benefits of a common currency costs have to do with macroeconomic management of the economy benefits...

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Benefits of a Common Currency Costs have to do with macroeconomic management of the economy Benefits have to do with the microeconomic aspect Eliminating national currencies for a common currency leads to economic efficiency gains Elimination of transaction costs Elimination of exchange rate risk

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  • Slide 1
  • Benefits of a Common Currency Costs have to do with macroeconomic management of the economy Benefits have to do with the microeconomic aspect Eliminating national currencies for a common currency leads to economic efficiency gains Elimination of transaction costs Elimination of exchange rate risk
  • Slide 2
  • Benefits of a Common Currency (cont.) 1. Direct gains from the elimination of transaction costs Eliminating the costs of exchanging one currency into another is themost visible gain from a monetary union E.C. Estimates these gains between 13-20 billion/year Of course banks will lose revenue they get for exchanging national currencies in a monetary union
  • Slide 3
  • Benefits of a Common Currency (cont.) 2. Indirect gains from the elimination of transaction costs The scope for price discrimination between national markets will be reduced The unification of currency along with the other measures in creating a single market will make price discrimination more difficult This is a benefit to the European consumer
  • Slide 4
  • Benefits of a Common Currency (cont.) 3. Welfare gains from less uncertainty The uncertainty about future exchange rate cahnges introduces uncertainty about future firm revenues Welfare of firms will increase when common currency is introduced (exception: firms taht make money by taking on risk)
  • Slide 5
  • Benefits of a Common Currency (cont.) 4. Exchange Rate Uncertainty and the Price Mechanism Exchange rate uncertainty introduces uncertainty about the future prices of goods and services Movement towards a common currency will eliminate the exchange risk and lead to a more efficient working of the price mechanism
  • Slide 6
  • Benefits of a Common Currency (cont.) 5. Exchange Rate Uncertainty and Economic Growth The elimination of the exchange risk will lead to an increase in economic growth (the EC argument) However, this view lacks empirical data
  • Slide 7
  • Benefits of a Common Currency (cont.) 6. Benefits of An International Currency When countries form a monetary union the new currency will likely weigh more in international monetary relations than the sum of individual currencies prior to the Union The currency is likely to find use outside of the union This creates additional benefits to the union: Issuer of currency obtains additional revenues It will boost activity for domestic financial markets (foreign residents will want to invest this creates know-how and jobs & financial institutions will have new opportunities
  • Slide 8
  • Benefits of a Common Currency (cont.) 7. Benefits of a Monetary Union and the Openness of Countries The welfare gains of a monetary union are likely to increase with the degree of openness of an economy Ex: elimination of transaction costs will benefit those countries that buy and sell a large number of goods and services in foreign countries With an increasing openness towards the other partners in the Union, the gains from a monetary union (per uniot of output increases)
  • Slide 9
  • Costs and Benefits Compared
  • Slide 10
  • Costs and Benefits Compared (cont.) The importance of costs and benfits depends on ones view about the effectiveness of the exhange rate instrument Monetarist View: Exchange rate changes are ineffective as instruments to correct for these different developments between countries Even if they are effective they make countries worse off
  • Slide 11
  • Monetarist View
  • Slide 12
  • Keynesian View The world is full of rigidities (wages and prices are rigid, labor is immobile) this makes the exchange rate a powerful instrument Mundells original theory represents this very well Few countries would benefit from a monetary union Large countries with one currency would be better off (economically) splitting the country into different monetary zones
  • Slide 13
  • Keynesian View
  • Slide 14
  • Monetarist View and Keynesian View Compared The monetarist view has been in favor with economists since the early 1980s
  • Slide 15
  • Is the EU an OCA? Intra-UnionExports ofEU Countries(% GDP) in 2007 Belgium/Lux.68.7%Denmark23,1 Slovakia67,1Sweden22,8 Czech Rep.60Latvia22 Netherlands55,3Finland20,8 Hungary54,3Malta19,5 Slovenia44.2Portugal17,7 Estonia36,9Italy14 Austria32France13,9 Ireland29,5Spain11,7 Lithuania28,5United Kingdom9,1 Poland26,1Greece4,9 Germany25,9Cyprus4,7
  • Slide 16
  • Is the EU and OCA? (cont.) Large differences in openness of EU countries with the rest of the Union Cost-benefit graph will be different for each country Most beneficial for the most open countries (ex. Benelux, Ireland) For other countries like Italy with lower openness, their authorities obviously did not consider the loss of the exchange rate instrument costly and therefore decided to join the Union
