com­monwealth. Though the strengthening of the bonds between themembers composing the British Empire is a good move in itself, it wil lnot prove adequate to balance the weakness of the mother country;moreover, the dominions, owing to their ascendancy, are inclined towork out their own salvation and to regard their particular political

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and economic interests irrespective of what Great Britain will do. Theinternal difficulties in the dominions, and especially in Canada and SouthAfrica, let alone India, contribute in no small measure to the declineof the British Empire and its prestige. Undoubtedly, America willderive excellent profits from these changed conditions and will certainlynot lend a hand in the re-establishing of a strong British Empire. Thereis an added burden in maintaining considerable forces on land, at seaand -in the air, causing peace-time conscription, which cannot beprolonged too long.

Nothing can demonstrate more clearly the fiasco of statesmanshipin this second world war than the fact that the United States of Americaas well as the United Kingdom and her Empire are forced to maintainlarge armies- and to produce considerable amounts of armaments nowthat the war is over. The situation reminds us of the worst times ofEuropean competition in armaments. Apart from the incalculableenergies of the atomic bomb, the creation of enormous navies, immenseair-fleets and standing armies are the main characteristics of this .. vic­torious peace" for which the utmost economic and financial sacrificeshad and have to be made.

The threat of depopulation applies to the British Isles in no lessmeasure than it does to the U.S.A. The population of Great Britainhas been stationary for many years, but decreases are likely. Thesameis true of the white populations of Australia, New Zealand, South Africaand Canada, though in the last-named country the French populationis still on the increase.

The growing self-assertion of the coloured races within the BritishEmpire is not to be gauged by its moral effect alone, but by the materialfact that political influence among these races is apt to weaken thegeneral position of the whites in the regions concerned. much to thedetriment of both Great Britain and the U.S.A.

Finally, what about Russia? Much of the ambiguity and uncer­tainty which surrounds the Soviet Union's internal affairs is due toStalin's personality. Stalin controls all the military, political and ad­ministrative factors, thus being omnipotent in Soviet affairs until hisdeath or until he is deposed from the dictatorship. Any weakening ofRussia's internal or foreign position is remote as long as he is alive,but afterwards we may expect almost anything, because so far no onehas been recognised as his successor, as possessing his energy andshrewdness, and the inevitable aftermath of a personal dictatorshipis usually one of weakness. The first grand impetus of the BolshevikParty and its general ideology have considerably slackened owing toStalin's personal dictatorship and to his change of views on inter­national communism, which, through his influence, has become a Russiannationalistic idea. This shift towards Russian nationalism may in the

Ilil

long run result in strengthening Soviet power, though for the immediatefuture it will prove derogatory to her foreign influence. Whether theseblighting effects can be remedied before severely injuring the Sovietposition, entirely depend on Stalin's statesmanship and, of course, onthe number of his days.

Two important factors which affect the lives of the present genera­tiun in Russia are; (1) Exhaustion of the people through the strain ofthe revolution and counter-revolution, reconstruction, rearmament, andthe murderous war itself (But let us remember that" the people" ina dictatorship have not much of a say!). (2) The growing desire uf theRussian people to raise the standard of living, a desire which arisesautomatically by the contacts of the Red Army with western civilisationand culture. If the peoples of Russia attain their goal in this respect.there will be added comforts, less armament industry and a tendencyto effeminacy.

Considering the sound constitution of the Russian people as awhole and the well-nigh inexhaustible reservoir of strength in Siberiaalone. these future problems do not shake the U.S.S.R. to her founda­tions, whereas her nationality problem does. It would be contraryto every historical precedent were the numerous nations which at presentcomprise the Soviet Union not in due time to assert them­selves and snap the bounds which now bind them to Moscow. Fiftymillion Europeans, Finlanders, Esthonians, Latvians, Lithuanians,Poles, Rumanians, have, as a sequel to the war, been annexed to theSoviet Union, mostly against their will. The Ukranians, WhiteRussians and Caucasians realise their importance now the fighting isat an end; regional feeling will inevitably assert itself as soon as thestandard of their culture is ripe for such developments. Backwardpeoples can be held together by huge centralised States and can begoverned by a compact minority. but it is extremely difficult to do sowith self-confident peoples who have become conscious of their nationalvalues and their individuality. It may further be assumed that Siberia.the basis of future Russian world power, will oppose g-overnment fromfar-away Moscow. But it is necessary to stress the fact that theseinternal dangers to the Soviet Union's mig-ht are potential rather thanactual so long as Stalin remains dictator.

