being and natures in aquinas, owens
TRANSCRIPT
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
1/12
Joseph Owens,
C.Ss.R.
B E I N G AND N A T U R E S IN
A Q U I N A S
Rev.
JOSEPH
OWENS
C.SS .R .
(Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies. 59 Queen s
Park Crescent East, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
M5S 2C4 is the
author
of
many
books and articles. He has been an active member in the Metaphysical Society of
America, the American Catholic P hilosophical Association, and the Canadian
Philosophical Association. At various times, he has been president of each of these
organizations.
I .
Undoubtedly there is persistent philosophical tension between being as
the most primitive and impoverished of allhuman notions, and being as the
infinitely perfect and rich nature of God. The tension pervades the
Aristotelian
tradition of metaphysics too profoundly for one to deny its
existence or to banish it from themind. It flows over, for instance, into the
Thomisticproblem ofrealdistinction between thing and being. Hereitposes
the issue sharply. Is being merely the most common aspect of things,
involving no
real
addition of content?
O r
has being a
real
content
all
its own,
over and above the thing itself? F o rAquinas being is identical with essence
inGod.i Yet being is other than essence in creatures. What resemblance is
there forhimbetweenthesetwo ways of being? Isthe being that is other than
essence a nature imperfectly similar to the being that is identical with an
essence? O ris being not a nature in creatures atall? Is it a positive actuality
that in finite things is neither a nature nor a part of a nature?
Inboth creatures and God being is named by the same word and is
brought in various ways under one and the same concept. Does the alleged
impoverishment of the notion through unlimited extension to
all
things, then,
still
allow being a minimal nature ofsome
kind
in finite things? Or is the
concept of being left empty, ablank,asurd,a meaningless object whose name
should be banished from the vocabulary of philosophy? Or is it present for
Aquinasin creatures as an actuality that has in no way the aspect ofanature?
Fromthis angle the problem surely cannot be dismissed like a nagging
thought. On that
initial
note of accord with
Father
Dewan may I go
directly
to the basic point of his disagreement with my understanding of the
question in the context of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Dewan's contention is
that the opening stage of Aquinas' argument, as given in the De Ente et
Essentia, ^'should be read as 'quidditatively' as possible, that is, as auniversal
h Modem Schoolman L X I March 1984 157
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
2/12
demonstration based on the 'natures' ofessenceandesse (Dewan, p. 5.10
12).
My
objection to this approach is clearcut. Through conceptualization
the human intellect knows finite things under the aspect of theiressencesor
natures.
We know what a man is and what a phoenix is. This knowledge
gives
a grasp of
essence
sufficient for the purposes of contrasting it with its
being. From the side of essence quidditative approach is accordingly in
order,in the ambit of the present problem.
But
have we comparable knowledge that the being we encounter in
observable things is a nature or essence? We are aware that the person in
front ofus,the person with whom we are talking, exists in therealworld. We
have never had positive knowledge of that type in regard to the phoenix.
Through thesejudgments we see that being is notably distinct from non-
being. But is that enough to show us that being is a nature? Does what is
known over and above the notion man in the judgment the man exists, or
over and above the notions man and pale in knowing that the man is
pale, appear as a furthernature? It is not originally grasped in the way
essencesor natures are known, that is, through conceptualization or simple
apprehension. It is known through judgment, a different activity of the
intellect, a composite apprehension that in speech is expressed by a
proposition.
What is known originally through judgment can of course be
subsequently conceptualized in terms of something else, for instance of
actuality in the concept the actuality of all actualities, or of perfection in
the perfection of all perfections, or indefinitely as something in the
notion of thatwhichmakes a thing be, or as the fact that a thing exists. We
have to form a concept ofitto have it as a subject for discussion.
But
we have
The
Latin esse allows translation by cither to
be or to exist, in the wayEnglishidiom requires.
In
Aquinas there is no philosophical difference be
tweenanexistential
is
and a predicative
is.
See
In Peri Herrn.,
1.5.