  • Slide 17
  • Price and Wage Rigidities, Labor Mobility and Monetary Union Cost-Benefit calculus of a monetary union is also influenced by the degree of wage and price rigidities
  • Slide 18
  • Price and Wage Rigidities, Labor Mobility and Monetary Union (cont.) An increase in the degree of mobility of labor shifts the cost curve to the left and makes the monetary union more attractive Single market with labor mobility makes the EMU more attractive However, regional concentration of industrial activities (like that of auto production in one country) would shift the cost curve upwards
  • Slide 19
  • Asymmetric Shocks and Labor Market Flexibility The size and frequency of asymmetric shocks also matters for the attractivenss of a monetary union Countries that have very different demand and supply shocks will find it more costly to join a monetary union Their cost line would shift upwards
  • Slide 20
  • Asymmetric Shocks (cont.) 17 6 6 2011
  • Slide 21
  • Asymmetric Shocks (cont.) Countries (regions) that experience a high divergence in output and employment growth need a lot of flexibility in their labor markets if they want to benefit from a monetary union As the degree of divergence goes up the greater the need for flexibility in labor markets This relationship is shown by the line AA Empirically, EU-15 (and EU-27) as a whole is located above the AA line from an economic point of view, a monetary union is a bad idea However, there is a subset of countries which do form an OCA (EU-5: Benelux, Germany and France)
  • Slide 22
  • Is the EU an OCA? The challenge for the EU is to move to the other side of the AA line Two strategies: 1. Reduce the degree of real divergence Difficulty: dependent on factors over which policy-makers have little influence (ex: industrial specialization) 2. Increase the degree of flexibility Requires reform of labor market institutions (difficult but necessary) However, by moving towards closer political unification asymmetric shocks could be reduced
  • Slide 23
  • Labor Unions and Monetary Union Role of labor unions in determining the cost of a monetary union is significant Presence of asymmetric shocks: wages shoudl be flexible Centralized wage bargaining harmful ex: German unification (E. German firms did not survive the shock of unification) Presence of symmetric shocks: Wages should be more uniform across countries Wage bargaining is still not desirable because: Asymmetric shocks less likely in unified Europe but regional specializaiton could lead to asymmetries Uneven changes in output and employment between sectors (sectors with less favorable developments would suffer) Future organization of labor unions in a monetary union will have to respect the requirements of flexibility
  • Slide 24
  • Costs and Benefits in the Long Run 17 6
  • Slide 25
  • Costs and Benefits in the Long Run (cont.) 13 17 6
  • Slide 26
  • The Challenge of Enlargement of EMU Since Eurozone is in existence the question of whether or not it is optimal is academic Still important to know, however, whether or not the beneifts of the union exceed the costs for the 17 members If costs do not exceed benefits individual members will be quite unhappy with the ECB Enlargement of the EMU may exacerbate problems of ECB Present Eurozone consists of 17 members Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain (1999) Greece (2001); Slovenia (2007); Cyprus, Malta (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011)
  • Slide 27
  • The Challenge of the Enlargement of the EMU (cont.) Denmark, Sweden and the UK have not yet joined the EMU Will all of these countries bring the enlarged Eurozone closer to an optimal currency area? Degree of Openness: Central European countries are at least as open towards the EU as the EU countries themselves Central European countries appear to be more integrated with the EU than Denmark, Sweden and the UK Thus, in terms of openness, the Central European countries would fit quite well into the existing EMU
  • Slide 28
  • The Challenge of the Enlargement of the EMU (cont.) Asymmetry of Shocks: Study of Korhonen and Fidrmuc (2001) analyzed the correlation of demand and supply shocks with the average of the union for the EU states and candidates 1. Study finds high correlations of the large coutnries (France, Italy and Germany) with the euro area Not surprising since these large coutnries make up a significant part of the Union 2. Although some Central European countries (Hungary and Estonia) are well correlated with the euro area, this is much less the case with others A large number of states have negative correlations of their demand shocks (Lithuania, Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Slovakia) This could be because these states pursue independent monetary policies once in the Union this source of asymmetric shocks will dissapear But the supply shock negative correlation is unlikely to disappear
  • Slide 29