Russia's present intransigent attitude towards Washingtonand towards the British Empire is very much in evidence and will cer­tainly place her in jeopardy. Public opinion in the Anglo-Americanworld is not likely to be bamboozled for long at Moscow's vacillationsand the pretence that" internal problems ,. trouble China. Persia.the Balkans. Eastern Europe and so forth, if there should go onappearing in these countries communist groups supplied with amplefunds. having considerable military forces at their command. and

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doing everything in their power to undermine the respective govern­ments. Besides, the peoples in East and Central Europe who havesuffered so terribly during Russian occupation, will undoubtedly riseagainst any form of tyranny should they receive political, financial andmilitary support from abroad.

It may be presumed that Moscow has made a quintessential politicalerror in annexing the eastern provinces of Germany, and cruelly crush­.ing the German inhabitants of these areas. These acts have made anyco-operation between Germany and Russia improbable in the future,unless Moscow makes a complete turn-about.

From the viewpoint of world politics, Moscow's post-war policy hasbrought her few friends and few allies, if the communists and theirfellow travellers be excepted, and should martial proceedings ensue,the Soviet Union mig-ht have to face a hostile coalition of the wholeworld.

WORLD POWERS OF TO-MORROW

The three world Powers of to-day enjoy that place in the sun whichwas once occupied by the world powers of yesterday, but there areother powers starting already out to be the rivals ofto-morrow. Any attempts on the part of the present world Powersto assure their status in perpetuity are as futile as were the endeavoursof Portugal and Spain in the sixteenth century to assert their prepon­derance over France and England. Without making any claim tobeing a prophet, one can easily foretell that China. India, and SouthAmerica are on the road to becoming- the world powers of the future.Each of these countries has the indispensable prerequisites for growinginto world powers: they possess space and sufficient men and rawmaterials; the only thing they now lack is adequate industrialproduction.

China has already asserted herself. As the Cairo Conference of1943 clearly showed, the astute policy of Generalissimo Chiang Kai­Shek succeeded in creating a stepping-stone to the materialisation ofthis claim. China was the most valuable ally of t U.S.A. againstJapanese aggression and is a potential ally of the Anglo-Americansagainst Russia. She can rely on actual support from the Ang-lo-Saxonpowers, whose self-interests lead them to side steadily with Chiang­Kai-Shek, Viewed from the historical angle, China's struggle withj apan was nothing other than a strenuous effort to achieve supremacyin the Far East. The comparison with Prussia's race against

~e~s~::ri~~ It~6~r:v::tVi~~;.im:~ri~~st~ces:re~~d~e::;,~~~t~h;:~nnaq~:r~~:

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vI Japan and she certainly will cultivate the friendship of Korea, Siamand Indo-China.

During the protracted struggle with Japan, China was constrainedto modernise her economy and her internal organisation. Once thestrain of civil war has fallen from her burdened shoulders, she mayrapidly develop her economic and political strength. In spite of thepoverty of her people, and in spite of the obstacles which Russia maythrow up, there is every reason to suppose that China will attain the

.position of a great power within the next fifty years. Russia, wellaware of the probability of Chinese aspirations, which, if theymaterialise, will weaken the Soviet position in East Asia, will in futuretry even harder to frustrate these objectives. Russia has alreadyforced independence on Outer Mongolia, is doing all she can to fosterevery separatist movement in Manchuria and Siankiang; neither is sheparsimonious in the matter of money and the supply of weapons tostrengthen and enlarge communist influences in China in the hope ofbringing the whole country under Moscow's tutelage. Should thispolicy prove to be impracticable, owing to Chiang Kai-Sheks methodsand the support he has from the Anglo-American powers, Russia willaim at least at dividing China into three parts or more. The strugglesagainst Chinese unity, be they labelled" independence movements" or

- .. communist opposition," boil down to the fact that machinations onthe part of Moscow are afoot in order to frustrate China in her en­deavour to achieve the position of a world power.

The day is far distant when India will become a world power. Forthe time being and for many years to come, India is a problem of thegravest importance to the British Empire, since at any time that countrymight yet cause serious conflicts between Great Britain and Russia.Though for the moment India seems to be out of the competitive racefor world power, some day she will emancipate herself because thenational and economic position is growing ever stronger and will de­velop more rapidly as time goes on. The industrialisation of Indiabegan during the first world war and has continued to develop on agigantic scale in the course of the late war. It is natural that hereconomic significance should have been enhanced and it is equallynatural that the sire to be independent economically, politically findnationally should have gone hand in hand with this achievement.Historical experience leads us to assume that when the struggle forindependence has been completed, and this depends largely on thepolicies adopted by London and Moscow, India-Pakistan, with her vastterritories and enormous population and productiveness, may well reachthe status ofa world power.

