between isolation and inter nationalization- the state of burma-siia_papers_4

SIIA Papers No 4

Between Isolation and Internationalization: The State of Burma

Conference Report edited byJohan Lagerkvist

2 3

© The Authors and The Swedish Institute of International Affairs Edited by Johan Lagerkvist

ISBN 91-7183-706-X

Printed by Hallvigs Reklam AB 2008

Between Isolation and Internationalization:

The State of Burma

Edited by Johan Lagerkvist

4 5

IntroductionJohan Lagerkvist

On May 8 and 9, 2008, the Swedish Institute of International Affairs convened an international conference on Myanmar/Burma with ge-nerous sponsorship from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The conference took place only six days after cyclone Nargis� the worst natural disaster in Burmese history� hit the lower Irrawaddy Delta on May 2 with gusts of wind reaching 190 km/h. As of June 24, the of-fi cial death toll was 84,537 people and 53,386 people were reported missing. The number of people displaced by the calamity may be as high as 800,000.1 Despite the magnitude of the disaster, the Burmese junta failed to act swiftly in the wake of the cyclone, revealing not only the junta�s incompetence and contempt for the suffering of its people, but also its xenophobia as Burmese military rulers dragged their feet in issuing visas to foreign aid workers for fear of losing control over the political situation in the run-up to the controversial referendum on the draft constitution.

How is one to understand the continuing political impasse between Burma/Myanmar and the international community even in the face of such a large-scale tragedy? And what are the options available to the international community and multilateral and regional organizations to facilitate a break away from this isolation? These questions were central to the conference held at the Swedish Institute in May. Leading researchers, diplomats, experts and practitioners in the fi eld gathered to discuss available policy options for engaging the military junta in Burma, the role of Burma�s big neighbors (including China, India, and the ASEAN countries), and future prospects for a democratic transition in Burma given the paranoid nature of its ruling military junta and longstanding ethnic tensions between the ruling Burman majority and ethnic minorities inside the country.

In order to promote domestic change and reform, the international community needs to adopt a richer �insider perspective� on various Burmese interests, in particular one that includes assessments of the role of civil society organizations and associational life in Burma, since these have an important part to play in promoting change, reconcilia-tion and reform in the country. The international community should identify, invest in and work with incipient civil society organizations within the country and support alternative channels of news and infor-

Table of ContentsLagerkvist, J: Introduction 5

Steinberg, D I: Burma�s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar�s Response 11

Babson, B O: Future Policy Optionsfor Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma 31

Chellaney, B: Promoting Political Freedomsin Burma: International Policy Options 57

Kivimäki, T: Can the International CommunityHelp Prevent Confl ict in Burma/Myanmar? 85

Goshal, B: Political Developmentsin Burma and India�s Strategic Interests 111

Ni, X: For Closer China � U.S. Collaboration on Myanmar 137

Storey, I: China�s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location 153

Haacke, J: Comparing ASEAN Countries� Effortsto Infl uence Political Developments in Myanmar:Towards a New Regional Approach? 173

Chachavalpongpun, P: Neither Constructive norEngaging: The Debacle of ASEAN�s Burmese Policy 201

Lintner, B: The Staying Powerof the Burmese Military regime 223

Guo, X: The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building 253

Yawnghwe, H: Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule 273

von Hauff, M: The Economic Development of Burmaand the Sanctions against Burma � An Assessment 293

Oo. Z: The Political Economy of Resource Cursein Burma: Implications for International Policies 315

Sakhong, L H: A Struggle for Democracy, Equalityand Federalism in Burma: An Ethnic Perspective 335

31 31

5 5 5

11

6 7

mation that are not state-controlled such as weeklies and satellite televi-sion. Recent media technological developments show how information from the outside is already reaching the Burmese people in many novel ways. Such efforts need to be sustained and strengthened so that the Burmese public gains more access to valuable and much-needed alter-native sources of information. There is also a need to further support capacity-building programs for advocacy groups and political parties in Burma. The capacity of the so-called �88-generation� � those involved in the mass protests of 1988 � to organize displays of popular discontent and mass protests through a loose network of people and activists (as opposed to the older generation�s opposition tactics through the more hierarchical National League for Democracy) was an encouraging sign for exiled Burmese and outside observers concerned with the impact and effectiveness of civil society organizations in Burma. A stronger and more credible opposition movement in Burma capable of offering a more inclusive platform and agenda for national reconciliation and political reform needs to materialize so that the Burmese electorate is given an alternative way of moving forward.

In addition, conference participants discussed a wide array of policy options available to international agencies given the continuing dete-rioration of socio-economic standards in Burma and the long-time po-litical impasse between the military junta and the domestic opposition, and between the junta and the international community. Providing immediate humanitarian assistance to the Burmese people affected by the cyclone was regarded as one window of opportunity for the international community to show its concern and serious intention to engage both the Burmese government and the Burmese general public. Moreover, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could, if given the opportunity, provide valuable assistance in Burma�s post-cyclone reconstruction phase, providing economic and development assessments of social and economic needs throughout the country, and offering comprehensive capacity-building assistance in such areas as public health, food production, and education. Second, realignment of international engagement inside and outside of the United Nations could help promote international collaboration between key actors across the �North-South� and �East-West� divides, i.e. between on the one hand the west, and on the other hand India and China � especially on the issues of humanitarian intervention, sovereignty and political reform. Despite the hopes and demands that stakeholders interested in political and humanitarian progress in Burma have often placed on ASEAN, ASEAN�s policy of engagement, its role and its impact

on the political reform process in Burma have been rather marginal. In recent years, however, some of the leaders of the ASEAN countries have publicly criticized Burma/Myanmar for not undertaking political reform.2

Although engaging the junta as a legitimate partner poses a fun-damental moral-political dilemma for the international community, there is nonetheless a need to establish a multi-party mechanism for intensifi ed dialogue that will include major multilateral organizations such as the European Union and ASEAN as well as China, India, Rus-sia and the United States � countries that have an increasing stake in national reconciliation, more meaningful political reform, and con-tinued stability within and around Burma. The issue of sanctions or/versus engagement and fi nancial investment could also be an item of discussion within such a multilateral format. Are �smart sanctions� targeting only the military leadership minimizing effects on ordinary people coupled with trade, investments and foreign aid preferable to a full spectrum of sanctions targeting the Burmese economy in total? Conference participants generally agreed that the largely Western-dri-ven program of sanctions directed at Burma has been ineffective and that �smart sanctions� � sanctions that specifi cally target the higher echelons of the junta � have proven more of an irritant than a force for regime change. On a bilateral basis, it would also be wishful thinking for the international community to expect to rely/to continue to rely on China and India to undertake more decisive action in sanctioning Burma. The military junta itself is highly nationalistic and has been regarded by some as a xenophobic regime that will continue to hedge in its dealings with neighboring powers so as to avoid becoming overly-reliant on any particular country. China and India will continue to be important stakeholders in issues pertaining to Myanmar/Burma, albeit their infl uence is likely to be wielded to a limited degree. Policymakers in Beijing and New Delhi will almost certainly continue to weigh their own national interests (e.g., continued stability along the porous China-Burma and India-Burma borders) against the interests of other regional and international stakeholders and actors, and can be expected to take decisive and collective action in tandem with the United Nations only when core national interests are at stake. For many outside observers, it is diffi cult to make sense of the isolationism of the Burmese military, the Tatmadaw. One key to understanding the attitude and behavior of the regime is the culture of isolation cultivated since the coup of gene-ral Ne Win in 1962, when the peoples of Burma were forced to take the �Burmese Way to Socialism.� Ensuing long periods of near constant civil war between ethnic groupings such as Mon, Kachin, Karen and

Introduction

8 9

the Burmese military have added to the state of alert against internal enemies in Burma, whether they be ethnic minorities in border areas or discontented Burmans in Rangoon.

It is also of crucial importance to understand how asymmetrical re-lations make the military junta vulnerable if it should proceed to hold meetings about Burma�s future with both internal and external actors. It would seem plausible to assume that the junta feels it lacks the know-ledge and capacity to negotiate with multilateral and bilateral actors. The lack of this capacity would prove daunting were the junta to choose to seriously engage with international stakeholders in order to initiate a reform process legitimate to all. Thus, the building of state capacity in Burma together with the initiation of confi dence building measures offers perhaps one way of reversing Burma�s isolationism and overco-ming its political impasse with the world.

In concluding conference discussions, many called for a sober reassessment of the situation on the ground in Burma as a basis for future policy approaches to the country at the multilateral, bilateral and internal/civil society levels. More important, participants agreed that despite all of the talk about the military junta as the problem, it has become increasingly clear that the junta must also be part of any future solution in Burma. Although many actors in the international system are hesitant, to say the least, to engage with the Burmese military junta and never believe that the junta will enter in earnest into a serious dia-logue of engagement with the outside world, any long-lasting change will have to come from within Burma. Therefore, it is necessary to fi nd ways to identify actors inside the ruling military bureaucracy who will agree to a step-by-step approach to open up their isolated country to the outside world. As Burma�s military rulers will never be quick to believe in the promises and prospects offered by foreigners and exiled opposi-tion groups, the potential value of establishing a confi dence-building mechanism capable of making these offi cers more intellectually and emotionally secure and ready to engage with the outside world ought to be discussed and developed further. Since such an endeavor is likely to be viewed by many as both controversial and hazardous, it may be more important to identify specifi c issues of potential change within the Burmese military establishment rather than asking individual per-sons to act as catalysts for change�individuals who may be purged the minute they are identifi ed as reform-minded, or associated with foreign elements. These are some of the many issues that were discussed at-length in what proved to be a most timely and rewarding conference in May and are now available in edited and revised form in the conference proceedings that follow.

1. See Post-nargis Joint Assessment, http://ocha.unog.ch/humanitarianreform/Portals/1/cluster%20approach%20page/Myanmar/21_07_08_asean.nargis.pdf. According to UN Offi cials and ASEAN representatives, the relief and reconstruction work in Burma/Myanmar after Nargis is likely to cost a minimum of 1 billion USD, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacifi c/7517655.stm

2. See Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, N.Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (eds.), Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007, p.3; See �Asean delivers rare re-buke,� 21 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacifi c/7516251.stm

Introduction

Conference Program

Morning, 8 May

Welcoming remarks, SIIA Director Tomas Ries, ResearchDirector Gunnar Sjöstedt and Research Fellow Johan Lagerkvist

Keynote address Burma�s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar�s ResponseDavid I. Steinberg

Discussion

International Policy OptionsFuture Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Burma/MyanmarBrad Babson

Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy OptionsBrahma Chellaney

Can the International Community Help Avoid Ethnic War in Burma/MyanmarTimo Kivimäki

Discussion

Afternoon, 8 May

Burma and Its Big Neighbors China and IndiaProspects for Change in Myanmar: Thinking Out of the BoxBaladas Goshal

For Closer China-US Collaboration on MyanmarNi Xiayun

China�s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets, Strategic LocationIan Storey

Discussion

10 11

Burma�s Multiple Crises:Globalized Concernsand Myanmar�s Response

David I. Steinberg

The Burmese military is in a state of denial.1 By all estimates a half-cen-tury ago, Burma should have become the richest nation in Southeast Asia. It is now the poorest. The junta�s complete public rejection of acknowledging the multiple tragic conditions of the Myanmar people is appalling to outside observers. More importantly, it upsets and even traumatizes those on the inside. But this denial may be more complex then the junta�s simplistic, self-serving lack of a public response that has been equally insensitive to internal and international concerns about the crises facing that state and its population.

This paragraph, and much of this paper, refl ects the author�s apprai-sal of the sorry state of Myanmar before cyclone Nargis hit the lower portion of the country in early May 2008. The reaction of the Burmese junta to this tragic event seems to confi rm this pessimistic analysis, and is in stark contrast to the Chinese leadership�s reaction to the mas-sive earthquake in Szechuan Province in the same month. The initial secrecy connected with the Myanmar response to allowing foreign aid teams into the country was probably linked in part to the May 10 date for the referendum for the new constitution. The apparent reluctance of the military to change the date, except in the Irrawaddy Delta where it was delayed for two weeks until May 24, probably relates to the choice of that date as astrologically appropriate.2 According to the government, there has been 92.4 percent approval of the new constitution with about 99 percent of those eligible to vote having done so, a result reminiscent of the Stalinist period of the Soviet Union, and has a similar lack of credibility.

The slow reaction of the military to respond to the situation in the delta refl ects both the apparent low priority of concern for the people so affected and a much higher priority to the military�s own control and the attempted portrayal of military effi cacy. The junta did not want foreign observers (including emergency aid workers) in the country before and during the referendum on the constitution, and they even failed in their public relations efforts both to their internal audience and to foreigners,

Conference Program

ASEAN Perspectives on BurmaComparing Policies towards Myanmar within ASEANJurgen Haacke

Neither Constructive, Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN�s Burmese Policy,Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Discussion

Morning, 9 May

The Military Junta, Nation buildingand Prospectsfor Democratic Transition The Staying Power of the Burmese Military RegimeBertil Lintner

The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation BuildingGuo Xiaolin

Multi-Party Talks on Burma: Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule

Harn Yangwhe

Discussion

Sanctions, Economic Development,and the scramble for national resourcesThe Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma � An Assessment,Michael von Hauff

Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma: International Policy Implications Zaw Oo

Discussion

Afternoon, 9 May

Recipes for ChangeRoundtable discussion moderated by Anders Hellner

Press meeting with Swedish journalists

12 13

in contrast to the Chinese who played up the highest level of senior in-volvement (including premier Wen Jibao) in their rescue efforts.

Fear of the U.S. has been palpable since 1988, and the cyclone has exacerbated that fear. Burmese military intelligence have long believed the U.S. could invade Myanmar, since it was on the record insisting on �regime change,� and that Thailand, a surrogate of the U.S. with a mutual defense treaty between them, could play a role. The U.S. navy positioned in the Bay of Bengal some thirty miles offshore, and the joint �Cobra Gold� annual military exercise between the U.S. and Thailand, together with senior Western diplomats and some think tank specialists calling for support to the Burmese victims of the cyclone even against the wishes of the junta, and even the absurdly violent movie �Rambo IV,� all contributed to this anxiety.3

Most, if not all, governments are prone to deny publicly any em-barrassing crises in which they are involved. Their responses are often blatant propaganda, or in a somewhat less pejorative term, �spin� (as we say in the United States)�making the best out of a poor situation by reinterpreting events in one�s favor. Yet in Myanmar the situation may even be more insidious�one questions whether the top leadership has been even aware before the cyclone of the severity of some of the issues facing the people and their state. The most senior Myanmar leaders may have been living in a Potemkin-like society, in which they were carefully encased in a self-infl icted cocoon and thus shielded from the grotesque reality facing their own population. Their erroneous beliefs that Myanmar, if not the Panglossian best of all possible worlds, was at least a good and developing one, and on the road to a multi-party �dis-cipline-fl ourishing democracy,�as the Senior General is want to say and the proposed constitution stipulates. This view may have been as sin-cerely held as it is dismissed by many of their own people and external observers. As a retired general indicated, the offi cial and abnormally in-fl ated growth rates for the country (some 12 percent--more than China) and the highest in the world were presented not to convince the outside world of the regime�s effi cacy, but rather for the highest level�s internal consumption. The leadership may claim that this natural disaster has not diminished the regime�s internal effi cacy (as they will take credit for the relief operations), although in many traditional societies in East Asia a regime�s legitimacy was closely related in the mind of the public by benign natural conditions and good harvests, and adversely affected when disasters struck. The implications for those who wish to negotiate with such individuals are, then, that those foreigners must distinguish between the junta�s perceptions of reality, however erroneous, and their propaganda concerning existential conditions. Although it is tempting

to discard all statements as falsifi ed claims, that could be a serious er-ror.

Spurious as well is the oft-held position by some foreigners, and more than a few expatriate Burmese, that the military command is only interested in self-aggrandizement�their perks and positions at the acme of power and the socio-economic ladder of their imposed social order. Although no doubt true among many of the tatmadaw (military), this ignores various strongly held ideological beliefs of the military and its leadership-- positions that are deeply inculcated through the military�s educational system and to the public at large. It seems evident to this writer that their tenets concerning the role of the military in national unity and national sovereignty, their primary goals, are vigorously and sincerely held, although their destruction of other Burmese institutions that might have contributed to those ends are ignored. To deny the tatmadaw its ideological commitment, no matter how erroneous that position may be, is to fail in negotiations as well.

The evidence for such apparent insensitivity to reality is, by its nature, indirect. If such a vacuum exists, it does so at the highest levels of govern-ment. The Burman areas of the country under civilian rule contained a highly mobile society, but present conditions force the conclusion that po-wer is highly stratifi ed through the hierarchical nature of Burmese society, a military command structure that demands obedience and compliance, and the nature of Burmese social relations that encourages subordinates to avoid raising issues that would embarrass or antagonize superiors. All this is compounded by the fear of foreign infl uences and power, resulting in highly nationalistic response to outside pressure, interpreted as �in-terference.� This, in turn, is refl ected in an enforced orthodoxy, resulting in the attempted control and censorship of all avenues of imported or internal publications and media. When access to unpleasant information is institutionally controlled, and when such information cannot even be personally conveyed, Potemkin-like conditions result. All media are cen-sored and no independent or alternative views disseminated. Even in im-perial China and Korea, the Censorate institutionally was established to provide moral and practical guidance and to present alternative views to the rulers, to whom they had access. In medieval Europe, the court jester sometimes was an instrument of informal, oblique personal criticism of the ruler�s actions. In many developed countries, the independent media play this role. There is in Myanmar neither institutional nor even perso-nal avenues of remonstrance. The leader is isolated from the reality that surrounds but does not intrude upon him.4

To the most senior leaders, thus, evidence of the regime�s success have been ubiquitous. From the number of roads, bridges, dams, irriga-

Burma�s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar�s Response

14 15

tion systems, and other infrastructure built during the SLORC/SPDC period, and the numbers dwarf all previous administrations since in-dependence, the evidence would seem to them to be overwhelmingly positive. These fi gures are repeated ad infi nitum at public meetings. A new capital has been built at Naypyidaw in central Myanmar at vast ex-pense. Cease-fi res have been arranged with most dissenting minorities. The foreign exchange holdings of the state are at an all-time high and future prospects are even brighter from off-shore gas reserves, goods have been available for those who can afford them, and the military was shielded from external reality through its proprietary stores, schools, hospitals, and even pagodas. As they seem to interpret it, the physical attributes and evidence of military legitimacy�the building of infras-tructure-- has been apparent to the leadership. Burmese history has also been rewritten to stress the military�s accomplishments. Military muse-ums have been constructed. Legitimacy and the military�s historical and present role have been confl ated. As has been written, the military is a state within a state, or perhaps it is in their view the state itself. The cur-rent cyclone crisis will not diminish the claims of the leadership of their own effi ciency, as they will take credit for any foreign assistance.

Not all high level military are so deluded. Some grumbling has occur-red at the cabinet level even before the cyclone, and those who travel to the ubiquitous ASEAN or other international meetings must be aware of the external reactions to misguided policies or their implementation. But their concerns are to date kept in check by perhaps a mixture of loyalty, fear, and the belief that progress is in evidence. Loyalty is highly personal, which leads to weakened institutions and limited continuity of policies or programs.

Although the color of the monks� robes was changed from yellow to rust a generation or so ago, the so-called �saffron revolution� of the fall of 2007 must have sorely tested the hierarchy, since all the senior military are Burman Buddhists and are believed to be devout. It is unlikely that the state�s explanation that those monks demonstrating were �bogus� incited by the imperialists and their perfi dious minions, together with the opposition, was totally believed by the military itself. Since foreign observers have limited access to the military hierarchy, it is only by indi-rect or surrogate evidence that any cracks, splits, or fi ssures in the junta and its associates may be prognosticated as a result of the crackdown on the monks and their supporters, and later by the cyclone. Differences in personalities and programs have been evident for some time, but, as we have seen, such issues do not necessarily result in open, public splits. They military may recognize that open fi ssures in the tatmadaw could lead to chaos (which the military always invoke as one of their constant fears) and/or the end of military rule.

Foreign attempts to catalogue the dire conditions and crises facing the population prior to the cyclone have been greeted with more than disdain�the United Nations Resident Representative�s visa was not renewed in November 2007 when he discussed this issue. Other such attempts to date have proven to be inconsequential. Yet the limited sta-tistical evidence that is available, together with the results of a variety of analyses of socio-economic trends, surely and undeniably record the crises facing that society.

These multiple crises, however, have been treated only peripherally in the foreign media, and indeed in many policy circles. The previous concentration on the most obvious of these crises, that of politics and governance, including the house arrest of the Nobel Prize laureate and the administrative destruction of the organizational outreach of the Na-tional League for Democracy (NLD), should not diminish our attention from other broad issues, including, but not limited to, the effects of the cyclone. The myopic cry that to solve the political impasse would thus resolve other issues was always likely to be spurious as well. That also would unlikely to have been the best of all possible worlds.

Even before the cyclone, there were multiple, overlapping, and urgent crises are that were not being addressed by the government, but now have become even more acute. Each of us could come up with a list; this writer would like to suggest four such crises that need to be resolved in unison, rather than sequentially, although some have suggested the poli-tical crisis needs attention fi rst. These in turn seem to be exacerbated or based on broad, almost philosophical conceptions of the role of power and authority in that society. The tatmadaw, if they were to respond, might claim that the constitutional referendum of May 10, 2008 and the elections that will follow in about two years will resolve these issues and result in their version of a discipline-fl ourishing democracy. They are li-kely to be mistaken that this will solve the society�s ills. The use of the ad-jectivally modifi ed term �democracy� is also questionable in international circles, for once the term is modifi ed (see �peoples�,� �guided,� etc.) the core of the meaning of democracy is likely to be diminished.

These four crises facing the state are:� The economic crisis of the population� The social crisis of youth� The political crisis� The minority crisis.

These are reviewed sequentially, and then consider broader issues that have impacts on these problems.


16 17

The Economic Crisis of the PopulationAlthough the government has banned unoffi cial surveys of the econo-mic conditions in the society even before the cyclone, the evidence that is available indicates a profound malaise in the conditions of the bulk of the population. Some 30 percent of the population has been under the World Bank�s poverty line and unable to access basic food and non-food requirements, and another 20-30 percent are at it, thus vulnerable to the inexorable rise in infl ation that the state underestimates. Some 73 per-cent of family income has been spent on food, an indicator of extreme poverty and far higher than any other Southeast Asian country. Drop-out rates for primary school were said to be about 40 percent. Malnutri-tion affected some 30 percent of infants and the vulnerable child popu-lation. Infant mortality has been high, and 80 percent of health care is borne by the patients. Various diseases, such as malaria and tuberculo-sis have been rampant. HIV/AIDS is prevalent. Debt has risen, and of-fi cial credit is inadequate and unoffi cial lending usurious. Landlessness is estimated at some 40 percent of the rural population. Although the government claims it increasingly expends higher amounts on educa-tion and health, on a per capita basis and in constant currency there has been a decrease in such expenditures in real terms. Myanmar is said to have the second worst health care system in the world, after Sierra Leone. The cyclone means that some 10-15 percent of the total popula-tion, those in the delta region, will be more susceptible to diseases such as dysentery, cholera, and malaria. Hunger may become apparent as salt water intrusion and lack of draft cattle or tractors may limit the new rice crop. Rises in food costs could severely limit the prospects for the survivors of cyclone Nargis and place them in greater jeopardy.

The abrupt, arbitrary, and unexplained steep rise in energy costs in August 2007 triggered the saffron revolution, as monks found people could no longer afford to make their normal donations of food to the monasteries (to make merit) and that parents brought children to the monks to feed, as they could no longer do so themselves. The lack of warning or explanation of the increase in prices in itself indicates the junta�s essential disregard for the people. The brutal suppression of the demonstrations, when they turned overtly political, highlighted the lingering and increasing plight of the rural poor. There had been gro-wing recognition of the seriousness of economic conditions by interna-tional observers, where international humanitarian assistance from all sources is in the range of about US$2.00 per capita compared to about 25 times that amount per capita for Laos. This understanding was, in te world�s perception, in the shadows, but the drama of the forcible disper-

sal of the monks and younger people brought Burma/Myanmar back to the international center stage.

Pockets of hunger are evident, and poverty, while pervasive, is more extreme in some areas, both among the minorities and in central My-anmar, as well as in combat zones. It will now also be evident in the Irrawaddy Delta. Although international NGOs have attempted to fi ll certain localized gaps, recent restrictions over the past two years have inhibited some of their activities, and the effective banning of the for-mer UN resident representative will have a chilling effect on efforts to inform the government of objective conditions on the ground.

The Social Crisis of YouthEqually insidious, even though in itself not life-threatening, and un-recognized in Myanmar as an emergency, is a stealth social crisis af-fecting youth. It became manifest in the scenes of younger monks, together with young people�often students�in the streets, the latter forming cordons to protect the monks from possible attack. This scene refl ected not only the immediate economic and political frustrations that have been built up over many years, but the lack of social mobility in a society under complete military domination.

In contrast, under civilian rule, no matter the political and econo-mic problems facing the state at that time (and they were numerous), conditions were better. Before 1962, there was no �brain drain� from Burma in contrast to most Asian states. Although the country was poor, the culture was congenial and comfortable. Youth then had four clear avenues to social mobility. Only one of these was the military, which was an honored and desired profession. Youth could also rise through free higher education and attendance at good universities, and many sons and daughters from obscure and impoverished villages were to be found at the Universities of Rangoon and Mandalay. The sangha was a respected avenue of both education and social prestige, and from which one could exit at any time with ease and increased dignity. Mass political organizations allowed those with some charisma to seek status. Mobility through the bureaucratic route was respected, and civilian pre-stige was the norm. But mobility through the private sector was limited unless family money or connections were available, and was completely shut down following the imposition of the �Burmese Way to Socialism� following the coup of 1962.

Today, all avenues are militarily controlled. Higher education is both in shambles even as institutions have mushroomed, and attendance is dependent on military approval. The sangha is administratively control-


18 19

led by the government; access to private capital through the banking system, which in any case is limited, is heavily dependent on military approval; most organizations are under military control or scrutiny�in-cluding those in civil society; and the military itself has become the central and essential avenue of advancement. Employment is severely limited, with the result that students have little incentive to study un-der a system in which promotion seems impossible, and the teaching profession at all levels has become corrupted through requirements for payments to faculty to ensure a modest standard of living for those in that profession. Teachers must often provide tutorial instruction outsi-de of the curriculum to meet their living expenses; they teach extra-cur-ricularly what they should have taught in the schools. Even just access to better schools often involved illegal funding.

The social crisis and frustrations of youth are dangerous to the well being of the state for two reasons. The fi rst is that any signifi cant inci-dent, egregiously poor policy choice, or almost any other event could set off demonstrations that would likely be more bloody than those of the saffron revolution. Such frustrations build, and the plateau of dissatisfaction rises, with dangerous consequences for all concerned. Those most prone to respond are the voices of social conscience and concern�students and monks.

The second are the attempts to leave the country for more economic opportunities and political space by the very population that the country needs to staff its future professions and bureaucracy. Since 1962, some one percent of the total population, and those with educational creden-tials, have fl ed to Thailand, Australia, Singapore, and other countries depopulating the state of the very people it will need for future devel-opment. This diaspora does not count the exodus of the four percent of marginally educated peasants and workers or refugees who have escaped war and/or sought menial employment abroad. The expansion of military educational institutions and the offi cer corps as a whole may not only be for the tatmadaw�s perceived security concerns, however spurious they may be, but it may be a strategic move to make up for this defi ciency and/or to ensure that it will have a future core loyal cadre of bureaucrats and professionals who will have had military training, and thus be more compliant.

This generation knows that something is wrong in their society. Some of them call for democracy, but since their birth they have not been legally able to read a modern textbook on this subject, let alone experience the give and take and compromises inherent in a democratic system. Perhaps the cries for democracy are rather an inchoate demand for some new form of governance and to get the military out of administrative control.

The history of the sangha and student involvement in the anti-colo-nial struggle are instructive to understanding the present, for as Mark Twain is said to have remarked, if history does not repeat itself it often rhymes. The military�s perception of the politically delicate nature of the involvement of monks in the demonstrations became apparent when there was no attempt at fi rst to stop them, and some monks were even allowed to march undisturbed past Aung San Suu Kyi�s house�an unprecedented event. Monks were leaders, along with students, of the anti-colonial struggle, and both have lead important demonstrations against the authorities. And so to the junta, there are lessons to be learned from Burmese history.

The insensitivity of the junta to the concerns of youth, both for their society and the future, is apparent , for if the state has denied the economic crisis, it has not even recognized the social concerns of youth.

The Political CrisisInternational attention has concentrated on the obvious political crisis that has galvanized international opinion since the elections of May 1990. This concentration is in part because the international com-munity thinks of human rights in political terms, and elections are held to be the benchmark of democratic governance, or so the media simplistically informs us. So restrictions on, interference with, or lack of recognition of the results of, elections are primary foci. The political crisis has been smoldering since the SLORC agreed to hold multi-party elections shortly after the coup of 1988. Although the votes in the 1990 election seem to have been fairly counted, the campaigning up to that election was severely restricted. Since that time, there has been an evi-dent attempt to emasculate the National League for Democracy, which won 80 percent of the seats and 59 percent of the votes in that election, and effectively to deprive the NLD of the services of its leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Both sides in this essentially lopsided struggle, have made tactical errors that mutually increased antagonisms.

Although sops were made to the international community by allowing UN special envoys Ambassadors Razali and Gambari into the country and to have access to the Nobel Laureate, the military clearly had no intention of agreeing to any system that would loosen their immediate and, I would argue, continued control over that political process. The employment of the military�s captive mass organizations, such as the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA), to demonstrate publicly against the opposition in the most extreme


20 21

language, and indeed on occasion physically to disrupt opposition activities, has been the obvious civilian surrogate of direct military action. They also have been involved in cyclone relief efforts. The USDA is apparently based on the Indonesian model of Golcar (�functional groups�). Which started as a social organization that became General Suharto�s political party. The USDA may follow this pattern.

It is the political crisis that has galvanized world opinion, now inten-sifi ed by the cyclone, and the encapsulation of political ideals into the person of Aung San Suu Kyi has attracted international attention even more than her South African Nobel Peace Prize counterpart, Nelson Mandela. The seeming image of the ostensibly fragile woman, having given up her family, standing up to a rough and stern-looking military junta cannot but evoke attention, sympathy, and admiration. This personalization of more profound issues makes political action more accessible to the public even as it may obfuscate more nuanced and complex policy questions.

The result of this confrontation, made more acute by the fall of Gen-eral Khin Nyunt in October 2004, who had been the spark of the efforts to have the UN have external dialogue with her and was the member of the junta most aware of world opinion, is political stasis. Perhaps stasis is too mild a term, for deterioration of the potential for any relationship is evident, as it seems that the Senior General is not prepared to have any dealings with her, and is said to want to avoid hearing her name mentioned in his presence.

She is still kept under house arrest, and likely to remain so perhaps even until the elections of 2010 have been held; the junta clearly has no intention of having her become the head of state or exert any inde-pendent administrative power; this provision has been built into the proposed constitution. Future military leaders may feel less constrained in dealing with �the lady,� as she is called (because to invoke her name is to bring up her embarrassing�to the junta-- relationship of her to her publicly revered father). Although some in the opposition have declared that resolution of the political crisis is the crux to solving all other issues, and thus this must precede changes in socio-economic or minority relations, this approach is contradicted by the experience in a number of other countries.

The political crisis has been compounded by the government�s loss of an essential element of its attempt to instill its political legiti-macy. The junta, using all its controlled avenues of communication and media, has used Buddhism as a critical component of its attempt to convince the public that its legitimacy is in accordance with Burmese norms of behavior. The daily outpouring of stories and pictures, as well

as sermons, of appropriate acts of religiosity by the military all attest both to the political importance of Buddhism and its public advocacy by the government; it also illustrates as well the deeply held religious beliefs of the hierarchy. Yet in a few days of violence against the monks, the tatmadaw has lost its claim to its devout standing. This loss of le-gitimacy, then, is perhaps the most important internal element in the overall political crisis facing the state, for this strikes at the one, essen-tial primordial value of the Burman population. The loss of Buddhist legitimacy is likely to be matched by a loss of regime effi cacy, if not by the cyclone itself than by the delays allowing foreign assistance and its belated response to the cyclone.

The Minority CrisisBurma/Myanmar is the quintessential multi-ethnic state with perhaps one-third of its population composed of minority groups. The minority crisis seems less apparent then the other multiple crises facing the state, for it did not explode during the saffron revolution or during the cyclone. Yet it is likely to be the most enduring of all the national is-sues, for in multi-cultural states these primordial concerns of ethnicity and culture loom larger than immediate economic, social, or political problems, and is less easily resolved. The importance and likely conti-nuing concern over minority affairs is compounded by the insistence of the military that devolving various types of authority to local, mino-rity groups, often called �federalism� by those peoples, is the fi rst step toward secession, the great fear of the military and its fi rst principle of its incessantly repeated ideological manifesto. This was articulated as early as 1962 by General Ne Win. The military was, after all, the core that held the state together in the early 1950s at the height of the Karen insurrection, and since that time under multiple revolts.

These concerns have been real, compounded by a still-remembered history of all the surrounding states of Burma, and others such as the U.S. and the UK, supporting various rebellions a half-century or so ago. These Burman suspicions are outmoded but still palpable, and have been compounded by the isolation of the Burman majority during the socialist period when most of the minority groups were in contact with their ethnic peers across the various ethnically arbitrary Burmese bor-ders, and when Burmese Christian and Muslim groups were in touch with, and supported by, their foreign co-religionists.

Minority issues were temporarily ameliorated by the multiple cease fi res initiated and negotiated by General Khin Nyunt. These were simply cease fi res, not peace accords, in which the various insurgents


22 23

were allowed to keep their weapons. As part of the process of building toward the state�s discipline-fl ourishing democracy, all arms were to be surrendered to the government prior to the referendum. It was evident that this would not have happened to any appreciable degree, and it also clear that General Khin Nyunt had been considering some means of incorporating some of the insurgents as militia or national guard to allow them to keep some of their armaments, give them some status, and yet exert some central control. Not only do many of the minorities fear Burman domination, for the military has often acted as if they were a foreign occupying force (which in some cases they were in minority areas), but they may also fear their own ethnic compatriots.

The proposed constitution will not give local, minority governments the degree of local power, let alone national infl uence, than they have wanted, as indicated in the various draft constitutions those groups pre-pared outside of the country, for to so write internally was considered an offense. Some form of federalism has been their goal, but even the use of such a term is regarded by the junta as anathema. Instead, active duty military will be represented at all national and local levels of ad-ministration, and aside from six smaller minority areas5 of contiguous townships that will have authority over certain local laws and customs, and a bicameral legislature, an essential unitary state is in place. No doubt the military will say that under the new constitution some minor-ity groups will have more autonomy than they had under the socialist period, and indeed in the civilian era, but this is still far removed from their aspirations.

Many of the minorities have articulated that they would regard as legitimate a central government in Naypyidaw that allowed them the re-tain their language, literature, and customs, while providing the subsi-dies necessary for the operations of local governance and development. The central government has never allowed them to do this. In spite of hortatory comments in the constitution6 on the protection of local cus-toms, language, culture and diversity, the state has refused to authorize the use of local languages in the offi cial school curriculum. This is in contrast to some other countries in the region. Yet, surveys in the Wa areas of the Shan State indicate that many of the primary schools there teach in Chinese, and a few in Wa, and some in the Mon areas teach in Mon, but perhaps these are regarded as private schools or are beyond the government�s control. Other local languages are taught outside of the state-authorized curricula.

Although the tensions between the minorities and the Burman majority are often blamed on the divide and rule policies of the British colonialists, similar policies have been followed by the military since

they took power. The fear that the Kachin were coming too close to the NLD may have been one cause of the Depeyin incident in May 2003. Ef-forts by the minorities to come together in coalitions are regarded with considerable suspicion by the state.The fragility of the relative peace along most of Myanmar�s frontiers may become evident following the results of the referendum. Although there is war-weariness among groups that for one or two generations have been in revolt from time to time, the tatmadaw, the leaders of which have risen through the ranks by their anti-insurgent fi ghting, view minority power with extreme suspicion. The resolution of this crisis is unlikely for some time.

The Political Culture and Its ConsequencesCentral to the amelioration of these separate but intertwined crises fa-cing the Burmese state are broader forces that impede the alleviation of these problems. A series of tendencies in the political culture present further diffi culties in achieving tidy and timely solutions to the crises noted above. Burma/Myanmar is by no means unique in this regard. In summary form, these stem from a socio-political system in which loy-alties are highly personal, and a �loyal opposition� is an oxymoron. This is based on fi nite concepts of power, under which to share or delegate authority is to lose it. The leader, then, has the incentive to avoid sha-ring power, or even information, with subordinates who in turn have diffi culty in contradicting their leaders. This attempt to control internal information is related to efforts to limit foreign comments and infl uen-ces, both viewed as interference in the political culture. The leader may then wish to keep his plans for succession private, for to divulge these plans could mean diminished authority.7

Personalized power results, most obviously, in weakened institu-tions, and in the development of factions and entourages. So, if one purges a leader (e.g., Khin Nyunt, Tin Oo), one also purges his loyal entourage, thus decimating any institution that the purged leader had commanded (e.g., military intelligence in 1983 and 2004). Since there is a reluctance to share power, which is essentially to lose some of it, the central authority is usually not prepared to delegate signifi cant authori-ty to lower echelons of institutions, such as local governments. There is thus a tendency for centralized control, and the development of federal structures, or independent judiciaries, legislatures, powerful advocacy civil society groups, autonomous business concerns, a central banking system, or other institutions is often more diffi cult. This concept of unitary control extends to information, which is viewed as power, and


24 25

thus there is a lack of transparency. The entourage system, in societies that are economically underfunded, requires the exchanges of monies, goods, services, and elements of power down from the top to ensure loyalty, and in some cases up from the bottom as well. Thus, corruption and rent-seeking are likely to be endemic.

Thus, to resolve these crises requires a more comprehensive ap-proach than some simple administrative decision by mid-level offi -cials. Ironically, insofar as the leadership addresses the problems, the solutions (if there are any) would tend to increase the authority and arbitrariness of those in command. Simple solutions of each of these crises is diffi cult, and at least in part will be dependent for long-range amelioration to modifi cations in the more basic political culture, which is malleable over time. All of these problems have been made more acute by Cyclone Nargis.

The Globalization of the CrisisThe tendency for the tatmadaw in Myanmar since 1962 has been to revert to an isolationist position in the face of outside pressures. The statement, often offi cially declaimed, is that we Burmese were isolated for thirty years and we can go that route again, if necessary. We have rice, raw materials, energy, and other resources we need. This oft-re-peated chauvinistic response is inaccurate. Even at the height of their isolationistic period, in 1972 the Burma Socialist Programme Party ad-mitted that it was necessary to reform its poor economic relations with the outside world.8 China has loomed large in its support to the junta. The reluctance to �globalize� the cyclone response was in part the rea-son for denying visas to aid workers (as well as journalists).

More basic, however, than the catalogue of locally available assets may be the attitudes formed through a culture perceived as under siege. The traumatic colonial experience, the perceived threat of the diminu-tion or even the extinction of Burman culture, attacks on Buddhism, immigration especially from India have all perhaps created a fear of vul-nerability that isolation (real or imagined) could eliminate, and results in nationalistic, even xenophobic, responses to perceived threats to the regime or to its culture. Myanmar leaders feel vulnerable in the face of more powerful neighbors and the U.S. and EU.

Whatever the basic causes, the infl uence of globalization is far more acute today than it was a generation ago. The exposure to foreign invest-ment, however ineptly that 1988 policy was implemented, has brought in the outside world, as has the policy to encourage tourism as a foreign exchange earner for the state. The new technology of television, e-mail,

cell phones, the internet, and other recent intrusions into Burmese life has transformed the exposure of Burmese to international trends.

As outsiders, we saw the horrifi c visions of the repression of the saf-fron revolution on television broadcast worldwide; this was an element of globalization important in galvanizing world opinion on Myanmar and the Burmese. To this writer, that is a less important issue compared to the reverse element of globalization. That is, foreigners saw all these images, but more importantly many of the urban Burmese did as well. The new urban phenomena of a myriad satellite television dishes, both registered and unregistered, has enabled important elements of the Burmese population for the fi rst time to see the repression in their own homes and offi ces. This is unique in Burmese history. No longer does hearsay or rumor in a society of completely controlled media have to be the means by which people are informed of the repression. Instead, there is a palpable, vital set of images that the military regime will not be able to erase. It is for this reason that the saffron revolution, as rela-tively small as it was compared to the failed peoples� revolution of 1988 and as far fewer casualties resulted, may have the most profound effect on the people and the future of direct military rule. As the saying goes, �To be Burman is to be Buddhist,� and the infl iction of terror on those who exemplify one of the primordial values of Burman society will pro-foundly affect the future of the regime in Myanmar.

Ironically, as Myanmar has relied on Chinese assistance for building infrastructure, economic assistance, military equipment, private Chinese investment, and perhaps two million illegal Chinese immigrants, China has become one avenue of Burmese globalization if of a particular brand and approach.

The Government�s Proposed SolutionThe government�s proposed solution to these crises has been, fi rst, to deny their existence (and to minimize the cyclone�s effects), and then to lay out the road map toward their proposed and desirable future. The rural population, so said the spokesman of the government before the cyclone, is better off and there are no real problems with the rural population. The bogus monks and other nefarious traitors stirred up the demonstrations, which did not represent the true feelings or beliefs of either the people on the sangha. Senior monks (the Buddhist hierar-chy is under the government�s administrative control) warned younger members to go back to their monasteries and avoid illegal activities, and since it was Buddhist �lent� in any case, they should not have been on the streets. The problems of youth are being met through increased


26 27

budgets for education and the expansion of institutions of higher lear-ning to include Ph.D. degree programs. The political problems would be resolved if Aung San Suu Kyi were not so intransigent, so they say, and if she were to agree with the preconditions set forth by the Senior General for talks, although there is no indication that even if talks were held, they would accomplish anything tangible.

In any case, the tatmadaw incessantly repeats the mantra that the roadmap toward the multi-party discipline-fl ourishing democracy is in place and proceeding as planned. It is, according the junta, the re-sponsibility of every citizen to support this process.

The response of the outside world has been predictable. The Chi-nese, Indians, the Thai, ASEAN, and the Japanese assert that some progress has been made, and they encourage the junta to keep up the positive changes so outlined. The United States and most of the Euro-pean Union say that the new constitution and the process envisioned will simply enfeoff the military in power for the foreseeable future. What the people believe can only be estimated, but their response may be prompted by the fears of repression. There is this likely to be no una-nimity on the future, but the government�s fi gures of almost universal approval of the results of the partial referendum cast extreme skepti-cism on the fairness of the process.

The Way ForwardObservers, commenting before the cyclone, may be confl icted in their analyses of the Burma/Myanmar situation. Should we (as unfashiona-ble as it is) quote Lenin and discuss the political changes in Myanmar as two steps forward and one step backward, or should we turn Lenin on his head and consider the Burmese situation as one step forward and two steps backward? Does the immediate future indicate progress through the constitutional process and eventual elections? Or are we in a political stalemate or regression? It seems evident that if the forces that control Myanmar remain in place, the next few years are likely to see little if any improvement in the plight of the Burmese peoples, an appraisal made profoundly more stark since the cyclone. Since 1988, the military has made it evident that they had planned to remain in effective power, eventually through a civilianized government such as they had done under the BSPP 1974 constitution. We may, I believe, presume there are moderates within the military structure who are li-kely to believe that the new constitutional government, whatever its de-leterious effects of concentrating power in the hands of the military, will eventually evolve into something more open and catholic. If the outside

world believed that the elections of 1990 or those planned for 2010 will provide for a government in which the military will effectively be sub-ordinate to civilian politicians, then they were not carefully reading the Rangoon tea leaves.

There is always the possibility of violent change through revolution or coup or unrest of various kinds. Authoritarian regimes have a ten-dency inadvertently to encourage such events because of their intense hierarchical system that rewards lower level orthodoxy and conformity to even the most bizarre whims and offhand remarks of the leadership. The cyclone was so devastating that a preliminary assessment would lead to the conclusion that it will not result in an immediate revolution, although it will certainly contribute to future, perhaps violent, change. One of the factors in change from military rule is the protection of the tatmadaw leadership from retribution by any future government. The new constitution so stipulates this. This provision was greeted with despair among those hurt by that government; there will be many who advocate the military relinquishing administrative power and want jus-tice for past crimes committed. This is most unlikely to happen. The Burmese will have to live with the ambiguities of past misrule if they are to proceed to the next stage of national development

Yet we are caught in the grips of multiple orthodoxies. The military orthodoxy is apparent and pervasive. That of the NLD is more subtle but evident as well. The expatriate Burmese community too has its singular approach to considering Myanmar problems, deviation from which leads to exclusion from that uniformly informed club. So too, in the policy circles of Washington, public debate on the problems of Burma/Myanmar is usually lacking, for those who disagree with the of-fi cial position are cast as �pariahs,� as is the regime itself.

One could indeed argue that there is another looming crisis�that of transition. That there will be changes over time is assured, although how and when is unclear. Yet a simple change from military to civilian rule, �nice and tidy as we learned in school� (as Bertol Brecht wrote in the Threepenny Opera) is most unlikely. Planning for such change internally seems anathema; planning for any realistic change externally seems unexplored. Gaps in capacities, conceptions of governance, laws and legal norms, administrative procedures, and institutional authorities will all have to be reconstituted if any new government at some undetermined time is to succeed in approaching the potential that once was Burma and alleviating the suffering of its peoples. It is to this end that concerned observers of the Burmese scene should give attention.

In any future scenario or transition, there looms a possible lesson


28 29

from the past. In the socialist era, there grew a gap between the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), founded by the military and initially staffed by many from the army, and the army itself, so that by the time of the elections of 1990, the military was not anxious to see a victory by the Union Party, the clear successor to the BSPP. So, if the USDA evolves into a party by the 2010 elections, we may see a gradual split after that time between the military and the USDA with further conse-quences for Burmese political life and strife.9

Yet there are efforts that might be taken. Although some want sanc-tions strengthened, others in senior positions allow that they have not brought about regime or even attitudinal change, and that attempted dialogue has not worked as well. ASEAN seems one fragile reed on which one could try to lean. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which includes the U.S., Japan, and China, among many others, might be an auspices that could be brought into play. True, it lacks a secretariat and has played no positive role to date in intra-ASEAN disagreements and disputes. Under forceful leadership, however, it could advocate three policies: [1] take the lead in assessing the cyclone tragedy and coordinat-ing foreign assistance, which would be perhaps more acceptable to the Burmese than coming from Western states; [2] invoke the new human rights provision of the ASEAN Charter (approved in November 2007), a provision without enforcement conditions, and begin its focus on pre-venting human traffi cking. This is prohibited under the new Burmese constitution, and no ASEAN country could claim it was being targeted, but it would begin the process of that institution trying to deal with human rights issues in a non-threatening manner but one that could have positive results; [3] under ARF, reaffi rm the territorial integrity of Burma/Myanmar, thus indicating to the junta that no foreign power is interested in seeing the secession of any part of that state, and reassur-ing the Burmese of the national unity that is a prime focus of the mili-tary. Whether any or all of these efforts would produce practical results in terms of bettering the lot of the Burmese peoples is unclear, but they would be better than the present stasis.

If the past process has been a political journey without maps because of the lack of transparency in the government but toward a militarily controlled future, another landscape is emerging. The ultimate destination is said to be the same, and the highway through it is rough, tortuous, and now through a miasmal swamp. But beyond the horizon may be detours, even alternative paths toward some other end. Those may also be more than diffi cult, but ones that may be navigable with care and concern. If the goal that we are striving for is democracy, then it will be a long time before the long-suffering Burmese peoples

reach that end or that the term �democracy� itself is used in Myanmar with any meaning.

Partial BibliographyDuffi eld, Mark. On the Edge of �No Man�s Land� Chronic Emergency in Myanmar. Uni-versity of Bristol, Centre for Governance and International Affairs, Working Paper No. 01-08. 2008

International Monetary Fund. Myanmar�Staff Report for the 2007 Article IV Consultation.November 5, 2007

Kyaw Yin Hlaing. �Challenging the Authoritarian State: Buddhist Monks and Peaceful Protests in Burma.� Fletcher Forum of World Affairs. Vol. 32:1 Winter 2008.

Petrie, Charles. �End of Mission Report.� United National Development Programme. April 2008.

Selth, Andrew. �Burma�s �Saffron Revolution� and the Limits of International Infl u-ence.� Australian Journal of International Affairs. (Forthcoming 2008)

Steinberg, David I. �Globalization, Dissent, and Orthodoxy: Burma/Myanmar and the Saffron Revolution.� Georgetown Journal of International Affairs. (Forthcoming 2008).

Steinberg, David I. Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar. Norwalk: East-Bridge Books. 2006.

Steinberg, David I. Burma�s Road Toward Development: Growth and Ideology Under Military Rule. Boulder: Westview Press, 1982.

Turnell, Sean. �Burma�s Long Road to Economic Privation.� Powerpoint presentation, Georgetown University, April 2008.

Turnell, Sean. �Burma�s Economy: Current Situation and Prospects for Reform.� Draft, 2008.

Notes1 In 1989, the military changed the name of the state from Burma to Myanmar, an old written form. The opposition did not accept this change, considering the regime ille-gitimate. The U.S. has continued to use �Burma,� while the UN and most other states have adopted �Myanmar.� The name, thus, has become a surrogate indicator of political opinion. Here, both are used without political intent; �Burma� for the pre-1989 period, �Myanmar� thereafter, and both (Burma/Myanmar) to indicate continuity. Burmese here is employed as an adjective and for citizens of that country. �Burman� indicates the ma-jor ethnic group of that state. 2 Most important dates since independence at 4:20 a.m. on January 4, 1948 have been so chosen.3 Burma/Myanmar, even in the civilian period, has been most reluctant to ask publicly for assistance, although they will often take it when proffered. This was true under the civilian government as well as under the previous military-run socialist government (1962-1988). 4 So deaths and destruction as a result of the cyclone will likely be underestimated, as positive results in other cases are overestimated.


30 31

5 Wa, Kokang, Danu, Palaung, Naga, and PaO, all �self-administered zones� except for the Wa area, which is a larger �division.� 6 (Chapter I, 11 (a); Chapter VIII, 10 (d), 23). Unauthorized English version.7 For an extended discussion, see David I. Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar. Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006.8 See David I. Steinberg, Burma�s Road Toward development: Growth and Ideology Under Military Rule. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981. Chapter 3.9 I am indebted to Dr. Zaw Oo for this observation.

Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/BurmaBradley O. Babson

The twin events of cyclone Nagris and formal announcement of the approval of a new Constitution in the referendum held on May 10 have fundamentally altered the context for international engagement with Myanmar/Burma.1 While frustrations are running high in the international community over the government�s handling of both events, moralistic outrage will not resolve these frustrations nor help the people of Myanmar whose suffering not only demands an urgent humanitarian response but also a much more deeply rooted transformation in the governance of the country. This situation must be faced with realism and fresh thinking against a backdrop where the UN has been fl oundering in its efforts to promote national reconciliation, democracy, human rights and humanitarian improvements in Myanmar/Burma.

The three prongs of UN engagement are political mediation through the good offi ces of the Secretary General�s Special Advisor under a man-date from the General Assembly, promotion of human rights by the Special Rapporteur appointed by the Human Rights Council, and hu-manitarian and social programs assistance provided by United Nations agencies under the leadership of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. All three have fl oundered in their relationships with the military leadership and in practical achievements in recent months, follo-wing the monk-led anti-government protests in September and October 2007. The expulsion of Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator Charles Petrie for issuing a statement on deteriorating humanitarian conditions, denial of a visa to Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro prior to fi ling his last report to the Human Rights Council, and rejection of Special Ad-visor Ibrahim Gambari�s proposals for constructive assistance to enhance legitimacy in the process of adopting a new Constitution, all signal a wea-kening of UN infl uence inside the country at the same time that there is intensifying concern in the international community about worsening political and social conditions. The wrangling over access and terms for international aid to the cyclone victims simply reinforces in stark terms the weakness of UN capacity to fi nd a meaningful role in managing the multiple crises now facing the country.


32 33

At the present moment, Myanmar/Burma faces not only a humani-tarian crisis but also a crisis of legitimacy in the announced timetable for democracy. In addition to the widely held view that the constitu-tional convention was not suffi ciently inclusive in its participation and processes, there is ample cause to believe that the referendum that was forced upon the population in the wake of the cyclone disaster was not conducted in a way that genuinely refl ects the will of the people.

Beneath the surface is a rising tide of anti-government sentiment, fed by revulsion at the treatment of monks, shock over extravagance and corruption in the senior leadership revealed by widely viewed video tapes of the wedding of Senior General Than Shwe�s daughter, despair over growing poverty, and disappointment with the government�s xe-nophobic response and inept management of international relief to cyclone victims. Open expressions of public anger have been rare in the past, as fear of reprisal has dominated the public space; but this too is changing. Future eruptions of public anger are unpredictable, but have been muted by the prospects for a new Constitution that promises an eventual end to military government, even if the military will retain ultimate controlling authority.

Rising anger is also a factor in the international community, even before the frustrations on the handling of humanitarian relief to cy-clone victims. The images of monk-bashing by the military authorities in 2007 fueled international disgust of the regime and added pressures to increase sanctions. In the US, public awareness of the plight of the people of Myanmar/Burma has been signifi cantly increased as a result of widespread media coverage of these events and Laura Bush�s per-sonal attention to this issue from the White House. There is a strong bipartisan consensus to express offi cial outrage and increase economic sanctions, notably by targeting fi nancial sanctions on individuals and companies closely tied to the leadership and their families. Similar sentiments are evident in Europe, Canada, and Australia, and in a more nuanced way among the ASEAN democracies.

Along with growing anti-government sentiment is a pervasive sense of frustration and helplessness in being unable to infl uence change in attitudes and behaviors of the military regime. Internally, the hope that the people and non-governmental stakeholders have invested in the ability of the UN to play a helpful role has been fading. Externally, there is a widespread perception that neither engagement nor sanctions have worked in moving the minds of the senior military. This is reinforced by the reality that the different policies towards Myanmar/Burma in the international community, and particularly among the members of the Security Council, together with the independent pursuit of interests of

neighboring countries in their relations with Myanmar/Burma, mili-tate against an effective role for the UN as a broker of political change or enforcer of a strong policy of sanctions and inducements for change. Frustrations abound on all sides, including the military government who do not feel they are being given credit for progress and conces-sions they have made.2

In light of these developments, there is a viewpoint emerging in some quarters that while the UN should continue its efforts in all three areas of its engagement because there seems to be no other obvious alternative, there should be some re-thinking of how the UN could re-shape its engagement, and also how other multilateral approaches might be developed in a complimentary way to strengthen overall im-pact on the thinking and behavior of the military leadership and on meeting the needs and aspirations of the people. The purpose of this paper is to explore some of these policy options in relation to both in-ternal and external factors that will determine their potential effective-ness.

Historical Context As Thant Myint-U (2006) and David Steinberg (2001, 2006) keep re-minding us, it is very important to understand Myanmar/Burma�s his-torical realities in framing policies towards infl uencing change in the country. The transition from colonial rule to independent nationhood after World War II was more the result of a hurried negotiation among groups who had no binding common national identity other than geo-graphic proximity after a long period of �divide and rule� under the Brit-ish, than the result of a genuine hard fought independence movement as took place in India and Vietnam. The democratic experiment held together by ethnic consent based on the Panglong Agreement of 1947 lasted only a decade, replaced by a military-led caretaker government in 1958 and a full-scale military coup led by Ne Win in 1962. As a result, the modern history of Myanmar/Burma has been marked by 60 years of civil war among a multiplicity of contending groups, with the mili-tary seeing its primary role to keep the nation whole and unifi ed. Thus the condition of the country should be more aptly viewed as similar to confl ict-ridden Africa, than as primarily a power struggle between the military and a western-oriented pro-democracy movement.3 While the historical context is dominated by ethnically and geographically based civil strife, the recent clashes between the military and the monks and their civilian supporters is essentially an intra-Burman ethnic group confl ict driven primarily by economic hardship, as was the case in the

Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma

34 35

uprising of 1988. It is notable that the ethnic minority groups which comprise about 30% of the population kept a very low profi le during the clashes of 2007.

Viewed from the historical perspective of pervasive confl ict, there is some merit in the military�s often stated priority that a measure of stability be achieved through ceasefi re agreements and other measures before the country can successfully move down the road towards full-fl edged democracy that will succeed, bearing in mind the failure of the democratic experiment of the 1950�s. In this sense, the image of the military (Tatmadaw) as the protector of the nation since in its inception under Aung San at the end of the British era, still has some validity in the country today, despite the military�s image being severely tarnished by violence towards monks and ordinary people, and by the hardships created through gross economic mismanagement that have given rise to the present day anger. Progress in reaching cease-fi re agreements with many of the insurgent groups is one reason that the senior military leadership is willing to proceed with their road map towards democracy. One has only to ask whether it is possible to conceive of a functioning government throughout present day Myanmar/Burma without a strong military presence and role. The answer for better or for worse is no, and that the Tatmadaw will be a necessary if not suffi cient part of a desirable and legitimate governance equation for the foreseeable future.

Equally important is the question whether Myanmar/Burma has the ingredients in place to establish a functioning modern democracy. Despite high emotions to the contrary, the answer is also no. Non-military related political institutions are weak and fragmented, worn down by decades of military oppression. The National League for De-mocracy (NLD) has an important voice, but is organizationally fragile and dependent on its icon of democratic hope and determination, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The newly emerging political players such as the 88 Generation and All Burma Monks Alliance are driven by anti-government protest motivations, but are loose networks without a formal structure, and are not likely to evolve into new political parties with national reach and platforms for future policies and governance agendas. As a result of the grinding erosion of social services and worsening poverty under military rule, the general population is also poorly educated and lacking a cultural history of popular participa-tion in governance, civil discourse and national debate. As in 1990, the population is bound in a collective desire to end military rule, but the country is not well-equipped to replace it with open democratic processes and rules-based decision-making accompanied by a mea-ningful role for the courts in dispute resolution.

The real question is how military adaptation and reform can be mo-tivated and managed to accompany a democratization process where the basic foundations and institutions for functional democracy have yet to be put in place. This duality of institutional adjustments and developments required for a successful democratic transition poses a fundamental challenge for policies of future engagement by the inter-national community with Myanmar/Burma. The UN frameworks for engagement with Myanmar/Burma so far have not built this dimension of military adaptation into any of the mandates. While UN experiences in post-confl ict transitions in Africa and Eastern Europe may have some potential application in the Myanmar/Burma context, it is even more li-kely that the experiences of other Asian nations which have undergone transitions from military to democratic rule -- such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea -- may hold lessons of experience that could usefully be drawn upon in future dialogue initiatives with the military regime in support of their own decision to move ahead with the seven step process of democratization. This could be a potentially productive area for ASEAN sponsorship or that of an informal regio-nal grouping of Asian countries seeking to fi nd helpful ways to sup-port consideration of practical issues related to workable institutional changes in the internally-determined process of moving forward on the roadmap to democracy.

Beyond this fundamental institutional set of challenges, in recon-sidering future policies for UN and other multilateral engagement it is important to consider the present day realities that are rooted in the country�s historical context and recent experiences.

Ethnic Minorities and Traditional Homelands One priority is that more attention is needed to facilitate and empower the politics of accommodation among ethnic rivalries amid the realities on the ground in the geographically defi ned traditional homelands or ethnic minority states. Mary Callahan (2007) describes the complexity and diversity of political authority in the ethnic minority states and dis-tinguishes between three types of situations: (a) states where authority of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is limited and there is near devolution of power to networks of former insurgent lead-ers, traditional leaders, business people and traders; (b) states where the SPDC military and other state agencies are dominant and oppressive occupying authorities; and (c) states where a range of strategic partners including ceasefi re group leaders, business operators, Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) leaders, traders, religious lead-


36 37

ers, NGO personnel and government offi cials, have achieved a worka-ble coexistence.

Recognizing these differences and the complexities of governance in different regions of the country is important. UN humanitarian agencies that are operationally active in Myanmar/Burma have been working in at least some of these areas for many years. UNICEF, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, FAO, WHO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, and UNODC have achieved modest but important and largely unrecognized and acknowledged successes in their efforts. Such programs defi nitely de-serve support and expansion. Collaboration among the UN agencies, other offi cial donors, local and foreign NGOs, and the government in immunization campaigns and HIV/AIDS are examples of relative suc-cess that have formed a foundation for other collaborative initiatives in education, tuberculosis, and malaria. While small in scale compared to need, there is a basic level of contextual operational experience and knowledge that can be built upon when the international community is prepared to make a signifi cant expansion of resources available.

Beyond the potential value and impact of expanding the availability of resources for locally-based humanitarian and development programs in the ethnic states, Callahan makes several important recommenda-tions for future international community involvement in the ethnic sta-tes. One is to appreciate the evolving nature of the diverse and complex social systems in the ethnic states, and approach peace building and social and economic programs in a highly participatory manner adap-ted to local situations. A second is to support strengthening capacity of civil society to contribute to confl ict resolution, social services, huma-nitarian relief and development through support to local community organizations, church service delivery networks and NGOs. A third is to fi nd ways to support military demobilization in the ethnic minority areas as opportunities arise.

Another critical question for the future is how these understandings of the dynamics of political authority in different ethnic minority areas are handled in the new Constitutional provisions for power sharing and for future central-local government authorities and relationships, legally, fi nancially, and administratively. Also, Constitutional design is one thing and implementation will be quite another. The primary focus of the UN Secretary General�s Special Envoy�s and Special Assistant�s mandates since the mid-1990�s has been on mediation between the NLD, particularly its leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the military leadership. This focus has not refl ected this deeper historical ethnic dynamic, despite efforts by all the Special Envoys and Special Assistant over the years to meet with leaders of ethnic groups and to refl ect their

concerns in the dialogue with the government and NLD leadership. If a new Constitution is approved by the upcoming national referendum, however fl awed it may be to outside observers, the implementation of new power sharing arrangements between national and local govern-ments and the development of political, administrative, and fi nancial capacities at the local as well as national level to implement these new arrangements, will become critical to the longer-term process of accom-modation of ethnic interests and national integration. A very useful role for multilateral organizations, including not only the UN and its opera-tional agencies, but also the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, will be to fi nd constructive roles and activities to support the evolutiona-ry process of political, administrative, and fi nancial development at the local level as well as at the central government level amid all the diver-sity around the country. Techniques developed and tested in post-con-fl ict African countries may be approaches that can be transferred and adapted to the Myanmar/Burma context in partnership with central and local authorities and civil society networks. Principles of effectiveness drawn from international experience, such as attention to harmoniza-tion and alignment among donors and with government mechanisms, will be important to pursue in the Myanmar/Burma context.

An additional factor in some ethnic areas is infrastructure construc-tion and Chinese incursion into traditional homelands. Partly fueled by Chinese and Thai economic interests, and partly supported internatio-nally through the development of regional transport networks under the Greater Mekong Sub-region program sponsored by the Asian De-velopment Bank, the physical and social landscape particularly of the Shan state and the Kachin state are being transformed. Depletion of local resources, acquisition of Myanmar/Burmese assets by Chinese immigrants, and increasingly affordable access to markets in China and Thailand are spurring powerful dynamics of change that are evol-ving in an unguided or unregulated way that creates new opportunities, but also threatens the interests of local groups, and in some ways the interests of the country as a whole.

This challenge is illustrated by the social, environmental, and econo-mic issues involved in schemes for building hydropower dams on the Salween river, largely to serve the energy demands of China and Thai-land. The international community has been absent, and local interests largely ignored in the developments on the Salween both in Myanmar/Burma and in China, in sharp contrast to international cooperation in the development of the Mekong River Basin. The huge appetite among central governments for expanding energy trade between Myanmar/Burma and Thailand and China is driving many activities that have


38 39

consequences at the local level. A better understanding of these dy-namics in the international community is needed, along with greater willingness to increase attention and get involved in the development challenges of these regions.

Internal Dynamics of the MilitaryA second reality rooted in the historic context is the slow-burning crisis of identity and control within the military itself that occasionally erupts in overt intra-military confl ict. After the coup of 1962, military rule un-der Ne Win promulgated a culture of violence to maintain stability and national control over divisive forces within the country. Coupled with this was a culture of command that governed the relationship of the state to society and dominated economic policy and management. The vision of the Tatmadaw as protector of the nation was largely tolerated in this period, but accompanied by both erosion of social capital and a weakening economy. The transition from dictatorship to collective mili-tary rule that followed Ne Win�s forced retirement, and the convulsions of 1988-1990, brought open confl ict between the military and society which became vested in both domestic and international perception of the legitimacy of the NLD. This also led to the emergence of widespread international views of Myanmar/Burma as a pariah state. First as the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and later as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military leadership ushe-red in a period of activism in efforts to negotiate cease fi re agreements with rebel groups, stimulate economic innovation and private sector development, and initiate discussions on constitutional revision.

Under the leadership of Senior General Than Shwe after he assu-med power in 1992, the military slowed down these innovative efforts, greatly expanded its ranks, reverted to growing use of coercive tactics to achieve its security objectives, and increasingly devoted attention to its own enrichment through prerogatives accorded military owned economic enterprises. As a result, the Tatmadaw has radically trans-formed its relationship with the people of Myanmar/Burma and effec-tively become a state within a state, operating under different rules and privileges. It secures its power by force and intimidation, control over economic revenue earning activities, and offering social and economic mobility only through military education and career building, and not through civil institutions.

Internally, the Tatmadaw has been heavily infl uenced by intra-military politics characterized by careful balancing of power among leadership fi gures, entourages linked by loyalty and patronage to leading fi gures,

intimidation and coercion within the rank and fi le, alliances with elite fa-milies, control over resources, and generational differences. A strong ethic of nationalism and pride in the historic role of the Tatmadaw in modern national identity has militated against internal fi ssures. Occasionally, ho-wever, internal confl icts erupt that remove contenders to power, notably the downfall of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and dismantling of the powerful military intelligence service in 2004.

While the present condition of the military leadership can be viewed as stable, it is headed for transition. Health issues have required changes in the senior leadership in the past year and the tenure of Senior General Than Shwe himself is uncertain due to his age and reputed health condi-tions. Competition for power between Than Shwe and the long-standing number two in the regime, Maung Aye, is also an ongoing dynamic that is affected not only by aging of both, but also by differences in their views on the handling of the monk demonstrations in 2007. Speculation about this competition and its impact on leadership transitions yet to come in the upper levels of the military has been increasing recently, and intra-military political developments are likely to be intertwined with the pro-cess of implementing the road map to democracy that now has a specifi c timetable attached to it.

Of particular concern to some within the military is the growing role and infl uence of the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA). This civilian organization is closely tied to a faction of the mili-tary loyal to Than Shwe, and has been given a lead role in the management of the Constitutional referendum and subsequent election process. Some senior military offi cers are expected to shed their uniforms and take on major Cabinet roles in a future civilian government with the endorsement of the USDA. The division between who stays and who goes out of uni-form, and the implications for future protection of economic and other privileges of the military, is bound to raise loyalty issues within the mili-tary establishment and raise questions about how the military will adapt to democratic rule even it if retains signifi cant powers and independence under the new Constitution.

The generational issue is also important, as one fi ssure within the military is between those focused on reaping the economic privileges of power derived from past policies and practices, and those younger of-fi cers whose well-being will be more infl uenced by the future than the past, and who thus are likely to be more invested in securing a future that will benefi t them and their families in a sustainable way, than hol-ding onto old ways.

To date, none of the activities of the UN or other multilateral organi-zations, including ASEAN and the International Financial Institutions,


40 41

have had any major impact on the inner dynamics of the military esta-blishment. The UN Security Council has been unable to forge a consen-sus on an international policy response to human rights violations and excessive use of violence against the population. The Special Advisor to the Secretary General and the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights have secured only minor concessions on treatment of political priso-ners and political dialogue. The International Labor Offi ce has been able to make some progress in the area of forced labor practices, but compliance is tenuous. ASEAN has tried, but failed, to achieve a mea-ningful dialogue on governance and democratization. And the UNDP, IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank have conducted occa-sional studies of economic developments and offered advice for more economically effi cient and equitable economic management that has largely fallen on deaf ears at the top, even while lower level offi cials have by and large been cooperative and receptive. In general, the civil service is progressively minded and eager to work to improve the governance of the country, but has been held in check by the military leadership.

A challenge for future policies for multilateral engagement is how to relate to the realities of the intra-military political dynamics while having positive infl uences on the directions of change that will be largely determined by the evolving replacement of key individuals in the senior leadership and by the ideas they espouse for future policy and management of the country. By necessity, any approach taken must be multi-dimensional, involving security, political and econo-mic aspects, because the military is deeply involved in all these areas of governance. It also must be incremental, recognizing the need for confi dence building as new leadership emerges, and also the need to overcome gaps in knowledge and institutional capacity to manage change that are rooted in Myanmar/Burma�s long-standing isolation and mismanagement.

The Religious FactorCulturally and politically, Myanmar/Burma is infused with religion, and religious ideals and language are deeply ingrained in the fabric of everyday life. Apart from the Tatmadaw, the religious orders and networks are the only institutions capable of operating on a truly natio-nal basis. As Callahan (2007) notes, there are substantial areas where basic government services are not capable of operating or operate only as agents of occupation. The Buddhist Sangha is vertically integrated down to the pagodas at the village level, and has historically played a vital role in providing basic education and fostering social cohesion in

the face of ongoing confl icts. Similarly, the Christian churches which have a signifi cant number of ethnic minority adherents, play a vital role in supporting social needs of some of the neediest and hardest to reach peoples in the country. The Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC), for example, provides an ecumenical network of coordinated social service capabilities that could potentially play an expanded role in peace buil-ding, community development, and meeting humanitarian needs in ethnic minority areas.

While some UN agencies and international NGOs have experience working with religious service delivery networks where the government has been willing to give permission, this possibility deserves more attention for international engagement and leveraging of resources through local capabilities. Much more could be accomplished in meet-ing needs at the grass-roots level by forming partnerships with these re-ligious networks and in helping to build their capacities for governance, resource management, and technical skills.

Even more notable by its absence, is engagement with religious leaders on normative issues such as human rights and peace building.4

The secular language and legalistic approaches pursued by Western governments and organizations in talking about basic issues of human rights, often fall on deaf ears in Myanmar/Burma, where discussions of respect for human dignity and relationships are instead couched in religious language � mainly Buddhism. Exploring the potential for drawing upon culturally familiar religious language and ideals to pro-mote reconciliation and cooperation is a good idea, but has been largely ignored in debates about how to promote human rights and democracy in Myanmar/Burma. For example, a core value in Burmese Buddhism is Myitta, which is an understanding closely aligned with Christian and Muslim values of �compassionate love.� The articulation of such inter-faith shared common cultural values could provide an avenue for con-sensus building on important elements of national identity in a highly pluralistic society. So far this has eluded the international community, which tends to keep religious and secular affairs independent of one another, as has become the norm in Western societies; but such a neat division is certainly not the case in other parts of the world, as we have seen in the Middle East.

Paradoxically, this segmentation of the worlds of state and religion has been strongly reinforced by the military government, who admo-nish religious leaders to keep to their side of the policy line that divides their two spheres of leadership for national governance and religious activity. For their part, senior generals are often depicted in the media as devoutly religious, paying homage to monks and sponsoring cons-


42 43

truction of new pagodas. While the senior Burman military leadership is Buddhist, there are Christian military offi cers who have reached Ca-binet level positions and who maintain links to the Christian leadership and networks. While there has always been a certain tension between the military and the religious networks, and there have been incidents of state sanctioned anti-Christian or anti-Moslem action, by and large the diversity of religious communities and their worship practices have been tolerated as long as they remain on the non-political side of the fence.

The breakdown of this tacit division by the marching of the monks in 2007 has changed the political equation in the country. The violence perpetrated against the monks and other military acts of disrespect for the spiritual role monks perform in Myanmar/Burma�s society, have altered the national psychological landscape and reduced public accep-tance of the many misbehaviors of the military in their rule of the coun-try and management of its resources. There is both increased popular willingness to speak openly against the government in public and an ex-pressed sentiment that the decision of the monks to march, means that the line between state governance and religion will no longer uphold a national conspiracy of silence against the oppression, greed, and ar-rogance of the military leadership. Theologically, the message from the monks to the military and the people is that it is the military that must amend its divergent ways from the true path of compassion exemplifi ed by the Buddha. This message was graphically illustrated by the image of the overturned rice bowl � symbolic as refusal to accept alms to allow the giver to earn merit towards his salvation.

Since Buddhism is the dominant religion in Myanmar/Burma, any future governance system will have to refl ect the Buddhist traditions and culture of the country. But there has been little discussion in the international debates about political mediation and democratization in Myanmar/Burma about the role of Buddhist thought and practice in framing expectations of good governance within the general popula-tion and among those in positions of public authority. As recent events make clear, Buddhism is a powerful force in Myanmar/Burma society and cannot be isolated in the monasteries. A better understanding of the relationship between Buddhism and governance would help the international community play a more effective and constructive role in both advocacy and practical support. This would seem to be a fruitful area for more exploration, perhaps through conferences or writings on the relationships of Buddhism and governance in other countries, such as Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Tibet.

Humanitarian PerspectivesThe UN has been committed to promoting basic principles of humani-tarian assistance to Myanmar/Burma in a politically complex situation, both in dealings with the military government and in dealings with the international community. These principles include impartiality, inde-pendence, accountability and transparency.5 While operational results have been constrained by many factors including problems of access and also of resources, the UN effort has been important and multidi-mensional. In addition, for almost a decade, the United Nations Coun-try Team (UNCT), based in Yangon, has been writing publicly about de-teriorating social conditions in Myanmar/Burma and the humanitarian crisis that is largely unseen by the outside world. The statement issued by the UNCT in October 2007 was only the latest expression of this concern, but the government response in expelling the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator was new. This had to have been a cal-culated measure to send a strong message to the UN and international community.

At a minimum, what this points to is that a new kind of dialogue with the military government on expectations of humanitarian work in the country and its relation to what the government views as political actions of the UN, will be needed. It also raises a question whether combining the role of the UN Resident Coordinator with the role of Humanitarian Coordinator is the right organization of responsibilities for future UN activities. In a politically complex country like Myanmar/Burma, where the UN is pursing multiple mandates, the Resident Co-ordinator is called upon to provide in-country support and coordination for all of the UN mandates and activities in the country. This involves local support to the work of the Secretary General�s Special Assistant and Human Rights Special Rapporteur, as well as for the in-country operational work of UN agencies in humanitarian programs and deve-lopment assistance.

The role of Humanitarian Coordinator was conceived to pursue an integrated approach for the humanitarian activities of the UN system and others both inside and outside Myanmar/Burma, so that there would be greater coherence and coordination among them. This is especially needed in efforts to address issues related to refugees in the border areas with efforts related to internally displaced persons inside the country, and in coordinated efforts to address cross-border problems such as drug control, traffi cking in women and children, and HIV/AIDS. But the Humanitarian Coordinator also has a public role in giving voice to the realities of the conditions and needs in Myanmar/


44 45

Burma and in advocating responses by both the government and the international community.

With the announcement of a timetable for a referendum on the Constitution and elections, the intersection of domestic politics and in-ternational humanitarian assistance is bound to become more sensitive and complex in the coming months and years. Contending parties for political authority will all want to be associated with delivery of huma-nitarian services to the people, and to be seen as in control and not do-minated by foreigners. This is as true for local political authority fi gures and organizations as for the military government which will be aligned with the USDA in promoting its policies and interests. This situation requires a reassessment of international policies and humanitarian strategies towards Myanmar/Burma.

Humanitarian donors have basically been following a script for humanitarian assistance prepared by the UNCT in 2003. This was anchored in what has been a surprisingly successful experience in addressing HIV/AIDS. While initially denying the scale and com-plexity of this disease in Myanmar/Burma, the government did agree to cooperate in a coordinated and multi-faceted program that included various UN agencies, bilateral donors, international NGOs, and local civil society organizations. This experience has demonstrated that co-ordinated operational programs are possible in the Myanmar/Burma context when space is created for cooperation and division of labor among groups that share the basic objectives of the program. The hu-manitarian strategy has been to work toward expanding areas where such cooperation can be achieved. Donor supported programs have been developed for a Three Diseases Fund that includes tuberculosis and malaria as well as HIV/AIDS, and for a multi-donor education fund. This basic strategy continues to be valid, but needs to be expan-ded, and operational modalities need to be adapted to the changing internal political dynamics.

Informal reports from international NGOs working in Myanmar/Burma indicate that obtaining central government approvals and de-cisions has become more diffi cult as a result of growing bureaucratic paralysis within the government and diffi culties of communicating with offi cials in the new capital in Nay Pyi Daw, but that cooperation with local level offi cials continues to be very positive, and progress is being made where central government involvement is not needed. The implication of these developments for the future humanitarian strategy of the international community is that a high level effort to establish a humanitarian policy dialogue with the government is needed to defi ne the framework for expanded international humanitarian support and

gain the decisions and permissions that only the government can give; and that operational priority should be given to expanding partnerships with local authorities and organizations as well as national civil society networks.

Beyond these dimensions of the underlying humanitarian challenges facing Myanmar/Burma, the dramatic escalation of humanitarian crisis in the delta area due to cyclone Nagris and its aftermath is bound to alter fundamentally the equation of international cooperation. Large-scale re-lief operations will be needed for a considerable period regardless of the management of the short-term response. A critical aspect is balancing roles of the government, domestic civil society, international NGOs, bila-teral agencies, UN agencies, and the ASEAN �Coalition of Mercy� initia-tive. Beyond the basic issue of access and admission of foreign aid experts to work in the delivery of humanitarian relief, there will also be a need for coordination among the organizations delivering humanitarian relief and between these groups and the government. This will be an ongoing need, and establishment of mechanisms for coordination of information and operations will be unprecedented for Myanmar/Burma. How these issues are handled will have long-term consequences for international cooperation on the broader range of humanitarian challenges facing the country. At a minimum there will be a need for an arrangement to align domestic and international policies for delivery of relief and monitoring process, and a mechanism for mobilization of resources and dialogue among partners in the humanitarian relief effort.

Economic Policy and ManagementBetter economic policies would probably do more to transform the si-tuation in Myanmar/Burma and trigger a dynamic of positive change than any other area of international engagement with the country. Fin-ding a way to pursue multilateral engagement in a serious high level economic policy dialogue should be a major priority.

Recognizing that economic pressures were a stimulus for the upri-sings in 1988, the government enacted a series of economic reforms to stimulate private sector investment and economic growth. This policy had initial success in the early 1990�s as the government allowed an expanded role for market forces, attracted foreign investment, and sti-mulated both formal and informal international trade. However, after taking control of the SPDC, Senior General Than Shwe refused to de-epen economic reform efforts, and instead pursued a policy of military enrichment through military control of the Myanmar Holdings Corpo-ration and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, and pursuit of impro-


46 47

ved economic ties with China, India and Thailand, Myanmar/Burma�s most important trade partners.

Exploitation of oil and gas resources to earn foreign exchange has been a particularly high priority along with infrastructure investment to facilitate increased trade. With revenues from sales of natural gas to Thailand now over $ 2 billion a year and likely to expand with future sa-les to China, and perhaps India, the government is running a balance of payments surplus and has to make important choices in the allocation of these revenues. These choices have important consequences for the economy as a whole and for poverty reduction. Critical to the poverty agenda will be offi cial commitment to address chronic infl ation, deepen liberalization of the agriculture sector, and expand social services.

The major efforts of the international community to engage in ma-croeconomic policy dialogue since 1990 have been the Article IV Con-sultations of the International Monetary Fund, which typically occur every 12 to 18 months; two reports prepared by the World Bank in 1995 and 1999 that looked at structural and social issues and advocated re-forms to increase economic growth and effi ciency and to reduce poverty; a similar report prepared by the Asian Development Bank in 2002; and a Japanese bilateral economic policy project that involved joint working groups. Both Alvaro De Soto and Ismail Razali, the Special Envoys of the United Nations, sought to link promotion of economic dialogue and potential future assistance for economic reform and development, with political dialogue on reconciliation and movement towards democracy. More recently, Special Assistant Ibrahim Gambari proposed a broad-ba-sed national economic forum that was rebuffed. The main lessons from these experiences can be summarized as:

• All attempts to link economic dialogue with political dialogue on democracy and human rights issues have failed to produce any serious economic dialogue.• Economic policy dialogue has not been productive in the ab-sence of prospects for fi nancing.• The realities of the military domination of the government and economy have trumped all efforts to engage in discussions of systemic economic reform, although some reform measures have been taken in recent years.• It has been possible to engage mid-level offi cials in construc-tive exchanges of information and dialogue on economic issues. But the impact of this has been limited not only by lack of interest and support from the top, but also by the poor quality of statisti-

cal information available to support policy dialogue, and limited analytical capacities due to lack of training opportunities and exposure to global best practices and knowledge.6

The unwillingness of the senior leadership to consider a serious economic policy dialogue with the international community is linked to its own economic interests in the status quo, deep-seated suspicions of market economy dynamics, and the implications of economic libe-ralization and reform for the state�s control over the population. Fun-damentally, this is an issue of isolationist mentality and fear of change, couched in nationalism and rationalization of the ongoing need for total effective control of the country by the Tatmadaw. The absence of domestic processes for policy analysis and debates among economic ex-perts and within the bureaucracy, coupled with the command culture of the military hierarchy, have essentially foreclosed objective formulation of economic policies that would serve the best interests of the country. An understandable government predilection for infrastructure projects and success in exploiting oil and gas resources for both fi nancial and political gains, together with privileges accorded military-owed state enterprises, have trumped rational economic policy-making and mana-gement in the larger national interest.

The ongoing international debates about the effi cacy of economic sanctions versus economic engagement with the government of Myanmar/Burma defi nitely affect the willingness of the senior leader-ship to engage in dialogue on economic policy issues. The reason given to Special Assistant Gambari for the government�s refusal of a recent proposal to convene a national economic forum, was that �sanctions were the primary cause of any socio-economic problems in Myanmar and the central obstacle to the country�s development. Technically, there-fore, (the government) considered the utility of the proposed forum or similar proposals limited, since, in their view, such vehicles would only produce a �distorted� diagnosis of the situation�Nonetheless, the gov-ernment has expressed an interest in fi nding areas of convergence in that area, with a view to addressing concerns and challenges.�7 In this situation, it is important that future interlocutors with the government on economic policy matters be seen by all parties to be objective and apolitical. The government�s statement reveals openness to some level of dialogue, but wariness about how this could be conducted in a pro-ductive way. This is an opening that deserves further exploration.

Cyclone Nagris caused an economic as well as humanitarian shock to the status quo that requires an urgent and robust response. Not only will the storm affect this year�s rice crop that threatens food security


48 49

nation-wide, but it has destroyed infrastructure and other assets such as housing and schools, that will require a large-scale reconstruction effort. Typically in other countries that have experienced similar disas-ters, such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in recent years, the international community not only provides humanitarian aid, but also rehabilitation assistance and fi nancing. The World Bank and Asian De-velopment Bank would normally take the lead in preparing reconstruc-tion programs and funding them, but both have been out of business in Myanmar/Burma since 1988 and are not presently positioned to play their normal emergency role. Efforts by ASEAN and the UN to build a linkage between humanitarian aid and economic reconstruction sup-port are important steps that should be exploited to rebuild a working relationship of the development banks with the Myanmar/Burma gov-ernment. There is also a high likelihood that the impact of the cyclone on agricultural production this year will add to infl ationary forces that are already high in the economy that will require careful macroeconom-ic management and rethinking of expenditure priorities in the govern-ment budget and use of foreign exchange reserves. It is important that the IMF also respond to the crisis by providing advice and if needed also stabilization assistance. The humanitarian crisis thus provides an opportunity for the international community to gain entry to a new framework for economic engagement.

The movement towards adoption of a new Constitution and fu-ture civilianized economic management also provides an opening for dialogue with the international community on future economic policy options, as well as a rationale for supporting capacity building in eco-nomic policy analysis and management. The earlier studies on poverty and economic development potential by the World Bank and Asian Development Bank, and the largely unnoticed support of the UNDP and other UN agencies, as well as NGOS in conducting household and other surveys in recent years, provide a starting point for updating and putting future policy discussions in the context of implementing a new Constitution. If the referendum leads to a situation where the country moves towards formal adoption of a new Constitution and elections, consideration should be given to the UN and International Financial Institutions preparing a major report in partnership with the transitio-nal government authorities on the economic policy and management issues that will need to be addressed. This should involve not only atten-tion to questions of macroeconomic policy and management, but also the restructuring of fi scal relations and responsibilities between central and local governments. Such a report should also address external deve-lopments that will affect the domestic situation, including the implica-

tions of rising food and energy prices throughout the Asia Region and globally. The potential for mapping out an agenda of practical measures to be prepared in parallel with the preparation for elections provides an unprecedented opportunity for the international community to infl u-ence constructively the management of Myanmar/Burma�s economic challenges and opportunities over the coming decade.

During a transition period before elections, a number of other steps could be taken by the multilateral organizations to help prepare the coun-try for a new era of economic governance. One is to provide technical assistance for upgrading statistical systems needed for policy analysis and program management, and for adopting critically needed reforms in exchange rate management and improvements in the banking sys-tem, building on recommendations from IMF Article IV Consultations. Another is to prepare building blocks for a future Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) that would be the centerpiece for a multi-donor support program for a new government. Any PRSP would be based on the OECD/DAC Principles of Development Effectiveness in applying the lessons of global experience to the Myanmar context, and would have to be prepared in a collaborative way with the transitional and future elected governments. UNDP, the World Bank and Asian Development Bank would need to work out a division of labor and partnerships with a core group of bilateral donors to undertake with the government a series of activities that would lead to the preparation of the PRSP. These could include updating of the Poverty Assessment prepared by the World Bank in 1999 with more recent household survey data that would also enable more decentralized assessments to help the formulation of policies at the local as well as national levels of future government. Also useful would be a Public Expenditure Review to examine future policy options in resource allocation, and a review of external debt to examine how Myanmar/Burma could use its growing balance of payments surpluses to overcome arrears to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank as well as to bilateral donors in order to clear the way for future large-scale economic development assistance programs.