  • The Challenge of the Enlargement of the EMU (cont.) 3. The position of the UK: Correlation of demand shock is also negative this reflects UKs pursuit of its own national monetary policies quite independently from what happens in the Euro area Correlation of the supply shock is also quite low Conclusions: It is not clear that all countries in the sample are part of an OCA with the rest of the EU (most evident for the UK) low trade with the euro area and is more subjected to asymmetric shocks than other large members of the Union hesitation of the UK to enter the EMU is understandable Despite the openness of the Central European states to the EU many of these countries are still subjected to relatively large asymmetric shocks Some of these countries may still enter the EMU however as the best possible way to import monetary and price stability
  • Slide 30
  • Conclusions 1. It is unlikely that the EU as a whole constitutes an OCA 2. The number of countries that benefit from monetary union is probably larger than most economists thought just a few years ago As the years increase, monetary union will become a more attractive option for most, if not all EU countries 3. Even the countries that are net gainers from a monetary union take a risk by joining the union When large shocks occur they will find it more difficult to adjust
  • Slide 31
  • European Central Bank In the postwar period 2 models of central banking have evolved: 1. Anglo-French model Objectives: Central banks pursue several objectives: Price stabilization Stabilization of the business cycle Maintenance of high employment Financial stability Institutional Design: Political dependence of central bank Monetary decisions are subject to the governments approval 2. German model Objectives: Only one objective: Price Stability Institutional Design: Political Independence no interference from political authorities
  • Slide 32
  • European Central Bank (cont.) When the European nations negotiated the Maastricht Treaty a choice between these two models had to be made and the German model prevailed as the choice for the ECB ECB objectives: Article 105 of Maastricht Treaty states that it is price stability Article 2 includes a high level of employment Treaty recognizes the need to follow other objectives as well, but they are seen as secondary to price stability Treaty is also clear on the need for political independence of the ECB In the absence of this independence the central bank can be forced to print money to cover deficits this would lead to inflation
  • Slide 33
  • European Central Bank (cont.) The Bundesbank is clearly the model for the ECB, however, the ECB is tougher on inflation and political inflation than the Bundesbank was Reason: a simple majority in German parliament can change the status of the Bundesbank, changes in the ECB are much more difficult They can only occur by a revision of the Maastricht Treaty requiring unanimity among all EU-member states, including those that are not members of EMU
  • Slide 34
  • European Central Bank (cont.) The success of the German model is intriguing When the EU countries negotiated the Maastricht Treaty, the Anglo-French model prevailed in almost all of the EU-member states It was rejected for the German model because: 1. Intellectual Development The reaction to Keynes: the monetarist view erupted It was felt that unemployment could not be lowered below its natural rate without creating inflation Lowering unemployment below natural rate could only be achieved with structural policies like more flexibility in labor aned lower taxes The central banks should only concentrate on what they can control: PRICES It was demonstrated taht countries whose central banks were politically independent managed their economies better (lower inflation without high unemployment or lower growth
  • Slide 35
  • European Central Bank (cont.) 2. Strategic Position of Germany in the EMU Process Germany faced the risk of having to accept higher inflation when they entered a monetary union In order to reduce this risk they insisted on creating a central bank tough on inflation In order to accept the EMU Germany insisted on having an ECB like the Bundesbank
  • Slide 36
  • European Central Bank (cont.) ECB was thus modelled on the German Bundesbank with a strong mandate for price stability and weak responsibility for stabilizing output and employment functions conservative central bank an institution that attaches greater weight to price stability and lesser weight to output and employment stabilization than the rest of society
  • Slide 37
  • European Central Bank (cont.) This leads to a conflict: In hard times such as an unexpected recession taht increases unemployment the ECB will do little in terms of expansionary policies or less than what the society wants it to do This represents a conflict between the ECB and elected politicians who represent the society ECB will argue this gives them greater credibility because of their reluctance to yield to political pressure This leads to a trade-off between credibility and stabilization
  • Slide 38
  • European Central Bank (cont.) For the ECB monetary policies should not be used to lower unemployment below the natural unemployment Politicians should do this by lowering taxes on labor and introducing flexibility in the labor market The question and the problem is: WHAT DOES THE ECB SEE AS THE NATURAL UNEMPLOYMENT RATE? and is it correct in its assesment?