South America's metamorphosis into a world power is already underAnd of this we may be certain' her growth will be almost un-

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fettered and harmonious, and, presumably, march forward at a quickerpace than can be the case with China and India. She win not behampered by the imperial rivalries of the present world Powers, thoughthe dense shadow cast across the Western Hemisphere by the paramountUnited States win deny her the enjoyment of a place in the sun forsome time to come. The process of industrialising South America iswell under way owing to the pressure exercised by the United States'economic policy which, in its turn, had to be adapted to the blockademeasures introduced during the first and second world wars. Still,South America's industrial efficiency has not reached the heightrequisite to becoming a world power. In an indirect way, the U.S.A.is helping South America to strengthen her productive efficiency, andthis on account of those among her capitalists who desire to acquireremunerative and lowly-taxed investments in Central and SouthAmerica. And it is worthy of note to mention that foreign capitalisticpenetration of a country does not to any considerable degree affect theawakening national spirit, as is shown in the case of Mexico, who simplyexpropriated the American Petroleum Companies. Once Latin Americahas brought productive efficiency to the level of her vast territories andpopulations, there remain only a national rallying cry and sound leader­ship to convert her into a great power. For many decades, the problemof leadership and the competition for this post have regulatedSouth American relations. Argentina and Brazil both intend toplay the leading role in South America, and this accounts for thedivergence of their policies and mutual antagonism. Moreover, theirrespective foreign policies differ as has been clearly demonstrated bythe fact that in each of the two world wars, Argentina hasbeen neutral, while Brazil has sided with the U.S.A. At themoment, Brazil basks in the rays of \Vashington's favour, whereasArgentina is indirectly influenced by European powers. It isimpossible to predict whether Rio de Janeiro win assume themantle of leadership in South America, or whether Buenos Aires isdestined for this part. Were historical and linguistic considerationsto act as the decisive factor; the odds would be on the side of Argentina,for she was at the head of Spanish America for centuries, and herlanguage, which is Spanish, is spoken by everyone save in Brazil, wherethe people talk Portuguese. Be this as it may, South Arnericar'ssignificance and power will increase during the next few decades. Atfirst she will be the main source of supply for raw materials and anoutlet for foreign markets, but in years ahead she will become a unifiedeconomic and political great power.

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STRANGLED FATHERLAND

Though for the moment the outlook for both Europe and Germanyappearsverypoorindeed,whenw<?cometoconsiderthcfateofnationsin the past it is obvious that the distress win eventually be overcome;but to achieve this end, great energy will be required and every forcepossible must be mobilised which may lead to a clear and soundgoal.

No one can escape death, for that is one of the laws of nature, buteven the most serious diseases can be cured if there is sufficient vitalspark and a strong will to live. Among the old, this vital spark islacking and the phenomena of life undergo a change. So it is withnations.

Europe is hoary with age. The vigour which i., left no longersuffices to rehabilitate her as the dominant factor in the world. Asearly as 1914 she had to share with the United States in world dominionand to-day the U.S.S.R. and the budding world powers are also makingworld-wide claims. This, however, does not mean that Europe iseffete. But since Europe is an ancient conglomeration, she has tohusband her strength and refrain from embarking on ambitious projectsfar beyond the capacities of her old age. To further this aim, thenations which compose Europe will have to pool their combined strengthand act in concert to advance their mutual interests It is time forabold conception of Europe.

In such an organically unified Europe, Germany cannot help butbe one of the strongest members, but like the other components of theEuropean family of nations, she will not be in a position to assumethe mantle of a great power because of lack of space and lack of rawmaterials. True, her productive efficiency and her population areequal to those of a great power, but these assets alone do not makefor that status.

By the Potsdam " diktat .. Germany was to concede about 25 percent. of her territory (equal to about 30 percent. of the total of her till­able land); the German inhabitants of this ceded territory to he evictedand compressed into a kind of "rump" Germany, which means that from10 to 15 millio Germans are" expellees" from their homesteadsand exposed to starvation; and a methodical ruination of Germany'shig industry, causing slow death for another 10 million Germans hystarvation. Germany is to be so ~reat1y reduced that, as the AmericanSenator, Claude Pepper, declared, the number of her population is notto exceed that of France. Thus a population of 70 million is artificiallyreduced, while the talk about democracy, re-education, etc., goes OIL

What would the reaction to the Potsdam stipulations have beenif they did not apply to Germany, but to, let us say, England? They

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would deprive highly industrialised Britain of her entire merchant navy;her industrial plants and equipment would be transferred abr oad; nonew industry could be established; foreign credits would be confi scated;t rad e with other countries would be prohibited, as also commerce,fina ncial t ransactions and insurance arrangements. Twenty millionEng lish people would starve to death. Everybody would con sid er su cha stat e of affairs truly iniquitous. In actual fact, Germany is evenwor se off than this owing to the terrible devastation caused by air-raids,which have almost completely destroyed many industrial plants, fa rmsand dwellings inside the Reich. Further, millions of Germans hav ebeen expelled from eastern Germany, from the Sudetenland, Silesia,etc . These people are not only herded together into an over-populatedzone , but have no work or hope and are consequently rotting away.