Long-Term Strategic National InterestsIt is often noted with disappointment that Myanmar/Burma entered its post-colonial era amid high expectations that it would take its place in the community of nations and realize its considerable potential for eco-nomic development, but the story did not turn out that way. Myanmar/Burma was an early proponent of the new international order esta-blished after World War II, joining the United Nations, International


50 51

Monetary Fund and World Bank under the view that membership in international organizations would serve to protect the interests of smal-ler states from hegemonic actions of powerful ones, a position which was quite understandable given its brutal victimization during the war. What was not appreciated at the time was how much Myanmar/Burma�s ability to pursue its own long-term strategic interests would be overshadowed by internal confl icts, mismanagement, and anti-foreign sentiment in the military leadership.

In the debates over Myanmar/Burma policy in recent decades, there has in fact been little discussion of what exactly the country�s long-term strategic interests are. To some extent, these seem to be taken for gran-ted, and the debates have focused on alternative visions and policies about how to achieve specifi c objectives that are articulated differently by various stakeholders. To a large extent, the purpose of a national Constitution building process is precisely to articulate and debate those long-term national goals and interests and to defi ne the governance framework that would help secure them. The absence in Myanmar/Burma of such an open discussion in the framing of the principles for the Constitution now tabled for referendum is one major reason why its legitimacy is being questioned inside and outside the country.

One potentially productive strategy for future UN dialogue and mediation efforts would be to focus on the articulation and rationale for these long-term strategic interests and how the international commu-nity can support the country in its efforts to pursue them. This is one way that issues surrounding relations with China, India and Thailand, for example, could be discussed neutrally in relation to issues pertinent to relations with ASEAN and with the US and Europe. To the extent that such conversations might yield understandings of common ground, they could build confi dence for pursuing cooperation and receptivity to international support. Such a macro framework enabled by a focus on long-term strategic national interests may in fact be essential for the UN to be able to move beyond a mediation orientation to a broad-based role in facilitating coordinated changes in the political, security and economic arenas. It may also be essential for more convergence of understanding and policy towards Myanmar/Burma within the interna-tional community at large.

Policy Choices for Future Multilateral EngagementThere are ample reasons, indeed a compelling need, to re-think future policies for UN and other multilateral engagement with Myanmar/Burma. In the very short-term, the priority will be on the internatio-

nal response to cyclone Nagris and its impact on both the victims on the delta area and the economy more generally. Beyond this, another short-term priority will be for the UN, either in a Security Council reso-lution or through the Secretary General�s Special Assistant, to address government�s handling of the referendum on the new Constitution so that a process for moving forward is determined that is accepted as legitimate enough for the international community to be willing to be supportive. If the referendum succeeds in gaining general acceptance of the new Constitution, then the international community will need to adjust the mandate of the Special Advisor and consider other forms of multilateral engagement that will align with the Constitutional pro-cess to address institutional and policy changes that will be necessary as this process unfolds. If the referendum fails to gain general public acceptance of the new Constitution, then continuing and expanding a mediation role for the Special Advisor should be considered to bring the Constitutional process back on track in a way that would be considered legitimate internally and externally.

Beyond the short-term issues of the response to the cyclone and acceptability of the referendum on the Constitution, the basic choice for the international community is whether to: (a) realign, amplify and diversify multilateral engagement; (b) maintain the status quo with mi-nor adjustments in the mandate of the Special Advisor and expectations for the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator functions, along with efforts to address challenges in delivering humanitarian support; or (c) curtail the mandate and activities of the Special Advisor pending further ratcheting-up of sanctions against Myanmar/Burma by like-minded countries, and with or without the support of the Security Council, while seeking at the same time to increase and realign humanitarian assistance to offset negative effects of sanctions on the people.

Despite pro-sanctions sentiments that are strongly held by many in the overseas Burmese community and prevalent in the US and Europe, most of Asia seems determined to remain engaged and to support the seven step process for democracy in Myanmar/Burma, with minimal involvement in trying to infl uence the internal political affairs of the country. Thailand, China and India have all made it clear they will conti-nue to pursue their own economic interests in relations with Myanmar, which effectively undermines the economic sanctions policies of the US and Europe. It is quite possible that the recently imposed �smart� sanctions by the US that target fi rms and individuals with close asso-ciation with senior military leaders and their families will have some impact on the fortunes of the military elite. But this is more likely to be an irritant than a death blow to the regime. Thus the option of UN re-


52 53

trenchment and disengagement seems not to be a realistic one, despite the anger and disgust felt towards the Myanmar/Burma government in many quarters.

Maintaining the status quo is also not a choice that is widely suppor-ted at the present moment. Whether pro-sanctions or pro-engagement, the supporters of UN involvement believe that the status quo is not working and that UN infl uence has been regressing.

Thus, logic in assessing the present political realities in the interna-tional community, as well as in evaluating factors internal to the coun-try that should be considered for effective multilateral involvement, points towards a strategy of realigning future multilateral engagement, amplifying its impact, and diversifying the areas for international invol-vement.

It is important in designing a new policy for multilateral engage-ment with Myanmar/Burma that this be based on pragmatism, not ideology (Guo and Alvin, 2007). Any new policy should also refl ect the principles for good international engagement in fragile states drafted by OECD in 2005 and adopted in 2007. Among these principles, ones that are particularly important for new policies for Myanmar/Burma include:

• Take context as the starting point.• Ensure all activities do no harm.• Focus on state-building as the central objective.• Recognize the links between the political, security, and deve-lopment objectives.• Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies.• Align with local priorities in different ways in different con-texts.• Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between interna-tional actors.• Avoid pockets of exclusion.

The International Crisis Group (ICG) in its report �Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown� issued in January 2008, provided a number of de-tailed recommendations directed to the international community, UN Secretary-General, regional countries, and western countries (including Japan). While these were formulated prior to the announcement of the Constitutional referendum and timetable for elections, they do refl ect these principles of realignment, amplifi cation and diversifi cation. Whi-le many of these proposals are well-founded and worth pursuing, there

is a need to integrate into the thinking about possible future policy options, deeper understandings of both the historical context and the present realities on the ground, as well as how to relate to the Constitu-tional process that is now moving ahead.

Recommendations1. The time has come for a fundamental realignment of UN promotion of national reconciliation and democracy from mediating between the military leadership and the NLD leadership with the focus on dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, to support for the democratic transition to a new Constitution in the context of historical realties and long-term national interests.8 This has multiple dimensions and should involve not only the UN, but also ASEAN and the international fi nancial in-stitutions. In such realignment, an important role for the Secretary General�s Special Assistant would be to perform a mediating role in promoting dialogue between those major political fi gures that emerge through the election process and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, even if she is barred from running for offi ce herself9barred from running for offi ce herself9barred from running for offi ce herself . The political challenge is to fi nd a way to give her a voice and infl uence in national discussions of ideals, aspirations, and standards for governance. As an icon of democratic principles, she can potentially achieve more long-lasting infl uence than as an administrative leader. Equally important will be to fi nd a way to broach issues related to military reform in the democratic transition. This is an area where other Asian countries which have experienced these transitions could take a lead, and where direct military to military dialogue might be benefi cial.

2. There should be a high priority and concerted effort to address economic policy and management issues as part of the strategy for sup-porting the democratic transition in addition to dealing with the after-math and consequences of cyclone Nagris. The chances of success will be much greater if political and institutional reform can be accompa-nied by economic growth that improves the lives of the large majority of the population. This logic should be an integral part of the UN Special Advisor�s dialogue with all parties. Now is the time to seek major, not incremental, change in economic policy, starting with a collaborative study of the economic management implications of implementing a new Constitution, and organizing collaborative activities for other buil-ding blocks that could pave the way for a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and future robust multi-donor development assistance program. A coordinated multilateral effort should be organized to support this agenda with lead roles for the international fi nancial institutions and


54 55

the development organizations of the UN, together with a core group of bilateral donors. This should be a partner-led process following OECD/DAC best practice principles starting with the transitional government and later with the elected government.

Along with this is the need to recognize that decades of international policies to deny and circumvent the government have contributed to the present situation in which technical and administrative capacities are very weak. Also, policy analysis and decision-making processes sty-mied by bureaucratic fear and the command mentality of the military leadership need to be modernized as the government is civilianized. To support these, technical assistance and education and training should be given high priority by the international community, and coordinated programs should be developed to build future capabilities both among government offi cials and through the universities. An important di-mension of capacity building should be to work out arrangements under which talented and experienced overseas Myanmar/Burmese can be repatriated so they may contribute to national development as participants in the democratic transition. Expanding opportunities for students to access overseas education, and tapping their future poten-tial should also be accorded high priority.

3. Recognizing the scale of the humanitarian needs in the wake of cyclone Nagris as well as the complexities of the challenges in the ethnic minority traditional homeland areas, a new UN Humanitarian Coordinator should be given a prominent role and a multi-faceted man-date to facilitate international engagement with the diverse local level situations and issues in different parts of the country, as well as with the multiplicity of cross-border issues. The donor community should signi-fi cantly expand resources for this agenda. Humanitarian work should be managed separately from but coordinated with political, human rights and economic reform dialogue and preparations for longer-term development activities.

4. The Human Rights Rapporteur should continue to monitor and report on human rights issues and advocate ways to address them. This should be independent of management of other UN mandates, but also be an integral part of the dialogue between the government and major domestic stakeholders with the international community on how best to respond to these issues. As international access and involvement in local level issues increases, it should be expected that the human rights agenda will become more diverse and locally contextual and less natio-nal in scope.

5. Overall coherence of multilateral engagement with Myanmar/Burma during the democratic transition should be provided through a

high level consultation group. This group should meet on an occasio-nal basis to review progress in all the main theaters of engagement in relation to the objectives of the transitional and elected governments, viewpoints of other major stakeholders, and OECD principles for good international engagement.

May 18, 2008

Bibliography

Babson, Bradley O. (2005) �Macroeconomic Policy Dialogue with Myanmar: Challenges and Opportunities.� Presentation at European Commission Burma Day 2005 Confe-rence. http://burmalibrary.org/docs3/Burma_Day-BradBabson.doc.

Callahan, Mary P. (2003) Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Cornell University Press. Ithaca and London.

Callahan, Mary P. (2007). Political Authority in Burma�s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence. East-West Center Washington. Washington DC.

Clapp, Priscilla P. (2007) Building Democracy in Burma. Working Paper-02. United States Institute for Peace. Washington DC.

Guo, Xiaolin, and Alvin, John. (2007) Engaging with the Issue of Myanmar: A New Perspec-tive. Policy Paper. Institute for Security and Development Policy. Stockholm.

International Crisis Group. (2008). Burma/Myanmar After the Crackdown. Asia Report Number 144. Brussels.

OECD. (2007) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States.

http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/48/38293448.pdf.

Steinberg, David I. (2001). Burma: The State of Myanmar. Georgetown University Press. Washington DC.

Steinberg, David I. (2006). Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar. East-bridge. Norwalk, CT.

Thant Myint-U. (2006). The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma. Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux. New York.

Notes1 The term �Myanmar/Burma� has been adopted for this paper because it embodies a fundamental tension within the international community and how it relates to this coun-try. The UN and other international agencies together with ASEAN, China and Japan all use the offi cially adopted name of Myanmar in references to this country. Most Western governments and expatriate groups use Burma, not wishing to accord legitimacy to the military government that rejected the outcome of the elections in 1990.

2 A good description of the frustrations felt by all sides was given by Ibrahim Gambari in an interview with the Irrawaddy News Magazine on April 4. 2008.

3 Thant Myint-U in an interview with Reuters Life!, March 5, 2008.

4 Some international NGOs and overseas religious groups have sought to develop rela-


56 57

tionships and dialogue with religious groups and leaders on these issues, but these are very low key and outside the frameworks for offi cial international community engage-ment.

5 From Principles and Practics of Good Humanitarian Donorship, adopted in Stockholm June 2003.

6 Babson (2005) presentation to European Commission Burma Day 2005 Conference.

7 From the statement issued by the UN Department of Public Information on the Special Advisor�s report of the Security Council on March 18, 2008, SC/9278.

8 In an interview with the Irrawaddy News Magazine on April 4, 2008 Ibrahim Gambari made clear that this is the direction that he believes UN dialogue should be taking.

9 Initial assessments of the draft Constitution suggest while she could not serve as Pre-sident she would be eligible to run for a seat in the national Parliament unless disbarred for some specifi c reason.

Promoting PoliticalFreedoms in Burma: International Policy OptionsBrahma Chellaney

The politicization of international assistance at a time when Burma�s food bowl, the Irrawaddy Delta, was devastated by a major cyclone in May 2008 helped underscore the plight of ordinary Burmese. Indeed, the month of May began with U.S. President George W. Bush announc-ing yet more sanctions against Burma. Less than 36 hours later, Cyclone Nargis, with winds up to 190 kmph, left a vast trail of death and destruc-tion in Burma. Tragedy, then, has come to symbolize Burma in the year marking its 60th anniversary as an independent nation.

Such is the politics of food aid that Western governments and out-side relief agencies insisted on the right to deliver assistance directly to the homeless and hungry in Burma following the cyclone. But the regime there, fearful that such deliveries might be intended to incite a popular uprising immediately before a new Constitution was to be put to vote, blocked the large-scale entry of foreign aid workers. Calls for forcible humanitarian intervention by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner and others made the junta�s hackles rise.

The regime postponed the Constitutional referendum in the cy-clone-racked areas until May 24, 2008, but held the balloting on sched-ule elsewhere on May 10. The referendum was part of a touted seven-step �roadmap to democracy.� With the military ensconced in power for 46 long years, few believe the junta will hand over power to civilians after promised elections in two years� time. It took the military more than 14 years just to draft a new Constitution,1 which grants wide-rang-ing powers and prerogatives to the military, including 25 percent of the seats in the federal and provincial legislatures.

While slapping more sanctions on Burma, President Bush denoun-ced the Constitutional process as fatally fl awed. The latest sanctions were targeted at state-owned companies that produce timber, pearls and preci-ous gem � fi rms that are, in Bush�s words, �major sources of funds that prop up the junta.�2 The United States earlier had imposed sanctions on companies controlled by private individuals in the airline and hotel busi-nesses in an effort to smother foreign tourism fl ow to Burma.


58 59

On the one hand, impoverished Burma is economically vulnerable and thus seemingly susceptible to outside pressure. On the other hand, Burma has proven to be a complex and exceedingly diffi cult case for the outside world to deal with.

However, the issue of the role that external actors might play in promoting democratic transition is not limited to Burma. Autocratic rule abounds in the world, including the world around Burma. Interna-tional principles and policies deemed appropriate to help bring about democratic transition in Burma should ideally be such that they permit application in other settings, if the promotion of democracy is not to be seen as a political tool to target bad autocracies while shielding those good autocracies perceived to serve one�s own self-interest.

Yet the temptation to look at Burma in isolation, as if it uniquely exists in a tight compartment, has been so overpowering that the coun-try has been held to special standards and subjected to unrelenting demands that are rarely invoked against stronger, more-entrenched autocracies that still fl out near-universal human-rights norms. These other autocracies, unlike Burma, actually pose a challenge to the liberal international order. But such selective targeting may be one reason why international efforts to demilitarize Burma�s polity have been a signal failure. It is helpful to look at Burma in a larger regional and Asian context.

Today, a qualitative reordering of power in Asia is challenging stra-tegic stability and reshaping major equations. A new Great Game is underway, centered on building new alliances, ensuring power equi-librium, gaining greater market access, and securing a larger share of energy and mineral resources. From war-games on the high seas to the establishment of exploratory enterprises like the Shanghai Coopera-tion Organization and the Quadrilateral Initiative, the ongoing deve-lopments are a reminder of that high-stakes game. With the center of gravity in international relations clearly moving toward the Asia-Pacifi c, this Great Game could indeed determine the future world order.

Asia has almost 60 percent of the world�s population spread across a 43.6 million-square-kilometer area. Geographically, Asia comprises 48 separate nations, including 72 percent of the Russian Federation and 97 percent of Turkey, although in popular perception it seems to comprise only the area from the Japanese archipelago to the Indian subcontinent. Asia encompasses very different and distinct areas � from the sub-arc-tic, mineral-rich Siberian plains to the subtropical Indonesian archipe-lago; and from oil-rich desert lands to fertile river valleys.

Asia is also very diverse. It has countries with the highest and lowest population densities in the world � Singapore and Mongolia, respec-

tively. It has some of the wealthiest states in the world, like Japan and Singapore, and also some of the poorest, such as Burma, North Korea and Afghanistan. It has tiny Brunei, Bhutan and the Maldives and de-mographic titans like China, India and Indonesia. The smallest country in Asia in terms of population, the Maldives, also happens to be the fl attest state in the world. In sharp contrast to the low-lying states like the Maldives, the Philippines and Bangladesh that are threatened by the potential rise of ocean levels due to global warming, Asia has mountai-nous nations like Nepal, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Parts of continental Asia are extraordinarily resource-rich. The de-sert lands of West Asia, the barren wastes of Central Asia, the Russian shelf in Asia and the Burma�s Bay of Bengal coast together hold nearly 60 per cent of the world�s proven oil and gas reserves. Burma, rich in na-tural resources, sits on potentially vast quantities of natural gas. There are vast coal reserves in China and the Russian Far East. Siberia holds ores of almost all economically valuable metals, including some of the world�s largest deposits of nickel, gold, lead, molybdenum, diamonds, silver and zinc. The belt running down from the Malay Peninsula to Indonesia contains huge deposits of tin.

Asia, however, is largely a water-stressed continent. Large parts of Asia depend on monsoon precipitation and on the glacially sourced water reserves of the Himalayas and Tibetan highlands, the riverhead of Asia�s waters. Climate change will have a signifi cant impact on the availability and fl ow of water resources in Asia and thus become an important factor in the national-security calculus of several states, in-cluding the world�s two most populous countries � China and India. The geopolitical importance of the Tibetan plateau, whose forcible ab-sorption in 1950 brought the new Chinese state to the borders of India, can be seen from the fact that most of the great Asian rivers originate there. If the demand for water in Asia continues to grow at the current rate, the interstate and intrastate disputes over water resources could potentially turn into confl icts in the years ahead.

Another area of sharpening Asian geopolitics is energy. Competition over oil and gas resources, driven by rapid economic growth in Asia, indeed constitutes one key dimension of the emerging Great Game. The ongoing global shifts in economic power are manifest from the changes occurring in the energy and materials sectors, with the growth in demand moving from the developed to the developing world, princi-pally Asia. Energy prices are going to stay high and volatile for the fore-seeable future, given these shifts and the soaring demand in countries like China and India, which together are projected to double their oil demand between 2003 and 2020.

Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options

60 61

Despite the total consumption of energy in the Asia-Pacifi c having grown by 70 percent between 1992 and 2005, per capita energy consumption is still relatively low by international standards: 749 kg of oil equivalent in 2005, compared with the global average of 1,071 kgoe. Not only will per capita consumption grow sharply in Asia, �on the supply side, Asia�s strong demand environment for energy and basic materials, coupled with its low labor costs, means that the region will increasingly become a global producer of aluminum, chemicals, paper, and steel.�3

Slaking the tremendous thirst of the fast-growing Asian economies and meeting the huge demands of the old economic giants in the West are at the core of the great energy dilemma facing the world in the 21st

century. Finding an energy �fi x� has become imperative if the Asian and other emerging economies are to continue to grow impressively and if the prosperous countries are to head off a slump. Such a �fi x� would have to be rooted in three essential elements: low-cost, prefera-bly, renewable alternatives to fossil fuels; greater energy effi ciency; and minimizing or eliminating greenhouse-gas emissions. The ongoing structural shifts in global energy markets carry important long-term political and economic implications, besides challenging the stability of these markets.

Employing their large oil and gas resources, energy-rich countries have positioned themselves as key players in the Asian Great Game. Russia, for example, has used its oil and gas exports to revive its for-tunes, succeeding in becoming an important geopolitical player again. But for its huge oil and gas wealth, Iran would not have been able to play its nuclear card in defi ance of the United Nations Security Council resolutions. In a more modest way, Burma has been able to use gas deals with Thailand and China to earn hard cash in the face of tighte-ning international sanctions. External players like the United States, the European Union and Turkey have sought to infl uence the pipeline politics in Asia. The United States has not only strengthened its mili-tary arrangements in West Asia, but also set up new bases or strategic relationships stretching from the oil-rich Caspian Sea basin to Southe-ast Asia. In this larger picture, southern Asia (of which Burma is a part) is a strategic gateway between the Gulf and the Far East, and between Central Asia and the Indian Ocean rim.

In the coming years, the voracious appetite for energy supplies in Asia is going to make the geopolitics murkier. The present geopolitical maneuvering is an indicator of that. What is striking is that the new fl urry of alliance formation or partnerships in Asia is being led by Asia�s rising powers, not by the United States, which has policed Asia since

the end of World War II. In this larger context, Asian cooperation and security will be very much infl uenced by the equations between and among the major players. The need to secure stable energy supplies will drive the major players in Asia to increasingly integrate their energy policy with foreign policy, as they consciously promote diplomatic stra-tegies geared toward seizing energy-related opportunities overseas.

Energy-driven competition should not be allowed to aggravate inter-state rivalries in Asia. Mercantilist efforts to assert control over oil and natural gas supplies and transport routes certainly risk fuelling ten-sions. Given the lack of regional institutions in Asia to avert or manage confl ict, the sharpening energy geopolitics makes the need for Asian energy cooperation more pressing. A challenge for states in Asia is to manage their energy needs through more effi cient transport and con-sumption and more cooperative import policies. Multinational coopera-tion on the security of sea-lanes is essential to avert strategic friction in Asia. Where maritime claims overlap, the answer to any such dispute cannot be unilateral drilling or production by one side. Disputes over what are legitimate zones of energy exploration in open seas need to be managed through an agreed code of conduct.

Multilateral energy cooperation in Asia indeed can pave the way for establishing a common Asian market and distribution network for petroleum products, with an Asian benchmark crude oil (similar to Europe�s Brent blend) to serve as a pricing yardstick for other types of crude. Multilateral cooperation can also help to both regulate the com-petition to buy foreign energy assets and to hedge risks in the event of any supply disruption, whether politically induced or accidental, like a major refi nery fi re. And just as Europe wants Russia to open its energy industry to European investment to create a two-way relationship, the major oil-and-gas exporters and the major Asian importers should in-vest in each other�s energy infrastructure.

It is against the larger Asian landscape that one should examine Bur-ma because no country or sub-region can be tightly compartmentalized and seen in isolation. Energy-rich states almost everywhere tend to have non-democratic governments, many of them repressive autocracies. In that sense, Burma is not an exception.

Even though it has signifi cant gas reserves that are coveted by its neighbors, a sanctions-hit Burma has not reaped the energy dividends that most other autocratically ruled energy-rich states have. Also, it is nobody�s case that Burma�s curtailment of basic rights is worse than Saudi Arabia�s.

While it is easy to criticize Thailand for boosting the Burmese junta�s revenues through gas imports and to condemn China for signing a 30-


62 63

year gas deal with Burma, it should be remembered that no democracy has compunction in buying oil from Saudi Arabia, even though such purchases help fatten the House of Saud, which played a lead role in fanning the spread of Islamist ideology in the world. It bankrolled jihad as part of its aggressive export of the medieval theology of Wahhabism, named after the revivalist movement founded by Muhammad Ibn�Abd al-Wahhab in 1744.

Burma�s resources and vantage locationBurma is a signifi cant state in size and strategic importance. Bordered by Bangladesh, China, India, Laos and Thailand and by the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal, Burma comprises an area of 678,000 square kilometers, making it the country with the largest landmass in the In-dochina belt. It currently has a population of nearly 58 million, with a large and capable workforce.

Few can overlook Burma�s strategic location. It forms the strategic nucleus between India, China and Southeast Asia. In other words, Burma is where Asia�s main regions converge � South Asia, Southeast Asia and East Asia.

Projects to establish an �Asian Highway Network� and a �Trans-Asian Railway� have only underlined Burma�s strategic-bridge role. It is a country that geographically bridges Asia�s major economies. In the Asi-an highway project, Burma will help connect fi ve important countries � India, China, Bangladesh, Laos, and Thailand. The Asian Develop-ment Bank has been negotiating a cross-border transport agreement among the six Mekong River-linked countries � China, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam and Burma.

Burma�s bounteous natural resources include natural gas, precious metals and gems, high-quality tropical hardwoods, and marine fi sh-eries. Given that profi le and position, Burma can hardly be ignored.

With major rivers and bountiful rainfall, Burma has fertile soil. But for recurrent fl ooding and cyclones, shortages of fertilizers and pesticides, and general mismanagement by the military-run government, its agricultural output could be much higher. Indeed, agriculture, including fi sheries, forestry, livestock, rice and sugarcane, made up almost 57 percent of Burma�s GDP in 2005.4 In the past decade, Burma has emerged as a major exporter to India, for instance, of lentils, which � rich in protein � are an integral part of the diet of vegetarians. India has the world�s highest concentration of vegetarians. Last year, Burma supplied around one million tons of lentils, or half of India�s total imports, according to offi cial data.

Burma is a signifi cant producer of antimonial lead, copper matte, nick-el speiss, and precious gemstones. Much of the copper exports go to Japan. It also produces barite, carbonate rocks, chromite, clays, coal (lignite), cop-per, feldspar, gold, gypsum, lead, natural gas, nickel, silver, tin, tungsten and zinc. Among processed mineral products, Burma produces polished precious gemstones, refi ned gold, refi ned lead, petroleum products and crude steel. Minerals, however, constitute a tiny fraction of its GDP.

With its exports totaling $3.1 billion and imports adding up to $3.5 billion in 2005, Burma�s main trading partners are its neighbors � Thai-land, China, India, Singapore and Malaysia. In merchandise trade, Thailand ranks No. 1. But if the opaque arms trade (for which no reli-able fi gures are available) and services are included, China is perhaps Burma�s largest trading partner.

Through sanctions and offi cially encouraged disengagement, Burma has become marginal to the foreign-policy interests of the West, thus reinforcing the Western approach emphasizing high-minded principles over strategic considerations, and isolation over engagement. Today, the West has little fi nancial stake left in Burma. About 95 percent of Burma�s trade in fi scal 2007-08 was with other Asian countries. The West also doesn�t have to live with the consequences of its actions. Burma�s neighbors, however, will not escape the effects of an unstable Burma. The imperatives of proximity thus dictate a different policy logic. That has spurred criticism that Asia is helping Burma beat sanctions.5

Rich in natural gas, Burma � according to one estimate by Alexander�s Gas & Oil Connections (a site for the gas, oil and affi liated industry) � has recoverable onshore and offshore reserves of 2.46 tril-lion cubic meters. But with greater foreign investment in exploration, more rich gas deposits could be discovered, especially in Burma�s off-shore areas in the Bay of Bengal.

In January 2008, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) signed production-sharing contracts with the Burmese Ministry of Energy covering deep-sea blocks off Burma�s western Rakhine coast. CNPC is about to begin construction of a trans-Burma pipeline to take the gas from the Shwe fi eld in Rakhine to China�s Yunnan province and beyond. Burma is already exporting natural gas worth $1.2 billion a year to neighboring Thailand from the Gulf of Martaban.

Daewoo International, the South Korean company, is the largest investor in the Shwe gas site. Two Indian energy fi rms, ONGC Videsh Ltd. and Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL), own a minority stake in that Burmese fi eld, A-1, and in the adjacent A-3 block. This Indo-Korean consortium of Daewoo, ONGC Videsh and GAIL had earlier discovered


64 65

additional gas deposits in the Shwe site, and consequently revised the Block A1�s total gas estimates to 566 billion cubic meters.

Burma, however, took India unawares by signing an accord with CNPC to export gas to China from the A-1 and A-3 fi elds over a 30-year period. To New Delhi�s acute embarrassment, Burma fi rst disclosed its intent to sell the gas to China no sooner than India had announced an agreement-in-principle with Beijing to jointly cooperate on securing energy resources overseas, so as to prevent the Sino-Indian competition from continuing to drive up the international price of such assets in third countries.

In recent years, Burma has stepped up piped gas exports to Thailand from its two offshore fi elds in the Gulf of Martaban � Yadana and Yetagun. But the new rich gas fi nds in the Bay of Bengal will help generate far more revenue for Burma than the current gas fl ow from the Gulf of Martaban. According to provisional data, gas exports to Thailand from the Gulf of Martaban fi elds were estimated to be worth $1.2 billion in fi scal 2007-08 that ended March 31. But because the offi cial exchange rate pegs the kyat, Burma�s currency, to an artifi cially low rate of 6 to 1 against the U.S. dollar (when the black-market rate is in the vicinity of nearly 1,000 kyat to a dollar), the gas-export earnings are much underreported in the public accounts in kyat � nearly 200 times below the unoffi cial exchange rate.6

France�s Total S.A. (with a 31.24 percent holding) is the main ope-rator at the Yadana gasfi eld, and its other partners are Chevron Corp. of USA (with a 28.26 percent stake), Thailand�s PTT Exploration and Production Public Company Limited (25.5 percent), and the state-run Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) (15 percent).

In the Yetagun gasfi eld, the main operator is Malaysia�s Petronas (40.91 percent), with MOGE (20.45 percent) and Thailand�s PTTEP and Japan�s Nippon Oil Exploration (19.32 percent each) as its partners. Gas imports from Burma are critical to Thailand�s power generation, with one-fi fth of Bangkok�s electricity supply coming from that source.

Interestingly, the United States, while prohibiting new investment by American citizens or entities, has protected the business interests of Chevron Corp., which acquired a stake in the Yadana gas project in Burma when it bought Unocal Corp. in 2005. Because Unocal�s invest-ment in the project predated the imposition of U.S. sanctions, Chevron has used a grandfather clause to stay put in Burma � one of the few large Western companies left there.

On the gas front, Burma has shown that interstate pipeline politics can be played not only by strong states but also by weak states. The junta in Burma has deftly played pipeline politics to keep the veto-empowered

China on its side at the United Nations Security Council. Since the early 1990s, the junta has relied on China�s veto power to shield itself from international intervention. It was China that helped beat back an early 2007 U.S.-led attempt to impose a Security Council diktat on the junta to improve its human-rights record.7

The junta then proceeded to thank Beijing for torpedoing that sanc-tions move by withdrawing the status of India�s GAIL as the �preferen-tial buyer� on the A-1 and A-3 blocks, and signing production-sharing contracts with China�s CNPC instead. For India, this was a discom-forting diplomatic setback for two reasons: (i) it had sought to sweeten the deal both with a US$20 million �soft credit� and by proposing to construct a power plant in Burma; and (ii) the A-1 and A-3 are partly owned by two Indian state-run companies.8

Burma also has some onshore and offshore oilfi elds, with reserves estimated to be 3.2 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil. It produced 8.133 million barrels of crude oil in 2005, compared with 7.160 mil-lion barrels in 2004.9 At least three oil companies from neighboring countries, including India�s privately owned Essar, are presently explo-ring for additional oil fi nds in Burma by conducting feasibility studies involving collection and analysis of geologic and seismic data.

Foreign investment in Burma�s energy sector, however, has not been too signifi cant compared to the sector�s actual potential. Had Burma not been an isolated, sanctions-hit country, the picture would have been different, with international oil majors seeking exploration and produc-tion rights there. Sanctions have actually prevented Burma (like Iran) from accessing liquefaction technology to become a major exporter of liquefi ed natural gas (LNG). That has left Burma largely with one choice: to export natural gas by pipeline. And to whom can it sell natural gas by pipeline? Naturally, to its immediate neighbors, as it is currently doing to Thailand and is going to do to China once the new pipeline is complete. India till date has failed to secure a single production-sharing contract to buy Burmese gas.

Burma�s vantage location has also added its energy-related impor-tance in a different way � at least for China. In addition to importing Burmese gas, China is setting up an energy corridor through Burma in-volving an oil pipeline to transship crude oil it imports from the Middle East and Africa. In other words, Burma is both a source of energy as well as a transshipment route for China. China presently is fi nalizing technical details for the construction of the oil pipeline, which � run-ning the length of Burma � will go at least up to Chongqing, a new province carved out of Sichuan, according to one report.10

This energy pipeline is part of a strategic corridor � the Irrawaddy


66 67

Corridor � that China is setting up to link its southwestern provinces with the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean through Burma. The cor-ridor establishes road, river, rail and energy links from China�s Yunnan and Chongqing provinces to Burma�s Chinese-built harbors at Kyauky-pu and Thilawa. Along with Beijing�s onshore and offshore strategic assets in Burma, this corridor signifi es an enlarging Chinese footprint in that country.

The energy pipeline and strategic corridor through Burma need to be seen in the context of the other Chinese moves and actions in south-ern Asia that have far-reaching strategic implications for India, Japan, the United States, Australia and other players in the Indian Ocean rim region. Besides the intent to transfer Gulf and African oil for its consumption by cutting the transportation distance and minimizing its exposure to U.S.-policed sea-lanes, China has important strategic objectives in mind in fashioning new transportation routes.11 A fourfold Chinese strategy is currently being implemented:

1. The north-south strategic trail that the Irrawaddy Corridor represents, granting China access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean.2. A second strategic corridor in a north-south axis being fashio-ned in southern Asia is the trans-Karakoram corridor stretching from western China down to Pakistan�s new, Chinese-built Gwadar port, at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 percent of the world�s oil supply passes. Opened in the spring of 2007, the deepwater port at Gwadar represents China�s fi rst strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea. China�s plan is to make Gwadar a major hub transporting Gulf and African oil by pipeline to the Chinese heartland via Xinjiang. Such pi-ped oil would not only cut freight costs and supply time but also lower China�s reliance on shipping lanes through the Malacca and Taiwan Straits. Pakistan has already signed a memoran-dum of understanding with Beijing for �studies to build the energy corridor to China.�3. China is shoring up an east-west strategic corridor in Tibet across India�s northern frontiers, as illustrated by the $6.2 bil-lion China-Tibet railway from Gormu to Lhasa that opened in July 2006. Beijing is now extending the Tibetan railway to the Nepalese capital of Katmandu and also to two other points: the tri-junction of the India-Bhutan-Tibet frontiers (in the Chumbi Valley) and the intersection of the India-Burma-Tibet borders. 4. China�s incremental efforts to build a �string of pearls� along

the Indian Ocean rim symbolize Beijing�s desire for a fourth strategic corridor. It seeks to assemble this �string of pearls� � a term fi rst used in a report for the Pentagon by U.S. defense contractor Booz Allen Hamilton � through forward listening posts, naval-access agreements and Chinese-built harbors stret-ching from Pakistan and Sri Lanka to Bangladesh and Burma. The Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean rim now extends to the Seychelles.

For China, Burma is a critical entryway to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean. Chinese strategic positioning in Burma also needs to be seen against the backdrop of Burma overlooking vital sea lanes of communication through the Strait of Malacca. Not unsurprisingly, the Irrawaddy Corridor has brought Chinese security personnel to Burmese sites close both to India�s eastern strategic assets and to the Strait of Malacca. With the Irrawaddy Corridor stretching to the Bay of Bengal, Chinese security agencies have positioned person-nel at several Burmese coastal points, including the Chinese-built harbors.

These security agencies already operate electronic-intelligence and maritime-reconnaissance facilities on the two Coco Islands in the Bay of Bengal. India transferred the Coco Islands to Burma in the 1950s, and Burma then leased the islands to China in 1994. Today, despite denials by the Burmese junta, there is documented evidence, including satellite imagery, showing that China operates a signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection facility from the Great Coco Island.

The Irrawaddy Corridor holds important strategic implications for several players in the Indian Ocean rim region. Such transportation and strategic links, for example, give China leeway to strategically meddle in India�s restive northeast, including the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims to be Chinese territory. Operating in India�s north-east through the plains of Burma (which was part of the British Indian empire) is much easier than having to operate across the mighty Hi-malayas.12 It is no wonder that during World War II, both the Allied and the Axis powers classifi ed Burma as the �back door to India.� The potential for Chinese strategic interference has to be viewed against the background that the tribal insurgencies in India�s northeast were all instigated by Maoist China, which trained and armed these rebels partly by exploiting the Burma route. Today, India has an 850-kilometer-long porous border with Burma, with insurgents operating on both sides with the help of shared ethnicity.13


68 69

Understanding international options Promotion of democracy in Burma is a justifi able goal because that ethnically fractious country cannot indefi nitely be held together by brute force. The empowerment of its masses is imperative to create a grassroots stake in Burma�s unity and territorial integrity. Genuine par-ticipatory processes are also necessary to promote ethnic reconciliation in a country internally scarred from long years of sectarian strife.

Yet, even among those who share this goal, one sees an interesting, even if nuanced, split: Europeans and Americans tend to emphasize the primacy of principles over strategic considerations, while Asians seem to favor engagement and a softer approach. To be sure, there is no common Asian approach. Differences over Burma are subtle yet eye-catching among the Asian players, with some states (like India and Japan) gently pushing the junta toward political reconciliation and de-mocratic opening, and some others (such as China) viewing democracy advocacy by the West as national-interest promotion by other means. Still, the imperatives of proximity impel states in the neighborhood not to rely on an approach centered on penal action against and the isola-tion of Burma. Similarly, the U.S. and the European Union have far from a common approach. The U.S., under President George W. Bush, has moved to a sanctions-only approach toward Burma, while the EU, despite widening its own sanctions since last year, is keen to keep open channels of dialogue and humanitarian assistance.

Distance from Burma has been a crucial factor in determining major players� approach toward that country. The greater a state�s geographical distance from Burma, the more ready for action it has been on Burma. And the shorter a state�s distance from Burma, the greater the caution and tact in its policy.

Burma�s present problems (and impoverishment) can be traced back to the politically cataclysmic events of 1962, when the military under General Ne Win ousted an elected government and thereafter sought to introduce autarky by cutting off the country from the rest of the world. If Burma has gone from being Asia�s rice bowl to becoming a virtual pauper state, the blame has to fall on the 1962 coup and what it introdu-ced. Ne Win, a devotee of Marx and Stalin, banned most external trade and investment, nationalized companies, halted all foreign projects and tourism, and kicked out expatriates engaged in business. Yet the West, not unhappy that the military had ousted a founding leader of the non-alignment movement, Prime Minister U Nu, imposed no sanctions on Burma. Over the subsequent years, Ne Win fashioned a virtual one-man dictatorship under his authority.

More than a quarter-century later, even the bloodbath of 1998 that left several thousand student-led demonstrators dead or injured did not invite Western sanctions. That bloodbath coincided with the nume-rology-dedicated Ne Win�s public announcement of retirement on the �most auspicious� day of August 8, 1988 (8.8.88). Time will tell whether China, also addicted to the power of number 8, is courting trouble 20 years later by launching the Beijing Olympics on 8.8.08 at 8.08 am. In Burma, for the democratic opposition, 8.8.88 symbolized the launch of the democracy movement. Its 20th anniversary thus will be commemo-rated on the same day the Beijing Olympics kick off with an opening ceremony that some world leaders are threatening to boycott over the brutal repression in Tibet.

In fact, the events of 1988 triggered a stronger response from India and Japan than from the West. India, with missionary zeal, began cut-ting off all contact with the junta in the post-1988 period and started giving sanctuary to Burmese dissidents. Such righteous activism, heightened by the junta�s subsequent July 1989 detention of Burmese opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has had close ties with India since her student days,14 however, cost India dear. By the mid-1990s, China had strategically penetrated Burma, opening a new fl ank against India. The sobering lessons from a decade of foreign-policy activism on Burma post-1988 has helped instill greater geopolitical activism in India�s approach in recent years.

Japan, for its part, suspended its Overseas Development Assistance to Burma, following the 1988 developments. And when in 1992 Japan adopted an ODA charter espousing human rights and democracy, that provision was fi rst invoked against Burma to slash ODA. Since then, Japanese ODA has been limited largely to humanitarian and technical assistance. While Japanese ODA to Burma had averaged $154.8 million a year during the period 1978-88, it has fallen to an average of $36.7 million a year between 1996 and 2005, according to offi cial Japanese fi gures. With China eclipsing Japan as the largest aid provider, Tokyo has seen its traditional infl uence in Burma wane.

The military has been in power in Burma for 46 long years.15 But the Western penal approach toward Burma began shaping up only in the 1990s. In fact, it was not until this decade that Burma became a major target of U.S. sanctions, refl ected in the congressional passage of the 2003 Burma Freedom and Democracy Act and the enforcement of seve-ral subsequent punitive executive orders dating up to May 1, 2008.16

Some U.S. measures put in place against the junta before 2003 in-cluded a ban on new investment and an American veto on any proposed loan or assistance by international fi nancial institutions. That ban on


70 71

new U.S. investments was imposed as far back as 1997 � the same year the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) admitted Burma as a member. The Clinton administration could take that deci-sion in 1997 because at that time the United States had minimal trade with Burma and a total investment of only $225 million.17 Apart from Burma�s opium produce having a bearing on U.S. counternarcotics policy, that country was not a serious foreign-policy concern in Wash-ington.

Indeed, until the advent of the Bush administration, Burma was not among the key targets of sanctions, with the broadest U.S. sanctions be-ing directed at countries identifi ed as supporting terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan. In a September 1998 report to the U.S. House of Representatives, for example, the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) had identifi ed 142 provisions in 42 federal laws applying unilateral economic sanctions against some countries. Some of the provisions were directed against Burma, but that country wasn�t among the key U.S. targets.18

Even though there was considerable evidence throughout the 1990s that the unilateral sanctions approach introduced by the Clinton ad-ministration wasn�t helping to loosen the military�s grip on Burma,19

the U.S. considerably broadened its penal actions in this decade under Bush. The bilateral and multilateral measures mandated by the 2003 Burma Freedom and Democracy Act20 have led to the U.S. imposition of a ban on all imports from that country, combined with an array of other sanctions. However, as the State Department has admitted, the U.S. �import ban implemented in 2003 would be far more effective if countries importing Burma�s high-value exports (such as natural gas and timber) � would join us in our actions.�21

While a number of nations have slapped sanctions on Burma, espe-cially after the brutal way the September 2007 monk-led protests were suppressed, the blunt fact is that no nation thus far has emulated the extent to which United States has gone in imposing penal actions. In fact, the history of U.S. sanctions against Burma since 1997 has follo-wed a now-familiar pattern in U.S. policy � fi rst imposing an array of unilateral sanctions against a pariah regime, then discovering that the sanctions aren�t working and, therefore, turning to allies and partners to join in the penal campaign, and fi nally threatening sanctions against fi rms from third countries if those nations refuse to toe the U.S. line.

As far as the Burma-related international sanctions are concerned, their history underscores the manner the penal approach got shaped not by a cause � bringing an end to the military rule � but by the poli-tical travails of an iconic personality, Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of

Burma�s founding father, Aung San, the Japanese-trained commander of the Burmese Independence Army. Suu Kyi, having been accidentally thrown into the vortex of national politics in autumn 1988,22 has helped inspire and mold the Western punitive approach toward Burma.

The junta�s detention of her from July 1989 onward and its refusal to honor the people�s verdict in the May 1990 national elections brought Suu Kyi to the center of world attention, with she receiving several inter-national awards in quick succession � the Rafto Human Rights Prize in October 1990; the European Parliament�s Sakharov Human Rights Prize in July 1991; and the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1991. A ma-jor trigger in galvanizing international opinion was clearly the junta�s brazen refusal to cede power despite the May 1990 national elections, which gave the detained Suu Kyi�s National League for Democracy (NLD) party 59 percent of the votes but 82 percent of the seats in Par-liament. By keeping her in detention for nearly 13 of the past 19 years, the junta has itself contributed to building Suu Kyi as an international symbol of the Burmese struggle for political freedoms.

The personality-shaped nature of the sanctions approach can also be explained by the fact that before Suu Kyi, there was no unifying fi gure to challenge the military�s domination in all spheres of the state and to lead a national movement for the restoration of democracy. The Nobel prize greatly increased her international profi le and domestic clout. Western aid cutoffs and other penal actions thus began only in the pe-riod after the junta refused to honor the results of the 1990 elections.

How a personality can help shape the sanctions approach was further underlined by the way Suu Kyi�s personal rapport with U.S. Se-cretary of State Madeleine Albright helped spur President Bill Clinton to reluctantly impose a ban in 1997 on new American investments to develop Burma�s resources. That ban was slapped even though interna-tional pressure, and the Clinton administration�s own intervention, had made the junta to release Suu Kyi in July 1995 after six years in house detention.

Not only has the sanctions approach been personality-driven, but also a personality hue has been put even on the internal struggle in Bur-ma. That struggle has been portrayed, simplistically, as a battle between Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta�s reclusive chairman, General Than Shwe, a fi ght between good and evil, and a tussle between the forces of freedom and the forces of ruthlessness. While such a portrayal is useful to draw international attention to a remote country that is peripheral to the interests of all except its neighbors, it helps obscure the complex and multifaceted realities on the ground.

Despite Suu Kyi�s central role in shining a constant international


72 73

spotlight for 19 years on the military�s repressive and illegitimate rule, the grim reality is that years of tightening sanctions against Burma haven�t helped loosen the military�s vise on polity and society. If anything, the sanctions have only worsened the plight of ordinary Burmese. Far from the people gaining political freedoms, an again-detained Suu Kyi�s personal freedom has remained an outstanding issue. While the ordinary Burmese have been the main losers, the international approach has proven a strategic boon for China, creating much-desired space for it to expand its interests in and leverage over Burma. That has happened largely at the expense of the interests of democratic states, which, in any event, have continued to pursue varying, and at times confl icting, policies on Burma. Against this background, what should be a realistic, yet productive, approach toward Burma?

Burma now ranks as one of the world�s most isolated and sanctioned nations � a situation unlikely to be changed by the Constitutional process and other steps in the junta-touted �roadmap to democracy,� unless the international community under the U.S. leadership adopts a fresh approach toward that country.

There has been a proliferation in recent years of indexes developed by research institutions that seek to rank countries in terms of their comparative vulnerabilities and weaknesses, including state failure, repression, corruption and disparities. What is striking about Burma is that it ranks in all the indexes as among the most corrupt and dysfunc-tional states. And yet its state machinery seems strong enough to wage unrelenting political repression and persecution of ethnic minorities.

The annual Failed States Index (FSI) prepared by the independent, Failed States Index (FSI) prepared by the independent, Failed States IndexWashington-based group, The Fund for Peace, for example, employs 12 social, economic, political and military indicators to rank 177 states in order of their vulnerability to violent internal confl ict and societal deterioration. It is based on the capacities of core state institutions to mitigate adverse trends promoting state instability. The 2007 index ranks Burma among the top 20 unstable states prone to violent confl ict and societal dysfunction.23 Sudan tops the rankings as the state most at risk of failure. But four states in southern Asia fi gure in the top 20 dysfunctional states: Afghanistan at No. 8, Pakistan (No. 12), Burma (No. 14) and Bangladesh (No. 16). That shows that symptoms of state failure are acute in this part of the world.

Similarly, the Brookings Institution�s new Index of State Weakness in the Developing World ranks Burma as the 17in the Developing World ranks Burma as the 17in the Developing World th weakest state among the 141 countries it assessed, with Somalia, at the No. 1 position, sym-bolizing an utterly failed state and the Slovak Republic (at the top of

the ladder, No. 141) representing a successful democracy.24 Burma was identifi ed as one of fi ve critically weak states outside sub-Saharan Africa.

In the World Press Freedom Index, 25 Burma ranks No. 163 in the 167-nation list. Without freedom of expression, no process of democ-ratization can begin. Burma�s leaders are not just autocrats; like other repressive rulers in Asia, they believe in the indispensability and virtues of autocracy.

They have used the threat of Balkanization to justify their strangle-hold on politics. The military sees itself as the only institution that can keep Burma united. Preventing the splintering of the country, however, has come at a heavy price. It was the military�s autarkic policies and gross economic mismanagement post-1962 that spurred widespread poverty and the fl ight of capital from the country.

According to Transparency International, Burma and Somalia are on par as the most corrupt countries in the world.26 The Berlin-based Transparency International, as part of its annual survey of corruption (which it defi nes as the abuse of public offi ce for private gain), publishes an index of countries ranked from the least corrupt to the most corrupt, on a scale of 10 to 0, with 10 representing no corruption and 0 signifying total sleaze and bribery. Its 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index brings out the growing problem of corruption in Asia. Among the most corrupt states in the index was Burma�s neighbor, Bangladesh. That the poorest states of Asia like Bangladesh and Burma are also the most corrupt only shows that corruption is both a cause of poverty as well as a hindrance to the amelioration of the conditions of the impoverished people.

The key point arising from the various indexes is that Burma is a pretty dysfunctional state with corroding institutions and an oversi-zed military that dominates all spheres of national activity. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, it has been increasingly recognized that the threats to international peace and se-curity now emanate more and more from the world�s weakest states. Tellingly, two of the world�s critically weak states, North Korea and Pa-kistan, are members of the nuclear club. It has become routine for the major players and the United Nations to reiterate their commitment to pull critically weak nations back from the precipice of state failure.

It is that argument � to stabilize a failing state � that the Bush ad-ministration has applied to pour some $11 billion as aid since 9/11 into terror-exporting Pakistan, ranked No. 33 in the Brookings� Index of State Weakness in the Developing World. Reinforcing that argument, it is now considering throwing its weight behind Senator Joseph Biden�s


74 75

call for a $2.5 billion package of additional nonmilitary aid to improve the lives of citizens in a country where the military has dominated all walks of life almost since Pakistan�s creation in 1947.

Can a different logic or argument be applied to Burma, one of the world�s weakest and most dysfunctional states that potentially poses a serious transnational security threat unless steps are taken to help stabilize its economy? Or should the stabilization of a failing state only begin when that country actually starts posing � like Pakistan � a th-reat to international security?

It is obvious that the international responses to separate cases of failing states need not be cut from the same cloth because every nation�s situation tends to be different from the others. Still, the undeniable fact is that Burma represents a case of grave state corrosion, with internatio-nal sanctions having had the effect, however unintended, to lower the living standards of ordinary Burmese.

Another question relates to the extent to which sanctions should be employed? Should punitive actions preclude engagement? Without the Bush administration engaging Pyongyang, to give just one example, would it have been possible to achieve the progress, however tentative it might seem at this stage, on the North Korean nuclear program? It is nobody�s case that Burma is worse than North Korea.

Sanctions by themselves do not usually promote political freedoms and indeed, by ignoring humanitarian concerns, may help a regime to instill a sense of victimhood and shore up domestic support. Nor can just engagement be the answer. The notion that democracy is sure to follow if a country is integrated with the global economy has been dis-proved by China. The more economic and military power China has accumulated, the more sophisticated it has become in repressing at home, including through electronic surveillance and intimidation.

If freedom is to bloom in more countries, it is imperative to fashion a more principled, coherent, forward-looking international approach that objectively calibrates sanctions and engagement, and allows out-side actors to actively infl uence developments within.

So what are the international options?Despite its predatory military elite continuing to monopolize power, Burma does exhibit severe state weaknesses. Those vulnerabilities make continued international sanctions against it attractive, in order that its military is compelled to return to the barracks. Yet, years of sanc-tions have helped underscore the limits of securing signifi cant results through punitive pressures alone.

Options still available to the international community will become clearer if we clinically assess our successes and failures vis-à-vis Burma thus far.

•Have economic disengagement from Burma and other puni-tive actions helped improve human rights in Burma?•Has outside role helped, directly or indirectly, to improve the living conditions of the ordinary Burmese or to loosen the military�s political grip?•By targeting vital sectors of the Burmese economy, to what extent have international sanctions helping choke the fl ow of funds to the military? •What objective is served when disengagement blocks the fl ow of liberal ideas as well as investment and technology to improve working conditions?•As shown in China, doesn�t foreign investment help build pri-vate institutions, boost employment and wages, aid civil-society development and exert a pro-reforms infl uence on a regime? •Has the sanctions approach helped increase or decrease exter-nal infl uence over the Burmese regime?•Given the waves of sanctions in recent years, what additional room is left to step up pressure on a recalcitrant junta? Have most cards already been played out?•Does the current approach centered on the primacy of sanc-tions provide the junta a convenient scapegoat for its own gross mismanagement of the economy?•By isolating Burma and forcing its regime to turn increasingly for succor to more-entrenched autocracies, are we promoting a regional power balance or imbalance?•To what extent will a weaker, more dysfunctional Burma pose transnational security threats or cause diffi culties in internatio-nal counternarcotics and counterterrorist efforts?

In addition to our options being shaped by our answers to the aforesaid questions, there is also one larger issue that needs to be factored in. International options on Burma not only need to be realistic, but also be based on principles and positions valid for promotion of a transition to democracy in other autocratic settings.

What role outsiders can play to help democracy take root remains a diffi cult issue internationally. Yet that issue looms large in relation to


76 77

Asia. Unlike Europe where democracy has become the norm, only 16 of Asia�s 39 countries surveyed by Freedom House are really free.27

As shown by the World Press Freedom Index by the Paris-based international rights group, Reporters Without Borders, a number of Asian countries are among the worst suppressors of freedom. In the 167-nation list, North Korea ranked at the very bottom, Burma 163rd, China 159th, Vietnam 158th, Laos and Uzbekistan 155th, Bangladesh 151st, Pakistan 150th, Singapore 140th and the Philippines 139th.28

Bringing in comparative assessments will also help sculpt down-to-earth international options. Let�s look at one revealing comparative picture. Until the September 2007 protests in Rangoon and other Bur-mese cities and the March 2008 Tibetan uprising, Burma and China had been free of any major pro-freedom protests for about two decades. The previous major pro-freedom demonstrations occurred in Burma in 1988, and in China in 1989.

In 2007, in a two-month period, fuel price increases were announ-ced fi rst in Burma and then in China. The junta�s announcement on August 15, 2007, to double the price of gasoline, diesel fuel and com-pressed gas hit the ordinary Burmese hard by forcing up the price of public transport and triggering a knock-on effect on staples such as rice and cooking oil. That triggered protests, which became bigger by the day, with monks gradually joining in from early September and the demonstrations acquiring increasingly a political color as an expres-sion of the grassroots anger against military rule. So, it was the rise in energy prices that paradoxically triggered the biggest protests since the 1988 uprising in an energy-rich country.29 By contrast, the fuel price in-creases in China � announced just eight weeks after Burma � sparked only a few sporadic incidents of violence, with one person killed in Hai-nan Island, but spurring no pro-freedom protests.

Why fuel price increases triggered mass protests in one state but not in the other owes a lot to the fact that China had transformed itself radically in the past two decades since the Tiananmen Square massacre, while Burma remains isolated, impoverished and battered by sanctions. The post-Tiananmen international trade sanctions against China did not last long on the argument that they were hurting ordinary Chinese and that engagement was a better way to bring about political change. That was the correct approach. Had an approach pivoted on widening punitive actions been pursued, would China have emerged to the same degree as a dynamic economy that today serves as a growth locomotive for the world? Through its economic transformation, China has made its political modernization inescapable, although no one can predict when and in what form that would happen.

The same principle, however, was never applied to impoverished Burma, creating an unhealthy impression that promotion of freedom has become a diplomatic instrument to target not the world�s biggest autocracies but weak, unpopular, isolated states.30 Sanctions against a jihad-bankrolling Saudi Arabia or a Tibet-repressing China would bring economic pain in the form of higher oil prices or job losses. So �it is the small or economically vulnerable kids on the global bloc, like Burma and Cuba � that will continue to be the targets of sanctions,� even if �innocent civilians living in those countries� suffer.31

While the military has ruled Burma for 46 years, the Chinese Com-munist Party has monopolized power for 59 years. Neither model is sustainable. The longest any autocratic system has survived in modern history was 74 years in the Soviet Union. At issue, though, is the role the free world can play in promoting a democratic transition in such states.

This issue has again been highlighted in comparative terms by the contrasting international responses to the monk-led freedom protests in Tibet and Burma. In fact, there are striking similarities between Tibet and Burma � both are strategically located, endowed with rich natural resources, suffering under long-standing repressive rule, resisting hard power with soft power, and facing an infl ux of Han settlers. Yet the in-ternational responses to the brutal crackdowns on monk-led protests in Tibet and Burma have been a study in contrast.

When the Burmese crackdown on peaceful protestors in Rangoon last September left at least 31 people dead � according to a UN special rapporteur�s report32 � it ignited international indignation and a fresh wave of U.S.-led sanctions. More than seven months later, the tepid global response to China�s ongoing harsh crackdown in Tibet has raised the question whether that country has accumulated such international power as to escape even censure over actions that are more repressive and wide-ranging than what Burma witnessed.33 Despite growing in-ternational appeals to Beijing to respect Tibetans� human rights and cultural identity and begin true dialogue with the Dalai Lama, there has been no call for any penal action, however mild, against China.

When the Burmese generals cracked down on monks and their pro-democracy supporters, the outside world watched vivid images of brutality, thanks to citizen reporters using the Internet. The photograph of a Japanese videographer fatally shot on a Rangoon street was fl ashed across the world; it is a picture that defi ned the events of that month when police used baton charges and tear gas on monks and fellow pro-testers and then opened fi re. On the worst day of violence � September 27, 2007 � authorities admitted nine deaths while unoffi cial fi gures were higher.


78 79

In contrast, China employs tens of thousands of cyberpolice to censor Web sites, patrol cybercafes, monitor text and video messages from cellular phones, and hunt down Internet activists. As a result, the outside world has yet to see a single haunting image of the Chinese use of brute force against Tibetans. The only images released by Beijing are those that seek to show Tibetans in bad light, as engaged in arson and other attacks.

The powerful Internet poses a bigger threat to repressive governme-nts than pro-democracy demonstrations on the streets, if such protests are allowed at all. Seeking to fi ght fi re with fi re, some authoritarian regimes have clamped down on the Internet, closing blogger sites and employing sophisticated fi ltering software to block Web sites that carry references to �subversive� words. Such regimes have proven that a coun-try can blend control, coercion and patronage to stymie the politically liberalizing elements of market forces, especially when the state still has a hold over large parts of the economy.

The important parallels between Burma and Tibet begin with the fact that Burma�s majority citizens � the ethnic Burmans � are of Ti-betan stock. But the Han demographic invasion of the Tibetan plateau is spilling over into Burma, with the Chinese presence conspicuous in Mandalay city and the areas to the northeast. Because of the growing Chinese commercial interests in Burma, the September 2007 street protests indeed had an underlying anti-Chinese tenor.

It is signifi cant that the resistance against repressive rule in both Tibet and Burma is led by iconic Nobel laureates, one living in exile in India and the other under house detention for long in Rangoon. The Dalai Lama and Aung San Suu Kyi received the Nobel peace prize in quick succession for the same reason: for leading a non-violent struggle, in the tradition of Mahatma Gandhi. Each, a symbol of soft power, has built such moral authority as to command wide international respect and infl uence.

It has been announced that President Bush would soon sign leg-islation conferring Congress�s highest civilian honor to Suu Kyi, just months after he had personally presented the same prize � the Con-gressional Gold Medal � to the Dalai Lama. Suu Kyi, in fact, married a scholar in Tibetan and Himalayan studies, Michael Aris. With Aris, a Briton, Suu Kyi edited a book on Tibetan studies in honor of Hugh Richardson, an expert on Tibetan Buddhism.34

Yet another parallel is that heavy repression has failed to break the resistance to autocratic rule in both Tibet and Burma. If anything, gro-wing authoritarianism has begun to backfi re, as the popular revolts in Tibet and Burma have highlighted. More than half a century after

Tibet�s annexation, the Tibetan struggle stands out as one of the longest and most-powerful resistance movements in modern world history. The latest Tibetan revolt, signifi cantly, coincided with the Chinese le-gislature re-electing as president Hu Jintao, who as Tibet�s martial-law administrator suppressed the last major Tibetan uprising in 1989.

Similarly, despite detaining Suu Kyi for nearly 13 of the past 19 years, the Burmese junta has failed to muzzle the grassroots democracy movement, as last September�s bloody events showed. Democracy offers the only path to bringing enduring stability to ethnically troubled Burma. Indeed, ethnic warfare there began no sooner than General Aung San had persuaded the smaller nationalities to join the union.

The importance of Tibet and Burma also comes from their strate-gic location and rich natural resources. The Tibetan plateau makes up one-fourth of China�s landmass. Annexation has given Beijing access to that region�s immense mineral wealth and water resources. Tibet�s vast glaciers and high altitude have endowed it with the world�s greatest river systems. Most of Asia�s major rivers originate in the Tibetan pla-teau and their waters are a lifeline to 47 percent of the global population living in South and Southeast Asia and China.

The key difference between Tibet and Burma is that the repression in the former is by an occupying power. Months after the 1949 com-munist takeover in Beijing, China�s People�s Liberation Army entered what was effectively a sovereign nation in full control of its own affairs. Instead of granting the promised autonomy to Tibetans, Beijing has ac-tually done the opposite: It has broken up Tibet as it existed before the annexation and sought to reduce Tibetans to a minority in the truncated Tibet through the state-supported relocation of millions of Han Chinese. It has gerrymandered Tibet by making Amdo (the present Dalai Lama�s birthplace) as the Qinghai province and merging eastern Kham into its provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu.

The contrasting international responses to the repression in Burma and Tibet highlight an inconvenient truth: the principle that engagement is better than punitive action to help change state behavior is applied just to the powerful autocratic countries, while sanctions are a favored tool to try and tame the weak. While animpoverished Burma reels under tighte-ning sanctions, a booming China openly mocks the Universal Declara-tion of Human Rights. The fact is that the more you punish the weak renegade states, the more the big autocracies tend to gain commercially and strategically. With its ability to provide political protection through its UN veto power, Beijing, in recent years, has signed tens of billions of dollars worth of energy and arms contracts with pariah regimes � from Burma and Iran to Sudan and Venezuela.


80 81

As resource-rich Burma remains mired in abject poverty under a brutal military regime that refuses to loosen its political grip despite widening international sanctions, it has become necessary to fashion a forward-looking international approach that allows outside actors, far from shutting themselves off from Burma, to seek to infl uence develop-ments within. The present disjointed international approach (if it can be called an �approach�) underscores the need both for greater multila-teral coordination on Burma and for engagement aimed at increasing external infl uence within Burma.

Today, under the cumulative weight of sanctions, Burma is coming full circle: Its 74-year-old junta head, the delusional Senior General Than Shwe, has amassed powers to run a virtual one-man dictatorship in Ne Win-style. Also, in the period since the free world began imple-menting boycotts, trade bans, aid cutoffs and other sanctions, it has seen its leverage over Burma erode. The situation thus calls for a more calibrated approach that entails refi ning the sanctions tool to achieve better-targeted sanctions and to create space to infl uence developments through engagement. Even as it has become fashionable to talk about better-targeted sanctions, the sanctions instrument, in reality, has be-come blunter against Burma.

Sanctions were intended to help the people of Burma, yet today it is the ordinary people that bear the brunt of the sanctions. The stepped-up punitive actions in the face of a deteriorating humanitarian situation are holding the Burmese people �economic hostage,� as Burmese author Ma Thanegi told Stanley A. Weiss in an interview.35

As far back as 2003, then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matthew Daley had warned in congressional testimony that many fe-male garment workers made jobless by sanctions were being driven into prostitution. Yet, in its 2004 report to Congress, the State Depart-ment actually boasted that U.S. actions had shut down more than 100 garment factories in the previous year alone, with �an estimated loss of around 50,000 to 60,000 jobs.�36 In the international effort to help build democracy in Burma � believe it or not � the big losers have been those on whose behalf the free world supposedly has been fi ghting.

While refi ning the sanctions approach to help spare the Burmese, international pressure must not be eased against the junta. But for in-ternational pressure, the junta would not have unveiled a timetable for a supposed transition to democracy. Earlier, it was due to mounting ex-ternal pressure that it moved Suu Kyi from prison to house detention in September 2003 and then freed seven of the NLD�s most senior leaders. More recently, such pressure also explains why the junta facilitated UN special envoy Ibrahim Gambari�s three visits to Burma in six months,

permitting him to meet with Suu Kyi, and also allowed? Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, a special rapporteur to the United Nations Human Rights Council, to come to Rangoon and investigate the September 2007 vio-lence, including the number of casualties and detentions.

Yet, if there is to be progress on the �roadmap to democracy,� the military cannot be excluded from engagement. As visiting Singapore Se-nior Minister Goh Chok Tong said in Washington in April 9, 2008: �On Myanmar, I told the President (Bush) that while the army is the problem, the army has to be part of the solution. Without the army playing a part in solving problems in Myanmar, there will be no solution.�37

Building democracy in Burma is vital not only to end repression and to empower the masses, but also to facilitate ethnic conciliation and in-tegration in a much divided society that has been at war with itself since its independence in 1948. There is, therefore, a need to build greater unity and coordination among the major democracies on a pragmatic Burma strategy. A good idea would be to build a concert of democra-cies working together on Burma, serving as a bridge between the U.S., European and Asian positions and fashioning greater coordination of policy actions.

Without a structured and more progressive international approach, Burma will stay on its present deplorable path, with the military continuing to call the shots. As one analyst states, �economic sanctions on Myanmar may feel right, but they have helped produce the wrong results. Encouraging Western investment, trade and tourism may feel wrong, but maybe � just maybe � could produce better results. That might be politically incorrect, but at least it wouldn�t be politically futile.�38 In an era of a supposed global village, why deny the citizens of Burma the right to enjoy the benefi ts of globalization and free trade? A more dysfunctional Burma is not in the interests of anyone.

The priority should be to carve out more international space in Burma, rather than shut down whatever space that might be left there. International pressure without constructive engagement and civil-society development will not bring enduring results. To avert a humanitarian catastrophe in Burma, the same international standards that are applicable to autocratic and no-less-ruthless regimes in neighboring states must also apply to Burma � engage, don�t isolate.

Notes1 After the failed 1993-1996 National Convention to draft a new Constitution, the junta did nothing until international pressure intensifi ed during 2003�04. It then issued invitations to a National Convention starting in May 2004 to take up the drafting of the


82 83

Constitution where the earlier convention had left off. But the democratic opposition did not participate in that convention.2 President Bush’s statement of May 1, 2008, stated: “Today, I’ve issued a new executive order that instructs the Treasury Department to freeze the assets of Burmese state-owned companies that are major sources of funds that prop up the junta.”3 Ivo J. H. Bozon, Warren J. Campbell, and Mats Lindstrand, �Global Trends in Energy,� The McKinsey Quarterly, Number 1 (2007), p. 48.

4 International Monetary Fund, 2006.

5 See, for example, Alan Sipress, �Asia Keeps Burmese Industry Humming: Trade, Both Legal and Illegal, Blunts Effect of U.S. Economic Sanctions,� Washington Post, January 7, 2005, p. A11.

6 Sean Turnell, �The Rape of Burma: Where Did the Wealth Go,� Japan Times, May 2, 2008.

7 On January 12, 2007, China and Russia torpedoed a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) draft resolution tabled by the United States and Britain that called on the Burmese regime to halt military attacks against ethnic minorities, release Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners, and promote a democratic transition.

8 The actual holding in the two blocks is: Daewoo International (60 percent), ONGC Videsh (20 percent), GAIL (10 percent) and Korea Gas Corporation (10 percent). This Indo-Korean consortium is currently engaged in a new exploration drilling program in Block A3.

9 Yolanda Fong-Sam, �The Mineral Industry of Burma,� in 2005 Minerals Yearbook (Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey, 2006).

10 International Energy, at: http://en.in-en.com

11 John W. Garver, �Development of China�s Overland Transportation Links with Central, South-West and South Asia,� China Quarterly, No. 185 (March 2006), pages 1�22.

12 Mohan Malik, �China�s Peaceful Ruse: Beijing Tightens Its Noose Round India�s Neck,� Force, December 10, 2005.

13 Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity1999).

14 Suu Kyi accompanied her mother, Ma Khin Kyi, to India in 1960 when she was appointed Burma�s ambassador there. Suu Kyi studied at a high school in New Delhi and then at the undergraduate Lady Shri Ram College, also in New Delhi. Then, in the mid-1980s, Suu Kyi and her British husband, Michael Aris, were fellows at the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies at Simla.

15 In September 1988, following Ne Win�s resignation, the military�s State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) formally took power. SLORC was offi cially rechristened the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997.

16 The 2003 Burma Freedom and Democracy Act prohibits the importation into the United States of any article that is a product of Burma until the president determines and certifi es to Congress that Burma has taken certain democratic and counternarcot-ics actions. The Act directs the secretary of the treasury to direct any U.S. fi nancial institution holding funds of the Burmese regime or the assets of individuals who hold senior positions in the regime to freeze them. It also requires that the executive seek to persuade international fi nancial institutions to oppose any extension of a loan or fi nan-cial or technical assistance to Burma until the requirements of the Act have been met.

Burma�s neighbors are to be persuaded to �restrict fi nancial resources� to Burma and Burmese companies. And, fi nally, the Act authorizes the president to assist Burmese democracy activists.

17 The May 20, 1997, executive order issued by President Bill Clinton banned most new U.S. investment in the �economic development of resources in Burma.� Steven Erlanger, �Clinton Approves New U.S. Sanctions against Burmese,� New York Times, April 22, 1997.

18 United States Information Service (USIS) Washington File, �USITC Report on Unilateral U.S. Trade Sanctions,� September 11, 1998.

19 See, for example, Leon T. Hadar, U.S. Sanctions Against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts,Trade Policy Analysis Paper No. 1 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998). It argued:�U.S. policy toward Burma is an irresponsible moral posturing. Supporters of sanctions want to feel good that they are doing something to improve political and economic conditions in Burma by forcing someone else--American businesses, the ASEAN nations, and the Burmese people--to bear the costs. The result will be reduced access of the Burmese people to American products, people, and ideas; worsening economic conditions; and potential political and regional instability. It is indeed ironic that some members of America�s cosmopolitan knowledge class, who are the main benefi ciaries of the process of economic globalization, are supporting policies that run contrary to free trade and open markets and deny the Burmese people the ability to enjoy the fruits of the global economy.�

20 To be sure, the 2003 Burma Freedom and Democracy Act fl owed from years of mount-ing congressional pressure on the executive branch to take a tougher approach toward that country. After the junta refused to honor the results of the 1990 polls, the U.S. Con-gress passed the Customs and Trade Act enabling the president to impose sanctions on Burma � an authority then-President George H.W. Bush declined to exercise. In 1993, the U.S. Senate, seeking to force the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, passed a nonbinding resolution calling on the president to work for a UN embargo against Burma. In 1995, Sen. Mitch McConnell introduced the Free Burma Act. Another similar legislation, with a name akin to the subsequent 2003 law, the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, was introduced in 1996 by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher.

21 Department of State, Report on U.S. Trade Sanctions Against Burma, Congressionally mandated report submitted to Congress on April 28, 2004.

22 Suu Kyi was in Rangoon to take care of her stroke-stricken mother when Burma was battered by the cataclysmic events of August 1998.By August 26, 1998, she had plunged herself into politics, addressing her fi rst public meeting outside the Shwedagon Pagoda that called for a democratically elected government. And less than a month later, she formed her National League for Democracy (NLD) party on September 24, 1998.

23The Failed States Index 2006 of The Fund for Peace is available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865

It is also available at: www.ForeignPolicy.com

24 Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008).

25 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders at: http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=55426 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2007, available at: http://www.transparency.org


84 85

27 Freedom House, Freedom in the World (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2006).

28 World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders at: http://www.rsf.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=55429 Even the 1988 protests were triggered by an economic decision of the government � the 1987 action devaluing the currency that wiped out many people�s savings. Like in 2007, the 1988 demonstrations began among students before gradually spreading to monks and the public, culminating in the national uprising on August 8, 1988, when hundreds of thousands of people marched to demand a change of government. At least 3,000 people were believed killed when troops opened fi re on protesters on that day.

30 In Jimmy Carter�s words, �A counterproductive Washington policy in recent years has been to boycott and punish political factions or governments that refuse to accept United States mandates.� Jimmy Carter, �Pariah Diplomacy,� New York Times, April 28, 2008.

31 Hadar, U.S. Sanctions Against Burma.

32 After his investigations in Burma into the September 2007 violence, Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, a special rapporteur to the United Nations Human Rights Council, released a report in Geneva which said that at least 31 people were killed in the protests in Rangoon � twice the death toll the regime had reported � and that 500 to 1,000 people were still being detained for involvement in the protests. The report also said that 74 people were listed as missing in the aftermath of the clashes. In addition, it reported that 1,150 political prisoners held before the September 2007 protests had not been released.

33 The Tibetan government-in-exile said April 29, 2008, that at least 203 people, most of them Tibetans, had thus far died in the Chinese crackdowns in Tibet. But China�s offi cial death toll � 22 � is almost 10 times lower.

34 Michael Aris and Aung San Suu Kyi (eds.), Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh Richardson (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979).

35 Interview published on website, New Mandala, at: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/newmandala

36 Department of State, Report on U.S. Trade Sanctions Against Burma, Congressionally mandated report submitted to Congress on April 28, 2004.

37 AFP, April 9, 2008.

38 Stanley A. Weiss, �Burma: Are Sanctions the Answer?� International Herald Tribune, February 8, 2008

Can the InternationalCommunity Help Prevent Confl ict in Burma/Myanmar?Timo Kivimäki

Individual rights and democracy have been the focal point of the in-ternational community�s Burma/Myanmar agenda. Authoritarianism and the lack of these rights is a major problem contributing to political violence in the country. However, collective rights of ethnic groups have not received much attention, apart from the international demand for tripartite talks between the government, the democracy movement, and ethnic groups in Burma/Myanmar. Yet most of the warfare in the coun-try has been, at least somehow, related to ethnic rights.

This chapter investigates cases of international confl ict prevention in Burma/Myanmar and international attempts to infl uence a stubborn military government to respond to the needs of its population. The idea is to introduce comparative evidence that has not been suffi ciently utilized in the relatively speculative literature on Burma/Myanmar confl icts. The cases used in this study are taken from international ex-periences of confl ict resolution and democratization as well as cases of international governmental economic and political pressure.1 However, before reviewing international strategies, one needs a diagnosis of the situation and patterns of confl ict in the Burma/Myanmar. The structure of the chapter is based on the idea of moving from problems to solu-tions. After an overview of the problems, this article proceeds to giving an overview of the types of solutions that have been globally successful in the kind of confl ict problems to be found in Burma/Myanmar. From there, the argument continues to the analysis of how the international community could contribute to creation of more successful solutions. The investigation of solutions in general is focused on what kinds of structures and capacities are needed for stable peace in a country like Burma/Myanmar. The this section of the chapter specifi cally focuses on the role of the international community and how it looks at recipes for effi cient pressure and seeks to fi nd recipes for the persuasion of the My-anmar government to the compromises that optimal solutions require.


86 87

What is the Problem? Patterns of Confl ict in Burma/MyanmarBurma/Myanmar has a long history of confl ict. To put its confl ict problem into a regional perspective, one can compare the country�s confl icts with those in the other regional countries. This comparison2

shows that over 40% of Southeast Asian confl icts take place in Burma/Myanmar. Since 1988 almost 30% of confl ict casualties of Southeast Asia take place in Burma/Myanmar:

Table 1: Number of Burmese confl icts in comparisonto other ASEAN states

However, while the share of confl icts and battle deaths has been rising, the absolute number of battle deaths of Burma/Myanmar has been declining. The pacifi cation of Southeast Asia has made it diffi cult for the rebel side to get hold of weapons and ammunition. In absence of regional confl ict spots it is not possible for Burma/Myanmar militias to cooperate with other rebel organizations in arms smuggling and production. This has contributed to the draining of opportunities of rebellion also in Burma/Myanmar. Furthermore, littoral countries have discouraged in many ways the confl ict activities of rebels.3

If one looks at the groups that challenge militarily the government, one can easily see that violence in Burma/Myanmar is primarily about democracy vs. authoritarianism and about ethnic rights. Battle deaths seem to peak in Burma/Myanmar whenever the government has back-tracked from its conciliatory policies. Whenever hopes of ethnic and democratic movements are frustrated, and the government has resto-red its stricter centralist and/or military order, the number of casualties increases. After independence, this happened as the government back-tracked from its commitments to relative ethnic autonomy. The casualty peak of the beginning of the 1960s could be attributed to the strengthe-ning of the military�s position and the eventual military takeover in 1961. The rising expectations for democracy and ending of the military rule, instead of the government backtracking from its promises, could have contributed to the rise of confl ict activities in the latter half of the

Can the International Community Help Prevent Confl ict in Burma/Myanmar?

Confl ict Years

Brunei (before independence 3

Burma/Myanmar 236

Cambodia 44

Indonesia 44

Laos 27

Malaysia 24

Philippines 94

Confl ict Years

1948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

Burma's Battle Deaths as % of Southeast Asia's BattleDeaths

1948

1950

1952

1954

1956

1958

1960

1962

1964

1966

1968

1970

1972

1974

1976

1978

1980

1982

1984

1986

1988

1990

1992

1994

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

Battle Deaths in Burma/Myanmar

88 89

1980s, while the frustration of these hopes and the strong suppression of the opposition in 1988, and the frustration of the hope of an elected government help explain the peaks in 1988 and after 1990.

In general, the pattern in Burma/Myanmar conforms to the general pattern of violence in authoritarian countries: instability and violence is most probable when the government backtracks from its own commit-ments and starts restoring its stricter centralist authoritarian rule.4 This suggests that the international community, rather than just demanding for new compromises, should focus on building (and expanding) the government�s own commitments to progress and preventing the go-vernment from backtracking from its promises.

The number of casualties of democide5 in Burma/Myanmar has not been estimated reliably. Yet already the counter-insurgency policies of the 1960s, based on cutting the rebellious villages from food, money, intelligence and recruits (the four cuts policy of the Burmese military), suggest that democidal practices against ethnic groups are nothing new for the Burmese military. Globally, the number of casualties of demo-cide is about 6 times the number of casualties of war.6 During the cold war, the ratio in the world rose to about 1:10.7 Regionally, the ratio is highest in East Asia, where 6 out of 10 world�s most genocidal regimes are located. Democide per population ratios are also higher in East Asia than elsewhere. 8 Thus, it is highly likely that repression and democide represent the gravest element of violence also in Burma/Myanmar right now, especially after the government has managed to suppress most of the open confl ict situations, and as the country experiences instability and demonstrations against the government.

Inability and unwillingness to tackle humanitarian disaster, and allow international help in the task, especially in rebellious areas, and areas which are considered opposed to the government, adds to the number of indirect casualties. The denial of access to international humanitarian organizations at the aftermath of the recent cyclone is an extreme example of a practice that has been going on in peripheral areas of the country for decades.

What Kind of Solutionsare Needed for Stable Peace?It seems clear from the analysis of the pattern of confl ict in Burma/Myanmar that the main issues that the international community should help solve are related to ethnic rights and democracy. On the one hand, fi nding solutions to these issues requires solutions that tackle

the confl ict structures. On the other, it requires simply parties to yield towards the positions and interests of their opponents. From the point of the international community this means pushing the government towards compromises, rather than pushing the opposition: much of the international community would rather like to see compromises towards democracy and respect of ethnic minority rights, rather than towards authoritarianism and centralism. Thus when thinking of solutions we must consider both structural objectives that can transform confl ict structures, and ways to persuade the parties. This section will mainly look into the former while the following section on the international community will look into the pressure element.

Macro StructuresThe two confl ict issues, democracy and ethnic rights, are interlinked, but still both need to be tackled before peace can be expected. Aut-horitarianism in Burma/Myanmar has traditionally been justifi ed by referring to the country�s ethnic diversity, and to the resulting inherent danger of war and insecurity. The British colonialists used it before the independence on Burma,9 and since this was such a useful rationaliza-tion for the autocrat, the Burmese military rulers could not resist the temptation to use it either. The takeover by the military was rationalized by the need to safeguard national unity10 and still the current govern-ment refers to the need of strong �leadership role� of the military in order to keep the country of more than 100 ethnic groups united and peaceful.11

The authoritarian justifi cation linking authoritarianism to ethnic confl ict is fl awed because of three reasons. First, ethnically diverse countries are not necessarily any more prone to confl ict than other societies.12 Thus, there is no ground for emphasizing the security di-mension in the Burmese society.

Secondly, military leaders are, in general, and in Burma/Myanmar case specifi cally, much less capable of preventing separatist wars than democratic leaders. In general, the risk of being killed in a war is redu-ced by more than one half, if instead of a military ruler; one�s country is ruled by an elected government.13 The benefi ts of democracy in confl ict prevention are most expressed in ethnically diverse societies.14

Thirdly, authoritarian internal security policies are often more dead-ly than the wars they try to prevent. Quantitative studies on democide show, on the one hand, that authoritarianism is the main predictor of democidal violence. On the other, they show that democide kills many times more people than wars.15 Thus the medicine of military security


90 91

policies is not needed, because there is no disease, because the medi-cine does not cure the disease, and because the medicine causes side-effects far more severe than the imagined disease.

The perception of the international community has been that it is the confl ict of individual freedom and democracy that overshadows Burma/Myanmar. Bad authoritarian regime is often seen as the reason also for ethnic confl ict. To some extent this perception has been suppor-ted both by comparative empirical evidence and by the fi ghting ethnic groups who feel most threatened by the strong role of the military of the central government. In interviews with seven of the armed opposition groups, mostly with their leaders, this became most clear: the principles that most groups resent most in the government constitution, were the introductory principle of the �military�s leadership role�, the right of the military to nominate key ministers, the stipulations on the presidential eligibility criteria related to the requirement that president has to have an �understanding on national defence�, and the stipulations that give too much power for the military in the declaration of emergency and in the exercise of the emergency powers.16 Pushing the country towards greater civilian role in politics would thus go a long way both to demo-cratize the country and to help meet the ethnic concerns.

However, ethnic concerns and democratic concerns are not identical. After decades of de facto independence within ceasefi re arrangements, some ethnic militias are well accustomed to their own authoritarian rule, and would not like their powers to be diminished by regional democratization. Furthermore, competition between bigger and smal-ler ethnic groups has often resulted in confl icts that have nothing to do with the authoritarian center. Finally, Burma/Myanmar has plenty of experience of ethnic confl ict within a democratic context: ethnic confl ict persisted also during the democratic decade of the 1950s. The number of casualties went down gradually, but started rising already in 1961 before the military coup of the 1962.17 Thus, the issue of collective ethnic rights cannot be reduced to democratic rights: also democratic countries have ethnic grievances some of which cannot be tackled in a normal political process.

Ethnic confl ict can persist in democracies especially when there is discrimination that is practiced against potentially rebellious ethnic minorities. This is one of the main causes of ethnic confl ict, according to comparative evidence18 Discrimination and prosecution of rebellious ethnic minorities is nothing new in Burma/Myanmar. The four cuts insurgency strategy revealed already that front lines have often been identifi ed ethnically and regionally. Martin Smith, one of the main authorities of Burma/Myanmar ethnic war, has concluded that �For the

Tatmadaw [Burmese military] in the Four Cuts campaign, there is no such thing as an innocent or neutral villager. Every community must fi ght, fl ee, or join the Tatmadaw.�19 While the current discrimination and ethnic politics are clearly related to the practices of the military, there is no reason to believe that democratization would automatically destroy the seeds of ethnic discrimination and confl ict. On the contrary, any political solution in Burma/Myanmar will have to guarantee also equality and freedom from discrimination by the majority ethnicity against ethnic minorities, in addition to introducing the basic responsi-veness of the government towards the needs of the people. Simple centralist democracy will not bring stable peace to Burma/Myanmar. This seems to be generally true for ethnically divided societies like Burma/Myanmar where centralism seems to be correlated with intra-state confl ict.20 Again the mentality of the Myanmar military (and most of their counterparts in the developing world) against decentralization and federalism is an authoritarian obstacle to a lasting peace.

Furthermore, Burma/Myanmar has the problem of bipolarity in its ethnic structure. This makes it more prone to ethnic confl ict even if the country was democratic.21 In Burma/Myanmar the dominance of the Burman ethnicity with more that 60% majority position makes the country confl ict prone. This bipolarity (majority against all the minori-ties) is easily introduced between ethnic Burmans and the other ethnici-ties. As is the case in almost all similar countries where about half of the population are from one ethnic group, such as Indonesia (Javanese), Pakistan (Punjabis), Fiji (Fijians), Boznia-Herzegovina (Boznians) Brazil (whites) East Timor (Tetum speakers), Afghanistan (Pashtuns), Rwanda before the genocide (Hutus), minorities in Burma/Myanmar easily see the state as serving merely the interests of the majority group. This setting increases the risk in Burma/Myanmar of confl ict, and it contributes to the ethnic structure of politics, which, again makes stable democracy diffi cult.22 Also indigenous confl ict resolution mechanisms are diffi cult to create as such mechanisms are easily seen as ethnically biased.

Political systems based on simple majority rule that do not acknow-ledge the need to protect the channels of expression and infl uence of the ethnic minorities do not tend to produce ethnic stability in bipola-rized countries like Burma/Myanmar.23 Political structures that offer autonomy in regional and ethnic issues to local or ethnic administra-tions have a much better prospect. Here the opportunities are many. In Indonesia and in Belgium, regional autonomy is complemented with cultural roles of ethnic groups. While in Belgium this is written in the constitution, in Indonesia, the practice is based on the division


92 93

of authority between positive law and customary law, and the practice varies from province to province. In the FCDCC constitution ethnic autonomy is solved by forming the regional states so that they mirror the historical ethnic lines. In the government constitution, this is done with the exception of the area of the majority ethnic group, which is divided into 7 divisions (=states). Furthermore, guarantees are needed for the infl uence of diverse groups in national politics in order to avoid the mounting ethnic pressures. Arend Lijphart, for example, points to several optional ways of doing this by guaranteeing power sharing in national affairs: �broad representation in the executive has been achie-ved by a constitutional requirement that it be composed of equal num-bers of the two major ethno-linguistic groups (Belgium); by granting all parties with a minimum of 5 percent of the legislative seats the right to be represented in the cabinet (South Africa, 1994�99); by the equal representation of the two main parties in the cabinet and an alternation between the two parties in the presidency (Colombia, 1958�64); and by permanently earmarking the presidency for one group and the prime ministership for another (Lebanon).�24

Political mechanisms of guaranteeing ethnic infl uence are especi-ally important for countries like Burma/Myanmar which do not have a long tradition in democracy.25 Thus in addition to pushing the go-vernment to greater responsiveness towards popular pressures about individual and group rights, the international community should help the government and the opposition develop the country�s constitutional model towards a direction that guarantees ethnic voice and a degree of regional and ethnic autonomy. Whether that means regional federa-lism as exemplifi ed by the Myanmar government constitution, ethnic federalism as exemplifi ed by the opposition constitution by the Federal Constitution Drafting and Coordination Committee (FCDCC), a conso-ciational model of power sharing between communities26 or something else,27 is less important, as long as the key concerns of the ethnic groups are somehow met.

