The Berlin blockade was a crisis ripe with opportunities that arose from the miscalculation and error of the involved superpowers. In this essay, I will support the idea that the Berlin blockade, to a negligible extent, was confirmation that error and miscalculation brought about the advent of the Cold War. I will develop the idea that error in divisive rights and Washington complacency simply created an opportunity for the restriction of Western transit rights to occur, that Soviet miscalculation encouraged this exploitation and that prestige maintenance / achievement and the conflicting motives of the two super powers ultimately ensured the advent of the Cold War and its continuation.

The European Advisory Commission was set up in an attempt to deal with the uncertain, post-war geopolitical landscape of Europe. The EAC's first meeting saw the forwarding of a draft protocol concerning the future zonal boundaries of Berlin. The suggested draft was particularly favourable to both the USSR and the involved superpowers. To the allies, the protocol adequately embodied the need to control post-war Germany. The Soviets had soon after accepted the protocol as a result of its lack of Soviet ambition restricting clauses. The USA would no longer be able to alter German zonal rights in favour of the Allies after Soviet acknowledgement of the protocol, as the Soviets would have a desirable benchmark reached for zonal rights. The protocol had been formed with a perception that had felt the Grand Alliance would be maintained through a common pursuit, the prevention of a hostile Germany resurgence. The protocol's allocation of a limited amount of area for the Soviets was seen as a more than appropriate preventive measure for any potential Soviet reaction .As a result, not much thought was placed into zonal boundary rights as assumption of co-operation within the Grand Alliance neglected the need for zone restrictions and the original purpose for zone imposition as an interim, troop fortifying affair was at the forefront ^1. These pre-conceptions resulted in a protocol which would be able to be easily exploited by the Soviets in future in regards to preventing Western transit rights.

The USA was unable to influence this plan as a result of its lack of involvement in the EAC's first meeting, and more importantly, its lack of involvement in the protocol's drafting process. Lack of US involvement, and British assumptions had encouraged the exploitable conditions created, and hence allowed the Berlin blockade crisis to occur. A series of miniature blockades had occurred before the enforcement of the major blockade. Washington officials failed to demonstrate a vigorous response to these potential foreshadows which hinted at an effort by the Soviets to undermine the US's presence in Berlin ^2. This complacency to take a suitable stand the blockade was largely as a result of the variance in intelligence received, with reports varying from extreme underestimations of Soviet opposition, typically stating the unlikely hood of any Soviet threat in Berlin, to exact opposite overestimations, inflating the threat. This complacency is likely to have to further persuade the Soviets to blockade West Berlin. However, Soviet miscalculation had also been a considerable factor in the Berlin blockade's initiation. Stalin did not have a full understanding of the economic consequences on the East Berlin zone as a result of blocking the importation of industrial goods from the West. Although, to the Soviets the immediate economic consequences were outweighed by the potential positive economic and political outcomes of the blockade the extent at which this immediate economic factor was miscalculated proved to be considerable. The immense economic cost of the blockade was a large factor for its disintegration. Stalin's desire to exploit the blockade opportunity would have not been so large had he been able to look in hindsight at the economic consequences, and lack of overall progress achieved in the actual blockade.

The course of the Berlin blockade was heavily influenced by the maintenance and attainment of prestige. To both the US and the USSR it was essential that no direct threats or challenges be made to their authority, without adequate response, in order to maintain their positions as superior powers. This heavy emphasis on the importance of prestige, a social and psychological factor, often outweighed the importance of physical or tangible effects in the Berlin Blockade Crisis as it would dictate the way in which other powers would regard them, particularly in the post-war world where the status quo was shifting dramatically.

The Soviets viewed West Berlin as an anomaly, being situated directly in Soviet aligned Germany; it mockingly enabled Alliance strongholds to flourish on their territory. This point leads to a contributing factor for the implementation of the Berlin blockade, the gain in prestige the Soviets, and the loss of prestige the US would experience, in the event that the US was to retreat from West Berlin. This US retreat would not only prove to empower the roots Communist party in the East, but

would certainly prove to encourage those movements in Western Europe and hence encourage the spread of Communism. Therefore the Soviets, overtime, may have seen the blockade as a means of shifting the current superpower status quo. The Alliance's intentions to start a Western aligned government to act outside of the four power system, and to introduce a new currency in West Berlin was contradictory to the initial agreements held at the London accords and for the Soviets to not respond to this would demonstrate a submissiveness and loss in prestige. The Berlin blockade was seen as an adequate measure of enforcing Soviet authority in the face of the US behemoth which sought to seemingly undermine the Soviets.