But neith er the vengeful decla ra t ions of Potsdam nor the hopefu lAtlanti c Charter will stand much chance of realisation, for they arcbuilt on qui cksand. They have been constructed on the basis ofincompatible contradictions. \Vhat advantage will it be toEurope if Germany is destroyed when it is only by aGer ma n recovery that Europe can expect to survive ? I ' e ithercan the British Commonwealth and Great Britain Or the U.S.A.and the whole world economy be stabilised unle ss Europe is relieved ofher burdens. Already the shortage of German coal has paralysed theentire economic syst em and inflicted quite unnecessary suffering on thepopul ations of Europe. Those who imagine that th e mines of Upp er.Silesia will work as efficiently under Polish administration as they did

~:~:rt~e~:~ns::~~:~;:~n;~o~:~~i~~e uj~::rst;i:~~;: :~~e~:~;~li~~\'~I~ i~~;forme rly did under German, that th e transplantation of German indus­t ries int o othe r European countries will prove practicable and profitable,are making a tremendous mistake. Such" experts" ignore thegener al cha racte rist ics of the Germans, their spirit of enterprise, theirent hus ias m, their traditions, all of which can neither be commandeerednor simply imbibed. There has been nothing in times past to hinderPolan d or France , It aly Or Spain in developing the quantity or thequa lity of th eir indust ries ; that these countr ies have not done so to theext en t that Germany did, is partly due to peculiarities of nationalcharac te r which cannot be expected to change merely by possessingst olen ma chinery. It is mainly the Germans, the Dutch and the Swisswho have been inst rumental in developing the industrial age on thecontinent.

It is neithe r subversive propagan da nor wishful thinking whichleads one to p roph esy th e utt er fiasco of the Potsdam a g-reement. ThePotsdam mandate can only exist permanently if the victorious Powersachieve complete unanimity. and since such concord cannot be

[23 1

OTTO STRASSER

achieved, the whole idea will topple like a house of cards. T he dis­crepancy between the interests of the present world Powers is too vastto be bridged securely and durably. In the course of deca des ,centuries, and even millenia, history has demonstrated that such re­conciliations of interests are impossible

GERMANY'S INTERNAL RECONSTRUCTIONEconomically, politically and culturally, Germany was for decades

condemned to. wade through the swamp of capitalism, imperialism andfascism, and suffered more acutely under these ordeals than almos tany other country because she had taken a leading place in all thes eprocesses. The root of Germany's decline must not just be tracedto the advent of a Hitler and Nazism, nor to Prussian militarism andthe Prussian ideology of Might is Right. We shall have to go backto the Middle Ages to find the source from which reconstruction ofGermany as a peaceful member of the European community willspring. The" Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation" was onthe whole a constructive idea, and might serve as spiritual gui de forthe formulation of Germany's modern policy . Never again mustGermany submit to the Prussian imperialist policy of Blood and Iron.

A federally consolidated Germany will be the seed fro m whichthe Federal States of Europe will grow. To achieve this,a new economic system is urgently required. The spi rit ofsolidarity is the basis of such a new economic system: co-operat ionof all classes and trades within the framework of a free society. Thiskind of economic structure resembles the old fief and gui ld sys temrather than the modern conception of economic egotism which we callunlimited capitalism, or group egotis-n which is represented by theselfishness of one particular class or race as in contemporary policestates.

With the inauguration of a new economic order, the politicalreconstruction of Germany on the lines of a federation of rea lly demo­cratic states with regional self-administration, must be unde rtaken.A federalised Germany will be capable of setting in motion the latentenergies of the people for their own well-being and that of Eur ope asa whole. A federalised Germany cannot misdirect political energy asthe centralised state is capable and inclined to do. Moreover, the fearengendered among other European states by a centralised Gennany willvanish into thin air. A path toward- a European confederat ion willbe paved.