It would make sense for the international community to offer as-sistance in the process of fi nding model for Burma/Myanmar: it would be good if the variety of alternatives were better known for the stakehol-ders. It seems, for example, that commitment to the best known models of federalism has affected the fact that ethnic representation has been sought, both by the government constitution and the FCDCC constitu-tion drafters from a system based on states. However, if ethnic groups do not live in geographical areas that could be easily defi ned, ethnic interests cannot be guaranteed by a system based on states in a federal upper house. A model, where in addition to regional representation eth-

nic groups have a non-territorial ethnic representation, could be more suitable as an alternative or a supplement to the suggested models. In this respect, for example the Belgian model could be interesting as a comparison to the one envisioned to Burma/Myanmar.

Human Capacities, and Micro-GovernanceIn addition to structures that tackle the problems of ethnic rights and responsiveness of the government, there has to be capacity to act within those structures. Ethnic and democratic grievances cannot be satisfi ed, and centralist authoritarian violence cannot be prevented, even in a con-text of better political structures, if the mentalities of the rulers do not change and the capacity of governance does not improve. It has often been suggested that capacity for better governance cannot be built be-fore the political structure is democratic and responsive. Empirical evi-dence does not, however, support this claim. If one looks at indicators of stability of governance, and indicators of human rights sensitivity of governance and compares them to indicators of macro structures of the polity one can see, on the basis of global evidence since 1800, that democratic structures are not a pre-requirement for the development of capacity to govern. Macro-structures and governance capacity are both needed for stable peace, but neither has to come fi rst before the other can be developed; the international community can try to work on both simultaneously.28 Experience shows that the focus should be on building the ingredients for durable peaceful change, rather than being focused on project level progress.29 In authoritarian settings, building institu-tions that are needed for governance and participation is challenging but necessary. In situations such as that facing Burma/Myanmar is, programs to build capacity for forms of media, and competence for the organization of political party institutions, labour organizations, and interest groups would be useful.30 Furthermore, of course, media support and the support of media infrastructure can contribute to the reduction of violent repression if it manages to build in at least some kind of transparency in an authoritarian country.31

The ability to design and modify constitutions and knowledge of the constitutional opportunities would also support the process of democratization and confl ict resolution as has been discussed above.32

How much external assistance can be given to these elements of democratization depend partly on the level of trust and distrust of the government towards foreigners or specifi c countries and donors, but also on the effectiveness of incentives and pressures that persuade the government to allow help in the build-up of democratic capacity.33


94 95

The third wave of democratization, from 1974-1990, proved the importance of religious organizations, their independence of the state and their contacts within the democratizing society and with actors outside the country. Wherever the Catholic church was suffi ciently independent and well connected inside the countries' networks of pro-democracy groups and donors who were pushing the countries towards democracy, it could play a constructive role in persuading the elite to compromise. This was mainly done by using extra-political arguments against violence. Those religious arguments were felt legitimate by both confl icting parties within the elites and among the democracy movements.34 This experience could also offer lessons to Burma/Myanmar, where Buddhist monks are challenging the legitimacy of the authoritarian government. Buddhist norms against violence should be used especially to weaken the legitimacy of authoritarianism within the elite.

Economic Capacity and Micro Governance In addition to structures and skills, governance that transforms the roots of confl ict requires economic capacity. The buildup of econo-mic capacity is a tricky issue, though, since it can negatively affect the pressure international community exerts to the military rulers to push them to compromises with democracy groups and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, if the international community empowers a repressive government, there is a risk that the government becomes more power-ful in its repression. Yet, poverty negatively affects Burma/Myanmar�s confl ict potential and at some stage the international community needs to tackle this, so that a durable peace can emerge. All other things being equal, one can calculate, on the basis of comparative evidence, that if Burma/Myanmar�s per capita income could be doubled, its confl ict risk could be halved, whereas if its per capita income halves its confl ict risk would be doubled. At the level of Burma/Myanmar�s economic deve-lopment, one percent of growth in income would reduce the probability of war by one percent.35 Poverty has to be won in Burma/Myanmar in ways that utilize broader economic participation. An economic strategy based on the revenue of natural resources will not help peace. This is because dependence of the economy on natural resources is a curse rather than a blessing for an instable country. It gives an incentive for armed groups to fi ght for political power,36 and makes democratiza-tion more diffi cult.37 Thus the long-term strategy of transformation of Burma/Myanmar�s economic confl ict structures has to manage to pro-duce economic growth and diversify the economy and make economic growth more inclusive.

How Can the International Community Be Part of the Solutions?We now have a picture of what, on the basis of experiences from other processes of confl ict resolution, should be done to help work for a dura-ble peace in Burma/Myanmar. But of course the problem for the inter-national community is that the international community does not rule Burma/Myanmar; the military does. In order to change structures of political governance, even in order to build capacity for governance, the international community will have to use its power to persuade the go-vernment to compromises that help the pacifi cation of the country. The fundamental issues of democracy and ethnic minority rights are issues where the government has its partisan interests and a partisan agenda. Thus it is unlikely to be willing to do too far reaching compromises. Ex-perience on how the international community has previously managed and failed to push governments towards democratic compromises and respect for ethnic and human rights can, therefore, shed some light on the ways to make an international strategy successful.

Can the Government be Defeated?Theoretically the government could be defeated by three alternative ways. One could crush the government militarily or defeat it poli-tically by strengthening the opposition�s power vis-à-vis it. Thirdly, since the government needs some basic economic means of gover-nance, depriving it these means could also defeat it as a functioning government.

Military scenarioThe experience of international community�s ability to destabilize aut-horitarian regimes is surprisingly impressive. If one looks at the 116 cases of international sanctions before 1990, one can see that 80% of sanctions succeed if the objective of the sanctions is to destabilize the target government, and if the target already is distressed.38 If we look at the most spectacular cases of democratization, the record of inter-national pressure is equally impressive. Polity IV data39 gives data on the level of democracy in each country since 1800. If one looks at year-by-year change of this overall indicator of democracy, one can pinpoint the radical positive changes towards democracy. Seven out of the ten most spectacular changes were at least partly caused by international manipulation of the military power balance in the country. In the case of Latvia 1991, Estonia 1991, Lithuania 1991, Bulgaria 1990, Czecho-


96 97

slovakia 1990, the reason was the ending of Soviet military presence, while in Panama 1989, Argentina 1983, Greece 1926, Lesotho 1993, and Haiti 1994 � all among 23 most spectacular cases of democratization � democratization was helped by international intervention or military humiliation of the authoritarian government. Against expectations, the role of international manipulation of military pressure is equally strong in many of the more gradual democratization processes. If one looks at processes where the government has not in fi ve years taken a single step towards authoritarianism, away from democracy (indicated by an increased annual authoritarianism indicator, or a reduced democracy indicator), and produced a good 5-year progress in democratization, se-ven out of the ten best (8 out of 11) processes were �assisted militarily� from the outside.

The experiences of manipulation of military capacity have, howe-ver, taken place in contexts that are substantially different from those in Burma/Myanmar. The occupation and the ending of occupation in the Baltic countries as well as the military pressure on Haiti were all in contexts where the target of military manipulation was a nearby country with very little military power compared to the occupier. In Eastern Europe the occupation required an exceptionally bloody war, and once the occupation and military dominance was in place it was only the military superiority of the Soviet Union that kept the authori-tarian systems of Eastern Europe going. The effect of regime change in the dominant neighbor of Lesotho was relatively similar to that of East Europe. The case of Greece in the 1920s was also very different in terms of power politics. It was the united world community in the League of Nations that was behind the coercion and military humilia-tion of the authoritarian regime that contributed to change. Military humiliation was also part of the explanation of the downfall of the military regime of Argentina in 1983, but there the domestic factors were more pronounced.

Needless to say that these contexts were very different than that in Burma/Myanmar, which has a mighty army, terrain that is very diffi cult for any military offender, and distance from all the powers who are most eager to see change in the country. Furthermore, littoral countries, including the powerful China, have interests in Burma/Myanmar very different from those of the West, and therefore, any military involve-ment in the country by the West would risk a war with China.40 Direct military �occupation� of Burma/Myanmar looks then neither possible nor desirable. Even military humiliation would probably be possible only for China, which again has its own strategic reasons not to break ties with Burma/Myanmar.

Political ScenarioThe military regime could be defeated by supporting the domestic for-ces that could then take over. This has been the formula for success in many Latin American countries. The sudden ending of the US support for the authoritarian regimes due to President Jimmy Carter�s human rights campaign, and due to President Ronald Reagan�s and George Bush Snr.�s campaign against drug trade (and in the case of Uruguay 1985, US support was withdrawn because of a dispute over Exclusive Economic Zones), tilted the balance of power in favor of the opposition groups, and defeated the authoritarian governments. However, while in Latin America (and in Syria 1954), the opposition had its political and military strength, in some countries nearly matching the capacity of the government, in Burma Myanmar, the government has 10-15 times more troops than the rebels. Furthermore, majority of the rebel troops are in a ceasefi re with the government and fear some of the other rebel factions as much or more than the government. Furthermore, the room for organization of political action against the government is very limi-ted in Burma/Myanmar, making it very diffi cult for the opposition to defeat the government.

The power balance that has previously defeated authoritarian go-vernments has in most of the spectacular success cases been much more even, even though estimates are diffi cult to make. Yet, obviously, the East European oppositions did not have any military power, and yet they won over the government. Also some of the Latin American regi-mes were equally unrestrained in suppressing their opposition. Uru-guay, for example, had world�s greatest number of political detainees in the beginning of the year that it democratized. Yet the democratic opposition won with the help of a divided military. But in all these cases the government yielded to compromises or was divided (as in the case of most of Latin American cases and Syria 1954) rather being simply defeated.

It would be possible that the Myanmar government could be di-vided, and part of the military would start supporting the democratic opposition or the ethnic minorities. However, bringing division into the military could also be dangerous: the only clear way to the �Soma-lianization� of Burma/Myanmar, in addition to the total collapse of the economy, would be the fragmentation of the army. With army factions fi ghting each other we could bring the silent and low intensity level confl ict with scarce resources for fi ghting into the level of open warfare, with abundantly equipped confl icting parties. This would obviously not be desirable. Thus the political avenue, á la Latin America seems also not feasible and not desirable.


98 99

While the power political element of the democratization of former European communist states was a mechanism of democratization, we cannot emulate in the Burmese context, there was another element of the transition that could be more relevant. While the power-base of the local communist elites was naturally weakened by the weakening and collapse of the Soviet Union, and while this was a major element in the explanation of the democratization processes, the military balance still stood in favor of them against the people at the time they yielded to fun-damental changes. Once the process of democratization had started in some parts of the communist world, there was a sense of inevitability of democratic change. This opened the fl oodgates of democracy. However, that element of East European democratization required an element of persuasion: the government was not defeated, but persuaded, and this is strategically very different

Economic scenarioEconomic �Somalianization� of Burma/Myanmar would constitute a defeat to the government. The lack of economic means for governance would create a situation where no-one was in control, or where gover-nance was reduced to regional war-lord administration. Since this is so obviously a strategy that would involve a lot of suffering, it remains a theoretical one. The third wave of democratization (1974-1990) involved cases where economic crises helped persuade the government to give up its control and give power to the opposition. According to Samuel Huntington,41 economic trouble was a major factor explaining the suc-cess of this wave. However, again, the economic trouble did not defeat these governments; it only persuaded them to give up power. It is time to go to that difference and look at strategies to persuade, rather than strategies to defeat Burma/Myanmar government.

Can the Government Be Persuaded?If the international community tries to make the government more ad-herent to the grievances of the opposition by defeating the regime and replacing it with another, it needs to push the government all the way. In that strategy, there is no room for positive signals or rewards. Howe-ver, a strategy that aims at persuasion needs to create a maximal cont-rast between reactions to stubbornness and reactions to compromise. Stubbornness has to be deterred, and punished, while compromise has to be rewarded. As it seems the odds for the strategy to defeat are not very good. Thus, it seems that the international community would need to opt for persuasion rather than defeating the government.

When the government starts yielding to the pressure of democratic forces, the process seems to have a special logic. Often it is coupled with the perception of inevitability of democratization. In some countries the radicalization of the civil society convinced some members of the government to the inevitability of democracy in the country. In some others, the element of international pressure was also important for the emergence of the conviction of inevitability of democracy. As a result of this conviction, individual offi cials started calculating their career moves and decided that it was wise to start building their �democratic credentials.� These credentials were useful for the rescuing of ones po-sition when the country became democratic. Offi cials felt that they had to jump into the bandwagon of democracy in order to survive politically. The more people did this, the more attractive this choice became. What happens on the macro level when individuals start jumping into the bandwagon of democracy is not really controllable, and can surprise the people who made the fi rst moves towards democracy. Very often though, the process does serve the fi rst movers, and those moving decisively will be able to control the process. In Indonesia the current president is the fi rst cabinet minister to turn against the authoritarianism of President Suharto. Also in the Philippines the fi rst military man to go against Marcos� authoritarianism, General Fidel Ramos, was the country�s president within ten years from the democratization. The same, where fi rst elite members that turn against authoritarianism inherit power in a democratic setting, has happened in many other countries with different variations, including many east European countries, such as Poland and Russia, let alone Latin America. The bandwagon of demo-cracy could have been in motion in Burma/Myanmar during the time of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. While the elite were not seriously divi-ded, scholars could identify the emergence of a third way, an approach that pushed the government towards democracy, even from the inside of the military.

The bandwagon process to democracy is precarious, though, since the fear of political future will often disappear when authoritarian mea-sures create a much more immediate danger of survival. The bandwa-gon to democracy was moving in Burma/Myanmar in 2003, as it was moving also in China of 1989, or in Indonesia in 1965, but it stopped, once the government cracked down on the ones who were going too far. Thus it is quite essential that the international support for processes of democratization focuses more on keeping government�s committed to democratic reforms than on pushing them to new measures of demo-cratization. According to confl ict literature, this can be done by maxi-mally publicizing the commitments of the leaders in a positive context,


100 101

by interpreting statements as commitments and by rewarding political compromise.42

While demonstrations and civil disobedience can be internal rea-sons for the government to conclude that the situation is impossible and democratization inevitable, international community can persuade the authoritarian rule by means of sanctions and conditionality.

Experience since the First World War suggests that sanctions can be successful in persuading the government if:

� Sanctions manage to threaten the core interests of the autho-ritarian leadership.� The effect of sanctions is not reduced by nations outside the sanctions regime that can offer the denied values. Circumven-tion of sanctions is a problem.� Sanctions are short and decisive so that the regime cannot, over time work out strategies to compensate the denied values or direct the costs to the people or the opposition.� Sanctions are strictly targeted against the regime (fi nancial rather than comprehensive trade sanctions), rather than against the nation or the people. This is in order to avoid unnecessary cost and in order to deny the regime the opportunity to success-fully frame sanctions as an issue of nationalism. � Sanctions should be conditional to target government�s be-havior rather its identity. If the target of sanctions feel that pu-nishment would be forthcoming regardless of what the target government does, sanctions will fail. Sanctions that are sent by enemies normally fail, too, because they are framed as hostility, while sanctions sent by allies often succeed. � When sanction strategy maximizes the incentive for compro-mise for the target of sanctions. This can be done by combining punishment of authoritarian action and by rewarding democra-tic compromise. � When compromises of the target of sanctions are made easier by avoiding nationalistic sensitivities, offering face saving for-mulas for the target government, and by avoiding power politi-cal framing in sanctions: sanctions in a context of a power battle (where yielding would be a defeat) do not succeed to persuade the target of sanctions.

The fact that sanctions must be costly to a stubborn government seems natural. This is also supported by empirical evidence. However, the cost for the target should be considered together with the costs for the sender. If the target feels that the sender suffers more from sanctions,

the threat of sanctions is not credible43: the target will not yield if it expects the sender to yield and end sanctions. Looking at the history of 130 sanctions after the First World War, until year 2000, we can, for ex-ample, see that sanctions were rarely imposed by weaker senders (who could possibly suffer more from the sanctions) on stronger targets (who would probably suffer less). When they were, they were never fully suc-cessful.44

If the target does not get help from other countries, sanctions will hit the target harder and this will increase the likelihood of success.45 This is especially true if the target cannot substitute the supply of important import goods with goods from countries outside the sanctions regime.46

This, of course is not the case for Burma/Myanmar, which gets many of the import goods from China, Russia, ASEAN and India. This wea-kens the power of sanctions considerably, but not totally. While many products are available from the Burma�s Dark Knights, many Western high technology products that the Myanmar elite would like to have are not available.

If the target of sanctions is an authoritarian country like Burma/Myanmar, with elite that has amassed overseas assets, hitting these assets has generally been a good strategy of creating pressure.47

Furthermore, fi nancial sanctions tend to manage to hit authoritarian regimes better than many other types of sanctions.48 In the same vein, Olsson,49 fi nds restrictions to aid, investment, fi nance and technology especially useful in pressuring authoritarian regimes. In the case of Western sanctions against Burma/Myanmar, technological and fi nan-cial sanctions could be the element of Western sanctions package that is most effective, as Western technology or capital is not easy to com-pensate for by resorting to the less developed and less capital intensive economies of Burma/Myanmar�s allies. Export restrictions of senders in military hardware are mainly motivated by the unwillingness of the West to participate in violent practices of Myanmar government, but they, too hit a well selected target. The hurt is felt by much of the military.

Symbolic sanctions hitting the elite, such as travel restrictions, sports ban of an elite sport have been reported to have a signifi cant infl uence on elite population, making it more likely that strong elite develops progressive factions.50

Trade sanctions that are not restricted to state-owned companies of the target countries can increase the price of the sanctions to the target country. However, unrestricted trade sanctions mainly hit people rather than the elite, and thereby they can actually play against the power of the pro-democracy coalitions, which are more dependent on the sup-


102 103

port of large constituencies of the target country.51 In addition to this, all-out trade sanctions go against European objectives of protecting the people of Burma/Myanmar. The contribution of sanctions to suffering of ordinary people is often greater than believed. Often it compares to the suffering of people in wars.52 This suffering can help the governme-nt use sanctions for its own legitimacy by channeling the popular dissa-tisfaction against the international community; the source of sanctions. This does not make sanctions less costly for the target, but it makes the target more determined, as people are more prepared to accept costs for the sake of the nation.53 Thus the selective strategy of European sanc-tions in Burma/Myanmar seems to be supported by empirical evidence more than the American all-out sanctions strategy. If we look at cases where the government has managed to mobilize nationalism against international sanctions, we can easily see that they have not been very successful:

While the duration of sanctions could be seen increasing the costs for the target, long sanctions tend to offer the target opportunities of substituting restrictions with domestic production and supply from countries outside the sanction regime. Furthermore, if sanctions are not effective in a few years, the government often fi nds ways to transfer the costs of sanctions to the people or to the opposition54. Thus it seems that the long duration of sanctions in Burma/Myanmar has reduced the likelihood of success.

Also if sanctions are seen as a sign of hostility they loose their power. This is because of the logic of persuasion, which requires that sanctions are conditional to the behavior of the targets of sanctions. If the target feels that it is being punished out of hostility, regardless of what it does, sanctions do not add to the incentive to make compromises.

The impact of hostility is very pronounced also in sanctions that specifi cally aim at coercing democratic compromise.

If sanctions become a matter of power battle between enemies, they will succeed only if the senders can totally defeat their enemies with sanctions.55 Otherwise they tend to fail totally: compromising to an enemy, means loosing ones face. A good example of this is the track record of sanctions across the divide of the global power play during the cold war. Of eight cases of sanctions over the iron curtain, seven were total failures, while one was a moderate failure. As defeating the target of sanctions is not possible in Burma/Myanmar, the international community should try to avoid making persuasion a matter of power battle. Instead, the international community should try to work for face saving formulas for the Myanmar government. For this, it would be important that the international community collaborated with Burma/Myanmar�s allies: in order to avoid Western sanctions becoming a �punishment from an enemy�, they should be coordinated with policies of nations friendly to Burma/Myanmar. If Myanmar�s allies can support some of the European objectives in Burma/Myanmar, this could have a positive effect: according to evidence of the previous cases of sanctions.

When the target of pressure tries to marginalize the infl uence of


Successful Unsuccessful cases cases

Nationalism 13 % of all cases 87%became where nationalisma major issue became a major issue

Nationalism 54% 46%did not becomea major issue

Totally successful allies neutral Enemies Totalcases, or total failures

Successful cases 10 4 2 16

Unsuccessful cases 5 9 18 32

Total 15 10 16 41

Cases realted to Human Allies Neutal Enemies TotalRights and Democratization

Totally successful cases 2 0 0 2

Modestly Sucessful cases 4 2 1 7

Modestly Unsuccessful cases 6 1 0 7

Totally unsuccessful cases 0 6 4 10

Total 12 9 5 26

104 105

enemy coercion, it often does that by building an identitive barrier between the target and sender of pressure. When the South African apartheid government tried to marginalize pressure from the African National Congress (ANC) and its international allies, it did so by associating the movement with communism and secular immorality. While doing this it also linked its own identity to the block of anti-communist countries, to free trade and to the community of Christians. This made the government very vulnerable to pressure from its anti-communist and Christian allies. Once these forces, important to the identity of the Apartheid government, turned their backs, and the country was left to trade only with socialist countries, it was very diffi cult for the government to legitimize its rule to its own white supporters. The government�s discursive shield against the ANC and supporters of racial equality dropped, and members of the government, as individuals, became exposed to democratic criticism of their roles as offi cials of a racist government. More and more people from the government itself started pressuring the government to reforms until the prime minister himself decided to open secret negotiations with the ANC.

Similarly, when the authoritarian governments of Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay tried to marginalize pressure from President Jimmy Carter�s �idealist regime,� they also made themselves more vulnerable to the pressure of President Ronald Reagan�s �realist administration.� When the USA continued to criticize these countries (no longer only due to democracy problems, though) after the ending of Carter�s pressure, the elites soon became ready for compromises. Also the marginalization of the West in Burma/Myanmar, by using arguments related to neo-colonialism, domination, etc. and by building on Asian exceptionalism, has made the country more vulnerable to criticism fellow Asians, especially China, who is often seen as the leading critic of Western moralist domination. This is clear from the interviews among government offi cials conducted for this article. Southeast Asian criticism and the Chinese behind the scenes persuasion is diffi cult to counter for the military government, since their discursive strategy of marginalizing criticism has been based on the nationalist anti-Western rhetoric.

Compromising can also be expensive if compromises required are too fundamental. According to Hufbauer et al. (1990 op. cit.), senders of sanctions should be realistic with their demands; otherwise the probability of success in sanctions becomes low. Yet it is natural that cosmetic changes in Burma/Myanmar will not change the situation of its people. What could be done to avoid demanding too much would

be to frame the demands in a way that avoids offending the country�s sensitive nationalism: compromises by the junta should not be made a matter of victory to the West. Instead, they should be framed as part of governments own plan. This could be done by trying to study the positive elements of the government�s own roadmap for democracy, and the constitution and encouraging reform that could be based on the progressive elements of government�s own program. The optimal situation would be if the process that the government calls the roadmap or Seven Steps to Democracy, which already facilitates some openness towards ethnic groups and the exiled and detained democratic opposition (the government has openly declared that it will negotiate with anyone who wants), could be encouraged to open further. This way it could effectively be some kind of tripartite negotiation on the constitution and its interpretation and implementation. If tripartite negotiation could be introduced without discrediting the merits of the progressive elements of government�s own strategy, the compromises that should be encouraged and pressured from the government would not be felt as too costly.

Finally, after an assessment of how pressure for compromises can be made more successful, one also needs to remember that in addition to pressure, the Myanmar government also needs encouragement and rewards for the compromises it makes. If the international community only uses its stick and never the carrot, it cannot maximize the incentive for compromise. The �stick only� approach can work for the hopeless task of defeating the Myanmar government, but it cannot aid the more realistic process of making democratization inevitable for individuals in the Myanmar leadership.

ConclusionsThe confl ict of Burma/Myanmar is complex, and contributing to so-lutions requires politically diffi cult strategies and a fl exible approach. On the one hand, the international community should not believe that it can solve one of the two main problems without tackling the other: democracy cannot guarantee ethnic rights, and ethnic harmony does not guarantee democracy. Yet both objectives need to be reached before a durable solution to the confl icts in Burma/Myanmar can be found.

In its efforts to fi nd solutions for the country, the international com-munity needs to address both the confl ict structures and to persuade the Myanmar government to compromise on issues relating to demo-cracy and ethnic rights. In some cases, it is natural to assume that the opposition can also be persuaded to compromise, especially if this does


106 107

not jeopardize the fi nal objective of a democratic and ethnically har-monious peace. Tackling confl ict structures is possible already before a change in polity.

International experience suggests several lessons on how to push the confl icting parties to compromise. However, the hostility and ani-mosity that international pressure and sanctions generates has made it diffi cult to implement these lessons. Is this article pointed out in the introduction, confl ict casualties peak whenever the government backtracks from its progressive commitments. It has also been shown how democratization processes in countries in which the government cannot simply be defeated often proceed with small steps taken by the authoritarian government towards democracy. From these small steps, and in combination with international and internal pressure, a sense of the inevitability of democracy may follow, and members of govern-ment then begin to jump on the bandwagon of democracy in pursuit of personal gain. This is the process that the international community can and should support. However, if animosity and hostility prevent the international community from recognizing progress when it is made, then it will not be possible for the international community to attempt to prevent the government in question from backtracking from the process. For example, when the Myanmar government introduced a constitution and called for a referendum on it, the international com-munity should have reacted positively, which would then have allowed it to react negatively to the subsequent watering down of the process by the introduction of pre-voting processes that failed to guarantee the anonymity and secrecy of the ballot. While recognizing the weaknes-ses of the government constitution draft, the international community should also try to cling to the progressive elements within it and push for an implementation of those elements. At the same time the inter-national community could try to push for negotiation with democratic and ethnic opposition on those parts of the government constitution that are unhelpful for the transformation of Burma/Myanmar�s confl ict structures. This would require cool-headedness and fl exibility, however. In order to foster a more rational strategy, we must learn to avoid the kind of emotional politics that prevent a more pragmatic strategy. The international community has to be focused on the questions of what will help Burma/Myanmar in the long term. By acting rationally instead of emotionally, while still keeping sight at the needs of the Burmese, the international community could be able to pursue a much more effective strategy. The international community should be able to contribute to the resolution and/or transformation of Burma/Myanmar confl icts.

Notes1 The cases of international pressure selected for this study are the 116 post-World War I sanction cases reviewed in Hufbauer Schott & Eliot 1990 + the 12 cases of UN mandated sanctions in the 1990s (based on the review of Cortright, Wagler & Lopez 2000) and 2 unilateral cases + EU sanctions in 10 ACP countries in the 2000. Altogether the number of cases studied for this study is thus 140. The cases of democratization utilize the data on polity development of all countries from 1800 until 2003. However, a more thorough qualitative investigation has focused on the 20 most spectacular cases of democratiza-tion. 2 The comparison is based on the data Uppsala and PRIO Confl ict Datasets. UCDP/PRIO Confl ict Dataset, see Lacina, Bethany & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2005. 'Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths', European Journal of Population 21(2�3): 145�166; Harbom, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen, 2007. 'Armed Confl ict, 1989�2006', Journal of Peace Research 44(5): 623�634; Harbom, Lotta & Peter Wal-lensteen, 2005. �Armed Confl ict and Its International Dimensions, 1946�2004�, Journal of Peace Research 42(5): 623�635. The threshold for confl ict is 25 casualties. It is likely that the Uppsala/PRIO data fails to reveal the accurate numbers of casualties for various years of the confl ict in Burma/Myanmar. Estimates can also be too conservative or too high on average, while it could be that some of the changes in year-to-year casualty levels has been estimated incorrectly. However, in absence of alternative data that could be used for year-to-year comparisons, and comparisons with other countries, this dataset, that has strictly enforced, unifi ed methodological tools for the assessment of casualties for each year and each country has been taken as best estimate that comparative work has to be based. 3 This assessment is based on interviews in March 2008, among 7 fi ghting groups4 Gleditsch, Kristian S. & Michael D. Ward. 2002. �Peace and War in Time and Space: The Role of Democratization,� International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, 1-29.5 In addition to direct killings by the government, the concept of democide covers cases in which death is caused by intentional or knowingly reckless and depraved disregard for life (thus constituting practical intent).6 Rummel, Rudolph 1994. Death by Government. Transaction Publishers, New Bruns-wick.7 Kivimäki, Timo 2003. �The Era of Terrorism: The Global Context of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism�, in Timo Kivimäki, ed., Development Cooperation as an Instrument In the Prevention of Terrorism. Copenhagen: Danish Foreign Ministry Publications. Calculation is based on data provided by Rummel, Ibid. 8 Kivimäki, Timo 2005. �The EU and Asian Security: Introduction�, in Timo Kivimäki & Jørgen Delman, eds, The Security Situation In Asia: Changing Regional Security Struc-ture? Report to the Danish Foreign Ministry. Copenhagen: NIAS Press. 9 Taylor, Robert H.2005. �Pathways to the Present", p. 7, in Kyaw, Yin Hlaing, Robert H. Taylor & Tin Maung Maung Than (Eds.) Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives. ISEAS, Singapore. 10 Christina Fink 2001. Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule. White Lotus/University Press Ltd./Zed Books: Bangkok/Dhaka/London/New York, p. 29.11 Briefi ng by the Minister of Information, of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung study group, Yangoon, October 2006.


108 109

12 According to Collier, it is the bipolar societies that are at greatest risk of war, not the di-verse societies. See, Collier, Paul (2000). Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance. Economics and Politics, November, 12(3), 225-45.13 Rummel, Rudolph J. 1995. "Democracies ARE less Warlike Than Other Regimes", European Journal of International Relations 1, 457-79.14. Rummel, Rudolph J.1997. "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism", Journal of Peace Research, vol 34, no. 2, 1997, 163-175.15 Rummel, Rudolph J. 1994. Death by Government. Transaction Publishers, New Brus-wick, NJ.16 Discussions and interviews by the author in Mae Sot, Chiang Mai and Rangoon, March 200817 Partly this could have been a result of military�s increasing role, but still, it happened in a democratic context.18 Gurr, Ted Robert 1993. Minorities at Risk. Washington DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press; Gurr, Ted Robert 1994. �Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Confl ict and the Changing World-System (1994 Presidential Address)�, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3. 19 Smith, Martin 1999. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London: Zed Books, pp. 259-60. 20 Gurr, Ted Robert and Mark Irving Lichbach 1979. �Forecasting Domestic Political Confl ict,� in J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, eds, To Auger Well: Early Warning Indicators in World Politics, 153-93. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.21 Collier, Paul 2000. Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance. Economics and Po-litics, November, 12(3), 225-45; for supporting evidence on the peacefulness of heteroge-neous societies, see Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin 2003. �Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War�, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97 (February).22 For the diffi culties of democracy and peace in countries where politics is structured along ethnic lines, see Zartman, I. William 2005. Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers.23 Welsh, David 1993. �Domestic Politics and Ethnic Confl ict,� in Michael E. Brown, ed., Ethnic Confl ict and International Security, 43-60. Princeton: Princeton University Press.24 Lijphart Arend 2004. �Constitutional Design for Divided Societies�, Journal of Demo-cracy, Vol. 15, No. 2., p. 99.25 McGarry, John and Brendan O�Leary 2006. �Consociational Theory: Northern Ireland�s Confl ict, and Its Agreement 2 � What Critics of Consociation Can Learn from Northern Ireland�, Government and Opposition, Vol. 41, No. 2, 249-277.26 Lijphart, Arend 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven: Yale University Press; Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press; Rabushka, Alvin & Kenneth A. Shepsle 2004. Politics in Plural Socie-ties Columbus, Ohio: Merrill. 27 Ian O�Flynn advocates a system of deliberative democracy that aims at promoting principled decision-making which involves stakeholders regardless of their ethnic origin (regional people in regional issues, ethnic Pa-o in issues that affect ethnic Pa-o, national leaders in issues involving the whole nation). See, O�Flynn, Ian 2006. Deliberative De-mocracy and Divided Societies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 28 I have elsewhere shown this by calculating the correlations between governance and

year-by-year development of political macro-structure, and between political macro-structure and year-by-year development of governance. Neither of the relationship was correlated, regardless of the indicator selected, proving that neither governance capacity, nor the political macro structure can be seen as a requirement for the other. Calcula-tion was based on Polity IV data from Marshall Mark & Keith Jaggers 2006. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2004. Available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/showFiles.asp

See Timo Kivimäki 2007. �European Policies vis-à-vis the �Burma/Myanmar Issue�: An Analysis of Arguments for Two Main Strategy Alternatives� Dialogue + Cooperation 1/200729 Brown, Keith 2006. Transacting Transition: The Micropolitics of Democracy Assis-tance in the Former Yugoslavia. Bloomfi eld CT: Kumarian Press Inc.30 Carothers, Thomas 2007. �The �Sequencing� Fallacy�, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18, No. 1 (January), 12-27.; Zeeuw, Jeroen de 2005. �Projects Do Not Create Institutions�, Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 4 (August). Krishna Kumar 2006. Promoting Independent Media: Strategies for Democratic Assistance. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.31 Rummel 1994, ibid. 32 Dauderstädt, Michael and Arne Schildberg 2006. Dead Ends of Transition. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag..33 Kumar 2006, ibid..34 Philpott, Daniel 2004. �Christianity and Democracy: The Catholic Wave�, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April), 32-46.35 This is based on statistical evidence by Collier and Hoeffl er, in Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffl er 2002. Aid, Policy and Peace. Reducing the Risks of Civil Confl ict. Center for African Economic Studies, Oxford University. Working Paper Series. Available at

http://econpapers.repec.org/article/tafdefpea/v_3A13_3Ay_3A2002_3Ai_3A6_3Ap_3A435-450.htm>.36 Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffl er 2000. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. World Bank Development Research Group. Available at <http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/06/17/000094946_00060205420011/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf>.37 Acemoglu, Daron James A. Robinson 2006 Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 38 Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Patricia Davis & Benjamin Radcliff 1997. �On the Determinants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis�, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 2, April, 608-618.39 Marshall Mark & Keith Jaggers 2006. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteris-tics and Transitions, 1800-2004. Available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/showFiles.asp40 Ian Storey identifi es the scenario where Burma/Myanmar is in a civil war as one of the least unlikely scenarios where a war between the UYS and China could break up. See, Sto-rey, Ian 2007. The United States and ASEAN-China Relations: All Quiet on the Southeast Asian Front. Washington DC: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.41 Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Nor-man: University of Oklahoma Press..


110 111

42 Staw, B.M., The Escalation of Commitment To a Course of Action, Academy of Man-agement Review, 1981, 6 (4), 577-587; Mitchell, C.R., Gestures of Conciliation, Basing-stoke: MacMillan, 2000; Salancik, G.R, Commitment and the Control of Organizational Behavior and Belief, in New Directions in Organizational Behavior, eds. Staw B.M and Salancik G.R. (Illinois: St Clair Press, 1977.43 This element of the logic of the Nash�s and Harsanyi�s bargaining game is well elabora-ted in Thomas C. Schelling�s classical book, Stategy of Confl ict (London, 1963).44 Canada managed to impose several sanctions on targets stronger than or equally strong as itself. However, in each case Canada represented a moral sender community (of Non-Proliferation Treaty supporters, for example), that was stronger than the target. At the same time, the Soviet Union tried to take on the West in the Berlin Blockade and failed miserably, as did Australia, when imposing sanctions on France, after France�s nuclear testing in the Pacifi c Atolls. In the latter case, however, the intention of sanctions was probably more demonstrative. As a moral punishment, one could say that Austra-lia managed to reach her objectives, as France�s wine industry was severely affected by sanctions.45 Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly A. Elliot 1990. Economic Sanctions Reconsidered. History and Current Policy. 2nd ed. Washington DC: Institute for Interna-tional Economics, 82-85.46 Drury, Cooper 1998. �Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered�, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 4. (July), 497-509.47 Morgen, T. Clifton, and Valerie L. Schwebach 1997. Economic Sanctions as an Instru-ment of Foreign Policy: The Role of Domestic Politics," Presented at the annual meeting of the APSA, Washington DC.48 Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Patricia Davis & Benjamin Radcliff 1997. �On the Determi-nants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis�, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 2, April, 608-618; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot 1997, ibid.49 Olsson, Richard Steward 1979. �Economic Coercion in World Politics" World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 4. (Jul.), 471-494.50 Sanctions restricting the participation of the South African national cricket team, for example, have been found effective.51 Lektzian, David & Mark Souva 2007. �An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and Success�, Journal of Confl ict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 6 (December), 848-871.52 Mueller, John and Karl Mueller 1999. �Sanctions of Mass Destruction�, Foreign Affairs, May/June.53 Baer, Georg: 1973.Sanctions and security: The League of Nations and the Italian-Ethio-pian War" International Organization XXVII, Spring; Pape, Robert A. 1997. Why econo-mic sanctions do not work. International Security 22 (2): 90�136.; Olsen 1979, op.cit. 479.54 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Tess Cyrus and Elizabeth Winston 1997. �US Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages�, Peter-son Institute Working Paper. Available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp.cfm?ResearchID=149; Miyagawa, Makio 1992. Do Economic Sanctions Work? New Yor:, St. Martin Press. 55 This was the case in UN sanctions against Khmer Rouge in 1992 and onwards until the demise of Khmer Rouge.

Political Developmentsin Burma and India�sStrategic InterestsBaladas Ghoshal

IntroductionBetween engagement and isolation, Burma, now known as Myanmar, is in a state of decline with an abysmal record in the political, economic and social spheres, which has had grave implications for the future of its people and for the country itself, once the richest and now the poorest country in Southeast Asia. The abandoned former campuses of Yangon and Mandalay universities, at one time leading institutions of higher learning in Asia, which produced distinguished Myanmarese from all walks of life, typically symbolize the state of things in Myanmar today. A country rich in natural resources and intellect has degenerated into an economically poor and intellectually mediocre country through misrule and ill-conceived social engineering. The ruling junta has de-vised an ingenious way of retaining their power and control over Bur-mese society. The university campuses have all been moved away from the cities to the outskirts, dispersed so that no effective mobilization of students and teachers can take place against the regime. Teachers and students have been forced to double as security agents, reporting any activities detrimental to the interests of the regime to their bosses in Tatmadaw. It is not just a strategy of divide and rule, but also one of dispersing and debilitating civil society, the vitality of which is a must for democratic political development. The development of a healthy ci-vil society has been viewed as an anathema to the junta�s role in politics and society in Burma.

Indeed there has been a proliferation of higher educational institu-tions in Burma in recent years to meet growing demand, but their qua-lity is embarrassingly poor and they lack an intellectual environment as well as any forum for discussing questions of nation-building, somet-hing that both the universities of Rangoon and Mandalay were known for. The destruction of the old university structures, a lack of academic job opportunities, and a stifl ed intellectual life in the country have led to a massive exodus of talent from the country. Burma�s main econo-


112 113

mic elite and entrepreneurs were already hounded out of Burma in the 1960s when Gen. Ne Win staged a coup took that overthrew the elected civilian government in power and initiated a process of ill-conceived na-tionalization based as part of the dubious �Burmese way to Socialism� programme. The economic impact of such measures and the resultant brain drain were disastrous for the country. As time passed and the Burmese regime proceeded with its social and political engineering programme, a claustrophobic political culture of fear developed that deprived Burmese citizens of any political space for debate and dissent and prompted most intellectuals and other elites to leave the country in droves. Intellectuals do not want to rot in an atmosphere that offers no scope for innovation or creativity. The Tatmadaw seeks loyalty, submis-sion and deference and has frequently resorted to violence to extract support from Burmese citizens whom they regard as their subjects with no obligation for their well being. Fear and the absence of oppor-tunities have reached such a great extent today that all young people in Myanmar with a choice want to leave the country to re-settle in places where they are able to receive greater opportunities and more freedom, unconstrained by the watchful eye of the junta.

For those who cannot leave the country, some make good by joining the Tatmadaw, which, given its privileged position, undoubtedly offers the best opportunities and perks available in Burma. Others join the Monastery, seeking solace in religion or social prestige and other incen-tives. Those who choose to adopt Buddhism as a career often do so not only for social prestige and the respect that Monks enjoy in a predomi-nantly Buddhist country, but also for fi nancial reasons, since donations collected by the monks are shared primarily with dependent family members who expect their grown children to support them. As a result, there is almost an equal number of monks and soldiers (approximately 400,000 to 500,000) in the country. The respect that monks enjoy in Burmese society, even among members of the armed forces, as well as their sheer number and their participation in the 2007 August protest movement against the military junta obviously offered a glimmer of hope to democratic forces both within the country and in exile. Osten-sibly against rising food and fuel prices, the 2007 protests undoubtedly revealed the political exasperation of a long-suffering populace, which emerged in large numbers to support the monks as the protests gained momentum and became a nationwide uprising. The monks, too, sho-wed tremendous courage in standing up to the military junta in protest of the junta�s failure to provide basic necessities for the people and asking it to step down and allow democracy to return. While the junta was obviously surprised by the spontaneous uprising of the monks and

the popular support that this uprising generated, as evidenced from the junta�s initial hesitation to respond to the protests in characteristic style, the junta soon decided to suppress the uprising with brutal force. They did so, too, with a fair amount of ease, as the international com-munity watched aghast while the regime brutally suppressed not only protesting citizens, but also the monks, who were generally revered by all in Buddhist societies.

Widespread grievances against the military junta notwithstanding, the situation on the ground in Burma belies any hope for political change in Burma in the near future. The junta suppressed the August 07 Monk uprising with such brute force that the event acted as a deter-rent to any prospective opposition to the regime. The Monks have been silenced by the imposition of all kinds of restrictions on their move-ments and activities and by their isolation from the mainstream. The fact that the junta alone possesses violent means and is ready to use them against unarmed civilians at the slightest is itself a powerful factor against any dissent in the immediate future. By all accounts, the army regime is now more entrenched in power than ever before. Even the recent Cyclone Nargis that devastated the country, killing almost 80,000 people and leaving many more homeless in the Irrawaddy delta has not been able to weaken its stranglehold on power. On the other hand, the politicization of humanitarian relief to cyclone victims by making it a condition that the relief be distributed only through aid workers, com-bined with the West�s imposition of further sanctions and its insistence on democratic change, and the parallel refusal by the Burmese to budge meaningfully from their xenophobic nationalist position, has conso-lidated the junta�s hold on power even further and complicated the process of rapprochement between the regime and the outside world. In the hours of Burma�s gravest disaster, all parties to the ongoing con-fl ict in Burma should have encouraged dialogue and communication among opposing parties in the name of rehabilitating the victims and their families and rebuilding the country.

While historical parallels are always misleading, one nonetheless recalls the case of Aceh during the 2004 tsunami, when insurgent for-ces, one of the key catalysts for peace, initiated a ceasefi re in a move that made the Indonesian military more willing to permit aid into the country. In Burma, opposition parties as well as the Western countries authoring sanctions should also have attempted to refrain from poin-ting fi ngers at the junta, concentrating instead on fi nding ways to coo-perate with the junta in order to provide relief to the hapless victims of the cyclone. When the tsunami hit Aceh in December 2004, a window for dialogue and communication among opposing parties opened up

Political Developments in Burma and India�s Strategic Interests

114 115

and became one of the key catalysts for peace. In the case of Aceh, no one began by blaming the Indonesian military for past failures or for the atrocities they committed in dealing with a genuine problem of alie-nation of its people from the central authority in Jakarta. Instead, the international community joined hands with the government in power to provide aid to the tsunami victims. In Burma, despite loud calls from many Western powers for global engagement with humanitarian relief efforts, no such political shift has taken place. A similar magnanimous gesture from the West, like the Aceh relief operation, in Burma might not only have softened the attitude of the junta toward outsiders and lessened its suspicion of Western aid workers, but also exposed the junta�s vulnerabilities and questioned its ability to deliver in the face of such disasters. This, in turn, would have exposed its claim to be the only viable force in the country capable of ruling the country and delivering goods to the people. One of the most important contributory factors in the declining political role of the Indonesian military was its inability to deal with the economic crisis of 1997�98, when, for the fi rst time since the Soeharto government assumed power, the myth of the armed forces as the only omnipotent force in the country unravelled, and the people came to realize that the feet of the armed forces were made of clay and that the armed forces could be challenged. The objective conditions in Burma and the character of the Burmese Tatmadaw, however, are different from Indonesia because of its international exposure as well as Indonesia�s experience with a national economy that is integrated with the global and regional economy. This experience shows why the Burmese junta needs to be brought out of its isolation, integrated with the regional economy and using it as a catalyst for change in Burma. Rather than continuing with the status quo and destroying all possibili-ties for a rapprochement between the West and the junta, thee slightest movement in the direction of political change in the country in the near future is a welcome development.

Prospects for Political Change Let us now fi rst look at the ground realities in Burma and assess the factors that normally accounts for fall of military and authoritarian re-gimes in other countries of Asia. First, the greatest asset the junta has vis-à-vis its opponents is its complete control over the means of violence to intimidate and instil fear in people to political passivity; second, its success in emasculating opposition leadership through a systematic campaign of misinformation and debilitating the civil society through its curb on the universities and other sectors of the society. The junta's

ability to stay in power is partly due to the failure of its opponents to form a solid coalition with a long-term, common strategy. In the recent protests more than 100,000 people were drawn onto the streets of the country's cities, but the protests lost steam after the authorities took ac-tion. Anti-junta activists inside and outside the country failed to capita-lize on the momentum of the protests or prolong and push the monks' initiative further and channel it into major national and international movements. At the same time the emergence of new leadership from the student community were stifl ed by its brutal suppression of civil so-ciety and students� politics. Any social and political movements require certain amount of success in its initial stage to build up further mo-mentum and its base within the society. Without any initial and credible gain in the objectives of the movement, people�s enthusiasm for social and political activism seems to die out and however might be the cause it is diffi cult to sustain it over a period of time. The military machine in its more than four decades of rule has seen to it that all movements are nipped in the mud with such a show of force that could act as a deter-rent to crystallization of any future grievances against the regime.

With Aung San Suu Kyi, the country's democratically elected leader who has never held power, in detention for almost 16 years that recently was extended further by another year at least for the time being, the anti-junta movement lacks a uniting leader, although she continues to be a symbolic rallying point. Aung San Suu Kyi has charisma but she remains under house arrest from where she can not take any active role in the organization of dissent, and nearly the entire, original leadership of the NLD is either dead, in prison or has simply given up all political activity. Most young NLD activists have been imprisoned, cowed into submission, or have fl ed the country. Only a handful of elderly spo-kespersons remain, and none of them has the strength and charisma to carry the party forward. That serves the interests of the junta, since the new-look NLD would appear to the outside world not to be a viable alternative. The ethnic-based desire for independence further compli-cates the national movement, with these ethnic groups having their own military wings that resist the central government. From a domestic perspective, unless the national democratic movement can reconcile its goals with the ethnic uprising's leaders and people�s aspirations, it is unlikely that their campaign against the junta will fi nd success in the near future. Neither there is any hope for the international and a large Burmese-in exile community�s attempt to bring about a freer and more democratic Burma through sanctions and tourist boycotts. They have not only failed to nudge the regime to any prospective change, but in fact have only pushed it toward even harsher dictatorship and isola-


116 117

tion, cocooned in their xenophobic nationalism arising out of a deep suspicion of the West and anything foreign. It has also given enough justifi cation from the junta�s own perspective to brand any opposition to it not emanating from within the country but as foreign-inspired and instigation from outside and from the enemies of the Burmese state.

The Xenophobic TatmadawAnother important and unique feature of the military regime in Myan-mar is the nature and character of its socialization process that made it different from other military regimes that enjoyed power in other Southeast Asian countries like Thailand and Indonesia. The Burmese military not only took over political power in 1962 when they overthrew the civilian government of U Nu, but also took complete control over the economic life of the country. Unlike in Indonesia and Thailand where the military got involved in businesses as they consolidated their political control in course of time, in Burma the take-over was simultaneous. Branded the �Burmese Way to Socialism,� this meant that almost all private property was confi scated and handed over to a number of military-run state corporations. The old mercantile elite, which to a large extent were of ethnic Indian and Chinese origin, left the country, and so did many of Burma�s intellectuals. Prior to the 1962 coup, Burma had had one of the highest living standards in Southeast Asia, and a fairly well-educated population. But thereafter the military became the only elite with very little formal education. Another im-portant difference between the Burmese military and the militaries of Indonesia and Thailand is that whereas the latter wanted to integrate their countries� economies with the outside world and took the help of technocrats and the international economic institution to achieve faster economic growth and development, the former was deeply suspicious of the outside world and therefore isolated itself to be happy with a pseudo-socialist model of development stifl ing the growth of a middle class capable of acting as catalyst to change.

Bertil Lintner, a leading expert on Myanmar, has pointed out in a recent paper: �The Burmese military establishment also developed into a state-within-a-state, a society where army personnel, their families and dependents enjoy a position far more privileged than their counter-parts ever had in, for instance, Thailand and Indonesia. There are few major enterprises which are not directly or indirectly controlled by the military, or by businessmen affi liated with the military, like the power-ful, 43-year-old tycoon Tay Za, who is close to junta leader Gen. Than Shwe and his family. His Htoo Trading Company was one of two main

contractors that built Burma�s new administrative capital, Naypyidaw. The other was the Asia World Group, which is headed by Tun Myint Naing, or Steven Law, the son of Lo Hsing-han, who in the 1970s was branded by U.S. authorities as the king of opium in Burma�s sector of the Golden Triangle.�1 The Tatmadaw is also much better equipped than at any time in Myanmar�s modern history, mainly due to massive procurement of arms from China. The latest expansion comes at a time when the ruling military has managed to strike cease-fi re agreements with most of the country�s rebel groups, so, during the past decade, there has been very little fi ghting in Myanmar�s traditionally volatile frontier areas.

Those who wished for change in Myanmar with the recent monk uprising perhaps forgot that �people�s power� is not enough to bring about downfall of a dictatorial military junta. It needs to be supple-mented by other objective conditions -- split within a regime, economic collapse and withdrawal of support from the benefactors of the regime. None of those factors are present in Myanmar today to trigger a collapse of the junta. While there are rumours about a rift between Gen. Than Shwe and Gen. Maung Aye, the latter believed to be unhappy about the brutal manner in which the monks� agitation have been put down, there is no major crack within the regime. On the other hand, there are enough indications to show that the Junta is united in its resolve to stay in power, as there are too many vested interests at stake. Apart from the fear of losing the privileged position the army enjoys in Burma today, there are other factors at work to go against any change and the mainte-nance of status quo. The top general Than Shwe and many other com-bat-hardened army chiefs had felt during 2002 and 2004 when they were negotiating with the NLD and the ethnic insurgence generating some hope of some understanding, there were too many risks involved in any compromise with the democratic groups. The memory of 1988, when the country had come so close to revolution, the fear of retribution, was still fresh in their minds. There was a measure of suspicion about the motives of the West who had focussed all their energies on Aung San Suu Kyi, ignoring all other developments in the country, including some element of opening up of the economy and cease-fi res with the insurgent groups. To quote Thant Myint-U from his book The River of Lost Footsteps: �There was also an impression that the outside world was out to get them no matter what. When the talks with the NLD and ethnic insurgents were still progressing, Washington had imposed new debilitating sanctions. Many felt that turning inward again was safer, more secure. There were venal motives as well, but the deeper source of today�s conservatism is the content of too many in the offi cer corps with


118 119

what they see, who admire the military state and military-led society, or at least who could not easily dream up anything much better.�2

Second, economic collapse can also trigger change in a military or authoritarian regime. One may be tempted to draw a parallel with In-donesia in Myanmar where the current unrest was also sparked by the rising fuel and food prices and the resultant hardships of the people. Price rises and economic hardships have not led to the same kind of economic depravation in the Myanmar to make the ordinary people rise in revolt. Koichi Fujita, professor at Kyoto University�s Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, has compiled an interesting report on the standard of living in Myanmar in which he suggests that even though consumer spending by the upper 20 percent of Myanmar�s households is about four times the comparable amount spent by the lowest 20 per-cent., there is almost no difference between the two groups in terms of the ratio of food expenses, the income gap mostly refl ects in the dif-ferences in the choice of foods, the rich only eating better in terms of quality of food. As the country�s infrastructure, such as electricity, tap water and housing, are quite inadequate, poorer sections do not buy TVs, refrigerators and other household electrical appliances because electricity is supplied to less than 20 percent of the country�s farming villages. The rise in the fuel prices in August may have made the food prices dearer and possibly even scarce, it did not lead to starvation of a signifi cant section of people, which alone could have triggered a po-pular revolt. Subsistence existence was enough to keep the bulk of the population in Myanmar away from the risks of challenging the junta, despite their strong support and empathy with the Monks in last year�s so-called orange revolution.

Third, military regimes have collapsed when their international pro-moters and benefactors have withdrawn their support. Both Marcos and Soeharto were at one time darlings of the United States for their critical role in promoting the Western strategic objectives in Southeast Asia during the Cold War, but as they outlived their usefulness and made a mess of their polity and economy through misrule they fell from favour and became a major source of embarrassment. The same was true about General Ershad in Bangladesh in late 1980s when he was asked to step down favour of a civilian regime. Other than the support they derived from their benefactor, the United States and the West, their economies were linked with the outside world and thus vulnerable to its pressure. This is not the case with Myanmar whose isolation, a function of a policy of sanctions and boycotts besides its own internal dynamics, makes the country least subject to pressure, particularly from the West. The Myanmar junta derives its sustenance from the crucial support it

receives from China for whom Myanmar is vitally important for its pro-jection of military power in its southward movement into the Indian Ocean. The main benefi ciary of political and strategic developments in Myanmar is China, upon whose military and fi nancial support Myan-mar depends. Now India is also friendly with the Myanmar junta for its own national interests -- curbing insurgency in the Northeast India in cooperation with the Myanmar army and competing with China in securing energy concessions and certain other strategic goals.

Any transition to democracy is always diffi cult. Burma�s transition will be especially diffi cult. This is a country that has already been at civil war for sixty years and where that civil war is not yet concluded, where there are hundreds of different ethnic and linguistic groups, many in-habiting remote mountain areas, where poverty is endemic and where a humanitarian crisis is looming, where there are hundreds of thousands of people displaced by the fi ghting and tens of thousands more who are refugees; and where there is a resilient narcotics industry and where some of the richest businessmen (always the most likely to be infl uen-tial in a democracy) are tied to the drugs trade. Added to these are two especially diffi cult factors, legacies of Burmese history. The fi rst is what Thant Myint-U calls, the long history of failed state building and the lack of a long-term vision in terms of the nature of the future state.3 In the case of the fi rst, he argues that the 19th century kings Mindon and Thibaw attempted to remake traditional institutions and create new ones to deal with the fast changing world, but these initiatives in the end went nowhere because of the steady approach of British imperia-lism. The traditional order collapsed entirely. The British Raj then tried to transplant familiar institutions � a civil service, a judiciary, a profes-sional police force and army, and eventually an elected legislature � but these remained largely alien institutions, unwedded to local society, and the abrupt end of colonial rule meant that they did not long survive the British withdrawal. Any institution requires time and nurturing to take root. There was some attempt in the U Nu days to fashion a democratic state, but these efforts were crippled from the start by the civil war, the Chinese invasions of the 1950s and the consequent steady growth of General Ne Win�s military machine, which further decimated whatever remained of the civil society in Burma. Arguably, if the army would not have staged a coup in 1962, U Nu�s popularly elected government even while it faced demand from the Shans and other ethnic communities for autonomy could have possibly evolved certain mechanisms like a fe-deral structure to mitigate some of their grievances vis-à-vis the central authority dominated by the Burmans, the majority community.

U Nu�s problems did not arise just from the army, which did not give


120 121

him any chance to try the autonomy plan for that would have deprived them of their special role in the political system crafted by its wily leader Ne Win, but also from his own party, the APPFL (Anti Fascist people�s Freedom League) badly split around the time, a process in which Ne Win and his cohorts also played contributory role in driving wedge within the civilian political elite. From the early 1950s the army was already stepping into a huge institutional vacuum, left behind by the collapse of old royal structures, incomplete or ineffective colonial state building, years of war, and then a sudden colonial withdrawal. And this military machine was slowly but surely came under the control of just one man, General Ne Win. Now after the army captured power in 1962, it spread its tentacles everywhere emasculating all other institutions. Today the military machine is all there is, with only the shadow of other institutions remaining. So the problem in Burma is not simply getting the military out of the business of government. It is also creating the state institutions from the scratch that can replace the military state that exists. And the military state exists not just in governance and adminis-tration, but has entrenched itself in the economy of the country having large stakes in its continuance. Civil bureaucracy is completely domina-ted by the military that is imbued with a civic and political culture that does not allow any democratic decision-making. To restore democracy in Burma, it will require not only creation of political institutions but also overhauling the existing bureaucracy and establishing new ones with values, norms, rules as well as an orientation appropriate to a sys-tem that enshrines civilian supremacy over the military in the adminis-tration and decision-making system.

The second factor is more in the realm of ideas. The collapse of the royal institutions led to the fast disappearance of many earlier notions of kingship and the relationship between government and society, including an entire tradition of learning, subtle and complex, based on centuries of court and monastic scholarship. In its place a militant nationalism came forward, merging at different times with different visions of the future. There is also a strong utopian streak, going back to the Student Union days of the 1930s, �a proclivity for absurd deba-tes, on communism, socialism, and democracy, endless conversations about diverse constitutional models and long-term political schemes, which never see the light of the day,� to quote Thant Myint-U again, �What is altogether missing is a history of pragmatic and rigorous po-licy debate, on economics, fi nance, health care, or education as well as a more imaginative and empathetic discussion of minority rights, rights and shared in modern Burmese society.�4 Shorn of institutions and vi-sions of new Burma based on the ground realities in the country, any

political change even with a new civilian government will be meaning-less, for the army would still be there, lurking in the wings and waiting to overturn everything through a coup as it was in 1962.

There are no easy solutions to the intractable problems in Burma and any particular one that will create democracy overnight or even in several years. Burma does not have the professional and socio-po-litical expertise to handle the vacuum that has been created through the destruction of civil society by long years of military rule. A civilian government without a broad political framework of inter-ethnic un-derstanding will hardly be equipped to deal with the situation. It will take decades to build various institutions � social, political, economic, education and professional. Only a multifaceted path of institution buil-ding, social change and economic development can lift Burma from a long history of ills. And this can begin with breaking down Burma�s isolation, reviving connections with the outside world, bringing in new ideas, providing fresh air to a stale political environment and, in the process, changing long-festering mentalities. Twenty years of Western sanctions haven't worked. Neither has 20 years of �constructive enga-gement� by Burma's neighbours. It is time to try something else. Ins-tead of balking under pressure, West�s policy of boycott and sanctions against the regime has only hardened the regime�s attitude toward both the democratic movement and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. The new missionary zeal in the U.S. approach, refl ected in the 2003 Burma Free-dom and Democracy Act banning all imports from that country and several subsequent punitive executive orders, has occurred because of the White House president's wife. Laura Bush's Burma fi xation has put the policy establishment in a bind: The more the United States seeks to punish the regime, the more it undercuts its ability to promote political reforms in Burma, and the more its actions threaten to disrupt the lives of ordinary Burmese.5

Possibly, if Burma were less isolated and economically integrated with the outside world and if it were coupled with a desire by the go-vernment for greater economic reform, a rebuilding of state institu-tions and a slow opening up of space for civil society in a gradual and incremental fashion, then perhaps the conditions for political change would emerge over the next decade or two. This may not be particularly encouraging to those like Aung san Suu Kyi and thousands of political activists, who had grown impatient with a system that is increasingly becoming unbearable politically and economically, and sacrifi ced so much to see at least some results in their own life time. However, given the objective reality in the country and the junta�s dogged determina-tion to stay in power defying both domestic opposition and internatio-


122 123

nal pressure through sanctions, bargaining for gradual and incremen-tal change over a period of time, rather than gaining nothing could be a realistic option. There is no guarantee as yet that such an option will succeed and that Burma will slowly move from authoritarianism to democracy and that its brutal grip over the society will be relaxed once the international community decides to do business and lift sanctions to attract appropriate and reciprocal gestures from the junta. But it is an approach which is worth trying given the fact that sanctions and in-ternational pressure has not brought about desired results of crippling the regime. Rather than sticking to a position that has not yielded any results, it is worthwhile to look for outside the box solution through a system of incentives to hope for incremental and gradual change. If no movement is seen from such an approach within a period, then there is always the scope for reverting to the sanctions regime all over again. But the ice needs to be broken and the West can take a major initiative in this process with India, China and ASEAN acting as interlocutors. Sanctions together with international isolation will further undermine institutions of government; a new generation will grow up less edu-cated and in worse health; another addition to the list of failed states, without any prospect of democratic change and with the military no longer holding things together; a return to anarchy and the conditions of 1948, only this time with more guns, more people and strong confi -dent neighbour unlikely to idly stand by.

Sanctions and isolation can work only with a regime that is eager for maintaining interactions with the outside world. The military junta in Burma would rather prefer to keep the international community at arms length, and the attitude of the international community gives it further justifi cation for isolation and repression. Thant Myint-U is elo-quent in making the penultimate point in his study of the intractable problems in his country: �What is sometimes hard to perceive from the outside is just how damaging forty years of isolation � in particular from the West and the international scene � has been to those trapped inside. Trade with China and a few other (still developing) economies is no substitute for renewed contacts with people and places around the world. It is this isolation that has kept Burma in poverty, isolation that fuels a negative, almost xenophobic nationalism; isolation that makes the Burmese army see everything as a zero-sum game and any change and any change as fi lled with peril; isolation that has made any conclu-sion to the war so elusive, hardening differences; isolation that weake-ned institutions � the ones on which any transition to democracy would depend � to the point of collapse. Without isolation, the status quo will be impossible to sustain. This is not to say that the problem will disap-

pear overnight, but rather that solutions, so elusive today, will become more apparent and easier to reach.�6 In isolation the army will simply and quite confi dently push forward its agenda, as it has done recently � pushing in May this year a military-dominated constitution through a guided referendum at a time when the country passed through natural calamity, to be followed by elections in 2010 � and claiming legitimacy from its sham outcome.

The constitutional draft the army prepared bans anyone who enjoyed the rights and privileges of a foreign citizen from holding public offi ce. This would keep Suu Kyi out of government because her late husband, Michael Aris, was a Briton and their two sons are British. Suu Kyi, who is currently under house arrest and whose term has been extended by another year, has been in detention without trial for more than 12 of the past 18 years. The proposed charter allots 25 percent of the seats in both houses of Parliament to the military. It empowers the president to transfer legislative, executive and judicial powers to the military's commander in chief for a year if a state of emergency arises. It also stipulates that no amendments to the charter can be made without the consent of more than 75 percent of lawmakers, making changes unlikely unless supported by military representatives in Parliament. The proposed charter also would protect junta members from prosecution for any acts carried out as part of their offi cial duties. Suu Kyi�s NLD which was not included in the drafting process, together with �88 Generation Students group and the All Burma Monks� Alliance, which were instrumental in organizing mass pro-democracy protests last year had obviously rejected the draft. Suu Kyi�s party tried to reassure voters that a �no� vote did not violate a law issued by the junta that said anyone who distributed leafl ets or made speeches against the referendum could be imprisoned for three years. Despite all those opposition, the junta ensured that referendum passed through smoothly in its favour. Burma has been without a constitution since 1988, when the current junta took power and scrapped the previous charter after violently quashing mass pro-democracy demonstrations.

Thinking Out of the BoxAs the Western sanctions in the past have not been able cripple the regi-me and international communities pleading for political reconciliation had fallen on deaf ears, the world was calling on India and China to use their leverage to make the junta to see reason. However, neither China nor India has so far shown any inclination to abandon their pragmatic strategic engagement with the regime for moral principles. The UN Se-


124 125

cretary General�s envoy to Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, despite his best efforts to establish a reasonable relationship with all the key players in Burma and abroad, has also not brought back any good news out of his recent missions. That however does not make his efforts to coordinate the diplomatic efforts less important. Indeed, he must continue with his efforts on political reform and national reconciliation between the government, the democratic opposition under Aung San Suu Kyi, and the ethnic groups to pursue one channel of opening up of Burma. This will require sustained, low-profi le mediation efforts by retaining the confi dence of the generals and refrain from too open and public denun-ciations of their human rights record and other failings for the simple reason of keeping the dialogue on board.

Gambari�s diplomatic and meditation efforts need to be complemented by informal regional talks for maintaining the second channel of communication with the Burmese junta. For years, ASEAN had pursued a policy of constructive engagement with the Burmese in the hope of nudging it to bring political reforms, and had taken heat for their defence of Burma, that seriously damaged ASEAN�s relationship with the West. Now is the time for them to call in their favours with the regime, particularly at a time when it has an activist Secretary General in the person of Surin Pitsuan, who in the past was in favour of even abandoning the organization�s policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of a fellow member. Other than ASEAN as a group, Indonesia, the largest country in ASEAN and one with a record of military�s dual function role that turned out to be dysfunctional over a period of time, is particularly well-placed to take a lead. It is keen to show progressive leadership, and it carries weight in the region and in Burma. Indonesia�s recent transition to democracy accompanied by gradual reduction of the military�s political role, and its experience in dealing with separatist confl ict has obvious relevance for Burma. Indonesia has become a different sort of model�of the transition from military to civilian rule, of openness and pluralism. It should use the infl uence it has in ASEAN both to promote these virtues, and to turn it into a club that enforces some minimum standards of decency on its members. Regional talks on Burma, based on the prospect of its reintegration into the region, should address the need for long-term stability, democratic reforms, and transparent economic policy. Without joining the generals in their paranoia, the participants will need to reassure them that Burma�s stability and territorial integrity are not threatened.

As we have noted earlier, military rule has also caused most formal and informal institutions to wither. Even many in the democratic op-position accept that progress will require close cooperation with the

army. The junta�s so-called road map to democracy, though wholly inadequate, could be viewed as an initial offer for discussion, but need to be broadened by the inclusion of NLD and other political groups that the junta has barred in their road-map. It is here India, as the largest democracy in the world and experienced in nation-building in a multi-cultural and multi-racial society, must use its infl uence with the junta to make their constitution as broad-based as possible and can also help in the process of drafting it. Minister Jairam Ramesh�s comment at an international pledging conference in Yangon on May 25. Organised by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the UnitedNations that India �salute(s) the people and the Government of Myanmar for their resilience and fortitude in facing [the] devastation�7

caused by Cyclone Nargis, at a time when the junta suspects a game plan of engineering its downfall in the wake of the disaster behind the West�s demand for entry to its aid workers, will surely endear India in the eyes of the regime that might offer some leverage in its back-room diplomacy to seek change in Burma. Change will require compromises, and will be slow at best.

Integration of Burma�s economy with its neighbours � India, China, Thailand, and Indo-China countries of the Mekong region is a neces-sary condition for economic interdependence and breaking Burma�s isolation. The success of Burma�s transitions to democracy hinges to a large extent on viable economic development that can create a gro-wing middle class, which can then seek greater reform and political change in the country. This has happened in the case of Indonesia, Thailand, Taiwan and South Korea in the last decade. Growing econo-mic interdependence has also changed the pattern of economy in the Mekong region, comprising, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. From 2002 to 2006, Vietnam registered an annual average economic growth rate of 7.8 percent, Cambodia 10 percent and Laos 6.5 percent. As these fi gures show, countries in the Mekong sub region are de-epening their economic interdependence with the help of economic and infrastructure development. In this open regional network of mutual reliance, Thailand and Vietnam are emerging as hubs with network of economic and trade interactions with China, Japan, theUnited States and other ASEAN member countries. The economic interdependence has also helped these countries to fashion new kind of relations in their diplomacy with the countries of the region. Thailand�s and Vietnam�s ties with China are growing side by side with their integration with ASEAN and maintaining strong diplomatic connections with Japan and the United States. The need is to adopt a long-term strategy aimed at further integrating Myanmar into the


126 127

regional network of interdependence.8 To realize such a goal, assis-tance should be extended for human resource development and the construction of the Asian Highway by extending the north-east and east-west corridors from Bangkok to India via Myanmar, measuresthat will in the long run facilitate socioeconomic and political change in Myanmar.

To nudge the regime toward reform and change, China, India and ASEAN must act in concert offering certain incentives to the junta in return for their readiness for political reconciliation, in the same way as North Korea was persuaded to give up its nuclear program.9 India, China and ASEAN have already been taking an active role in the relief of the recent cyclone victims in Burma with the consent of the junta, which is less suspicious of these three than any country from the West. It is in this context India�s role in Burma assumes signifi cance. India can mull the idea of hosting Seven-Party talks involving China, ASEAN, Japan, USA, EU and Myanmar. As fi rst step, Myanmar should be urged to free Aung San Suu Kyi immediately in return for lifting of economic sanctions, followed by the beginning of political reconciliation based on a framework whereby the interests of the people and their democratic aspirations need to be matched and reconciled with the legitimate con-cern of the armed forces. The West need to be magnanimous, if not to the regime but to the suffering people of Burma in their hour of crisis, in lifting the economic sanction they have imposed over the years that affects essentially the ordinary people than the regime. Lifting of econo-mic sanctions for a limited period could be tried to persuade the regime to give some matching concessions in the form of release of all political prisoners. There is need for concessions from Suu Kyi�s side as well. She can possibly do what Ramos Horta of Timor Leste once suggested - dissociate herself from the NLD and emerge as a non-partisan leader, a mediator and a facilitator in the progress toward democracy -- Nelson Mandela of Myanmar. It is a diffi cult job but worth trying to break the deadlock.

Politics of Cyclone ReliefMore than seven weeks have passed since Cyclone Nargis Swept th-rough the Irrawaddy Delta in southern Burma leaving a trail of fl at-tened villages and broken lives and arousing international sympathy that turned to anguish as the military government obstructed aid. Ho-wever, according to a report in New York Times, published in the third week of May 200810, doctors and aid workers returning from remote areas of delta offered a less pessimistic picture of the human cost of

the delay in reaching survivors. The doctors have not seen any signs of starvation or outbreaks of disease. According to the doctors, while the estimated loss of lives due to the catastrophe might have been 130,000, the number of lives lost specially because of the junta�s slow response to it appears to have been smaller than expected. They continue to criticize the government�s secretive posture and obsession with security, its restrictions on foreign aid experts and the weeks of dawdling that left bloated bodies befouling waterways and survivors marooned with little food. But the specifi c character of the cyclone, the hardiness of villagers and aid from private citizens helped prevent further death and sickness. Most of the people killed by the cyclone drowned. But those who survived were not likely to need urgent medical attention. �We saw very few serious injuries,� to quote Frank Smithuis, manager of the substantial mission of Doc-tors without Borders in Myanmar, �You were dead or you were in OK shape.�11 The cyclone swept away bamboo huts throughout the delta; in the hardest hit villages, it left almost no traces of habitation. That appears to be the primary reason villagers were able to stay alive for weeks without aid. As they waited, the survivors, most of whom were fi shermen and farmers, lived off the coconuts, rotten rice and fi sh.12

Relief workers and doctors believe that the debate over access for foreigners and the refusal; of the government to allow in military he-licopters and ships from the US, France and Britain overshadowed a substantial relief operation carried out mainly by Burmese citizens and monks. Even the highest ranking American diplomat in Burma, Shari Villarosa, admitted: �The Burmese people are used to getting nothing. . . .I�m not getting the sense that there have been a lot of deaths as a result of the delay.�

Indeed, the junta�s cavalier response to the catastrophe has been rightly criticised for throwing roadblocks in the way of an international relief effort, by slowing the logistics of getting emergency supplies to an estimated 2.4 million needy victims of the cyclone and for reluctantly granting visas to foreign relief experts keen to enter the country and the areas hardest hit by the storm. But keeping in mind junta�s suspicion toward the West for its agenda of �regime change� one can explain its reluctance to forfeit its right to be the main regulator of relief efforts of all external aid, particularly the one�s coming from the Western sources and agencies dominated by them. The regime�s obduracy is also con-ditioned by its fear that the foreign aid workers might use their relief efforts to destabilize the regime. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon�s personal visit to Rangoon together with the efforts of ASEAN�s new Se-cretary General Surin Pitsuan yielded some positive results and brought


128 129

pressure on the junta to relax their restrictions on the entry of relief workers, particularly from the countries that are not friendly toward it. "We will warmly welcome any assistance and aid which are provided with genuine good will from any country or organisation providing that there are no strings attached, nor politicisation involved," Thein Sein told the conference that was organized in Rangoon under the auspices of the United Nations and the ASEAN in the last week of May. While about two dozen planes from Asian countries and the United Nations have been allowed to land in the capital, Rangoon, during the past few weeks, the junta has denied visas to many relief workers, insisting that it will distribute all the aid itself, it has impounded much of thesupplies at the airport. The United States has been granted permission to land a single planeload of supplies -- and that only 10 days after the cyclone struck.

India is believed to be the fi rst donor to have succeeded in off-loading relief supplies by sea at the Yangon port. And, the Myanmar junta did not say `no.' Indeed, Myanmar Foreign Minister U Nyan Win (not to be confused for the NLD Spokesman by the same name) was present at the Yangon airport to welcome the arrival of two of India's AN-32 aircraft laden with relief supplies such medicines as also shelter-related and roofi ng materials. India airlifted more supp-lies thereafter too. China is also understood to have had no diffi culty in sending in relief supplies to Burma at this time. And, all this hap-pened, when Western aid agencies were reporting a stand-off with the SPDC over permissions to send in supplies by air and, no less importantly, �expert� foreign aid workers. The purpose here is not to condone the Burmese junta for its tactics to deny any credit to the out-side agencies by restricting their entry into the affected regions and take frontline position in relief operations and thereby earn all the lau-rels for itself and show to the people their sincerity and earnestness for their well being. If the West and the outside agencies would have played ball with the junta, it would have found no ground to justify to the people of Burma its lack of credibility and also its lack of expertise in handling such massive aid and rehabilitation measures. The pe-ople themselves would have found out the hollowness of the regime�s claim to handle the crisis alone, and exposed its vulnerabilities. In the stand off between the junta and the outside relief agencies, the junta won a partial victory in protecting the sovereignty of the country and its position as the only legitimate agency to handle its own problems. By being magnanimous, the West could have turned this into their own victory by exposing the regime�s hypocrisy about its concern for the people.

Possible Role for India in the Political Change in BurmaArguably India can play a positive role in the political development of Burma by integrating its economy with that country and break its isolation from the region. India�s position on Burma has shifted from its initial total support to the democratic movement in the country, pro-viding shelters to its leaders in exile, to one of doing business with the military junta to derive certain strategic benefi ts to counter the strategic depth China, India�s major rival in Asia, has achieved over the years by providing necessary support to an isolated regime that was desperate for its survival against the odds imposed by Western sanction. While India�s current policy appears to all observers as tilted more towards the Burmese junta, in reality since the August 2007 uprising it is pursuing a more nuanced policy through its backdoor diplomacy and genteel persuasion to bring about its integration with the economy of its north-eastern part that borders Burma, and nudging the junta to a possible reconciliation with the opposition. These efforts have not yet brought any visible results, except that India was believed to have facilitated UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari�s second visit to Rangoon to meet Burmese generals. While India is handicapped by the complexity of Burma�s in-ternal development as well as limited resources at its disposal vis-à-vis other players in Burma, India must play a much greater pro-active role given its moral claim as the world�s largest democracy in the world and a country that can act as a mediator between the junta and the West in the future process of political reconciliation and development in Burma.

Burma is important in India's foreign for at least three, if not more, important reasons. First, it�s strategic importance as a bridge between India and Southeast Asia. Myanmar is the only country in Southeast Asia that has land and maritime borders with Southeast Asia, an impor-tant route for trade and commerce, particularly with India's northeast states. The latest thrust in India's Look East Policy is to link India's Northeast with Southeast Asia to restore old historical relations bet-ween the two regions, and also build land connectivity between India and Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam through Myanmar for pro-motion of trade and commerce. This could be achieved by the revival of the old silk route used for trade and commerce between India and China. If infrastructure and the security situation in India's Northe-ast could be improved, the closer interaction between the two regions will bring enormous economic benefi ts to both India's Northeast and Myanmar as they are natural partners for sub-regional cooperation for economic development and prosperity for the people of the area. Aro-


130 131

und 1993 India began to re-evaluate its strategy due to concerns that its policies had achieved little except to push Burma closer to Beijing, which obviously has no interest in promoting democracy in the country. Closeness to Beijing has also helped the junta to withstand the pres-sure from the international community and ensured its survival. India, therefore, initiated a dramatic policy shift aimed at improving relations with Myanmar�s generals, as it was also becoming clear that the pro-democracy movement would not achieve power within the foreseeable future. At that time Myanmar�s military government had effectively cowed Suu Kyi�s National League for Democracy (NLD) party into sub-mission that the exiled community seemed to have little or no impact on political developments inside the country- even as some of them actually stayed in the personal residence of George Fernandes, defence minister from 1998 through 2004.

To improve closer relations and connectivity with Myanmar, India in recent years has taken up a number of road and port construction projects. It has constructed the 160-km Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road in Myanmar from Manipur border. It is also assisting in the proposed trilateral highway project to connect Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand via Bagan in Myanmar. The Indian government in January 2008 committed US$120 million to rebuild Myanmar�s western Sittwe port and construct road and water links through the facility, which will connect Myanmar�s western Arakan State to India�s northeastern state of Mizoram. The build-transfer- use Kaladan Multi-Modal Tran-sit Transport Project comes on top of a previous $27 million invest-ment to improve the 160-kilometer road from Mizoram to Kalewa, in Myanmar�s Sagaing division, northeast of Sittwe. Final agreement for the Sittwe project, which has been under consideration for more than six years and will take nearly three years to complete, was fi nally signed during a visit in April this year of high-level offi cials from Myanmar to India. India�s Kaladan multi-modal transit transport facility is aimed at improving linkage between Indian ports on the eastern seaboard and Sittwe port in Myanmar. This would enable transportation by river transport and road to Mizoram providing an alternate route for trans-port of goods to northeast India. A proposal to build a rail link from Jiribaum in Assam to Hanoi in Vietnam through Myanmar is also on the cards.

India undoubtedly is in a disadvantaged position compared to China in improving its connectivity with Myanmar, as Most of Myanmar�s mountain ranges and major river systems run north south. This ma-kes construction of road communication and movement from India�s east to Myanmar against the grain of the country diffi cult. At the same

time it facilitates easier movement from the Chinese border in the northeast, and provides for natural fl ow of traffi c. The Chinese have used this favourable terrain confi guration to build road from the Chi-nese border to Mandalay in the heart of Myanmar and onward to the coast. As Myanmar provides the shortest access from Mainland China to India�s eastern borders these developments have special strategic signifi cance. India�s north-eastern states bordering Myanmar are not as well developed as Yunan province of China bordering Myanmar in the northeast. China has found it useful to link the development of Yunan region jointly with Myanmar and Laos. Thus the two-way border trade and commerce is qualitatively and quantitatively better with China than with India.

India�s trade with Myanmar is growing at a fast clip. It is fourth largest trading partner with its investment reaching $35.08 million last year. In 2006�2007, India-Myanmar trade was estimated at $733.59 million falling short of the target of $ one billion. (In 2004�2005, China-Myanmar trade was $1.145 billion as against India�s fi gure of $ 341.40 million in 2004�05). India is taking steps such as extending airlines; land and sea routes to strengthen trade links with Myanmar. It is also cooperating with Myanmar in areas like agriculture, telecommunications, and oil and gas sectors etc. The principal exports from Myanmar to India include rice, maize, pulses, beans, sesame, seeds, fi sh, and prawns, timber, plywood and raw rubber, base metals and castor seeds. In return, India exports machinery and industrial equipment, dairy products, textiles, pharmaceutical products and consumer goods. In February 2007 Sanjay Budhia, vice president of the Indian Chamber of commerce and Industries, said in a speech in Kolkata that India and Myanmar �have set a US$ 1 billion trade target in 2006-07 up from US$ 557 million in 2004-05.�13

In January 2008, India�s foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee became the fi rst senior leader from a major democracy to visit Myanmar�s new capital, Naypuitaw, where the junta moved its administrative offi ces in November 2005. Even in the midst of recent tumultuous anti-government demonstrations in Myanmar, when soldiers fi red on protesters, senior offi cials from the ONGC led by Petroleum and natural Gas Minister Murli Deora, fl ew to Naypyitaw to sign an agreement to explore for gas in three new blocks in the Bay of Bengal off Myanmar�s southwestern Arakan coast.14 Myanmar, for its part, appears to play the two countries off against each other. India was reportedly disappointed by Myanmar�s decision last August to give the nod to Chinese state-owned PetroChina for highly coveted gas concessions in the large Shwe fi elds off the coast of Myanmar�s Arakan


132 133

State. China edged out South Korea�s Daewoo International and India�s two state energy companies, which are currently developing the fi eld. The Shwe gas fi eld reserves are estimated to be worth between $37 billion and $52 billion, with the SPDC scheduled to receive $12 billion and $17 billion over a 20-year period. Meanwhile, on December 12 2007, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed to set up a center for the sharing of information technology skills in the old Myanmar capital of Yangon. The agreement to set up the India-Myanmar Center for the Enhancement of Information Technology Skills (IMCEITS) was signed by deputy foreign minister Kyaw Thu during the fi rst offi cial visit to India of a Myanmar offi cial since the crackdown.

India became much more proactive after Gen. Maung Aye, the sec-ond most powerful man in the Burmese junta, visited India in early April 2008, and the country signed a major agreement with Burma ac-cording to which it has agreed to build a multimillion-dollar (euro) sea-port and transportation system in Myanmar as India presses ahead with investment. The project envisions the construction of the earlier men-tioned multi-modal Kaladan transport corridor, which will allow port access to northeastern states, bypassing Bangladesh. It includes the up-grading of the Sittwe port and the Kaladan waterway as well as the con-struction of a road from Setpyitpy in (Kaletwa) to the India-Myanmar border at a cost of 5.3 billion rupees. This project will greatly enhance connections between Myanmar and India, in particular with India�s northeast region. The transportation system will give India greater ac-cess to Burma�s oil and gas reserves, which India needs to fuel its rapid economic growth. This alternative route is crucial in view of the long distance involved and the severe pressure exerted on the extant Siliguri Corridor. In addition, it offers an alternative route given Bangladesh�s continued reluctance to provide India with transit rights through its territory to the Northeast. The project would link Kolkata-to-Sittwe-to-Kaleutuwa-to-Myanmar Border (in Mizroam). Besides development of a 225-km waterway, the project envisages the construction of two roads, namely NHI54 to the India-Burma border and Kaleutwa to Boaorder, stretching 117 km and 52 km respectively. Since the proposed route would save both time and shorten the transport distance of goods, the costs are likely to go down and the availability of goods to increase in the region.15 The project is also likely to promote economic development and greatly reduce insurgency in the area. It also includes the Northeast in a web of connectivity with South East Asia, and as such, represents a strategic project of immense geopolitical importance to India.

Assistance to Burma/Myanmar by International Financial Institutions (IFIs)� the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund

(IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)�was suspended in 1988 following the suppression of the Burmese democracy movement. UNDP assistance was limited in the early 1990s to humanitarian assistance at the grassroots level. In practical terms, only the USA has the power to authorize the resumption of IFI assistance to Burma. However, India has a defi nite stake in resuming international assistance to Burma as one way of ending Burmese isolation, and funds from the IFIs would enable India to build the transport infrastructure in Burma/Myanmar (including the Asian Highway) necessary to create an effective Asian regional economic zone. Such a zone could be established more quickly Such a zone could be established more quickly with IFI (International Financial Institutions) funds and the highways would most likely be of higher quality than locally-funded roads. This would bring more trade and investment to India, especially its Northeast region, a development that might help stabilize the area. The accelerated construction of the Asian Highway and other transport links might encourage Bangladesh to open her borders to free transit. Internationally-funded transport infrastructure, training of Burmese civilian administrators, improvement of Burma�s economic and legal institutions, and a likely increase in direct foreign investment could all lead to a more economically stable Burma capable of purchasing Indian goods, which would help restore Burma�s balance of trade with India. Better energy and transport infrastructure would reduce the costs of extraction of Burma�s mineral exports. The training programmes that would doubtless be part of IFI assistance would increase administrative expertise in Burma/Myanmar, leading to a more stable and prosperous economy, in part through increased foreign investment. The increase in prosperity likely to accompany a more stable economy and a more stable political situation might also reduce the fl ow of migrants from Burma to India. A Burma connected through trade, investment and other linkages fi rstly with the Mekong Region through the East-West and North-South corridors and secondly with India though its Northeast region is bound to become integrated into regional networks of interdependence. Such integration will bring Burma economic prosperity and development, as it did Burma�s Southeast Asian neighbours. Only this kind of scenario makes it possible to envision political change and a transition to democracy in Burma.

At present, however, these are little more than necessary foundation stones for a comprehensive Burma policy. To construct such a policy, Indian offi cials need to think outside the box. Trading links can be pursued not just through natural resources, but also through small-scale cross-border commerce that helps to enrich marginalized and


134 135

impoverished parts of both Burma and India. Currently, however, such trade is constrained by restrictive travel regulations informed by security concerns rather than development perspectives. Cultural diplomacy is another important area that should rise up the agenda. Historical bonds between the two states are extensive, formed notably by religious links, trading ties and a common experience of the British Raj. Only 60 years ago, India�s fi rst Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Burma�s fi rst Premier U Nu were good friends and often consulted each other on international issues. Just 20 years ago, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was a personal friend of democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi. However, several decades of xenophobic rejection by successive Burmese generals mean that New Delhi must now work hard to re-establish friendly relations. Education is also key. The shambolic state of teaching and learning in Burma means that the country is in desperate need of outside help to train future generations. While a small number of American, British and Australian schools now operate inside the country, they cannot meet the need for affordable education. Indian schools, which have been successfully opened in many parts of the world, have a crucial role to play.