  • Slide 39
  • European Central Bank (cont.) The Maastricht Treaty gave a mandate to the ECB to maintain price stability but also stabilize output and employment (provided this does not endanger price stability) A wall was erected around the ECB to protect it from political interference so it could accomplish these objectives Although there are good reasons for independence there are also problems associated with it mainly, its lack of accountability It is possible for the ECB to make a mistake, for ex to miscalculate the natural unemployment rate and therefore fail to stabilize output and employment while it could do so without endangering price stability
  • Slide 40
  • European Central Bank (cont.) There needs to be a mechanism to check that the ECB fulfills its mandate and applies sanctions if this is not the case If the government decided about interest rates there would be no need for accountability of the central bank If the central bank has lots of power then there is a corresponding need for accountability since the government is accountable to the voters Independence and accountability are part of the delagation of powers granted by voters
  • Slide 41
  • European Central Bank (cont.) Bundesbank Federal Reserve
  • Slide 42
  • European Central Bank (cont.) Does the ECB have the strongest degree of accountability? Evidence suggests that it is less well developed than that of the Federal Reserve Banking System of the USA (the Fed) Although both presidents of these two banks face the parliament regularly the chairman of the Fed faces an institution that can change the status of the Fed by a simple majority therefore he needs to pay attention to the opinions of Congressmen
  • Slide 43
  • European Central Bank (cont.) When the president of the ECB appears before parliament they have no power to change its status it can only be changed by changing the Treaty requiring a unanimity of all EU states ECB has much more power Thus ECB has lots of independence but not a corresponding degree of accountability
  • Slide 44
  • European Central Bank (cont.) The other issue of accountability rises from the ECBs objectives they are not clearly defined Although price stability is given as its objective it was not given a precise content making it possible for the ECB to define it itself The other objectives of the ECB (provided price stability is achieved) have been left very vague If this strategy of the ECB is successful it will only really be responsible for its performance against inflation
  • Slide 45
  • European Central Bank (cont.) For ex. The Fed is responsible for movements in employment, mandated by law unlike the ECB the Fed has greater responsibility The primary responsibilities of the Fed: conducting the nations monetary policy to help maintain employment, keep prices stable, and keep interest rates relatively low supervising and regulating banking institutions to make sure they are safe places for people to keep their money and to protect consumers credit rights. providing financial services to depository institutions, the U.S. government, and foreign central banks, including playing a major role in clearing checks, processing electronic payments, and distributing coin and paper money to the nation's banks, credit unions, savings and loan associations, and savings banks.
  • Slide 46
  • The Federal Reserve System The central bank of the United States Created by Congress in 1913 Consists of a network of twelve Federal Reserve Banks and a number of branches under the general oversight of the Board of Governors. The Reserve Banks are the operating arms of the central bank
  • Slide 47
  • The Federal Reserve System Districts
  • Slide 48
  • European Central Bank In summary the accountability of the ECB is weak 1. Absence of strong political institutions in Europe capable of exerting control over its performance 2. As a result of the Treatys vagueness in defining its objectives the ECB has restricted its area of responsibility to inflation
  • Slide 49
  • European Central Bank (cont.) This creates a long-term problem for the political support of the ECB Most central banks are responsible for macroeconomic stability: reducing business cycle fluctuations, avoiding deflation, managing financial stability,... Difficult to see how European politicians will continue to support an institution to which great power has been delegated and over which they have so little control
  • Slide 50
  • European Central Bank (cont.) Some things the ECB can do to avoid this: To compensate for the lack of formal accoutnability it could enahnce informal accountability, ex. Have greater transparency (for ex the ECB can inform the public about its objectives and how it will achieve them and openness in the decision-making process The ECB has tried to do this with its monthly reports and press conferences by the ECB president Publish the minutes of its meeting like th eFed showing the voting of members but the ECB says it cannot due to an article in the Treaty that prohibits it from doing so ECB could broaden its responsibility ECB should announce its estimate for the natural unemployment rate giving the public something to measure it by
  • Slide 51