The self-administration of the trade guilds which a mode rn, demo­cratic, federated Germany assures, holds out excellent prospects forthe renewal of the German nation which will be in a position to exercisecontrol pennanently and efficiently over affairs of State. If suc h prin -

[24]

GERMANY TN A DISUNITED WORLD

ciples of g ood citizenship are to be adequately appli ed to the ccono~ ic

an d political life, a change of heart among German peopl e and a re vivalof the ir cultur al institutions is essential. No effort mus t be spared tofoster the religious spirit, for this is intimately bound up with a revivalof old German culture and craftsmanship. \Vestern civilisation willonly be saved in this way ; there will be economic and politi cal security,a fres h outlook on life, and universal prosperity. It is a task of life ordeath for the German people themselves to try and save their countryand Occid ental civilisation, irrespective of vicious and vindictive pea cetr eaties whi ch have little in common with democratic idealism orEuropean recovery.

FREN CH-GERMAN RAPPROCHEMENT

Su rely, an indispensable prerequisite of any fruitful co-operationbetwee n the European states and their formation into a EuropeanFedera t ion is that France and Germany must work together! Asmatt er s sta nd, France must take the first step. Occupied Germany isunfit to take the initiative. If, as throughout the last centuries, Franceholds rath er aloof from European affairs and continues her chauvinisticpolicy in respect of Germany, and if, as heretofore, she thinks herselfjustified in calling for assistance from abroad in order to maintain herprcsumptuousattitude, then European co-operation is out of the questionand Europe will become a continent subject to bargaining and double­dealing in the struggle of the world Powers. Unfortunately, France isst ill under th e delusion that she is a strong country, and blinds herselfand da zzles the world in general, endeavouring to capture the leadingrole in worl d affairs , a role which sh e i~; neith er called upon to assumenor able to play. In this second world war, France has played a veryminor pa rt from whi ch ever angle one views th e situation, and there isno pr ospect of her ever soaring to the heights she once occupied. Thisis no more and no less than sober fact. The birth-rate is already solow, that it is estimated that by 1985 the population of France will beno more tban 28 million i she is so greatly debilitated that it would bea veritable miracle were she to re-establish her former position, letalon e enlarge her sphere of economic, political, and military interests;she does not even appear to be in a position to maintain her possessionsin East Asia, Asia Minor and in Africa without aid from outside Powers.Yet in spite of so disastrous a condition, France still keeps to her old­tim e policy of a nnihila t ing Germany, just as in the days of Richelieu,Loui s XIV , Napol eon I, Napoleon III, Clemenceau and Poin care.

Th ose who have the salvation of western civilisation at heart feeldismay ed wh en the y contempla te the French policy of ripping awaythe Sa a r district . the Rhineland, parts of Baden. Wtirttenberg , and

[25]

OTTO STRASSER

possibly the Ruhr, from the body of Germany. Already befo re this war,French territorial assets greatly exceeded those of Ger ma ny , thoughtlfere were only 72 inhabitants to the sq uare kilometre as agai nst 148Germans to the square kilometre; now Ger man territory is only halfthat of France and something like 230 Germans are herded together inthe square kilometre; in addition, French colonial possessions amountto approximately 12 million square kilometres.

There will be many psychological impediments to overco me beforetrue collaboration between France and Germany can start. Throughoutthe centuries, France and Germany have wag-ed war aga inst oneanother; there is the ticklish problem of historical guilt, if any ; butthese past wars do not form the background of antagonism so much asd sentiment of jealousy on the part of France. The French are fullyaware of the discrepancy between the population of France and thatof Germany; they also recognise that German productivity fa r exceedstheir own and they en tertain a repugnance to recognise th ese obviousfacts. The large and wealthy colonial empire whic h Fr ance stillpossesses could well serve as a French asset in collaboration withGermany and other E uro pea n nations ; mistrust on the part of France.however, contributes to her disinclina tion to co-operate because shefears that Germany migh t exploit her goodwill in the long run.

Whatever the precise reasons for France's unw illing nes s to col.labora te with Germany, it is up to Germany to try to convince Francethat German intentions are sincere.

The same applies to Germa ny's preparedness to co-o pera te with allother European nations.

THE EUROPEAN FEDERATIONAND AFRICA

If a pan-European federation is to be born at all, Fr ance andGermany ought to work solid ly together. The British Co mmonwealthrather than the United States of America would serve as model forthe crea tio n .of this federation. The history, culture and economy ofthe various European nations differ much more than the f orty-eightfederal states of America; therefore, the elements which make up theBritish Commonwealth, in which the continent of Australia and thesmall island of Bermuda enjoy equal rights in every res pec t , bear anearer resemblance to European conditions.

Th e object of the European Federation is to bring the nations intocloser contact wit h one another to the advantag-e of all who pa rticipate .Each of the European nations would preserve its specific national,cultural and economic traditions and should have a chance of develop­ing these in full measure for the benefit of Europe as a whole. for

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furope's strength depends precisely on the multiplicity of the vari ousnation s.