The Burma problem runs deep and will not be solved in a matter of months or even years. To build a platform for long-term engagement with its strategic neighbour, India�s foreign policy elite needs to be more creative. By taking its Burma policy beyond military and natural resource issues, New Delhi can both enhance its security leverage, and recapture a relationship that was once close. Engagement on a broad front can pay multiple dividends. Promoting this policy shift is also in the interests of the wider world that desperately wants to facilitate long-term change inside Burma. Indeed, if India were able to gain the confi dence of military leaders in Burma through multiple strands of en-gagement, it could start to promote multilateral talks bringing ASEAN, China and Japan from Asia together with the EU and US from outside to engage in talks with the Burmese junta and, ultimately, leading op-position forces. In charting a new Burma policy for India, it has to be acknowledged that greater engagement by New Delhi will not generate immediate political reform. However, it will mean that when fresh cri-ses create new opportunities for mediation, India will be better placed to step up to the plate.

Notes1 Bertil Lintner, �The Staying Power of the Burmese Military Regime.� See this volume 2 . Thant Myint � U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (Faber and Faber, New York, 2006). p.341.

3 Ibid, pp. 345�64 Ibid.5 While prohibiting new investment by American citizens or enti-ties, Washington has protected the business interests of Chevron Corp., which acquired a stake in the Yadana natural-gas export project inBurma when it bought Unocal Corporation in 2005. Because Unocal�s investment in the project, in which France�s Total SA holds the biggest stake, predated the imposition of U.S. sanctions, Chevron has used a grandfather clause to stay put in Burma � one of the few large Western companies left there. See, Brahma Chellaney, �Burma sanctions don�t Work, Japan Times. Accessible at: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20080314bc html. 6 Ibid. p.347. 7 Quoted in P.S. Suryanarayana, Myanmar�s cyclone crisis and India�s aid,� The Hindu, 30 may 2008. India is the only country to have so salu-ted the Myanmarese authorities, and New Delhi was conspicuous among the fi rst parties that sent relief supplies. In fact, it is believed that Indian Navyships were the fi rst to offl oad seaborne aid supplies at the Yangon port. But New Delhi fi ghts shy of claiming credit for such a `humanitarian fi rst.� India, China, and Thailand rushed to provide unconditional aid as soon as it was possible, responses that went over well with the Burmese junta.8 For outlining a long-term new strategy, see also Takashi Shiraishi, �Approach Myanmar with long-term initiatives,� The Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 10 February 2008. Accessible at: http://www.yomiuri. co.jp/dy/ world/20080210TD Y08001.htm9 Offering incentives does help to pull regimes out of isolation and promote more inter-national understanding, e.g., North Korea, which has recently handed over a long-awai-ted account of its nuclear programme to China as part of the arrangement of Six-Party talks offering North Korea diplomatic and economic incentives to disarm., an initiative launched by China. The declaration, which is six months overdue, is expected to detail North Korea�s plutonium production efforts. The United States was initially very reluc-tant to deal with North Korea due to its extreme cynicism about the regime�s intentions. US President George W. Bush cautiously welcomed the move, but said the US still had �serious concerns� about Pyongyang. He said he was notifying Congress of his intent to take the communist state off a US list of state terrorism sponsors in 45 days - if the declaration was complete. International Herald Tribune, 27 June 2008.10 Quoted in Times of India, 25 may 2008.11 Ibid.12 Ibid.13 The Telegraph (Kolkata), 26 February 2007.14 See, Bertil Lintner, �India Stands by Myanmar status quo,� Asia Times, 14 November 2007.15 For details on these projects, see Times of India, 3 April 2008.


136 137

For Closer China � U.S. Collaboration on MyanmarXiayun Ni

The Myanmar issue fl ared up once again in 2007. Viewing the outbursts of massive anti-government demonstrations there ever seen since 1988, Washington highlighted it, with President George W. Bush and other government leaders repeatedly condemning the Yangon (also Rangoon) military regime. It used the United Nations as a platform for exerting pressure and asked surrounding countries, China in particular, to use its leverage in bringing the ruling Junta into line.

Instead, on January 12, 2007, China and Russia jointly vetoed the U.S.-British-sponsored draft resolution on Myanmar at the UN Security Council, thus turning the matter into a point of discord between Beijing and Washington. Under these circumstances, a proper handling of the question will surely benefi t sustained expansion of bilateral ties. In-deed, this has turned out to be another task facing Chinese diplomacy after the Korean nuclear crisis and the Darfur issue in Sudan.

BackgroundLocated in the western part of Indo-chine, neighboring two big powers as China and India, Burma has the largest land territory among the Southeast Asian countries. It occupies an extremely important strategic geopolitical position, not only because it is the only land route way lin-king Southeast and South Asia, but also because it has a pretty long sea shore, which once served as one of the main seaports for China toward into the Indian Ocean. Along with its abundant storage of natural re-sources, Burma has been long regarded as �a bridge connecting regio-nal cooperation.� Constantly highlighting Burma�s unique geopolitical occupation, international powers are more and more getting involved into this country today, especially after it joining the ASEAN; its strate-gic importance is even more stressed, and gaming over it is even fi ercer. Thus Burma�s political life becomes an international one � the �Burma Issue� was offi cially listed into the agenda of UN Security Council in September 2006, being argued around an international table. Over a vote on a draft bill of Burma Issue this January 16, jointly proposed by the US and British, both China and Russia cast their negative ballots.

138 139

Consequently, the Burma Issue, 20 years after its fi rst up show, turned out to be another confl icting point between the US and China.

The Myanmar issue can be traced to the September 18, 1988 harsh suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations. In the name of the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) the military junta inherited the regime from aged General Newen, the long time (1962-1987) army chief two months earlier after nationwide unrest beginning in March.

In 1992, the military renamed itself as State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in a bid to placate critics. Under dual pressure from domestic opposition and international condemnation, the Junta was forced into holding multi-party elections to accommodate demands for reform. Led by Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of national independence hero Aung San and the 1991 Nobel Peace Prizewinner, the major oppo-sition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won 87 percent of the seats of the National Assembly.

But the military regime refused to hand over power by placing Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest and splitting up the opposition. This sparked strong resentment from Western countries and set in motion a succession of economic sanctions and political pressure, thus turning the crisis into a confrontation between the junta and external Western forces.

The problem has also turned into an international issue ever since. In May 2003, bloody confl icts broke out between NLD supporters and government loyalists, leading to the house arrest of Suu Kyi for the third time and resultant tougher U.S. sanctions.

The year 2006 saw deterioration of the political crisis. Defying strong Western opposition, the military regime extended another year the de-tention term for Suu Kyi and NLD vice chairman Ting Oo and outlawed four anti-government groups in exile including the All Burma Student Democratic Front as terrorist organizations.

Under pressure from ASEAN, the junta gave up rotating chairmanship of the sub-regional organization for 2006. The UN Security Council had twice held hearings on Myanmar since 2005 and decided to adopt the is-sue on its formal agenda, thus making it possible for any member to raise the matter at any time, thereby driving the military regime into an unpre-cedented harsh international environment. However, on January 12, 2007, China and Russia double vetoed a US-UK cosponsored draft resolution, calling Myanmar a threat to regional peace. But things did not end here.

Since September 2007, the military junta raised by a big margin fuel oil prices, touching off once again anti-government demonstrations led by Buddhist monks in major cities, the largest scale ever seen in two de-cades. Their harsh suppression triggered political turmoil. The Myan-

mar issue once again fl ared up. Though the situation has been brought under control, the future of the Myanmar issue still merits attention due to the interaction of a number of external and internal factors.

U.S. Interests in BurmaThe essential reason for the U.S. not to leave Burma alone is that the U.S. and its western allies regard it as being of strategic importance to their international interests. I will explore the geopolitical, military and energy transportation aspects of this view.

Geopolitically, because Burma is so close to China and India, it could easily cut off the land connection between China and the ASEAN countries, and could play a key role in restraining India�s move towards the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. At the same time Burma serves as the only land route connecting Southeast Asia and south Asia, and it also guards the gateway to the Strait of Malacca, the crucial channel linking the Indian and Pacifi c oceans. For its two giant neighbors, China and India, Burma performs an even more important function. For China, it is the strategic passage for its strategies both in the Asia Pacifi c and the India Ocean, and for India, it is the important bridge to the ASEAN countries.

Because the Vietnam War dragged the U.S. into that country for two presidential administrations, Burma � regarded as an uncompleted section in the arc surrounding China � was left undisturbed by the U.S. during the Cold War. However, soon after the end of the Cold War, the U.S. began to intervene. Under the pretext of developing democracy and protecting civil rights in Burma (together with the imposition of political restrictions and economic blockades from the west) the U.S. is putting heavy pressure on the present military regime to turn power over to U.S.-friendly political groups, such as the Democratic Union, led by Aung San Suu Kyi. But that is not all the U.S. wants. Its plan is to see a pro-U.S. Burmese government and a strategic network of Southeast Asian states favored by the U.S. which will restrain the upward rise of China and protect U.S. interests in the region.

Burma matters a lot to the U.S. militarily. According to some U.S. strategists, it is possible that Burma could act as one of China�s seaports or naval bases. The U.S. also seriously considers that Burma could be-come a future key stalwart in its encircling chain around China. Much has been discussed within the U.S. about China�s use of military power to ensure control of strategic passages, yet most of which have no proof or evidence. As early as the end of the 1990s, a classifi ed report from the U.S. Southern Command asserted, amongst its other statements,

For Closer China � U.S. Collaboration on Myanmar

140 141

that China was attempting to make use of trading ports and facilities all over the world in order to construct strategic toll-gates. An interior U.S. Defense Department report entitled �Energy Future in Asia� exposed in early 2005,1 listed six �pearls� on its �string of pearls� strategy, with Burma�s Sittwe Port as one the pearls. �China has developed close ties to the military regime in Rangoon and turned a nation wary of China into a �satellite� of Beijing close to the Strait of Malacca, through which 80% of China�s imported oil passes. China is building naval bases in Burma and has electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal and near the Strait of Malacca. Beijing also supplied Burma with �billions of dollars in military assistance to support a de facto mi-litary alliance,� the report said.2 Another article, in the Washington Ti-mes of March 24, 2007, commented that �China is modernizing at least six naval bases in Myanmar, using the Burmese government�s name for its country. This could support Chinese submarine operations in the region as part of Beijing�s string of pearls� strategy of clinching regional defense and security agreements to secure its mounting fuel require-ments and enhance its military profi le in the Indian Ocean region.�3

As far as energy is concerned, Burma has the richest natural resour-ces in Indochina and is especially abundant in minerals, timber, oil and gas. Today, Burma ranks as the world�s 10th biggest exporter of gas. Because of long-term economic sanctions imposed by the U.S., there has been little progress in bilateral economic relations. What worries the U.S. most is that China might get rid of the oil embargo imposed by the U.S. by means of getting Burma under control. The U.S. regards Burma as occupying a very important position in China�s overseas ener-getic strategy map. The U.S. government believes that both China and Burma are planning an oil pipeline between the two countries to avoid the oil transportation channels via the Strait of Malacca. Once China has Burma under control, not only could the oil pipeline run straight from Burma into China, but it would also be possible for oil tankers to reach Burma directly through the Persian Gulf, thus avoiding the long route around the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. This would be an enormous saving in oil expenses for China. Furthermore, China could take advantage of its position to put pressure on all the Southeast Asian countries, as well as on Japan and Taiwan.

U.S. Pressure on BurmaThe United Nations is still a main stage for U.S. activity. It can be seen that most actions taken by the U.S. are within the framework of the UN as a means of persuading its allies as well as ASEAN members to

impose intense political pressure and strict economic sanctions against Burma.

This intense pressure started as early as 1990, when the U.S. began to criticize Burma for its democracy and human rights conditions. These included suppression of democratic groups, detention of politi-cal prisoners, impeding of the democratic process, as well as its drug problems. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice labeled Burma one of six �outposts of tyranny� in her confi rmation hearings on January 18, 2005, and the following December the U.S. took its fi rst concrete step against Burma within the UN by successfully forcing the Security Council for the fi rst time into a formal discussion on the Burma issue.4

Soon after the Burmese government announced a year-long exten-sion of the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of an anti-go-vernment party, the U.S. renewed its efforts to force the UN Security Council into passing a draft resolution against Burma. The U.S. added new charges this time, accusing Burma of planning to obtain a nuclear weapon, as well as abuse of political prisoners, mass requisitioning of labor, and use of armed forces to move native populations, and it urged the UN to impose severe penalties on Burma. Two reports on human rights and kidnapping were released in March and June 2006, severely criticizing the Burmese government for its human rights and demo-cracy conditions.5 The draft resolution on the Burma issue proposed by the U.S. in January 2007criticized Burma for its appalling domestic human rights record, AIDS and drugs conditions, all of which pose a threat to regional security, and it urged Burma to take action to make improvements, in case of even worse consequences. In the March 6 2007 Human Rights Report, the U.S. criticized Burma once again for its worsening human rights situation, and its weakness in stopping drug exports due to the government�s failing to crack down on smuggling. The latest statistics showed that total opium output in Burma in 2006 increased by 2 percent. Burma is believed to be the world second-lar-gest producer of opium after Afghanistan with up to 65% of opium exporting to the U.S.

U.S. economic sanctions against Burma began in 1997 and included banning arms sales, revoking Burmese favorite tariff status, opposing multilateral loans, prohibiting American investments, and rejecting Burmese senior offi cials� visa applications. The Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act and Washington�s embargo against Burma in 2003 made things even worse. Burmese imports were banned, Burmese go-vernmental assets in the U.S. were frozen, Burmese high-ranking offi -cials were refused entry, investment, loans and technical aids to Burma prohibited, all of these sanctions imposed with the intention of forcing


142 143

the Burmese military administration to improve democracy situation and eventually hand over power. Pressure from the U.S. was boosted in 2004, when the overall embargo against Burma was extended.

The U.S. has made the UN and ASEAN its playground. Squeezing the Burma issue onto the UN Security Council agenda has internationalized it. Two reporting meetings of the Security Council on the Burma issue were held in 2005, one was an updated report on the Burma issue close-door meeting, introduced by John R. Bolton, the ambassador to the UN at that time. Since 2006, the U.S. has taken great pains to persuade the Security Council to discuss the Burma issue. Despite internal differences, the Security Council added the issue to its agenda, and this was followed by another vote on the issue on January 12, 2007. The U.S. has also tried to persuade ASEAN to put pressure on Burma. The U.S. regards the Burma issue as a test of ASEAN countries, claiming that the issue is a key factor for ASEAN to reveal its position to the U.S. as regards understanding of values. Rice�s refusal to attend the 2005 ARF hosted by Laos was a way for the U.S. to show its regret at ASEAN�s attitude to the Burma issue. Rice attended the 2006 Malaysia ARF in order to discuss �Burma�s lack of democracy and the progress of its national reconciliation,� announced in a State Department statement right before her fl ight. A Heritage foundation report issued on March 20, 2007 pointed out, �The best the U.S. can do is to keep it on the international agenda, build on ASEAN�s doubts, and bring pressure to bear where and when possible. In the meantime, the U.S. needs to be creative in fi nding ways around Burma to engage ASEAN fully. The U.S. cannot afford to allow developments in Burma to drive the broader U.S.� ASEAN relationship.�6

Pressure from the U.S. has caused disagreement over the Burma issue within ASEAN. Aside from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which publicly oppose a hard-line policy against Burma, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand agreed on criticizing Burma severely. Dato� Seri Syed Hamid Albar, the Foreign Minister of Malaysia, even suggests a new �let it go� policy, which would leave the Burma problem to be solved by the UN, a view shared by Singapore. Persuaded by the other members of ASEAN, Burma gave up the hosting country qualifi cation in 2006.

Furthermore, the U.S. is attempting to make India a balancing power against China in Burma. Both Burma and India have a fast-developing re-lationship, with frequent mutual visits by high-ranking offi cials, growing military cooperation, and an increase in bilateral business and trade. An article that appeared in The Washington Times on March 24, 2007 said that India was providing the Burmese military government with weapons to balance China�s increasing infl uence in Burma. As Shaikh Azizur Rah-

man, Chairman of Pacifi c Forum in the Center of U.S. Strategy and In-ternational Study, pointed out: �If the democratization of Burma is to be supported, India should keep itself engaged with Burma, trying to reduce the Chinese infl uence as much as possible. Gambari was telling New Delhi that although the Western world namely, the US and the European Union- was in favor of taking a tougher line on Myanmar, including the imposition of new fi nancial sanctions, it was also amenable to India ta-king a soft approach. It is apparently believed that India s infl uence could help to check and balance Myanmar s key ally China. 7 I�m sure many in the U.S. administration have mixed feelings about this report. On the other hand, no one wants to see Burma become a Chinese client state, so India provides useful balance in this regard�8

Disagreements between China and the U.S.Disagreements between China and the U.S. over the Burma issue lasted for years. From the time that the U.S.-favored government was overtur-ned by the present military administration, there has been no let up in the U.S. sanctions, support of anti-government groups, or even dispatch of special troops. Three aspects of the disagreements are discussed below.

Confl icting interests occur. While the U.S. hopes for a Burmese ad-ministration favoring the west headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma�s next door neighbor, China, welcomes a more stable Burma. According to China, a politically reformed, stable, democratic and conciliatory Burma not only guarantees the security and stability of the border pro-vinces, but also ensures the development of bilateral trading coopera-tion, making full use of Burmese energy and natural resources and its shortcut to the India Ocean.

The Sino-Burma oil pipelines under construction and the ongoing Iran-Pakistan-India-Burma-China natural gas pipe plan will reduce China�s en-ergy reliance on the Strait of Malacca. China�s three largest oil enterprises, SINOPEC (China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation), CNPC (China National Petroleum Corporation) and CNOOC (China National Offshore Oil Corporation) have already completed projects in Burma. The Sino-Bur-mese oil exploration project reports that there is much oil to be exploited in the Bohai Sea. As far as the U.S. is concerned, it wants to ensure that Burma would adopts Western democracy and value concepts, and beco-mes part of the U.S.-led economic structure and trading system.

China and the U.S. judge the Burma threat differently. According to China, the Burmese domestic situation is not harmful to regional or international peace and security. Burma has no explicit plan to develop weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear and biochemical weapons,


144 145

nor does it have the ambition to invade neighboring states. Burma is not yet a threat. But in the view of the U.S. government, Burma is a time bomb posing a threat to the region. Robert B. Zoellick, former Deputy Secretary of State referred to Burma as a cancer when he was attending the 2006 ARF hosted by Vietnam.9 And Assistant Secretary of State Eric John said that because Burma kept silent on international requests to free political prisoners and cease armed attacks on minorities, it is al-ready a threat to international and regional peace and security, and the UN Security Council should have at least discussed the matter.

China acknowledges that Burmese society faces many serious chal-lenges, such as refugees, neglect of children, HIV Aids, human rights and drugs problems, and supports the idea that Burma respond more actively to address international concerns more constructively and fl exi-bly. �The Burma issue is essentially a domestic one, a common sense shared by all its neighbor countries, all ASEAN members, and most of the states in the Asia-Pacifi c Ocean region,� said Wang Guangya, China�s permanent representative to the UN, when he gave his expla-natory speech before the vote on the Burma issue on January 12, 2007. Problems could only be solved gradually in accordance to Burma�s internal progress and improvement, but not by external force. It is possible for world powers to jointly tear down the military administra-tion, but there is a possibility for Burma to be dragged into a civil war when there is no other political group strong enough to take its place. With majority populations and more than a hundred languages, Burma might suddenly become �another Yugoslavia, with a situation several ti-mes worse,�10 pointed out Wang Jingrong, ASEAN�s General Secretary.

In contrast to China, the U.S. believes that Burma�s problems today could not come to an end through the efforts of its military administra-tion alone, with state power still dominated by the military, Aung San Suu Kyi remaining under house arrest, and human rights and drug smuggling getting worse. Believing that the National Assembly Con-stitution of Burma might keep some of the Burmese political groups permanently out of the political process, the U.S. will not just stand by, leaving Burma heading for a wrong direction. The situation can be im-proved only by joint international forces, as shown by all the U.S. efforts in the UN and ASEAN.

U.S. Expectations from ChinaThough from time to time U.S. policymakers criticize China�s Burma policy, they welcome a supportive and cooperative China on the issue.

Firstly, the U.S. regards China as an infl uential and forceful go-

between between the U.S. and Burma. The U.S. regards China as the key to the Burma issue, and Burma�s most supportive and infl uential power. The U.S. expects China to urge Burma to continue with its poli-tical reform. Because there is no offi cial channel for exchange of ideas between the U.S. and Burma the U.S. is hoping for a Beijing- or Ran-goon-based communication channel.

On March 21, 2007, Assistant Secretary of State Eric John spelled out the U.S. wish to have some kind of contact with Burma. He made it clear that direct talks would be the next step if both sides were ready, and he also hoped that U.S. concerns could be delivered directly to Chairman Than Shwe. The U.S. is considering the practicalities of doing this. As regards Burma�s political reform, the U.S. is expecting China to join it in pushing Burma to take the fi rst step. The following views have been expressed by various U.S. commentators: �If Wash-ington wants a democratic future for the Burmese, it must fi nd some way of persuading China to police its southern neighborhood. The U.S. cannot do so directly.�11 �The Chinese were told that certain standards of behavior will be key to the U.S.-Sino relationship, and one test will be how China deals with governments with unsavory reputations.�12 �The U.S. has no intention to challenge China�s infl uences in Southeast Asia. The only thing the U.S. concern is the political issue of Burma, and the U.S. hopes to cooperate with China and to change Burma together.�13

Secondly, the U.S. wishes China to support the UN�s draft resolution on the Burma issue. The U.S. expressed its concern that joint voting by China and Russia against the draft resolution might send Burma the wrong message. According to the U.S., there are to be other similar proposals, on which China is expected to be supportive or at least keep silent. Burmese political analyst Win Min pointed out that �the U.S. is trying to kick the ball to China.� As for human rights, China is expected to be fully aware of the seriousness of the Burma issue, and to make ef-forts to promote an improvement in the situation. U.S. First Lady Laura Bush appealed for joint efforts by China and the U.S. to improve the human rights records of the Burmese military administration during her speech at the ceremony of the Core Group on Burmese Women in the Senate House on May 23, 2007. She pointed out that as a neighbor of Burma, China should be concerned about the human rights situa-tion next door. China should also pay attention to drug smuggling and public health within Burma, and their impacts on Southeast Asia and the rest of the world as well.14

China is expected to act as a partner in cutting off aid and in efforts to curb drugs. In the view of U.S. policymakers, China holds the key to the resolution of the Burma crisis, and they suspect that China supp-


146 147

lies the Burmese military with most of its modern weapons, though smaller quantities of arms arrive from Singapore.15 China is Burma�s largest trading partner and serves as an intermediate transit port for Burmese opium and heroin, 60�70 percent of its total export fi rst ente-ring China�s Yunnan Province and then transported to Thailand, South Asia and the rest of Southeast Asia. The U.S. expects China to come up with a concrete plan to deal with this.

Perspective and ConsequencesAlthough the Burma issue has existed for nearly 20 years, China and the U.S. have kept their differences over the issue under control. The above analyses may lead to the clear conclusion that in the short term the confl ict between China and the U.S. over the Burma issue is unli-kely to explode.

Burma is not the most strategic concern for the U.S. at present, with the problems of the Middle East, North Korea and Afghanistan attracting too much of its resources. It would not be wise for the U.S. to have another fl ash point in its bilateral relations with China at present. Steady progress and much cooperation in many situations with China are preferable. Evidence of this can be seen in the U.S. moderate reac-tion which stresses the importance of Sino-U.S. cooperation over the Burma issue, rather than its rather tough reaction to China and Russia voting jointly against its proposal. The U.S. does not want to see Burma becoming a trigger in its relations to China, and hopes to see a stable and cooperative China. The U.S. did not display outrage at the joint re-jection of its proposal, stressing the importance of cooperation between China and the U.S. on the Burma issue. The U.S. is striving for a more realistic Burma policy, not insisting on changing the Burmese military administration and to some degree accepting its existence in Burmese political life. In an interview with the Financial Times, Eric John, De-puty Assistant Secretary of State for Asian affairs, said Washington was not seeking a change of regime. �There seems to be unjustifi ed paranoia in the leadership about what it is the rest of the world wants, it is not a policy of economic strangulation. The generals are going to be part of the solution.�16

However, negative factors will continue to exist for quite a long time to come. The U.S. will not alter the basic tone of its Burma policy, the Burma issue will continue to be mentioned and its democracy and hu-man rights situations will be criticized. It will be an excuse for the U.S. to put pressure on China�s foreign policy. Arguments between China and the U.S. will continue over the Burma issue in the UN.

In the long term, however, there is still the possibility that the Burma issue could trigger a Sino-U.S. confl ict.

Firstly, there is a possibility of an increase in U.S. interference in Burma. With the rapid rise of China and as the relationship between China and ASEAN countries becomes closer, the U.S. will regard China as the biggest threat in its relations with countries in the region. To con-tain China�s future development, the U.S. is very likely to become more involved in countries around China, with Burma being the most impor-tant state, serving as China�s gateway to the Indian Ocean. The major measures the U.S. will take to achieve its aims in the region will be to continue to exert pressure, increase the embargo and even overturn the current Burmese administration.

Secondly, the future of Burma�s domestic situation is complex and uncertain and there is little cause for optimism for Burmese political reform. The planned reform agenda includes a draft constitution based on principles decided by National Assembly Constitution, a nationwide vote to pass the new Constitution, and holding parliamen-tary elections in accordance to the Constitution. The military adminis-tration has announced that the Constitution should be completed by 2008 or 2009. The Associated Press quoted a government statement announced on the offi cial television on February 9, 2008 as saying, The government announced its plan for the referendum the fi rst time the junta has set any date for a step in its earlier-announced roadmap to democracy. General elections are supposed to follow in 2010.17

The Democracy roadmap of the ruling military projects a national referendum on the new constitution in May 2008. The referendum represents the fourth step in the ruling junta s seven-step roadmap to democracy, which was fi rst broached in 2003. However, there has emerged a major divergence of opinion on the reform and a power struggle within the Burmese authority, that includes the three top generals in the State Peace and Development Council, Than Shwe, Maung Aye, Thura Shwe Mann. Maung Aye has categorically rejected part of the reform plan proposed by Than Shwe. A senior offi cial in the Burmese military has revealed that the reform plan, which has been argued over for the past year, is unlikely to come to fruition owing to internal disagreements.18

Moreover, the administration has never given up its effort to get rid the NLD infl uences of Burmese political and social life. While the military dominates the government, the NLD is heading towards collapse, weak leadership, disorganization, and diminishing infl uence in both political and social life. Unwillingly and slowly carrying out of the �Democratic Road Map� could do nothing good with the military administration trying


148 149

to keep NLD out of process of the constitution making. The intention, without saying, is to ensure the military control from behind the curtain. It is not clear that whether the military would permit NLD to take part in the national election. Western analysts point to the possibility of setting some obstacles in the constitution to block Aung San Suu Kyi�s road to power, for instance disqualifying candidates with a foreign spouse (Suu Kyi was married to a Westerner) to run for presidency.

Thirdly, international power games over Burma will increase the complexities of the situation there. Taking advantage of its geopolitical position and its natural resources, Burma has striven to obtain closer bilateral relations with China, India and Russia. Relations with India and Russia are particularly remarkable both in speed and level. Both Russia and India have high-level exchanges, growing military cooperation, and increasing trade. The Asia Times reported that India, in the face of Western criticism, continues to economically engage Myanmar's ruling generals, providing the junta a much-needed investment lifeline at a time when the US and European Union have imposed new punitive sanctions against the rights-abusing regime. The India government committed US$120 million to rebuild Myanmar s western Sittwe port and construct road and water links through the facility, which will connect Myanmar s western Arakan State to India s northeastern state of Mizoram.19 Burma is importing weapons from Russia, who has embarked on a plan to export a nuclear reactor to Burma. Under the new agreement, Russia�s atomic energy agency Rosatom will build a nuclear-research center, including a 10-megawatt light-water nuclear reactor with low-enriched uranium consisting of less than 20 percent uranium-235.20 Burma is also maintaining its traditional trade and business with Thailand and Singapore. In 2006, Burma reported record-high foreign investment of $6 billion, mostly from a single hydropower project backed by Thailand, now the largest investor.21

Thus a delicate external environment is emerging for Burma in the future. As for China, U.S. pressure may decrease since China, the U.S., Russia and India all share the same views on Burmese democracy and human rights issues. China needs to meet the challenge that the U.S. and India might jointly intervene in Burma to diminish China�s infl u-ence in Burma as far as possible.

Policy SuggestionsMishandling the Myanmar issue would adversely affect China-US, Chi-na-Myanmar and US-Myanmar relations. Beijing and Washington may benefi cially take an advantage from the successful bilateral coordina-

tion in handling the North Korean nuclear crisis so as to turn Myanmar from a possible point of friction into a new fi eld of collaboration.

We should strive to make the U.S. better understand China�s My-anmar policy. Unlike the nuclear situations in North Korea and Iran, Myanmar is an internal issue that does not pose any substantial threat to regional peace. Also, the situation in Myanmar is not as serious as it is in Darfur. Moreover, the military regime has shown fl exibility in car-rying out political reforms.

Ample facts have shown that external pressure and sanctions do not work. The coercion-intensive approach favored by Washington has only served to reinforce the siege mentality of Burma�s military leadership and undermine the positive infl uence that the international community has through critical engagement. The United States should acknow-ledge that merely reinforcing its strategy of isolation and the existing regime of sanctions will not achieve the results it desires. Instead, these moves have only widened the schism between Washington and the ASEAN countries.

Instead, China has played a constructive role in persuading the military regime to properly handle domestic problems, accept UN mediations, pursue dialogue with the opposition and carry out steady reforms. Even so, U.S. government offi cials and the media are still dissatisfi ed and trying to bring pressure to bear on China. They have clearly exaggerated China�s infl uence on Myanmar�s military junta, where hard liners are clearly in ascendancy. According to Green and Mitchell, Beijing s engagement with the SPDC has been essential to the regime s survival. China has provided it with moral and fi nancial sup-port � including funds and materiel to pay off Burmese military elites � thus increasing its leverage at home and abroad.22

Common sense shows that China and America need to broaden the scope of their collaboration and promote an exchange of opinions on My-anmar through existing channels of dialogue. They also need to enhance contact with Myanmar in order to explore the feasibility of establishing a tripartite engagement channel. China and the US should, moreover, enhance their cooperation around relief efforts and reconstruction in Myanmar following the devastation of cyclone Nargis. China tried to nudge the Burmese leadership to waive its visa policies, ease restrictions on the import of humanitarian supplies and allow the US relief team into the country. According to a report in the Washington Post, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke on May 8 with Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, urging both governments to use their infl uence to persuade the Burmese leadership to open up its country to relief specialists. President Bush, in turn, plans


150 151

to call Chinese President Hu Jintao to seek his help in pressing the Bur-mese government to accept more disaster assistance.23

We need to improve coordination within the UN Security Council and other related institutions. After the January 12, 2007 co-sponsored resolution on Myanmar, the United States and Britain may do the same once again. In fact, on October 5, 2007, a new U.S.-U.K.-crafted draft statement condemning Myanmar circulated between America, Britain and France in the Security Council. Though the statement was not le-gally binding on Myanmar, America is still pushing for such a resolu-tion in the Security Council.

Frankly, America needs to consult with China on this matter. In ad-dition, efforts should be made to exchange views with Russia, India and the ASEAN countries in order to fi nd a satisfactory settlement to the Myanmar issue that takes into broad consideration all of the interests of the parties concerned.

We should explore the possibility of China-U.S.-Myanmar tripartite collaboration, starting from such easy items as a joint ban on narcotics. The narcotics trade, human traffi cking, and HIV/AIDS are all spreading through Southeast Asia, thanks in part to Burmese drug traffi ckers who regularly distribute heroin with HIV-tainted needles in China, India, and Thailand. Since Myanmar is a major source of opium and heroin smuggling (according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Burma accounts for 80% percent of all heroin produced in Southeast Asia), the three sides have common interests in banning these drugs, which can serve as a base for expanding cooperation in other related areas. Both U.S. Chevron and Chinese Oil are engaged in oil exploita-tion in Myanmar. It is advisable for the two sides to strengthen their coordination so as to avoid fi erce competition.

We should explore collaboration on Myanmar in the form of a fi ve-party model or four-party mechanism. The international community is examining a variety of feasible options for solving the Myanmar issue. American scholars have raised the possibility of a fi ve-party model or four-party mechanism with six-party talks on the Korean nuclear crisis in mind. They proposed a U.S.-sponsored meeting of America, ASEAN, China, India and Japan for working out a roadmap for solving the My-anmar issue, or a so-called fi ve-party model. The fi ve partners should develop a road map with concrete goalposts that lays out both the bene-fi ts that the SPDC would enjoy if it pursued true political reform and national reconciliation and the costs it would suffer if it continued to be intransigent. The road map should present the SPDC with an interna-tional consensus on how Burma s situation affects international stability and the common principles on which the international community will

judge progress in the country. 24Advocating the four-party mechanism, some scholars suggested the participation of America, China, ASEAN and India for working out a feasible formula. Since conditions are still premature for such a formal mechanism, the four parties may benefi ci-ally start from a double track model, with academic meetings serving as a second channel. Admittedly, these ideas have yet to be accepted by the parties concerned. Yet they nonetheless offer a line of thinking about how to resolve the Myanmar issue. China and America may explore col-laboration along similar lines.

Notes1 Booz Allen Hamilton, �Energy Futures in Asia, The Washington Times, Jan.18, 2007.2 Billl Gertz, �China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes, � The Washington Times, Jan.18, 2005.3 Shaikh Azizur Rahman, �India Seen Arming Burma to Counter Chinese,�The Wash-ington Times, Mar. 24, 2007.4 http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/40991.htm.5 http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78768.htm.6 Walter Lohman, �Guidelines for U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia.� Backgrounder No.2017, by the Heritage Foundation, Mar.20,2007.7 Jyoti Malhotra, �UN as India, Myanmar Matchmaker�, Asia Times, Feb7, 2008.8 Shaikh Azizur Rahman, �India Seen Arming Burma to Counter Chinese,� The Wash-ington Times, Mar. 24, 2007.9 http://www.burmanet.org/news/2005/07/29/agence-france-presse-asia-says -engage-ment-of-myanmar-more-effective-than-isolation/.10 Li Chenyang, �Rice Pressures Asian While the U.S. Thinking Regime Change in Burma,� The Global Times, July 28, 2007. 11 Robert I. Rotberg, �The Road to Burma May Run Through China,� The Christian Sci-ence Monitor, Oct. 2, 2004.12 Glenn Kessler, �U.S. Sees Burma as �Test Case� in Southeast Asia,� The Washington Post, Dec.28,2005. 13 http://www.singtaonet.com/global/world/t20060523_219216.html.14 http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfi le-english&y=2007&m =May&x=20070524152104mlenuhret0.7033808.15 Robert I. Rotberg, �The Road to Burma May Run Through China,� the Christian Sci-ence Monitor, Oct. 2, 2004.16 Andy Bounds, �U.S. Wants China to Push for Reforms in Burma,� The Financial Times, Feb.12,2007.17 �Myanmar to Jail Referendum Disrupters�, The Associated Press, February 27,2008.


152 153

18 Larry Jagan, �The Generals Fall Out in Myanmar,� The Asia Times, Jan.31, 2007.19 Brian McCartan, �Myanmar deal right neighborly of India,� The Asia Times, Jan.11, 2008.20 Larry Jagan, � Myanmar Drop a Nuclear �Bombshell,�� The Asia Times, May24, 2007.21 Stanley A. Weiss �Myanmar�s Neighbors Hold the Key,�The International Herald Tri-bune, March 7, 2007. 22 Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, �Asia�s Forgotten Crisis-A New Approach to Burma,� Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007.23 Glenn Kessler and Dan Eggen, �Bush Plans Call to Chinese Leader Over Burma's Stance on Aid�, the Washington Post, May 10, 2008.24 Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, �Asia�s Forgotten Crisis-A New Approach to Burma,� Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007.

China�s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic LocationIan Storey

It is a truism that countries which share borders cannot afford to be disinterested in each other�s affairs. The People�s Republic of China (PRC) and Burma share a frontier that is 1,300 miles in length � the longest between China and any other country in Southeast Asia � and this contiguity explains Beijing�s long-standing interests in its southern neighbour since 1949, and vice versa of course. Over the past sixty years the PRC�s interests in Burma have evolved and been prioritized diffe-rently. But since 1988, when the friendless, fearful and cash-strapped Burmese military regime turned to Beijing for succour, China�s inte-rests have expanded and intensifi ed. Over the past two decades China and Burma have become quasi-allies; China�s relationship with Burma is the closest to any Southeast Asian country since North Vietnam in the 1950s.

China has clearly accrued enormous benefi ts from this asymmetrical, but still symbiotic, relationship. For China, the economic benefi ts have been front and centre in its policy towards Burma. The PRC has gained privileged access to Burma�s vast store of natural resources, vital ingredients in the country�s breakneck economic expansion and hence Great Power aspirations. Burma�s off-shore oil and gas deposits in particular have helped China enhance its overall energy security situation. Going across the border in the other direction, cheap, low-quality Chinese manufactured goods have fl ooded the Burmese market, while large numbers of businessmen � some estimate millions - from Yunnan province and elsewhere have set up shop in Burma in search of business and investment opportunities. Burmese ports, upgraded by Chinese companies, have given China�s underdeveloped and landlocked southwest provinces an outlet to the sea, and hence access to larger overseas markets. Burma also represents an important, if often embarrassing, friend inside the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the premier regional organization and driver of several larger Asia-Pacifi c multilateral forums which Beijing has utilized to further its regional agenda. Burma also occupies an important strategic location at the junction of East, South and Southeast Asia, and access


154 155

arrangements to Burmese naval facilities may one day allow the People�s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to project power into the Indian Ocean and northern approaches of the Straits of Malacca, one of the world�s most important trade arteries. In short, alliance with Burma has been an essential component of Beijing�s Southeast Asia policy, and the country�s importance to China should not be underestimated.

Burma�s regime, though not the vast majority of its impoverished population, has also benefi ted handsomely from the tightening relationship. China�s has acted as the regime�s primary supplier of weaponry since 1988, providing it with the wherewithal to consolidate power, crack down on internal dissent and intimidate ethnic armies along the country�s periphery. Soft loans and fi nancial grants from China have helped keep the economy afl oat during lean times, and enabled the regime to circumvent international, mainly Western, imposed sanctions. Most importantly for the paranoid generals, China�s veto at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) gives the junta a diplomatic shield to defl ect international condemnation and, in the worst case but frankly unlikely scenario, the ultimate insurance policy against an East Timor-style multinational intervention force. The focus of this chapter, however, is not on the benefi ts the Burmese generals have derived from their close association with China, but the development of Beijing�s manifold interests in its Southeast Asian neighbour since 1988 and why the Chinese government has such a strongly vested interest in the survival of one of Asia�s most brutal regimes.

The Political Dimension of China-Burma RelationsSince its establishment on 1 October 1949, one of the PRC�s enduring foreign policy imperatives has been to foster friendly, even pliant, re-gimes along its borders and periphery. This imperative was especially pressing for the Chinese government during the fi rst few decades of the Cold War when it feared US military intervention through the Korean Peninsula or the Indochinese countries on its southern fl ank � hence Beijing�s massive support for Pyongyang in the Korean War (1950-1953) and for Hanoi during the First and Second Indochinese Wars (1946-1954 and 1964-1975 respectively). Although Burma has a longer and more porous border with China than either North Korea or Vietnam, it was never the main focus of attention for Beijing during the Cold War. On independence Burma�s government of U Nu adop-ted a policy of neutrality and non-alignment and was friendly � some would argue excessively deferential � to the Chinese Communist Party

(CCP).1 Unlike Pyongyang and Hanoi, Rangoon was not an ally of the PRC � but crucially nor was it an enemy.

The presence of two divisions of Nationalist Chinese (Kuomintang, KMT) troops on the Burmese side of the border, armed and supplied by America�s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the virulently anti-communist Thai military, however, did pose a serious security concern for China after 1949. Because of cordial relations with Rangoon, however, Beijing refrained from launching a massive �mopping up� operation across the border, though the PLA did launch repeated small-scale incursions. The issue was more or less resolved in the mid-1950s with the repatriation of most KMT forces from Burma to Taiwan. A border treaty and mutual non-aggression pact in 1960 helped defuse any remaining tensions along the frontier and provided a solid basis for Sino-Burmese political relations.

Nevertheless, China was always ready to interfere in the internal affairs of its southern neighbour should Rangoon adopt policies inimical to Chinese interests; the mechanism for applying pressure on the government was the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) which the CCP had established close ideological links with even before 1949. Thus when U Nu�s successor, General Ne Win, who had seized power in a military coup in 1962, nationalized Chinese banks and closed down Chinese language papers, refused to condemn US military action in Vietnam in 1964 and prevented Red Guards based at the Chinese Embassy in Rangoon from distributing Maoist propaganda in 1967 leading to violent anti-Chinese demonstrations, China responded by ratcheting up support for the BCP, enabling it to conduct a major and prolonged offensive against government forces until the early 1970s. A complete breakdown in relations was avoided, however, and not wishing to push Burma into either the US or Soviet camps, Beijing normalized relations with Rangoon in 1971.

In 1978 Premier Deng Xiaoping took the momentous decision to set China down the path of economic reform. Thereafter, the Chinese government began to look more seriously at the potential economic synergies between with Burma. However, it was the domestic politi-cal turbulence in both countries during 1988-1989 which served as the catalyst for the Sino-Burmese alignment. Violent crackdowns against anti-government demonstrators in Rangoon in August-September 1988 and in Beijing in June 1989 resulted in disapprobation from the international community; their pariah status pushed the two countries closer together. But the alignment was asymmetric from the very begin-ning: while the Burmese junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), depended on China for its survival, the same could

China�s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location

156 157

not be said of Beijing. In any case China�s growing importance in the global market and on the world stage ensured its pariah status was only fl eeting. Nevertheless, Beijing saw in the ruthless suppression of pro-democracy protestors in Burma an opportunity to expand its economic and strategic interests in mainland Southeast Asia. As a result, Sino-Burmese political ties blossomed after 1988-1989. At the rhetorical level the two governments repudiated Western criticism of their hu-man rights records, rejecting it as blatant interference in their internal affairs. More importantly for China, however, close political ties with Burma enabled it to advance its economic agenda in the resource-rich country.

Despite the bonhomie expressed during frequent, high-level leadership exchanges, from the mid-1990s the SLORC endeavoured to lessen its dependence on the PRC and create more diplomatic room for manoeuver by expanding the country�s repertoire of foreign relations. Burma�s accession to ASEAN in 1997 was a key element in this policy, improved relations with India after 2000 another. A desire to wean Burma away from China was undoubtedly a factor in both ASEAN�s decision to admit Burma into its ranks and in New Delhi�s move to repair relations with its eastern neighbour. China remained, however, Burma�s principal diplomatic ally and economic partner throughout the 1990s.

Domestic developments in Burma during the fi rst decade of the twenty-fi rst century deepened the regime�s � now called the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) � dependence on the PRC. Increased dependence started with the May 2003 Depanyin Incident, when pro-SPDC militias attacked National League for Democracy (NLD) leader and Nobel peace prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi�s entourage. Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest and a major crackdown on the NLD followed. In the wake of the Depanyin Incident, the United States and European Union (EU) tightened sanctions against Burma, while Japan and Australia suspended humanitarian aid. In an attempt to assuage international condemnation, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, the reputed architect of Sino-Burmese relations, unveiled a seven-step �roadmap to democracy� which, the SPDC argued, would lead to the framing of a new constitution and democratic elections but was, in reality, a transparent attempt to remove the NLD from the electoral process and calcify the military�s political primacy.

The �reform� process was thrown into disarray, however, after Khin Nyunt�s ouster in October 2004. SPDC Chairman Senior General Than Shwe�s visit to India a few weeks later fueled speculation that Rangoon had made a decisive shift away from Burma in favour of India. But

such speculation was misplaced: rather than weaken the Sino-Burmese nexus the Depanyin Incident and downfall of Khin Nyunt actually strengthened bilateral ties. The tightening of international sanctions in particular helped raise China�s economic profi le in Burma. Meanwhile, Rangoon looked increasingly isolated. Exasperated by the SPDC�s failu-re to advance the political reform process, even incrementally, some of Burma�s fellow ASEAN members became more vocal in their criticism of the generals. And fearing Burma�s chairmanship of the Association would strain corporate relations with its dialogue partners, particularly America and the EU, in July 2005 the core members of ASEAN pressu-rized Rangoon into relinquishing the rotating chairmanship in favour of the Philippines.

Pressure mounted on the SPDC throughout 2006, mainly from Washington. The Bush administration had labelled Burma an �outpost of tyranny� and a threat to international peace and security because of the junta�s widespread and egregious human rights abuses, refugee outfl ows into neighbouring countries, the manufacture of illegal narcotics inside Burma and the spread of communicable diseases from the country such as HIV/AIDS, bird fl u and malaria. Matters came to ahead in January 2007 when the United States and United Kingdom jointly tabled a resolution at the UNSC calling on the Burmese government to cease military operations against ethnic minorities, release all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi, and engage in political dialogue leading to genuine democratic transition. The PRC moved quickly to defend its Southeast Asian ally: on 12 January, together with Russia, it used its veto to defeat the proposal. China�s wielding of the veto was precisely the kind of insurance Burma�s generals had been paying premiums on since 1988.

The PRC justifi ed its veto on the grounds that the concerns raised by American and British diplomats at the UN were Burma�s internal affairs, and in any case did not pose a threat to international peace and security. Nevertheless, China�s actions at the UN should not be inter-preted as approval of the political status quo � quite the contrary in fact. Over the past two decades the PRC had invested considerable capital, both fi nancial and political, in Burma and in return expected the SPDC to provide a stable polity in exchange so that it could reap long-term re-turns on those investments. Beijing recognized, of course, that political stasis and deteriorating socio-economic conditions would help incubate instability - instability that would put China�s investments at risk. As a consequence the Chinese leadership had indicated its support for Khin Nyunt�s �roadmap for democracy� because it was seen as the only hope of giving the SPDC a veneer of legitimacy. Thus, when Kin Nyunt made


158 159

his last visit to the PRC in mid-2004, Premier Wen Jiabao conceded that while the political process was Burma�s internal affair, nevertheless the Chinese government hoped that the SPDC would accelerate �political settlements of existing disputes and move towards democratic progress so as to enhance stability and peaceful development.� 2 Wen reiterated this message to Prime Minister Soe Win during a one-on-one meeting at the China-ASEAN Summit in Nanning in November 2006.3 Speaking earlier in the year, a senior US State Department offi cial had revealed that China had privately expressed concern to Washington regarding the stalled political process in Burma.4 Prodding from Beijing, both in public and behind the scenes, seems to have had the desired effect, for in June 2007 acting Prime Minister Thein Sein informed the Chinese government that the National Convention, the body tasked with fram-ing a new constitution that had been suspended since May 2005, would resume in July.5

China seems not only to have been troubled by the failure to advance the political process in Burma, but also by the rapid deterioration of US-Burma relations during the second Bush administration. A less confrontational relationship between the junta and the White House might, Beijing reasoned, assuage the junta�s paranoia and result in more moderate policies (in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, US-Burma relations had warmed slightly, resulting in the release from house arrest of Suu Kyi). Thus in an effort to bring the two sides closer together, China brokered a meeting between US and Burmese diplomats in Beijing in June 2007.6

The PRC�s fears that domestic instability in Burma was brewing proved prescient. In mid-August 2007, anti-government protests erupted in response to the SPDC�s decision to slash fuel subsidies. By late September the number of protestors had swelled to over 50,000 people in Rangoon, including a large number of monks. Finally, on 26 September the inevitable occurred, and the Burmese armed forces launched a violent crackdown, killing an unknown number of protesters and detaining several thousand.

Initially, when the protests began, China elected to remain silent. It was not until 13 September, when the protests were well underway, that the Chinese government reiterated its hope that Burma would �push forward a democracy process that is appropriate to the country� and �restore internal stability as soon as possible, properly handle issues and actively promote national reconciliation.� 7 When the crackdown began, Beijing merely called on all parties to �exercise restraint.� 8 In contrast, a statement by ASEAN foreign ministers expressed revulsion at the crackdown. When the United States and some European coun-

tries tried to push through a UN resolution condemning the Burmese government, China blocked the attempt, declaring that such a move would �not be useful� as the protests were an internal affair and did not affect regional stability or international peace.9 Instead, China threw its support behind the UN Special Envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, in an effort to promote dialogue between Suu Kyi and the generals. Gambari later admitted that China had been �helpful� in arranging his visit during the height of the crisis, diplomatic speak, perhaps, for putting pressure on the SPDC.10 Following Gambari�s mission to Burma, during which he met with Suu Kyi and the generals separately, China declared itself satisfi ed with the results of his trip.11 After Gambari�s briefi ng to the UN, Chinese diplomats once again went into bat for their Burmese al-lies, softening the tone of a UNSC statement which �strongly deplored� the use of force against unarmed demonstrators instead of the original �condemn�.12 China also made plain its �resolute opposition� to the imposition of UN sanctions, hardly surprising given the damage such measures would have taken on China�s considerable investments in Burma.13

Throughout the so-called �Saffron Revolution,� the PRC had come under pressure from the United States, Australia and several ASEAN countries to use its infl uence to rein in the generals.14 Such calls verged on the naïve for two reasons. First, the extent of Beijing�s infl uence over the junta was almost certainly exaggerated; although the SPDC would have taken note of China�s advice, ultimately the generals, and in par-ticular Than Shwe, make decisions based on their own self-interests, not Beijing�s. Second, it is manifestly not in China�s interests to see regime change in Burma and the political uncertainties and foreign policy outlook associated with a transfer of power to opposition groups. A continuation of SPDC rule, preferably in civilian garb, is seen by China as the best way to protect and advance its interests in Burma. The following sections identify and examine the extent of China�s interests in Burma.

Trade, Aid and Energy InterestsChina did not have large commercial interests in Burma during the Cold War period, despite the country�s geographical contiguity and abundant natural resources. China was largely self-suffi cient in terms of fossil fuels and other resources and in any case Burma was not a very attractive economic partner after the military coup of 1962: Ne Win�s autarkic polices, known as the Burmese Way to Socialism, drove the nation�s economy to the brink of bankruptcy, and economic distress


160 161

was a major catalyst of the anti-government demonstrations in 1988. Chinese economic and technical aid to Burma during the Cold War was intended to buttress political relations rather than facilitate Sino-Bur-mese economic links per se.

The introduction of economic reforms in China in 1978, however, led to an expansion of two-way trade, primarily along the border. But what particularly attracted China�s economic planners to their southern neighbour was its geographical position and long coastline. In the early stages of China�s reform process the focus had been on attracting foreign investment � mainly from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong and Taiwan � to the special economic zones in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. Long term, however, economic planners looked to develop the landlocked southwest provinces particularly Yunnan and Sichuan. Transportation costs from these inland provinces to ports along the eastern seaboard were prohibitive; a cheaper and more effi cient alternative was to move Chinese goods by road and rail through Burma for shipment to overseas markets, a developmental strategy fi rst outlined in the Beijing Review in the mid-1980s.15 But it was not until the Sino-Burmese alignment of 1988-1989 that the PRC had the political leverage in Rangoon to translate these plans into reality.

To realize Burma�s economic potential the PRC has provided the regime with considerable developmental assistance in the form of grant aid, concessional loans and debt relief since 1988. Grants and concessional loans have most often been used to procure equipment and machinery from the PRC, and to upgrade the country�s dilapidated infrastructure, particularly the decrepit transportation network of roads, rail and rivers.16 In the 1990s, for instance, Chinese fi nancial aid was used to upgrade existing routes between Burma and China (including the Burma Road of World War II fame) and new routes were laid between Yunnan province and Burma�s northern states.

The volume of bilateral trade has expanded considerably since 1988, with border trade accounting for the lion�s share. Burma�s exports to the PRC have consisted largely of raw materials and commodities: lumber, agricultural and fi shery products, livestock and gemstones and precious metals (including jade and gold). Chinese exports to Burma have been composed mainly of cheap manufactures and foodstuffs.17

Statistics purporting to show the value of bilateral trade are notoriously unreliable due to a variety of factors not least of which are pervasive corruption, misreporting and the huge volume of illegal transactions which are conducted along the poorly regulated and porous frontier. For instance, Global Witness, an environmental NGO, estimates that 95 per cent of Burma�s total timber exports are illegally exported to Yunnan.18

Nevertheless, according to fi gures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) the value of Sino-Burmese trade has increased from $171 million in 1990 to $677 million in 2000 and $1.56 billion in 2006 (see Table 1). Given off the books transactions along the border though, the true amount is likely to be many times higher.

Table 1. Burma�s Trade with China, 1990�2006(Millions of US$)

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, various issues 1990�2007)

What the IMF fi gures do reveal is that the balance of trade since 1990 has continually been in China�s favour. Burma�s accumulated trade defi cit with its northern neighbour was nearly $4 billion in the period 2000-2005. Burma�s underdeveloped domestic manufacturing industry has found it very diffi cult to compete with China�s.

Another important facet of the Sino-Burmese economic nexus that


Year Export to PRC Imports fromPRC Total Trade

1990 33 138 171

1991 96 315 411

1992 119 285 404

1993 150 357 507

1994 130 406 536

1995 136 680 816

1996 125 573 698

1997 67 627 694

1998 56 586 642

1999 92.25 477.21 539.46

2000 113.47 546.03 677.5

2001 121.99 547.26 669.25

2002 124.47 797.34 921.81

2003 154.10 998.75 1,152.85

2004 187.68 1,029.24 1,216.92

2005 249.49 1,028.40 1,277.89

2006 229.70 1,327.95 1,557.65

162 163

is not visible in the offi cial fi gures is the business activities of PRC nationals in Burma. Illegal Chinese immigration from Yunnan and elsewhere has been a perennial problem in bilateral relations even during the Cold War, but since 1988 the trend has greatly accelerated.19

As no offi cial census has been taken in Burma since 1983 it is diffi cult to gauge with any accuracy the number of PRC citizens residing in Burma. The problem is compounded by the fact that Chinese citizens, intent on doing business in Burma, often enter the country on tourist visas and then purchase the identity cards of deceased Burmese citizens on the black market.20 This method allows Chinese not only to remain in Burma indefi nitely but also to circumvent laws on foreign ownership of businesses including hotels, shops, restaurants and hotels. The presence of Chinese nationals is reported to be particularly heavy in Upper Burma (so much so that the area is sometimes jokingly referred to as �Lower Yunnan�) and one estimate puts the number of Chinese in Mandalay at 200,000, accounting for one-fi fth of the population.21

According to another source, the total number of Chinese citizens in Burma could be as high as 2 million.22

Despite burgeoning economic ties, it should be stressed that China is not Burma�s only trade partner, nor perhaps even the most important. While many Western companies have refused, or are barred from doing business in Burma because of the SPDC�s human rights record, companies from Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and India have shown no moral qualms about doing business with the military regime. In 2005, Thailand was Burma�s number one trade partner ($2.4 billion) followed by the PRC ($1.28 billion), Singapore ($754), India ($570) and Malaysia ($392).23 Thailand took pole position because it is a major buyer of natural gas from Burma; it is estimated that in 2006, Burmese exports of natural gas to Thailand were worth $2 billion.24 In 2005 Thailand accounted for 63 per cent of Burma�s total trade, China only 33 per cent.25 However, this situation could well be reversed within the next few years as China ramps up imports of Burmese energy resources.

After 2000, the Chinese leadership continued to dole out ever larger quantities of developmental assistance to the SPDC. For example, during President Jiang Zemin�s state visit to Burma in December 2001, the fi rst ever by a Chinese head of state, $800 million was pledged; when General Than Shwe returned the visit in January 2003 a further $200 million was committed, plus partial debt relief on earlier loans.26 The bulk of this developmental aid has been committed to a few strategic sectors: manufacturing concerns, mining and extraction industries and power generation. The latter has exerted a particularly strong pull on PRC investment for four reasons. First, Burma sits on signifi cant

reserves of hydrocarbons. According to the state-owned Mynama Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), proven recoverable reserves of oil and gas, both on-shore and off-shore, amount to 3.2 billion barrels and 510 cubic meters respectively.27 Second, Burma�s oil and gas fi elds are located relatively close to the PRC and energy resources can be imported by ship or through proposed pipelines. Third, the strong political relationship between the SPDC and the Chinese government gives Beijing�s state-owned oil companies a competitive advantage over foreign rivals when it comes to signing exploration or exploitation contracts. Fourth, access to Burma�s oil and gas helps reduce China�s dependence on the Middle East. For the SPDC there are obvious benefi ts as well: energy contracts with Chinese companies helps circumvent Western sanctions and fi lls the generals� coffers with much needed foreign currency.

Virtually all of China�s state-owned energy companies have entered into commercial agreements with MOGE, either to explore for oil and gas, purchase reserves already identifi ed or upgrade existing oilfi elds. Since 2000, major contracts have included:

• December 2001: China National Petroleum Corporation(CNPC) invested in the on-shore Pyay oilfi eld to boost production.28

• September 2004: China Petroleum and Chemical Company(SINOPEC) and MOGE signed a production sharingagreement to exploit oil in an on-shore fi eld near Kyaukyphu.29

• December 2004: China National Offshore Oil Corporation(CNOOC) signed an exploration agreement covering offshore blocks off Rakhine State;30

• January 2007: CNPC signed production sharing agreementswith MOGE covering three crude oil and natural gasexploration projects off the Rakhine coast.31

• March 2007: PetroChina secured sole purchasing rights toan estimated at 6 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas in theShwe off-shore fi eld. The announcement came as a majorblow to India, which had proposed piping the gas to itsnortheastern states, and was widely interpreted as a gift toChina for using its veto at the UNSC earlier in the year.32

Burmese oil and gas bought up by Chinese companies will likely be transported to the PRC via two proposed pipelines fi nanced by loans from China. In April 2007, the SPDC gave the green light for a 2,380 km gas pipeline to Kunming.33 A second pipeline for crude oil is expected to follow with an oil refi nery to be based in Kunming.34 The two pipelines


164 165

should reduce China�s dependence on energy shipments through the Straits of Malacca.

In addition to oil and gas, hydroelectric power generation has also become a magnet for Chinese aid and investment in Burma. The SPDC has identifi ed hydroelectric power as an important source of domestic energy, as well as a lucrative foreign currency earner, and plans exist for the construction of 30 hydroelectric power plants. China has become a major player in this sector for a number of reasons. First, the rate of return on hydroelectric power projects in Burma is very good. Second, the electricity generated can be exported to China�s southwest provinces and beyond. Third, hydropower plants can power mining concerns, many of which themselves have been the target of PRC investment. Fourth, Chinese companies benefi t through the export of engineering equipment and expertise to Burma. Fifth, Chinese consumers can enjoy the benefi ts of electricity without paying the high social and environmental costs which the Burmese suffer.

After the Sino-Burmese alignment was forged in the late 1980s, Chi-na invested in a number of small hydropower projects in Burma. Since 2000, however, the scale of Chinese-invested projects has increased. These large projects have been centered on two areas � the Salween River and the Irrawaddy River. Chinese companies have invested heavily in three hydropower projects along the Salween: Shweli 1, 2 and 3 designed to generate 600 Megawatts (MW), 460 MW and 360 MW respectively. Construction of Shweli 1 began in 2002, and agreement on the other two plants was reached in April 2007.35 Along the Irrawaddy, China Power Investment Corporation will fi nance and construct the Myitsone Dam, China�s fi rst build-operate-transfer project in Burma, plus six more large hydroprojects upstream which will have a combined generating capacity of 13,360 MW.36

These projects and others like them which have attracted foreign, mainly Thai, investment have been heavily criticized by NGOs on environmental, social and political grounds. Environmentally the hy-dropower projects are predicted to upset the rivers� delicate ecological balance, and negatively impact fi sheries, food plain farming and river bank cultivation. Social disruptions, based on earlier dam projects, are likely to include land confi scation, forced labour, population displace-ment, and human rights abuses, the sexual exploitation of women and spread of HIV/AIDS through the presence of Burmese troops sent to guard construction sites and the completed facilities. NGOs have also accused the SPDC of using the dams as a pretext to expand its military presence in areas controlled by ethnic army ceasefi re groups.37

China�s Military and Strategic Interests in BurmaOne of the central pillars of the Sino-Burmese alliance has been mili-tary cooperation. Over the past two decades the Chinese government has furnished the Burmese regime with a formidable array of military equipment. This aid has helped bind the two countries closer together and enabled the junta to consolidate power. The robust Sino-Burmese defence relationship has provided China with opportunities to advance its strategic interests in both South and Southeast Asia.

In the aftermath of the 1988 crackdown, the SLORC�s desire to strengthen internal security and prevent further anti-government pro-tests from threatening regime survival meant that military-security as-sistance from the PRC was an immediate priority. The fi rst in a series of military assistance agreements between Burma and China was signed in October 1989 during a visit to Beijing by SLORC Vice Chairman Gen-eral Than Shwe and then head of the intelligence service, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt. Further defence agreements were inked in 1991, 1992, 1994 and 1996, with perhaps others remaining secret. Under these agreements China has provided the Burmese armed forces, the Tatmadaw, with an estimated $2 billion of equipment, including over 5,000 military vehicles, 200 main and light battle tanks, 300 armoured personnel carriers, 100 artillery pieces, tens of thousands of rifl es, small arms and mortars plus ammunition, 56 F-7 fi ghter bombers, 50 close air support ground attack fi ghters, training and transport aircraft, heli-copters and 30 naval vessels.38 The agreements have also covered the training of Burmese military personnel, undertaken in both Burma and China. With hard currency in short supply during the 1990s, the junta paid for the military equipment through barter trade and with Chinese concessional loans. According to Tatmadaw expert Andrew Selth, mili-tary aid from the PRC has transformed the Burmese military from a �small, weak counter-insurgency force� into a �powerful defence force capable of major conventional operations.� 39

Arms transfers from the PRC to Burma have continued into the twenty-fi rst century. However, in keeping with the junta�s attempts to lessen its dependence on its northern neighbour, some diversifi cation of arms acquisitions has occurred, principally from Russia and India. In 2001 Rangoon surprised Beijing by signing a deal with Moscow to purchase 10 MiG-29 fi ghter jets. The deal was signed in the wake of tensions between Thailand and Burma during 2000-2001 which saw the Thai and Burmese militaries trading artillery fi re along the border and the Thai air force deploying F-16 fi ghter jets in a show of strength. Further Russian acquisitions were agreed to in 2006, including more


166 167

MiG-29s and air defence systems for the new administrative capital of Naypyidaw.40 In 2006 India agreed to transfer an unspecifi ed number of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery pieces, helicopters and maritime surveillance aircraft to Burma as part of its overall policy of improving relations with the SPDC so as to off-set PRC infl uence, gain access to the country�s energy resources and secure the junta�s support for coordinated military operations against insurgents operating in India�s northeast states.41 After the Saffron Revolution, however, New Delhi suspended all further arms sales to the Burmese regime. Moreover, despite its diversifi cation efforts, the PRC remains Burma�s number one armourer.

Close relations with Rangoon have also provided the PRC with useful strategic advantages. As Selth has noted, Burma�s strategic value to China lies in its geographical location: at the junction of three subregions, East, South and Southeast Asia.42 Alliance with Burma helps secure China�s border, the East Asian element of the triad. But the most important geostrategic advantages for China are to be found in South and Southeast Asia.

Burma shares a long border with India, China�s long-term Asian rival, notwithstanding recent improvements in the bilateral relationship. Since the early 1960s China has forged a close relationship with Pakistan, the country which absorbs a lot of New Delhi�s political and military energies; Burma provides Beijing with an additional �pressure point� on India�s eastern border. The Sino-Burmese alliance has been of great concern to strategic thinkers in India since the late 1980s. Burma also provides an important vantage point to monitor New Delhi�s military activities in the Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea and wider Indian Ocean. China�s role in monitoring such activities has been subject to a great deal of rumour and speculation over the past two decades. Military agreements between the two countries signed in the early 1990s were alleged to have given China permission to establish signals intelligence (SIGINT) listening stations on Great Coco Island and at several other locations along the Burmese coast.43 The alleged purpose of these facilities was to eavesdrop on India�s ballistic missile tests conducted at the Defence Research and Development Laboratory in Hyderabad and to monitor the activities of the Indian Navy at Port Blair in the Andaman Islands.44 Both Rangoon and Beijing always denied the reports, and there was speculation that the Indian armed forces had played up the issue for budgetary reasons. In mid-2005, however, in a surprise announcement, the Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian Navy, Admiral Arun Prakash, said he believed the Burmese government when it said China was not involved in SIGINT activities on Coco

Island.45 Prakash�s comments were made at a time of warming political and military ties between New Delhi and Rangoon, and may have been made for political purposes. Senior Indian naval offi cers have told the author, however, that the armed forces have plenty of evidence to prove China�s SIGINT activities at Burmese military facilities.46 Because of the closed nature of Burmese society and acute sensitivities associated with national security issues, it is diffi cult to determine the full extent of China�s intelligence activities in Burma.

China�s long-term strategic interests in Burma have also aroused controversy. Reports in the 1990s suggested that the PRC had fi nanced the upgrade of Burmese naval facilities on Ramree Island, Hainggyi Island, Zadetkyi Island and Monkey Point Naval Base. These reports generated speculation that China might one day establish look to es-tablish a semi-permanent naval presence in Burma to protect its sea lines of communication (SLOCs) which stretch from the Middle East and Africa to China, and pass through the Indian Ocean and Straits of Malacca in Southeast Asia. Strategic thinkers in the PRC recognize the nexus between China�s continued economic development and in the need for uninterrupted energy supplies. Because the Chinese Navy is currently incapable of protecting the country�s SLOCs, there is concern that during times of crisis these vital lifelines could be constrained or even severed by China�s opponents. Emblematic of these concerns over SLOC security is the Straits of Malacca, the 550-mile long waterway separating Indonesia and Malaysia, and the shortest route between the Indian and Pacifi c oceans. Chinese security analysts view the Straits as a serious strategic vulnerability because two-thirds of the country�s energy imports pass through it and �certain major powers� (a codeword for the United States and its allies) can exercise control over it � a situa-tion dubbed China�s �Malacca dilemma.� 47

The Chinese government has adopted a number of strategies to enhance its energy security situation, including continued reliance on coal, increasing nuclear power generation capacity, improving energy effi ciency and greater utilization of renewable energy resources. However, such programmes will take decades to bear fruit and in any case it will be virtually impossible for China to become totally self-suffi cient in energy resources. As a consequence, China�s dependence on imported energy resources has become a permanent reality.

Burma could play a role in mitigating China�s so-called �Malacca dilemma� in two ways. First, as noted earlier, the construction of oil and gas pipelines from Burma to the PRC, which were reportedly given the green late in April 2007, would reduce China�s dependence on the Strait as vessels would be able to off-load their cargoes of crude oil at


168 169

Burmese ports instead of making the long journey to China�s eastern seaboard. Second, it has been suggested that China could improve its SLOC security by stationing PLAN warships at Burmese naval facilities. This latter strategy was fi rst outlined by a US defence consultancy fi rm and dubbed China�s �string of pearls.� In it, China would establish a naval presence at ports in Burma, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Cambodia.48 The strategic logic of the �string of pearls� notion is open to debate. The ports noted above are a long way from China�s SLOCs. China�s involvement in the upgrade of Burmese port facilities has been on a commercial basis, with no evidence of direct PLA involvement. Moreover, a Chinese naval presence along the Burmese coast might be counterproductive as it would raise India�s hackles and might push New Delhi into a closer military relationship with the United States. The ASEAN states would also fi nd this development unsettling, as it would raise the unwelcome prospect of one of its members being at the centre of Sino-Indian rivalry, much as Vietnam was during the era of Sino-Soviet enmity in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, China�s strategic planners tend to think long term, and it is possible that re-furbished Burmese naval facilities have been designated as important �place holders� in a larger global naval strategy.

ConclusionsTwenty years ago, against a backdrop of anti-government protests and socio-economic dislocation, Burma�s military leaders launched an in-cumbency coup. The new government, the SLORC, decided that in the face of international censure and economic sanctions they had little op-tion but to discard the country�s 40 year commitment to neutrality and non-alignment in favour of tighter relations with the PRC. Since then, the story of Sino-Burmese relations has been one of deepening depen-dence, despite the junta�s somewhat successful attempts to diversify its foreign and trade relations. China�s shielding of Burma at the UN on two occasions in 2007 underscored just how dependent the generals had become on China.

The Sino-Burmese alliance has clearly served both governments well, but perhaps it is China that has made the most impressive gains. The PRC gained an ally on its southern fl ank and a friendly voice within ASEAN. The junta�s atrocious human rights record has from time to time shone a light on Beijing�s support for the regime � most recently during the �Saffron Revolution� � but economic interests have far outweighed any embarrassment for China. The alliance has been a boon to China�s policy of developing its southwestern provinces, as

goods produced in these landlocked areas now have an outlet to the sea thanks to ports along the Burmese coast. Burma has become a veritable treasure trove of natural resources for the PRC, with the grand prize being almost unfettered access to the country�s substantial oil and gas reserves.

The strategic benefi ts for China are more potential than real, but no less important for being so. If the construction of pipelines to pump oil and gas across Burma and into Yunnan province goes ahead, the PRC�s �Malacca dilemma� will be partially � but only partially - miti-gated. And in the future, the rotation of Chinese naval ships through Burmese ports will enhance the PLA�s power projection capabilities in both South and Southeast Asia, though Beijing will likely think twice about such a move because of the negative diplomatic repercussions that would undoubtedly follow.

In short, the scale of China�s interests in Burma means that Beijing has a huge stake in the country�s stability. That stability requires an end to political inertia in Burma, and forward momentum on political reform, however limited and self-serving the �roadmap to democracy� is. It does not mean, of course, that China supports regime change, for there is absolutely no guarantee that a non-SPDC government would protect and advance China�s interests � quite the reverse in fact. New political arrangements in Burma could also lead to chaos on China�s southern fl ank, with waves of refugees fl owing into the country and the resumption of violent ethnic separatism. Stability also requires the Bur-mese authorities to prioritize economic development, as rising living standards might yet mitigate popular dissatisfaction with the regime and hence defuse further unrest. Yet China has been sorely disappoin-ted with the junta�s gross mismanagement of the economy and rising poverty levels. Beijing is particularly anxious about the widening income disparities between ordinary Burmese and China�s economic migrants in the north of the country who are enriching themselves at the expense of local people. A popular backlash against PRC nationals would pose a major security headache for the Chinese authorities. And xenophobic outbursts are not without precedent in Burma�s recent history.

The PRC must have been heartened that the 2007 Saffron Revolu-tion was snuffed out quickly and with relatively little loss of life, and that the junta seems to be fi rmly back in charge. But the Chinese lead-ership must also be worried that the abortive revolution has introduced an unwelcome element of uncertainty into the political dynamics and economic prospects of its Southeast Asian ally. The bloody crackdown against the country�s deeply revered monks may have engendered splits within the armed forces, and these divisions could widen over time,


170 171

possibly leading to an internal coup, dialogue with the opposition and perhaps even political transition. Future anti-government demonstra-tions cannot be ruled out, either. Such developments would not, in China�s view, bode well for stability and the safety of its considerable economic interests and continuation of political infl uence.

Notes1 William C. Johnstone, Burma�s Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 276.2 �Chinese premier, Myanmar PM hold talks�, People�s Daily, 13 July 2004.3 �China to maintain non-interference policy on ties with Myanmar�, PLA Daily, 1 No-vember 2006.4 Remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacifi c Affairs, Eric John, Harvard Asia Center, Cambridge, 17 February 2006, US State Department.5 �China�s satellite�, The Irrawaddy, 7 June 2007.6 �Myanmar, US hold rare talks in China over Aung San Suu Kyi�, Channelnewsasia (Singapore), 29 June 2007.7 State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan Meets with Special Envoy of SPDC Chairman of Myan-mar, PRC Foreign Ministry, 13 September 2007.8 �China makes contingency plans for junta�s fall�, International Herald Tribune, 26 Sep-tember 2007.9 Ibid.10 �China �helpful� in Myanmar crisis: UN envoy�, Channelnewsasia.com, 18 October 2007.11 �China backhands Burma over UN envoy�, Bangkok Post, 5 October 2007.12 �China leads move to soften UN text on Myanmar�, Channelnewsasia.com, 9 October 2007.13 �China opposes sanctions against Myanmar�, Xinhua News Agency, 9 October 2007.14 See, for instance, �Bush appeals to China to pressure Myanmar�, Reuters, 27 Septem-ber 2007 and �Thai PM urges India, China to help end Myanmar crisis�, Agence France Presse, 27 September 2007.15 Pan Qi, �Opening the Southwest: an expert opinion�, Beijing Review, 2 September 1985. 16 Maung Aung Myoe. �Sino-Myanmar Economic Relations Since 1988�, Asia Research Institute Working Paper No. 86 (April 2007), Singapore, pp. 19-20.17 Ibid., p. 12.18 Cited in Khun Sam, �Where money grows on trees�, The Irrawaddy, 1 August 2007.19 As early as 1952 a British writer bemoaned the fact that illegal immigration from China was turning Mandalay and Bhama into �Chinese cities�. See Hinton, China�s Relations with Burma, op. cit., p. 48.20 See Mya Maung, �On the Road to Mandalay: A case study of the Sinonization of Upper Burma�, Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 5, May 1994; and Michael Vatikiotis, �Catching the wave�, Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 February 1995.

21 David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington D.C.: Georgetown Uni-versity Press, 2001), p. 228.22 Comments made to author by Professor David Steinberg, October 2007.23 Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2006)24 Thomas Fuller, �Region�s energy needs enable Myanmar junta�, International Herald Tribune, 1 October 2007.25 Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2006)26 �Jiang seals $780 million Myanmar support�, South China Morning Post, 14 December 2001 and �China throws Burma a fi nancial lifeline�, Financial Times, 17 January 2003.27 Cited in Maung, �Sino-Myanmar Economic Relations Since 1988�, op. cit., p. 15.28 �Jiang seals $780 million Myanmar support�, South China Morning Post, 14 December 2001.29 Tin Maung Maung Than, �Myanmar�s Energy Sector�, op. cit., pp. 263-266.30 Maung, �Sino-Myanmar Economic Relations Since 1988�, op. cit., p. 15.31 �MOGE inks oil, gas exploration deal with CNPC�, Myanmar Digest, 17 January 2007.32 See �Myanmar says no to gas exports to India, prefers China�, Press Trust of India, 21 March 2007; and �The Good, Bad and Ugly of China�s Shwe Gas Deal�, The Irrawaddy, 12 December 2007.33 �Construction of China-Myanmar oil pipeline is expected to start this year�, People�s Daily, 22 April 2007.34 �Kunming favourable for Sino-Burma pipeline oil refi nery�, Interfax China, 1 February 2007.35 �Myanmar, China sign new hydropower deal�, Agence France Presse, 10 April 2007.36 �China to build Myanmar hydropower plants�, Shanghai Daily, 10 May 2007.37 George McLeod, �Atrocity before the deluge�, Bangkok Post, 8 July 2007; �China�s dams in Burma cause for concern, say activists�, Bangkok Post, 4 December 2007; also see the NGO reports, Palaung Youth Network Group, �Under the Boot: The Burma Army Clears Way for Chinese Dams on the Shweli River� (3 December 2007) http://salweenwatch.org/downlaods/UndertheBootEnglish.pdf; and Kachin Development Network Group, �Damming the Irrawaddy�(22 October 2007) http://www.aksyu.com/2007/AKSYU-Books/Damming-the-Irrawaddy-eng.pdf 38 Andrew Selth, Burma�s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk, CT: East Bridge, 2002), pp. 169, 193, 213�214, 219.39 Andrew Selth, �Burma and Superpower Rivalries in the Asia-Pacifi c�, Naval War College Review, Vol. LV, No. 2 (Spring 2002), p. 56.40 �Russia to supply wide range of arms to Myanmar�, Press Trust of India, 4 April 2006.41 �India begins supplying Myanmar military hardware�, IANS, 4 October 2006.42 Selth, �Burma and Superpower Rivalries�, op. cit., p. 43.43 Desmond Ball, Burma�s Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from the Second World War to Civil War and Cyber Warfare (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1998), p. 220. �Chinese puzzle over Burma SIGINT base�, Jane�s Defence Weekly, 29 January 1994.


172 173

44 See Selth, Burma�s Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 119; �Snooping Around�, Far Eastern Economic Review, 4 August 1994, and �Sino-Burmese pact�, Far Eastern Economic Review, 30 January 1997.45 �India says no China defence posts on Myanmar Island�, Reuters, 24 August 2005.46 Author discussions with senior Indian naval offi cers, New Delhi, February 2006 and Sydney, February 2008.47 Ian Storey, �China�s �Malacca Dilemma��, China Brief, Vol. 6 (Issue 8), 12 April 2006.48 Bill Gertz, �China builds up strategic sea lanes�, Washington Times, 18 January 2005.

Comparing ASEAN Countries� Efforts to Infl uence Political Developments in Myanmar: Towards a New Regional Approach?Jürgen Haacke

IntroductionOn 9 February 2008 Myanmar�s ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, formerly the State Peace and Order Restoration Coun-cil, SLORC) announced that it would hold a referendum on the fi nal draft of the country�s new constitution in May 2008. It also indicated that there would be multi-party elections in 2010. In reaction to this sur-prise announcement, the UN Special Adviser on Myanmar, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, who assists the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) in the exercise of his good offi ces role in line with the mandate given by the UN General Assembly (UNGA), travelled to Myanmar for the third time since the suppression of peaceful protests in the autumn of 2007 to urge the military leadership to fully incorporate the political opposition in the country�s political process before the referendum. The regime informed Ibrahim Gambari that the military would implement its roadmap to democracy as planned and thus disregard calls to inclu-de Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and the National League for Democracy (NLD) in re-drafting the constitution. Indeed, Information Minister Brigadier-General Kyaw Hsan made it entirely clear that those who fai-led to participate in the National Convention (NC) would nevertheless have the possibility of participating in the referendum and subsequent election.1

A week before the referendum, Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, cau-sing massive devastation and loss of life, particularly in the Ayeyawady (Irrawaddy) Delta.2 The ruling junta nevertheless proceeded with the referendum in those areas not affected by the cyclone, and it was ostensi-bly approved by 92% of those voting. In other areas, the referendum was postponed until 24 May. According to the SPDC, 98.12% of eligible voters ultimately cast their votes in the referendum, with 92.48% supporting the draft constitution.3 There are few observers who believe that these results were not manipulated. While the constitution, which will effectively leave


174 175

real political power in the hands of the military commander in chief, was ratifi ed and promulgated, ASSK�s house arrest was extended to May 2009. These developments have raised a number of important questions? What role have the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Na-tions (ASEAN) played in promoting political transition in Myanmar and what approach can they still play in promoting national reconciliation in Myanmar, either individually or collectively, both in the immediate future and in the medium term? And has Cyclone Nargis added further impetus to developing a new regional initiative?

ASEAN�s Declaratory Position on Myanmar: Looking backPrior to February 2008 the last major occasion at which the ASEAN states explicitly formulated a collective position on Myanmar was their 14th Summit in November 2007. At the time, the then ASEAN Chair, Singapore, released a robust statement whereby the military regime in Naypyidaw was expected to fend for itself in dealing with the United Nations and the wider international community, until the military leadership again wanted ASEAN to be of assistance. Read out by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and ostensibly supported by eight fellow ASEAN leaders, the statement outlined their joint expectation that Myanmar work with the UN in order to: (1) Open up a meaningful dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy (NLD); (2) Make full use of the good offi ces of the UN Secretary-General and Professor Gambari in this process; (3) Lift restrictions on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and release all political detainees; (4) Work towards a peaceful transition to democracy; and (5) Address the economic diffi culties faced by the people of Myanmar. ASEAN affi rmed its readiness �to play a role whenever Myanmar wants it to do so�, while stating that �[m]ost Leaders expressed the view that Myanmar could not go back or stay put.�4

The immediate trigger for this unequivocal statement was the late refusal by the top leadership of the ruling SPDC to allow the UN Spe-cial Adviser on Myanmar to brief the leaders of the East Asia Summit (EAS) on developments in the country.5 The statement signalled that ASEAN was putting a stop to collective attempts to directly infl uence Myanmar�s process of national reconciliation. Notably, these efforts had been resumed only two months earlier in response to the SPDC�s violent suppression of the monk-led September protests, following a period of almost two years during which ASEAN had steadily refused to defend Myanmar internationally.

Sustained collective efforts by ASEAN to infl uence Myanmar�s politi-cal developments had initially begun in reaction to the detention of ASSK and members of her entourage at Depayin in late May 2003 after a bloody clash with pro-government groups.6 This incident, which provoked wides-pread international condemnation, prompted ASEAN to urge Myanmar to �resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among all parties concerned leading to a peaceful transition to democracy.�7

Ministers also looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD members.

Responding in part to ASEAN�s diplomatic pressure, former Prime Minister Khin Nyunt presented in August 2003 a roadmap to democracy, and also introduced suffi cient ambiguity about ASSK�s status to satisfy Myanmar�s critics just before the October 2003 Bali Summit (ASSK underwent medical treatment and was allowed to return to her house in University Avenue) before affi rming a new spell of house arrest. The-reafter, however, the relationship between Myanmar and several ASEAN countries deteriorated steadily as the SPDC�s wilful procrastination in implementing the 2003 roadmap caused deep frustration. By April 2005 signifi cant levels of concern and disappointment about the military�s re-calcitrance led some ASEAN members to effectively talk Myanmar out of assuming the grouping�s chairmanship for 2006/7. At the end of 2005, the overwhelming consensus among ASEAN countries was that unless Myanmar decided to be more constructive in the way in which it respon-ded to their expectations, the grouping could no longer publicly defend Myanmar. This position was articulated above all by the original ASEAN-5: Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.

This withdrawal of diplomatic support represented a signifi cant turn-around. In preceding years ASEAN had resorted to �blunting the attacks� on Myanmar in the ASEAN Regional Forum,8 and backed My-anmar in its dispute with the International Labour Organization (ILO). ASEAN had also supported Myanmar in the Third Committee of the UN General Assembly and stood fi rm against the EU on the issue of Myanmar�s participation in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM); ASEAN economic ministers even refused to take part in ASEM economic ministers� meeting in The Netherlands in September 2005 given The Hague�s refusal to issue a visa to the Myanmar representative.

Combining their more critical stance with the necessary diploma-tic accommodation, foreign ministers at the 2006 ASEAN ministe-rial meeting (AMM) called �for the early release of those placed under detention and for effective dialogue with all parties concerned�, while acknowledging that �� Myanmar needs both time and political space to deal with its many and complex challenges.� 9 Ministers added that

Comparing ASEAN countries� efforts to infl uence political developments in Myanmar

176 177

ASEAN would remain constructively engaged as required. However, the more the SPDC was perceived as undermining ASEAN�s reputa-tion and credibility, the less inclined the grouping was to accommodate Naypyidaw. Thus, when before the 2007 ASEAN Summit in Cebu (Phi-lippines), just as the UNSC was about to vote on a draft resolution on Myanmar co-sponsored by Washington and London, the late Myanmar Prime Minister General Soe Win apparently asked ASEAN colleagues to defend Myanmar against the accusation that the country posed a th-reat to regional peace and security, the consensus was that if Myanmar wanted to avoid the internationalisation of the issue, ASEAN should be allowed a role in facilitating the country�s reconciliation process.10 In ad-dition, then ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong made clear that there was no offi cial ASEAN position.11 At the 2007 AMM, member sta-tes even �expressed concern on the pace of the national reconciliation process and urged Myanmar to show tangible progress that would lead to a peaceful transition to democracy in the near future.� 12

The violent suppression of civil protests in September 2007 led to the sharpest rebuke of Myanmar ever sanctioned by other ASEAN govern-ments. This took the form of a statement issued by Singapore as ASEAN Chair on the sidelines of the UNGA plenary in late September. In it mi-nisters expressed their �revulsion � over reports that the demonstrations in Myanmar were being suppressed by violent force and that there had been a number of fatalities.13 Ministers also called upon Myanmar to resume its efforts at national reconciliation with all parties concerned, and to work towards a peaceful transition to democracy, as well as for the release of all political detainees, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Expressing full support for the good offi ces role of Ibrahim Gambari, ministers moreover urged the Myanmar government to grant him full access to all parties and to cooperate fully and work with him. As noted, Singapore�s efforts to organize a briefi ng by the UNSG special advisor to leaders of the 2007 East Asia Summit came to a halt when on the eve of the Singapore Summit in November 2007 Myanmar�s prime mi-nister strongly voiced strong objections on the grounds that Myanmar could handle itself what was said to be a domestic issue. Faced with the possibility of Myanmar walking out of the Summit, Singapore was then obliged to cancel the Gambari briefi ng.

In the event, ASEAN�s apparent decision to end its efforts to promote national reconciliation not only left the effectiveness of the grouping�s stance on Myanmar hostage to the success of the good offi ces under-taken by Gambari (at least temporarily), but also exposed intramural discord within the organisation, clearly articulated by Indonesian Presi-dent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the informal pre-Summit meeting

of ASEAN leaders.14 The divide was essentially between the original and the newer member states over the Association�s respect for its own core principles and norms.

Initiatives and National Perspectives on MyanmarThe consensus positions ASEAN has formulated on Myanmar have glossed over signifi cant differences among individual members over whether and how to foster political reconciliation and change. As the voting record by ASEAN states on draft resolutions on Myanmar�s hu-man rights situation at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) shows, there is a clear divide between the original ASEAN-6 and the Indochinese countries. In the most recent UNGA vote on the situation in Myanmar in late 2007, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand all abstained, while Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and Viet-nam voted against the revised draft resolution under consideration. Cambodia was absent. That said, the original members do not neces-sarily sing from exactly the same hymn sheet. To explore the state posi-tions and approaches towards Myanmar in more detail, the paper will fi rst briefl y summarise the most important diplomatic efforts towards Myanmar initiated by the rotating ASEAN Chairs, and � where relevant � other ASEAN countries, covering the time since the Depayin incident in May 2003. It will then focus in more detail on members� different perspectives on Myanmar.

Different ASEAN Chairs, Different InitiativesSince the Depayin incident, which happened under Cambodia�s watch as ASEAN Chairman, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore have held the Chairmanship. Having assumed the chairman-ship in June 2003, Jakarta relied on a combination of public and private diplomacy to induce the junta to comply with the demands formulated by the ASEAN foreign ministers� meeting that month. Its efforts were both in response to the international opprobrium unleashed by the de-tention of ASSK and concerns that developments in Myanmar might derail the Bali Summit, which was to be organised in October 2003. The tactful and quiet diplomacy conducted by former Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas days before the Bali Summit seems to have been crucial to achieve the abovementioned last-minute face-saving solution on the issue of Suu Kyi�s detention.