The US's decision of refusing to give into the demands of the Soviet Union's blockade by initiating a counter blockade and carrying out an airlift, was not only dictated by the tangible consequences of the loss of Berlin, but also by the loss of prestige that would result. This refusal to give into the demands of the Soviets was largely determined by the US's emphasis on the policy of containment, an idea which stresses the importance of maintaining US prestige and reducing the Soviets' in order to demonstrate US superiority. This mentality encouraged the US to maintain their position, and therefore their prestige in Berlin, while ultimately undermining that of the USSR's^3.

The Berlin blockade crisis demonstrated the consequences of superpower motives, and foreshadowed the inevitability of future tensions. These varying motives were shaped by the different powers' political perspectives. The Soviets' strong conviction that it would be in their best interests to keep Germany weak and divided in order to ensure security influenced their actions in Berlin. Where as the Americans supported the idea of a strong, self-sufficient Germany capable of keeping the Soviets in check, and revitalising Western Europe. These different outlooks proved to clash and sustain conflict. The motives for continuing the Berlin blockade had varied over time for the Soviets. The prospect of the announced currency reform by the West provoked the beginning of the major Berlin blockade. The currency reformed threatened the Soviet zone with economic destitution through encouraging the eastward flow of the old Reimarch, and hence significantly devaluing it as a currency. Although, to the West, the currency reform was seen as a measure that would promote economic activity in their zones and prevent black market reliance. This had been the initial motive for the Soviet blockade, but it had then expanded to be the movement against the formation of a Government in West Berlin ^4. The West viewed the establishment of a Western aligned democratic state as relevant to their self-interests as it would promote a stable West Germany and therefore a Western Europe. Where as the Soviets had discredited this attempt to create a Western, unified government. It extended the West's sphere of influence and contradicted the Soviet's core desire for a weak and divided Germany, which was seen as a necessity to advance the spread of communism. The USA's willingness to back up these motives were demonstrated overtly with Truman's decision to transfer B-29 bombers to North Britain, and the continuation of the airlift which involved transporting goods to the populace of West Berlin by avoiding ground access restriction.

In conclusion, although error in the form of protocol implementation, the complacency of Washington officials, and Soviet miscalculations, had created a readily exploitable opportunity I have developed the idea that this was not the primary factor for the Cold War's advent. Instead, I argued that the conflicting motives of each super power, combined with prestige maintenance ultimately resulted in the exploitation of the Berlin blockade opportunity and its continuation. Actions performed by the superpowers in order to preserve their self-interests, resulted in negative outcomes for the other power in question which proved to be the root of the blockade and its continuation. The dramatic variation in the political and economic structure of the two superpowers was far too conceptually different for peaceful co-existence to occur in the four power, dependence heavy system of Berlin. Prestige was a vital attribute to maintain in the eyes of the US and the USSR, as it would correlate to the perceptions other nations, and that each other, would hold of them. This refusal to appear submissive on both sides accounted to for the longevity blockade. It can be concluded with some confidence then that had not the Berlin blockade opportunity manifested, some other opportunity would have in future, which would have encouraged self-interest based opposition. These factors which encouraged the conditions for the Berlin blockade proved to remain primary factors in the Cold War's course, which makes the Berlin blockade crisis a symbol for the advent of the Cold War as being brought about and maintained through conflicting motives and prestige consciousness.

^1 The International History Review, Berlin blockade revisited, page 89 ^2 Avoiding war: problems of crisis management, The Berlin blockade Crisis of 1948-1949, page 201^3 The United States and the Berlin blockade, 1948-1949: a study in Crisis, page 390 ^4 Avoiding war: problems of crisis management, Berlin blockade crisis of 1948 – 1949, page 196

Berlin blockade crisis essay bibliography:

Source Type: Book extract Text title: The International History Review, Volume 6. Extract Title: The Berlin Blockade Revisited. Date created: 1984 Author: Daniel F. Harrington

Source Type: Book extract Text title: Avoiding war: Problems of crisis. Extract title: The Berlin blockade crisis of 1948 - 1949 Date created: 1991 Author: M. Steven Fish

Source Type: Book Text title: The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948-1949 Date created: 1983 Author: Avi Shlaim

Source Type: Magazine extract Text title: The East German communists and the origins of the Berlin blockade crisis Date created: 1995 Author: Charles F. Pennacchio.

Source Type: Documentary Video Title: Berlin : 1948 - 1949 ; Korea : 1949 - 1953 ; Reds : 1947 - 1953

Date created: 1988 Author: Branagh, Kenneth;Isaacs, Jeremy;Smith, Martin