Th e nations of the European continent must be bound to oneanoth er by common vital interests and common vital aims , but theyshould not be welded together into uniform compactness; neithershould one pr eponderate over another, but each should unf old itsstr ength in th e best interests of Europe.

It is no simple matter to construct such a complicated and subtlemechan ism as the Federal States of Europe and, when once broughtinto being , to keep it going in a satisfactory manner. It would becontrary to the spirit, sense and purpose of the federation tocreateacentra lised g overnment of the whole of Europe; there can be only theregu lar mee ting of the various governments on an equal basis. It couldbe cons tit uted from the governmental representatives of all Europeancountr ies and, perhaps later, it might be amplified by direct representa­tion from the peoples themselves; it would have to elect a chairmanfrom among its members annually, or it might entrust the presidency toSwitzerland once and for all.

Th e beneficial effect of a federation of European nations wouldprobably first make itself felt in the economic life of the people. Shouldth is prove true , it would form a firm basis whereon to build a confidentco-ope rati on in the political and cult ura l spheres likewise. Regionalg roups within the framework of the European Federa rion-s-a BalkanUnion, a Latin Union, Benelux, a Scandinavian Union, and so forth­migh t with advantage be taken into consideration since it may well bethat th ese var ious unions will be helpful in the construction ofso complexan organisa tion. Furthermore, it wi1l put to flight all existingprejud ices ag a inst Germany.

Europe will have to cope with a number of problems of the utmostimportance now and in the immediate future: food, finance, production,air lines, transport , the supply of raw materials and many others.

All these are convincing arguments in favour of the creation of theEuropean Federation.

T he most important impulse of such a European Federationwill be the consumer use of Africa. Two world wars havebrough t home to 350 million Europeans, exclusive of the Russians andthe Briti sh , the bitter fact that they depend on vital goods from over­seas . If in the future, these 350 million Europeans want to securetheir lives they will have to secure, jointl y or separately, a commonsou rce of supply. This sou rce can be found only in Africa.She is the least developed of any continent, and possessesin ab unda nce the very goods Eu rope needs , she is geographicallyas well as g eo-politically within reach of Europe, and the exploitationof her resources would not collide with the interests of present

[27 1

a nd future wo rld powe rs . Nat ura lly, Brit ish possessions in Africado not fall within th e orbit of a n All-E uropean manageme nt unlessGreat Britain herself chooses to be incl uded. Tact and prudence alsodemand that French possessions in Africa should remai n untoucheduntil such time as the French themselves have overcome thei r suspicionsin regard to joining the European Federation whole -heartedly . OnceFrance is convinced that her colon ial realm is res pected as her inalien­able national possession, which is in no way and for no purpose includedin any action the Fe dera l States of Europe may deem ex pedient toundertake, then much of France's dislike of the idea to help org a nisethe European Federation will vanish.

Under present condi tio ns, about one -third of Africa, mainly con­sisting of Belgian, Portuguese and Spanish colonies, andthe former German and Ita lian possessions will be the te rra in whichthe Federation of European states would develop and from whenceEurope would be su pplied with the requisites for her economic life.The common utilisation a nd administration of the sup ply regions inAfrica by the Euro pean Federation should be regulated by a public bodysuch as the African Company of the European Federal States, whoseduty it will be to shoulder responsibility in the execution of the tasksimposed by the decrees and decisions of the co-operating gove rn ments .

The African possessions of such nations as the Europ ean FederalS tat es will run on behalf of the Federation as a whole, will keep theirow n flags flying; the mo ther tong ue of the nation concerne d will remainthe lega l and administrative lan gu a ge ; all administrative officials onactive service at the time of the take-over must be left at the ir posts,a nd all their rights should be recognised . An a nn ual rent amount ingto the average rate of profit during the la st ten years of peace mustbe paid to the owner State prev ious to the take-over by the F ed eration,and will cover a period of 99 years. The expenditure and profit of theAfrican regions under the European Federal States' admi nis t ra t ionmust be ap portioned fairly to the diverse nations-with the exceptionof France, so long as her colo nial possessions in Africa are no t includedin the federated scheme. T he ratio of compensation woul d best func­tion pro rata to population in the countries concerned and this will haveto be adjusted from time to time according to changing circ um stances­perhaps at ten -yearly intervals. Apart from the tremendous materialgains from joint exploitation and utilisation of African sup plies for thebenefit of the European family of nations, the moral effect of s uch un ifiedeffort will promote a feeling of good fellowship and peace among thevarious members of the Federation.

nnder existing conditions, Europe must keep he rself to herselfand make the best possible use of the African treasure. Sh e will,therefore, have to dissociate herself from all other politica l int erests.