With Indonesia�s focus on Myanmar slipping somewhat after the Bali Summit, Bangkok sought to lead the multilateral diplomatic enga-


178 179

gement of the SPDC. Having had put forward the idea for a roadmap of national reconciliation- albeit in very different form than the one adop-ted by Myanmar in that Thailand had suggested a quick release of ASSK as a confi dence building measure � the Thai government succeeded in late 2003 in establishing a new platform bringing together regional and extra-regional states in a dialogue with the junta, dubbed the �Bangkok process�. In the event, however, the government of Thaksin Shinawatra was unable to persuade Yangon to politically invest much in this kind of multilateral conference diplomacy. Only one gathering materialized; plans for a second meeting in April 2004 offi cially fell victim to the SPDC�s need to concentrate on the re-launch of the National Conven-tion, which was fi rst started in 1993 but had been on ice since 1996, as the fi rst step of the SPDC�s roadmap. The subsequent political demise of Premier Khin Nyunt towards the end of 2004 deprived Thailand of a key interlocutor within the regime.

This following two years spanned the chairmanships of Laos (2004/5) and Malaysia (2005/6). Having neither the political will to persuade nor the required diplomatic capacity and clout to oblige Myanmar to pay heed to ASEAN�s stated collective position (e.g. to release ASSK and other political detainees and to begin an inclusive political dialo-gue), Laos did not pursue any particular initiative towards Yangon. The Chairman�s statement issued by Vientiane at the 2004 ASEAN Summit makes no reference to Myanmar. On the important question of whether Myanmar would assume the ASEAN chair in July 2006, it was left to other member states to infl uence the SPDC, but no clearly distinct voice from within ASEAN emerged, nor was there any sustained new diplo-matic initiative except a combined successful effort to make Yangon temporarily give up the chairmanship.

Malaysia � as the incoming ASEAN chair - pursued a more critical and proactive stance towards Myanmar than had Laos or even Indonesia. Trying to coax the military regime into complying with the grouping�s stated position, Malaysia secured in the 2005 Summit statement an invi-tation by Myanmar to the Foreign Minister of Malaysia in his capacity as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee to visit Myanmar �to learn fi rst-hand of the progress.�15 Whether the Senior General had actually issued or agreed to such an invitation was not entirely clear. In the event, Myanmar�s leadership played hardball with Malaysia�s foreign minister, Syed Hamid Albar, by delaying his visit, not accepting his coming as ASEAN Chair, and denying him requested talks with ASSK and Than Shwe. This development not only saw Malaysia�s top diplomat �burned� by the regime; it also greatly stifl ed any remaining enthusiasm in Kuala Lumpur to develop further initiatives during its ASEAN chairmanship.

The Philippines, which stepped in to replace Myanmar as ASEAN Chair in the summer of 2006, decided to let its foreign minister pay an early ministerial visit to Naypyidaw to push the regime to make con-cessions on the core issues raised by ASEAN. The visit produced no concrete positive outcome, not least because the two capitals disagreed in particular about the need to release ASSK. The bilateral relationship had previously also taken a decisive knock because Manila had been the fi rst and only ASEAN country to anger Naypyidaw by offering support for the involvement of the UNSC in late 2005 in order to bring about national reconciliation in Myanmar. The double veto of the January 2007 UNSC draft resolution confi rmed Naypyidaw�s confi dence in Rus-sia and China to provide diplomatic protection, while Manila under the circumstances had little choice but to put a brave face on the matter for the remainder of its chairmanship.

In contrast, Singapore�s chairmanship of ASEAN (2007/8) has been largely shaped by events unfolding in Myanmar. Its leaders impres-sed the international community by their capacity to rally all ASEAN neighbours to unambiguously condemn Myanmar�s military junta for its use of violence to suppress the street protests of September 2007. To promote political reconciliation in Myanmar, Singapore�s diploma-tic efforts then aimed to reinforce support for the good offi ces role of the UNSG and Ibrahim Gambari. To this end, Prime Minister Lee also invited Prof Gambari to brief East Asian leaders on Myanmar at the Singapore Summit in November 2007. As noted, however, the event was cancelled shortly before the Summit. In May 2008, Singapore or-ganised a special ASEAN foreign ministers meeting to deal with the humanitarian situation in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.

The Perspectives of the ASEAN StatesASEAN�s internal differences on Myanmar are put into greater relief by examining individual country perspectives. They are largely shaped by four factors: (1) varying levels of commitment to promote democracy and human rights; (2) different views held by state elites about how ASEAN members should respond to international pressure over Myanmar�s po-litical impasse; (3) varying levels of pressure placed on governments by public opinion and party politics; and (4) a range of economic interests and security considerations. Two further factors also impinge on the My-anmar approach adopted by particular ASEAN countries: political �brui-sing� experienced at the hands of Myanmar, and assessments regarding the junta�s willingness to embrace political change. The relative impor-tance of these factors varies considerably from country to country.


180 181

From Singapore�s perspective, Myanmar�s way of responding to con-cerns about its domestic developments has for some time been a thorn in ASEAN�s relations with key dialogue partners and the city-state�s attempts to focus fellow members on advancing regional economic integration in Southeast Asia. Singapore leaders have also been exasperated over the glacial pace with which the SPDC has implemented its own roadmap, in part because this has exposed the city state and the region to increasing Western pressure to do more to infl uence Myanmar�s top leadership.

Signifi cantly, Singapore�s leaders have not deemed it a prudent in-vestment of their time and reputation to invest heavily into personal diplomacy at the highest level to infl uence Naypyidaw, presumably because they have not held out much hope to persuade the SPDC to do what Western countries demand. Noting how the strident nationa-lism and recalcitrance of the ruling generals has been reinforced by the West�s verbal attacks and its punitive policies towards Myanmar, Singapore has spoken out against ASEAN countries imposing retalia-tory measures against Myanmar, especially economic sanctions. Singa-pore sees sanctions as an ineffective means to sway the military regime as long as Myanmar maintains trading ties with China and India in particular; Singapore also wants to prevent the ASEAN countries from pushing Myanmar more deeply into Chinese arms. Appreciating that Myanmar has considerable geopolitical signifi cance given its location at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia and the wider East Asia, a related fear is that weaker ties between Myanmar and the other ASEAN countries could cause a situation in which China and India engage in a destabilising competitive struggle for infl uence in the country.16

Wider stability concerns also come into play. In the aftermath of the September protests, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew referred to an unstable Myanmar as a �time bomb�.17 Noting the economic mismana-gement of the ruling military junta in the absence of political reconcilia-tion, Singapore in the wake of the September protests agreed with the proposition that Myanmar could not be allowed to simply return to the status quo ante. However, Singapore has not been keen to see ASEAN saddle the primary responsibility for achieving political reconciliation and transition in Myanmar. Regarding China and also India as best pla-ced to exert infl uence on the SPDC, Singapore responded to Myanmar�s domestic crisis by seeking to involve Asia�s major powers in a concerted regional approach towards Naypyidaw. Singapore�s push for the Gam-bari briefi ng at the 2007 East Asia Summit, and hence the role of the UN, was sold in Beijing and New Delhi with reference to their potential image gains given persistent international criticisms of the backing ex-tended by China and India to the ruling military regime.

There have been questions why Singapore does not more forcefully exercise its assumed leverage over Myanmar, which is considered to derive from its position as one of Myanmar�s main trading partners and investors as well as provider of banking services to the regime. Notably, the chairman of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, Djoko Susilo, has squarely pointed the fi nger at what he con-sidered to be Singapore�s continued blind support for the regime. As he argued, �It is time for the Singapore government and businessmen to use their conscience and moral obligation to stop aiding the junta. Act now or more people will be killed, raped and tortured by the junta which is assisted and kept in power by all the investments and fi nancial facilities provided by Singapore.� 18 For its part, the Singapore govern-ment has said it would abide by all UN sanctions (though these remain only hypothetical); it has however refused to be drawn over how much money from Myanmar has fl owed into Singapore, and what the level of Singapore�s investment is in Myanmar.19 Indeed, Lee Kuan Yew has sought to pour cold water over claims that the city-state has leverage over Myanmar, arguing that �[t]he members of ASEAN who could infl u-ence them [SPDC leaders] will be Thailand and beyond [that] China and India. The rest of us-we are a kind of background muzak [music].� 20

ThailandUnder former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Bangkok embarked on a more pragmatic policy towards Yangon than had been the norm under the second Democrat-led government of Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001). This involved (1) severely curtailing territorial space previously available to regime adversaries, including the ethnic minorities; (2) con-solidating and strengthening economic links with Myanmar, especially investment in the areas of hydropower and natural gas exploration; (3) abstaining from trenchant criticisms of the incumbent junta, while treating as security issues the cross-border fl ow of narcotics and refu-gees; and (4) offering to support UN efforts to engage the SPDC. Thai offi cials have essentially been of two minds about Myanmar. On the one hand, Myanmar has been considered as the source of transnational challenges and threats. On the other hand, Thai offi cials appreciate that Bangkok�s diplomatic leeway vis-à-vis Myanmar is circumscribed by the reality of Thailand�s dependency on its neighbour�s natural gas, timber, and labour.

After Thaksin�s removal by a coup in September 2006, Thailand�s diplomatic pro-activeness in relation to Myanmar ground to a halt. The interim military leadership appreciated that unlike previous govern-


182 183

ments it was not endowed with suffi cient moral authority to publicly lecture its counterpart in Myanmar on democratization. Instead, it fo-cused on stabilizing the relationship with Naypyidaw, not least by buil-ding confi dence with senior Myanmar leaders, promoting stability on the border, and addressing transnational security issues. For instance, shortly after the UNSC rejected the US/UK sponsored draft resolution on Myanmar in January 2007, Thai supreme commander Boonsrang Niempradit visited Myanmar to discuss counter-narcotics cooperation. Reacting to the anti-SPDC protests in September 2007, some support emerged within Thai policy-making circles for establishing the ASEAN Troika or initiating a multilateral diplomatic dialogue similar to the Six-Party talks (which was apparently considered a possible way to revive in effect the �Bangkok Process�).21 However, beyond the support given to the good offi ces role of the UN Secretary General, no initiative was visibly pursued as Thailand prepared to return to democratic rule.

The incoming elected government under Prime Minister Samak Sundaravej has signalled broad continuity in Thai-Myanmar relations, continuity with the Thaksin years. When travelling to Naypyidaw for a routine introductory visit, Samak suggested that Western views of Myanmar were too critical. The agenda he discussed with Myanmar apparently excluded the country�s internal affairs, human rights and confl ict with ethnic minorities. Instead, economic issues are said to have dominated. The pattern was repeated when Myanmar�s Prime Mi-nister Thein Sein visited Bangkok at the end of April 2008.22 Bangkok clearly wants a larger bite of Myanmar�s natural gas reserves. Furthe-ring the country�s economic interests, the Thai government is moreover committed to help improve Myanmar�s road infrastructure, including the development of a deep-sea port at Dawei. Thai Foreign Minister Noppodon Pattama has also confi rmed that Thailand would pursue the Tasang dam project on the Salween River, reportedly a US$ 6bn hydropower project. Notably, the pursuit of Thai economic interests has taken place despite signifi cant disenchantment with Myanmar among Thailand-based civil society and human rights activists.

The PhilippinesThe Philippines has routinely expressed grave concern over the situation of human rights in Myanmar and the treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi, as well as the perceived failure of the SPDC to comply with its roadmap to democracy. Foreign secretaries Blas Ople (2002�3), Delia Domingo-Al-bert (2003�4) and Alberto Romulo (August 2004�present) have all been more or less fervent critics of Myanmar. In 2005, Manila put forward

four demands: (1) full implementation of the roadmap; (2) safe and early release of ASSK; (3) full participation of the NLD in political life, especially in drafting the constitution; and (4) return of the UN Special Envoy (then Razali Ismail).23 The fate of Suu Kyi remains the overriding issue for Manila in its bilateral ties with Naypyidaw; refl ecting in part the low level of economic interaction between the two countries. On the sidelines of the January 2007 Cebu Summit the Philippine President privately told Premier Soe Win that ASSK�s house arrest must not be extended any more. At the subsequent ASEAN Summit in November 2007, President Arroyo insisted that ASSK �must be released now�.24

Having apparently been hesitant to sign the ASEAN Charter because of the political stalemate in Myanmar, the Philippine President even suggested there would be a link between her country�s ratifi cation of the Charter and political progress in Myanmar, particularly as regards the release of ASSK. The underlying reasoning, as advised by the President, was that by signing the ASEAN Charter, Myanmar had committed itself to democratic reforms that involved releasing the Nobel Prize laureate. She again linked the release of ASSK to the Charter�s ratifi cation by Congress at the January 2008 World Economic Forum.25

While this focus on values builds on ASEAN�s collective position and appears to refl ect deeply rooted conceptions of identity, external as well as domestic political pressures and political vulnerability also provide important stimuli. Manila has nothing to gain by resisting US pressure on Myanmar. Not least in view of the President�s limited political legi-timacy, domestic criticisms of Myanmar are ignored at a potential cost. One of the most vocal critics of Myanmar has been Senate Minority Leader Aquilino Nene Q. Pimentel, Jr. (PDP-Laban), who has also been vice chairman of the ASEAN Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar.26 That said, Myanmar has been a target of criticism across the political divide in Philippine congressional politics.

VietnamWhile there is no deep historical friendship between the two countries, Vietnam has offered Myanmar ample diplomatic support in a range of regional and international settings. Pointing to Vietnam�s own ex-perience of having been subjected to international sanctions, Hanoi has consistently articulated its opposition to punitive measures being imposed against Myanmar. Instead, Hanoi has wished for the active and effective implementation of the roadmap to democracy set out by Khin Nyunt in 2003. In its offi cial rhetoric Hanoi has moreover emp-hasized the importance of stability in Myanmar, both as a prerequisite


184 185

of the country�s economic reform as well as for regional stability and development. The methodical diplomacy pursued by Hanoi as Chair of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 2004 helped broker a deal whereby Myanmar participated at the ASEM Summit organised by Vietnam that year.

In line with other ASEAN countries, Hanoi has expressed support for the good offi ces role of the UNSG and his Special Advisor. However, it would seem that this support has been qualifi ed by the emphasis placed on the respect for Myanmar�s independence and sovereignty. Unlike other ASEAN states, Vietnam has also not been specifi cally concerned with the credibility of Myanmar�s political process. Indeed, Hanoi for instance simply welcomed the announcement of the referen-dum and the multiparty elections as positive progress.27 Vietnamese reluctance to unambiguously endorse demands for political transition in Myanmar are believed to be linked to concerns about the incumbent regime�s own political future as well as ASEAN�s role in amplifying external pressure. The depth of Hanoi�s reluctance to see members interfere in the domestic politics of Myanmar was highlighted when the Vietnamese Communist leadership made clear its objections to the scheduled Gambari briefi ng at the EAS in November 2007.

Malaysia Kuala Lumpur played a key role in pushing Myanmar�s admission into ASEAN in 1997 and put a protective cloak around the SPDC in the early years of Myanmar�s membership on the understanding that the gene-rals would usher in reforms. To help promote political reconciliation in the context of continued diplomatic support for Myanmar at the UN and the International Labour Organization (ILO), Kuala Lumpur put forward Tan Sri Razali Ismail, Malaysia Permanent Representative at the UN in New York, for the role as UNSG Special Envoy on Myanmar, a post he assumed in 2000. This move coincided with the decision of SPDC Secretary-1 Khin Nyunt to invest his and the junta�s political ca-pital by pursuing a limited political opening. In the event, however, the SPDC soon found Khin Nyunt�s approach go unrewarded by Western powers, even after ASSK�s release from house arrest in July 2002. The subsequent deterioration of the political situation in Myanmar in 2003 in turn caused consternation in Kuala Lumpur, and when Myanmar de-fi ed ASEAN�s expectations regarding the early release from detention of ASSK, Dr Mahathir issued the starkest warning of all Southeast Asian leaders, threatening Yangon with possible expulsion from ASEAN as a last resort. However, this was an empty threat and the SPDC knew it.

In continuity with the policy of his predecessor, Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi has not been prepared to underwrite the political sta-lemate in Myanmar. As noted, both he and Syed Hamid Albar used the opportunity of the 11th ASEAN Summit to suggest that Myanmar could no longer count on the grouping to defend the SPDC in the absence even of progress with respect to its own roadmap. However, given the political bruising endured at the hands of the SPDC, Syed Hamid con-cluded that �Myanmar does not want us to stand with them�[and]�it is best that it is handled by the UN.� 28 Unlike Manila, Kuala Lumpur has nevertheless favoured not UNSC action but a meaningful good of-fi ces role of the UNSG. Indeed, Malaysia has not regarded Myanmar as posing a threat to international or regional peace and security. Signifi -cantly, despite suggesting that there was no more need for ASEAN to be actively involved,29 Malaysian policy makers have not set aside the idea that ASEAN could play a role in bringing about peaceful political change in Myanmar if Naypyidaw was willing.

To some extent, current Myanmar policy also refl ects societal values and domestic political pressures. It is perhaps no accident that the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, which probably comprises the most important and infl uential group of Myanmar critics in Southeast Asia, was founded in Malaysia.30 The Member of Parliament for Kota Bharu, Datuk Zaid Ibrahim, who is also member of the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), was AIPMC�President from 2004-8; even now he remains on the AIPMC Steering Committee. How his new position as Minister in the Prime Minister�s Department entrusted with judicial reform, and the (re-) appointment of Datuk Seri Utama Dr. Rais as Foreign Minister, both with effect from March 2008,31 will impact on the government�s policy towards Myanmar is as yet unclear.

Meanwhile, Myanmar has also become an issue in Malaysian party politics. The defi ance of Myanmar�s military rulers is a factor, as is the considerable number of Myanmar citizens seeking refuge and/or work in Malaysia. For instance, Lim Kit Siang of the Democratic Ac-tion Party (DAP) who also serves on the AIPMC Steering Committee, severely criticised Syed Hamid in October 2007 for allegedly undoing the �revulsion� statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.32 He also demanded that Myanmar�s suspension and expulsion from ASEAN must remain options. Myanmar has also been an issue for YB Datin Sri Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, who has headed the opposition Parti Keadilan Rakyat/KeADILan (the People�s Justice Party). Wan Azizah is now the Vice-President of AIPMC; her husband, Anwar Ibrahim, who has been considered likely to re-assume public offi ce in Malaysia�s politics in due course on the back of the opposition�s huge electoral gains in the March


186 187

2008 poll and may yet re-emerge in government, has also been a fervent advocate of transparent and accountable government. The opposition�s commitment to human rights improvements in Myanmar and the country�s democratization, as well as their interest in investigating the role of Petronas in Myanmar, will ensure that the UMNO-led govern-ment remains under pressure on these issues. These factors are likely to severely limit the scope for engaging the SPDC in uncritical ways.

IndonesiaMyanmar�s relationship with Indonesia builds on a shared rhetoric of historical friendship and support. Signifi cantly, Indonesian policy-ma-kers and offi cials also see important parallels with respect to the politi-cal history of the two countries. On the basis of Indonesia�s successful transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the late 1990s, Jakarta has reiterated that Myanmar will be able to undergo a similar political transition. Indeed, President Yudhoyono has identifi ed the sharing of Indonesia�s own experience of political transition as a key reference point for Myanmar�s generals as the �soft power approach� to bringing democracy to Myanmar. This approach, pursued in the absence of sig-nifi cant bilateral economic ties, is welcomed both by grassroots organi-zations as well as Parliament, although both tend to be more critical of Naypyidaw than is the government. To achieve the lifting of restrictions imposed on ASSK and political detainees, as well as a meaningful pro-cess of national reconciliation, and actual political change in Myanmar, Indonesia has relied in particular on three diplomatic routes: (1) bila-teralism; (2) ASEAN; (3) and the UN. More recently, Jakarta has also encouraged regional powers to deal with Myanmar, particularly China.

At the bilateral level, Jakarta has resorted to a signifi cant amount of quiet diplomacy, involving the President, cabinet ministers, and former foreign minister Ali Alatas. Indonesia has also publicly recognized the sensitivities of the SPDC and acknowledged the regime�s anxieties concerning Myanmar�s territorial integrity and stability. The purpose has been to build trust and to reassure the generals because, as foreign minister Hassan Wirayuda argued, the core impediment to political change is a �sense of insecurity on the part of the military junta about their future in democratic Myanmar.� 33 Signifi cantly, however, Indone-sia has also not found the SPDC to be easily swayed. The espousal of de-mocratic values and its frustration with the junta has thus seen Jakarta launch into public criticism of the SPDC when deemed justifi ed and necessary. For instance, while abstaining on the UNSC vote on the situ-ation in Myanmar in January 2007, Indonesia had no qualms pointing

to the Human Rights Council as an appropriate forum to take the junta to task. Also, the September 2007 violence was conspicuously interpre-ted as resulting from a lack of democratization/fl awed democratization process.34 Still reacting to the junta�s suppression of the September 2007 protests, Wirajuda suggested Naypyidaw embark on a transitional period of fi ve years to allow the military leadership to gain confi dence in the transition process (that would involve a power-sharing arrangement between the military and civilian leaders), and then to have elections.35

In November 2007, Indonesia�s defence minister, Dr Juwono Sudarso-no, argued that forcing Myanmar to hold elections would not reduce the role of the military, which he still regarded as �the unifying force� that covered �most of the levers of power, political, economic and also cul-tural.� 36 At the same time, however, Ali Alatas suggested again that the Tatmadaw should play a power-sharing role in the transition and gra-dually get out of the picture, as happened in Indonesia.37 In response to the junta�s announcement that the constitutional referendum would be organised in May 2008, Hassan Wirajuda maintained that the draft constitution should be revised to accommodate the interests of ethnic groups and the Bamar political opposition and that including ASSK was critical to the political process being credible and acceptable.

With ASEAN�s reputation at stake over Myanmar, and as a long-time advocate of �regional solutions to regional problems�, Jakarta seems to have been interested in doing more at the sub-regional level to infl u-ence the SPDC. It has however found it diffi cult to extend the conven-tional political limits circumscribing ASEAN cooperation. For instance, following the September protests, ideas about invoking the ASEAN Troika mechanism were put forward, potentially involving Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. The obstacles to its establishment have proved signifi cant, however. Countries such as Singapore are wary about the likely unevenness of decisions that is bound to result from the Troika�s agreed rotational membership. At the same time, mutual suspicions prevent members from reconsidering the ad-hoc nature of the Troika and from embracing the notion of more continuous repre-sentation. Indonesia has in declaratory terms nevertheless remained in favour of ASEAN playing a larger role in infl uencing the SPDC. As foreign minister Wirajuda said, �[Myanmar] being a member of the ASEAN family, we see the importance of ASEAN or Indonesia, at least, to engage Myanmar so we can ensure the process that they are now undertaking�could result in a solution that is also acceptable to the international community.� 38 This would also suggest that for Jakarta ASEAN in principle remains a more appropriate forum to address �re-gional problems� than other regional dialogue settings, including the


188 189

East Asia Summit. That said, Indonesia has emphasized the important role that China and India play with respect to Myanmar by pointing out that no regional initiative towards Myanmar would succeed without their active and full support. At the 2007 Singapore Summit, China and Indonesia agreed jointly to rely on diplomacy to encourage reconcilia-tion, democracy and development in Myanmar.39

Indonesia has strongly supported the good offi ces role of the UNSG to promote political reconciliation. This support was unambiguously communicated to Naypyidaw after the September protests, promp-ting Senior General Than Shwe to assure President Yudhoyono that Myanmar would work with the UN Special Adviser.40 By comparison with other members, Jakarta has not been enthusiastic about pushing regime transition through the UN Security Council, however, despite some parliamentary pressure. When holding the Council Presidency in November 2007 and having to navigate, on the one hand, between the positions of those countries that were deeply sceptical about whether the outcomes attained by Gambari during his visit to Myanmar in early November met the objectives of the UNSC Presidential Statement of 11 October 2007 and, on the other hand, those which regarded the Gambari mission as a success, Indonesia sought to bridge the divide by favouring the release of a press rather than a presidential statement on Myanmar. 41

As this broad overview shows, there has been considerable varia-tion in the perspective of ASEAN states towards Myanmar. Singapore and Thailand, while critical of Myanmar, have basically adopted a pragmatic attitude vis-à-vis Naypyidaw, punctuated by bouts of frus-tration over the cross-border implications of Myanmar�s politics. Apart from disappointment or outrage at the SPDC�s stubbornness the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia approaches are heavily infl u-enced by a combination of democratic values and domestic political considerations, which points to the growing signifi cance of pluralist constraints on their respective foreign policy towards Myanmar. Of those members examined here, Vietnam remains the most fervent ex-ponent of the traditional understandings associated with the �ASEAN way�. Not surprisingly, therefore, ASEAN countries fi nd it relatively straightforward to agree on their collective support for the UNSG good offi ces role but not much else. Also, it is ultimately down to individual members to develop new national or regional initiatives towards Myanmar. In this regard, Indonesian offi cials and policy-makers seem the most interested, not least because ASEAN reliance on the UN has not yielded the expected results. The question is what these initiatives might involve.

Towards a New Regional Approach?While Indonesia, like other ASEAN countries, will continue to support the good offi ces role of the UNSG, there are questions about whether the present mandate, which derives its authority from the UNGA, is best suited to promote political reconciliation and change in Myan-mar. It is certainly unclear how Professor Gambari would continue to try to facilitate political reconciliation given the junta�s criticisms of how he has executed the good offi ces role to date. First, the ruling jun-ta has publicly doubted the UNSG Special Adviser�s impartiality and accused Gambari of taking instructions from the big powers. Pointing to Gambari�s release of a statement by ASSK during a stopover in Singapore in November 2007, Myanmar�s Information Minister also accused Gambari of a breach of trust and of being biased in favour of ASSK. Indeed, Brigadier-General Kyaw Hsan has even suggested that Gambari might himself have written the letter in advance of a Novem-ber meeting with ASSK. According to the minister, the statement �was dangerous to the degree of hurting the prevailing peace and stability of the nation in addition to harming the already-achieved national unity.� 42 Secondly, the Myanmar government already complained to Gambari in November 2007 that his mission had yielded little for the military junta and that it was subjected to an unprecedented UNSC Presidential Statement, more sanctions by the US, EU and Australia, as well as criticisms put forward by former UN Resident Coordinator Charles Petrie.43 In other words, the regime suggested that it saw no real incentives to respond to UN exhortations. Third, the junta sternly rejected Gambari�s proposal for mediating between the regime and the political opposition as interference in the country�s internal affairs. The junta also for the most part denied the Special Adviser�s requests to meet with representatives of the ethnic minorities. Fourth, the re-gime objected to Gambari conducting extensive visits to the region discussing Myanmar.44 Indeed, BG Kyaw Hsan publicly reprimanded Gambari for going �beyond his mandate� by touring the region in an ostensible effort to force political reform in Myanmar. In short, Prof Gambari has encountered problems that raise questions about what the good offi ces role of the UN can achieve.45 Of course, Gambari has nevertheless indicated that he wishes to pursue issues raised during his previous trip to Myanmar: the human rights situation, progress on timebound dialogue between the government and ASSK; the referen-dum and electoral process, economic and humanitarian issues, and a regularised process of engagement.46 Some ASEAN members also continue to be part of the Group of Friends of the UNSG on Myanmar


190 191

that was formed in December 2007. This forum has also yet to prove that it can play a signifi cant role.47 In terms of its composition it is too unwieldy to offer any prospect of a political breakthrough in Myanmar along the lines advocated by the junta�s many critics, largely because there is no real meeting of minds among participants. More impor-tantly, Myanmar is not even included. No clear outcomes have been reported following its second meeting in February 2008. Indonesia�s foreign ministry announced in late February that it might host the third meeting of the Group of Friends, but - not surprisingly - regio-nal processes have been considered to be potentially more effective in dealing with Myanmar.

Possible New Diplomatic Avenues From the perspective of most Western capitals Indonesia has probably played the most helpful part among the ASEAN members in terms of promoting Myanmar�s democratization. However, as Jakarta has also not been able to extract signifi cant political concessions from Naypyidaw, the question is whether there remains any prospect for a new regional approach that ASEAN or Indonesia could lead and that would aim to infl uence the SPDC to take substantive steps to promote political reconciliation in the run-up to the 2010 elections. Two ideas about regional diplomatic settings have emerged. One is for ASEAN to pursue with Myanmar a multilateral dialogue taking broadly the format of the Six-Party talks. Another is for ASEAN or Indonesia to engage the military regime and other stakeholders in Myanmar�s future in a setting structured along the lines of the Jakarta Informal Meetings. As the fol-lowing will show, the prospects for both avenues are at best uncertain.

Within policy-making and academic circles inside and outside Southeast Asia there have been several permutations of the idea of esta-blishing a forum akin to the Six Party talks on North Korea in which to facilitate Myanmar�s national reconciliation. These include the sugges-tions to either involve the P5, plus Norway, Japan, Singapore (as ASEAN Chairman);48 or to anchor the group in East Asia, involving ASEAN, China, India, and Japan.49 As these variations of the proposal indicate, there are questions about whether Western countries should be directly involved, in part because they are generally considered to demand rapid regime change at the expense of the military rather than the facilita-tion of national reconciliation. However, what the respective proposals share in common is the assessment that the involvement of China is crucial. ASEAN countries tend to stress that China in particular and India are the only countries able to infl uence Naypyidaw. Seen in this

light, Singapore�s efforts to support the Gabari briefi ng at the EAS also represented an attempt to identify one possible venue for a future broad regional dialogue, even though the primary immediate motive at the time seemed focused on avoiding the junta�s procrastination on the implementation of its roadmap.

However, as events in November 2007 showed, Myanmar�s top lead-ership has no interest in seeing what it regards as its domestic affairs discussed either at the EAS or even within ASEAN. China may also no longer want to support this kind of idea. Having been themselves subjected to severe criticism over Tibet which in turn stimulated strong nationalist outrage, Chinese leaders may now feel less inclined to go out of their way to enhance their international image and simply act in accordance with its so-called responsibilities as a stakeholder in international society. Pushing the generals in Naypyidaw too much on political reconciliation outside the existing frameworks in the face of the generals� presumed obstructionism might also be considered incompatible with Beijing�s economic agenda.50 Beyond the import of natural gas, China�s apparent decision to establish an oil refi ning base in Yunnan for instance signals a growing interest in seeing Myanmar in future become a major transit country for oil shipments.51

The second approach mooted as worthy of further investigation has been a process modelled on the Jakarta Informal Meetings organised by Indonesia in the late 1980s.52 Important backing for convening a JIM-equivalent has come from the International Crisis Group. In addition, analysts such as Michael Vatikiotis have suggested that ASEAN�s quiet diplomacy during the Cambodia confl ict was much more successful than ASEAN�s contemporary megaphone diplomacy.53 Above all, the attraction of JIM-like talks would lie in bringing together the parties to the political confl ict, and their regional backers, and to do so informally. In Cambodia�s case, the JIM represented the fi rst occasion after years of fi ghting at which the four competing political forces in Cambodia came together to discuss power sharing and the international supervision of the Vietnamese troop withdrawal. Notably, the fi rst JIM was divided into two stages to accommodate remaining sensitivities: only after the meeting of the Cambodian parties to the confl ict were they joined by Vietnam, Laos and the then ASEAN countries in regional multi-party talks.54

Modelling a diplomatic setting to further political transition in My-anmar on the JIM poses several issues. How did the JIM come about? To what extent is the contemporary situation in Myanmar different from that concerning Cambodia at the time? Then the Cambodian fac-tions began to come under increasing pressure to do their bit to draw


192 193

the Third Indochina confl ict to a close. Vietnam and the Soviet Union sought to reduce the fi nancial burden and political cost linked to sus-taining Vietnam�s military intervention and to concentrate on their own economic reconstruction. China too stood increasingly ready to strike a deal with the other four veto states of the UNSC at the expense of the Khmer Rouge. By comparison, Myanmar�s neighbours are today not in the same position to press the regime to make concession on issues it takes to be non-negotiable. Secondly, the Vietnamese-backed People�s Republic of Kampuchea faced stiff military opposition from the Khmer Rouge and the non-communist opposition. By contrast, Myanmar�s military government � at signifi cant human cost- has imposed ever more military control over the country (despite remaining problems of reach that stem from ceasefi res). Third, in the Cambodian case, four major parties vied for power. In Myanmar, the lines of confl ict are drawn among the Bamar majority, and between the Bamar majority and a considerable number of ethnic nationalities.55 This complicates the organisation of any informal multilateral process, not least because the SPDC has been unequivocal in its rejection of outside parties beco-ming involved in its dealings with the ethnic nationalities. Fourth, JIM I/II was designed but failed to make headway on the question of power sharing and the proposed UN peacekeeping. In Myanmar, however, the question of power sharing has been addressed (for what it�s worth) by the referendum of May 2008. In other words, the basic conditions that led the Cambodian parties down the path of JIM I/II are not present in the Myanmar case. Despite some interest among Indonesian policy advisers in reviving the Jakarta Informal Meetings, it is thus not sur-prising that foreign policy advisers temporarily concluded that ��what kind of role Indonesia should take is not yet well defi ned.� 56 If a diplo-matic process building on JIM is revived, it is likely to be different from the original both in process and purpose.

The release from house arrest of ASSK in advance of the 2010 elec-tions will probably remain a key objective for ASEAN countries, not least because her detention was extended for another year in late May 2008. By comparison, ASEAN will likely regard the idea of mediating between the SPDC and the ethnic nationalities to be off-limits (unless a dramatic shift in Southeast Asia�s security culture occurs). The Asso-ciation may be tempted to create the conditions for ASSSK to assume representative or ministerial offi ce in future. To be sure, it is uncertain what substantive demands beyond Suu Kyi�s release ASEAN might push for in advance of the 2010 elections. The fact that her two sons are British citizens does not necessarily pose an obstacle to her assuming a political role. Rather, the question is whether the regime would again

frustrate this by construing a case according to which her alleged conti-nued allegiance to Britain prevents her candidature. Such a case might be made by the regime on the basis of her not recanting her presumed support for sanctions imposed on Myanmar. That said, Daw Suu Kyi has not clarifi ed her own thinking on this issue.

The practical diffi culties encountered in laying even the groundwork for political reconciliation between the current leadership and ASSK of course remain enormous, as highlighted by developments following the September protests. In early October 2007, Senior General Than Shwe spelled out the terms for a personal meeting with the NLD General Secretary. His preconditions were that ASSK abandon confrontation, re-tract her threat of �utter devastation� and end her support for sanctions.57

ASSK responded with a media statement released by Ibrahim Gambari, which apparently was not shared with the junta before its release. The statement expressed the expectation that the phase of preliminary con-sultations then begun with Labour Minister Aung Kyi as liaison minister would lead to �a meaningful and timebound dialogue with the SPDC leadership� as soon as possible.�58 These consultations have produced no signifi cant breakthrough. She had added that she was committed to pursue the path of dialogue constructively and invited the government and all relevant parties to join her in this spirit. Despite the positive tone, to the junta Suu Kyi�s message probably appeared as a refusal to comply with the leadership�s demands, particularly as regards sanctions, and an indication of her likely continued unwillingness to cede political ground. Indeed, her invitation that the government join her for a dialogue was presumably interpreted as bordering on the condescending because she was thereby suggesting that she was morally superior to the generals. The decision by the NLD to appeal for a �no� vote in the constitutional re-ferendum has likely also been taken as a sign of continued intransigence. That said the regime probably appreciates that it has lost much of its limited legitimacy as a consequence of the suppression of the monk-led protests in September and the evidently inadequate assistance rendered to survivors of Cyclone Nargis. The question thus is whether Cyclone Nargis will prompt ASEAN countries to make an extra effort to push for political reconciliation in Myanmar, notwithstanding the ratifi cation and promulgation of the regime�s new constitution.

The Impact of Cyclone NargisDealing with the devastating humanitarian impact of Cyclone Nargis has for some time obviously taken precedence over direct efforts to fos-ter political change in Myanmar. UN estimates suggested that about 2.4


194 195

million people were severely affected, with relief operations in the fi rst weeks following the cyclone apparently reaching only a quarter of those homeless and in need. Particular concerns of the UN and internatio-nal relief agencies have focused on a possible second large-scale wave of deaths arising among other factors from the lack of clean drinking water, water-borne diseases, and malnutrition. Notwithstanding these concerns, Myanmar�s military leadership initially denied international relief workers access to the delta and in this context also rejected the use of American, French and British military assets located off the coast. The diffi culties encountered by UN agencies, various governments and relief organisations in providing assistance to those hit by the cyclone briefl y prompted an international debate about external intervention in line with the responsibility-to-protect principle, which was not really ta-ken up in Southeast Asia however. However, gradual improvements in access offered in response to the urging of ASEAN and visiting UNSG Ban Ki-Moon in the run-up to an international pledging conference took much of the wind out of the sails of this particular idea. Two days prior to the pledging conference, Than Shwe fi nally informed Ban Ki-Moon that all foreign disaster-relief experts would be given access to the hard hit delta. At the conference, which was co-chaired by the secretary-generals of the UN and ASEAN, organised in Yangon and involved 51 countries as well as 24 UN agencies and international non-governme-ntal organizations, the SPDC reaffi rmed that it would welcome inter-national assistance �with no strings attached�. Naypyidaw even pressed for US$11 billion in aid for reconstruction, while the UN was looking for approximately US$100-120 million to meet its Flash Appeal target with a view to offering immediate assistance to 1.5 million survivors for three months. Ultimately less than US$50 million of new funds was pledged to the Flash Appeal.59 Some of this money was made conditio-nal - due to the lack of trust between the Myanmar government and do-nor countries and the continued lack of an independent comprehensive assessment by expert relief workers.

Cyclone Nargis may well prove another turning point for how ASEAN engages Myanmar, at least in the near to medium-term. First, after ASEAN secured a leading role in coordinating the relief effort (next to the UN), thanks in large measure to the hands-on approach by ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, members again seemed to be in broad agreement that the grouping should develop a collective role vis-à-vis Myanmar. Second, Myanmar�s obvious need for recons-truction and economic assistance as well as capacity building more generally provides ASEAN and the UN with the opportunity to explore with greater vigour how the longer-term humanitarian prospects for

Myanmar might be improved. After all, a chronic emergency is said to have gripped the entire country for some time.60 At present, Myanmar receives very limited assistance per capita, much less than Laos or Cam-bodia. Third, the thinking about how to promote political change in My-anmar even after the ratifi cation and promulgation of the referendum may gather pace. Indonesian academics and advisers have apparently already put to President Yudhoyono a plan entitled the Jakarta Initiative on Myanmar (JIM) that would promote political change in Myanmar by appointing a special envoy, presumably Ali Alatas, forming a dialogue group that would include China and India and offering the military le-adership political and security assurances in return for progress in rela-tion to national reconciliation and democratization.61 How this agenda � if adopted by the President- would be pursued in practice, not least given the political antagonism between the Myanmar regime and its many detractors, remains to be seen.

ConclusionUnderneath the veneer of the ASEAN consensus position that has prevai-led on Myanmar for some years, member countries have been seriously divided. While the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia in particular have called in recent years for political reform in Myanmar, the newer ASEAN members have demonstrated little enthusiasm for obliging the SPDC to embrace a political transition that does not conform to Naypyidaw�s road-map. The intramural differences regarding Myanmar stem from several factors, not least the extent to which incumbent regimes are concerned about their own security and political survival. In addition, Thailand, Ma-laysia, and Singapore have all found themselves �burned� by the junta, as their diplomatic initiatives and efforts set in motion shock waves that lost all momentum in the face of the political-security imperatives of gene-rals. The pressure exerted by domestic and wider regional networks and audiences has nevertheless led ASEAN countries to remain critical of the SPDC. Indonesia arguably remains one of the most committed to achie-ving political change in Myanmar and on the basis of its own historical trajectory seems one of the best placed ASEAN countries to indirectly shape Myanmar�s transition.

There remain competing ideas about what new diplomatic fram-ework would more effectively facilitate political reconciliation in Myan-mar. As ASEAN�s intramural diplomacy has yielded virtually no conces-sions by Naypyidaw of the calibre that the Western countries demand, most ideas for an alternative forum have focused on involving China and India and reviving informal diplomacy. As this paper has shown,


196 197

however, the implementation of such processes will require considera-ble thought. Moreover, in the still politically charged atmosphere before the Olympic Games, it cannot be assumed that China will be publicly supportive of such proposals if Naypyidaw is not.

Above all, Cyclone Nargis has prompted governments critical of Myanmar to offer humanitarian assistance, but they and the SPDC essentially remain at loggerheads. Whether the cyclone will do for political reconciliation in Myanmar what the Asian tsunami did to reach a political settlement for Aceh remains to be seen. Meanwhile, ASEAN�s incoming Secretary General has been eager to demonstrate the association�s relevance in responding to the more immediate huma-nitarian challenges posed by this natural disaster. While politics were claimed not to have infl uenced humanitarian assistance provided to Myanmar, the longer-term issue of reconstruction and more substan-tial development assistance is inextricably linked to political transi-tion. Apart from Indonesia�s likely new diplomatic initiative, the task of leading ASEAN�s engagement of Myanmar will fall to Bangkok as Thailand will assume the ASEAN Chairmanship at the end of July 2008 and retain it for a full 18 months, assuming ratifi cation of the ASEAN Charter is completed by the time of the 2008 Summit. This will give Bangkok more time than any other member state has ever had as chair to make an impression on the SPDC. Judging from the outcome of past Thai efforts to infl uence Myanmar, however, expectations should be kept in check. Myanmar�s leaders seem averse to making political concessions vis-à-vis Thailand.

If the SPDC continues to keep ASSK under house arrest, calls for her release and those of other political detainees are likely not only to resume, but also to increase in both number and volume during the early months of the Thai chairmanship, in part because many believe that the Philippine Congress will not be inclined to ratify the ASEAN Charter without substantial concessions by Myanmar�s military lead-ers. However, for now, it seems likely that policy-makers in Manila will reconsider their stance. By the time promised multiparty elections take place in Myanmar in 2010, the junta may have followed Indonesia�s lead. If not, it will fi nd Vietnam in the ASEAN Chair. Paradoxically, dea-ling with Hanoi rather than Bangkok or Jakarta may prove far easier for the SPDC, especially since the Vietnamese and Myanmar leaderships have a similar perspective on issues of external pressure by major po-wers, the importance of political stability, and the continued relevance of pristine interpretations of the principles associated with the so-called ASEAN way. Only time will tell.

Notes1 SPDC Spoke Authoritative Team meets Special Adviser to UN Secretary General, New Light of Myanmar, 8 March 2008, p.92 According to offi cial fi gures, more than 78,000 people perished, with a further 56,000 missing. UN estimates are that 2.5 million people were affected. 3 See New Light of Myanmar, 30 May 2008, p.14 ASEAN Chairman�s statement on Myanmar, 20 November 2007, http://www.aseansec.org/21057.htm5 For a more detailed discussion of the proposed EAS briefi ng, see Jürgen Haacke, �ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma�, in Xiaolin Guo, ed., Myanmar/Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, Stockholm: Institute for Security & Development Policy, 2008, pp. 131-58, also available online http://www.isdp.eu/fi le/publications/books/08/myanmarburma6 Jürgen Haacke, Myanmar�s Foreign Policy: Domestic Infl uences and International Implica-tions (London: Routledge for IISS, 2006), Ch.37 Joint Communique of the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Phnom Penh, 16-17 June 2003, http://www.aseansec.org/14833.htm8 Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the former ASEAN Secretary-General (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p.1939 Joint Communique of the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 25 July 2006, http://www.aseansec.org/18561.htm10 Aung Zaw, �A House on Fire�, The Irrawaddy, 15 January 2007, http://aungzaw.com/article_show.php?id=25111 Manny Mogato, �ASEAN declines to defend Myanmar at U.N.�, The Washington Post, 11 January 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/AR2007011100336.html12 Joint Communique of the 40th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 30 July 2007, http://www.aseansec.org/20764.htm13 Statement by ASEAN Chair, Singapore�s Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo in New York, 27 September 2007, www.mfa.gov.sg14 �Southeast Asian Summit opens with Myanmar row �, Forbes.com, 20 November 2007, http://www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2007/11/20/afx4357164.html15 Chairman�s Statement of the 11th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 2005, www.aseansec.org/18039.htm, para.3416 Transcript of Reply by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo to questions on ASEAN and Myanmar in Parliament on 22 October 2007, www.mfa.gov.sg17 �Lee Kuan Yew: Myanmar crisis destabilizes ASEAN region �, Radio Singapore International, 6 October 2007, http://www.ntu.edu.sg/corpcomms2/news/RSIonline_071006_MinisterialForum.pdf18 Djoko Susilo, �Singapore and Myanmar junta �, Jakarta Post, 3 March 2008. His criti-cisms focused on four issues in particular: access to Singapore medial and educational facilities in return for money; Temasek�s alleged substantial investments in Myanmar; refuge provided to owner Lo Hsin Han; and the export of technological and military equipment to the military junta.


198 199

19 Transcript of Reply by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo to questions on ASEAN and Myanmar in Parliament on 22 October 2007, www.mfa.gov.sg20 Quoted in �S�pore�s Lee criticises Myanmar military rulers �, Reuters (India), 8 January 2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-3128732008010821 Supalak G Khundee and Piyanart Srivalo, �PM suggests 6-Party Talks �, The Nation, 16 October 2007, www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/10/16/headlines/headlines_30052579.php22 The Nation, Editorial: Human Rights Issue not on Samak�s Agenda, 1 May 2008, ttp://www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/05/01/opinion/opinion_30071980.php23 Alberto Romulo, �On the Issue of Myanmar �, Statement, 21 November 2005, http://www.dfa.gov.ph/archive/speech/romulo/myanma.htm24 Martin Abbugao, �Myanmar faces calls for Suu Kyi release at Asia summit �, Agence France Press, 21 November 2007. 25 �President renews call on Myanmar to return to the path of democracy �, Of-fi ce of the President, Republic of the Philippines, released 26 January 2008, http://www.news.ops.gov.ph/archives2008/jan26.htm26 Interestingly, Senator Pimentel has also been at the forefront of arguing in favour for the Federal Republic of Philippines to replace the current unitary system of govern-ment. 27 Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, �Nation supports UN role, respects My-anmar sovereignty �, 18 March 2008, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/nr040807105001/ns080320094634/view28 Syed Hamid Albar, �It is not possible to defend Myanmar�, Asian Wall Street Journal, 24 July 2006, www.burmanet.org/news/2006/07/24/asian-wall-street-journal-it-is-not-possible-to-defend-myanmar-syed-hamid-albar29 Michael Vatikiotis, �ASEAN key to Myanmar change�, Asia Times, 23 October 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IJ24Ae01.html30 For details of the activities of AIPMC, see http://www.aseanmp.org/. On the general infl uence of parliaments in Southeast Asia, see Jürgen Rüland, Clemens Jürgenmezer, Michael H. Nelson and Patrick Ziegenhain, Parliaments and Political Change in Southe-ast Asia: Comparative Study of India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thai-land, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005. 31 Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim had previously held the post of Foreign Minister from 1986�1987.32 Lim Kit Siang, http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2007/10/17/never-suspend-myanmar-from-asean-hamids-statement-most-deplorable-and-reprehensible/33 Quoted in �Myanmar must defend itself if brought to UN Security Council: Indone-sia�, Agence France Press, 23 August 2006, http://www.newagebd.com/2006/aug/24/inat.html34 �Indonesia unsatisfi ed with Myanmar�s excuse �, Antara News, 29 September 2007, http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/9/29/indonesia-unsatisfi ed-with-myanmars-ex-cuse/35 Hassan Wirajuda, Speech to Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2 October 2007; �Myanmar junta should be offered shared rule: Indonesia FM�, Antara News, 3 October

2007, http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/10/3/myanmar-junta-should-be-offered-shared-rule-indonesia-fm/36 Haslinda Amin and Arijit Ghosh, �Sudarsono says elections in Myanmar wouldn�t reduce army�s role �, Bloomberg, 15 November 200737 Quoted in Haslinda Amin and Arijit Ghosh, �Sudarsono says elections in Myanmar wouldn�t reduce army�s role �, Bloomberg, 15 November 200738 Quoted in �Indonesia wants Suu Kyi in Myanmar democracy process �, AFP, 27 February 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i4bJGpmQoMCbj9BEz3KmrGPGMR0A39 �RI, China agree Myanmar crisis cannot be solved through pressures �, Antara, 21 November 2007, http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/11/21/ri-china-agree-myanmar-crisis-cannot-be-solved-through-pressures/40 �Myanmar junta reassures SBY on cooperation �, The Jakarta Post, 18 October 200741 Security Council SC/9171, Security Council Press Statement on Myanmar, 15 Novem-ber 2007, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9171.doc.htm42 SPDC Spoke Authoritative Team meets Special Adviser to UN Secretary General, New Light of Myanmar, 8 March 2008, p.943 Statement of the United Nations Country Team in Myanmar on the Occasion of the UN Day, Yangon, 24 October 2007.44 Transcript of the Spokes Authoritative Team of SPDC, New Light of Myanmar, 6 No-vember 200745 Aung Zaw, �Gambari�s Mission is Dead in the Water �, The Irrawaddy, 20 February 2008, http://aungzaw.com/article_show.php?id=29146 For Gambari�s assessment, see �I do not see an alternative to dialogue �, The Irrawaddy, 4 April 2008, http://www.irrawaddy.org/interview_show.php?art_id=1128047 The Group of Friends is a consultative forum for developing a shared approach in sup-port of the implementation of the UNSG good offi ces mandate. It comprises Australia, China, France, India, Japan, Norway, Russia, Slovenia (as the EU Presidency), United Kingdom, United States, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.48 Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, �Asia�s Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to Burma �, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, pp.155-158.49 Michael Vatikiotis, �ASEAN key to Myanmar change �, Asia Times, 23 October 2007, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IJ24Ae01.html50 See Bertil Lintner, �China no sure bet on Myanmar �, Asia Times, 8 November 2007, www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IK08Ae01.html51 Elaine Kurtenbach, �China�s CNPC and Yunnan sign Burma-related Pipeline Agre-ement �, The Irrawaddy, 3 December 2007, http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=949552 C.P.F. Luhulima, �Forty Years of ASEAN-what to do with Myanmar �, Jakarta Post, 16 November 2007.53 Michael Vatikiotis, �ASEAN megaphone diplomacy strong words, yet no action�, The Jakarta Post, 26 November 2007. 54 See Sorpong Peou, Confl ict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefi eld to Ballot-Box (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997), Ch.1


200 201

55 Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Confl ict in Burma, Washington, D.C. East-West Center, 2007; also see Mary P. Callahan, Political Authority in Burma�s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence, Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2007. 56 Rizal Sukma, �Time to act on Myanmar democratization�, Jakarta Post, 4 March 200857 Government of the Union of Myamar, Announcement No.1/2007, 4 Octo-ber 2007, reprinted in The New Light of Myanmar, 5 October 2007, pp.1, 8; http://myanmargeneva.org/NLM2007/eng/10oct/n071005.pdf. For a useful overview of government viewpoints on ASSK�s alleged provocations, see http://mission.itu.ch/MISSIONS/Myanmar/mofa/Article%20_English.pdf58 The full text is available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/08/asia/AS-GEN-Singapore-Myanmar-UN-Text.php59 By 26 May a total of US$132.7 million had been committed to relief operations, with a further US$100.2 million pledged. United Nations, Offi ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Cyclone Nargis: Myanmar, OCHA Situation Report No. 21, 26 May 200860 Mark Duffi eld, �On the Edge of No Man�s Land: Chronic Emergency in Myanmar �, Working Paper, Centre for Governance and International Affairs, University of Bristol, No.1/200861 Greg Sheridan, �Jakarta proposes to use cyclone in push for radical change in Burma �, The Australian, 2 June 2008, http://www.burmanet.org/news/2008/06/02/the-australi-an-jakarta-proposes-to-use-cyclone-in-push-for-radical-change-in-burma-greg-sheridan/

Neither Constructive nor Engaging: The Debacleof ASEAN�s Burmese Policy Pavin Chachavalpongpun

Two recent political phenomena in Burma have severely challenged the credibility of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in its ma-nagement of the grave situation in this country. The brutal crackdown on street protesters in September 2007, killing at least 31 people according to the United Nations, and the abrupt announcement of the constitutional referendum in May this year as well as the proposal of general elections in 2010 without the participation of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, proved that Burma remains unrestrained in its management of domestic affairs after all these years, even when ASEAN�to which Burma belongs�has incessantly called for peaceful political solutions and an inclusive democratisation process. The Burmese political crisis has struck at ASEAN�s most critical moment, with the launch of its charter last November and the ratifi cation due to take place during the ASEAN Summit in Bangkok later this year. Will ASEAN countries be bold enough to punish this recalcitrant member if its political violence persists? While ASEAN is re-evaluating its mandate for bringing about an acceptable solution to Burma�s political stalemate, the global com-munity is also keeping a watchful eye on the role of Thailand, Burma�s immediate neighbour, to see whether the new government under the le-adership of Samak Sundaravej will work closely with ASEAN toward such an objective or continue to legitimise the despotic regime of Burma. This paper examines ASEAN�s perspective on the recent political developments in Burma, the failure of its past and present policies, and Thailand�s posi-tion in the Burmese political makeover. It also discusses available policy alternatives and options for ASEAN and Thailand vis-à-vis Burma.

The Failure of ASEAN�s Burmese PolicyIn 1992, the Thai-initiated �Constructive Engagement� policy was conceived with the blessing of ASEAN. It was designed to help Burma achieve a more rapid transition toward internationally acceptable beha-viour and norms not only in international relations but also in tackling


202 203

national economic and political issues.1 The implementation of the con-structive engagement policy was in fact an implicit preparation for the admission of Burma into ASEAN in 1997. ASEAN members at the time rushed to endorse Burmese membership because they believed that including Burma into the organisation would complement ASEAN�s geopolitical strategy of counterbalancing the growing infl uence of China on Southeast Asia. More naively, ASEAN was convinced that, once admitted into the grouping, Burma would naturally undertake the necessary reforms and adopt ASEAN�s values, standards and practices.2

ASEAN was wrong. This rationale of gradually acclimatising Burma into the regional stream, despite its obvious fl aws, continues to form the foundation of ASEAN�s approach to the Burmese leadership even as the international community continues to impose heavy sanctions against the unruly regime.

In the decade following its admission into ASEAN, Burmese leaders have continued to fortify their power position at the expense of national democratisation efforts and at the expense of ASEAN credibility. The growing strength of this power position further exacerbated the human rights situation in Burma, ranging from the endless extension of im-prisonment of opposition fi gures to the use of violence against certain ethnic minorities and the recent suppression of pro-democracy activists on the streets of Rangoon. The Burmese junta�s newfound confi dence is also refl ected in its blunt rejection of ASEAN involvement in the Bur-mese political reconciliation process and its refusal to accept the UN�s offer to provide observers for May�s constitutional referendum and elections in 2010.3 Today, ASEAN�s view of Burma is closely tied to two contrasting realities. On the one hand, Burma represents a necessary strategic partner for ASEAN as a whole and for individual members in the context of mutual economic interests. On the other hand, Burma is likely to become a dead weight capable of scuttling ASEAN�s long-term interests. ASEAN�s inability to weigh interests against disadvantages in its relations with Burma stems largely from its lack of a clear vision about how it sees Burma�s place within the organisation.

The Wrong Path of ASEANThe assessment of ASEAN�s Burmese policy should begin where it has failed, especially in bringing Burma into the modern era. Burma�s ruling junta made numerous promises to the organisation prior to membership, but it has continuously defi ed regional and international pressure to change its political course. A number of factors explain ASEAN�s failure to introduce change in Burma. First, ASEAN lacked a

viable strategy, or the collective will, to make good on its policy promi-ses towards Burma.4 The absence of a unifi ed policy not only diminis-hed the infl uence of ASEAN on the political transformation process in Burma, but also undermined ASEAN�s relevance as an effective organi-sation and spoiled its attempts to build a genuine regional community. For example, while Singapore was passing judgment on the Burmese government for not engaging United Nations special envoy Ibrahim Gambari more substantially in order to strive towards a real political solution, Thailand was overtly criticising the Western nations for being too harsh and prejudiced against the Burmese regime.5 Inconsistency towards Burma on the part of ASEAN�s individual members has allo-wed the ruling junta to treat international criticism and sanctions with contempt. It has also weakened ASEAN�s institutional leverage, leaving it incapable of making a considerable impact on the Burmese regime.

Second, the seemingly sacred principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states and consensus-based decisions have long shielded the Burmese junta from outside pressure. Non-interfe-rence was quickly normalised upon the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, precisely because each member had no intention of surrendering its sovereignty, even when sovereignty confl icted with the concept of regionalism. More importantly, the principle of non-interference was employed to evade international questions regarding the legitimacy of ASEAN member governments at a time when authoritarianism, mo-ney politics, human rights violations, and periodic coup d�états were rampant in the region. Today, Burma is walking down this very same route in taking advantage of the non-interference principle to cloak the odious regime at home as well as to obstruct internal democratisation by isolating Suu Kyi and forcing the NLD to capitulate to the govern-ment.6 Although ASEAN has attempted to curtail the importance of the non-interference principle in recent years, it is still far from abando-ning it for the sake of a more transparent and accountable organisa-tion. While the ASEAN Charter was in the fi nal process of ratifi cation, it was revealed that a provision for sanctions against �badly behaved� members was not included, and suspension and expulsion were also out of the question7, again based on ASEAN�s strict adherence to the non-interference principle.

Third, ASEAN members have drawn on the regional body in order to bolster national interests, which is legitimate. However, some members have skilfully exploited ASEAN for their own ends, thus weakening the dividing line between the good of the greater whole and the narrow in-terests of individual members. There has been a very fi ne line between the interests of the association and those of its individual members.

Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN�s Burmese Policy

204 205

This is not immediately obvious from the statistics. These do show, ho-wever, that whereas Burma was of marginal interest to its neighbours in the past, the transformation of the country into the region�s leading exporter of oil and natural gas has meant that ASEAN members have developed economic interests there at the same time as they have begun to compete with each other as well as with bigger powers like China, In-dia and Russia for Burma�s valuable natural assets. Some members of ASEAN obviously let economic interests dictate their foreign relations with Burma to the point of putting aside contentious political issues in that country in order to please the Burmese leadership. Thailand, cur-rently the most signifi cant importer of Burmese gas, remained silent during the crackdown on street demonstrations in Rangoon last year. Noppadon Pattama, new Thai Foreign Minister, said during his fi rst press briefi ng in February 2008 that democracy and human rights were domestic issues internal to Burma and that he would maintain a policy of non-interference regarding the junta-ruled country. He further said, �If working through an ASEAN framework can help Burma�s demo-cracy fl ourish, we will do it, but we are not the headmaster who can tell Burma to do this and that.�8 Noppadon is the former personal lawyer of Thaksin Shinawatra, former Prime Minister of Thailand. Thaksin, ousted from power by a military coup in September 2006, is known to have a variety of businesses in Burma, most notably in the telecom industry. Thus far, the push to satisfy the economic interests of certain members of ASEAN has totally eclipsed the real issues in Burma. In the Thai case, short-term economic interests in Burma not only deeply complicate their bilateral relations, but also generate a considerable im-pact on Burma�s politics. By maintaining ASEAN�s policy of non-inter-ference, Thailand�s long-term interests in Burma are not jeopardised. Otherwise, the problems arising from Burma could become a burden for Thailand, its immediate neighbour. .

Fourth, ASEAN�s move to acknowledge the necessity of the tat-madaw, or the military, and its involvement in the political transition in Burma proved fl awed. This acknowledgment only legitimised the military�s political ambitions, since it could now consider itself an indispensable factor in the Burmese political development process. Following the suppression of pro-democracy protesters in Rangoon, ASEAN leaders came to the conclusion that Burma, having been ruled by the tatmadaw for so long, had lost most of the institutions deemed fundamental for national development. ASEAN members argued, the-refore, that the Burmese military institution had to be nurtured and sustained so that political transition could be accomplished. Prime Mi-

nister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore said that regime change was not the best thing for Burma. �ASEAN countries would have to work with the Burmese military, which is the only institution capable of ruling Burma,� he stressed. Singapore�s Foreign Minister George Yeo also said in Parliament that removing Burma from ASEAN would result in a �Balkanisation� of the region.9

The reality, however, is that the military in Burma is dispensable, while little attention has been paid to the able men in the Burmese bu-reaucracy. These civil servants have been a driving force behind major administrative works, involving infrastructure, transportation, educa-tion as well as foreign policy. ASEAN�s support for a political role for the tatmadaw has to a certain extent actually perpetuated the militarisation of politics in Burma and thus crippled the chance of the NLD to partici-pate in the upcoming elections. The Burmese government appointed a commission whose members consist of its own cronies and loyalists to be in charge of the drafting of the new constitution. Obviously, one of the main points in the constitution is to guarantee the political role of the military. Nyan Win, spokesman of the NLD, said, �No one has seen the fi nal version of the proposed constitution. This one-sided proposal means that the military junta will continue its rule in Burma.�10 ASEAN has, consciously or otherwise, made the concept of the tatmadaw indis-pensable to the achievement of Burmese political solidarity.

Fifth, ASEAN initially perceived the Burma problem as largely a regional issue requiring a regional solution. But as ASEAN paid more attention to overcoming other obstacles to its expanding infl uence, the Burmese political impasse remained a lesser priority. Burma, in the meantime, let ASEAN know of its preference to the United Nations� approach in search of its political change. This is because the Burmese junta saw the interest in compromising with the UN, as well as using to UN to water down the level of international sanctions against its regime. This therefore explains why Burma allowed UN special envoy Gambari into the country to hold talks with its top leaders as well as with Suu Kyi. This explains why Burma allowed UN special envoy Gam-bari into the country to hold talks with its top leaders as well as with Suu Kyi. Still, even when the junta seemed to support the UN approach, it clearly prescribed the scope of the role that the UN would be allowed to play. One good example of this was Burma�s outright rejection of the creation of the �Core Group,� also endorsed by Gambari, to facilitate a reconciliation process in the country. The proposed Core Group would have been comprised of permanent members of the UN Security Coun-cil�the US, Britain, France, Russia and China�together with India, Japan, Norway and Singapore (as chair of the ASEAN Standing Com-


206 207

mittee). Burma voiced its concerns over the �real agendas� of certain members of the Core Group, particularly the US. China was also un-happy with this idea, since it feared that it would lose infl uence. China subsequently pushed to see the problem solved regionally.Burma�s embrace of the UN approach, no matter how superfi cial, has devastatingly belittled ASEAN efforts on the Burmese issue. Ultimately, Burma is a member of ASEAN. What has happened in this country, from an ASEAN perspective, should be addressed in the regional con-text, and existing regional mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Troika, should have been exercised long ago to solve the Burmese impasse.11

ASEAN�s ignorance regarding Burma stems from the way it perceives itself as a modern-day organisation. Kyaw Yin Hlaing of the National University of Singapore has argued that ASEAN is a Cold War type of organisation incapable of dealing with certain issues, not because it does not want to, but because it lacks a proper mechanism to deal with the issues playing out in Burma. He also emphasised that ASEAN has been making a big fuss about Burma mainly because Western countries have been pressuring the organisation to come up with a viable strategy on Burma. If Western countries stopped putting pressure on ASEAN, it would probably do nothing to solve the Burma problem.12

ASEAN�s Response to the Saffron Revolution When the violence committed by the Burmese army against monks and pro-democracy activists broke out in September 2007, ASEAN mem-bers fi rst put on a brave face in collectively condemning the junta�s suppression of its own people. Singapore�s prime minister made seve-ral telephone calls on 27 September 2007 to ASEAN leaders, stressing that the unfolding of the confrontation in Burma would have implica-tions for ASEAN and the whole region. For this reason, ASEAN could not credibly remain silent or uninvolved in this matter.13 Singapore�s Foreign Minister George Yeo, attending the UN General Assembly in New York at the time, also consulted with his ASEAN counterparts on a coordinated ASEAN response. This effort would initially seem to suggest a serious departure from ASEAN�s usually taciturn position re-garding the situation in Burma. But critics argued that ASEAN leaders initially assumed the role of �tough guys� merely due to intense pres-sure from the global community, which viewed the crackdown on street protesters as the most violent abuse of the Burmese people since 1988. Singapore�s efforts to resolve the Burmese confl ict were not so much the result of a shift in the country�s position towards Burma, but most likely an attempt to safeguard its credibility as ASEAN chair.

This led to the release of the �Statement by ASEAN Chair� on 27 Sep-tember 2007, endorsed by Singapore�s foreign minister, which contained remarkably strong language in its reproach of the Burmese regime. It says, �They (the ASEAN Foreign Ministers) were appalled to receive re-ports of automatic weapons being used and demanded that the Myanmar government immediately desist from the use of violence against demon-strators. They expressed their revulsion to Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win over reports that the demonstrations in Myanmar are being suppressed by violent force and that there has been a number of fatali-ties.�14 In the same statement, ASEAN proffered its full support for the decision of the UN Secretary-General to dispatch Gambari to Burma, sig-nalling ASEAN�s own powerlessness in having any kind of infl uence on the junta. When the Singaporean media suggested that ASEAN should send its own mission, possibly composed of Thailand (Burma�s closest neighbour), Singapore (ASEAN�s Chair) and perhaps Malaysia and Laos, whose governments enjoy good relations with Rangoon, to plead against Burma�s use of force, the Burmese junta immediately rejected the idea, claiming that it was a breach of ASEAN�s non-interference principle.15

Following the release of the ASEAN Statement, Foreign Minister Yeo gave a series of interviews to the international media, admitting that with very little leverage over internal developments in Burma, ASEAN possessed only the soft weapon of �moral infl uence� in the Burma case.16 The term �moral infl uence,� which was never clearly defi ned, has since been repeated in many political speeches and exploi-ted to defend ASEAN�s crippled stance regarding Burma. In fact, as an analyst said, the ASEAN Statement was merely a face saving measure without muscle and bite.17 It failed to initiate any tangible measures, despite its many sensational statements, including the reference to Burma as a regional �time-bomb� by Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore�s Mi-nister Mentor,18 and a provocative article by Barry Desker, Singapore�s former ambassador and Director of S Rajaratnam School of Internatio-nal Studies, which suggested a suspension of Burma�s membership in ASEAN.19 As Singapore carried on in its its role as ASEAN Chair, other ASEAN members were less energetic about increasing the level of pres-sure on Burma. Thailand, under the military government of Surayud Chulanont, only criticised the Burmese regime from the viewpoint of a fellow Buddhist, while attempting to avoid engaging in Burma�s political muddle precisely because the Thai government was trapped in its own political confl icts. Besides, Thailand perceived the import of Burmese gas as more vital than saving the lives of Burmese monks and activists, a stance that seemed to fi t well with the public view on protec-ting Thailand�s so-called national interests.


208 209

It is obvious that the course of action that ASEAN decided on � sup-porting the efforts of Gambari, convincing the regime ensconced in Naypyidaw to negotiate with Suu Kyi and the NLD, and cooperating with China and India20� � is little different from yesteryear�s approach. It is a newly repackaged �Constructive Engagement� which has failed miserably for decades. ASEAN viewed this course of action as not only the best, but perhaps also the only option open to the region.21 ASEAN leaders assumed that ASEAN�s continued engagement with Burma would help prevent this member state from breaking apart, not an un-likely prospect given the fact that Burma is a multi-ethnic society. If the military regime were to collapse precipitously, Burma might descend into civil war, and China, India and Thailand would likely be drawn into the ensuing maelstrom, since Burma�s restive ethnic minorities live mostly along the country�s borders. As Foreign Minister Yeo stated, �The last thing we want is a Yugoslavia or an Iraqi situation on our doorstep.�22 Therefore, ASEAN strongly rejected international sanc-tions and economic embargoes as well as a regime change in Burma. Of course, ASEAN�s description of Burma as being the next possible Yugoslavia or Iraq directly contradicts its previous view of Burma as a non-threatening state. ASEAN has long refuted the argument raised by the West and human rights groups that Burma has been a threat to regional and international security. They argue that a �threat� does not necessarily mean a military threat in the traditional sense, but could mean the spread of infectious diseases, human traffi cking, narcotic pro-duction and commercialisation, and forced labour. Rodolfo Severino, former ASEAN Secretary-General, said that ASEAN rejected the notion of Burma as a threat to regional security, because Burma�s immediate neighbours, including some ASEAN members and China, have never perceived Burma this way.23 These countries have instead competed fi ercely with each other for Burma�s attention. There seems to be, then, signifi cant contradiction in ASEAN�s perception on Burma. Despite this fact, ASEAN continues to claim that Burma is part of the ASEAN family, even as its continued defence of the Burmese regime undermi-nes its own infl uence over that regime.

On the part of Burma, the lack of interest in taking advantage of the many ASEAN forums to explain its domestic situation to the outside world was evident. In fact, Burma openly expressed its mistrust of ASEAN, particularly following the release of the ASEAN Statement. It was reported that Than Shwe was infuriated by Singapore for labelling the junta�s behaviour as repulsive. In ASEAN�s offi cial gatherings, the Burmese representatives continued to rigidly uphold the state�s policy rather than engaging in frank discussions on the real situation with

other members. During the ASEAN Defence Senior Offi cials� Meeting (ADSOM) held in Singapore from 17-19 October 2007, Maj-Gen Aye Myint, Deputy Defence Minister, debriefed his counterparts about what had happened in his country while condemning Western media for distorting the facts. He also denounced Thailand�s The Nation and Bangkok Post for following in the footsteps of the Western media in printing distorted news about Burma. Aye Myint went on to defend his government by emphasising that violence was never used against the protesters, and that ASEAN�s non-interference principle must be strict-ly upheld to prevent any further complications that might be caused by foreign involvement.24 Burma�s lingering suspicion of ASEAN was very much evident during the ASEAN Summit Meeting in November 2007, which revealed the failure of Singapore�s chairmanship and ASEAN�s ability to respond to the Burma crisis, and blemished the inaugural launch of the long-awaited ASEAN Charter.

Face-Slapping DiplomacyOne week before the ASEAN Summit Meeting, Singapore sent Zainal Abidin Rasheed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to Naypyidaw from 13-14 November 2007, reportedly to brief Burmese leaders on preparations for the Meeting. Little was revealed to the public about how Singapore was in fact trying to convince the junta to accept its plan to invite Gambari, who had just returned from Burma after a series of discussions with parties involved following the crackdown, to appear before the East Asian Summit (EAS), which was to be held back-to-back with the ASEAN Summit Meeting. The objective was for Gambari to update EAS members�the ASEAN members plus China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand�on the political situation in Burma. For Singapore as ASEAN Chair, the purpose was not only to redeem the credibility and the involvement of ASEAN in the Burmese reconciliation process, but also to convince non-ASEAN players, par-ticularly China and India, to lend their support to ASEAN efforts at political change in Burma. Singapore�s diplomatic effort was also to lo-cate ASEAN at the centre of the Burma issue. Initially, Burmese Prime Minister Thien Sien and Foreign Minister Nyan Win reportedly went along with Singapore�s proposal of inviting Gambari to speak at the EAS before they consulted with Than Shwe.

Burma, of course, changed its mind soon after Thien Sien arrived at the Summit Meeting, just as Gambari was on a plane bound for Singapore. The Burmese junta, embedded in its mistrust of ASEAN, realised that it would inevitably become a target of collective criticism,


210 211

and that it did not need to explain itself on what had taken place in its own backyard. China was thought to back up Burma�s decision since Beijing wanted to keep the Burma issue strictly in the Southeast Asian context. The Burmese premier angrily responded to the media that if members of the EAS wished to know about his country�s political situa-tion, it would be Burma�s own responsibility to provide such informa-tion, not Gambari. Months of ASEAN�s diplomatic manoeuvring fell short in the face of the global community, which had insisted all along in pursuing further sanctions against the Burmese regime. Prime Mi-nister Lee of Singapore was forced to admit ASEAN�s shortcoming in bringing the Burma crisis into the EAS. He declared, in front of other ASEAN leaders, that ASEAN would from now on let Burma handle its own affairs, but stand ready if the country needed assistance�a posi-tion that did not seem to surprise anyone. ASEAN�s failure had a lot to do with its lack of a sense of urgency to toughen the stance on Burma, and a collective power and common position that would be compelling enough to deal with the stubborn regime. While Singapore teamed up with Gambari in introducing the Burma problem to the EAS, Thailand came up with a new proposal of �North Korean-styled six-party talks� to tackle the issue. Not only has the failure represented a major barrier in ASEAN�s external relations, particularly with Europe and the US, but it has also been a destabilising factor in the group�s mission of commu-nity building by the year 2015.

The constitutional referendum in May will pose another test to ASEAN�s mandate of achieving political change in Burma. So far, the prospect of success seems slim. ASEAN continues to pay lip service to the junta by calling for an inclusive political process, which means es-sentially the participation of the NLD and Suu Kyi, and yet no concrete actions have been taken. ASEAN is also lacking in its understanding of the real political condition in Burma, particularly when it relentlessly urges the junta to open the political door to Suu Kyi and her party. The reality is that the inclusion of Suu Kyi and the NLD is unlikely to occur, since the Burmese government has already set a political course that does not include Suu Kyi. This explains why the international commu-nity reacted to Burma's announcement of a referendum and elections with such indifference. Some ASEAN members rushed to congratulate the country, regarding its decision as �a positive political development.� Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN Secretary-General, said he saw some merit in the regime�s announcement. �It has to begin somewhere and now it has a clear, defi nite beginning. I think it is a development in the right direction,� Surin said.25 The other reality, however, is that the junta's un-expected referendum signifi es an attempt to delay the political transi-

tion rather than to speed up the democratisation process even when the dates of the referendum and elections have been fi xed. The regime has been using the new political timeline to prolong its hold over the country, spinning an empty promise that the country's military era is coming to an end. The decision to announce early elections was also linked to international politics. Burma has made great efforts to soften international sanctions imposed upon it, especially after its crackdown on street protesters. In the past few months, Western powers have cal-led for harsher sanctions against cronies and supporters of the military regime. Economic sanctions, which were long a cause of severe hard-ship for the Burmese people, are now beginning to be felt by the top echelons in the military regime.

Despite international protest, the Burmese leaders are determined to follow their own political track without Suu Kyi. Even Gambari, who just returned to Burma for his third visit in March 2008, was blamed by the junta for being biased toward Suu Kyi when he demanded that the political process in Burma be inclusive. �Sadly, Gambari went beyond his mandate. Hence, the majority of people are criticising his action as a biased act. We are concerned that his task of offering impartial advice may be undermined,� said Kyaw Hsan, Burma�s Information Minis-ter.26 In response to such statements, the opposition has rallied for a no-vote against the upcoming public referendum among in Burma, and many fear a possible mass protest that could provoke another brutal crackdown. One question remains eminent: can ASEAN do anything to change Burma�s political course and to prevent another vicious supp-ression of the Burmese people should demonstrations erupt during the referendum?

The Cyclone Nargis DisasterBurma, particularly in the Irrawaddy Delta, was badly hit by Cyclone Nargis on 3 May 2007, just one week before the constitutional referen-dum. According to the government�s release, there are 28,458 dead and 33,416 persons still missing (as of 10 May 2008). However, independent estimates have put the death toll at more than 100,000. One estimate by an international agency suggested a death count as high as approx-imately 600,000 people. Meanwhile, the United Nations estimates that between 1.5 and 2 million people have been severely affected by the cyclone.27

The devastating effects of the Cyclone Nargis were, of course, made worse by the Burmese government�s refusal to open its doors to foreign aid, especially aid from the West. Wary of the politics attached to the


212 213

aid handed out by anti-junta Western governments, the junta chose to deal with the task of disaster relief in isolation, and only later accepted limited help from neighbouring countries. ASEAN was once again too slow to respond to the crisis in Burma. It took the organisation almost three weeks before it could come up with a package of initiatives in the aftermath of the cyclone. ASEAN Chief Surin admitted that such criti-cism was valid. He said, �I do not have any defence for that. But I think the international community also realises we have a lot of sensitivities to work around, to the point where all international agencies have come to accept the fact that if it has to be an ASEAN-led vehicle or structure or architecture, they would be happy and willing to work with us and rally behind us.�28

At the beginning, some ASEAN members provided fi nancial as-sistance and relief goods to Burma on an individual basis instead of addressing the catastrophe as a single, united organisation. But they were criticised for being less generous in their assistance to the victims of Nargis. According to David Fullbrook, �Thailand should surely be in the donor vanguard. Its elites have courted vast investments in Burma during the past decade especially in the import of Burmese gas. But government cash and the state-owned energy giant PTT�s donations total less than US$2 million; the Bank of Thailand holds reserves of approximately US$50 billion. Indonesia, which benefi ted tremendously from global charity when the tsunami struck in 2004, has given US$1 million and blocked a Security Council resolution against Burma. Sing-apore helps the junta with trade and banking, and is a playground for the children of the Burmese elite. The super-rich island offered a mere US$200,000.�29 Rodolfo Severino, former ASEAN Secretary-General, perceived that uncoordinated assistance from certain ASEAN mem-bers has been delivered relatively smoothly to Burma not only because Burma is a member of the organisation, but also because such assis-tance comes without a political agenda and threats.30 Such statement, however, only shows that Burma is always one step ahead of ASEAN, putting itself in a position of relevancy without sacrifi cing too much of anything.

On 19 May 2008, Singapore played host to an ASEAN emergency meeting in order to search for a further step in an attempt to persuade the Burmese military to allow foreign assistance. Burmese Foreign Mi-nister Nyan Win agreed to let ASEAN lead an international aid effort through the establishment of a mechanism that would facilitate aid from all over the world to fl ow into the country. But as always, Burma has prescribed a limited role of ASEAN by emphasising that aid given through the organisation must not be politicised and that foreign relief

workers would not be given �uncontrolled� access. ASEAN, in despera-tion to prove its effectiveness and credibility, has had to deal with great diffi culties with Burma�s stubborn regime as well as pressure from international community at the same time.

The Cyclone Nargis brings to the attention ASEAN�s struggle to address issues that require special engagement with its sovereign members such as human rights and natural disaster. It is also a rema-inder to ASEAN members that they should immediately implement or ratify a number of agreements, including the 2005 Agreement on Disaster Management and Emergency Response and the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution.31 Indeed, Surin has ur-ged ASEAN members to recognise the importance of ratifying those documents which would oblige them to assist one another in times of natural disaster and provide for the protection of people from any cata-strophic impact.

ASEAN has always been perceived as playing second fi ddle to Bur-ma, mainly because it lacks a clear leader capable of guiding ASEAN policies and activities, especially in diffi cult times. If ASEAN had been under strong leadership, the problems in Burma, including the Nargis disaster, might not have become such a thorny issue. An ASEAN leader could have fi rst rallied support from his fellow members and come up with an integrated stance on how to assist Burma in dealing with the disaster, as well as to strengthen a sense of trust so that the generals in Naypyidaw would be comfortable enough to work with ASEAN. Such a leader might also have been able to convince other ASEAN countries that it is in their interests to help those suffering from all forms of cala-mity anywhere in the region, even when individual member countries themselves are not directly affected by these events. Time has changed so much since the end of the Cold War and so have the circumstances that regions face today. New kinds of problems have emerged in the ASEAN region. Some of them are non-traditional and transcend natio-nal boundaries. A regional leadership vacuum in ASEAN has not only left these challenging problems unresolved, but such a vacuum has the potential to turn an already much criticised ASEAN into a completely irrelevant entity.

The Thai Role in the Burmese ImpasseThailand is probably the most important player within ASEAN on the Burma due to its intricate relations with the Burmese regime and the burdens it has had to bear as a result of internal confl icts in Burma. Singapore�s Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew once said, �The members


214 215

of ASEAN who could infl uence them (the Burmese generals) will be Thailand and beyond (that) China and India. The rest of us�we are kind of background Muzak (music).�32

Relations between Thailand and Burma have been erratic over the years, depending on the changing notions of national interests especial-ly on the Thai part. At its lowest, the relationship is usually held hostage by the bitter historical memory in which Ayutthaya, Siam�s old capital, was invaded and ransacked by the Burmese army in 1767. This inimical past has consistently been exploited as a vicious political tool of the mo-dern-day elites in order to satisfy their political legitimacy through the manipulation of nationalism. In the meantime, however, the new breed of Thai leaders who are more interested in business than historical past, choose to adopt a more friendly policy toward Burma. Some take advan-tage of the offi cial policy to augment their personal interests in Burma, with the consent of the Burmese generals who are eager to do business in order to sustain their own regime. The fl uctuation in the Thai policy towards Burma, from being an antagonistic neighbour to a business partner, has been evident for a decade since the Democrat Party took power in 1997 to the present day of the People�s Power Party (PPP)-led government. In 1997, the Chuan Leekpai government closely tied his foreign policy toward Rangoon with the need to defend democracy. This was when �Constructive Engagement� was redefi ned to become more direct in dealing with Burma. Renamed �Flexible Engagement,� the policy was reformulated to allow Burma�s neighbours to raise con-cerns over the situation in the country. But ASEAN quickly rebuffed the content of this new policy, charging it of breaking the norm of non-interference. The Chuan government may have won a trophy from the democratic world, but it found itself on the outs with both Burma and ASEAN.33

Amicable relations between Thailand and Burma returned during the Thaksin-led government from 2001-2006, and have lasted into the cur-rent era of PPP rule. Economic interests, not promotion of democracy, have been a determining factor in bilateral relations. On the legitimate front, Burma represents a myriad of economic interests for Thailand, ranging from natural gas (Thailand today is the biggest single buyer of Burmese gas, which makes up about 50% of the country�s supply34), teak, gems and precious stones, marine products, as well as low-wage Burmese labour.35 Behind the scenes, Thai leaders have been preoc-cupied with shoring up their own interests, both in the form of power and money, in their relations with the junta. Leaders� self-interests have resulted in the Thai policy of piggy-backing the Burmese regime even as the latter was accused of committing human rights violations and

continued to challenge ASEAN�s credibility and reputation. Thaksin�s foreign policy was heavily criticised by the West for lacking morality, and therefore contributing to a worsening situation in Burma. The economic benefi ts that resulted from Thailand�s forgiving ap-proach toward Burma were evident. In 2005, Thailand was Burma�s top trading partner, with total bilateral trade revenues amounting to US$2.5 billion, an increase of 27.2% from the previous year. Currently, Thai private businesses have invested in 56 projects in Burma�total-ling more than US$1.3 billion, or equivalent to 17.28% of Burma�s total foreign direct investment.36 On top of this, Thailand�s exports to Burma amount to around US$1.26 billion annually. The total border trade stood at US$2.2 billion in 2005. Thaksin himself also owns businesses in Burma. His company, Shin Corp, the third largest satellite operator in Asia, concluded a deal in 2003 with Bagan Cybertech, and internet service provider of Ye Naing Win, who is the son of former Prime Mi-nister Khin Nyunt. Prior to the conclusion of the deal, Thaksin invited Burma to participate in the Economic Cooperation Strategy (ECS), later renamed ACMECS (Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Coo-peration Strategy), in which Thailand offered Burma generous fi nan-cial assistance worth US$45 million. At the same time, Human Rights Watch reported that the Thaksin regime continued to clean up Burmese refugees living along Thailand�s border.37 The Irrawaddy reported that this raised concerns about Bangkok�s ability to act as an honest broker in the Burmese political standoff and also questioned Thaksin�s confl ict of interests. The Bangkok process, hosted by the Thaksin government in 2003, ostensibly to advance democracy in Burma, failed to take off and came to an end when the Burmese representative failed to turn up at a planned second session in April 2004.38

It was reported that Thaksin was also involved in setting up high technology communications networks in Burma as part of the IPSTAR project, a US$350 million telecom broadband satellite. This project was linked with the controversial EXIM Bank�s four billion baht loan to the Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank in 2004 for road construction and in-frastructure developments in Burma. Thailand�s EXIM Bank provided fi nancial support to Thai investors and exporters under the procure-ment contracts granted by the Burmese government. Thaksin�s telecom empire was suspected of gaining the most from the EXIM Bank�s loan to Burma. After Thaksin was toppled in a military coup, the Surayud government appointed the Assets Examination Committee to look into whether the loan was made to benefi t politically connected companies, as well as the decision of the Board of Investment of Thailand that granted Shin Satellite an eight-year tax holiday on revenues from the


216 217

IPSTAR project.39 The Thaksin period saw Thailand, in particular Thai leaders, prioritise economic benefi ts to be gained from Burma above other considerations, and even above ASEAN�s offi cial stance of urging political change in the country. Thai scholar, Thitinan Pongsudhirak, characterises Thaksin�s Burmese policy as a policy of accommodation and appeasement, at times bordering on fl attery. It rendered �Construc-tive Engagement� completely elastic in accordance with the preferen-ces of the Burmese junta. He stressed, �Whatever the Burmese junta wants, the Thaksin government seems willing to comply.�40 This bu-siness-oriented policy not only enriched the self-isolating regime with profi ts from the sale of its natural resources, but also legitimised those in power in Burma, which has in turn further alienated Suu Kyi and the NLD and therefore delayed the process of political reconciliation.

Thai foreign policy during the military government (September 2006-February 2008) was rather dormant for a number of reasons. It was preoccupied with a mission to heal the sharply divisive society brought about by the ongoing battle between pro-Thaksin and the roya-list forces. Moreover, Thailand had to explain its actions to the West�its motives behind the power seizure and its intention to return to democracy. In regards to Thailand�s relations with Burma, the military government repeatedly claimed that it lacked moral authority to preach to Burmese counterparts to respect democracy. It was simply satisfi ed with the status quo, which seemed to be met favourably by the Burmese leaders. Even then, Thai-Burmese economic activities remained vibrant since Thailand continued to rely on energy imports from Burma.