  • European Central Bank (cont.) Institutional Framework of the ECB: The continuing importance of nation-states in the EU made it necessary to construct monetary institutions for Euroland that are sufficiently decentralized and yet maintain unity in the conduct of monetary policy The institutions of Euroland were established in the Maastricht Treaty. Monetary policy is entrusted to the Eurosystem which consists of: ECB National Central Banks (NCBs) of the EU countries in the EMU (in 2013 there are 17)
  • Slide 52
  • European Central Bank (cont.) The governing bodies of the Eurosystem are: Executive Board: President (Mario Draghi, Italy) Vice-President (Vitor Constancio, Portugal) 4 Directors of ECB Jrg Asmussen, Germany Yves Mersch,Luxembourg Benoit Coeure, France Peter Praet, Belgium
  • Slide 53
  • European Central Bank (cont.) Governing Council: 6 members of the Executive Board Governors of the 17 NCBs
  • Slide 54
  • Members of Euroland 1.Austria 2.Belgium 3.Cyprus 4.Estonia 5.Finland 6.France 7.Germany 8.Greece 9.Ireland 10.Italy 11.Luxembourg 12.Malta 13.Netherlands 14.Portugal 15.Slovakia 16.Slovenia 17.Spain
  • Slide 55
  • European Central Bank (cont.) Governing Council: Main decision-making body of the Eurosystem It formulates monetary policies and takes decisions concerning interest rates, reserve requirements and the provision of liquidity Meets every 2 weeks in Frankfurt Each of the 23 members has one vote Executive board implements the monetary policy decisions of the Governing Council Gives instructions to the NCBs Sets agenda for the meetings of the Governing Council
  • Slide 56
  • European Central Bank 17
  • Slide 57
  • European Central Bank (cont.) The whole decision-making structure is called the Eurosystem ECB is only a part of this system and cannot take decisions on its own about monetary policies The national banks are fully involved in the decision- making process Decisions are then implemented by the ECB NCBs then carry out the decisions in their own markets
  • Slide 58
  • European Central Bank (cont.) The question is whether or not this system is too decentralized The NCBs in the Governing Council have a clear majority (17 out of 23 members) This contrasts with other decentralized central banks For ex. The US Feds decision-making body is the Board of Governors 12 members where 5 are presidents of regional banks (representing regional interests in minority position) the other 7 members are appointed by Congress to represent the interests of the system as a whole
  • Slide 59
  • European Central Bank (cont.) The ECB is small (employee-wise) in contrast to the national banks It is possible for the NCBs to analyze issues to their national advantage Staff at ECB and NCBs Total Staff In analytical functions (research, statistics, econ.) ECB600100-150 Bundesbank17,632360 Banque de France16,917750 Banca dItalia9,307300 Banco de Espana3,269350 Nederlandsche Bank1,721165 Note: NCB data refers to 1995
  • Slide 60
  • European Central Bank (cont.) However, this should not be exaggerated In a recent study DeGrauwe et al concluded that in case of an asymmetric shock even if all the NCBs acted in their own national interest, as long as the Executive Board took a Euroland perspective, the outcome would not be biased in favor of one country or another Even though the Executive Board has minority voting since the NCBs will want different things the Executive Board ends up with the majority This may not always be the case if the different governors end up in coalitions
  • Slide 61
  • European Central Bank (cont.) One of the most peculiar features of Eurolands monetary system is the fact that while monetary policy was entrusted to a European institution, the responsibility for banking supervision was kept firmly in the hands of nation states This could lead to problems
  • Slide 62
  • European Central Bank (cont.) Bank Regulation and Supervision were set out in an EC Directive prior to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty: 1. Responsibility for the supervision of banks entrusted to the authorities of the coutnry where the banks have their head office The principle of home country control Ex. Deutsche Bank is supervised by the German supervisory authority This also means Germany is responsible for supervising the Deutsche Bank branches in other countries
  • Slide 63
  • European Central Bank (cont.) 2. Host Country is responsible for financial stability in its own market host country responsibility Ex. France is responsible for stability of all banks in France (including foreign ones) As long as the national banks remain within national borders there is not much of a problem However, the degree of segmentation in the banking sector is very large The cross-border M&A activity is expected to increase
  • Slide 64
  • Mergers and Acquisitions in the EU Banking Sector
  • Slide 65
  • Slide 66
  • Example of Banking Crisis Example of a possible crisis: It is possible that in the near future 50% or more of the banks operating in Italy will be branches of banks from another country (ex. Germany, France,...) The Italian monetary authorities will be responsible for the stability of the banking sector in Italy and will need information on the soundness of these banks and will need to acquire this informaiton from supervisory institutions in the other country (Germany, France,...)