[28]

GER~lAKY I ,' A D1SCKITED WO RLD .

an d es pec ia lly from those of America, Asia and Australia. Only ifEu rope concentrates all her attention and all her political end eavouron her ow n affairs (with Africa as a source of supply) an d refuses to bein,-oh'cd in the complex interests of other continents, only if Europefollows the path of European solidarity, will she su cc eed in keepin galoof fro m outs ide world politi cal confli cts. It does not matter by wh atna me the policy of the F ederal States of Europe is ca lled, the factremains th at there will actually be a kind of European-African M onr oeDoc tr ine whi ch does not permit of interference from without an d keepsher fro m interfer ing with outside interests. British possession s inAfrica, wh ich are integral parts of the British Commonwealth , will betotally outs ide the sphe res of interests connected with the F ederalStates of Europe--unless they desire to join. For the same reason,European co u nt r ies whose colonies are not in Africa, su ch as the As iat ican d Ame r ica n possessions of France, the Netherlands, Portugal, et c .,will be ex cluded from the European federal union. It is solely th eregio ns in Africa above defined, exclusive of islands, which will comewit hin the sphere of influence of the Federation of European States.T hese will cons t it u te a kind of Dominion of Africa and belong to theFederation.

On ce the Federation is formed, it will have no interests in theAtlantic , Pacific an d Indian O ceans, and there will he no need to createa navy of siza ble strength, but merely one which will be capable ofdefen ding the European and African coasts and especially the shoresof tb e Mediterranean. Similar arguments apply to the future air-fleetof the European Federation. Bearing in mind that th e Federation willbe clo se ly link ed with th e Af rican con t inen t , there mu st l.e an oppor­tun ity of b uild ing air traffi c.

GE RM AN Y ANDTHE BRITISH COJlIMONWEALTH

Thoug h there ex is t very weighty reasons for the creation of aF edera l Europe, and though this must be Ge rmany's foremost aim,it is likely tha t the whole proj ect will come to nought.

The re ca n be no douht about the fact that to form such a federationit is absolute ly essential that France and Germany should co-operate .T houg h the Germans would do a ll in their pow er t o be on g ood terms

7oi:ht:er~~~:~; ~o~:i:~~vh:~otl~~~e~:rtil~:en;'i~'1nnsc~'1r:i~b~~:~:~a;~, ~:~~lab ora te in a ny such sch eme. We hav e to fa ce fa cts squ ar ely . Franceis leani ng towa rds th e forei gn poli cy of Cl em en ceau and Poincare andinte nds to rob Germany of essent ia lly German territory such as t h »

[29)

OTTO STRASSER

Saar, or to slice off such regions as the Rhineland and ioternationalisethe Ruhr, thus crippling Germany and harming the German people.If this policy is adopted, then with the best intentions in the world,Germany can do practically nothing, for there will be no beneficialco-operation between the two countries and thus the idea of a federatedEurope will be still-born.

It is a regrettable historical fact that for many centuries, France'spolicy has permanently and invariably been guided by egoistic motivesand never by a far-seeing European point of view. Constantly, Francehas caIled in the aid of extra-European powers such as Turkey, Russia,America and so forth against her European neighbours. Should theidea of creating a European Federation be frustrated by France adheringto her ancient anti-German policy, there can be no practical alternativeleft to Germany but to come to an enduring agreement with the BritishCommonwealth and, if possible, to develop a free union between herself,Great Britain and the Dominions.

Close co-operation with Russia, once advocated by reactionaryGerman politicians, and to-day by people with communist sympathies,is unlikely on account of the monstrous post-war policy adopted byMoscow against Germany. The Germans will never cede Koenigs­berg, Breslau, Danzig, Stettin and all that these cities stand for InGerman history.

A close and sound Anglo-German co-operation, or a Germanyas partner of the British Commonwealth, would not only beconsonant with the ties of relationship between those Teutonic tribeswhich remained in continental Europe and the Angles and Saxons whomigrated to the British Isles, but would also mean a recapitulation ofa long-time political and personal relationship between England andGermany, present circumstances underlining such historical precedent.The loss of 30 percent. of her tillable land has shaken Germany to herV1~ry foundations. The 70 million Germans who lived in pre-HitlerGermany had to strain every nerve to the utmost in order to bring exportto" level that enabled them to buy the needed raw materials and foodstuffs. Their standard of life was even then about 25 per cent. belowthat of the British people and approximately 60 percent. below that ofthe Americans. Now, being deprived of agricultural land and industrialproductiveness, the population is threatened with starvation. And thereare not only the 70 million Germans of pre-Hilter days to consider, butalso those miIlions who have been expelled! The crushing defeat after aprotracted war has made the Germans very aware of the fact that theymust reduce the necessities of life to a minimum, but even that minimumcannot be attained unless they are able to work and live in the greaterand sounder economic framework of a federated Europe or of the BritishCommonwealth, Should the latter be the solution to the problem, the