The current government of Prime Minister Samak, a self-confes-sed nominee of Thaksin, does not hide its admiration for the Burmese regime and is clearly pleased with the return of his country�s amicable policy toward Burma. Samak paid a one-day visit to Naypyidaw on 14 March 2008 as part of his introductory tour of ASEAN countries as a new leader of Thailand. While in Naypyidaw, Samak made public his Burmese policy based on two principles. First, Thailand opposes Wes-tern sanctions on Burma, and prefers peaceful negotiations since these could lead to positive developments. Moreover, Thailand is prepared to help the Burmese military government hold a referendum on a new Constitution in May. Second, Thailand hopes to strengthen bilateral economic relations with Burma, especially in the area of production and exploitation of natural gas and hydropower projects.41 On a less publicised note, his visit failed to pressurise Burma to expedite its road-map to democracy. Samak has recently been discouraged in this, since Burma and India shook hands over the signing of an agreement on a transport project that would develop a sea route between Kolkata and

Sitwe for the shipping of energy products, an outcome of the visit to In-dia of Burma�s Vice-Senior General Maung Aye from 3-7 April 2008.42

In the end, Thailand�s domestic politics and the push to meet the self-interests of its elites have had a powerful role in dictating the country�s foreign policy toward Burma. Past and present governments have shown their willingness to achieve such objectives at ASEAN�s ex-pense, defying the West on Burma�s behalf, and ignoring the frustrated calls from the Burmese opposition for democratic change. Thailand�s self-serving policy has in many ways contributed to ASEAN�s lack of credibility, despite its many desperate attempts to be seen by the inter-national community as a serious, capable and credible regional entity.

Policy Options and AlternativesThe Burma problem has persisted so long, and the hurdle ahead�the May referendum�seems so critical that it could turn ASEAN�s credi-bility to rubble and shatter the much publicised ASEAN Charter before its ratifi cation by the end of the year. If ASEAN is serious about rein-venting itself as a recognised regional body, it must therefore pursue a number of new policies and exercise some muscle if the organisation wishes to salvage its reputation:

§ It is suggested that ASEAN needs to begin a process of rigo-rous and coordinated commitment not only for the benefi t of the Burmese people, but also for the sake of peace and stability in the region. In order to achieve common advantage, the ASEAN member countries will therefore have to fi nd some middle ground from which to take a multilateral approach. ASEAN members need to reassess their historical commitment to the policy of non-interference. The organisation will also have to convince the world that sanction policies against Burma must go hand-in-hand with various forms of engagement. It will be ne-cessary to coordinate all kinds of dealings towards the common goals of persistent reform, reconciliation and democratisation in Burma. To achieve success, ASEAN members will need to make a mutual concerted effort.43

§ What ASEAN could do at this point is to widen the diploma-tic scope of its engagement with Burma. ASEAN should make Burma less of a regional problem and more of an East Asian one. This would help to create immense pressure on the Burmese re-gime. ASEAN could begin by building dialogues with China and India about the deteriorating situation in Burma through exis-


218 219

ting frameworks like the EAS. The two Asian giants are known to be Burma�s close friends, particularly since the implementation of heavy international sanctions by Western nations. The most diffi cult task for ASEAN will be to convince China and India of the necessity of putting human rights before strategic interests. �ASEAN may remind them of the danger of their selfi sh pursuit of strategic goals in Burma that will put them on par with an energy-driven policy of the US in the Middle East during the past few decades,� said Michael Vatikiotis, visiting research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.44 The challenge for ASEAN is to refrain from competing with China in order to win over Burma, either for organisational purposes or in the interests of individual members. § It is time for ASEAN and the world to rethink Burma policy, particularly in regards to international sanctions. Since there have been so many confl icting approaches, Burma has success-fully utilised its weaknesses and problems as a tool to divide its neighbours and other great powers and hit at their soft spots. These countries urgently need a common approach to bring about changes in Burma. Such a process would require some �give� on the part of each state, and with the right mix of stick and carrot, there could be progress in Burma. It is obvious that non-interference and total sanctions against Burma have not worked during the past 16 years. On the contrary, they have ge-nerated counterproductive results such as the extension of Suu Kyi�s house arrest and the continuing imprisonment of Burmese political activists. The sanctions also failed partly because the countries involved were far too tactical and distracted by great power politics and other economic interests. A reassessment of this approach towards Burma is crucial, since it would be foo-lish to continue a course of action that has so clearly proven to be ineffective. First and foremost, one has to reject a simplistic "black and white" treatment of sanctions, where non-support for sanctions is equated with support for the junta.45

On an ending note, it has become obvious that the US and Europe, in freezing their relations with Burma, have inadvertently deprived themselves of the chance to infl uence political developments in Burma. Since Burma remains an ASEAN member, the organisation has a legi-timate opportunity to raise its concerns about political developments in one of its member countries. Such a role could prove powerful for ASEAN in its dealings with Burma, if the rest of the ASEAN members

work together with ASEAN�s other partners and with all of the Burmese parties involved � the government, the opposition and the Burmese pe-ople � for the true promotion of genuine democracy in this Southeast Asian nation.

Annex 1Statement by ASEAN Chair Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo

New York, 27 September 2007The ASEAN Foreign Ministers had a full and frank discussion on the si-tuation in Myanmar at their Informal Meeting this morning in the UN and agreed for the Chair to issue this Statement. They were appalled to receive reports of automatic weapons being used and demanded that the Myanmar government immediately desist from the use of violence against demonstrators. They expressed their revulsion to Myanmar Foreign Minister Nyan Win over reports that the demonstrations in Myanmar are being suppressed by violent force and that there has been a number of fatalities. They strongly urged Myanmar to exercise utmost restraint and seek a political solution. They called upon Myanmar to resume its efforts at national reconciliation with all parties concerned, and work towards a peaceful transition to democracy. The Ministers called for the release of all political detainees including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressed their concern to Minister Nyan Win that the developments in Myanmar had a serious impact on the reputation and credibility of ASEAN. They noted that Singapore�s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has spoken to his ASEAN counter-parts over the past day, and will be writing to Senior General Than Shwe.

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers gave their full support to the decision of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to send Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari to Myanmar. They welcomed FM Nyan Win�s assurance that a visa would be issued to Mr Gambari in Singapore. They asked the My-anmar government to cooperate fully and work with him. Mr Gambari�s role as a neutral interlocutor among all the parties can help defuse the dangerous situation. The Ministers urged the Myanmar government to grant him full access to all parties in Myanmar, as they had done in the past.


220 221

Notes1 Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, p.109

2 Surapong Jayanama, Thailand, ASEAN and the Burma Problems: Eight Long Years of Disgrace, unpublished article, April 2005. Surapong also added that ASEAN wanted to send the right signal to the international community that by admitting Burma, ASEAN intended not to kowtow to outside pressure or interference, or more specifi cally to Wes-tern domination. Surapong is former Thai ambassador to Vietnam, Portugal, Greece, Germany and South Africa.

3 �Yangon Missed Chance to Engage UN Envoy: Singapore,� The Straits Times, 15 March 2008.

4 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, �The ASEAN Dilemma,� in The Irrawaddy, Vol.15, No.8, August 2007, p.36.

5 �Westerners too Critical of Myanmar, Says Samak,� The Straits Times, 17 March 2008.

6 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Rela-tions, Lamham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: The University Press of America, 2005, p.139.

7 Tin Maung Maung Than, �Charter for ASEAN: Boon or Bane?,� in The Irrawaddy, Vol.15, No. 8, August 2007, p.39.

8 Mungpi, �Will Thailand Gain from Lack of Democracy and Human Rights in Burma,� in Mizzimi News, 8 February 2008, at http://www.mizzima.com/MizzimaNews/News/2008/Feb/23-Feb-2008.html.

9 Akshay Kothari, �The Tragedy of Burma,� in The Singapore Law Review, 9 December 2007, at http://www.singaporelawreview.org/2007/12/the-tragedy-of-burma/

10 Quoted in Pavin Chachavalpongpun, �Little Hope in Burmese Junta�s Democratic Bluster,� in The Nation, 12 February 2008.

11 In several private conversations with Dr Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN Secretary-General (in-waiting at the time), December 2007. Also see, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, �The My-anmar Problem: Internationalisation or Regionalisation?,� in OpinionAsia, 30 October 2007, at http://www.opinionasia.org/TheMyanmarProblemInternationalisationorRegio-nalisation.

12 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Alliances and the Problems of Burma/Myanmar Policy: The United States, Japan, Thailand, Australia and the European Union, Asian Voices Seminar Series Transcript, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Washington DC, USA, 3 November 2006. Kyaw delivered this talk together with other 6 panellists, including Michael Green, Peter Christian Hauswedell, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Andrew Selth, David Steinberg and Tsumori Shigeru.

13 �MFA Spokesman�s Comments on PM Lee Hsien loong�s Calls to ASEAN Leaders on the Myanmar Issue,� MFA Press Release, 27 September 2007.

14 See Annex 1.

15 Suresh Kumar and Martin Stuart-Fox, �Why ASEAN is the Only Hope,� in Today, 27 September 2007.

16 �A Test of Cohesion,� The Straits Times, 2 October 2007.

17 Zin Linn, Burma: ASEAN should not go against the UN,� Asian Tribune, 5 December 2007, at http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/8574.

18 �Keep Pressure on Myanmar,� The Straits Times, 10 October 2007.

19 Barry Desker, �Suspend Myanmar from ASEAN,� The Straits Times, 4 October 2007.

20 George Yeo, Singaporean Foreign Minister paid unoffi cial visits to China and Japan from 25-27 October 2007 in an attempt to win support from the two countries to push for a political change in Burma. He also visited India at the beginning of November 2007 to achieve the same objective.

21 Janadas Devan, �Wedged Between a Rock and a Hard Place,� The Straits Times, 26 October 2007.

22 Ibid.

23 In an interview with Rodolfo Severino, former ASEAN Secretary-General and cur-rently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 31 October 2007.

24 In an interview with Maj-Gen Aye Myint, Deputy Defence Minister, Singapore, 18 October 2007.

25 Aung Zaw, �Burma�s Referendum Ambush,� The Irrawaddy, 13 February 2008.

26 �Myanmar Rebuffs Gambari�s Reform Call,� The Straits Times, 9 March 2008.

27 Nyi Nyi Kyaw, �The Myanmar Nargis Aftermath: A Disaster in Governance,� in RSIS Commentaries, No.60/2008, 16 May 2008, p.1.

28 �We Were too Slow, Admitted ASEAN Chief,� in The New Zealand Herald, 21 May 2008.

29 David Fullbrook, �Burma Praying in the Rain,� Newstatesman, 15 May 2008.

30 Rodolfo Severino, �Lessons in Offering Neighbourly Aid,� The Straits Times, 15 May 2008.

31 Achara Ashayagachat, �ASEAN Struggles to Help Burma,� Bangkok Post, 21 May 2008.

32 The Irrawaddy, Vol.16, No.2, February 2008, p.5.

33 Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations, Chapter 6.

34 Through concessions granted to the PTT Exploration and Production Co Ltd (PTTEP) in the Yadana and Yetagun fi elds in the Bay of Bengal, Thailand is at present importing about 9 billion standard cubic feet a day, and wishes to buy an additional 100 million cubic feet of gas per day to match its rising domestic demand.

35 N Ganesan, �Myanmar�s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World,� in Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H Taylor, and Tin Maung Maung Than, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, pp.46-47.

36 Source from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, http://www.mfa.go.th

37 Thailand: Burmese Democracy Activists Targeted by Thai Government, Human Right Watch, Press Release, 29 March 2005

38 Aung Zaw, �Thaksin�s Burma Blunder,� The Irrawaddy, 6 March 2006, at http://www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=5516&z=157


222 223

39 See, �Bt4-bn Burma Loan Fine: EXIM,� The Nation, 4 October 2006; and �EXIM Bank Details Loan Status,� The Bangkok Post, 4 October 2006.

40 Thitinan Pongsudhirak, �A Win-Win-Win Proposition for Thaksin,� The Irrawaddy, August 2005.

41 See, �Thailand Opposes Sanctions against Myanmar,� and �Westerners too Critical of Myanmar, Says Samak,� in The Straits Times, 15 March 2008 and 17 March 2008 respectively.

42 P Jayaram, �India to Develop Transport Project in Myanmar,� The Straits Times, 4 April 2008.

43 Zin Linn, �Burma: ASEAN should not go against the UN.�

44 Quoted in Pavin Chachavalpongpun, �The ASEAN Dilemma.�

45 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, �World Needs to Rethink Burma Policy,� The Nation, 14 November 2006.

The Staying Powerof the Burmese Military RegimeBertil Lintner

The Enigma of Military Power in BurmaBetween 1962 and 1974, there were 64 military takeovers throughout the world, most of them entailing the overthrow of civilian governme-nts. Only two of these takeover military governments remain today: Li-bya, where Col. Mohammar Khadaffy seized power in 1969, and Burma, where the military overthrew the democratically elected government of Prime Minister U Nu in 1962 and has been in power under various guises ever since.

The survival of successive military regimes in Burma is one of the enigmas of Southeast Asian politics. The key to this puzzle is the under-standing that Burma in no �ordinary� military dictatorship, and it can-not be compared to Thailand, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan or other countries in the region that have also had spells of military rule.

When the army fi rst seized power in Burma in 1962, it not only took control over the government, but it also assumed control over Burma�s economic institutions. Branded the �Burmese Way to Socialism,� the takeover meant that almost all private property was confi scated and handed over to a number of military-run state corporations. The old mercantile elite, largely of Indian and Chinese ethnic origin, left the country, and so did many of Burma�s intellectuals. Prior to the 1962 coup, Burma had had one of the highest living standards in Southeast Asia and a fairly well-educated population. After the coup, the military subsequently became Burma�s new and only elite.

The Burmese military establishment also developed into a state-within-a-state, a society in which army personnel, their families and dependents enjoy a position far more privileged than their counterparts ever had in, for instance, Thailand and Indonesia. In both of these countries, some degree of pluralism has always been accepted, even during the darkest years of military dictatorship.

The Burmese Way to Socialism was abolished after the 1988 upris-ing, perhaps in an attempt to appease the international community, which had condemned the carnage in Rangoon. However, this may also have occurred because the military realized that they could make


224 225

more money in a free-market economy. For example, private enterprise and foreign investment were permitted after the bloody events of 1988, when at least 3,000 protesters were gunned down, but, in essence, the Burmese Way to Capitalism remains a military-dominated economy.

There are few major enterprises that are not directly or indirectly controlled by the military or by businessmen affi liated with the military, such as the powerful 44-year-old tycoon Tay Za, who is close to junta leader Gen. Than Shwe and his family. His Htoo Trading Company was one of two main contractors that built Burma�s new administra-tive capital, Naypyidaw. The other was the Asia World Group, which is headed by Tun Myint Naing, or Steven Law, the son of Lo Hsing-han, who, in the 1970s, was branded by US authorities as the King of Opium in Burma�s sector of the Golden Triangle. The military�s own company, the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH) controls or su-pervises all vital economic activity, and the money goes directly into the pockets of the generals, not the government which, in April 2008, was quite clearly bankrupt. The fi scal year, when all debts have to be settled, normally ends on March 31. Thus year, it has been extended to June because it is unable to pay its bills to private contractors.

In Burma, there are special schools and hospitals for the military and their dependents. They live in secluded, subsidized housing and shop for goods that are not available in ordinary stores. An army pass assured the holder of a seat on a train or an airplane, and a policeman would never dare to report him or her for violating traffi c rules. The military�s only civilian support base is the Union Solidarity and Devel-opment Association, USDA, which was formed in 1992. It claims to have 21 million members, but that is mainly because membership is compulsory for civil servants and ordinary citizens are forced to join. Like the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) which ruled Burma until the 1988 uprising, it is a colossus on feet of clay, which, in the wake of current events, is likely to collapse, as the BSPP did nineteen years ago.

But nothing is going to change fundamentally as long as the military remains united, and there have so far been no credible reports of splits within the military. Given the abuse of power, their privileges and the atrocities they have committed, the Burmese military has everything to lose and nothing to gain from allowing more openness and transparen-cy, and they have shown on numerous occasions that they are prepared to gun down their own people to protect their absolute hold on power.

Foreign-based opposition groups � and foreign governments as well � like to talk about �dialogue� and �national reconciliation,� but these are no more than popular buzzwords with little relevance inside

Burma, where the military talks to no one but itself. A Rangoon-based Western diplomat once put it to me quite bluntly: �They fear that if they don�t hang together, they�ll hang separately.�

The fear of retribution is so strong that when, after the 1990 general election � which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won with a landslide � Kyi Maung, the acting head of the party, said in an inter-view with the now defunct Hong Kong magazine Asiaweek that, �Here in Burma we do not need any Nuremberg trials,� he was promptly ar-rested.1 The very mention of Nuremberg scared the generals.

The fact that the military remains in power refl ects the failure of both the �softer� approach of Burma�s neighbours and partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) � and economic and political pressures from the West, which include trade sanctions and travel bans to Europe for the ruling generals and their associates.

A younger generation of army offi cers, who see the need to negotiate with the pro-democracy movement, is probably the only hope. For now, however, no one is aware of any �young Turks� lurking in the wings. If change is going to come to Burma, however, it will be because of action taken by such younger army offi cers rather than the demonstrations of monks or students. Such protests can, at the most, infl uence sections of the army to realize that there is no future in supporting the present regime. Still, only time will tell if this is going to happen.

Burma�s Military Intelligence Apparatus: The Main Pillar of the StateThe rise of military power in Burma began shortly after independence from Britain on 4 January 1948. Communist as well as ethnic rebel armies rose in rebellion against Rangoon, and, in the northeast, rem-nants of Chiang Kai-shek�s Nationalist Chinese forces retreated across the border after being defeated by Mao Zedong�s communists. At inde-pendence, the Burmese army was only 15,000 strong, plus militias. But by 1955, because of the civil war, the ranks of the army had increased to 40,000, and it was already involved in businesses such as shipping, ban-king and publishing. When the emerging state-within-a-state gobbled up the state in 1962, there were 104,200 men in all three services. These numbers rose to 140,000 in 1976, 160,000 in 1985, and, at the time of the 1988 uprising, 180,000 in the army and nearly 200,000 in all three services.

Today, the strength of the three services is estimated at 400,000, and they are much better equipped than at any time in modern Burma�s

The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime

226 227

history, mainly due to massive procurement of arms from China, and, more recently, North Korea. The latest expansion comes at a time when the ruling military has managed to strike cease-fi re agreements with most of the country�s rebel groups, so, during the past decade, there has been very little fi ghting in Burma�s traditionally volatile frontier areas. The enemy now is the population at large.

The rise of the Burmese army as a political and economic force be-gan under Gen. Ne Win, Commander-in-Chief from 1949 to 1972, and mastermind behind the 1962 coup. He resigned as president in 1981, but remained chairman of the BSPP until 1988. He died in 2002, and left behind a legacy of repression and dictatorial rule, which the Bur-mese military has been unable � and unwilling � to relinquish.

Ne Win also built up one of Asia�s most ruthless as well as effi cient secret police forces, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), which was known throughout Burma down to the lowliest non-English speaking peasant as �MI� (em-eye). Even if executions of political opponents was the exception rather than the rule, anyone suspected of having contacts with opponents of the regime was likely to be arrested and tortured while in jail. The MIS also had its own prison and torture centre, the infamous Yay Kyi Aing (�Clearwater Pond�) near Rangoon�s Mingala-Yay Kyi Aing (�Clearwater Pond�) near Rangoon�s Mingala-Yay Kyi Aingdon airport.

The MIS kept a watchful eye not only on the country�s ordinary citi-zens, but especially on army offi cers with liberal ideas � which apart from rotations, corruption and institutionalized brutality contributed to the remarkable cohesiveness of Burma�s armed forces � and on the many politicized Burmese exiles living in Britain, West Germany, Thai-land, Australia and the USA. Among the Burmese community abroad, no one was ever sure who was an informer or not; for many years, mu-tual suspicion neutralized them as a political force.

The origin of MIS and its methods can be traced back to the Japanese occupation of Burma 1942�45. Before the Japanese invasion in 1942, Japan trained, armed and equipped Aung San Suu Kyi�s father Aung San�s legendary �Thirty Comrades,� who became the core of the Burma Independence Army and of whom Ne Win also a member. Burma was granted nominal independence in 1942. But, as Seekins emphasize, be-cause of Tokyo�s policy self-suffi ciency in its occupied Asian territories, the large numbers of Japanese soldiers in Burma � 300,000 � essentially lived off the land. The Japanese secret police, the Kempetai, conducted a reign of terror, which was so harsh that even the head of the pro-Japa-nese puppet government, Dr. Ba Maw, had to intercede with the highest military commanders to curb the worst excesses. In the end, Aung San

and his Burmese nationalists turned against the Japanese, and allied themselves with Britain, the former colonial power, on 27 March 1945 � a date that is still celebrated offi cially as Armed Forces Day.

Donald Seekins, a professor of Southeast Asian Studies ay Meio Uni-versity in Okinawa, argues that Japan behind a number of other, more unsavory legacies, including brutal counter-insurgency tactics: �There are more than superfi cial resemblances between the Tatmadaw�s [the Burmese military] �Four Cuts� policy against ethnic minority rebels (to�deprive rebels of recruits, funding, supplies and information) and the Japanese army�s sanko seisaku or �three all� policy in China (�kill all; burn all; destroy all�).�2

It is no coincidence that Ne Win � the architect of the Four Cuts pol-icy � was trained by the Kempetai and other sections of Japan�s security forces, as were many of the ministers who later served in his post 1962 BSPP governments. Among them were Maung Maung Kha, Burma�s prime minister from 1877�1988, and Dr. Maung Maung, president for a few weeks in 1988.

Lt. Col. James McAndrew states in his study of Burma�s military in-telligence apparatus: �Chosen for both �guerrilla tactics and clandestine activities� ad �special� leadership training was the future dictator and longtime strongman, Ne Win. Signifi cantly, this cirriculum included intelligence training provided by Kempetai, the brutal Japanese Military Police and counterintelligence organization. Being selected for training by the Kempetai is more than noteworthy in hindsight, and it must be viewed as an important early demonstration to Ne Win that maintain-ing coercive intelligence and counterintelligence organizations were essential to maintaining authoritarian rule.�3

Ne Win�s intelligence chief for many years was his devoted subor-dinate Brig.-Gen. Tin U � not to be confused with NLD Chairman Tin U, a retired general and former army chief. �MI� Tin U was trained by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the Pacifi c island of Saipan in the 1950s and, by 1961, he had become Ne Win�s aide-de camp and was almost regarded as Ne Win�s adopted son. At the time, Rodney Tasker characterized Tin U in the Far Eastern Economic Review: �He and his MIS colleagues were men of the world compared with other more short-sighted, dogmatic fi gures in the Burmese leadership. They were able to travel abroad, talk freely to foreigners and generally look beyond the rigid confi nes of the corrupt regime�although known to be ruthless, he built up a reputation as a gregarious, open-minded, charismatic fi gure � a di-rect contrast to some of his mole-like colleagues in the leadership.�4

But then, in May 1983, the Burmese government suddenly, and to-


228 229

tally unexpectedly, announced that Tin U had been �permitted to resign� along with the Home and Religious Affairs minister and also a former intelligence chief, Col. Bo Ni. They had been purged ostensibly because their wives were corrupt � a charge that could be brought against any army offi cer in Burma. Tin U and Bo NI were subsequently jailed � and the entire MIS apparatus purged as well.

The reason behind the move, however, remained a matter for con-jecture. It was suggested at the time that the urbane MIS people had become too powerful for comfort and almost managed to establish another state-within-a-state � which threatened Ne Win�s inner circle of hand-picked, less-than-intelligent yes-men.

Whatever the reason behind the purge, it had immediate effects on the security situation in the country. On 9 October 1983, 21 people, including four visiting South Korean cabinet ministers, were killed in a powerful explosion in Rangoon. Three North Korean military offi cers were behind the atrocity. One of them was killed in a shoot-out with Burmese security forces, while the other two were captured alive. One of the bombers remain in Rangoon�s Insein Jail while the other was executed in 1985.

Observers at the time believe that the incident would never have taken place if Tin U had still been in charge; it clearly indicated that the military intelligence apparatus was no longer what is used to be. A new intelligence chief, Khin Nyunt, was appointed in 1984. His Directorate of the Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) soon became almost as ef-fi cient as the old outfi t. Khin Nyunt in many ways also resembled Tin U; he was fairly young, relatively bright and he could be exceedingly ruthless whenever this was considered expedient by the old strongman, Ne Win.

Table: Names used by Burma�s military intelligence:

Name Dates

Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Late 1940s�late 1960s

Directorate of the Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) Late-1960s�2001

Offi ce of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI) 2001�2004

Offi ce of the Chief of Military Affairs Security (OCMAS) 2004�present

Source: Lt. Col. James McAndrew, op. cit.

The 1988 Uprising and its AftermathLess than four years after Khin Nyunt began rebuilding Burma�s shatte-red military intelligence apparatus, Burma faced the largest civil unrest in its history. Across the country, millions of people marched against the BSPP regime and for a return to the democracy that the country had enjoyed prior to the 1962 coup. Any regime anywhere would have collapsed under the pressure of an entire population rising up against tyranny. Such was not the case with Burma�s military-dominated re-gime, however. Thousands of people were gunned down in the streets of Rangoon and elsewhere as the military stepped in, not to overthrow the government but to shore up a regime overwhelmed with popular protest.

However, abandonment of the Burmese Way to Socialism was not the only outcome of the events of August and September 1988; the old one-party system under the BSPP was abolished, and several opposition fi gures were allowed to set up their own political parties. The most pow-erful of them was the National League for Democracy (NLD), headed by former army chief Tin U and Aung San Suu Kyi.

At the same time, the DDSI was expanded. Nine new units were established by 1991, bringing the total to 23. MI also operated 19 deten-tion centers, seven of them of Rangoon, of which Yay Kyi Aing was the most notorious. Undercover DDSI agents covered every movement of the NLD�s leaders and other opponents of the regime. When, in July 1989, the opposition proved to be too strong for comfort for the regime, the DDSI launched a massive crackdown on all pro-democracy forces. Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin U were placed under house arrest while scores of others were detained in Insein Jail, Yay Kyi Aing and other detention centers.

With almost all prominent pro-democracy leaders in jail or under house arrest, the junta that had been formed in September 1988, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), probably thought it was safe to hold the elections that it had promised after crushing the demonstrations the year before. On 27 May 1990, elections were held � and the NLD won a landslide victory, capturing 392 of the seats in the 485-seat National Assembly. The military-backed National Unity Party (NUP, formerly the BSPP) managed to secure only 10 seats. The rest went to various ethnically-based pro-democracy parties, which were loosely allied with the NLD but still wanted to emphasize their ethnic identities, such as the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD).

The popularly assembly was never convened, however. Instead, a


230 231

700-strong Constituent Assembly � of whom only about 100 had been elected in 1990 and the rest hand-picked by the military authorities � was formed to draft a new constitution for the country.

This was a complete reversal of the promises the SLORC had made before the election. On 31 May 1989 � a year before the election � the SLORC had even promulgated a �Pyithu Hluttaw Election law�, which was published in the state-run newspaper the Working People�s Daily on 1 June. A Pyithu Hluttaw in Burmese is a �people�s assembly,� i.e. a parliament. According to the 1974 Constitution, �The Pyithu Hluttaw is the highest Organ of state power. It exercises the sovereign powers of the State on behalf of the people.� The Pyithu Hluttaw that was elected in 1990 had the same number of seats as the one that was abolished in 1988. The only difference was that several political parties, not only one as before, could contest those seats.

Drafting a constitution was not a major issue before the election, even if SLORC�s then chairman, Gen. Saw Maung, on a couple of occa-sions had mentioned the need for a new charter. But he had also said: �We have spoken on the matter of State power. As soon as the election is held, form a government according to law and then take power. An elec-tion has to be held to bring forth a government. That is our responsibil-ity. But the actual work of forming a legal government after the election is not the duty of the Tatmadaw [the armed forces]. We are saying it very clearly and candidly right now.�5

He had also lashed out against the pro-democracy movement for raising the issue of a constitution before the people went to the polls. In a speech on 10 May � two weeks prior to the election � he stated: �A dignitary who once was an Attorney-General talked about the impor-tance of the constitution. As our current aim is to hold the election as scheduled we cannot as yet concern ourselves with the constitution as mentioned by that person. Furthermore, it is not our concern. A new constitution can be drafted. An old constitution can also be used after some amendments.�6

�That person� was former Attorney-General U Hla Aung, who was close to the NLD and, at the time, researching constitutional issues for the pro-democracy movement. I met him in Rangoon in May 1989, and he was quite dismayed at the reluctance of the military to discuss the constitution. I also met Col. Ye Htut of the SLORC�s information committee, who told me that �as soon as the elections are over, we will return to the barracks.� When I asked him what the military would do if the NLD won, and he replied: �Then we will hand over power to them and return to the barracks.�

The problem, of course, was that they had not expected the NLD to

win, so the rules had to be changed. That a constituent assembly, not a parliament, had been elected was fi rst stated by then intelligence chief Khin Nyunt in a speech on 27 July, 1989 � two months after the election. A constituent assembly in Burmese is not a Pyithu Hluttaw but a thaing pyi pyu hluttaw, as in the Myanma naing-ngan thaing pyi pyu hluttaw, which drafted Burma�s fi rst, 1947, constitution. That term was never used before the May 1990 election.

In the end, the elected assembly turned out to be not even a thaing pyi pyu hluttaw. About 100 of the 485 MPs elect were to sit in a �Nation-al Convention� together with 600 other, non-elected representatives who had been hand-picked by the military. No Burmese citizen expected that to happen when they went to the polls in May 1990.

Today, 18 years after the election, Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin U re-main under house arrest, and nearly the entire, original leadership of the NLD is either dead, in prison or have simply given up all political activity. Most young NLD activists have been imprisoned, cowed into submission, or have fl ed the country. Only a handful of elderly spokes-persons remain, and none of them have the strength and charisma to carry the party forward. That serves the interests of the junta, since the �new-look� NLD would appear to the outside world not to be a viable alternative.

The Rise of the Union Solidarity Development Association, USDAWith Suu Kyi under house arrest, and the NLD reduced to a gathering of geriatrics, it appears that the organized struggle for democracy has been effectively strangled. Meanwhile, Than Shwe and the State Peace and Development Council (the new name of the junta since November 1997) continued to strengthen their new mass organization and main pillar of support, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, the USDA

Apart from its �Three National Causes� � �the non-disintegration of the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of sovereignty� � the USDA has also articulated in its own inimitable phra-seology a �Four-Point People�s Desire: �oppose those relying on external elements, acting as stooges or holding negative views; oppose those try-ing to jeopardize the stability of the State and progress of the nation; op-pose foreign nations interfering in internal affairs of the State; and crush all internal and external destructive elements as the common enemy.�7

The USDA became the vehicle for the SPDC�s recreation of civil soci-ety while suppressing all other alternative possibilities, especially in areas


232 233

inhabited by ethnic minorities. It established offi ces at national, district, township and about one in four ward or village levels.8 By 1997, the USDA claimed to have 7.51 million members, which rose to 10 million in 1998, and 22.8 million in 2005, or nearly half the population of Burma.9 Now, its mass rallies are attended by up to 100,000 people, all proclaiming their allegiance to the new �State of Myanmar,� and the National Convention which is supposed to draw up the country�s new constitution.

In recent years, the USDA has also assumed a paramilitary role in society. Offi cial media has described it as �a reserve force for national defense,� which has trained �2,395 new generation air youths and 2,614 new generation naval youths.�10 And Than Shwe himself, the senior patron of the USDA, had stressed already in 1996 at an �Executive Ad-vanced Management Course� organized by the USDA:

The trainees constitute not only the hard core force of the USDA, but also the sole national force which will always join hands with the tatmadaw [armed forces] to serve national and public interests. Hence�they should be morally and physically strong with sharp national defence qualities. Therefore�the trainees will be taught military parade, military tactics, and the use of weapons.11

Basic military training has become part of the USDA�s policy of mass mobilization, and it has also formed its own militia forces, especially in ethnic minority areas. These have taken on names such as �the Anti-Foreign Invasion Force,� �the State Defense Force,� and �the People�s Strength Organization.� As early as 1997, army chief and deputy SPDC chairman, Gen. Maung Aye, referred to the USDA as an �auxiliary national defense force,� thus acknowledging its security role in the country.12

With the sacking of intelligence chief Khin Nyunt in 2004 (see be-low) and purging of all his associates, the USDA has also assumed an intelligence function. According to a report on the USDA compiled by the Thailand-based Network for Democracy and Development:

The SPDC has met with USDA central executive committee members and other loyal members to train them as intelligence offi cers, forming intelligence teams in each township. One intel-ligence team in Mon State adopted responsibilities which included watching the NLD as well as other members of the opposition. All information collected was expected to be reported directly to the USDA general headquarters.13

The same report stated that, in December 2005, a USDA meeting was held in which members were instructed to �watch all army and police

forces including staffs from various departments within the township� and report to the headquarters.14 In other words, USDA members are being used not only to watch the opposition, but to monitor the actions of the regime�s other institutions.

Consequently, according to Dutch Burma expert Gustaaf Houtman, a culture of violence and intimidation has come to surround this new, mighty mass organization, which is �designed in particular to frighten and deter NLD members, their supporters and residents in their neigh-borhood. With an active USDA the regime hopes that NLD political activity will be curtailed, once NLD visitors or NLD elements are known to automatically attract USDA �volunteers� intent on wreaking havoc to disrupt proceedings.�15

While Suu Kyi was still able to give interviews to foreign reporters, she told American journalists Leslie Kean and Dennis Bernstein:

The USDA is increasingly becoming a branch of the local au-thorities. On Burmese New Year�s Day [1997] the USDA people were sent over to my house to physically break up the NLD�a fi sh-releasing ceremony. In another incident, members of the USDA, most of them students, were instructed to throw toma-toes at me at the anniversary of the death of Burma�s fi rst demo-cratic prime minister [U Nu]�Sadly many students are mem-bers of the USDA because they�re forced to be, partly through threats. In some schools, they are threatened that if they don�t become a member of the USDA, they willnot be allowed to take their examination, or they will not be given good grades. I re-ceived a letter from a teacher who said that in her school those who want to go to their classes reserved for the best students have become members of the USDA, so students must join for their own survival.16

And, Suu Kyi warned, the USDA was not to be dismissed as just an-other farcical invention by the junta:

The world community must realize that the USDA is not an in-nocent social-welfare organization, as it claims to be, but an or-ganization being used by the authorities as a gang of thugs. Their operations resemble those of the Nazi Brown Shirts. The [ junta] sent people from a so-called welfare organization to beat up people taking part in a non-violent, religious ceremony. I must say that that amounts to something very, very close to what the Brown Shirts used to do in Germany.17

Suu Kyi herself became the target of USDA violence in Depayin in


234 235

May 2003, which also led to a renewed spell of house arrest. But given the coercion involved in recruiting members for the USDA, it is ques-tionable whether its foundations are any stronger than the erstwhile BSPP. The difference is that the USDA, unlike the BSPP, is not the only legally permitted political organization in the country. One of the stated objectives of the USDA, which was outlined in a secret docu-ment in 2004, is �narrowing and eliminating the activities of opposi-tion forces�[and to] diminish and ruin the opposition parties� capacity economically.�18

Unlike the BSPP, the USDA has also carved out a role for itself in the Burmese economy, enabling the SPDC to control and manipulate the new, ostensibly free-market oriented economy that was introduced after the upheavals of 1988. The USDA�s main business front is the Myangonmyint Company, and it also controls the local gem market and the military-run investment fi rm Myanmar Economic Holdings. In 1995, the USDA obtained control over the Panlong Yadana and Thein-gyi markets in Rangoon, and it runs bus and train lines and car rental services, it collects taxes and is involved in housing and real estate, fi sh-ing, paddy cultivation, rice milling, transportation of cement and con-struction materials, supply of water, and it imports cars, motorcycles and spare parts into the country free of tariffs.19

Furthermore, the USDA has reached out to parties and organiza-tions in other parts of Asia, claiming to represent �the people of Myan-mar.� In 2000, the Communist Party of China � China being a close ally of the SPDC � invited Gen. Win Myint to Beijing not in his role as one of the top generals in the junta, but in his capacity as USDA vice president. Four years later, the Chinese communists invited 84 political parties, including the USDA, from thirty-fi ve countries to the �Third All Asian Parties Forum� held in Beijing. Members of the USDA have par-ticipated in an International Youth Development Exchange Program in Tokyo, and in January 2006 representatives of the organization attended the Third Asia Pacifi c Regional Cuba Solidarity Conference in India. And when Malaysian foreign minister Syed Hamid Albar visited Burma in March 2006 as an envoy for the Association of Southeast Asian Na-tions, Asean, he met with offi cials from the USDA, but not with anyone from the NLD or other opposition parties.20

In Burma today, it is almost impossible for any citizen to survive and prosper without being a member of the USDA. But the SPDC�s and USDA�s emphasis is given to the youth in �what it may regard as a long-term approach to ensuring its continuing role into the next generation,� to quote US Burma expert David Steinberg, who also stresses that the USDA will remain important �only insofar as the military have an active

role in governance. After all, the youth movements of the BSPP were ephemeral as well.�21

Asia Times Online commented in June 2006:

The reality is that the popularity of Suu Kyi � and the National League for Democracy she founded � still widely outpaces the ruling junta�s, whose illegitimate rule has run the economy into the ground and placed the country�s democratic hopes behind bars. Across the country, Suu Kyi is affectionately referred to simply as �the Lady.�22

But the military, supported by the USDA, is likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future, and there is precious little Suu Kyi, despite her popularity, can do about it from her home on Rangoon�s University Avenue, cut off as she is from her supporters and isolated from the rest of the world. But she has nevertheless remained a symbol of defi ance and moral strength, and as such attracted sympathy and support not only inside Burma but from all over the world.

Burma after the Fall of General Khin Nyunt27 March, Burma�s Armed Forces Day, is meant to commemorate the day in 1945 when the Burmese nationalists, led by Aung San, shifted sides, joined the Allied powers and took up arms against their former patron and benefactor, the Imperial Japanese Army. It used to be a day when army units marched down the streets of Rangoon chanting martial ant-hems and being garlanded by crowds of cheering well-wishers. After the 1988 massacres, however, military parades were held in secluded areas, away from a now potentially outraged public, but still in Rangoon.

Then came Armed Forces Day 2006, and it was celebrated in an entirely different manner. Forgotten was the anti-fascist struggle in the past � and, even more importantly, the 61st Armed Forces Day was held at a vast, new parade ground in the new capital Naypyidaw near the old town of Pyinmana, which it is gradually absorbing. Only foreign de-fense attachés, not civilian diplomats, were invited, and they witnessed an amazing spectacle in the new �Capital of a King� � King Than Shwe, the leader of the ruling State Law and Development Council, SPDC, and Burma�s new undisputed strongman following a series of unex-pected purges in late 2004. The military intelligence chief at the time, Khin Nyunt, who was also prime minister, was ousted and arrested, along with up to 3,500 intelligence personnel countrywide, including some 300 senior offi cers.23


236 237

Khin Nyunt�s fall from grace followed the death of his mentor, Gen. Ne Win, in December 2002. The old general had been placed under house arrest earlier that year, allegedly because of the corrupt behavior of his daughter, Sanda Win, her husband Aye Zaw Win � and the cou-ple�s three unruly grandsons, who had terrorized private businessmen in Rangoon with demands for bribes and �protection money.� But few doubted that the move against Ne Win and his family came as prepara-tion for the post-Ne Win era; to make sure that Khin Nyunt�s infl uence would be limited. The dictator, who had ruled with an iron fi st for sev-eral decades, was cremated near his home in Rangoon. The funeral was attended by a handful of family members and about 20 plainclothes military offi cers, none especially high-ranking.

Khin Nyunt�s ouster was not, as some reports in the foreign media at the time suggested, a power struggle between the �pragmatic� intel-ligence chief and �hardliners� around Gen. Than Shwe and his deputy, Gen. Maung Aye. According to the press reports, Khin Nyunt favored a dialogue with long detained Suu Kyi and those opposed to it. Khin Nyunt had, after all, met her when she was under house arrest. Khin Nyunt may also have been smoother in his dealings with foreigners, but his dreaded military intelligence service, the DDSI, was the junta�s pri-mary instrument of repression against Suu Kyi�s pro-democracy move-ment. During the August-September 1988 uprising, he had carried out Ne Win�s orders, cracked down on the protesters, and had student activ-ists imprisoned, tortured and even killed.

A more plausible explanation for the purge was that Khin Nyunt and his DDSI had accumulated signifi cant wealth through involvement in a wide range of commercial enterprises. They were building up a state within a state � like the old �MI� Tin U had done in the 1970s � and not sharing their riches with the rest of the military elite. And Than Shwe did not want to have any potential rivals around him; Khin Nyunt clearly had political ambitions. He was a man not to be trusted.

Immediately following the ousting of Khin Nyunt, his latest intel-ligence outfi t, the Offi ce of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI), was dissolved and an entirely new organization established: the Offi ce of the Chief of Military Affairs Security (OCMAS), which was placed under more direct military control. Details of the new military intelli-gence apparatus remain sketchy, but it is not believed to be as effi cient as its predecessors. Some observers even argue that the regime�s in-ability to prevent the emergence of a massive anti-regime movement in September 2007 would not have been possible, if Khin Nyunt and his men had remained in charge of security.

Bu that as it may, but Burmese military politics has always been

murky, full of infi ghting and rivalries. As soon as one particular offi cer has become too rich and powerful, he is ousted. The only exceptions are Ne Win, who ruled from 1962 to 1988, and the present junta leader, Than Shwe, who has made himself almost the monarch of the coun-try.

And Than Shwe�s path forward � and, indeed, his vision for his coun-try � became clear on 27 March 2006 in Naypyidaw. Addressing a crowd of 12,000 soldiers, he said: �Our Tatmadaw [armed forces] should be a worthy heir to the traditions of the capable tatmadaws established by noble kings Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya.�24 None of them had fought the Imperial Japanese Army, but Anawratha had in 1044 AD founded the First Burmese Empire and established a new capital at the temple city of Pagan on the banks of the Irrawaddy River, southwest of today�s Mandalay. He conquered Thaton, the capital of the Mon � major rivals of the Burmans for control of the central plains � and expanded his empire down to the Andaman Sea.

Bayinnaung was Burma�s most celebrated warrior king. He reigned from 1551 to 1581 and conquered territories north of Pagan, parts of the Shan plateau in the east, and pushed as far east as Chiang Mai in today�s northern Thailand and Vientiane in Laos. He was the most prominent ruler of the Second Burmese Empire and ruled from Pegu in the central plains.

Alaungpaya reigned in the 18th century and was the fi rst king of the Konbaung Dynasty, or the third and last of the Burmese Empires. Alaungpaya also fought the Mon, and his successor, Hsinbyushin, sacked the Thai capital of Ayutthaya in 1767, a deed for which the Thais have never forgiven the Burmese. But the Konbaung kings were defeated by the British in the three Anglo-Burmese wars of 1824-1826, and 1885, and the country became a British colony. In 1885, Thibaw, the last king of Burma, was led away by the British in front of a mourning and wailing crowd who had come to take farewell of the last monarch of an independent Burmese state. He was sent, with his once-power-ful wife, Supayalat, and their children into exile in Ratanagiri in India, where he died in 1916.

On the Naypyidaw parade ground stand newly erected larger-than-life statues of the three warrior kings, whom Than Shwe sees as his role models � and he has also formed not only a new capital but a new Bur-mese state, the State of Myanmar, a unitary state which is fundamen-tally different in nature from Aung San�s concept of �unity in diversity�, federalism and some kind of parliamentary democracy. In �Myanmar� everybody is a �Myanmar�, and subjects of the new King in Nay Pyi Daw. There are no portraits of Aung San in Naypyidaw.


238 239

Some have argued that moving the country�s capital was nothing unusual in an international context. Many countries have established purpose-built capitals away from major population centers, like Aus-tralia did when its government moved to the new city of Canberra in 1927 � halfway between Sydney and Melbourne � or when, in the 1960s, Brazil built Brasilia, a new futuristic capital in the middle of the jungle far away from Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In more recent times, 1999, Nigeria moved its capital to Abuja, a minor central town, from Lagos. In 1983, the small village of Yamoussoukro in central Ivory Coast was made the new capital, replacing Abidjan, one of West Africa�s most bus-tling cities and commercial centers. Yamoussoukro had been chosen for only one reason: it was the home village of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the then dictator of the Ivory Coast. Millions of dollars were spent on transforming Yamoussoukro into a new city, but it soon became the butt of jokes.

But Naypyidaw is no joke, nor is it comparable to Canberra or Brasilia. The construction of Burma�s new capital was carried out in secret, and government offi cials were given only very short notice that they had to move. In November 2005, the Thailand-based Irrawad-day magazine reported: �Diplomats, UN agencies and observers in Rangoon were dumb-founded to see hundreds of Chinese-made army trucks carrying offi cials, civilians and offi ce supplies head north out of the capital. Neighboring countries, Rangoon�s diplomatic community and UN offi ces wanted to know how they were going to keep in touch with Burma�s new centre of government. �Don�t worry,� they were told. �You can reach us by fax�.�25

According to one eyewitness:

The area around Naypyidaw was depopulated in order to seal the huge compound off from the outside world. Entire villages disap-peared from the map, their inhabitants driven off land their fami-lies had farmed for centuries. Hundreds � perhaps thousands � joined Burma�s abused army of �internally displaced persons.� Able-bodied villagers, however, were �enlisted� to help build the new capital.26

Apart from the parade ground with statues of the Three Kings, Naypyidaw, now has a brand-new airstrip, a hospital, hotels � some reputedly 5-star-ones � military mansions and a new command centre, government offi ces, and bunkers. Trucks that carried bricks, timber and cement to Naypyidaw bore the logos of Burma�s biggest construction companies, Htoo Trading and Asia World.27 But in May 2006, intel-ligence agencies in Thailand intercepted a message from Naypyidaw

confi rming the arrival of a group of North Korean tunneling experts at the site. Nawpyidaw is at the foothills of Burma�s eastern mountains, and it was becoming clear that the most sensitive military installations in the new capital would be relocated underground.28

The junta�s apparent fear of a preemptive US invasion by sea or air strikes was seen by some at the time as a major motivation for the junta�s decision to move the capital to what they perceived to be a safer, central mountainous location away from the coast. After all, the US gov-ernment had publicly linked Burma together with other rogue regimes and referred to it as an �outpost of tyranny.�29

The Irrawaddy gave a more plausible explanation. The Burmese generals are less worried about a US invasion than they are an attack by their own people: �Rangoon has never been a safe place for the paranoid generals. In 1989, when opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi mobilized the people in the streets again, the regime declared Rangoon a war zone and assigned army offi cers and soldiers to deal with demonstrators.�30

Demonstrations, or any form of protest, are much less likely to take place in heavily-fortifi ed and secluded Naypyidaw, which also remains off-limits to most outsiders. It represented a safe place from where the country could be ruled without interference from �internal and external destructive elements,� which is what the junta calls its domestic and foreign critics and opponents.

Military research centers, a new airport as well as luxury private mansions for army offi cers, and especially family members who do not want to live in dreary Naypyidaw, have also been built in Pyin Oo Lwin, more commonly known as Maymyo, a former British hill station east of Mandalay, where the air is fresher than and the scenery greener than in the dusty, grey central plains around Pyinmana.

At Naypyidaw, Than Shwe has founded his own royal city and found-ed the Fourth Burmese Empire in the spirit of Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya. This is a far cry from the promises the junta gave when it assumed power on September 18, 1988: �The Defense Forces have no desire to hold on to power for a prolonged period.�31 Elections would be held and power handed over to the party that would win those elections. As �proof� of the temporary nature, the junta appointed only a small, nine-member caretaker cabinet.

Nearly twenty years later, the military is not only in power, but Than Shwe and his generals have reinvented the notion of what kind of state Burma is, or should be. And in this new State, there is no place for Aung San Suu Kyi or the National League for Democracy, the NLD. They belong to Rangoon and the past; Than Shwe, the military � and Naypyidaw � symbolize for them the future of the New Royal State


240 241

of Myanmar. The Armed Forces Day celebrations in 2006 were the ultimate proof of the military�s desire to rule the country the way they believe is right, and to decide the destiny of its people.

The creation of a new national concept for Burma began when, on 27 May 1989, the offi cial name of the country was changed to �Myan-mar.� �Burma�, for reasons which are historically absolutely incorrect, was termed a �colonial name,� and therefore had to be abandoned. But historical accuracy was not an issue for the generals. A Cultural Revolu-tion had begun, and a military-appointed commission was appointed to rewrite Burmese history to suit the new power-holders.

It was not only the country that was given a new, offi cial name (although it has always been myanma naingngan or bama pyi in Bur-mese) and Rangoon became �Yangon�; even more offensive were name changes in the ethnic minority areas, especially in Shan State. Pang Tara, Kengtung, Lai-Hka, Hsenwi and Hsipaw � place names that have a meaning in Shan � have been renamed Pindaya, Kyaington, Laycha, Theinli and Thibaw, which sound Burmese but have no meaning in any language.32

Houtman calls this development the �Myanmafi cation of Burma,� which he describes as a move away from the original idea of a federa-tion � agreed by Aung San and the leaders of the ethnic minorities at the Panglong conference in February 1947 � to the new �Myanmar� identity propagated by the junta.33

Whither Burma?Given the odds she is up against, there is precious little pro-democracy leader Suu Kyi can do during her occasional meetings with UN offi cials � her only appearance outside her compound in Rangoon � other than merely to appeal to the international community to put pressure on the SPDC to be less repressive. Thus far, this has clearly not helped much either.

A host of UN envoys have visited Burma over the past two decades. The fi rst �independent expert� the UN sent to the country to �study� violations of human rights was Sadako Ogata, a Japanese professor who later went on to become the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The report she submitted to the UN�s Commission of Hu-man Rights on 27 December 1990 was unusually bland. General elec-tions had been held in May, resulting in a landslide victory for Aung San Suu Kyi�s party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and Ogata concluded in her report that �it is not in dispute that it will be the task of the elected representatives of the Pyithu Hluttaw (National Assembly)

to draft a new constitution, on the basis of which a new government will be formed. At present, however�it is not clear when the Hluttaw will be convened for that purpose.� The Hluttaw was, of course, never convened.

Then, in 1992, the UN appointed another Japanese academic, Yozo Yokota �special rapporteur on the situation of human rights� in Burma � a step higher than an �independent expert.� He compiled some critical reports, but resigned in 1996, according to a statement by a UN spokes-man at the time, �because of planned career changes in Tokyo� as well as �frustration at the lack of logistical support from human rights staff in Geneva�, where the Human Rights Commission is based. His suc-cessor Rajsoomer Lallah, a former chief justice of Mauritius, was not even allowed by the Burmese government to visit the country during the four years as he served as special human rights rapporteur. Accord-ing to Jose Diaz, then spokesman for the UN Commission for Human Rights, Lallah had �expressed frustration�with the little change that he has seen in the country he follows.�

Lallah was succeeded by Paulo Pinheiro, a Brazilian law expert, who, in the beginning was quite upbeat about his work. He believed he was free to talk to political prisoners without interference from the au-thorities, but his rather positive reports were severely criticized by NLD spokesman U Lwin. However, Pinheiro changed his tune completely � when, in March 2003, he discovered a microphone beneath the table at which he was interviewing a prisoner in Yangon�s infamous Insein Jail. He immediately left the country in disgust, and was not allowed back until now. In the meantime, he has become a vocal critic of the Burmese regime.

Then there were the special envoys, sent not by the UN:s Human Rights Commission but by the Secretary General. Peruvian diplomat Alvar De Soto made six fruitless visits to Burma between February 1995 and October 1999. He was succeeded in 2000 by Razali Ismail, a Malay-sian diplomat, who also began his mission by believing that he could persuade the Burmese generals to be more cooperative with the opposi-tion inside the country and the international community. In November 2001, Razali said he was �hopeful that some signifi cant progress could be made in the near future�. The following year, he was instrumental in securing the release from house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, which prompted him to say: �I am delighted for her and the country�we have to give them time. Don�t expect things to happen immediately. I think there is a commitment on the part of the military to make the transi-tion� (to civilian rule).34

But nothing did change, and, in May 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi was


242 243

locked up again after government thugs had attacked her and her en-tourage at Depayin, when she was nearly killed and put back under house arrest.

Razali quit his post in January 2006 after being refused entry to Burma for nearly two years. By then, it had also become clear that his mission to Burma had not been entirely altruistic. Apart from being a Malaysian government civil servant, he is also in private business as the chairman and thirty percent stockowner of IRIS Technologies, a company that, during one of his visits, managed to secure a contract with the Burmese government for high-tech passports with biometric features. A confl ict of interest? Not according to the UN, which came to his rescue by saying that his kind of part-time contract with the world organization did not �carry any restrictions on business activities.�

Because of the lack of transparency and accountability, and the ab-sence of any investigative and critical media, Burma provides, in fact, plenty of opportunities for corruption and private business deals even for some UN offi cials and diplomats who are based there, such as the smuggling of antiques in diplomatic and UN bags, and the sale of duty free goods on the black market.

Razali�s successor as special envoy, the Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari, seems to continue the tradition of upbeat UN offi cials who, in the end, achieve nothing of any importance for the people of Myanmar. Kyaw Zwa Moe, a Burmese writer with the Chiang Mai-based publica-tion Irrawaddy, wrote in a recent article that Burma �now is a diplomatic graveyard.� When the smoke has cleared, it is always business as usual in Burma � and yet another UN envoy or rapporteur may come, full of optimism at fi rst, then frustrated at the lack of progress. At any rate, they can become richer because of striking lucrative business deals.

Gambari should be held under even closer scrutiny than his pre-decessors in the UN system. He has a long record of cooperating with various military dictatorships in Nigeria, and, speaking to the UN on 4 December 1995, he defended the execution of Ken Saro-Wiva, a re-nowned Nigerian author, television producer, and environmentalist who had been hanged on 10 November along with eight other leaders of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The NGO had been leading a non-violent campaign against environmental damage associated with the operations of several multinational oil com-panies. According to Gambari, Ken Saro-Wiva had been executed in �ac-cordance with the law� and further stated that �the law and the violation of human rights must be differentiated.� 35

The other approach, the policy of �constructive engagement� pur-sued by Burma�s partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Na-

tions, or Asean, has proven equally fruitless. Burma was admitted into Asean in July 1997, but has snubbed its partners by going back on promises of political reforms, and, in the process, become a burden for the bloc and an obstacle in its relations with the United States and the European Union.

Change would have to come from within the only institution that really matters in the country: its armed forces. Min Zaw Oo, a Burmese researcher, has analysed various possible scenarios, which could lead to state failure in Burma, and, therefore, political change by voluntary means, or a UN intervention which would lead to such change.36

According to the fi rst scenario, socio-economic erosions could lead to another uprising, similar to that of 1988 � or September 2007. �If there is another uprising in Burma, the most pivotal change will depend on how the military responds to the crisis.� A popular uprising could divide the armed forces, but that could also lead to Burma�s breaking up into different sectors controlled by different factions of the army or, in plain speak, civil war.

The second of Min Zaw Oo�s scenarios is no uprising but infi ghting within the armed forces. The purge of Khin Nyunt and his intelligence faction in 2004 showed that there are serious divisions even within the military establishment. Khin Nyunt�s fall from grace did not lead to se-rious infi ghting, but rivalry between Than Shwe and his deputy, Gen. Maung Aye, could well be such a catalyst for change. But it would most certainly be bloody, and could also lead to civil war. In May 2005, a series of near-simultaneous explosions rocked shopping centers and super-markets in Rangoon, wounding more than a dozen people. The authori-ties were quick to blame the blasts on �Thai-based terrorists,� but these would hardly have the means to infi ltrate the then capital. More likely, it could have been the work of disgruntled, former MI offi cers who had been purged along with Khin Nyunt, or the junta itself, which needed an excuse to crack down on real or imaginary opponents to its rule.37

Despite rigid military rule and control, Burma is far from a stable coun-try. Chaos and internecine strife could easily break out any time.

The third scenario is �the emergence of a reformist faction in the military that decides to cooperate with the civilian opposition to foster a political transition while the other signifi cant forces resist any change in the status quo.� But, as Min Zaw Oo also points out, the civilian op-position does not have adequate capacity to fi ll the power vacuum that such a split in the military would produce, and to form, alone, a new government. And any state failure in Burma would have regional reper-cussions as its neighbors would be affected by an even bigger fl ow of refugees, drugs and weapons than is the case today.


244 245

State failure could also encourage the insurgents, who now have cease-fi re agreements with the government, to go their own ways, per-haps even declare independence from Naypyidaw. A Yugoslavia-style scenario is not unthinkable, and would also have disastrous conse-quences for the region. Politicians and statesmen in the region would rather see Suu Kyi focus on these problems rather than a �revolution of the spirit,� and mixing politics with Buddhist practices and concepts such as vipassana and metta, as she has increasingly been doing over the past decade.

Suu Kyi may be a heroine in the West, but realpolitik dominates the thinking of Burma�s immediate neighbors. After the 1988 uprising, India almost openly supported the pro-democracy movement, partly because of then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi�s old friendship with Suu Kyi. But as the infl uence of India�s traditional rivals, China and Pakistan, grew in Burma � and it was becoming obvious that the pro-democracy movement was not going to assume power anytime soon � New Delhi began to improve ties with the junta.

In February 2001, Jaswant Singh, then India�s foreign minister, visit-ed Burma to discuss avenues for closer cooperation. This was preceded by two visits to India by SPDC vice chairman Gen. Maung Aye in 2000 and followed by the fi rst-ever visit to Burma by an Indian president. In March 2006, Abdul Kalam paid a four-day visit to Rangoon and high-lighted the importance India placed on promoting closer connections with Burma.

While India had been cultivating ties with the pro-democracy move-ment, China had become an important ally of the Burmese govern-ment. This began already when on 6 August 1988 the two countries signed a bilateral border-trade agreement. By then the days of Mao Ze-dong�s support to the CPB was well and truly over, and Deng Xiaoping�s pragmatism was guiding Chinese foreign policy. This agreement was the fi rst of its kind that hitherto isolated Burma had entered into with a neighbor. It was especially signifi cant because it was signed at a time when Burma was in turmoil: two days later, the countrywide uprising broke out.

But the Chinese, renowned for their ability to plan far ahead, had expressed their intentions, almost unnoticed, in an article in the offi cial weekly Beijing Review as early as 2 September 1985. Titled �Opening to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion,� the article, which was written by the former vice-minister of communications, Pan Qi, outlined the possibilities of fi nding an outlet for trade from China�s landlocked provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou, through Burma, to the Indian Ocean. It mentioned the Burmese railheads of Myitkyina and

Lashio in the north and northeast, and the Irrawaddy River as possible conduits for the export of goods from those provinces � but omitted that all relevant border areas, at that time, were not under Burmese central government control.

All that changed when the rank and fi le of the insurgent Communist Party of Burma rose in mutiny in March-April 1989 and drove the old Maoist leadership into exile in China. The once powerful CPB split up into four different, regional armies based on ethnic lines. But instead of continuing to fi ght, they reached cease-fi re agreements with the govern-ment. Soon, other Chinese-border based insurgents followed suit. The Sino-Burmese border was open for trade.

By late 1991, Chinese experts were assisting in a series of infrastruc-ture projects to spruce up Burma�s poorly maintained roads and rail-ways. Border trade was booming � and China emerged as Burma�s most important source of military hardware. Additional military equipment was provided by Pakistan, which also has helped Burma modernize its defense industries. The total value of Chinese arms deliveries to Burma is not known, but intelligence sources estimate it to be about US$1.4 billion. Deliveries include fi ghter, ground attack and transport aircraft, tanks and armored personnel carriers, naval vessels, a variety of towed and self-propelled artillery, surface-to-air missiles, trucks and infantry equipment.

India, feeling that Chinese allies � Pakistan and Burma � were clos-ing in on it in the west as well as the east, and wary of China�s grow-ing infl uence in Burma, dropped its support for the pro-democracy movement and began to woe the country away from its new backers in Beijing. Democracy and human rights were not part of the equation. Consequently, neither China nor India � Burma�s two most powerful neighbors � would like to see another round of upheavals in Burma. Dealing with the �devil you know,� the present government, is far easier than banking on a democratic administration which may or may not assume power sometime in the future.

In other words, Burma�s future looks bleak. Its neighbors do not want to rock the status quo at the same time as the military is showing no signs of being interested in any kind of national reconciliation, or even talks with the pro-democracy movement. If there indeed is a re-form-minded faction within the armed forces, as Min Zaw Oo suggests, it must be keeping an extremely low profi le. On the other hand, Suu Kyi and the NLD have proven unable to bring the democratic movement any nearer its stated goals. Nor has it tried to reach out to any elements of the armed forces, or explain its policies to Burma�s neighbors.

But time is running out for Burma. Economically, it is a total wreck,


246 247

and it remains socially backwards. Since 1988, universities and colleges have been closed more than they have been open, and thousands of the country�s brightest talents have left the country to look for a brighter future abroad. More than 100,000 people from the Karen, Mon and Karenni minorities live in squalid refugee camps in Thailand. Drug abuse is rampant, especially in the border areas, and the HIV epidemic is out of control, probably more severe than in any Southeast Asian country.

According to the World Health Organization, WHO, an estimated one in 29 adults in Burma is living with HIV infections and some 48,000 died from AIDS in the year 2000 alone. Malaria causes even more deaths, with over 700,000 cases reported in 2004. Dengue fever, tuberculosis and other diseases are also widespread, and little is done about it. While the Burmese government is spending most of its budget on the military, only $22,000 was spent on a national AIDS control pro-gram in 2004. Burma allocates in total only 3 % of its budget to health and 8% to education, while the military gets at least 50%.38

Until recently, the largest chunk of disease control came from inter-national donors � but, in August 2005, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, the largest funder in Burma for HIV/AIDS control, withdrew because of new restrictions laid down by the military government, which made it impossible for foreign health workers to operate in the country.39

Arguing that Burma�s health crisis and unsettled political situation pose a threat to regional security, the United States began to push for bringing the Burma issue before the UN�s Security Council � which could be a way forward � but met with stiff resistance against such a move from permanent members China and Russia. Japan, which is not a permanent member but sits on the Security Council, has also argued that the UN should not intervene in what is considered �an internal Burmese affair� with no relevance to regional security. More precisely, Japan � like India � does not want to antagonize the Burmese govern-ment, which they believe would drive it even further into the hand of the Chinese.

In September 2006, the Security Council fi nally agreed to a �discuss� the Burma issue, but it is unlikely that any resolution will be passed, or fi rm action taken against the generals in Rangoon. The political stalemate is thus likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Burma is a country where everything seems to have gone wrong, and little can be done about it. Suu Kyi may be �Asia�s Mandela,� but, as one observer commented wryly, she may also be as old as he was before she experiences freedom again. The situation in Burma seems hopeless with the SPDC fi rmly en-trenched in power and the NLD paralyzed as a political movement.

The only real hope lies with the emerging �88 Generation,� i.e. peo-ple who were young and idealistic activist during the 1988 uprising and now have become a bit older, wiser and more experienced. The most prominent among them is Min Ko Naing, a prominent student leader who was arrested in March 1989 � and released only in November 2005, after nearly 16 years in solitary confi nement. In 1988 he was a 26-year old zoology student addressing crowds of tens of thousands in Ran-goon. When he was released he was 42, and he looked old and haggard � but his fi ghting spirit had not been quelled. �The people of Burma must have the courage to say no to injustice and yes to the truth,� he said at a meeting of the newly formed �88-Generation Students� Group� in Rangoon in August 2006. �They must also work to correct their own wrongdoing that hurts society.�

Many countries in Asia have certain �generations� that fought for democracy, and sacrifi ced much of their lives for it. In South Korea, the term �386 generation� was coined in the 1990s to describe those who then were in their thirties, attended university and fought for de-mocracy in the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s. Today many of them are university lecturers, lawyers, newspaper columnists, and some and even been government ministers. They are a new liberal elite that is admired by the public at large because of their past sacrifi ces.

In Thailand, people speak of the �1970s generation,� men and women who took to the streets in October 1973 and managed to force that country�s then military government, led by Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, into exile. Three years later, Thanom and some of his as-sociates returned to Thailand � which caused a new wave of student-led protests. These, however, were crushed by the military, and thousands of students, teachers and labor activists took to the jungle where they joined the insurgent Communist Party of Thailand. But they were hard-ly communists, and, before long, fell out with the diehard CPT leader-ship. Following a general amnesty in 1980, almost all of them returned to Bangkok and other cities, where they too became prominent political and literary fi gures. To have been with the CPT in the jungle in the 1970s bears no stigma; on the contrary, they are respected because they endured hardships and continued to fi ght for what they believed in.

Burma now has its �88 generation,� and it is coming of age. They are not only meeting in teashops, many have become journalists and writers. Burma�s has fi ve daily newspapers which are published by the government, but � contrary to what is generally assumed in the out-side world � the majority of the country�s journals and magazines are privately owned, although publishing licenses are more easily obtained by those with strong connections to the government.


248 249

Still, Burma today has nearly 400 newspapers, journals and maga-zines, and the number is growing steadily � in November 2005 the gov-ernment issued 15 new publishing licenses. These publications may operate under some of the most restrictive laws and regulations in the world, but they are nevertheless becoming bolder and more outspoken in their reporting. In fact, the media in Burma has become one of the few dynamic sectors in a society that remains mostly stagnant.

Local journalists and editors often state that their main motivation for getting into the profession is �public service� and a desire �to do something for the country�. Many are interested in politics and develop-ment, and fi nd that journalism � despite all the constraints placed upon journalists � is one of the few professions that allows them to play a role in current events in a constructive fashion. Many took part in the 1988 uprising and remain faithful to their democratic ideals.

If any political or social force is going to play an important role in Burma�s future and carry the country�s unfi nished renaissance forward, it is not the increasingly geriatric NLD, but men and women of this new 88 generation. The government soon realized their political potential � and reacted in its own inimitable way. On 27 September 2006 it was learned that Min Ko Naing had been arrested along two other former political prisoners, Ko Ko Gyi and Ko Htay Kywe. Each had spent 15 years in the Burmese military�s notorious prisons, but they had not given up hope for a better future for Burma.

Their arrest turned out to be counterproductive, because the 88 gen-eration is a generation, not a political party. On 2 October, their com-rades who had not been jailed started an unprecedented, nation-wide signature campaign. People put their names under demands for free-dom for Burma�s political prisoners and they could also in a few words express their grievances and desires. When the campaign ended on 23 October, 535,580 signatures had been collected all over the country. The results were sent to the UN headquarters in New York.

At the same time, the 88 generation urged citizens across the coun-try to participate in a �Multiple Religious Prayer� to be held in Buddhist and Hindu temples, Christian Churches and Muslim Mosques. People fl ocked to the holy sites, dressed in white, the symbol of the sacrifi ces of Burma�s many martyrs. The government was no doubt taken aback by this massive, but entirely peaceful, expression of dissent. A few more people were arrested, but then there were no more repressive measures. The generals were busy building their new Royal Capital, Naypyidaw.

The 88 generation now is a force to be reckoned with, although it has no proper leadership or organization. They, in fact, see Aung San Suu Kyi as their leader: �She is the one person that can bring about reconcili-

ation and lead us into a new, democratic future,� one of the activists told the foreign reporter who interviewed them in September 2005.

In January 2007, Min Ko Kaing and those who had been arrested in September 2006, were released, just as the 88 Generation launched yet another audacious campaign dubbed �Open Heart.� It entailed a letter-writing campaign encouraging Burmese citizens across the country to write about their everyday complaints and grievances with military rule. When the month-long campaign ended in February, nearly 25,000 let-ters had been sent to Than Shwe.

Given the SPDC�s strict restrictions on freedom of association and assembly, the 88 Generation may not morph into a full-blown political movement any time soon. But therein lies, perhaps, the nascent move-ment�s strength: the military has shown that it is easy to squash a politi-cal party and detain its leaders, but it will be considerably more diffi cult to crush an entire generation.

Recognizing the threat posed to the regime by the 88 Generation, most of its leaders � including Min Ko Naing � were arrested as soon as people began marching in the streets in August 2007 to protest against rising fuel prices. The monks carried on the movement and turned in into a massive manifestation against the regime. But that movement was crushed as well � further underscoring the argument that nothing will change as long as the military remains united.

BibliographyBall, Desmond. Burma�s Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from 1941 to Cyber Warfare. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998. 294p.

Callahan, Mary P. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca and Lon-don: Cornell University Press, 2003. 268p.

Houtman, Gustaaf. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 1999. 392p.

Lintner, Bertil. Outrage: Burma�s Struggle for Democracy. London and Bangkok: White Lotus, 1990. 208p.

McAndrew, Lt.Col. James. From Combat to Karaoke: Burmese Military Intelligence 1948�2006. Thesis from the National Defense Intelligence College, Washington DC, 2007. 178p.

Mya Maung. Totalitarianism in Burma: Prospects for Economic Development. New York: Paragon House, 1992. 277p.

Seekins, Donald. Burma and Japan Since 1940: From �Co-Prosperity� to �Quiet Dialogue�. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007. 181p.

Selth, Andrew. Burma�s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk: Eastbridge, 2002. 372p.


250 251

Steinberg, David. Burma: The State of Myanmar. Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2001. 342p.

Taylor, Robert. The State in Burma. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1987.

Thant Myint-U. The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006. 361p.

Notes1 �We�ll Play Fair,� Interview/Kyi Maung, Asiaweek, 13 July 1990.2 Donald Seekins, Burma and Japan Since 1940: From Co-Prosperity� to �Quiet Dialogue�. Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007, p. 14 and 23.3 Lt. Col. James McAndrew, From Combat to Karaoke: Burmese Military Intelligence 1948�2006, Washington: National Defense Intelligence College, 2007, p. 27.4 Rodney Tasker, �Ne Win�s No Win Situation,� Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 July 1983.5 SLORC Chairman�s Addresses, Rangoon: Government Printing, 1990, p. 323.6 Working People�s Daily, 11 May 1990.7 The White Shirts: How USDA Will Become the New Face of Burma�s Dictatorship, Mae Sot and Mae Sariang: Network for Democracy and Development, May 2006, p. 18.8 Gustaaf Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 1999, p. 117.9 White Shirts, pp. 18-19.10 Houtman, op. cit., p. 118.11 Burmese radio recorded by FBIS, 16 May 1996.12 White Shirts, p. 53.13 Ibid., p. 55.14 Ibid., p. 56.15 Houtman, op. cit., p. 118.16 �Aung San Suu Kyi: The Progressive Interview.� With Leslie Kean and Dennis Bern-stein, BurmaNet News, March 1997, quoted in Houtman, op. cit., p. 199.17 Ibid.18 White Shirts, p. 35.19 Ibid., p. 26, and David Steinberg, �The Union Solidarity and Development Organisa-tion,� Burma Debate, Jan/Feb 1997.20 White Shirts, pp. 69-72.21 Burma Debate, Jan/Feb 1997.22 Larry Jagan, �Another Unhappy Birthday in Myanmar,� Asia Times Online, June 20, 2006.23 Bertil Lintner, �Myanmar Payback Time,� Jane�s Defence Weekly, April 20, 2005.24 Irrawaddy, April 2006. I have changed the spelling of the names of the kings to the standard form of Romanisation.

25 Aung Zaw,�Retreat to the Jungle,� Irrawaddy, December 2005. The move took place in November.26 Edward Loxton, �Off-Limits � Asia�s Secret Capital,� Citylife (Chiang Mai), June, 2006.27 Clive Parker, �A Tale of Two Cities,� Irrawaddy online August 24, 2006.28 Bertil Lintner, �Myanmar and North Korea share a tunnel vision,� Asia Times online, 19 July 2006.29 Ibid.30 Aung Zaw, op. cit.31 Burmese Broadcasting Service monitored by BBC, FE/0265 i, 24 September 1988.32 Interview with Harn Yawnghwe, the son of Burma�s fi rst president, Sao Shwe Thaike (who was a Shan), Bertil Lintner, �Cultural Revolution,� Far Eastern Economic Review, 18 November 1999.33 Houtman, op. cit., p. 55ff.34 See �UN in Myanmar: A History of Failed Efforts,� International Herald Tribune, 4 November 2007.35 UN Press Release GA/SHC/3348 and http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=2936 Min Zaw Oo, �When the Sky Collapses: Strategic Simulation of State Failure in Burma and Its Consequences,� 20 April 2006.37 Associated Press and the BBC, 7 May 2005.38 Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma, Washington: DLA Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, 20 September 2005.39 Min Zaw Oo, op. cit.


252 253

The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation BuildingXiaolin Guo

Shortly after the People�s Liberation Army (PLA) had entered Kunming, the government seat of Yunnan province, in early 1950, a major political transformation got under way. The central component of that transfor-mation was to establish local-level governments in the ethnic minority populated areas across this historical Chinese frontier. In the summer of 1951, a provincial Institute for Ethnic Minorities was inaugurated in Kunming. Its location was in what until recently had been, under the auspices of the former governor Long Yun (r. 1928�1945), a school set up for the privileged children � to be precise, the heirs of Yunnan�s native chieftains.1 The mandate of the Yunnan Institute for Ethnic Mi-norities now operating under the auspices of the new government was to train ethnic cadres in preparation for an up-coming land reform. The fi rst enrollment of ethnic minority students numbered 685, between the ages of 14 and 51, representing over 40 ethnic groups,2 a majority of whom came from the �frontier areas�. 3 Whether themselves former slaves or slave owners, commoners or native chieftains, most of the stu-dents enrolled in the cadre training program identifi ed themselves only with the local communities from which they came, having only the fain-test idea about being Chinese (i.e. citizens of the Middle Kingdom),4 to the baffl ement of their instructors who were themselves communist revolutionaries, many from outside the province.5

This was the situation in China�s southwestern province of Yunnan, shortly after the founding of the People�s Republic of China (PRC). The anecdote cited in the beginning of the paper highlights the challenge posed by ethnicity to nation building, an experience shared by PRC and its southwestern neighbor, the Union of Myanmar, despite their diffe-rences in political system and many other aspects.

Yunnan � its name standing for �South of the Clouds" historically the Nanzhao Kingdom succeeded by Dali, became a Chinese province already in the thirteenth century, following the Mongol conquest of the Southern Song dynasty (1127�1279). For centuries that followed, however, the Chinese state apparatus and concurrent garrison deployment exerted only limited infl uence on the social structure and way of life across this rugged terrain. The historical frontier thus

254 255

persisted, as local powers remained vested in the hands of native chieftains who acted as the real masters of the local societies, despite repeated attempts by the court to integrate the southwestern frontier.6

The ethnic diversity of Yunnan in the early 1950s was mirrored in the names registered for offi cial nationality identifi cation, a total of 260 (out of 400 in all of China).7 As part of the social transformation, the fi ve million ethnic minority population in Yunnan at the time was identifi ed as representing different phases of social development � from �late primitive communal society and slavery society to feudal suzerain system and landlord economy" on the basis of existing primary modes of production.8 Such diversity of local societies and uneven economic conditions constituted a major challenge to the PRC nation building effort that had a distinctly socialist fl avor.

The ethnic landscape in Yunnan then was, by no means, signifi cantly different from the one across the border in modern Myanmar.9 The term paukphaw (�brotherhood") that arguably characterizes the traditional relationship between China and Myanmar � connotes shared kinship and religions between peoples of common origin living on both sides of the national border. The Shan in Myanmar are related to the Dai residing on the Chinese side of the border. The Kachin are of the same stock as the Jingpo in Yunnan. On both sides of the border reside the Lisu, Wa, Lahu and Bulang, who share identical names. In history, the residents of the Myanmar frontier states had similarly been the subjects of native chieftains. Ethnicity, however, posed a far greater challenge to the Union of Burma in its nation building efforts than it did to PRC leaders in the 1950s, because in the case of the former, the frontier areas had been far more loosely administered by the central state institutionally prior to independence from British rule in 1948.

This paper seeks to address the problem of ethnic confl ict that has, in part, contributed to prolonged military rule in Myanmar. It elabo-rates on the complexity of the ethnic landscape and how it interacts with national politics, with emphasis on the legacy of British rule and subsequent government policies toward ethnic minorities in the wake of independence. The analysis of the post-colonial government policies toward ethnic minorities and impact on nation building is focused on three periods: 1948�1961, 1962�1988, and 1989�2007, characterized by alienation, confrontation, and reconciliation, respectively. The analysis draws a line at the recent national referendum on the draft constitu-tion in Myanmar. Throughout this paper, ethnic confl ict and problems revolving around it all point to a missing step of nation building in post-independence Myanmar. It is a matter of great concern, and requires national reconciliation that involves not only the Burman-dominated

political opposition whose search for democracy strikes a chord with the West and has managed to win unyielding support from Western go-vernments in the past twenty years, but also the various ethnic groups that have fought, quite separately, for their existence � social, economic, and political � or many decades now. The paper ends with some refl ec-tions on ethnicity in relation to nation building in a broader context.

Alienation, 1948�1961Out of the total population of approximately 55-56 million in Myanmar today, about one third is composed of ethnic minorities (i.e. outside the category of the Bamar, or Burman, that constitute the majority of the country�s population and gave the country its name Burma). These ethnically diverse populations speak over 100 languages, and are widely distributed across seven states on the periphery, mainly on the western and eastern sides of �Burma proper� that is, in turn, divided into seven administrative divisions.10 This geographically demarcated administra-tive set-up has its roots in the colonial era when British Burma included �areas that had never been part of royal administration� and the British implemented �a cheap and easy policy to rule these areas separately from Burma proper.� 11 The political reform in the 1920s led to the im-plementation in �Burma proper� of parliamentary rule (comprising of a diarchy constitution, general elections and Legislative Council), where-as the periphery (or the so-called �Excluded Areas�) remained under the direct rule of the governor.12 In the latter case, hereditary headmen exerted real control on local affairs. Separate rule and a contrast bet-ween �Burma proper� and the frontier areas due to asymmetrical social and economic development was the legacy that the post-colonial Union of Burma had to deal with in its long struggle for integration, both ter-ritorial and political.

The frontier areas were of serious concern to the nation�s founder, Aung San, who realized on the eve of independence that winning the support of ethnic leaders was crucial for any successful independence settlement that was to include �the early unifi cation of the Frontier Ar-eas with the Government of Burma.�13 The historical Panglong meeting, convened on February 9-12, 1947 between Aung San and frontier repre-sentatives, granted the Shan (constituting the second largest population in Myanmar, next to the Burman) together with other hill-tract leaders local autonomy and a share of decision-making power, in addition to a promise of economic assistance, in exchange for their support to make territorial integration of the Union of Burma viable.14 The constitution adopted a few months later that year duly recognized the special status

The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building

256 257

of the frontier areas within the Union, and accorded to the local leaders the right to withdrawal from the Union after an initial ten-year period, although the special provision in effect applied only to the Shan and Kayah. The Union�s fi rst constitution seemingly presented a united front between the state maker and ethnic leaders who were the de facto rulers of the country�s vast peripheral region. It was a necessary step at the time to achieve independence, but without effective mechanisms to deal with the rights of all ethnic minorities and the simultaneous devel-opment in the frontier areas for them to be further integrated into the Union, the special provisions to woo the ethnic leaders only sowed the seeds of trouble that would come to affl ict the country.

The post-independent government faced insurgencies on all fronts. Following the revolts by the Red Flag communists (Stalinist) and the Rakhine/Arankan (mujahideen Islamic), the most formidable insur-gency was led by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) that had split from the Anti-Fascist People�s Freedom League (a political party assem-bled during World War II to rally all pro-independence forces). Among the armed forces mobilized by the government to fi ght the insurgents were the Kayin (Karen) Rifl es and Kachin Rifl es.15 Kayin amounts to the second largest ethnic minority population in Myanmar, next to the Shan, and a fairly large proportion of the Kayin population is Christian. Their special relationship with the British colonialists seemed to be ac-countable for the deep and enduring antagonism of the Kayin, not only to the post-colonial government but also the Burman people at large.16

Having successfully driven the CPB out of its base, the Kayin fi ghters began to have second thoughts about supporting the government. To the Kayin demand of independence, the government retaliated with force. Further destabilizing the government, the Kachin echoed the Kayin demand for independence and joined the ethnic rebellion.17

The Shan may have had their local autonomy endorsed by the consti-tution, but their leaders had since independence not been happy about their privileges being encroached upon by the government and their local interests undermined. Tension began with the heavy presence of the government troops in the Shan territories following the invasion by defeated Chinese nationalist troops from the east in the 1950s.18 Power struggles within the government, meanwhile, seriously estranged the Shan leaders who had been offered posts in the cabinet by Aung San prior to independence. The last straw seemed to be the �anti-feudal-ist campaign� aimed at removing the privileges of, and containing the power of, the Shan leaders in the frontier areas under their control. In the summer of 1961, the Shan leaders who had a constitutional right to secede from the Union pushed for a federal movement as a solution

to the undesirable situation where they found themselves in the fi rst decade after independence.19 The then Prime Minister U Nu is said to have been �not unsympathetic� and convened a Nationalities Seminar in Yangon in March 1962.20 The outcome of that meeting was a military coup by General Ne Win who had been heading the caretaker govern-ment since 1958. After arresting U Nu and the ethnic leaders who came to the capital to negotiate terms with the government, the parliament was dissolved, thus ending a decade of democratic rule in the country.

Political struggles within the government aside, ethnic revolts in that particular period, which exacerbated the U Nu government�s cri-sis, deserve special attention and analysis. The problems themselves were essentially ramifi cations of the government policy toward ethnic minorities in the program of nation building, compounded by a prevail-ing social environment alienating the ethnic minorities in the process of political integration. While de-feudalization may indeed be seen as constituting a step of nation building, without trained civil servants available to perform the necessary administrative tasks, the frontier areas remained largely ungoverned rather than integrated.21 The failure to train civil servants among the ethnic minorities who speak languages different from that of the majority Burman, and who possess different life styles, amounted to the fi rst obstacle to nation building. A further failure was the neglect of economic development in the frontier region, as the national economic planning of the central government essen-tially excluded the areas populated by ethnic minorities. It is said that between 1948 and 1962, economic disparity between �Burma proper� and the frontier areas grew rather than shrank.22 Last but not least was the policy of assimilation pursued by U Nu, which, to put it mildly, sought to downplay cultural differences. The proposal put forward by U Nu to amend the constitution to designate Buddhism the national religion, in particular, disaffected ethnic minorities, and was directly responsible for the Kachin rallying under the banner of the Kachin Independent Army, and perhaps indirectly for the fl aring up of social riots such as attacks on Mosques by Buddhists which ended in blood-shed.23 The prevalence of Burman chauvinism in society at large only aggravated the situation further. As noted by a foreign observer in the 1950s, �There are many Burmese politicians, puffed-up and narrow, to whom the only real citizen is a Burmese Buddhist, and whose approach to every frontier problem is harsh and exclusive.�24

To sum up, ethnicity constituted a major challenge to the Union of Burma in the early years of independence. The democratic system practiced in the country by holding parliamentary elections, however, gravely failed to win the backing of the ethnic minorities in the frontier


258 259

areas in the political process of nation building. The situation contin-ued to deteriorate under military rule that sought to solve the problem of political integration by resorting to force and brutality.

Confrontation, 1962�1988As a state actor, Ne Win sought total control of society. If one includes the period of caretaker government (1958�1961), Ne Win�s rule of the country in effect lasted for a total of three decades. While military and civilian style of rule may be starkly contrasted, one should bear in mind that the military had been present on the scene of national politics even while the government was headed by a civilian and democratically elec-ted politician. Insurgencies by CBP and ethnic minorities in the 1950s were suppressed by the government, in cooperation with the military leaders. Back in his days of heading the caretaker government, Ne Win had already moved forward with de-feudalizing the Shan and Kayah sta-tes, and getting rid of the seats reserved for the native chieftains in the parliament.25 Throughout his tenure as head of state, Ne Win�s priority was to achieve political integration and maintain order. But the strategy he resorted to only yielded cycles of violence and prolonged instability in the country.

The trademark of Ne Win's rule was the Burmese Way to Socialism. It sought to achieve nationalization of the economy on the one hand, and unifi cation of the country on the other. As far as policy toward the frontier areas and ethnic minorities was concerned, Ne Win differed from U Nu. As a military strategist, instead of an idealist, Ne Win regarded political integration as paramount, while making no particular efforts in pursuit of cultural assimilation. National unity, in his language, equated merely to absolute loyalty toward the Union of Burma and unconditional submission by the local powers to the central state. By the promulgation of the Protection of National Unity Law in 1964, the government annulled the rights previously granted to the ethnic minority leaders in the 1947 constitution, with respect to self-government, autonomous legislation, and secession. The 1974 constitution, though it designated separate states for the Chin, Mon, and Rakhine respectively, further undercut the local autonomy of the ethnic leaders in the frontier areas.26 Notwithstanding all these uncompromising political measures, Ne Win adopted a less antagonistic approach to cultural practices � abolishing the bill to designate Buddhism the national religion previously advocated by U Nu, and appearing instead to act as a state sponsor of alternative religious practices.27

Despite his seemingly accommodationist approach to ethnic minorities in terms of cultural practices, compared to his predecessor, Ne Win's peace making with anti-government forces of all sorts � of which ethnic minorities constituted a major component � did not proceed very far. Immediately after the military took power, Ne Win sought to appease various opposition forces, urging them to cooperate with the government in order to achieve national unity. But neither his talks with the CPB nor negotiations with ethnic minority leaders yielded any results. Without any alternative strategies, the solution left to him was all-out war with the ethnic armed forces, in addition to the CPB of several factions, which lasted for over two decades. By the early 1970s, there had been two-dozen ethnic armed forces fi ghting the government across half of the country's territory. No less than an estimated third of the government expenditure was exhausted on military campaigns.28

All were anti-government, but each one of the resistance forces fought only for its own interests. After the CBP was banished by the government, its high-ranking offi cers went to China for training (in political theory and military strategy); among them was Ba Thein Tin who was to succeed Than Tun as party leader in the mid 1970s. The ideological rift between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Burman Socialist Program Party (BSPP), and the later anti-Chinese riots in Yangon, fi nally threw into the open the confl ict between China and Myanmar, with the CCP backing up the CPB by opening a new front in northeast Myanmar close to the Chinese border.29 Fully equipped by the PLA, the CPB Northeast Command recruited its rank and fi le among the ethnic minorities on both sides of the border. This is the reason some scholars have put the CPB-led insurgency into the category of being an ethnic armed confl ict.30 The intricacies of the force alignment in this people's war served as an illustration of the customary saying that blood is thicker than water. Yet, for many of the resistance forces, loyalty to China or Myanmar hardly mattered; nor was ideology a particular concern. Resistance in different outfi ts was simply a fi ght for one's own existence, underpinned by grievances of all sorts. The revolution failed in the end, largely due to relentless infi ghting within the CPB and the fi nal withdrawal of Chinese support in the 1980s.31

From a purely military point of view, Ne Win won the war against the CBP after launching a ferocious campaign in Bago in the mid 1970s. His initiative to mend fences with Chinese leaders succeeded, furthermore, in ending CCP support for the CPB. Yet, his government maintained no real control of the country's vast borderlands. Struggling for their survival fi nancially, the CPB remnants entered the drug trade. Their involvement led to a boom in the age-old drug production on


260 261

the northeastern border, and stimulated competition for control over resources among all other ethnic armed forces. A war of a different nature thus continued. Each force, ethnic or communist, fought to expand its own territory of control. Fierce competition for resources fueled more strife, and continued to render the frontier areas impenetrable to government forces.32 Political integration remained elusive as ever, while prolonged confl ict took a heavy toll on society. As estimated, within the period of half a century after independence, hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives, and as many as two million suffered internal displacement, with poverty and infant mortality rising and many infectious diseases growing rampant.33

Between the government and the resistance groups, the former obviously had the advantage as far as military equipment and manpower were concerned. But ruling by military means alone can hardly solve a country's problems, including, most importantly, that of political integration. What in the end failed to win the hearts and minds of the people, crucial to national cohesion, was the government's failure to tackle problems of an economic nature.