  • Slide 67
  • Example of Banking Crisis (cont.) Will this information be provided in a timely manner? Will all necessary information be disclosed? (Most countries do not like to give out negative information on their banks) It is possible that Italy will be badly informed and this will make it more difficult for Italy to provide the stability it is supposed to Problem could be worse in a crisis
  • Slide 68
  • Example of Banking Crisis (cont.) Ex. Banking crisis happens in Italy and Italy needs to bail out good banks that are in a liquidity crisis (lender of last resort) and needs quick information If it does not get this information quickly it may hesitate to lend to a good bank The crisis will get worse The ECB needs to take over this lender of last resort function to prevent banking crises
  • Slide 69
  • Example of Banking Crisis (cont.) Banking Crisis: Failure of a bank with bad loans, a run on other sound banks by deposit-holders threatening the closure of these banks as well Lender of Last Resort: Walter Bagehot (famous 19th century English economist) defined the principles that central banks should follow to prevent a banking crisis: 1. The central bank should lend without limits to sound but illiquid banks (lender of last resort) 2. The insolvent banks should either be allowed to fail or should be restructured whereby the bad loans are taken out of the failing bank and the remaining sound portfolio is placed in a new and recapitulated bank (usually the taxpayer will foot such a bill)
  • Slide 70
  • The New Financial Regulatory and Supervisory Structure in the EU Banking crisis of 2008: Caused a major overhaul of the way banks and financial markets are regulated and supervised in the Eurozone and the EU New framework applies to all EU countries and is not restricted to the Eurozone countries The President of the ECB has been given the task of analyzing sources of potential systemic risks that may affect the financial system and issuing early warnings of impending problems The board has no executive power
  • Slide 71
  • European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) European Banking Authority (EBA) (London) National Banking Supervisors European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) (Frankfurt) National Insurance Supervisors European Security and Markets Authority (ESMA) (Paris) National Securities Supervisors As of January 1, 2011
  • Slide 72
  • Conclusion Eurosystem is unique Compromise between national banks and unified decision-making Its shortcomings: Lack of accountability The decentralization of the ECB making it difficult for supervision to prevent and manage financial crises
  • Slide 73
  • Turkish Central Bank (TCMB) Lesson will seek to answer the following questions: When was the TCMB formed How was the TCMB formed Why was the TCMB formed
  • Slide 74
  • The Birth of the TCMB Central Banking born out of need to provide war financing in many states The central bank of the Ottoman State was born due to similar reasons however it was somewhat different in institutional and ownership status The Crimean War of 1853 was the beginning of the financial bankruptcy of the Ottoman Empire The Ottoman State attempted to finance the war with domestic and foreign borrowing
  • Slide 75
  • TCMB This led to the first foreign borrowing of the Ottoman Empire 1854 the Ottoman Treasury sought long term debt in the European financial markets of London, Paris and Vienna 1863 Osmanli Bankasi (Bank- Osmani-i ahane) formed by British and French capital to aid in Ottoman debt repayment The Bank had the right and monopoly to print money
  • Slide 76
  • TCMB The Bank would borrow at low interest in the European markets and increase its gold reserves and print three times the amount of its reserves and give the government capital advances in exchange for interest Although the Bank operated with profit, the Ottoman state was not allowed to share in the profit 1875 the Ottoman state declared that it would default on foreign debt 1881 Dyun- Umumiye daresi (Debt Management Administration) formed with the duty of managing the Ottoman states foreign debt
  • Slide 77
  • TCMB The formation of the Duyun-i Umumiye daresi signaled the symbolic end of the Ottoman state This trauma helped shape the economic politics of the new Turkish republic in 1923 i.e. Avoidance of foreign debt and budget deficits These concepts also influenced the institutional structure of the central bank during 1930-1950
  • Slide 78
  • TCMB The absence of a national central bank as the symbol of economic independence became a major problem of the Ankara government especially during the War of Independence Problems created by this deficiency The rejection of the Ottoman bank formed by foreign capital to provide war financing during WWI High inflation and the havoc it brought on society The constant depreciation of the Turkish Lira 1925-1930 : the ideological foundations of a new central bank for the new Turkish state planted