[3°1

GERMANY IN A DISUNITED W O RL D

strength of the British Empire would be considerably increased, for thetwo ar e not only consang uineous but also the hist ory , culture a ndability of Britain and Germany are similar. Moreov er, if the Britis hCommo nwealth is to maintain her position as a gr eat power on a leve lwith the U .S .A. and the U.S.S.R., she will need all available st rengthat her comma nd. A Germany closely linked economically and politicall ywith Great Britain would contribute towards the safety and mig ht ofthe Commonwealt h, just as Canada, Australia or South Afri ca do atprese nt.

Fr om a purely German point of view, such a proposal ma y beunpa lata ble and seem illogical. So far as their vital interests a reconcerned , the Germans may prefer the solution of their problems bythe for mation of a European confederation. Yet the idea of Ge rman ybecomi ng a partner in the British Commonwealth, besides securingthe existence of the people of Germany, could- as well as the Europea nFederation- ac hieve an even gr eater aim which mankind is longingfor: it would bring about the pa cification of Europe and rescueEuropean culture and a decent st andard of life at the eleventh hour.

In Exile, Autumn 1947 . DR. OTIO STRASSER.

Dr OTTO STRASSER was one of the half-dozen top-rankingNational-Socialists, following the ideas of it's founder, T. G. Masaryk,from whom first the Austrians and then the Germans had taken overidea and programme. Though he was never in sympathy with Hitler'spolicies, Dr. Strasser believed that the National-Socialist Party pro­gramme was the only one at the time that could regenerate Germany.He was the Nazi Party's rebellious " brain" from 1926-1930, and asone of the key men during these formative years he knew Hitler,Goering. Gocbbels, Hess, Himrnler, Streicher. Rosenberg, Haushoferand the others intimately. He broke with the Nazis three years beforethey rose to power in the Reich, and with his newly-founded "BlackFront," opposed them bitterly ever since. He fled Germany in 1933,living for a time in Austria, then Czechoslovakia. Switzerland. France.Portugal. Bermuda and Canada, all the time carrying on a desperatefight against the Hitler system. Goebbe1s himself denounced Dr.Strasser as Nazi public enemy No. I. and his name topped therefugee extradition list presented to the former Vichy Governmentwhen the Nazi armies conquered Paris. Despite a price of one millionReichsmarks offered by the Gestapo for his capture, Dr. Strasserescaped over the Spanish mountains to reach safety once morc-atruly fantastic story unequalled by fiction.

Otto Strasser was born at Windsheim, in Franconia, Bavaria. Hewas a student at the Oberrealschule of Munich when the 1914 waibroke out, and he became the youngest volunteer in the Bavarianarmy, rising from the ranks to become an officer on tbe WesternFront, twice wounded, and decorated for outstanding bravery. After1918 he studied Law and Political Science at Munich, Berlin and\Yurzburg. His brother, Gregor, was killed by Goering's order in theblood purge of 1934. During and before the recent war the Strassergroup carried on a relentless struggle against the Gestapo, distributingunderground leaflets, broadcasting secretly, unmasking Nazi agentsin the Western Hemisphere. After a bomb explosion in 1939. duringone of Hitler's beer cellar speeches in Munich, the entire Nazi Presshurled vitriolic abuse at "this British murder tool," requesting theSwiss Government to hand over Dr. Strasser to the Gestapo. Huntedfrom country to country, never giving up the unequal fight, separatedfrom his wife and children for over eight long years. Strasser helpedto beat the Nazi Gestapo in the end.

Now. at fifty, square, ruddy-faced, Hitler's Trotzky is one of ruinedGermany's white hopes-for unlike Trotzky, he survived his opponentand he never joined in the revolutionary terror. As a war-time exilein far away Nova Scotia, he planned for a Fatherland that may yetarise out of the ashes of post-war chaos. He is not forgotten at home,and before 1948 has run its course a new party will spring into actionin Germany. To many patriots in the Reich, and to many of his non­German friends abroad, Dr. Strasser is the man who can pull Germanyout of the ever-worsening dilemma, and whose energy, integrity andidealism could well help in the building of a peaceful Germany work­ing for and in a peaceful Europe.

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