Aside from the prolonged confl ict that severely drained the national treasury, the Burmese Way to Socialism under the BSPP that pursued a closed-door policy in due course served to bankrupt the country's economy. Economic stagnation became evident in the 1970s. Infl ation and food shortages fomented political discontent and social unrest. The new constitution in 1974 may appear to have secured military rule by affi rming the one-party system, but in the years that followed the government failed in measures to turn the national economy around. In 1987, the government applied to the United Nations for the status of Least Developed Country, in order to lessen the burden of foreign debts on the country. A year later, public protests erupted in Yangon and other cities, ultimately causing the downfall of Ne Win. The democratic movement that followed, however, did not put an end to military rule. Instead, the determination of the military to continue ruling the country became heightened. The rhetoric of a new generation of military leaders seeking to exert total control was not so different from when Ne Win staged his coup, that is, to maintain law and order, and above all, national unity.

In summary, nearly three decades of rule under Ne Win saw prolonged confrontation between ethnic minorities and the Burman dominated government. It was, in essence, a continuation of strife between the central state and the country's frontier areas, a colonial legacy with which the new nation state has had to cope since its independence in 1948. During the long decades of confl ict, however,

the military grew ingrained in the state bureaucracy, which secured a foothold for the military leaders to cling to power in the decades to come.

Reconciliation, 1989�2007In today's international politics, a lack of appreciation of the socio-political complexity characterizing the country often informs simplistic perceptions of a standoff between the state (i.e. Tatmadaw) and society (pro-democracy movement) as the root problem facing Myanmar. What underlies this standoff is sometimes analyzed, if at all, only cursorily. Staring one in the face, meanwhile, are two problems � ethnic and economic � that have provided much of the momentum for the political upheavals in the country during the past half a century. As already mentioned, the situation that had given Ne Win grounds for his seizure of power in 1962 was largely attributed to the perceived threat to national unity, as the leaders of the frontier areas sought to negotiate with the government about the terms of their autonomy. What brought Ne Win down in 1988 � and subsequently triggered widespread unrest in the country � was essentially the government's poor performance in managing the national economy, in addition to the ethnic confl ict that had been simmering for too long. The cycle of confl ict and violence that the country of Myanmar has experienced in the past half century has been ultimately fueled by what has been identifi ed as �greed and grievances �, the nature of which is again economic and ethnic.34

The post-Ne Win government�fi rst, the State Law and Order Res-toration Council (SLORC) headed by General Saw Maung and later the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) under the command of Senior-General Than Shwe�dismissed the result of the 1990 parlia-ment elections that won the opposition NLD a majority of seats, on the ground that the country�s stability came fi rst. At the same time, how-ever, the SLORC and its successor SPDC tactically adjusted its policy to combine political appeasement with military suppression, while pursu-ing what the government itself called national reconciliation and eco-nomic development in the country. By tackling the ethnic and economic problems together, the military consolidated its power and managed to stabilize the country, in contrast to Ne Win�s rule in the previous decades. One highly symbolic move in attempting to achieve national reconciliation was the government decision to change the name of the country in 1989, from the British Burma to the indigenous Myanmar (duly endorsed by the United Nations) � the new name symbolically inclusive of the Burman as well as all ethnic minorities.35 In the 1990


262 263

elections, dozens of ethnic minority parties participated, and many of them won seats in the parliament, with the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy emerging as the second biggest winner next to the NLD.

The government furthermore established special organs to tackle economic development in the frontier areas and ethnic minorities work in general. In 1993, it drew up a ten-year plan for economic develop-ment in the borderlands with earmarked funds. The draft of Develop-ment of Border Areas and National Races Law that same year formally incorporated development in ethnic minority areas into the national development strategy.36 In a parallel development, the military govern-ment initiated the process of negotiating ceasefi res with ethnic armed forces. So far some two-dozen ethnic minority armed forces have reached cease-fi re agreements with the government. The economic development in the borderlands together with ceasefi re agreements have contributed to some stability in the country; along with that de-velopment, ethnic strife has notably subsided in these areas and what used to be rampant opium production has been partially contained. This achievement of stability, however tenuous, created the necessary preconditions for the military government to implement the so-called seven-point roadmap to democracy in the country.

The above development has led some to conclude that ethnic relations in Myanmar today are enjoying their �best time" since 1948.37

Even so, one can hardly say that peace in the borderlands is already in sight. The ceasefi re agreements, fi rst of all, do not presently entail disarmament of the ethnic minorities, and therefore the armed forces in their self-governed territories persist as potential threats to political integration. Secondly, there is currently much discord between the central government and ethnic leaders regarding the size of ethnic armed forces that each frontier state may in the end retain and the area that each ethnic group may control, in addition to the degree of local autonomy to which each entity is entitled. Thirdly, a number of ethnic armed forces � such as the Kayin/Karen National Union, the Shan State Army-South, the Kayah/Karenni National Progress Party and the Chin National Front � are yet to reach cease-fi re agreements with the government, while the cooperation in drug control between the government and the Wa leaders is far from easy. Finally, the claim of independence by the Shan Prince living in exile in Canada, albeit largely rhetorical, adds further complications to the volatility of ethnic relations in the borderlands.38

The Saffron Revolution in 2007 once again served as a reminder of persisting problems of an economic nature. While such a �colo-

red revolution � may be associated by an audience in the West with democratic changes unfolding in the states of the former Soviet Bloc, the social unrest in Myanmar on this particular occasion was essentially prompted by frustration over economic stagnation, to which a hike in fuel prices provided a catalyst for an outburst of public discontent. The events suggest that the legitimacy of the military government is increasingly being tested by its economic performance, as the population at large continues to struggle to make ends meet in day-to-day life.39

Myanmar's economy in the past decade has benefi ted from its cooperation with countries in the region, namely, ASEAN, China, and India. China's on-going economic reform that started three decades ago, decentralization of economic management, and the recent development of China's western region, in particular, have stimulated economic cooperation between Yunnan province and the Southeast Asian countries, Myanmar included. Economic projects undertaken by enterprises based in Yunnan largely involve infrastructure construction and exploitation of natural resources. That aside, the Chinese government has through Yunnan province supported efforts to eradicate drug production on the Shan Plateau, by subsidizing cultivation of alternative crops and trade in agricultural produce.40 Again, as in the old days, the economic development in the borderlands has availed itself of the existing kinship (paukphaw) on both sides of the border. In a local context, the economic cooperation � that is often interpreted in the West as China's communist regime supporting military rule in Myanmar � is typically business conducted between neighbors, many of whom are in a sense close relatives.

In economic development across the border, China's involvement is motivated by its concern for national security; for that reason, China does not, and will not, allow any third-party interference in Myanmar affairs. This is a factor of grave importance infl uencing China's policy-making vis-a-vis Myanmar, in contrast to the geographically distant West.41

China's cooperation is crucial for economic development in Myanmar's borderlands, which, in turn, has implications for the country's political stability as a whole. As noted by one long-time observer of Myanmar affairs, �Chinese remains a commonly-spoken language in many transSalween districts and the CPB's former �liberated zones � are administered by breakaway ethnic ceasefi re forces, whose leaders continue to maintain cross-border relations with Yunnan Province. � 42

Even though the Chinese infl uence through cross-border economic cooperation today has hardly any ideological bearing, ethnic proximity can be politically disconcerting. This would have prompted the Chinese


264 265

to make their policy known to exclude playing any role in the ethnic insurgency across the border, or tolerating any infl ux of refugees except during an emergency.43 Such public disposition does, in a way, suggest that the paukphaw relationship has its political constraints, although they may not be immediately discernible to outsiders.

Like Myanmar, one third of the population in Yunnan is composed of ethnic minorities. The local-level autonomy currently granted to ethnic leaders in the borderlands of Myanmar resembles in form the administrative system adopted in Yunnan. To some, the existence of �self-administered divisions � and �self-administered districts � as prescribed by the new constitution of Myanmar for ethnic minorities � in the highly centralized unitary state may constitute �an inherent contradiction. � 44 The PRC experience of nation building shows that local-level autonomy in a centralized state is a workable solution to political integration, and that balanced development is the key to stability. Admittedly, however, the history of central-local relations in China is very different from that in Myanmar. In this regard, Myanmar's own conditions will have to determine an administrative system that is able to accommodate political integration and ethnic diversity in a modern nation state.

In short, decades of civil war in Myanmar show that neither the government nor the ethnic minorities have emerged as clear winners. The ceasefi re agreements reached between the government and ethnic armed forces so far suggest that a political solution is the only option to achieve peace. The political development in the country and a lasting peace must rest on economic development on the one hand, and the safeguarding of ethnic minority rights on the other. A fulfi llment of these tasks requires political change; the change, however, cannot be divorced from the indigenous conditions.

Constitution in Present TenseThe draft constitution of Myanmar that was ratifi ed by the national ref-erendum on May 10, 2008 is the third one since the country gained in-dependence. The drafting of the constitution was a long-drawn-out pro-cess that began in 1993 and was halted between 1996 and 2004, as the result of the NLD�s withdrawal from the National Convention. Drafted under military rule, the constitution is understandably controversial. It manifestly enshrines, as a basic principle, the position of the Tatmadaw in the political leadership of the country, with 25 per cent of the seats in the parliament being reserved for the military and an endorsement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services taking over and

exercising state power in a state of emergency perceived as endanger-ing the Union and national sovereignty. The draft constitution also puts in place a parliament system, composed of two Hluttaws (Pyithu and Amyotha), with representatives from all divisions and states, and all (offi cially recognized) �national races" (the term employed by the government). In addition to the existing seven states designated to the Shan, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Chin, and Rakhine, respectively, the constitution prescribes six additional self-administered divisions/zones to be granted to the Wa, Kokang, Palaung, Pa-O, and Danu in the Shan state and Naga (in Sagaing division).

The implementation of local-level (provincial and sub-provincial) autonomy is crucial for political integration. It is a matter of rights on the part of ethnic minorities and unity on the part of the central go-vernment. The function of this dual system requires compromise from both sides. Despite all the controversy surrounding it, that the draft constitution was adopted by a national referendum and was not rejec-ted outright by the ethnic leaders, would suggest that some concessions had been made and certain agreements, however tenuous, had been reached. By drawing up a constitution, the state is committed to helping develop language, literature, fi ne arts, and culture of ethnic minorities (�national races�); helping promote solidarity, mutual amity, and re-spect and mutual help among ethnic minorities; and helping promote socio-economic development including education, health, economy, transport, and communications of less developed ethnic minorities. Needless to say, future legislation and ultimately the result of the up-coming elections will determine to what extent the local-level autonomy is to be enjoyed and how these promises will be delivered.

On a macro-level, the constitution ratifi ed may amount to one im-portant step of political integration. Yet, issues of ethnic minorities will continue to pose a serious challenge to the current military government and a future democratically elected government (should the 2010 elec-tions go ahead as promised). It would be naïve, fi rst of all, to believe that the cease-fi re agreements between the ethnic leaders and the military government are based on mutual trust rather than on tactics aimed at short-term gains on both sides. The current government policy bearing traces of cultural assimilation furthermore is cause for concern,45 as it could potentially produce a backlash in society like during the rule of U Nu in the 1950s. The most disconcerting issue is likely to be the development of Burman nationalism toward ethnic minorities within the Union and toward foreigners and foreign countries. It remains to be seen how nationalism of all sorts (Burman and ethnic) will play out in the continuing efforts to achieve national reconciliation in Myanmar.


266 267

All in all, trust between governments (present and future) and various interest groups will be crucial to any sustainable peace in the country. The constitution may have been ratifi ed, but national reconciliation will have a long way to go. As it has been so perceptively put, �The fragility of the relative peace along Myanmar�s frontier may become evident fol-lowing the results of the referendum.�46

However controversial, the ratifi cation of the draft constitution marks a watershed in the country's history, by laying a foundation for further political change in Myanmar. From confrontation to reconciliation, there is evidence of modifi cation in the policy pursued by the government, despite the nature of its military rule. For the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that the military will withdraw voluntarily from national politics. On the other hand, sustaining its rule of the country by absolute force can no longer be an option for the incumbent government. Decades of civil war and prolonged confl ict have shown to the leaders of the country and the people of Myanmar that political integration and lasting peace must be built on national reconciliation and economic development. This realization itself is, for the time being, of great signifi cance.

Some Refl ectionsThe year 2008 marks the 60th anniversary of Myanmar�s indepen-dence. The country�s nation building has over the past decades been continuous, yet far from complete. An alliance with ethnic minority leaders had helped win the country�s independence while maintaining its territorial integrity. Parliamentary rule and elections in the early years of independence, however, did not solve the problems affecting ethnic minority rights effectively, and this failure came to be exploited by the military in justifying its toppling of the democratically elected government. The authoritarian rule that followed resorted to extreme measures in response to political dissent and ethnic confl ict, resulting in decades of civil war. The post-Ne Win military government is seen to have adopted a more pragmatic approach to the country�s problems, ethnic and economic. The initial achievement of cease-fi res and eco-nomic development in the borderlands in recent years has somewhat helped stabilize the country. Nevertheless, a much needed lasting peace is yet to be realized.

While military authoritarian rule has no doubt been the main factor obstructing political progress in the country, ethnic confl ict remains a core problem that to a large extent makes political integration of the country unattainable. Over the past twenty years, the Western politics

of intervention has focused squarely on the magic word �democracy �, with politicians in the United States and Europe demanding resolutely �democracy fi rst! � thus echoing the demands of the Myanmar political opposition NLD on the military government to �hand over the power!� A common variant of the cultural exoticism that contours Western views of foreign countries has in the case of Myanmar become transfi xed on Aung San Suu Kyi and allowed her name to be, quite literally, the focal point of policy-making in the West.47 That the international intervention � political isolation and economic sanction � has so far not achieved its intended goals suggests just how little the reality of the country has been understood and how little it actually matters to policy-making in the West.

This paper has outlined the challenge of ethnicity to nation building in post-colonial Myanmar. While the country is unique in terms of its socio-political, cultural, and economic conditions, there are some wider implications worthy of further pondering, in regard to nation building in such an ethnically diverse country. A dual system � local autonomy in the presence of a highly centralized state � dating back to the thirteenth century has provided modern China, as a nation state bequeathed by the Republican Revolution in 1911, with a mechanism capable of achieving territorial and political integration. Such a mechanism may appear to contradict the Western concept of the nation state that has been very much taken as a given when it comes to drawing boundaries between peoples perceived as demonstrating ethnographic or linguistic differences.48 Since the end of the Cold War, some Western governments have grown increasingly keen on promoting nation-building projects in different parts of the world. The invention of ethnographic boundaries as the foundation of nation states by nineteenth-century anthropology has duly served as a blunt tool in international intervention, which is today motivated by political (as well as economic) agenda, thus replaying a history of Europe that appears to have been deliberately, or selectively, and in any case, quite conveniently, forgotten by many Europeans.49

In many parts of the world today, ethnicity acts as a force obstructing nation building when the historical being comes into contact with the modern concept of nation state. Many confl icts involve ethnicity, but this is not to say that ethnic confl icts can be solved by simply drawing boundaries between peoples who happen to speak different languages or practice different religions. Behind every ethnic confl ict, there is a shared history and complexity of cultural contacts. It is the contempora-ry perception of that history and such contacts that generates problems for categorizations involving people. Like many kinds of boundaries, ethnic ones constantly shift and remain negotiable, depending on a va-


268 269

riety of circumstances, actors and inter-actors. Much of Europe recon-ciled ethnicity with the nation state in its own way more than a century ago at a time when Myanmar (then Burma) and many other parts of the world were subject to European colonial rule. The situation in the post-colonial world is very different to the order delimitated by the world po-wers in the aftermath of World War II. Against the backdrop of today�s highly ideologically charged international politics, ethnicity is an issue particularly vexing to nation building efforts around the world.

The people of Myanmar have a history of their own as well as their own understanding of their history. It should be up to them to decide among themselves about the future of their country and what they can benefi t from it. This is what democracy is all about. The external environment and its infl uence on the way ethnic confl ict in a country plays itself out, and impacts on nation building, is an interesting topic of research, and certainly deserves more attention than it does now. It is hardly a secret anymore that during the Cold War, world powers like the U.S. and Britain all pursued policies of supporting various ethnic insurgencies through military and fi nancial means.50 The end of the Cold War has created new grounds for political intervention exploiting, similarly, ethnic confl ict. It is not at all improbable, as some have so insinuated, that regime change as attempted by some Western powers may involve aiding some ethnic groups perceived to support the inter-ests of the West, and similarly seeking to restrain those perceived not to be on the right side, in which case, the current situation of narcotics production and traffi cking in the borderlands can well serve a conve-nient pretext.51 The probability of involvement by external forces in Myanmar is likely to be determined by how relevant such involvement is going to be to the play of international politics with its constantly shifting priorities.

The mounting criticism of the military government by Western media and governments in the wake of Cyclone Nargis that devastated the Ayeyarwady delta and the coastal Yangon serves to demonstrate how a humanitarian effort, such as disaster relief, can be politicized to serve ideological objectives.52 The natural disaster that struck a week before the national referendum on the draft constitution provided a unique angle for observing the play of international politics. Calls for a postponement of the national referendum seemed to only reinforce the generally negative attitude of Western governments toward the consti-tution drafted under military rule. At the same time, the tardiness of the military government in administering disaster relief in the aftermath of the tropical storm shows just how weak the state of Myanmar is, in terms of bureaucratic functions at all levels, and how detached

the Tatmadaw is from the populace, in sharp contrast to the Chinese experience of post-quake relief in Sichuan province during the same period. The failure on the part of the military government to provide rapid and effective disaster relief, once again, illustrates how pressing nation building is for the people of Myanmar.

Notes1 The local chieftainship was hereditary and endorsed by the state through a formal appointment system originating in the Yuan dynasty (1271�1368). It was adopted and reformed by the succeeding Ming and Qing governments. After the collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911, the provincial government of Yunnan continued to honor the old ar-rangement in the frontier areas in the west, northwest, and southwest.2 This was prior to the PRC offi cial nationality identifi cation. Yunnan province currently has a population of 45 million, one third of which is composed of 25 offi cially identifi ed ethnic minorities.3 This is a historical demarcation by the Qing government in its reform to the local chiefdoms in the 18th century, which referred to the territory on the right bank of the Lan-cang River (Mekong) in the southwest, and the territories on the right bank of the Nu River (Salween) and north of Jinsha River (Yangtze) in the northwest. The PRC government in effect adopted the same format when implementing land reform in the 1950s. See Xiao-lin Guo, �Chinese Socialism and Local Nationalism in the Discourse of Development.� Inner Asia (2008), 10: 131�152.4 Chinese (Zhongguoren) is a concept that came into being in the nineteenth century. Prior to that, the ancestors of today�s Chinese identifi ed themselves with the emperor.5 Wang Lianfang, Yunnan minzu gongzuo huiyi [Recollection of nationalities work in Yun-nan]. (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe,1999), p. 185.6 The most vigorous campaigns against the local chiefdoms in the southwest took place during the Yongzheng reign (1723�735). See, John Herman, �Empire in the Southwest: Early Qing Reforms to the Native Chieftain System.� The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 47�74.7 Fei Hsiao-tung, Towards People�s Anthropology (Beijing: New World Press, 1981), p. 64.Towards People�s Anthropology (Beijing: New World Press, 1981), p. 64.Towards People�s Anthropology8 Yunnan minzu gongzuo sishinian [Forty years of nationalities work in Yunnan], 2 vols. (Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1994), Vol. 1, p. 70.9 The name of the country (except in historical context and direct quotes) and of places in it appearing in the text are consistent with the current domestic use, as well as with the use endorsed by the United Nations and accepted by the international postal service.10 The seven peripheral states are the Shan, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Chin, and Rak-hine. The seven administrative divisions are Sagaing, Mandalay, Magway, Bago, Yangon, Ayeyarwady, and Tanintharyi.11 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma (London: Faber and Faber, 2007), p. 194.12 Ibid., p. 206.13 Hugh Tinker, �Burma�s Northeast Borderland Problems,� Pacifi c Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 4 (December 1956), p. 339.


270 271

14 The Shan currently has a population of fi ve million, half of which is concentrated in the Shan state, and the rest is distributed across Kachin, Kayah, Kayin states, as well as in Sagaing. 15 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma (2007), pp. 259-61.16 Li Chenyang, �Miandian de Kelun yu Kelunren fenli yundong� [The Kayin of Myanmar and their separatist movement], Shijie minzu (No. 1, 2004). Shijie minzu (No. 1, 2004). Shijie minzu17 Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps (2007), pp. 262�63.18 Ibid., p. 287.19 The fi rst president of independent Burma, Sao Shwe Thaike, a Shan, is said to have led the �Federal Movement� to amend the constitution (see Harn Yawnghwe, this volume).20 Thant Myint-U (2007), p. 289. 21 This was the case in both the Shan and Kachin states. See Hugh Tinker, �Burma�s Northeast Borderland Problems� (1956), pp. 341-42, 22 Li Chenyang, �Miandian dulihou lijie zhengfu minzu zhengce de yanbian� [Develop-ment of ethnic minority policies in post-independence Myanmar] in Yazhou minzu lun-tan, edited by Fang Tie and Xiao Xian (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2003).23 Ibid.24 Hugh Tinker, �Burma�s Northeast Borderland Problems� (1956), p. 346.25 He Shengda and Li Chenyang, Miandian: Lieguozhi [Myanmar: A Guide to the States of the World] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005), p. 117.26 Li Chenyang, �Miandian dulihou lijie zhengfu minzu zhengce de yanbian� (2003).27 Ibid.28 He Shengda and Li Chenyang, Miandian (2005), p. 120.29 The military aid from the CCP to the CPB is characterized as party-to-party. See Martin Smith, �Ethnic Challenges and Border Politics in Myanmar/Burma,� in Myanmar/Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, edited by Xiaolin Guo (Stockholm: ISDP, 2008), p. 42.30 Li Chenyang, �Miandian dulihou lijie zhengfu minzu zhengce de yanbian� (2003).31 See Xiaolin Guo, Towards Resolution: China in the Myanmar Issue (Uppsala: Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Paper, March 2007).32 See Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Confl ict in Burma (Washing-ton D.C.: East-West Center and Singapore: ISEAS, 2007).33 See Martin Smith, Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change (Report for Minority Rights Group International, May 2002). 34 See Martin Smith, State of Strife (2007).35 The signifi cance of the name change for the purpose of national reconciliation seems to have eluded many politicians in the West, rejecting fl atly the use of the name on the ground that it was a choice made by the military government.36 Li Chenyang, �Miandian dulihou lijie zhengfu minzu zhengce de yanbian� (2003).37 Li Chenyang and Chen Yin, �Yingxiang Miandian minzhuhua jincheng de zhuyao zhengzhi shili� [Main political forces infl uencing democratization in Myanmar], unpu-blished paper (2004), p. 11.

38 For more on this topic, see Robert H. Taylor, �The Politics of Identity in Myanmar Revisited,� South East Asia Research Paper (No. 13, 3, 2005), pp. 261-86.39 Kyaw Yin-Hlaing, �The State of the Pro-Democracy Movement in Authoritarian Myanmar/Burma,� in Myanmar/Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, edited by Xiaolin Guo (Stockholm: ISDP, 2008), pp. 69-105.40 Some may, however, question the long-term effect of such development on the local livelihood and environment.41 For more on the Chinese position in the Myanmar issue, in contrast to that of the West and ASEAN, see Xiaolin Guo, �The Myanmar/Burma Impasse and Practice of Intervention.� in Myanmar/Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, edited by Xiaolin Guo (Stockholm: ISDP, 2008), pp. 9-33.42 Martin Smith, �Ethnic Challenges and Border Politics in Myanmar/Burma� (2008), p. 43.43 Ibid.44 Tin Maung Maung Than, cited in Martin Smith, State of Strife (2007), p. 51.45 Li Chenyang, �Miandian minzu wenti de xianzhuang jiqi fazhan qushi� [The current state and future of ethnic problems in Myanmar], in Mianxiang 21 shijide dongnanya: gaige yu fazhan [Southeast Asia at the turn of the twenty-fi rst century: reform and deve-lopment], edited by Chen Qiaozhi (Guanzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe, 2000).46 David Steinberg, this volume.47 Laura Bush, for one, made it plainly straightforward that her interest in Burma started �with an interest in Aung San Suu Kyi� (�First lady remarks on Cyclone in Burma, says U.S. will increase aid�� Washingtonpost.com, May 5, 2008. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/05/AR2008050501928_pf.html Right after the announcement of U.S. aid to cyclone-struck Myanmar, President Bush signed a congressional legislation to award Aung San Suu Kyi the Congressional Medal of Honor (Ibid.). For U.S. policy and Aung San Suu Kyi, see also Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown, Asia Report No. 144 (Yangon/Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 31, 2008), pp. 13-14. 48 Ernst Renan, �What Is a Nation?� http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/e_renan.html49 For a refl ective comment (prompted by international media coverage of the riots in Tibet in March 2008) on the record of how ethnic relations have in the past and present been handled in Western countries, see Floyd Rudmin, �The Hypocrisy and Danger of Anti-China Demonstrations,� CommonDreams.org (April 14, 2008), http://www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/04/14/8287/50 In the case of Myanmar, see David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Wash-ington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001).51 Li Chenyang, �Miandian de Kelun yu Kelunren fenli yundong� (No. 1, 2004).52 After Cyclone Nargis: The Politics of Humanitarian Relief� (May 7, 2008) http://networkmyanmar.org/images//nb.pdf


272 273

Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transitionfrom Military RuleHarn Yawnghwe

Burma � The ProblemScholars have attributed the cause of the problems in Burma to various factors � social, economic, constitutional and political. While these are all valid to varying degrees, I would like to suggest that an additional factor that has perhaps not been studied adequately is the different concepts of national or ethnic identity held by the Burma Army and the rest of the population.

Several books have been written about the politics of ethnic nationa-lisms from the point of view of the minorities or ethnic nationalities1. But I have not seen scholarly studies on the politics of ethnic nationa-lism from the point of view of the Burma Army or the majority Burman. Usually, the Burma Army is portrayed as a neutral modernizing force2

or as a nation-building institution3. The majority Burman make up about 60 percent of the population

and live in the lowlands which make up about 40 percent of the land. The remaining population lives in the highlands in the seven ethnic sta-tes � Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kareni, Karen and Mon - bordering Bangladesh, India, China, Laos and Thailand.

The Arakan, Mon and Shan kingdoms pre-dated the Burman king-doms by several centuries. Arakan kings were said to have ruled in wes-tern Burma from 2666 BC. They certainly ruled from 146 AD until 1785 AD, when the Arakan kingdom was conquered by the Burman king - Alaung-paya. Burman religion, script and culture are derived from the Arakan and Mon.

Mon-Khmer kingdoms also fl ourished in southeast Asia before the advent of the Burmans and Thais. Mon kings ruled lower Burma from 825 AD until Honsawadi was conquered in 1757 AD by the Burmans. Modern day Thai and Burman culture have been greatly infl uenced by the Mon. Cambodia can be said to be a modern Mon nation.

Shan or Tai kings were said to have ruled the upper reaches of the

274 275

Irrawaddy from 754 AD until 1253 AD. Shan/Tai kings also ruled in lowland Burma from 1287 AD in Ava, Pegu/Bago, and Toungoo. Not being united as a single nation, Shan rulers were either independent or paid tribute to the Chinese, Burman or Thai emperor/kings. At the time of the British annexation of Burma, the various Shan prin-cipalities were recognized as British Protectorate States and did not become part of British India. Laos and Thailand can be said to be modern Shan nations. In fact, Siam and Shan and Thai and Tai are synonymous.

The fi rst Burman kingdom or empire was founded at Pagan by A-naw-ratha in 1044 AD. The second was founded at Pegu/Bago by Tabin-shwe-hti in 1539 AD. Tabin-shwe-hti�s brother, King Bayin-naung expanded the Burman empire by conquering Thailand (1569 AD) and some of the Shan states. He is a major hero of the cur-rent regime in Burma. The third Burman empire was founded by Alaung-paya at Ava in 1752 AD. In common lore, General Ne Win�s rule was the fourth Burman empire, and the current military regime is the fi fth.

According to this mindset, the Burman empires were interrupted by the British in the 19th century. The British divided up the Burman em-pire into the various ethnic states which today are causing a problem be-cause these states now refuse to acknowledge Burman suzerainty over them. It is, therefore, the duty of all Burman patriots to re-establish the Burman empire to its former glory. This may sound strange in the 21st

century but the underlying concept may go a long way towards explain-ing some of the seemingly inexplicable strategies of the Burma Army such as the exclusion of ethnic nationalities in the higher ranks of the military and in the political process; the near-genocidal suppression of ethnic insurgencies; etc.

From the point of view of the ethnic nationalities, their kingdoms were also interrupted by the advent of the British. But this interruption was benefi cial. It especially enabled the Shan/Tai and Karenni to rebuild their nations. While the Arakan and Mon were not able to re-establish their kingdoms, their histories and their status as distinct entities were recognized. The Chin, Kachin, and Karen who did not have kingdoms and prior to the British colonization had little to do with the Burmans, gained recognition through their service in the British armed forces. This was especially true during the Second World War.

This may also be another factor in the �Burman � ethnic nationa-lities � confl ict. The ethnic nationalities remained loyal to Britain and fought the Japanese Imperial Army in the jungles behind the front lines. Burman nationalists, however, actively assisted the Japanese war

effort in order to drive the British out. War-time atrocities further fueled a Burman-Karen confl ict.

After the war, in February 1947, Aung San (father of Aung San Suu Kyi) attended the 2nd Panglong Conference convened by the Supreme Council of the United Hill Peoples (SCOUHP). As a Member of the Executive Council of the British Governor of Burma, Aung San came to the Conference to persuade the gathered Chin, Kachin and Shan leaders to agree to join the �Frontier Areas� to �Ministerial Burma� and together seek early independence from Britain. The Aung San-Atlee Agreement, reached earlier in London in January 1947, had stipulated that the peoples of the Frontier Areas be consulted about their future.

The 1947 Panglong Agreement became the basis for the new Repu-blic of the Union of Burma. The Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry to determine �the best method of associating the Frontier peoples with the working out of the new constitution for Burma� reported in April 1947 that:

�The importance of the Agreement lies not only in the fact that it settles the form of association during the interim period, but also in its enunciation of certain principles, notably that the frontier peoples should be entitled to fundamental democratic rights, that they should have the right to full autonomy in the internal sphere, and that they should be entitled to receive a me-asure of assistance from revenues of Ministerial Burma, which are relevant to decision of the ultimate form of association.�

Since then, all Burmese constitutions from 1947 (amended to allow for the creation of the Arakan, Mon and Karen States), to Ne Win�s Burme-se Socialist Programme Party constitution of 1974, to the SPDC�s 1993 proposed military constitution, recognized these ethnic states:

1. Arakan State (Akyab, Kyaukpyu and Sandoway Districts of Ministerial Burma)2. Chin State (Chin Hills and the Arakan Hill Tracts of the Fron-tier Areas)3. Kachin State (Myitkyina and Bhamo Districts of the Frontier Areas)4. Karen State (Salween District of the Frontier Areas, and eas-tern Toungoo, parts of Thaton and Amherst Districts of Minis-terial Burma)5. Kayah State (Karenni States - Frontier Areas)

Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule

276 277

6. Mon State (parts of the Thaton and Amherst Districts of Mi-nisterial Burma)7. Shan State (Federated Shan States including Northern and Southern Shan States, the Kachin Hill Tracts of Northern Hsen-wi and Mongmit States, Kokang, and Northern and Southern Wa States - Frontier Areas).

The following Frontier Areas were incorporated into Ministerial Bur-ma:

a) Naga Hills District (including Somra Tract and the Thaungdut and Singkaling Hkamti Shan States) b) Upper Chindwin District (Homalin Sub-division and Tamu township)

While each state is named after the major ethnic group residing in the state, it is recognized that each state is multi-ethnic as is �Burma Proper� or �Ministerial Burma�. The basis for the states is historical rather than racial.

From the point of view of the ethnic nationalities then, the basis for national unity should be the 1947 Panglong Agreement where equal partners agreed to voluntarily join their territories together to form a new democratic nation.

The Burma Army�s motto of �One blood, one voice, and one com-mand� to promote national unity troubles the ethnic nationalities. Atrocities committed by the Burma Army in the ethnic states since in-dependence in 1948 have also raised the question of whether the Burma Army is not an invading army of a rejuvenated Burman empire. Ethnic nationalists, therefore, see their struggle for self-determination not as an insurgency but as a war of national survival.

These confl icting concepts of nation building may add to the ge-nuine fear in the region that removing the iron grip of the Burmese military will open up a Pandora �s Box of separatist ethnic movements. But the situation in Burma is not sustainable and sooner or later, these issues will have to be addressed. The National Reconciliation Program-me managed by the Euro-Burma Offi ce has made signifi cant headway in trying to resolve these issues amongst the ethnic nationalities, but the international community has yet to recognize let alone address these problems. I have touched on this matter only to illustrate that the problems in Burma are deep-rooted and complex. They will not yield to easy solutions and greater efforts will be needed if we want democracy in Burma.

Democracy versus Military RuleAdded to this already diffi cult situation is the tendency internationally to oversimplify the struggle in Burma as a struggle between good and evil, a struggle between the forces of democracy and totalitarianism, a struggle between peaceful Buddhist monks and warmongering soldi-ers, a struggle between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a helpless heroine and Senior-General Than Shwe, an all-powerful king. They make very good copy for the media.

But if we keep to this mindset, there can be no compromises, no dialogue, no national reconciliation, and no political solution. In this scenario, someone has to win and someone has to lose. There cannot be a win-win solution. While this could be very emotionally satisfying if the forces of evil were to lose, the reality is that if we push for this sce-nario of winners and losers, the likely winners will be the military, not the democracy advocates or the ethnic nationalities.

It is also ironic that while Daw Aung San Suu Kyi herself has called for dialogue and advocates a non-violent Gandhian struggle against oppression, the rhetoric in the democracy camp especially amongst the diaspora is one of violent regime change. The frustration with the two-decade old political deadlock and the specifi c needs of modern media may have added to this sense of confrontation rather than compromise. The underlying desire is to punish the generals, not to fi nd a practical solution. This in turn has led to call for more sanctions, which I would also like to touch upon briefl y later.

I just want to mention here that simply bringing democracy to Burma will not solve our problems. Apart from the issue of ethnic iden-tity mentioned earlier, it must be remembered that the problems with the ethnic nationalities started in the democratic period of Burma�s history.

After Burma became independent in 1948, the Communist Party of Burma denounced it because independence had not been achieved th-rough a people�s revolution. The Communist Party went underground and Aung San�s private army, the People�s Volunteer Organization (vete-rans from the war), the paramilitary Union Military Police, Special Po-lice Reservists, and Burman units of the Burma Army mutinied. Only the 4th Burma Rifl es remained loyal. The ethnic army units � notably the Chin and Kachin Rifl es � rallied behind the government and saved the day. This was the fi rst major challenge for Prime Minister U Nu of the newly independent nation.

The second major challenge was the Karen uprising in 1949. The Karen who served with distinction during the Second World War had


278 279

been promised a state of their own. But negotiations with U Nu broke down and a massacre of Karen civilians triggered an uprising. The Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Army who was a Karen was repla-ced by Ne Win, who had commanded the 4th Burma Rifl es. This was the beginning of the process of the Burmanization of the Burma Army. Other challenges included the Karenni�s non-acceptance of the Union of Burma. In 1887, Karenni sovereignty had been recognized by the British and since they had not participated in the Panglong Conference, Karenni leaders fought to break away from the Union.

The next major challenge was the �Kuomingtang � invasion of Shan State. Retreating from Mao-Tse-Tung�s Red Army, Chinese nationalist troops backed by the Central Intelligence Agency made Shan State their base from which to invade China. They were fi nally pushed out of Burma into Thailand in the early 1960�s with the help of the Chinese People�s Liberation Army. But in trying to assert Burmese sovereignty, Burma Army troops operating in Shan State committed atrocities against the civilian population. This led to widespread dissatisfaction and a call for Shan State to exercise its constitutional right to secede from the Union of Burma. Shan leaders led by Sao Shwe Thaike, the fi rst president of independent Burma, formed the �Federal Movement� and instead tried to amend the constitution.

In 1962, U Nu accepted this proposal. But General Ne Win, claiming that a federal system of government would break up the country, seized power.

Therefore, if we want the Burma Army to return to the barracks, the constitutional arrangement with the ethnic nationalities has to be sett-led. In this context, it would seem sensible to endorse the 1994 United Nations General Assembly resolution that called for a �Tripartite Dialo-gue � � the military, democracy advocates, and the ethnic nationalities � in order to solve Burma�s problems and build a sustainable democracy in Burma.

Sanctions versus EngagementIn addition to the simplifi ed �democracy versus military rule� solution, the policy debate on Burma always focuses on sanctions and engage-ment and whether either option works. The problem is that no one in these debates bothers to defi ne what we want to achieve through either sanctions or engagements.

What is the strategic objective of either applying sanctions or en-gaging with the generals? Is our goal the overthrow of these generals, punishing them, or bringing about change in Burma? Without a com-

mon goal, the proponents of both sanctions and engagement can claim success for their own self-defi ned goals.

In the sanctions debate, the main focus is on democracy and human rights. The concept is that the Burmese military should be punished and pressured to enter into a dialogue with the opposition.

On the engagement side, the focus is on the economy. The concept is that there is no democracy in Burma because its economy is not developed. It is said that engagement and trade with the generals will develop the economy and entice the generals to reform. Or alternately, a more affl uent and a larger middle-class will infl uence the generals to change.

If we defi ne our goal as punishing the generals, the sanctions have worked while engagement has not. If we defi ne our goal as pressuring the generals to enter into a dialogue with the opposition, neither has worked. If we defi ne our goal as bringing about change in Burma, again neither policy has worked.

I have myself been very active in calling for sanctions. My fi rst ob-jective was to raise the profi le of Burma and get the international com-munity committed to the idea that it has a moral obligation to act. In this sense, I believe the sanctions policy has been very successful, and I believe that the international community is now very aware of the situa-tion in Burma and is committed to fi nding a solution.

The second objective was symbolic. I wanted sanctions imposed so that the generals will know that their behaviour is not acceptable, and that they need to change. I also wanted the people of Burma to know that they are not alone. The world does care about what is happening in their country and is concerned. Again, I believe that this objective has been met, although the generals are not convinced that they need to change.

The third objective was to pressure the generals into having a dialo-gue with the opposition and bringing about change. This objective has not been met.

It has failed for several reasons. One is the fact that the sanctions have not been multilateral and Burma�s neighbours in particular have helped to negate the effects of the sanctions. The other factor is that the-re is no real political will within the international community to bring about change in Burma. Burma is not high on any nation�s priorities. Burma has been isolated for so long that it has no impact on the global scene. For most countries, Burma is an abnormality that should either be exploited or dealt with but it does not make much of a difference one way or the other. There are a few exceptions, such as the Nordic countries which have been trying to make a real difference, but in gene-ral, there is no will to invest political capital in Burma.


280 281

Burma is an embarrassment for the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) but it can continue to function without doing anyth-ing drastic.

Access to the Indian Ocean and regional stability are strategic issues for China but there are more pressing issues. The same can be said of India�s containment of China policy and its energy security concerns.

Yes, the European Union has renewed its Common Position. But do the generals in Naypyitaw care? What more can the European Union do?

President George Bush has also issued another Executive Order but what do these actually amount to other than being symbolic and of good publicity value? Will the USA jeopardize its trade relations with China in order to bring about political change in Burma?

The United Nations Security Council has recently issued another statement on Burma. But what will the Security Council do if the Bur-mese generals continue to ignore the UN Secretary-General�s �good offi ces � mandate? Will the Security Council be able to adopt a binding resolution on Burma? Even if China were for some reason, such as the Olympics, able to agree to a resolution, will Russia agree? It is extremely unlikely that both nations will refrain from using their veto. But even if both nations agree and the UN Security Council passes a binding reso-lution, what will the UN do if the generals refuse to comply?

Will the UN send in troops to make the Burmese generals comply? Given the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, I do not think the in-ternational community is prepared at this time to do much more in Burma.

But the third reason why we have not been successful in bringing about change in Burma is probably related to the fact that Burma is a �critically weak state � which is not capable of changing on its own.

Weak StatesA recent Brookings Institution analysis4 and a University of Maryland study5 suggest that Burma is a �critically weak state � that requires a dif-ferent approach than the strategies that have been applied.

For a number of years now, Burma has been identifi ed by various governments like the UK and institutions like the OECD/ World Bank as a �fragile� state or a country on its way to becoming a �failed� state.

�Weak� states are defi ned by the Brookings Institution as countries lacking the capacity and/or will to foster an environment conducive to:

1. Sustainable and equitable economic growth

2. Establish and maintain legitimate, transparent, and accoun-table political institutions3. Secure their population from violent confl ict and to control their territory4. Meet the basic human needs of their population

In this context, Burma is a �critically weak� state in the bottom 20 percent of the 141 countries surveyed. Burma�s overall ranking is number 17 with a score of 4.16. The lowest score is 0.52 and highest score is 9.41.

What is interesting about this analysis is that Burma is in the com-pany of mostly Sub-Saharan African countries like Burundi number 5, Chad number 16, Congo (Dem Republic number 3 and Republic num-ber 20) Eritrea number 14, Ethiopia number 19, Sierra Leone number 13, Somalia number 1, Sudan number 6, and Zimbabwe number 8.

It is interesting because when we talk about Burma, most people com-pare it to South Africa number 110, or former Eastern European countries � Czech Republic, Slovak Republic number 141, Hungary number 140, or Poland number 135, or to other Asian countries that have undergone a transition (weak states) � Cambodia number 34, East Timor number 43, Indonesia number 77, and the Philippines number 58.

But from the analysis, Burma has more in common with Sub-Saha-ran African countries than with Asia except for Afghanistan number 2 and North Korea number 15. If this is true, this means that policies that may have worked in South Africa, Eastern Europe, or even in other Asian countries will not work in Burma. It also means that transition in Burma is not likely to follow the Eastern European model. The question then is, what will work in Burma?

The key defi nition of a �weak � state is that it is incapable or unwil-ling to fulfi ll its responsibilities as a government. In other words, there is a disconnect between the rulers and the ruled. This explains why neither sanctions nor engagement with the SPDC have yielded the desired results. Sanction may hurt the population and the regime, but the regime is able to fi nd ways to evade the sanctions, and after a time nullify the pressure that it faces. But the people have no such options and their conditions deteriorate further, which is the case in Burma and in �critically weak � states. The Burmese regime will also engage econo-mically up to a point. But it will not endanger its power base and it will not provide a climate for sustainable and equitable economic growth.

This means that, if the international community wants to bring about change in Burma, a rather drastic new strategy � or a drastic reinterpretation of the existing policies � may be needed. In spite of the unacceptability of the SPDC�s undemocratic policies, the international


282 283

community may have no choice but to engage the military � not to trade and promote economic relations, but to prevent Burma from deteriora-ting further and becoming a �failed� state like Somalia number 1, Af-ghanistan number 2, or the Democratic Republic of Congo number 3.

Therefore, a longer-term strategy to bring democracy to Burma ins-tead of an immediate transition may need to be considered.

Preventing Burma from becoming a �failed � state should serve to unite both the �sanctions � and the �engagement � camps. The instability from Burma becoming a �failed � state would serve neither the cause of democracy nor the cause of economic development. Both camps should cooperate and coordinate their efforts and jointly engage the Burmese regime to address the structural weaknesses in Burma�s economy, is-sues of good governance, human security and the government�s ability to meet the basic human needs of its population.

What then should the international community do?

The Burmese MilitaryUnfortunately, the only real political actors in Burma are the generals. Burma�s survival and future are priorities for them. They have in the past fi ve decades, and will in the foreseeable future, set the political agenda. The democratic opposition and the ethnic nationalities are important political actors too. But to date, they have not been able to counter-balance the military.

Again unfortunately, the generals do not intend to give up power. They feel the pressure to change. But if possible, they will only concede minor points to ease the pressure and continue with their basic Road Map to ensure that the military has a leading role in Burma�s political future. The generals do not want to speak to anybody. They have a plan and they are confi dent they can carry it out.

In this context, the regime in February 2008 announced a referen-dum for its new constitution on 10 May 2008, and general elections in 2010. Preparations are underway to ensure that the people vote �Yes �. This is happening in spite of the fact that a cyclone hit Burma in early May causing possibly up to 60,000 deaths.

Reactions from the Burmese democracy movement to the military�s plans for a referendum and elections are predictably negative. Scepti-cism about the referendum and elections being �free and fair � are wi-despread. Most Burmese are of the opinion that the military is planning to win the referendum at all costs. They believe that the generals would not have call for a referendum unless it had found a way to determine the outcome. The fact that an election date has been set is also seen as

an indication that the military has already decided the outcome of the referendum.

The National League for Democracy and other political parties that have been excluded from the constitutional process are calling for a �No � vote for the referendum. They will also likely reject the new elec-tions as fraudulent. At stake are:

a) The results of the 1990 general elections;b) The political future/exclusion of the Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the NLD, the United Nationalities League for Democracy / Uni-ted Nationalities Association and others including the National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and National Council of the Union of Burma, whose mandates derived from the election results;c) The legitimizing of military rule.

The ethnic armies with ceasefi re agreements � United Wa State Army, Kachin Independence Army, Shan State Army, New Mon State Party, etc. � will not be able to infl uence the outcome of the referendum. They will also likely participate in the new elections as political parties. A crucial question is whether they can participate in the elections without giving up their arms? Most groups are not happy with the military�s constitution and do not want to give up their arms until a satisfactory constitutional arrangement is made. This will be a major issue to re-solve in the next two years leading to the elections.

Most ethnic armies that do not have a ceasefi re agreement � Karen National Union, Shan State Army (South), Karenni National Progress Party, Chin National Front, etc. � will side with the NLD and other po-litical parties if they continue to be excluded by the Burmese military. But if the generals make overtures and offer them comparable terms to those given to the ethnic armies with ceasefi re agreements, some groups might participate in the military�s Road Map process. To date, the military has not done so and this means that even after the elections in 2010, these ethnic insurgencies will continue to be a problem.

But whatever the motivation or game plan, it is clear that the gene-rals �

1. Are preparing for a change in the governance; 2. Are preparing for a change in leadership;3. Have set a time-table for the change in governance.

The dilemma is that by rejecting the military�s plans because they are not perfect or not in accordance with what we want, we may be pro-longing the dictatorship. By opposing the National Convention in 1993,


284 285

have we not prolonged military rule by 14 years? General Ne Win�s one-party rule by the Burmese Socialist Programme Party was imposed in 1974. It collapsed 14 years later in 1988. Could a similar fate not await the SPDC�s new game plan?

In 1990, most of us in exile rejected the call for elections and called for a boycott. We had to reverse our stand when the NLD unexpectedly won 82 percent of the seats. Should we this time also call for a boycott or should we be preparing our people to contest the elections in 2010?

But if the opposition endorses the military�s Road Map, it would mean that the 1990 election results are no longer valid. This in turn would mean that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the 1990 election-winning parties no longer have a mandate. Worse still, the new elections will legitimize military rule.

According to the new constitution:

� Political prisoners like Daw Aung San Suu Kyi cannot contest the elections;� Basic human rights are not guaranteed;� Power is concentrated in the President, who must have mili-tary experience;� There will be no independent judiciary;� There will be no independent legislature;� The President can decide the national budget;� The Commander-in-Chief can seize power if he deems natio-nal security is threatened;� The Commander-in-Chief will appoint 25% of national legis-lators; � The Commander-in-Chief will appoint 33% of regional and state legislators;� The Commander-in-Chief will appoint the Minister of De-fence who reports to him;� The military will be independent of the new elected govern-ment; � Cannot be amended except with the approval of more than 75% of the representatives in both houses of Parliament, and more than 50% approval of all eligible voters.

So it is clear that the new constitution will not lead to a democracy � �disciplined � or otherwise. So, the question, is why participate in the elections?

Is this the end of the road then? Is this a win-win solution for the military and a lose-lose solution for the democracy movement?

OptionsFortunately, the generals are not gods. They too have to die one day. Senior-General Than Shwe is 75 years old and reportedly not in good health. Therefore, we need to be prepared for a generational change.

Secondly, the results of the May 10th referendum, like the severity of the cyclone, may be a surprise. The Senior-General and most Burmese expect the generals to win. Vote manipulation is almost a foregone con-clusion. But there are indications that the military as a whole was taken by surprise by the Senior-General�s decision to hold the referendum in May, so soon after the uprisings in September 2007. It is possible that there is no master plan in place to ensure that the vote will be �Yes�. It will likely depend on the zeal of each local commander and results could be patchy.

Thirdly, even if the referendum produces the results that the mi-litary wants, there is no guarantee that the military will be able to maintain the absolute grip on power that it has managed to have up to now. Some political space has to be opened up if the election process is to have any credibility at all. Some opposition parties may be able to win some of the seats out of the 75% non-appointed national seats and 67% non-appointed regional and state seats. This could introduce some level of limited debate as opposed to no debate today. In the early days of the National Convention that was convened in 1993, the opposition was able to use the controlled forum to air their disagre-ement.

But even if the military appointed 25% of the national seats and 33% of the regional and state seats, and ex-military offi cers won all the remaining seats, there could still be room for disagreement. During Ne Win�s Burmese Socialist Programme Party era, the arrangement bet-ween serving and ex-service offi cers worked well because the socialist philosophy at that time frowned upon excessive wealth. The Burmese military today espouses capitalism and uses their privileges as offi cers to accrue wealth. Those offi cers who are required to doff their uniforms to become �civilian � elected representatives will lose their privileges and immediately become poor. This could create another unexpected dynamic within the ruling elite. Therefore, the situation may not be as bleak as it seems on the surface.

In any case, it behooves the international community to be prepared if an opportunity presents itself. What would a transition plan look like, assuming the Burmese generals want to talk? And what role can the international community play in such a transition plan?


286 287

Framework for a TransitionAssuming that the generals want a transition and are willing to start a dialogue, there will be two processes, one domestic and one internatio-nal to support the domestic process.

On the domestic front, key objectives for the negotiation should include:

1. A peaceful transition to democracy2. Building peace and ensuring justice3. Safeguarding the territorial integrity of Burma4. Affi rming Burma�s sovereignty5. Making Burma a prosperous nation6. No recrimination or fault fi nding

Ideally, participants in the dialogue and negotiations should include:

1. Members of the Burmese military:Members of the State Peace and Development CouncilMembers of the War Offi ce/Ministry of DefenceRegional Commanders

2. Democracy advocates � Political parties that won in the 1990 elections. (Rohingyas had a party that won several seatsin the 1990 elections).Political parties that will participate/participated in the 2010 elections88 Generation students (in Burma, in prison and in exile). Others political groups including exiles (NCGUB, NCUB, etc.).

3. Ethnic Nationalities: Representatives of the seven ethnic states considered�legal� by the military including ceasefi re groups.Representatives of the seven ethnic states considered �illegal�by the military, mainly non-ceasefi re groups and exiles.They include Rohingyas and smaller nationalities.

4. Buddhist, Christian, Muslim and other religious leaders.

5. Others � Academics, businessmen, workers, etc.

But it must be kept in mind that �A. No individual Burmese general, no matter how willing he is to negotiate, can go against the collective will of the offi cer elite. Therefore, any plan that directly infringes on the rights and po-wers of the military will not work.B. The Burmese military genuinely believes that it is the only institution capable of safeguarding Burma�s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Any plan must take into consideration the military�s key role in Burma�s future. It must also not infringe on Burma�s sovereignty or affect its territorial integrity.C. Since its independence, Burma has remained neutral in international big- power politics. Any plan must respect this neutrality, or it will not work. D. The Burmese military needs to be an active participant in any international process. It is paranoid and tends to be suspicious of any process especially if it is not in control. Without the con-sent and participation of the military, there can be no national reconciliation in Burma.

Given these key requirements, the current international mechanism for bringing about change in Burma will not work, and the generals will not talk. But if there were the political will, it would be possible to engage the generals in a dialogue:

1. First, the international community would need to accept the offi cial name �Myanmar�. This is a major concession that the democracy movement and the international community will have to make. I have personally argued to retain �Burma� based on the democratic principle that the people and not an elite should decide on a country�s name. But if this is the price we have to pay to get a dialogue going to bring about change in Burma, we should pay it for the sake of the people. In addition, it makes no real difference to a Burmese whether Burma or My-anmar is used. In reality, they mean the same thing: Burma is colloquial and Myanmar is the literary form. 2. It needs to be mutually agreed by the international commu-nity and the people of Burma, especially the generals, that the current situation in Burma is not benefi cial to either the people of Burma or the international community.3. Instead of merely making demands for the generals to change, the international community could approach the gene-


288 289

rals to see how the concerns of the generals can be addressed as we seek to bring about change together. 4. Instead of trying to impose external solutions, the internatio-nal community needs to convince the generals that their advice and suggestions could help Burma become a respected mem-ber of the community. In this sense, the UN needs to fi nd a way to convert the UN Secretary-General�s �good offi ces � mandate into multi-party talks based on a combination of the �Six-Party Talks on North Korea�6 and the �Quartet of International Medi-ators for the Middle East�7 as outlined below. 5. The United Nation�s involvement is crucial because the pe-ople of Burma (both the military and the opposition � democra-cy advocates and ethnic armies) are more likely to accept a UN solution rather than a Chinese solution or an ASEAN solution.6. The UN Secretary-General�s �good offi ces � process (Gambari) is more acceptable to the military, China, India and Russia. The advantage of the Gambari process is that it gives direct access to the top decision-maker in the military which is crucial. The disadvantage of this process is that it lacks an enforceable mechanism, and needs back-up from the UN Security Council.7. The UN Security Council process carries more weight but it is not acceptable to China, India and Russia for several reasons including:

The UN Security Council initiative is seen as a US-led attempt to inter-fere in domestic matters using the excuse of violations of human rights and democracy which cannot be denied in the case of Burma;

The perceived ultimate end result of UN Security Council involve-ment is foreign troops in Burma. This is unacceptable to both India and China.

This may change if the situation deteriorates further and the insta-bility becomes untenable for China. One possible scenario � frustrated Burmese turn on the visible perceived allies of the SPDC. In other words, the mobs turn on Chinese businesses in Burma like the 1967-68 anti-Chinese riots. In such a case, China could either turn to the UN Security Council or take matters into its own hands.

If the above conditions can be met, it must be made clear that the goal of the multi-party talks is not to overthrow the military regime but to help the people of Burma to reconcile their differences and to have a peaceful transition.

Goals of Multi-Party Talks8: � To affi rm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union

of Myanmar; � To assist in the process of national reconciliation in the Union

of Myanmar; � To assist in the transition to democracy in the Union of Myan-

mar; � To assist in the economic integration of the Union of Myan-

mar into regional and global markets.

Possible Participants in the Multi-Party Talks: 1. ASEAN - 3 seats (Thailand, Laos & ASEAN Chair)2. China3. European Union - 2 seats (Presidency & Commission)4. Japan5. Russian Federation6. South Asia - 2 seats (India & Bangladesh)7. Union of Myanmar8. United Nations � 2 seats (S-G Representative and UN

Resident Coordinator)9. United States of America

Possible Concrete Benefi ts from Multi-Party Talks: • Coordination of increased humanitarian aid. This is particu-

larly relevant in light of the current crisis after the cyclone.• Coordination of technical assistance by the Asian Develop-

ment Bank, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund,Japan, China, India and others.

• Coordination of economic strategies in the region. • Coordination of strategies to combat HIV-AIDS, infectious

diseases, drugs, human traffi cking, environmental degrada-tion, transnational crime, etc.

• Peaceful transition to a democracy.

Role of Burma�s Neighbours

India�s policy towards Burma is based on the strategic containment of China, the security of its energy needs, and the insurgencies in the northeast. But China is already the country with the most infl uence on the Burmese generals. India cannot hope to balance China�s infl uence


290 291

without quickly losing both its friends and credibility in the internatio-nal community. No amount of goodwill gestures or the sale of arms at friendship prices will tip the balance in favour of India. Its concern for the security of its energy needs cannot also be addressed by cosying up to the generals. They will sell energy from Burma to whoever they believe will benefi t them at any particular time. The only way India could hope to secure its energy supply is if Burma were to change and adopt open market policies. In such a case, its energy resource would be sold to the highest bidder, and not for political considerations. The economic development of Burma would also open up India�s northeast. India has tried very hard by political means to resolve its problems in the northeast. Much has been achieved but until the northeast develops economically, the problems will remain. Therefore, the key to success for India�s strategic concerns is a stable democratic and competent go-vernment in Burma.

China�s Burma policy is based on economic development and stabi-lity. Its eastern seaboard has developed by leaps and bounds. But there is an imbalance with western and south-western China. To correct this imbalance and develop the west, China needs access to the Indian Ocean. In the 1990s China poured resources into Burma to encourage the generals to open up a sea route for China�s Yunnan province. The Burmese generals did not deliver. Another fact that worries China is that the Chinese do not want their economic development to exceed their neighbours by too great a rate and expose themselves as a prime target for jealous competitors. They want the neighbourhood to develop in tandem with them. Burma, however, is a black hole and it is drawing unwanted attention to China by its wrong-headed policies. An emer-ging strategy concern for China though is its energy security. As China develops, its need for energy will increase dramatically. Most of China�s oil supplies today come from the Middle East. These crucial supplies reach China via a circuitous route through the Straits of Malacca. In any confrontation with the USA, the Straits would become a choke point for these vital supplies. An alternate strategic supply route through Burma is gaining popularity.

The hinese have, therefore, already decided that the status quo in Burma is not in their national interest. In spite of the veto in January 2007 at the UN Security Council, China is actively working with the UN to help bring about change in Burma. It is not interfering in domestic Burmese affairs but it is helping to create a climate where Burmese stakeholders may solve the problem themselves.

Therefore, a Multi-Party Talk on Burma would benefi t both India and China.

Thailand�s policy towards Burma has been one of exploitation and appeasement, and keeping the Burma Army at a distance. Faced with an unpredictable and belligerent neighbour, Thailand has generally had a buffer zone along its long undemarcated borders. But if both sout-hwest China and northeast India were to open up with a democratic and stable Burma, Thailand could benefi t much more from these two gigantic markets than merely exploiting Burma�s resources.

Bangladesh could also benefi t more from a stable and open market economy in Burma in terms of its food security. It would also benefi t from not having to periodically host Rohingya refugees and add a bur-den to its already overloaded infrastructure.

Even Laos would benefi t because it will have more access to markets in the west. Its access to China to the north would also be enhanced.

Therefore, in conclusion, a Multi-Party Talk on Burma including the Burmese military and Burma�s neighbours would benefi t all concerned. What is needed now is the political will - both domestic and internatio-nal � to bring it about.

The alternative is to do nothing until the crisis can no longer be ig-nored. The situation after the cyclone should be a lesson that we cannot afford to wait.

Notes1 �Burma in Revolt � Opium and Insurgency since 1948�, Bertil Lintner, 1999, Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, and �Burma � Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity�, Martin Smith, 1991, Zed Books, London, UK.2 �Burmese Nationalists Movements 1940�1948�, 1989, Kiscadale Publications, Edin-burgh, UK.3 �Making Enemies � War and State Building in Burma�, Mary P Callahan, 2003, Cornell University Press.4 �Index of State Weakness in the Developing World�, Susan E Rica and Stewart Patrick, 2008, Brookings Institution, USA. www.brookings.edu 5 �Peace and Confl ict 2008�, J Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, 2008, Center for International Development and Crisis Management, University of Maryland, USA. www.cidcm.umd.edu 6 �Six-Party Talks� - North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia & the USA.7 �Quartet of International Mediators for the Middle East� � The UN, the EU, Russia & the USA.8 Attachment to letter of Saw Ba Thin Sein, Chairman, Ethnic Nationalities Council, Union of Burma, to Ban Ki-Moon, United Nations General-Secretary, 24 September 2007 - �Multi-Party Talks�, Concept Paper.


292 293

The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma � An AssessmentMichael von Hauff

Introduction The sanctions by western countries against Burma are controversial. The supporters of the sanctions argue that the military regime has oppressed and exploited its own people and ignored human rights for decades. As a result, the population has suffered material and social impoverishment, which is unacceptable to the Western democracies. Therefore, sanctions were imposed to punish the military junta. The opponents claim that the sanctions are counter-productive; that the sanctions have led only to a political blockade by the military regime and the situation of the population has grown steadily worse. Only targeted cooperation or assistance in specifi c areas such as health, education, and research as well as cooperation with the few civil society organizations can improve the living conditions of the population and bring about a change in the despised policies. This paper provides a brief examination of where Burma stands today in economic terms and where the country�s real potential lie.

In the years following its independence in 1948, Burma/Myanmar was one of the economically wealthiest countries in south-east Asia. For many experts, the period between 1950 and 1962 was the �golden age� of the post war era. �The eight-year �Pyidawtha� Plan saw solid ac-hievements in infrastructure, agriculture and industry, despite failing to meet its ambitious targets because of the collapse in the price of rice after the Korean War� (Kyi et. al 2000, p. 2). Then, in 1962, the �Bur-mese Way of Socialism� began. This period has been analyzed and dif-ferentiated in great detail, for example, by Perry (2007). In 1988, after 26 years of socialist rule, a military government came to power, known as the �State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).� This military junta continues to govern the country to this day.

The military government initiated a process of transformation from a planned economy to a market economy in the years after 1988; it has not yet been possible to conclude this process. From a present perspec-

294 295

tive, it occasionally even appears as though the transformation process is still in its initial stages. First reforms and liberalization policies were introduced after 1988, intended above all to ease infl ows of foreign in-vestment and capital into the country. However, many of the reforms announced did not materialize, or have not been implemented rigo-rously so far. For this reason, Burma is currently in a �double transition from underdevelopment and from socialism (Andreff 1993, pp. 515).�

Rüland neatly sums up the initial situation: �It needs little foresight to forecast that Burma/Myanmar�s transition is likely to take place under highly adverse and diffi cult circumstances. Most likely it is a transition paralleled by economic crises, at a low level of economic development accompanied by spells of violence and ethnic fragmentation. The long duration of authoritarian rule further complicates a smooth transition as there is virtually no institutional base from which a new democratic government can be built (Rüland 2002, p. 22).�

Irrespective of this appraisal, however, it must be said � and here a remarkable contradiction becomes apparent � that Burma belongs to those countries that are rich in natural resources. Compared with many countries in the region, Burma has considerable deposits of minerals, natural gas, and oil, a great potential for an economically profi table timber industry, and large and fertile areas of land for agricultural use (Perry 2007, p.13). Most economic experts agree, however, that the eco-nomic potential for development has been insuffi ciently exploited in Burma, at least in the past four decades. Compared in both absolute and relative terms with other developing countries in the region, Burma has revealed a tendency to stagnate. Many experts even speak of economic and social regress as opposed to progress.

Although Burma is one of the richest countries in terms of raw ma-terials, many indicators reveal, economically at least, that Burma is one of the least developed countries in the region. As an example, let us look at per capita income as an indicator of how Burma compares with other countries in the region. While per capita income was more or less the same in many countries in the region at the beginning of the 1950s, the differences between them have increased enormously since that time. This is especially true for Malaysia but also applies to Thailand. At the other end of the spectrum, the per capita income of Burma fi rst fell below that of Indonesia during the mid 1980s and has been losing con-siderable ground to the Philippines as well since that time. In 1998/99, according to the World Bank classifi cation, Burma�s per capita income of 300 US$ made it one of the poorest developing countries (Least De-veloped Countries � LDCs).

The question to be asked is why the military regime has been unable

to improve the standard of living. The next section fi rst looks at what is required to maintain power in a dictatorship. This is approached in the context of a theoretical justifi cation for the �political economy of dictatorship.� Section three turns to the economic development and the quality of life of the population under a military regime. In section four, we will discuss and show evidence of the impact of sanctions on the living conditions of the Burmese population.

The political economy of dictatorshipThe political economy of dictatorship is discussed in economic terms in the context of the �new political economy�. In very general terms, the new political economy is concerned with the political decision ma-king processes. Here, political action is similar to economic trade and based on the maximization of individual utility. As with the purchase of goods, the individual must choose between two or more alternatives. In so doing, the person weighs the alternatives and then makes a deci-sion. As a rule, individuals will choose the alternative that provides the greatest utility.

Similar to the market for private goods, these same process delibe-rations can be applied to the trade in political goods. The supply of poli-tical goods is provided by the politicians, who receive fi nancial support and/or votes in exchange for their political goods from the consumers (voters). Political goods can include educational facilities, health clinics, roads and highways, as well as the provision of energy and drinking water.

The political calculation in maximizing utility focuses especially on offering those political goods that have the greatest demand and there-fore, can be traded for votes. The number of votes is decisive for access to or retention of political power, and consequently must be maximized. The actions of the ruling party are legitimized in the transfer of rights by the voters. The political economy in a democracy, in which political decisions are taken based on the reaction of the population or a cer-tain segment of the population, is different from that in a dictatorship (Durth, Körner, Michaelowa 2002, p. 194).

In contrast to a democracy, there is no transfer of rights to the dicta-tor; rather he appropriates them for himself. It is important to the de-mocratically legitimized politicians to have the right of rule repeatedly transferred. The dictator on the other hand must be shrewd enough never to lose the right of rule once seized. In other words, he must make sure that no one else has the desire or the ability to wrest power away from him. The difference between democracy and dictatorship

The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma

296 297

is poignantly phrased by Kirsch: In a democracy a politician must win over the majority, whereas, in a dictatorship the ruler must win over all those who might want to and could remove him from power. He must effectively neutralize those who would overthrow him (Kirsch 2004, p. 379�380).

The international community is in agreement that the military re-gime in Burma is a dictatorship. Therefore, Burma�s political regime is discussed here in the context of the political economy of dictatorship. The political economy of dictatorship has been defi ned by Tullock (1987), Olson (1993 and 2000), McGuire/Olson (1996), as well as Guy Kirsch (2004). The calculation of utility maximization by a dictator or a group of dictators may be summed up as follows: What is the most ad-vantageous way for the ruler to insure that power will not be wrested in the future. However, the political economy of dictatorship cannot only be viewed from the perspective of the ruler, but also through the eyes of those persons affected.

According to Olson (1968), in his theory about the infl uence of interest groups, it is very unlikely that a large number of individuals will unite to fi ght against a measure that hurts them all in roughly the same way. In such cases, each individual citizen has only a mini-mal motivation to undertake action against the measure (specifi cally, in this case, against the dictatorial regime). This also explains the empirically backed observation that only in the rarest of cases does a dictator fall victim to a popular uprising. In the case of a common cause that could benefi t all, it must be expected that each individual will wait for the other to take the fi rst step and, in this way, get a free ride to the profi ts.

This explains why the maximization calculation of the dictator or the dictatorial regime always aims at putting an equal burden on the largest portion of the population and selectively preventing any incentive for an overthrow. An opportunity exists when the living standard of the population continuously improves across the board and the people are content. However, this generally can only be partially successful. Conse-quently, it is necessary to pursue parallel measures to keep threatening individuals or small groups with especially strong interests in overthro-wing the dictatorial regime in check (Dauth, Körner, Michaelowa 2002, p. 195). In this respect, regimes normally rely on the use of a security apparatus that is well trained and equipped with the appropriate infor-mation, weapons and other instruments of power.

This allows us to explain the policy decisions made by a dictatorial regime or a dictator. Economic development, but also allocation and distribution decisions, which favor individual sectors like health, edu-

cation, and internal security, can now be understood in the context of the preservation of power. This is also the topic of a widely respected article by Josef Stieglitz written in 1996, in which he explains why seve-ral of the authoritarian regimes in the Asian region were economically very successful. In contrast, the rather more democratically oriented regimes were much less successful, for example, India. As long as the population is supplied with the respective public goods such as health and education and poverty is avoided, many dictatorial regimes are able to retain their hold on power. The situation is quite different for these regimes when the population reaches a higher level of need and demands other goods like participation, democratic elections, and the right to organize.

In the fi nal analysis it comes down to the question of who within the country poses a threat to the dictator or a group of ruling dictators. The literature at this point basically names three groups: the lower, the middle and the upper classes. There is a consensus, that the lo-wer ranks as a rule do not have strength or desire to turn against the dictator. They are unable to muster the motivation or the funding to cover the expenses of revolt. The upper class is also not normally the one that turns against the dictator as groups are small in number and these are the ones that profi t most from the dictatorship. These are the people who belong to the groups that are most closely associated with the dictatorial regime proper. Most of the coup d�etats � based on empirical knowledge � originate in the middle class. According to the theory of collective action, it is the mid-level bureaucrats and/or the groups of majors and colonels that, in contrast to the lower clas-ses, already possess the major means to power, like information or decision making authority, without belonging to the ruling group of dictators. No one individual in these groups has the chance to topple the regime. However, a group is suffi cient, if not to topple, at least to force change on the regime. To this extent, the middle ranks have an important strategic role.

Section three introduces three propositions known in the new poli-tical economy and typically followed by dictators or dictatorial regimes in their goal to retain power that the military rulers in Burma have only conditionally upheld. This leads to the conclusion that they themselves are unsure of their hold on power or are willing to risk their maximiza-tion of utility (preservation of power). If we assume, as already mentio-ned above, that Burma was until the 1950s still relatively well developed among the countries of the region with great potential for economic growth, it must be said today that this country has undergone an econo-mic regression, as is discussed in more detail in the next section.


298 299

Burma�s economic developmentA comprehensive analysis of the economic development and quality of life of the Burmese population is beyond the scope of this paper (for a detailed discussion of the economic and social development in Burma see v. Hauff 2007). The focus of this analysis therefore is on selected major economic trends and the development of the living standards of the population. Consequently, it is possible to recognize developmental trends and how they affect the lives of the population today. Finally, we will conclude with a discussion of the relationship between the develop-ment of the quality of life for the people and the preservation of power by the military regime.

Overall economic trendsThe following analysis of the development of the national economy gives special attention to the 1990s and the early years of the new mil-lennium. The conventional indicators will be used to analyze and assess macro-economic trends. Over the long term, real gross domestic pro-duct (real GDP) shows a positive trend. While average GDP growth was 4.7% in the 1970s, it fell back to 1.8% in the 1980s. In the 1990s, average GDP growth reached a relatively high level of 5.8% (World Bank 1999, p. 10). Looking more closely at the 1990s, it is striking that the rate of growth was initially very low, at 2.8% in 1990/91 and even -0.6 % in 1991/92. In 1992/93, there was then a huge jump to 9.7%, but this rate declined reaching 4.6% by 1997/98.

Only in 2000/01 was there again a slight increase in growth rate to 13.7%, with a constant level of more than 11% for the years 2001/02-2005/06. However, in this context, Set Aung identifi ed a signifi cant problem with the calculation method: �GDP calculation in Myanmar is reportedly quite complicated, dealing both with offi cial and parallel rates of exchange when converting some US$ dominated fi gures into local currency which results in infl ated and misleading fi gures. Hence it is neither easy nor appropriate to dollarize GDP data from local cur-rency directly into US$ currency (Set Aung 2006).� There is no satisfac-tory answer to this problem.

There are also conspicuously large differences between the various sectors of the economy. For example, the agricultural sector reported large variations (11.1% in 2000/01 and 4.7% in 2003/04), while the ma-nufacturing and processing sector reported a growth rate of 20% in the period from 2000/01 to 2005/06. The lowest growth was reported in the lumber industry with fi gures ranging between 3.2% (2000/2001) and

7.7% (2001/02). The large fl uctuation is also conspicuous in the cons-truction sector with 4.0% in 2000/2001 and 60.5% in 2002/03.

To sum up, then, Burma presents relatively a high level of economic growth in the 1990s, but this tended to decline in the years after 1994/95, leveling off at a level of around 5% until 1998/99 and increased until 2003/04 on more than 10%. On the whole, this roughly corresponds with the development in East Asian developing countries. In this con-nection, it should also be pointed out that the Asian economic crisis of 1997 had only a minor effect on economic growth in Burma, due to the extremely dominant status of the agricultural sector and Burma�s weak links with the global economy. The only appreciable effect of the crisis was a signifi cant decrease in foreign investment. Several UN experts (e.g., UNFPA) are of the opinion that the rate is actually much lower. The IMF estimates the current GDP per capita at 250 US$, which is lower than that of Cambodia, Bangladesh, Laos, and Vietnam (Bünte 2004, p. 374).

Figure 1: Development of GDP from 1990 to 2005(changes in %, in real terms)Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2007, p.136

Nonetheless, we can only draw limited conclusions from the general development of economic growth in Burma. In a country in which the agricultural sector is extremely dominant, the growth rates in that sec-


2,8

9,7

6

7,56,9

6,4

4,6

5,8

10,9

13,8

11,312

13,8 13,6 13,2

-0,6

-2

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

Development of GDP(Change in %)

300 301

tor are particularly relevant. Several of the more important features of the agricultural sector are: the contribution of agricultural sector as a share of GDP is nearly 60%. What stands out is that of the 26 million acres planted in 1995/1996; nearly 20 million of these were planted with food crops whose yields have been stagnant or decreasing over the last decade. Only one in six acres had crops whose yields outpaced the growth of population (Dapice 2003, p. 4). Over two thirds of all employ-ed persons are working in agriculture endeavors, yet only one third of the population works on farms larger than 3 acres. This explains the widespread poverty that exists in the rural areas.

Much of the labor force in the rural regions owns no land. Accor-ding to estimates by UNDP, 40% of the population does not own any agriculturally productive land. They work for daily wages. Beyond this, subsistence farming is common. Many of the small farmers face the additional problem of a lack of access to the fi nancial sector, i.e., they are unable to obtain loans. Another problem, especially for the small farmer, is the fact that the prices for agricultural products are set artifi ci-ally low by the government in order to prevent civil unrest in the cities. This in turn leads to low productivity, especially by the small farmers, who are unable to purchase affordable farm equipment because of the low incomes.

The system of government price controls below market value had a political objective and should have lead to higher export earnings. The negative consequences were known to the government. In April 2003, a liberalization of the rice trade was attempted, whereby the price of rice was allowed to fl oat, i.e., the state monopoly was ended (Bünte 2004, p. 275). However, the liberalization was short lived. In 2004, the govern-ment ordered a ban on the export of rice to prevent a supply shortage at home. This resulted in a sharp price decline, which had the effect of raising the infl ation rate. These few examples demonstrate the incon-sistency or impulsiveness of the agricultural policy does not contribute to a sustainable, positive expansion in this sector.

One further signifi cant macroeconomic indicator for the assessment of economic development is the infl ation rate. One peculiar feature of the way infl ation is calculated in Burma is that, up until 2000, it was restricted to a measurement of the consumer price index for Yangon, the capital. The market basket on which this was based originated from 1986, when the economy was still socialist in character. Up until the middle of 2000, no infl ation rates were measured to show price deve-lopments in the various provinces. Since 2000, the infl ation rate � re-trospectively also for recent years � has been measured for the country as a whole. If the available data is looked at in isolation, Burma has had

extremely high infl ation for many years. This had a particularly nega-tive impact on the poorer population groups, as 70% of their income is spent for the purchase of food.

Figure 2: Consumer Price Index 1993/94 � 2005/2006

Source: IMF 1999, p. 13, Asian Development Bank 2007, p. 303

However, it is diffi cult to assess the consequences of the high infl a-tion rate. First, and Burma is no exception here, lower income groups (which form the clear majority in Burma) have suffered the most from the high infl ation rate, while the owners of real capital belong to those who have benefi ted from it. With respect to rice, which is a particularly important product, urban workers have lost out as a result of infl ation, while the rural population has benefi ted from infl ation in this respect. In this context, it can certainly not generally be concluded that high ra-tes of infl ation exacerbate the impoverishment of the population. There is still no doubt that people living on irregular income are particularly hard hit by infl ation.

Here, too, a comparison between Burma and other countries in the region is interesting. As the following graph shows, the infl ation rate has been signifi cantly higher in Burma than in other East Asian countries since 1998.


302 303

Figure 3: East Asia CPI-Infl ation, 1994�2006 (in percent)

Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2006, p. 11

As concerns the development of employment and wages, the problem is that there is no offi cial measurement of the unemployment rate in Burma. Let me illustrate this with an example. According to the offi cial data for 1997/98, the potential number of people in gainful employment is 19.7 million out of a total population of 46.4 million. Of this potential fi gure, 18.3 million are currently employed. However, this fi gure does not include those unpaid family members who are also employed. In this respect, the offi cial unemployment fi gures do not stand up to much scrutiny. The unemployment rate stated for 1992/93 was 5.3%, while 5.8% was stated for 1994/95 and 4.1% for 1997/98 and 1998/99. The rate of increase in the number of people in employment rose slightly in the 1990s. While this was 1.4% in 1988/89, it rose by 2.89% in 1992/93 and stood at roughly 2.1% in the second half of the 1990s (Asian De-velopment Bank (Volume 2) 2001, p. 15). The offi cial unemployment data fails to consider the problem of underemployment. Also, sanctions aggravate the problem of joblessness. For example, as a consequence of the closure of foreign textile manufacturing plants in the past, hund-reds � some experts say thousands � of textile workers lost their jobs. In this context, the situation in the job market is much more strained than the offi cial unemployment data would indicate.

The development of income shows relatively large fl uctuations, as income in the agricultural sector depends to a great extent on when the monsoon starts and how heavy it is. For incomes in other sectors, it is a different story. At fi rst glance, incomes in the public sector appear to be relatively stable, although it is noticeable that they rose appreciably after 1988/89 in the course of liberalization. When the high rate of infl ation is considered, however, it has to be said that they rose by only 27.5% in the period between 1988/89 and 2000. However, in April 2000, govern-ment workers� wages were increased fi vefold, and other public-sector workers also received signifi cant wage increases. In increasing these wages, the government was reacting to growing dissatisfaction among public-sector employees, and in this way avoided potential political ten-sion. As discussed in section two, this reaction is typical for a political regime under a dictator. So far, no reliable data are available for income developments in the private sector.

As one would expect, the high wage increases in the public sector in 2000 did not help to reduce the large budget defi cit of the government. While the fi rst half of the 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the budget defi cit to 8% of GDP, it dropped again to 5% by 1999/2000, 5,8% in 2001/02, 3,6% in 2002/03 and 4,9% in 2003/04 (Asian Development Bank 2005, p. 321). The defi cit declined to below 4% in 2005/06 but re-mains high. �This is mainly due to several recent tax measures that are consistent with the bank´s past advice. These include steps to improve tax administration, reduce tax evasion, raise the exchange rate used to value imports for tariff purposes, and, more recently, contributions from SEEs� (IMF 2006, p. 6). What impact this will have on the budget defi cit remains to be seen.

One major reason for the continuing high level of public debt is the constant fall in the share of state revenue in GDP, from 17% in 1981/82 to 7, 9% in 1992/93 to 6, 4% in 1995/96 and to 4, and 6% in 2003/04. The budget defi cit could thus only be reduced by drastically cutting spending. Spending as a percentage of GDP fell quite considerably, from 7.2% in 1998/99 to 4.9% in 1999/2000. However, in 2003/04, ex-penditures again increased to 9.5% of GDP. Burma is the only country in the region where the budget defi cit is higher than the state revenue (4.6%) as a percentage of GDP. Most of this spending is accounted for by economic services, followed by �other services�, which also include military spending. The share of the military in GDP is approximately 3.2%, although experts assume that this share is considerably higher if the expansion and modernization of the army is considered. In other words, the military budget is probably by far the largest item in the Burma government budget. The last available data are from 1992/93,


-10

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

Myanmar China, People’s Rep. of Hong Kong, China Mongolia Taipei, China

304 305

when the military budget took up 43.8% of the total government budget (Asian Development Bank (Volume 2) 2001, p. 22).

By contrast, social spending fell from 1.8% in 1992/93 to less than 1% in 1999/2000. Finally, it should be mentioned that the defi cits of the state economic enterprises (SEE) have increased substantially since the beginning of the 1990s. These defi cits also present a great burden for the government budget. I will return to this topic in more detail in section 2.3 below. Greater stability in the value of money presupposes more autonomy for the Central Bank of Burma (CBM). Offi cially, the central bank is independent, and should therefore be able to control the money supply. In fact, however, it is very much tied to the directions of the government, and therefore also obliged to print more money to cover the government�s high defi cits. A reduction in this high budget defi cit would also require a sustained increase in signifi cant degree for the large budget defi cit.

Before concluding, a brief introduction to the structure of the Bur-mese economy is essential. This is the case, especially for the contri-butions of the three sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Burma�s status as a least developed country (LDC) underlines one typi-cal feature of its economic structure. One major characteristic of LDCs is their extremely one-sided economic structure. In Burma, the share of the industrial sector in GDP was only 9.2% in 2002/03, and the entire secondary sector revealed a share of 13.6%. While the industrial sector has been on a constant level of less than 10% ever since the end of the 1980s, the share of the secondary sector as a whole has risen somewhat. Figure 4 also shows that overall economic development depends very signifi cantly on the primary sector. Standing at 55, 3% in 1987, this sector�s share increased relatively slightly reaching about 57% in 2000. The tertiary sector also reveals a relatively stable share in GDP of 33%.

Seventy percent of the population is dependent on agriculture, which contributes over 50% and represents the most important sec-tor of the economy. This illustrates low productivity and subsistence farming is widespread. However, a positive assessment can be made for the rice production in 2004/05 which increased slightly to 24.5 mil-lion tons (prior year 22.8m tons). A new ban on exports is intended to keep the price stabile for the public. The export of teak wood was also higher in 2004/05 at 12.8m cubic feet which represents an increase of 13% contrasted with the prior year. It is also assumed that a signifi cant amount of illegal exports are shipped to China (Stärk 2006, S. 379).

The exploitation of natural resources like gold, copper, and iron is still to a large extent underdeveloped. There is also a great untapped po-tential of precious stones. This contrasts with a signifi cant increase in

the export of natural gas. Pipelines to India and China are in planning, although no decisions have yet been made. The decision is still pending whether liquifi cation should take place in Burma for later export by sea as liquid gas. What is remarkable in this discussion is that although natural gas is already an important export product and will continue to be one in the future, at the same time the energy supply in Burma is entirely insuffi cient, which severely impacts the economic expansion.

Figure 4: Contribution of the three sectors to real GDP 1987�2005

Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2007, p. 301

In closing, it may be safely said that the overall economic situation is in a desolate state. Furthermore, it is evident that the overall economic si-tuation is well below the level that would be possible on the basis of the economic potential of the country: the military regime has not been able to exploit this great economic potential, i.e., it is incapable of planning for positive economic growth. The question now is how the standard of living for the population specifi cally presents itself. Here again, this analysis examines a few selected developmental trends.

The standard of living A regional comparison with respect to social and economic development in East Asia provides the fi rst indication of Burma�s ranking. What is striking about the region is the relatively large reduction in poverty and positive development in living conditions (human development) from


57,4 57,3 60 57,2 54,5 50,6 48,4

9,7 10,5 9,9 9,7 1314,3 16,2

32,9 32,2 30,1 33,1 32,5 35,1 35,4

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

1988 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004

ServiceIndustrieAgriculture

306 307

the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. GDP per capita grew by an impressive average of 7.2% between 1985 and 1995 (World Bank 1999, p. 10). The number of people living in poverty fell from three-fi fths in 1975 to rough-ly one-fi fth in 1995. These altogether positive developments suffered a severe setback as a result of the fi nancial crisis at the end of the 1990s. We will have to wait and see how this develops in the long term.

At this point, the positive developments in Burma deserve to be men-tioned. Living standards have improved in Burma to the extent that life expectancy has risen and the infant mortality rate has fallen. However, as shown in the following table, the standards of living in most other countries in the region have risen far higher and have shown greater improvement than in Burma over the past decades. Table 5 points out that the childhood mortality rate is twice that of China and three times that of Vietnam. This is further evidenced by the fact that in Burma/Myanmar, according to data supplied by the World Bank at the end of the 1990s, malnutrition was seen in 39% of all children under the age of 5 years and a third of these children were seriously undernourished (World Bank 1999).

Table 6: Poverty and human development in Burma/Myanmar and East Asia

Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2007

The economic living standard of the population of Burma depends on a number of factors. The following discussion focuses on a few of these determinants. An initial evaluation of socio-economic living conditions can be found in the Human Development Index (HDI). A regional comparison shows that the HDI is higher in Burma than in Cambodia or Laos because of Burma�s better performance in the life expectancy and/or education index. Cambodia and Laos have a higher GDP index than Burma. In six original member ASEAN countries plus Vietnam, it can be seen that social development is well correlated with overall economic performance (Thein, Nyo 1999, p. 395). In other words, the higher the GDP index, the higher the life expectancy and/or education index. In the period between 1992 and 2004, the HDI was not stable. It should be remembered here that the way in which the HDI is calculated was modifi ed after 1998, and the values for 1999 to 2004 are not comparable to those for prior years.