  • Slide 79
  • TCMB The endeavor to create the central bank brought about restlessness in the two major banks, Bankas and Osmanl Bankas Trkiye Bankas supported the creation of the new institution The General Manager of Is Bankasi, Celal Bayar, declared that he was ready to turn Is Bankasi into the new central bank Osmanl Bankas, opposed the new institution because it did not want to lose its privileges in printing money and stated that the new institution should be formed with foreign capital and that the new state should provide its financial stability with foreign borrowing
  • Slide 80
  • TCMB Osmanli Bankasis wishes would have led the new state to lose its economic independence The new leaders of the Republic decided to repay the Duyum-i Umumiye debt without foreign borrowing This allowed for the new central bank to replace the Osmanli Bankasi which lost its priveleged status 1930 the Central Bank Law passed in the Turkish Parliament The new institution took over the governments domestic and foreign exchange and treasury operations 3 October 1931 the Turkish Republic Central Bank (TCMB) formally began its operations as the 38th central bank in the world Other central banks formed after this period: New Zealand (1933); Canada (1934); Ireland (1943); Australia (1945)
  • Slide 81
  • Political Independence of the TCMB 1930 the Governor of the Bank Council appointed for 5 years with the option of renewal by the President of the Republic 1970 the law was changed to allow the upper level management to be appointed after the Bank Council declared the candidates and the Council decided on appointments Today the Governor of the TCMB is appointed byt eh Cabinet of Ministers and the deputies are appointed from the Governors choice of 3 candidates Since the Governor and his deputies are not appointed at the same tme the government can shape the members of upper management
  • Slide 82
  • Political Independence After 1987 elections the individual independence of the TCMB Governor was damaged Governor and deputiess duty period reduced to 3 years 1990 Governors appointment period re-extended to 5 years 2001 Governors appointment period re-extended to 5 years Harmonization with European Central Banking System Law (ECBs president appointed for 8 non-renewable years)
  • Slide 83
  • Political Independence 1930 no specific education requirement for Governor and top 4 executives 1970 mandate that Governor should have higher education with experience and knowledge in finance, economics and banking Governor should have higher eduation in social sciences with previous experience in the public sector Deputies should have an undergraduate or graduate degree in either law, finance, economics, management or banking along with adequate experience and knowledge and at least 10 years experience Since 1970 the Banks Council is composed of 6 people selected by the Governor and General Council of the Bank
  • Slide 84
  • Institutional Structure of the TCMB
  • Slide 85
  • TCMB President of the TCMB Assoc. Prof. Dr. Erdem Ba (since 19 April 2011) 47 y.o., PhD in Economics Members of the Bank Council Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Faruk Aysan (since November 2011) 36 y.o., PhD in Economics M. Vehbi tak (since 1 May 2005) 53 y.o., lawyer with graduate degree in social sciences Assoc. Prof. Dr. Lokman Gndz (since 1 May 2005) 43 y.o., PhD in banking Prof. Dr. Sabri Orman (since November 2011) 65 y.o., PhD in Economics Prof. Dr. Necdet ensoy (since 7 December 2006) 59 y.o., PhD in accounting Abdullah Yaln (since 1 May 2012) 60 y.o., degree in accounting and masters in finance, former head of Etibank and auditor at Ziraat Bankas
  • Slide 86
  • Aims of the TCMB
  • Slide 87
  • TCMB The primary aim and priority of the TCMB pre-1986 was to support the governments development program With the changes in the foreign exchange and convertibility of the Turkish lira the aim of price stability became a major goal of the TCMB Law No. 19126 of 3 June 1986: ekonomik gelimeye yardmc olmak amacyla; para ve kredi politikasn, kalknma planlar ve yllk programlar gz nnde bulundurularak ekonominin gereklerine gre ve fiyat istikrarn salayacak bir tarzda yrtmektir.
  • Slide 88
  • TCMB 2001 new law lists the primary aim of the Bank as price stability Provided that price stability is achieved the Bank can support the governments growth and employment policies The Bank determines the inflation target with the government Co-responsibility of the government and the Central Bank The EU Progress reports criticize this aspect stating that it damages the independence of the Central Bank and does not conform to EU norms
  • Slide 89
  • TCMB The government does not have power over the formation of the budget of the TCMB However the government must approve the TCMBs budget This limits the economic independence of the Bank The TCMB can also be audited by the Prime Ministry This is incompatible with the European Central Banking System norms