Table 7: Human Development Index 1992�2005 for Burma

*calculated since 1994; a) old formula; b) new formulaSource: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1992�2007

The striking fact here is that Burma fell from 111th to 133rd place between 1992 and 1996, and has remained on that level ever since. The living standard is also illustrated by the proportion of the population living below the poverty line and by the distribution of income. In


Life expectancy atbirth

Infant mortality Rate of economicgrowth

(years) (per 1,000 livebirths)

(period average %)

1970 1993 2004 2005 1970 1993 2004 2005 1970-80 1981-90 1990-2004

Myanmar 50 60 60,5 60,8 122 79 76 75 4,7 1,8 5,6

East Asia 59 68 70,5 84 34 31 4,8 4,7 5,6

China 62 69 71,6 72,5 85 31 30 23 7 9,2 8,5

Indonesia 48 63 66,8 69,7 104 56 31 28 7,9 6,4 2

Lao PDR 40 51 54,7 63,2 145 95 82 62 10,5 3,7

Malaysia 62 71 73,2 73,7 46 13 7 10 7,7 6 3,4

Philippines

57 67 70,4 71 60 42 27 25 5,7 1,8 1,2

Thailand 58 69 70 69,6 74 36 23 18 7,3 7,9 2,8

Vietnam 49 65 70,5 73,7 55 41 19 16 4,6 5,9

Year HDI Rank Life Education GDP Index* HDIExpectancyIndex*

1992 111 - - - 0,385a)1993 123 - - - 0,390a)1994 132 0,54 0,7 0,12 0,457a)1996 133 0,55 0,71 0,09 0,451a)1997 131 0,56 0,71 0,16 0,475a)1998 131 0,57 0,71 0,17 0,481a)1999 128 0,59 0,74 0,41 0,580b)2000 125 0,59 0,75 0,41 0,585b)2001 131 0,53 0,72 0,39 0,549b)2002 132 0,54 0,73 0,39 0,551b)2003 129 0,59 0,76 0,39 0,578b)2004 130 0,59 0,76 0,39 0,581b)2005 132 0,596 0,764 0,389 0,583b)

308 309

this context, however, it should be emphasized that poverty is a very controversial topic for the Burma government.

This also explains why the government has no offi cial poverty line. Various sources disclose a poverty rate of roughly 23% (International Monetary Fund 1999, p. 30), while the UN estimates that over 50% of the population is living below the poverty line. This presents a problem when attempting to make international comparisons as the wide discre-pancy in the fi gures may lead to a distorted view. Nevertheless, the follo-wing table is provided in an effort to convey some basis for orientation. The following comparison looks at the rural, urban, and total poverty rates in selected countries.

Table 8: Estimated poverty for rural and urban households (various years)

Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators, 2004-2006

Compared with other countries in the region, Burma occupies a middle position in the ranking, with a poverty rate of 26.6%. However, it should not be forgotten that the situation of the poor differs from country to country. Based on a poll of 300 households, for example, it can be sta-ted for Burma that the situation of the poor in marginal urban areas

is extremely desperate (Clawson, Keller 1999). Men�s income average is roughly 100-200 kyats, while women earn as little as 50-200 kyats or less. Regular work is the exception for these people, and many people have to rely on casual or seasonal work.

This explains why the living conditions of these poor people are ex-tremely critical. One further striking aspect is that poverty is distributed extremely irregularly between the various regions. The greatest diffe-rence in the Poverty Headcount Index is between Tanintharyi Division (8.1%) and rural areas of Chin State (42.1%). Here it has to be pointed out that the index in urban Chin State is only 19% (and thus below the national average). The percentage of people living in poverty in rural areas is 47%. There are many reasons for this uneven distribution of poor people in Burma. The concentration of people living in the poorer border regions is one of them.

The 1997 Household Income and Expenditure Survey allow a number of conclusions to be drawn that go beyond the fi nding of a 26, 6 % poverty rate. The World Bank, for example, assesses the situation as follows: �Some 23 million people, or almost one in four households, live below minimum subsistence levels. If those whose levels of spending are not signifi cantly above (10 percent) the mini-mum subsistence level are included, the estimated poverty incidence jumps to about one in three households� (World Bank 1999, p. 11). If one also considers Burma had a very high level of infl ation in the 1990s � in 1998/99, infl ation was 49.1% � and this had a particularly negative effect on the price of consumer goods, a further burden for those living in poverty. According to many experts, the poverty rate is closer to 50% or even higher.

An analysis of the distribution of income and property makes the standard of living even clearer. As a rule, distribution of income is measured by the Gini coeffi cient. However, there are no reliable data for Burma for this purpose. Nevertheless, at least some qualitative sta-tements can be made. It can be assumed there is no great imbalance in income distribution in Burma. This is because of the largely homoge-neous population. Burmese society ��is not sharply divided into diffe-rent classes or castes with unequal access to property or unequal levels of income (Kyi et al. 1999, p. 130).� In fact, the majority of the Burmese population has such a low level of income that one cannot identify any great differences among them.

During the socialist phase, the distribution of real property was li-mited to a maximum of nine to ten acres per landowner, which resulted in a drastic leveling of ownership wealth. Similar �leveling tendencies� were also manifested in the private sector, which is why only micro-en-


National poverty line in % Distribution of poor

Country, year Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total

Myanmar, 2001 28,4 20,7 26,6 68,5 31,5 100

China, 1998 4,6 2 4,6 82,1 17,9 100

Indonesia, 2002 21,1 14,5 18,2 96,9 3,1 100

Laos, 1997 41 26,9 38,6 83,3 16,7 100

Malaysia, 1999 12,4 3,4 7,5 75 25 100

Mongolia 32,6 39,4 35,6 33,3 66,7 100

Philippines, 2003 n.a. n.a. 30,4 n.a. n.a. 100

Thailand, 2002 12,6 4 9,8 87,3 12,7 100

Vietnam, 2004 n.a. n.a. 19,4 n.a. n.a. 100

310 311

terprises and small business are privately owned still today. If Burma�s economy were to open up, however, this might result in greater inequa-lity in income and property distribution in the future, unless the state countered this development by some appropriate means. Currently, the problem is rather that Burma has a very low average income level and widespread poverty.

A country�s living standard is infl uenced by still other determinants. Health status and education are particularly signifi cant. Following the reorientation toward a market economy in 1998, it is interesting to note the highest goal formulated by the State Peace and Development Coun-cil was in the social area: �To promote the health, fi tness, and education level of the nation as well as to conserve the cultural heritage and the national character.� This objective was to be supported through the cre-ation of a national health committee, which was to be directed from the highest level of the offi ce of the First Secretary of the SPDC. In order to attain this goal, the government cooperated with international orga-nizations like the WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, and approximately 20 international NGOs (Bünte 2005, p. 11). In spite of these efforts, the health system in Burma/Myanmar still presents serious problems.

The health status is infl uenced to a great extent, by the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of poverty and the resources of the health system. An accessible and well equipped public health system is cruci-ally important for the population of the poor. This is especially true for women and children. There is adequate proof that children living in poverty are very prone to disease and infection. Further, there are some differences between the poor and non-poor in health status and access to services (World Bank 1999, p. 24). Those living in poverty usually have less access to healthcare facilities than those not living in poverty. This is the case, as can be empirically proved, for Burma.

Another crucial factor contributing to the state of the people�s health is their access to drinking water. The following facts should be consi-dered: (a) Burma has ample water resources. There are four main river systems covering most of the country. With seasonal variations, these rivers provide the population with an adequate quantity and quality of water. (b) Unlike other countries in the region, the relatively low level of industrialization and low level of motorization of the population has helped keep the country relatively free of any signifi cant pollution up to this point. In principle, this is true for the water supply.

It is therefore surprising that, according to offi cial statistics, an aver-age of only 67.2% of the population had access to safe drinking water in 2000. But here, too, there are huge regional differences. Yangon has the highest proportion of people (90.2%) with access to safe drinking water.

Chin, by contrast, has the lowest proportion of people with such access � only 44.5%. In this context, too, it becomes clear that the population of border areas has the worst supply of drinking water.

Among other things, this results in a higher child mortality rate as mentioned earlier. In 1997, Burma had a slightly higher infant mor-tality rate (77 compared with the average of 68 per 1,000 live births) and a signifi cantly higher child mortality rate (113 compared with the average of 77) than other Southeast Asian countries with comparable per capita GDP (between US$ 323 and US$ 396). While infant mortality fell slightly in the 1990s, child mortality increased (International Mo-netary Fund 1999, p. 32). Widespread child malnutrition is named as a signifi cant factor. In 1997, an average of 39% of the children under fi ve in Burma was regarded as malnourished. However, there are great dif-ferences here between different regions. The following table shows the development patterns for public health in Burma. From this, it may be concluded that living conditions in Burma are extremely poor. In princi-ple, this should indicate a great level of dissatisfaction with the govern-ment, i.e., the military regime. This is explored in the next section.

Conclusions: The divergence between the power cal-culations of the military regime and the living condi-tions of the Burmese people and the consequencesAn analysis of the economic situation and the living conditions of the Burmese people is limited by a lack of reliable statistical data. Often, only estimates of the true problems can be determined. The most re-cent census was conducted in 1983 and the last labor market study by the ILO was in 1993. This situation, in essence, complicates any reliable economic survey or political planning in Burma. Nevertheless, it is pos-sible at least to identify trends. The discussion has shown a national economic situation that, measured against the political potential and the development of neighboring countries, is entirely unsatisfactory.

The economic and social living conditions of the population are, correspondingly, equally poor. Many important business sectors, for ex-ample, the fi shing industry have experienced an economic ruin. There is a great divergence between the living conditions of the population and the power calculations of the military regime, as discussed in sec-tion two. There is great dissatisfaction with the current situation by the majority of the population. This is the reason why, over the past years, many qualifi ed workers have emigrated to other countries.

This teaches us that today�s theories of power preservation as prac-


312 313

ticed by dictators or dictatorial regimes are still largely inadequate. The empirical analysis of Burma clearly indicates that a hold on power can also be created even when the population is brought to a materially and politically totally inadequate living situation and many people are forced to live on the brink of subsistence. A signifi cant portion of the popula-tion as well as the lower and middle ranks are busy just trying to survive and are mainly lethargic.

Perhaps such preservation of power is dependent on certain religi-ous contexts, but this aspect cannot be discussed in a qualifi ed manner within the scope of this paper. It is also not clear whether the military regime has intentionally aspired to this strategy. All things aside, in the case of Burma the fact is the population has been unable under the rule of a dictatorial regime for the past 40 years � omitting the attempted democratic elections at the end of the 1980s and the demonstrations in the fall of 2007 � to free itself from this lethargy. This can be a rea-listic expectation only if the regime, for example, were to open itself to external pressure and allow change in the political structures and the decision making processes. Perhaps another option � and this is in contradiction to sanctions � would be to strengthen the middle class through some form of international cooperation and in this way gain infl uence on the political structure and decision making processes of the military regime.

This analysis of the economic and social progress in Burma de-monstrates in any case, that the political sanctions directed against the dictatorial regime have not achieved any positive results. Quite to the contrary, the case may be made that sanctions have served only to strengthen the regime�s hold on power, isolating the regime to the extent that it has refused every reform. As a consequence, the living conditions in Burma have gotten even worse in the last few years, which has obviously encouraged the lethargy more than it has reduced it (with the exception of the peaceful demonstrations in September/October 2007). The quality of the education system has declined to the point that it has become a burden to the country�s ability to compete in the long term even if it were to be free. The lack of human capital is exacerbated by the emigration of the qualifi ed workers. Even if the country opens to the outside world, the development of the institutions of a civil society would have to be relearned in small steps.

In this case, the question is what alternatives are there to sanctions. Burma teaches us that a dictatorial regime is anything but a homoge-nous and consistent entity. Even in Burma there are representatives of the regime with varying levels of willingness to introduce reforms. This is especially true for the groups within the middle class. Therefore, it

is valid to take soundings now to fi nd out where reforms should begin. There are evidently several representatives at the ministerial level who have recognized that the fi nancial sector is in need of urgent reform.

But also the education sector, the health sector and labor markets are in urgent need of reform or stimulation. There are some starting points for cooperation that would raise the standard of living for the population. Reforms could be implemented and could even signal the initiation of a process of transformation by the military regime. For this reason, a general conclusion may be stated: the sanctions have contri-buted to lowering the standard of living for the population, while re-forms offer a chance to improve the quality of life for population. What the opportunities are and whether the military regime will accept them, remains to be explored.

LiteratureAndreff, W.: The Double Transition from Underdevelopment and from Socialism in Vietnam, in: Journal of Contemporary Saia, 1993, p. 515�531

Asian Development Bank: Country Economic Report Myanmar, Volume 1 and 2, Manila 2001

Asian Development Bank: Key Indicators 2005, Manila 2005



Bünte, M. Myanmar, in: Ostasiatischer Verein e. V. (Hrsg.): Wirtschaftshandbuch Asien-Pazifi k 2004/2005, Hamburg 2004, p. 371�378

Bünte, M.: Dimensionen sozialer Probleme in Myanmar � Ein Überblick, in: Bey, U. (Hrsg.): Armut im Land der goldenen Pagoden � Soziale Sicherheit, Gesundheit und Bildung in Burma, Focus Asien Schriftenreihe des Asienhauses, Essen 2005, pp. 9�14

Durth, R., Körner, H., Michaelowa, K.: Neue Entwicklungsökonomik, Stuttgart 2002

v. Hauff, M.: Economic and Social Development in Burma/Myanmar, Marburg 2007

International Monetary Fund: Myanmar: Recent Economic Developmnets, Washington 1999

Kirsch, G.: Neue Politische Ökonomie, Stuttgart 2005

Kyi, K. M. et al.: Economic Development of Burma � A Vision and a Strategy, Singapore 2000

McGuire, M., Olson, M. (1996): The Economics of Autocracy and Majority Rule, in: Jour-nal of Economic Literature, Bd. 34, Nr. 1, S. 72�96

Olson, M. (1968): Die Logik des kollektiven Handelns, Tübingen

Olson, M. (1993): Dictatorship, Democracy and Development, in: American Political Sci-ence Review, Bd. 87, Nr. 3, S. 567�575

Olson, M. (2000): Power and Prosperity, New York

Rüland, J.: Political Transition in Southeast Asia � The Relevance of Burma, in: Oo, Z.


314 315

(ed.): Shaping Concepts for Democratic Transition in Burma � Policies for Socially Re-sponsible Development, Washington, 2002, pp. 9�29

Set Aung, W.: Myanmar Economy, 2006 (unveröffentlichtes Manuskript)

Stärk, M.: Myanmar, in: Ostasiatischer Verein (Hrsg.): Wirtschaftshandbuch Asien-Pazi-fi k 2006/2007, Hamburg, 2006, pp. 65�97

Stioglitz, J. E. (1996): Some Lessons from the East Asian Miracle, in: The World Bank Research Observer, Bd. 11, Nr. 2, S. 151�177

Thein, M., Nyo, K. M.: Social Sector Development in Myanmar � The Role of the State, in: ASEAN Economic Bulletin, No. 12 (1999), p. 394�404

Tullock, G. (1987): Autocracy, Dordrecht

UNDP: Human Development Report 1992-2000, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007

World Bank: Myanmar: An Economic and Social Assessment, Washington 1999

The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma: Implications for International PoliciesZaw Oo

IntroductionBurma emerged as a promising, newly-independent country in 1948 after nearly one hundred years of British colonial rule. Many obser-vers of the time lauded her rich natural resources, literate population, educated technocrats and legal administrative systems inherited form British colonial rule as key conditions for the country�s continued eco-nomic development and growth. Burma�s people proudly called their independent country �Golden Land� with reference to its rich natural resources, while the rest of the world knew Burma as the �Rice Bowl of Asia�� one of the world�s largest exporters of rice during the pre-World War Two era. An initial wealth of resources did not help Burma very much in the long run, however. After nearly sixty years of national independence, today�s Burma is an unfulfi lled golden land with an empty rice bowl; a country in which fi fty fi ve million people now face the prospect of a full-blown food security crisis in addition to other humanitarian emergencies.

Why did resource-rich Burma become one of the world�s least-developed countries in 1987, one still struggling to recover from eco-nomic failures? Many have suggested that �gross mismanagement� of Burma�s rich natural resources and its resource-dependent economy are the culprits behind this failure. However, resource dependence is not a new phenomenon. Since the time of colonial occupation, successive political regimes in Burma, including the British colonia-lists, post-independent democrats, military-dominated socialists and


316 317

today�s military capitalists, have all been dependent on the country�s rich natural resources. In spite of such dependency, different politi-cal regimes have produced different economic outcomes. When the mode of economic decision-making process was broad-based and democratic, Burma�s political regimes prior to 1962 chose export-led strategies, which in turn resulted in high economic growth and equitable developmental outcomes. In contrast, import-substitution and self-reliant strategies under the socialist period of centralized-planning process resulted in poor economic growth with negative developmental effects to all income groups. Although more recent strategies based on open-door economic policies have achieved faster economic growth, the benefi ts of economic growth are unfairly dist-ributed, leaving Burma�s vast population in deep poverty and forcing previously better-off middle class families into relative poverty.

Different economic policies have infl uenced the international community�s formation of policy towards Burma in different ways. Post-independent democratic Burma was a rising star of the interna-tional donor community, and its support of infrastructure building, agricultural extension and industrial development in Burma could have made the country into a �tiger economy� if the democratic re-gime there had not been removed from power by a military coup in 1962. The continuation of international donor engagement under the subsequent socialist regime proved less effective, since the policies that the socialist regime promoted were meant for inward-looking, self-reliant economy. The military regime that later came to power in Burma in 1988 did open up the economy for foreign investment and trade. However, the Western donor governments suspended almost all overseas development assistance programs to Burma when the mi-litary regime violently suppressed popular uprisings in 1988. In addi-tion, the United States and the European Union imposed additional economic sanctions against the Burmese regime for its continuing repression of the opposition and its failure to stem human rights vio-lations. Meanwhile, several Asian countries as well as Burma�s neigh-bors ignored international calls for economic sanctions and adopted the opposite strategy towards Burma, instead promoting trade and investments inside the country.

This paper argues that a particular combination of resource de-pendency and institutional defi cit is the most signifi cant source of Burma�s current ills. The role of natural resources in Burma has changed fundamentally since 1988, when the military regime then in power declared an open door economic policy and consciously fol-lowed particular strategies of natural resource development. At that

time, natural resources were not just economic resources aimed at achieving development outcomes. They also became political resour-ces aimed at maintaining regime stability. In this regard, this paper aims to explainthe underlying political mechanisms as determinants of developmental outcomes by arguingthat (1) direct sales of natural resources helped resuscitate Burma�s weak regime in its earlier phase from 1988-1992; (2) the joint extraction and exploitation of natural re-sources motivated long-time armed opponents to sign ceasefi re agre-ements with the military regime from 1993 to 1996; (3) the in-fl ow of foreign investments into Burma�s extractive sectors helped the mili-tary regime to overcome signifi cant political opposition in the country and to consolidate its political control there from 1997 to 2002, and (4) institutional, executive and other internal constraints of the military regime led to the implementation of sub-optimaleconomic and deve-lopment policies, setting the country into a deeper crisis.

By way of conclusion, this paper argues that Burma�s resource curse is in essence a political problem with economic manifesta-tions. Therefore, an examination of the underlying political mecha-nisms at work in the area of economic decision making makes the analysis of natural resource wealth and its impact on that country more complete and persuasive. Indeed, such analyses are also helpful when examining international policies toward Burma and the implications of such policies. Burma�s resource curse has had serious implications for both the incentive and disincentive policies adopted by various foreign governments, regional associations, UN organizations and international NGOs. Previous international poli-cies focused on broad sanctions against Burma became ineffective in the wake of the revenue windfalls generated by Burma�s natural gas sales to neighboring countries. Instead, if this sanction regime were instead fi ne tuned and focused on targeted fi nancial sanctions, these sanctions would be more effective in preventing the SPDC from using such resources for maintaining the current regime. Li-kewise, the old constructive engagement policies of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were incapable of bringing about meaningful change in Burma when the regime continued to ignore broad-based economic reforms in favor of capital-intensive resource extraction activities. Recent efforts by ASEAN to persuade the Burmese regime to undertake fundamental reforms in both the economic and political arenas while gradually integrating Burma into its regional cooperative mechanisms would seem to be a much more promising strategy.

The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma

318 319

Historical Overview: Natural ResourcesManagement and Economic Policies in BurmaContemporary literature on natural resources amply suggested that various political regimes that have been dependent on natural resour-ces for their income usually have negative economic consequences. Likewise, Burma falls into a similar vicious cycle of many other re-source-rich countries that are �cursed� to make poor economic per-formance. The Burmese economy declined from relatively a dynamic one in 1950s to a least-developed country by 1987, further lagging behind the vast sea of changes in the region throughout the 1990s and reaching to the bottom in terms of per capita growth in Southeast Asia at the beginning of new century.

An overview of Burmese economic history revealed several interes-ting relationships between natural resource management and regime maintenance. The relatively better economic performance found in 1950s was in fact due to U Nu regime�s active policy of agricultural promotion. Rice sector was the main engine of growth, and affl uent farmers were the main constituency of election-winning coalitions under robust parliamentary system. The economic decline under socialist era from 1962-1988 was mainly due to autarkic policies that choke off the rice sector from the gains of export-oriented growth po-tentials. While the country�s main population of farmers became poor and weak, the military regime could effectively maintain the socialist order. However, the autocratic head of the socialist regime, General Ne Win, also had peculiar obsession with nationalist zeal that he pre-ferred to keep rich natural resources of the country away from foreign interests.

Such policies of economic development and natural resource management were abruptly changed in 1988. The incoming military regime applied open door policy on natural resource sectors; however, the agriculture sector remained effectively closed both domestically and externally. In this period, liberalization of rice sector elsewhere in the neighboring socialist economies experienced rapid growth by just correcting market distortions and setting right economic incentives to the farmers. The military regime failed to liberalize the sector, which never recovered since 1988. The performance of rice sector continued to deteriorate in late 1990s, as the regime neglected any serious libera-lization efforts and failed to learn the lessons from its own successful decontrol of beans and pulses and comparable experiences in China and Vietnam. The demise of rice sector was perhaps accelerated by the increasing fl ow of revenue from hard minerals and natural gas.

Graph 1. Shifting signifi cance of natural resource exports--rice, teak and gas

Source: Key Indicators, ADB, 2006, and various issues of Central Statistical Organization, Mynmar Statistical Yearbook.

At this juncture, Burma experienced a whole range of �resource curse� effects that incapacitated state of manufacturing sector, deferral of agricultural liberalization and fundamental reforms, wasteful spending on new capital and nuclear projects while neglecting public expenditures of social services, and distortion of public fi nances. Meanwhile, humani-tarian conditions including food security in the country was so alarming that the United Nations came up with a rare criticism directed against the regime on their �ill-informed and outdated socio-economic policies.�1

How did the current military regime end up in poor economic performance even after receiving huge income from the country�s rich resources? A careful examination of economic policy changes in Burma showed that the massive sale of teak and fi shery resources delayed much needed reforms in 1990s, which then became almost totally neglected when the regime began to enjoy gas bonanza after 2000. The regime introduced market reforms only partially to benefi t a few private sector fi rms that happen to be owned by or connected to the military. It opened market access and invited foreign investments only selectively to a few extractive sectors. In other words, misguided economic policies, when they are combined with particular structural conditions of resource dependency, created the �curse.� These policies of state capture and partial reforms, which preceded the discovery of natural gas reserves in offshore seas of Burma, brought the economic diffi culties into a deeper crisis when the regime began to receive booty futures at the beginning of this century.


0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%

1960 1980 1990 2000 2004

Crops

Teak

Gas

320 321

The experience of Burma�s poor economic performance in the context of natural resource boom in 1990s can also be contrasted with high growth performance of Vietnam, another transitional economy in her neighborhood with comparable socio-economic and political chal-lenges. Like Burma, Vietnam also found oil and natural gas in 1990s to earn substantial export revenue from its sales to Thailand. However, the Vietnamese leadership shrewdly crafted a plan to utilize these resour-ces to boost domestic economy. While the Burmese leaders preferred quick return of cash from gas sale, the Vietnamese leadership opted the construction of domestic pipeline from off-shore gas fi elds and fertilizer plants to stimulate downstream growth within the country. Such policies of natural resources combined with export liberalization not only boosted Vietnam�s agricultural production in late 1990s but also transformed the economy into an attractive manufacturing base for the foreign investors. Meanwhile, the Burmese economy suffered from haphazard attempts to liberalize the economy while the country�s nascent manufacturing sector never developed due to serious shortage of electricity and favorable export environment.

If misguided economic policies, not the richness of natural resour-ces, accounted such misery in Burma, a question could be asked why the regime continued to be misguided for so long. Why did the mili-tary regime opt for sub-optimal economic policies when it had every opportunity to correct them? Indeed, there are many policy options to save such resource-dependent economy from the curse. While other resource-rich economies use their endowments for long-term compa-rative advantage, Burma fails to offset any of these negative effects from resource boom. Yet to explain why does Burma experience slow growth and leading to the resource curse, it is also important to explain why the regime fails to take corrective action.

The key to these questions lies not in the conditions of resource abundance and extractive economic policies but the particular political confi gurations and processes that led to the adoption of such policies in a particular structural context. A short answer is that rich natural resources did not make a Burmese rentier state, but a military regime that utilized these natural resources to maintain power led to a rentier state in making. A detailed narrative is offered in this section to explain how the political objectives of regime maintenance led to the choice of particular resource development policies, which in turn generated serious consequences of resource curse effects and poor economic per-formance in Burma under the current military regime.

Evolving Process: Resource Dependency, Regime Maintenance and International Policy Implications

Regime Survival and Fire Sales of Resources, 1989�1992The 1988 popular uprisings marked one of the most important turning points in Burma�s modern history. Although the military was able to suppress the popular uprisings and imposed martial law on September 18, 1988, the military regime was barely surviving. The entire govern-ment machinery collapsed as there were massive resignations from the Burma Socialist Program Party, the military regime inherited very little state resources to restore order. The title of the military regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, itself signifi ed the priority of restoring order over peace and development. For the sake of immediate survival, the SLORC did not try to revive the socialist-style mass politi-cal party but expanded the armed forces to take a dual role in restoring order and managing governance. In the process of such expansion, the SLORC made three important decisions. First, the SLORC expanded the armed forces from 180,000 troops at the time of 1988 to a sizable force of 500,000 by the end of century. Second, it also modernized the armed forces and improved its equipment, particularly on the outmo-ded navy and air force. Third, instead of commanding and controlling the state authority indirectly through a cadre party system or civilianiza-tion of military bureaucrats, as previously done under the Burmese way to socialism period, it decided to assign military offi cers directly on all aspects of the executive, legislative, and judicial elements of state gover-nance while they were still serving the armed forces.

Rapid expansion of force structure, military capability and dual responsibilities put a heavy price on the regime. The implementation of such plans took place under the circumstances of huge fi nancial constraints imposed by Burma�s traditional donors who suspended all their bilateral and multilateral assistance in protests of brutal killings in 1988. The massive breakdown of government functions during the six-month-long mayhem also left the regime with no means to collect taxes and other revenues. The entire economy contracted rapidly after the combined effects of demonetization of the previous Socialist go-vernment and the disruption of production and trade activities during the uprisings, which in turn left the regime with very little resources to stabilize the situation. The option to pacify the restless population through economic incentives was simply non-existent, and therefore, the regime simply used the armed forces to control the population by repression. With few resources were available domestically or external-


322 323

ly, the regime had no other options but to adopt open door policy and allow foreign fi rms to exploit forest and fi shery resources in exchange for quick income.

Thailand, probably the most problematic neighbor in terms of se-curity to the regime, also responded to open door policy favorably by investing heavily inside Burma while acquiring concessions on logging, fi shing, extracting mineral resources and most importantly, buying na-tural gas from the regime. Thai timber companies managed to take 17 concessions worth more than US$100 million while 8 fi shing conces-sions brought additional US$17.7 million by end of 1989.2 In addition to the revenues raised from resource sales, the regime also received the bonus of diplomatic assurances from these neighbors that they would not allow any meaningful sanctuaries for the members of the exiled opposition to organize counter-attack against the regime. The infl ow of over US$100 million dollar did resuscitate the regime from the brink of state failure when it was most vulnerable under various pressures.

While Burma�s neighboring states were quick to respond to the �open door� policy by fl ooding investments into the untapped sectors of various natural resources in Burma, the Western governments conti-nued to refrain from engaging with the regime. Although the regime�s policy declarations committed liberal positions particularly in foreign investment areas, the actual practice of reform process was rather patchy. Traditional donor governments such as Japan and Germany, which funded almost 80% of overseas development assistance to the country prior to 1988, joined with other Western governments in criti-cizing the regime�s human rights records than paying attention to the regime�s economic agenda. There was not even technical assistance to guide the government policies for natural resource management under �open door� strategy. On the other hand, the regime�s military expan-sion plans favored quick generation of revenues from resource sales, leading to further ignorance of long-term structural adjustments in the economy.

Meanwhile, the political deadlock between the regime and the main opposition party, the National League for Democracy has deepened when the regime refused to transfer power to the NLD that won the 1990 elections in a landslide victory. The junta�s chief, Senior General Saw Maung, was abruptly retired by fellow offi cers when he became burned out with martial laws and began to contemplate speedy transfer of power to the NLD. General Than Shwe succeeded the chairmanship of SLORC in early 1993 and began to implement the constitutional convention, a plan put forward by the SLORC to defer the immediate transfer of power to the NLD.

Regime Building and Booty Futures, 1993�1997Facing powerful forces of urban dissidents, the military regime sought ceasefi re agreements with various armed groups in Northern Burma since 1989. Among the armed groups, the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) was the major threat against the regime because of not only their military capabilities and good relationships with the neighboring People�s Republic of China (PRC) but also their ideological affi nity to many dissident groups in urban centers where popular protests were staged against the regime. The CPB was less keen on making peace with the regime; however, it launched the most serious military cam-paigns against the regime in early 1989 while providing material assis-tance to some dissident groups in the urban areas. The Directorate of Defense Service Intelligence under the leadership of SLORC�s secretary (1) Brig Gen Khin Nyunt handled the CPB�s threats in both urban and frontier areas and fi nally found an opportunity to broker a deal with Wa and Kokang ethnic leaders under CPB in staging mutiny against their party elders. The CPB collapsed in late 1989 when Wa, Kokang, Shan and other ethnic factions threw their support behind the mutiny while the Chinese authorities tacitly paved the way for the new groups to as-sert power.

CPB quickly disintegrated into several ethnic factions and each faction made separate ceasefi re agreements with the military regime from 1990 onward. The regime rewarded these agreements with the concessions to these groups to control the areas adjacent to the lucrative border trade routes and to begin extracting precious gems and other minerals from the areas in a large scale. As a result of ceasefi re agreements, the government troops were able to retreat temporarily from the frontlines to control the urban centers, which was a more immediate threat to the regime.

The deal that achieved both the collapse of serious communist threat and the pacifi cation of highly capable ethnic armies provided a serious lesson for the SLORC to handle the rest of the ethnic resistance forces by offering economic incentives and development assistance to keep them away from resorting to armed movements. SLORC secretary 1 Brigadier General Khin Nyunt extended ceasefi re offers to other ethnic resistance groups in eastern and southern Burma in order to neutralize their armed threats. As a result, many more ethnic armies entered into separate ceasefi re agreements with the regime in mid 1990s, the num-ber grew into a total of 17 groups by the end of the century. In return the SPDC established administrative and security outposts in the hearts of ethnic resistance areas through border area development program.

Although military superiority of Burmese armed forces could ex-


324 325

plain relative stability of ceasefi re agreements, it did not explain fully about why any of the armed opponents in Northern Burma did not capi-talize on a weak regime that was preoccupied with urban-based protest movements. While the military regime openly acknowledged (and often exaggerated) the communist threats from both military offensives in the north and underground (UG) elements in the urban areas, a few ethnic resistance groups aided the communists or the urban protesters by launching their military campaigns against the regime. The regime found out this disconnect between the urban opposition and rural eth-nic rebellions, and tried to put a wedge by actively reaching out to all other ethnic groups in mid-1990s and pacify them with ceasefi re deals.

In that process, abundant supply of natural resources in ethnic areas, which used to fuel confl icts between central government and dozens of ethnic minorities before 1988, became a source of incentives for ceasefi re agreements. Obviously, the regime�s strategy of ceasefi re agreements and guaranteed access to extractive activities played a major role in stabilizing these ceasefi re agreements. From the perspectives of ethnic leaders, there were many factors that infl uenced their ceasefi re decisions, and among them, war weariness, non-requirement of disarmament, changing geopolitical situation and reduction of war-related abuses were critical in addition to economic opportunities.3 From the regime�s perspective, the real benefi t was the shifting of their military resources from the fi ght against rural guerillas to the control against urban dissidents.

Meanwhile, the regime�s policy of ceasefi re agreements gained tacit support from the neighboring countries that were also keen to promote cessation of deadly confl icts in Burma�s border areas and resumption of trade fl ows across the borders. Accordingly, the policies of supporting anti-Rangoon elements in the name of communism or buffer zone have been replaced by common commercial interests that sought to extract Burma�s natural resources. Squeezed between relentless pres-sures from both the military regime and the neighboring states, several ethnic armed groups simply took the offer from Rangoon to become subsidiary to cross-border activities of joint-extraction and production. For instance, Kachin ceasefi re groups got the concessions from the regime to produce timber in Northern Burma to export to China while Democratic Buddhist Karen Army (DKBA), a splinter group of Karen resistance, supplied timber to Thai saw mills set up across the border.4

Minimal disruptions from armed confl icts under ceasefi re agreements allowed collusion and tacit cooperation between the SLORC, its troops in the war zone, certain ethnic armed groups and business fi rms from the neighboring countries to engage in various extractive activities during the ceasefi re period.

Another important cash crop, �poppy cultivation� also rose from 103,230 hectares in 1988 to 161,012 in 1991....the annual heroin pro-duction skyrocketed from 68 tons to 185 tons� as the ceasefi res in Northern Burma could relieve many new laborers to the poppy fi elds. The cessation of major battles provided an opportunity for Burma�s two largest and most well-equipped ethnic armed groups, the United Wa State Army and Mong Tai armies to engage in labor-intensive poppy growing. The windfall of booming drug trade was quite substantial, and both went on arms spree.5 As predicted that �diffuse resources (which are scattered over a larger area and hence harder for any single group to capture) far from the capital lead to �warlordism,� the areas control-led by both the UWSA and MTA established de facto sovereignty with economies built around the resource itself. By end of 1990s, the MTA surrendered in en masse in exchange for their leader Khun Sa to refuge in Burma�s capital, Rangoon. A more powerful UWSA did not exercise that option, but it sought ceasefi res with the SLORC since 1989, which resulted in booming drug trade in the Wa region. Both ceasefi res, ac-cording to the U.S. government, �have had the practical effect of condo-ning money laundering, as the government these groups to invest in �legitimate� business as an alternative to traffi cking.�6

The regime�s pacifi cation schemes also worked well with its own disgruntled group powerful regional commanders who commanded the border regions. granting resource extraction activities in the ceasefi re zo-nes also helped local commanders from the government�s military units to take their lion share from the whole range of production to traffi cking of natural resources. Joint extractions and sharing of booty futures not only helped stabilize the ceasefi re agreements, but also facilitated the regime�s efforts to allocate rents to the rank-and-fi les and to maintain the loyalty of regional commanders who really controlled the troops. Timber, gems and other natural resources are lucrative spin-off for re-gional commanders, who decide how much of these resources go out of any region. Awarded with booty futures, the regime leaders sitting at the capital can ensure that regional commanders who really controlled vast areas of Burma�s peripheries with rich natural resources would provide basic services of governance in these areas.7 By appointing, reshuffl ing and demoting regional commanders, the regime gradually built a reward system to maintain loyalty from the mid-level army commanders.

During this period, the western governments that have been pursu-ing disincentive policies toward the military regime did not take an active approach to the emerging conditions of joint exploration, extrac-tion and production projects in Burma. Some were less prepared to take a stronger stand against the seemingly positive developments such


326 327

as ceasefi re agreements and participation of ethnic groups in consti-tutional discussions. A few governments made harsh condemnations against the regime for its failure to honor the election results; however, such public outcries were not followed up with substantive policy re-sponses. More importantly, several governments took no stand against their business fi rms investing in extractive sectors in Burma, which replenished foreign reserves of the regime.

Meanwhile, the SLORC�s top leadership commanding from war offi ce in the capital also retained an edge against fi eld commanders by 1995. By then, the regime has received substantial foreign invest-ment and export earnings into the central coffers. Foreign investment commitment made in 1995 was amount to US$1.3 billion, exceeding a combined total of the previous years since the open door policy was announced. On the political front, the regime released Nobel Peace Laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, showing its con-fi dence to deal with popular movement. By 1997, the regime had not only survived the popular movement, it had also secured control over the largest area of border regions for the fi rst time and built substantial economic base to support its control over the country�s entire territory and populations. With full of confi dence, the regime decided to shake up its Council structure in November 1997, and also changed its title from the one mainly oriented to law and order enforcement to a more forward-looking one, the State Peace and Development Council.

Regime Consolidation and Gas Economy, 1997�2004By 1997, SLORC has already controlled urban dissent through sheer size of troop expansion and neutralized peripheral armed movements partly through economic incentives in joint extraction schemes and sharing of side payments from such schemes. The regime now focu-sed on its internal consolidation. The urgent priority was to control internal factions and frictions within the armed forces. Several factions are divided along different fault lines: between war offi ce offi cers and fi eld commanders; between the intelligence and combat units; between graduates of different academies, and between generations. Such factio-nalism posed dangers of military coup, and the top leaders are compel-led to use side payments in rewarding most senior military leaders to lucrative cabinet positions. As a result, the government of the SLORC and SPDC grew exponentially in the last seventeen years. In 1988, the SLORC established a cabinet including only seven ministers who took charge of seventeen ministries. By the time of reconstituted SPDC in 1997, the number of ministers has grown to thirty seven ministers co-

vering thirty two ministries.8 The number of deputy ministers was also increased dramatically in 1997, by about 50 percent to 35 within a year or two.

The growth of ministries occurred, as commercially lucrative line ministries are divided into smaller ministries, creating rental heavens for individual ministers to set monopolistic rules and predatory poli-cies. For instance, a single agriculture ministry was multiplied into four ministries, each controlling lucrative resource sectors. In another ex-ample, a single ministry of transport and communication has been divi-ded into three miniseries such as transport, rail transport and telecom-munication. The most interesting new ministry created in late 1990s was the Ministry of Military Affairs, an addition to the separate Ministry of Defense, which supposed to handle all the business and commercial activities on behalf of the armed forces. The decision refl ected that �the corporate interests of the military establishment would be explicitly taken into consideration at the government level beyond the (previous) implicit representation under the ambit of the defense ministry.�

Since mid 1990s, the SLORC appointed a number of powerful re-gional military commanders in the cabinet. Like Indonesia�s territorial command structure, the regional commands within the Burmese ar-med forces �wield considerable powers and have extensive extracurricu-lar perquisites� since earlier times. When the military established mar-tial laws and governed the country under the military administration, the regional commanders usually chair the law and order restoration councils at the state and division levels. When the SLORC was more preoccupied with the restoration of ministerial functionaries and mana-ging government fi nances at the central level, the regional commanders took charge of the overall administrative functions at the local levels and built power bases. The appointment of these powerful commanders in the cabinet positions prevented them from becoming too powerful or forming factions across the regions.10 To some ambitious commanders, the appointments served as side-payments in exchange for surrender of their positions as area commanders particularly in the lucrative regions that put up black markets, border trade routes and illicit activities.

During this period, the United States imposed ban against new investments in Burma while establishing visa restrictions against key offi cials of the military regime. Although the European Union quickly followed suit by imposing similar visa ban and arms embargo, all these policies made no effort in stopping both US and European fi rms from operating extractive industries in Burma. By early 2001, the gas pipe-line constructed by the consortium of American fi rm Unocal, France�s Total, Thailand�s PTTEP and Burma�s MOGE began to transport gas


328 329

to Thailand, and revenue stream also increased steadily afterward. The windfall of natural gas sale not only brought foreign exchange to the regime, the prospects of more reserves in the offshore sites and weaker bargaining power of the military regime drew more investments into the sector and attracted additional revenues from new projects.

Moreover, revenue from oil and gas sector has a distinct impact on the governance functions of the regime than the earlier windfalls from other resources such as teak, gems and agricultural products. Natural gas is a point-source type of resource that requires specialized foreign fi rms to use capital and technology-intensive extractive methods to ex-ploit them. In case of Burma, offshore location also helped the regime to reduce any chance of looting at the production site or being threatened by ethnic separatist movements who never had the naval facilities. The revenue generated from the industry fl ew directly into the centralized process where the regime�s top leaders redistributed among lower-ran-king offi cers, soldiers and well-connected private sector fi rms through budgetary allocations as well as business and trade licenses. With fl ows of gas revenues increased, more power was consolidated in the hands of the top leaders whose central task was simply distributing the rents and guarding the status quo without really achieving any improvement in the economic performance.

Regime Decay and Resource Curse?, 2004�present Although the gas bonanza enhanced the power of the top leaders, it also led to regime extravagance in terms of myopic and wasteful spending, including the building of a new capital and the relocation of the entire government to Nay-pyi-taw; the acquisition of a nuclear reactor and other advanced technology; various public works on non-essential, mo-numental projects, and repeated arms purchases�all costly endeavors that do not promote development or alleviate the current sufferings of the population. In the areas of public fi nance, the extractive capacity of the government has become very weak, with every ministry was predis-posed to disburse and spend the allocated budget than to consider cost recovery or cost effectiveness in spending the budget. Since less taxa-tion was collected from the public, the regime also felt less obligated to spend and allocate more budgetary resources to social services. All of these developments indicate that resource curse has already affected the Burmese economy and its inhabitants.

Will the resource curse affect the regime internally? Huge expansion of military into government on the basis of allocating resource rents among military factional leaders may have enhanced regime stability;

however, it did not translate into state capacity in terms of policy stabi-lity and coherence. First, there is no rationalization of addition of new portfolios and the expansion of ministries, as new ministries were crea-ted simply by either dividing up the existing ministries or upgrading directorate and departmental offi ces into ministries. Second, there is lack of good coordination to offset policy fragmentation resulted from the increase in the number of ministries and ministers.

While there are divergent and often inconsistent instructions from the SPDC and the ministries, the state intervention in various econo-mic sectors has never decreased. This perhaps led to the practice of uncoordinated government interventions, frequent use of decrees and laws, and duplication of enforcement by various agencies. Many of such laws and regulatory enforcements are done with the purpose of setting and seeking rents, disintegrative consequences were visible in the form of disruptive government functions. The resulting outcome is worse than the metaphors used by Mancur Olson�s distinction between stationary and roving bandits--the centralized and decentralized pat-terns of rent-seeking.11 It appeared that the top leadership of the SPDC ruled as stationary bandits, while the regional commanders acted as roving bandits, leaving the citizens at the mercy of unpredictable and costly interventions from the disorganized state hierarchy.

Although power was consolidated in the hands of top commanders who controlled the centralized process of rent distribution, such pro-cess did not guarantee to be effi cient and effective. Like centralized planning system that the previous military regime under Burmese way to socialism had practiced, the rents distributed were often wasteful wit-hout contributing toward building loyalty to the top leaders. The mas-sive purge of military intelligence illustrated the ineffi cacy of building loyalty within the ranks. The military intelligence was a favored military unit with several thousands of its elite members who benefi ted the lion share of rents generated through its dealing with ethnic ceasefi re groups in northern Burma as well as other illicit economic activities el-sewhere. However, the whole apparatus was completely purged in 2004 when their leader General Khin Nyunt was removed.

Another inherent problem had to do with the nature of regime that relied on the military as its sole constituent. Maintaining loyalty from the military was an overriding objective for the regime even at the expense of the general population. For instance, the regime increased the wages of civil servants, the majority of which were in-service and retired military personnel, for four to six folds in April 2006. The result was a three fold increase of the government�s total wage bill, increasing from Kyat 77.8 billion in the estimated 2006 budget to Kyat 247.2 billion, causing infl a-


330 331

tionary pressures on the entire population. When the regime sought to narrow the massive budget defi cit of Kyat 600 billion by raising the fuel prices, it instigated widespread resistance from the population, which challenged the regime�s stability for the fi rst time in nineteen years.

The centralized control over the rent allocation has another inherent problem because it could easily create grievances within the lower ranks even within the same patronage networks. Recent scandals disclosing lavish living styles, deviant social fi xtures and other luxury amenities for the top leaders and their family members made the lower level parti-cularly detested against perceived unfair distribution. At the same time, the larger the size of the rent becomes, the greater the attractiveness of the prize to grab by any challenger against the current leaders of the regime, who were already viewed widely as illegitimate. This higher threat of power feeds into this vicious cycle of rent-distribution along patronage networks, which in turn tends to cause more factionalism and disputes. In a way, rich natural resources that resuscitated, built and consolidated the power of the regime has now cursed the leaders and threatened the integrity of the underlying institution the regime was built upon. Economic impact of resource curse is already proble-matic; however, their political impact can be lethal to both the country and the regime in power.

ConclusionLike many other resource abundant countries, Burma is caught up in a myriad of economic woes. Recent developments in the country are clearly manifestations of resource curse, and one sees similar develop-ments in other resource rich countries that have gone wrong. Although natural resources helped the Burmese regime to survive popular dis-content and uprisings, build coalitions with patronage constituents as well as former armed opponents and consolidate its leadership in the country, Burma�s natural resources have also been/become a main source of tension within the armed forces entrusted with maintaining the regime�s stability and its existence. Such internal erosion at a time of heightened societal challenges suggests a recipe for the end of military rule, and Burma may not be spared from the famous dictum that �the armed forces as a government always undermine[d] and destroy[ed] the armed forces as an institution.�12 Burma�s natural resources may prove an accelerant in this process.

The question, then, is what set of international policies can accelerate the change process in Burma. Previous international policies of broad trade sanctions proved rather ineffective. Although such sanctions ini-

tially had some effect on the SPDC and their government-linked fi rms in the fi rst few yearsby affecting external revenues from textile exports to the United States, these sanctions no longer hurt the regime. Indeed, Burma�s regime has evaded the most damaging consequences by con-centrating more on resource exploration and extraction activities, par-ticularly after 2003, when the United States strengthened its sanction regime to include a broad trade ban. In any case, the Burmese textile sector is now facing a slow death under the weight of the WTO decision to roll back textile quotas among developing countries, which will lead to the relocation of textile fi rms and manufacture to cheaper, more effi -cient and less politically sensitive destinations like China, Vietnam and Bangladesh. The net effect of international sanctions and new WTO rule, then, has been the slow death of the Burmese textile industry due to a loss of the lucrative US market as well as higher transaction costs in penetrating alternative markets. The long-term impact is rather ne-gative, in other words, although most of the welfare effects in terms of employment loss and income loss fell disproportionately on the fa-mily members of the military personnel and lower echelons of SPDC regime, which provided the pool of labor that both the regime-owned enterprises as well as connected business fi rms favored to employ in their factories.

Given negative welfare impacts of broad sanctions, the international community has recently considered imposing ban on teak and forest products that could seriously affect the SPDC�s income without hur-ting the general population. The income from teak amounted to 10% of the total export revenue Burma received in 2001. More signifi cantly, the military government-owned Myanmar Timber Enterprise was en-titled to almost all of this income, since the government enjoys full control over teak production and export. A few private fi rms may have received logging licenses, but the SPDC controls the licensing process, which redirects lucrative deals to fi rms owned by the government�s friends and relatives, while generating rents for Burmese military of-fi cers who oversee security operations in selected forest areas. Since the early 1990s, Burma�s logging industry has pursued less and less sustainable methods of logging, instead relying on the increasing use of heavy machines that log Burma�s forests in the most destructive of ways. It means the industry employs very little manpower to produce teak. In theory, banning teak import might hurt the generals as well as put a break on the destructive logging practices in Burma. However, the regime itself has nowadays limited the exploitation of Burma�s teak forests after a number of serious environmental disasters as well as international campaigns against Burmese forest management. In addi-


332 333

tion, the complicated process of determining the origin of teak and teak products with the Chinese intermediaries concealing the real identity of Burmese teak exports also weakened the direct effects of Western ban on forest products. Perhaps, engaging with the regime to promote their own awareness of deforestation and to support their efforts in environ-mental protection might be a better option in reality.

Like the international ban on teak imports, banning the import of minerals from Burma can theoretically undermine the SPDC�s capacity to generate income from the sale of minerals or exploration rights. In Burma, the government owns all extractive industries under the Mi-nistry of Mines, and foreign investments are encouraged in the form of joint ventures with government fi rms. Most investments are capital intensive, while generating negligible numbers of local jobs for the Burmese. In addition, Burma lacks both upstream and downstream in-dustries capable of utilizing raw materials extracted within the country. For this reason, most extracted minerals are exported overseas. Since Chinese fi rms have already become the main consumers of mineral exports from Burma, however, this limits the impact that Western sanc-tions on Burma�s mineral exports might have.

In light of such loopholes, targeted fi nancial sanctions have become a more effective tool against the SPDC and their state-owned enterprises as well as those joint ventures and private fi rms owned by individuals with connections to the regime. This instrument will seal the loophole used by the SPDC and its business partners to evade the effects of the comprehensive trade ban instituted by the US government in 2003. Alt-hough this instrument may not entirely block trade fi nancing and other fi nancial transactions between Burma and its neighboring countries, it would signifi cantly increase the transaction costs of all trade operations controlled entirely by the military government in the form of trade li-censes and permits.

In adopting a regime of targeted sanctions, it is also important that Western governments pursue strategies that will alleviate the sufferings of ordinary Burmese in the country. The economic structure of Burma is largely agricultural and is more or less operating at subsistence and regional levels. Although targeted sanction instruments will notdisrupt economic functions of the agricultural sector, which generates nearly sixty percent of Burma�s GDP and employs seventy fi ve percent of the country�s labor force, broad sanction instruments such as import ban can have negative impacts on the agricultural sector. The international community should consider fi ne tuning in this aspect.

Burma�s informal economy, estimated to be as large as its formal economy, is by defi nition beyond the ownership of the state. In this

case, Burma�s informal economy is linked more to neighboring (mar-ket) economies through traditional market exchange mechanisms such as barter trade and cash payment than the offi cial formal economy. Targeted fi nancial sanctions have no reach over these types of trans-actions. Therefore, targeted fi nancial sanctions should have only neg-ligible effect on the free fl ow of trade across Burmese borders, which benefi ts the private sector and ordinary people of Burma far more than it does the country�s regime. In contrast, the formal economy of Burma is more or less owned and controlled by the state. In addition, the mi-litary-business conglomerates such as Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Ltd and Myanmar Economic Corporation as well as several dozens of private fi rms organized by select friends and family members of the SPDC own and operate most of the lucrative business and ma-nufacturing fi rms in Burma. Targeted sanctions could be sharpened to affect only those meant to be hurt.

If, on the other hand, Burma is able to develop a comprehensive framework of natural resource management policy, the country may be able to pursue successful sustainable development policies, which would allow Burma to become a more responsible and active partner in economic cooperation with her neighbors. Given the entrenched nature of Burma�s regime and economy, both of which are heavily dependent on the country�s natural resources, such a solution would prove to be more than a mere technical fi x. Resource curse in Burma has had de-vastating economic effects on the country, but these are not caused by economic policies alone. Although economic reforms may counteract some of these effects, they cannot resolve the root causes of Burma�s ills. Unless the underlying political processes that have been fostering the country�s resource curse are addressed, the negative consequences will remain serious challenges to the viability of Burma�s military re-gime and the future of the country itself.

Notes1 The confi dential report, cited in Irrawaddy, also mentioned the lack of public expen-ditures on much needed social services and other political factors as reasons for the fai-lure. See Htet Aung. �UN coordinator�s report lists causes of Burma�s social problems,� Irrawaddy, 29 Jun 2007, accessed at www.irrawaddy.org.

2 Far Eastern Economic Review. Asia 1990 Yearbook. Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic Review, 1990.

3 For more detailed assessment of the factors behind ceasefi re agreements and the contribution to relative stability of such agrements can be read in Zaw Oo and Win Min. �Assessing Burma�s Ceasefi re Accords,� Washington, D.C.: East West Center, 2007.


334 335

4 Global Witness. A Confl ict of Interests: London, UK, 2002.

5 Bangkok Post, �Ethnic rebels launch arms spree - Wa move to upgrade their potent arsenal,� July 1, 2000

6 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999. Washington D.C., last assessed at www.state.gov.

7 Roger Mitton. �Who Rules on the Ground? The power of Myanmar�s area commanders Asiaweek, September 3, 1999, Vol. 25, No. 35,

8 The portfolios such as the Offi ce of the SPDC Chairman and the Offi ce of the Prime Minister (both portfolios served SPDC chairman and Prime Minister Senior General Than Shwe) took two ministers each.

9 Than, Tin Maung Maung. �Myanmar: Preoccupation with Regime Survival, National Unity, and Stability,� in M. Alagappa, eds. Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideatio-nal Infl uences. Stanford, CA: Standford University Press.

10 Also see Bertil Lintner. �Army divisions: Reshuffl e may spark dissent among senior offi cers,� Far Eastern Economic Review. 23 April 1992.

11 Mancur Olson. �Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,� American Political Science Review. Vol. 87, No. 3, 1993.

12 Alfred Stepan. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton University Press, 1988.

A Struggle for Democracy, Equality and Federalism in Burma: An Ethnic PerspectiveLian H. Sakhong*

IntroductionOn 12 February 1947, the Union of Burma was founded at Panglong by four former British colonies, namely the Chin, Kachin, Federated Shan States and Burma Proper, all of which already had their own constitu-tions. The British occupied these four colonies separately as independent countries in different periods of time, and applied different administrati-ve systems in accordance with the different constitutions that the colonial power had promulgated for them. The British offi cially promulgated the Chinland/Chinram Constitution, called the �Chin Hills Regulation,� in 1896, the �Kachin Hill Tribes Regulation� in 1895, the �1919 Act of Fede-rated Shan States� in 1920, and the �1935 Burma Act� in 1937. The Chin Hills Regulation of 1896 covered present Chin State in Burma, present Mizoram State, Nagaland State, and part of Manipur and Meghalaya Sta-tes in India. The 1935 Burma Act was applied to the area of pre-colonial Myanmar/Burman Kingdom, which included the former Arakan and Mon Kingdoms as well as delta areas of Karen country.

Since independence, the twelfth of February has been celebrated as the Union Day of Burma. The observation of Union Day as an offi cial holiday in Burma implies the recognition of the distinctive national identities of those who signed the Panglong Agreement and ratifi ed the treaty through the constitutional arrangement of 1947. It also implicitly recognizes their political rights � the right to independence and to es-tablish their own nation-state. The essence of the Panglong Agreement was, and is, mutual recognition and respect, based on the principles of political equality, self-determination and voluntary association.

However, Aung San, who had persuaded the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities to join the Union, was assassinated before Burma gained her independence. After his assassination, the


*Dr Sakhong could not attend the conference to present his paperas he had to stay in SE-Asia after cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar/Burma on May 2

336 337

1947 Union Constitution was rushed through to completion without refl ecting the spirit of Panglong. As a result, the country was plunged into fi fty years of civil war. Burma�s political crisis today is therefore not merely an ideological confrontation between military dictatorship and democracy, but also a constitutional problem. The ethnic nationalities joined the Union as equal partners, preserving their rights of self-deter-mination on the basis of the Panglong Agreement, but Burma�s consti-tutions have failed to adhere to the spirit of that agreement.

In this paper, I shall argue that federalism is the only viable solution to Burma�s current political crisis, including fi ve long decades of civil war. Federalism, therefore, is essential to the ultimate success of the de-mocracy movement, to guarantee political equality for all nationalities, the right of self-determination for all member states of the Union, and democratic rights for all citizens of the Union.

Federalism: Theoretical AnalysisThe term Federal is derived from the Latin words foedus and fi des. Ac-cording to S. R. Davis, the Latin word foedus is translated as �covenant�, while its cognate fi des means �faith� and �trust.� When we fi nd in these terms the idea of a �covenant, and synonymous ideas of promise, com-mitment, undertaking, or obligation, vowing, plighting one�s word to a course of conduct in relations to others, we come upon a vital bonding device of civilization.� The idea of covenant involves �the idea of co-operation, reciprocity, mutuality, and it implies the recognition of enti-ties�whether it be persons, a people, or a divine being.�1

According to Daniel J. Elazar, the fi rst example of a federal state with the essential characteristic of the �idea of a contract, treaty, or alliance� was the ancient Hebrew state, whose principles are mentioned in the Bible.2 In modern times, the rise of federal political thought went hand in hand with the emergence of a political-theological philosophy of fe-deralism in 16th and early 17th century Renaissance Europe, when the sovereignty of the modern nation-state appeared as a conceptual instru-ment for the organization of power within the state.

Since the emergence of the modern nation-state, federalism has ge-nerally been defi ned as an approach to government that divides public powers not only horizontally, i.e. division of powers between legislative, administrative and judiciary; but vertically, i.e. separation of powers between two or more levels of government. In other words, federalism is �a constitutional device which provides for a secure, i.e. constitutio-nal, division of powers between central and �segmental� authorities in such a way that each is acknowledged to be the supreme authority in

specifi c areas of responsibility.�3 The basic essence of federalism, the-refore, is �the notion of two or more orders of government combining elements of �shared rule� for some purposes and regional �self-rule� for the other.�4 As such, federalism is seen as a constitutionally established balance between shared rule and self-rule: shared rule through com-mon institutions, and regional self-rule through the governments of the constituent units or states. The federal principles of self-rule and shared rule, in turn, are based on �the objective of combining unity and diversity: i.e. of accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities within a larger political union.�5

In a genuine federal system, neither the federal nor state govern-ments (or, the constituent units) are constitutionally subordinate to the other, i.e. each has sovereign powers derived from the constitution rather than from one another level of government, each is empowered to deal with the citizens in the exercise of its legislative, executive and taxing powers, and each is directly elected by its citizens. The structural characteristics of a genuine federal system, at its full development, can thus be generally defi ned as follows:

1. Two or more orders of government each acting directly on its citizens, rather than indirectly through the other order;2. A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and execu-tive authority, and allocation of revenue resources between the orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine auto-nomy for each other;3. Provision for the designated representation of distinct re-gional or ethnic views within the federal policy-making institu-tions, provided not only by a federal second chamber (i.e., what used to be known in Burma as the Chamber of Nationalities or the Upper House) composed of representatives of the state and regional electorates, but also by state legislatures or governme-nts;4. A supreme written federal constitution, not unilaterally amendable by one order of government, and therefore requi-ring the consent not only of the federal legislature but also of a signifi cant portion of the constituent units or states, through assent by their legislatures or by referendum of majorities;5. Written constitutions for all member states of the union, or constituent units, which are to be promulgated, exercised and amended independently and unilaterally by each constituent state for its own state, so long as such procedures are conducted in accordance with the federal constitution;

A Struggle for Democracy, Equality and Federalism in Burma

338 339

6. An umpire (in the form of a supreme court, or as in Switzer-land provision for referendums) to rule on the interpretation and valid application of the federal constitution;7. Process and institutions to facilitate inter-governmental col-laboration in those areas where governmental responsibilities are shared or inevitably overlap.6

What basically distinguishes federations from decentralized unitary systems, on the one hand, and from confederations, on the other, accor-ding to Blindenbacher and Watts, is that �in unitary systems the govern-ments of the constituent units ultimately derive their authority from the central government, and in confederations the central institutions ultimately derive their authority from the constituent units and consist of delegates of constituent units.�7 In a federation, however, �each order of government derives its authority, not from each order of government, but from the constitution.�8

Federalism in the Burmese Context: Lessons Learned from the 1947 Union ConstitutionAt the Panglong Conference in 1947, the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other non-Burman nationalities were promised, as Silverstein observes, the right to exercise political authority (in the form of administrative, ju-dicial and legislative powers in their own autonomous national states) and to preserve and protect their language, culture and religion, in ex-change for voluntarily joining the Burmans in forming a political union and giving their loyalty to a new state.9

On the basis of the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution was framed. Aung San himself drafted the Union Constitution and submitted it to the AFPFL convention held in May 1947, at the Jubilee Hall in Rangoon. Aung San delivered a long speech at the convention and explained the essence of the Panglong Agreement, which had the aim of establishing a Federal Union. He also argued:

When we build our new Burma, shall we build it as a Union or as a Unitary State? In my opinion it will not be feasible to set up a Unitary State. We must set up a Union with properly regulated provisions to safeguard the rights of the national minorities.10

Aung San also insisted on the right of self-determination for ethnic na-tionalities who signed the Panglong Agreement to found a new Federal Union with so-called Burma Proper. He referred to his co-signatories, the Chin, Kachin and Shan, as nations, or pyidaung in Burmese. He said:

The right of self-determination means that a nation can arrange its life according to its will. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relation with other nations. It has the right to complete secession.11

Moreover, Aung San clarifi ed the nature of ethnic and cultural mino-rity rights and their implications, an issue which many of his contem-poraries regarded as problematic:

What is it that particularly agitates a national minority? A minority is discon-tented because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its native language and this discontentment will pass of itself. A mino-rity is discontented because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience etc. Give it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented. Thus, national equality in all forms (language, schools, etc.) is an essential element in the solution of the national problem [or, ethnic confl ict?].

A state law based on complete democracy in the country is required, prohibiting all national privileges without exception and all kinds of disabilities and restrictions on the rights of national minorities.12

On the basis of the principles of equality, the right of self-determi-nation, and constitutional protection of ethnic and cultural minority groups, Aung San drafted a new constitution for a new Union of Bur-ma, which was duly approved by the AFPFL convention. According to Aung San�s version of the constitution, the Union would be composed of National States, or what he called �Union States,� such as the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Mon, Myanmar (Burman), Rakhine (Arakan) and Shan States. The �original idea,� as Dr Maung Maung points out, �was that the Union States should have their own separate constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government and Judiciary.�13

However, U Chan Htun reversed all these principles of the Fe-deral Union after Aung San was assassinated. According to U Chan Htun�s version of the Union Constitution, Burma Proper or the ethnic Burman/Myanmar did not form their own separate National State; ins-


340 341

tead they combined the power of the Burman/Myanmar National State with the whole sovereign authority of the Union of Burma. Thus, while one ethnic group, the Burman/Myanmar, controlled the sovereign po-wer of the Union, that is, the legislative, judicial and administrative po-wers of the Union of Burma, the other ethnic nationalities who formed their own respective National States became almost like �vassal states� of the ethnic Burman/Myanmar bloc. This constitutional arrangement was totally unacceptable to the Chin, Kachin and Shan who signed the Panglong Agreement on the basis of the principle of national equality, and also to other nationalities.

Another serious fl aw in the 1947 Constitution was the absence of state constitutions for all the member states of the Union. In contrast to the original agreement, according to which Aung San and Chin, Kachin and Shan leaders intended to establish a separate state constitution for each and every state, U Chan Htun�s version of the Union Constitution incor-porated clauses covering all the affairs of the states. In this way, state af-fairs became part and parcel of the Union Constitution, with no separate constitutions for the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities. Such a constitutional arrangement indicated that whatever powers the governments of states enjoyed and exercised under the 1947 Constitution were given to them by the central government, characteristic of a unitary state system. In a unitary system, power lies in the hands of the central government, and the powers of local governing or administrative units derive from or are devolved to them by the central government.

What the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities envisio-ned in Panglong was a federal system, in which the member or consti-tuent states were the basic and founding units of the federation, and whatever powers they exercised or possessed were not given to them by the centre. The powers of the constituent states of a federation are, in principle, derived from the peoples of the respective states, as is sta-ted in most state constitutions in countries that are federal in form. In theory, as Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe observes,

A federation is formed when a number of states agree for some rea-son to live and work together under one fl ag. And because there is an agreement among founding states to band together as equal partners, there arises a need for another level of government to handle matters of common interest. Accordingly, this government � the federal or cen-tral government � is given or vested with certain powers by the mem-ber states. In a federation, therefore, it is the power of the federal or central government that is derived from, or given to it, by the member states. Thus, in federalism, the federal government is not a superior

government that holds all powers. Various and signifi cant powers are held by the member states, and these are clearly spelt out in the state constitutions. In addition, some powers which are shared by all are gi-ven to the federal government, and these too are spelt out, this time in the federal constitution. In a federation, therefore, there are two levels of powers as well as two levels of governments, which are intertwined, yet separate. Hence, in a federal system there are two constitutions: one is the federal constitution, and concurrently with it there exists another set of constitutions, those of member states of the Union.14

U Chan Htun�s version of the 1947 Union Constitution of Burma did not allow for the existence of separate constitutions for the founding member states of the Union, namely, the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other nationalities�including the Burman.

The third point that betrayed the Panglong Agreement and Aung San�s policy of federalism was the way in which the Chamber of Nationalities at the Union Assembly was structured. The original idea of the creation of the Chamber of Nationalities was to safeguard not only the rights of non-Burman ethnic nationalities, but also the symbolic and real equality envisaged at the Panglong Conference. Thus, the intention was that each ethnic national state should have the right to send equal numbers of re-presentatives to the Chamber of Nationalities, no matter how big or small their national state might be. But what happened under U Chan Htun�s version of the Union Constitution was that, while all the non-Burman nationalities had to send their tribal or local chiefs and princes to the Chamber of Nationalities, it allowed Burma Proper to elect representati-ves to the Chamber on the basis of its population. Thus, the Burman or Myanmar from Burma Proper, who composed the majority in terms of population, was given dominance in the Union Assembly.

In this way, the Union Assembly, according to U Chan Htun�s ver-sion of the Union Constitution, was completely under the control of the Burman or Myanmar ethnic nationality. Not only did the powerful Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the legislature) have the po-wer to thwart the aspirations and interests of the non-Burman nationa-lities, the Burmans even dominated the Chamber of Nationalities itself. For that reason, the combined votes of the non-Burman nationalities (even in the Chamber of Nationalities) were unable to halt the passage of the �state religion bill� in which U Nu promulgated Buddhism as a state religion in 1961. Thus, all the non-Burman nationalities viewed the Union Constitution itself as an instrument for imposing a tyranny of the majority and not as their protector, and it was this perception that led Burma into fi fty years of civil war.


342 343

The Panglong Agreement was the most solemn agreement that the Chin, Kachin and Shan had ever signed in their history, and therefore it had to be protected as the covenant on which they built the Union to-gether with the Burman and other ethnic nationalities. However, since the agreement was betrayed or even broken by Burmese politicians af-ter Aung San was assassinated, the Chin and other non-Burman ethnic nationalities in the Union of Burma have had to redefi ne the covenant, or Union Constitution, through which they have sought to build a pea-ceful Union of Burma.

Nation-building and the Problem of Forced AssimilationWhen the Chin, Kachin and Shan signed the Panglong Agreement in 1947, what they aimed to achieve was to �speed up� their own search for freedom, together with the Burman and other nationalities, based on the principles of equality, mutual trust and recognition; but not to integrate their societies and their lands into Myanmar Buddhist society and the Burman Kingdom. Thus, for them, the basic concept of inde-pendence was independence without integration, that is, what political scientists used to term �coming together�, or �together in difference.� These phrases refer to a process by which nations come together in order to form a modern nation-state in the form of a Federal Union, or Pyi-daung-suh in Burmese, while maintaining the right of national self-determination and the autonomous status of their nations.

Within this concept of �coming together,� it is important to differen-tiate between �nation� and �state,� or what Hannah Arendt refers to as a �secret confl ict between state and nation.� According to Arendt,

[The nation] presents the �milieu� into which man is born, a closed society to which one belongs by the right of birth; and a people beco-mes a nation when it arrives at a historical consciousness of itself; as such it is attached to the soil which is the product of past labour and where history has left its traces. The state on the other hand is an open society, ruling over territory where its power protects and makes law. As a legal institution, the state knows only citizens no matter of what nationality; its legal order is open to all who happen to live on its ter-ritory.15

The state, far from being identical with the nation, is �the supreme protector of a law which guarantees man his rights as man, his rights as citizen and his rights as a national.�16 By signing the Panglong Agre-ement, the Chin, Kachin and Shan had co-founded a Federal Union of

a multi-national state, which is an administrative and legal unit, but they still wanted to keep their own respective nations, a concept which according to Weber belongs to the sphere of values: culture, language, religion, ethnicity, homeland, shared memories and history, a specifi c sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups or people. Thus, what Aung San and the Chin, Kachin, and Shan leaders wanted to achieve at Panglong was to build a Union through a state-building process, not to create a nation through nation-building.

As mentioned above, the Burmese word for �Union� is �Pyi-daung-shu,� which means �the coming together of different �nations� and �national states.��17 As the term indicates, the Pyi-daung-shu allows the peaceful co-existing of different ethnic groups with different cultural and religious backgrounds, i.e. different nations, within an adminis-trative and legal unit of political union. It is, therefore, clear that state-building is very different from nation-building, because in the building of a multi-national state, there can be many nation-building processes taking place at the same time for the different member nations.

In contrast to state-building, nation-building excludes from its process other ethnic groups, cultures, religions and everything related to multiculturalism and diversity. Thus, by accepting only one homo-geneous set of cultural and religious values as its political values, the very notion of nation-building can produce only a nation-state made by a homogeneous people or nation that claims �pre-state unity based on culture, history or religion.�18 As a result, a nation-state made by a nation through the nation-building process cannot accommodate other cultures, religions and ethnic groups. At best, as Saunders argues, �it can tolerate non-integrated minorities as guests, but not as equal citi-zens. The status of fully recognized citizen can be attained only by inte-gration. Those who want to become citizens must change their cultural identity.� Moreover, as Saunders explains:

If a cultural minority demands political recognition and identity, the state must reject the claim. Because it is unable to accommodate a fragmented political identity, it will ultimately come into confl ict with its minorities. Either the minorities must be integrated within the majority culture, destroying their original cultural roots, or they must be denied the opportunity to enhance their cultural identity through political means. A fragmented political identity is rejected as a solu-tion, because of is threat to the unity, homogeneity, and the roots of state�s existence.19


344 345

Aung San seemed to have a clear policy of state-building based on the principles of equality and unity in diversity. He maintained that nation-building in the form of �one race, one religion, and one language ha[s] gone obsolete.�20 By inviting the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities to form a new Union, Aung San�s policy of unity in diver-sity transcended all different cultures and religions, rejecting them as structural and functional factors to unite the country. By rejecting cul-ture and religion as uniting factors of the country, he opted for a secular state whose political values would be based not on cultural and religious roots but on the equality of individual citizens and the right of self-determination for member states of the Union. Aung San particularly rejected religiously oriented ethno-nationalism, which mixed religion with politics. He thus declared:

Religion is a matter of individual conscience, while politics is social sci-ence. We must see to it that the individual enjoys his rights, including the right to freedom of religious belief and worship. We must draw clear lines between politics and religion because the two are not the same thing. If we mix religion with politics, then we offend the spirit of religion itself.21

However, after Aung San was assassinated, U Nu reintroduced cultural and religious values into political debate and abandoned Aung San�s policy of unity in diversity together with the state/union-building pro-cess. For U Nu, the only means to build a new nation was to revive the pre-colonial cultural unity of Buda-bata Maynmar Lu-myo, which had nothing to do with the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationali-ties who joined the Union in order to speed up their own freedom.

Although Buddhism had been a powerful integrative force in traditional Myanmar society, a modern multi-national state of the Union of Burma with its multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic plural society was a very different country from that of the pre-colonial Myanmar Kingdom. However, leaders like U Nu still believed that Buddhism could make a signifi cant contribution to some aspects of national integration. When he became the Prime Minister of the newly independent Burma, U Nu contradicted Aung San�s version of the Union Constitution, particularly the clause that separated religion from politics, by declaring: �In the marrow of my bones there is a belief that government should enter into the sphere of religion.�22 In this way, U Nu�s government offi cially adopted Buddhism as its state religion, as a means of national integration. By this means, an attempt was made to achieve homogeneity by imposing religious and cul-tural assimilation into the predominant group of Myanmar Buddhists. In 1953, the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs was created to promote

the process of assimilation, and eventually it promulgated Buddhism as the state religion of the Union of Burma in 1961.23

While U Nu opted for cultural and religious assimilation into Budd-hism, or Buda-bata Myanmar-lumyo, as a means of integration, Gene-ral Ne Win, who came to power through military coup in 1962, removed the rights of the country�s religious and cultural minorities, including all civil and basic human rights, as a means of creating a homogeneous unitary state. Moreover, General Ne Win imposed his national langu-age policy by declaring Myanmar-sa as the only offi cial language in the entire Union of Burma, which therefore was required to be used at all levels of government and public functions, and also to be the only medium of instruction at all levels of schools in the country�from pri-mary to university levels. He not only imposed the Myanmar-sa as the offi cial language, but also suppressed the right to learn the other ethnic national languages of the Union.

Nation-building, for both U Nu and Ne Win, was simply based on the notion of �one race, one language and one religion��that is to say, the ethnicity of Myanmar-lumyo, the language of Myanmar-sa and the state religion of Buddhism. Thus, what they wanted to achieve through nation-building was to create a homogeneous nation of Myanmar Naing-ngan, by drawing its political values from the cultural and religi-ous values of Maynmar-sa and Buddhism. Although their approaches to national integration were different, U Nu and Ne Win shared the goal of creating a homogeneous people in the country. While U Nu opted for cultural and religious assimilation into Buddhism as a means of inte-gration, Ne Win used the national language policy of Myanmar-sa and denied the rights of the country�s religious and cultural minorities as a means of creating a homogeneous unitary state. U Nu and Ne Win thus complemented each other, although their approaches in oppressing the cultural and religious minorities were different in nature.

Supplementing U Nu�s policy of state religion and Ne Win�s national language policy, the current military regime is opting for ethnicity as a means of national integration, by imposing ethnic assimilation into Myanmar-lumyo. The changing of the country name from Burma to Myanmar, the name only of the ethnic Myanmar, in 1989 is a case in point. When it implemented its policy of ethnic assimilation by force, the present military junta applied various methods: killing people and destroying the livelihood of ethnic minorities in fi fty years of civil war, using rape as a weapon of war against ethnic minorities, and religious persecution as a means of destroying ethnic identity, especially of the Chin, Kachin and Karen Christians. In this way, the successive govern-


346 347

ments of the Union of Burma � from U Nu to Ne Win to Saw Maung and Than Shwe � have carried out the nation-building process in terms of �one race, one language, one religion,� that is � Myanmar-lunyo, Myanmar-sa, Buddhism.

In the name of nation-building, the successive governments of the Union of Burma have violated not only basic human rights and civic rights but also all kind of collective rights. In the name of national sovereignty the rights of self-determination for ethnic nationalities are rejected; in the name of national integration the right to follow different religions, to practice different cultures, and to speak different langu-ages are deprived; and in the name of national assimilation the rights to up-hold different identities and traditions are denied. In short, the successive governments of the Union of Burma have been practicing ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide for forty years.

State-making and Unity in Diversity: An Option for the FutureAs mentioned above, nation-building belongs to what social scientists call �subjective values,� that is, culture, language, religion, ethnicity, homeland, shared memories and history, etc., which differentiate one group of people from another�values that cannot be shared objectively. Thus, the nation-building process is impossible to implement in a mul-ti-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious plural society like the Union of Burma. The only way to implement the nation-building process in a plural society is to use coercive force to achieve assimilation, but that approach will defi nitely result in confrontation and confl ict, because the very notion of nation-building is �hostile to multiculturalism and diversity.�24 Unfortunately, this is exactly what has occurred in Burma during the past fi fty years.

In a plural society like the Union of Burma, the only good option is federalism with a strong emphasis on decentralization and local au-tonomy, in which the parallel processes of nation-building for all the national states, i.e. member states of the union, and state-building for the union as a multi-national state, can go hand in hand. Federalism by defi nition is the division of power between the federal government and state governments, which have their own separate constitutions. When member states of the federal union are composed in terms of ethnicity and historical homeland, each national state can implement its own nation-building process within the territory of its homeland based on its own culture, language, religion, ethnicity, shared memories, etc., by

making its own state constitution. Thus, while the purpose of writing a state constitution is self-rule through a nation-building process allowing for the preservation and promotion of distinct identities, the purpose of making a federal constitution is shared-rule through a state-building process aimed at the establishment of common institutions for mul-ticulturalism and diversity. In a nutshell, while the drafting process of the state constitution aims at implementing a nation-building process for national states within the Union, the federal constitution aims at completing the state-building process for the Union of Burma. In this way, federalism can combine nation-building and state-building with the objective of unity in diversity, thereby �accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct identities within a larger political union.�25

Although the state constitution-making process through nation-buil-ding can be a value-based subjective approach, the federal constitution-making process through state-building is purely a matter of objective value; for the federal constitution is �a legal institution, [which] knows only citizens no matter of what nationality, and [whose] legal order is open to all who happen to live on its territory.�26 As a legal institution, federal constitution rules �over territory where its power protects and makes law�, which guarantees �man his rights as man, his rights as citizen and his rights as a national.�27 Thus, in a genuine federal sys-tem, the federal constitution will never adopt cultural values as political values, and it shall never promulgate a law that aims at the creation of a homogeneous culture, which excludes other cultures.

Conclusion: Finding Equilibriumbetween Nation-building and State-makingThe question of constitution-making is usually focused on the structure and function of the state and government�how the state should be formed, how government should be organized, and how people should be governed. In a multicultural plural society like Burma, such simple questions concerned only with good governance are simply not enough. We need to raise more controversial issues such as: Who should govern whom? What majority or majorities should rule over what minorities? Who should control the political power of the state, and with regards to whom? Who should decide the procedure by which it is settled who should govern whom?

As mentioned above, federalism is an approach to government that divides public powers not only horizontally, but also vertically. Federalism, therefore, has been viewed as a useful way of limiting go-


348 349

vernmental power in order to secure good governance. In addition to balancing self-rule and shared rule through constitutionally established mechanisms, the recognition and participation of cultural and ethnic minorities can also be achieved through:

� Emphasis on the political rather than the cultural base of the nation-state;

� Separation of the state and religious or other socio-cultural powers;

� Emphasis on human rights as protection of minority rights;

� Emphasis on separation of powers, formally and informally;

� Executive power sharing;� Multiparty system and proportional rule in elections of the

parliament;� Decentralization and local autonomy, including bi-camera-

lism, as a means of vertical power sharing.

In today�s Burmese political context, the processes of federal consti-tution and state constitutions drafting can be defi ned as fi nding a politi-cal compromise between state-building and nation-building, which will hopefully result in an institutional equilibrium. A political compromise has to be found between a cultural majority having enough power to defi ne a majority regime on the one hand, and cultural minorities see-king recognition within the constitutional framework and participation in political decision-making on the other. The institutional equilibrium is always a compromise between a majority regime and institutional forms of minority protection and power sharing.

In the context of the legal system, an institutional equilibrium bet-ween state-making and nation-building implies the concept of equality. Thus, a multi-national state or a union that implements this fundamen-tal principle must translate the concept of equality into effective collec-tive rights. Although democracy is based on the principle of majority rule, the majority should not abuse its democratic power by tyrannising its minorities. Federalism can effectively control the tyranny of the ma-jority through not only constitutionally mandated decentralization, but also the equalisation of majority and minority before the law, which recognizes the rights of a minority to be treated equally both as indivi-duals and as communities.

The concept of equality implies both collective rights and individual rights. The protection of the human rights of individuals prevents the

authorities of the state from discriminating against individuals who be-longs to minorities, on the grounds of their language, religion, ethnicity or race. The guarantee of human rights as individual rights according to the law is different from that of tolerance. Tolerance also allows eve-ryone to live within his or her community as a respected individual, free from discrimination on the ground of ethnicity, religion or language. However, those who are tolerated are not part of the governing people, the �We� who form the state; for members of tolerated minorities, the state is �their� state and �their� union, not �our� state or union. Diversity might be respected, but not as a political value. Minorities are respected because that is required by the universal values enshrined in the consti-tution, as in the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma. But in such a situation, diversity is neither a policy nor a goal of the state.

Fifty years of negative experiences of constitution-making and prac-tice demonstrates that federalism is the only good option for the future of Burma. In order for unity in diversity to become a political value of the Union, state constitutions drafting for �self-rule� must engage in nation-building; federal constitution drafting for �shared-rule� must engage in state-building; and the constitutional structure as a whole must seek equality between these two processes. Thus, the ultimate goal of the democracy movement in Burma is to establish a genuine Federal Union of Burma, which will guarantee democratic rights for all citizens, political equality for all ethnic nationalities, and the right of self-determination for all member state of the Union within the fram-ework of a federal arrangement.

Notes1 S. R. Davis, The Federal Principles: A Journey Through Time in Quest of a Meaning (Lon-don: University of California Press, 1978), p. 3.2 Daniel J. Elalzar, �Federalism,� in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol. V (New York, 1968), pp. 361�2.3 Alan Smith, �Ethnic Confl ict and Federalism: The Case of Burma,� in Gunther Bächler (ed.), Federalism against Ethnicity? Institutional, Legal and Democratic Instruments to Pre-vent Violent Minority Confl icts (Zurich: Verlag Ruegger, 1997), pp. 231-267.4 Raoul Blindenbacher and Arnold Koller (eds.), Federalism in a Changing World (London Federalism in a Changing World (London Federalism in a Changing Worldand Ithaca: McGill-Queen�s University Press, 2003), p. 95 Ibid.6 Cf. Blindenbacher and Watts (2003), p. 107 Ibid.8 Ibid.


350 351

9 Josef Silverstein, �Minority Problems in Burma Since 1962,� in Lehman (ed.), Military Rule in Burma Since 1962 (Singapore, 1981), p. 51.Rule in Burma Since 1962 (Singapore, 1981), p. 51.Rule in Burma Since 196210 Aung San, Burma�s Challenge (Rangoon, 1947), reprinted in Josef Silverstein, The Political Legacy of Aung San (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), cited in Maung Maung, Burma�s Constitution (The Hague, 1959), p. 169.11 Bogyoke Aung San�s Speeches, pp. 306�307. Also cited in The 1947 Constitution and the Nationalities, Volume 11 (Rangoon University: University Historical Research Centre, 1999), p. 60.12 Bogyoke Aung San�s Speeches, pp. 306�307.13 U Maung Maung, Burmese Nationalist Movements, 1940�1948 (1989), p. 170.14 Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, “Burma: State Constitutions and the Challenges Facing the Ethnic Nationalities,” in Yawnghwe and Sakhong (eds.), Federalism, State Constitutions and Self-determination in Burma (Chiang Mai, UNLD Press, 2003), pp.99-110in Burma (Chiang Mai, UNLD Press, 2003), pp.99-110in Burma15 Hannah Arendt, “The Nation,” cited by Ronald Beiner, “Arendt and Nationalism,” in Dana Villa (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press: 2000), pp. The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press: 2000), pp. The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt44–56.16 Ronald Beiner, “Arendt and Nationalism,” in Dana Villa (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (2000), p. 53.Hannah Arendt (2000), p. 53.Hannah Arendt17 Chao Tzang Yawnghwe ”State Constitutions, Federalism and Ethnic Self-determination,” in Yawnghwe and Sakhong (eds.) Federalism, State Constitutions and Self-determination in Burma (Chiang Federalism, State Constitutions and Self-determination in Burma (Chiang Federalism, State Constitutions and Self-determination in BurmaMai: UNLD Press, 2003), pp. 99-11018 Cf. Saunders in Blindenbacher and Koller (2003), p. 19919 Ibid., p. 20120 Aung San’s speech entitled “Problems for Burma’s Freedom,” delivered on January 20, 1946, in Josef Silverstein (ed.), Political Legacy of Aung San (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, Political Legacy of Aung San (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, Political Legacy of Aung San1993), p. 96.21 Aung San’s speech entitled “Problems for Burma’s Freedom,” delivered on January 20, 1946, in Josef Silverstein (ed.), Political Legacy of Aung San (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, Political Legacy of Aung San (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, Political Legacy of Aung San1993), p. 96.22 Jerold Schector, The New Face of Buddha (1967), p. 106.The New Face of Buddha (1967), p. 106.The New Face of Buddha23 Cf. John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), p. 638.24 Saunder (2003), ibid., p. 198 25 Ibid.26 Ronald Beiner in Dana Villa (2000), op.cit., p. 53.27 Ibid.

List of ParticipantsMr. Bradley O. BabsonBrunswick

Dr. Pavin ChachavalpongpunInstitute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Prof. Brahma ChellaneyCenter for Policy Research, New DelhiProf. Baladas GhoshalCentre for Policy Research and Institute of Peace and Confl ict Studies (IPCS), New Delhi

Dr. Xiaolin GuoInstitute for Security and Development Studies, Stockholm

Dr Jürgen HaackeDepartment of International RelationsLondon School of Economics & Political Science

Mr. Anders HellnerSenior AdvisorThe Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Stockholm

Dr. Timo KivimäkiThe Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Copenhagen

Dr. Johan LagerkvistThe Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Stockholm

Mr. Bertil LintnerForeign Correspondent with the Swedish daily Svenska dagbladet,Chiang-mai

Dr. Xiayun NiChina Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)Beijing

Dr. Zaw OoSchool of International ServiceAmerican University, Washington DC

Dr. Tomas RiesThe Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Stockholm


352 353

Dr. Lian SakhongGeneral Secretary for the Ethnic Nationalities Council, (Union of Burma)Senior research associate Stockholm UniversityProf. David I. SteinbergGeorgetown University, Washington DC

Dr. Gunnar SjöstedtThe Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Stockholm

Dr. Ian StoreyInstitute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Dr. Michael von Hauff University of Kaiserslautern

Mr. Harn YangwheDirector of the Euro-Burma Offi ce, Brussels

How is one to understand the continuing political impasse between Burma/

Myanmar and the international community? And what are the options available

to the international community and multilateral and regional organizations to facilitate

a break away from this situation?

These questions were central to the conference �Between Isolation and

Internationalization: the State of Burma,� convened at the Swedish Institute of

International Affairs (SIIA) on May 8 and 9, 2008. Leading researchers, diplomats,

experts and practitioners in the fi eld gathered to discuss available policy options for

engaging the military junta in Burma, the role of Burma�s big neighbours (including

China, India, and the ASEAN countries), and future prospects for a democratic

transition in Burma.

Utrikespolitiska Institutet/Swedish Institute of International Affairs, SIIA

Address: Drottning Kristinas väg 37, Box 27035, 102 51 StockholmTelephone: 08-511 768 00

Telefax: 08-511 768 99 www.ui.se

between isolation and inter nationalization- the state of burma-siia_papers_4

Documents