Spiazzi
no. 73. InAristotlethis
non-recognition od theFrege-Russelldistinction has
been called byJaakko Hintikkathe unambiguity
ofAristotelianbeing. Different asAquinas'notion
of being is from that of Aristotle, it remains
unambiguous in meaning existential actuality for
both predication and assertions of existence, even
though it is multisignificant from the viewpoint of
the categories and of existence in reality and in
cognition.
2On
the distinction in the
Islamic
thinkers, see F.
Rahman, Essence and Existence in Avicenna,
Mediaeval ndRenaissance Studies,4 (19588), 1-16:
P. Morewedge, Philosophical Analysis and Ibn
Sina's Essence-Existence Distinction,
Journal of the
American Oriental Society,
92 (1972), 425-35. With
regardto the
Scholastics,
seeEtienne
Gilson,
History
of Christian Philosophy
in the
Middle Ages (New
York:
Random H[ouse, 1955), pp. 420-27.
^ In
Deo autern ipsumesseest sua quidditas: in
ideo
nomen quod sumitur ab
esse,
proprie nominat
ipsum,
et estpropriumnomenejus:sicut proprium
nomen hominis quod sumitur a quidditate sua
{Sent., 1.8.1.1,
S O L U T . , ED.M A N D O N N E T , t,
195.
Dewanremarks
that esse...doesnot,
properly
speaking have an essence (p. 153). Yet it is
undoubtedlyanessence
in
God.
The
relevant point
is that it is not an
essence
in creatures, and is not
known by us originally as an
essence.
Yet Dewan
insists that we first know existence as *like a
nature' .
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
3/12
no original concept of it. It is not known to us immediately as a nature.
F o r
Aquinas(Sent,, 1.38.1.3,Solut.; ed. Mandonnet, I, 903) knowledge
of the quiddities of things {quidditates rerum) was in this way radically
distinguished from knowledge oftheirbeing. Though Aristotle was cited for
the designation of the knowledge of quiddities as the thinking of indivisible
objects, no basis in his thought was broughtforwardforrealdistinction of
being from quiddity. Forthe Stagirite one man andbeing
a man
and
a man
arethe same (Metaph., 4.2.1003b26-27; Apostle
translation).
Against that
Aristotelian background the question of distinction
between
being and
essence could hardly be expected to assume any importance till it was
approached by Moslem andChristianthinkers with theirtenetof creation,
namely that being was something first received by creatures from God
through
creation.
In the
Scriptural
revelation of God as / am
whom
am
(Exod.,3.14) Aquinas saw the sublime truth that God was named in terms of
being. God was thereby named from his quiddity,
parallel
with the way
man is taken from human
nature.
As a nature, being isGod . The being
that is immediately known in creatures, then, cannot be a nature. It is not
something that can be known in the way natures are grasped, that is, through
conceptualization. But as known through judgment it may be traced by
demonstrative reasoning to its first cause, where it is subsistent and in
consequence a nature. To show that being is a nature, therefore, is to
demonstrate that God exists.
Only
then can one see that when received by
any other real thing being has to remain really distinct from the thing it
actuates, if each thing is not to be absorbed in Parmenidean fashion into a
single being.
Thebeing that is received by arealfinite nature cannot, in consequence,
be really part of that nature. Emphatically being in creatures cannot be
regardedas a nature, no matter how minimal. This is far from meaning
that,onceit has been
seen
that existence, in God, is aquid, what something
is ,wecan then and only thenviewina quidditative way the act of existence ofa
creature,
as this stand is interpreted by Dewan (p. 11.21-24).
Rather
the
tenet requires that we can never view the existence of a creature in a
quidditative way at
all.
When it is
seen
in creatures, being has always to be
viewed as an actuality that is other than any finite quiddity whatever, as an
object knowable originally through judgment only and not through
conceptualization.
T o
sum up on this point, in the opening section of the demonstration in
the
e
Ente
et
Essentia the
essence
is known quidditatively, but the thing's
being is not so known. The demonstration remains universal because it is
Being and N atures
in
Aquinas
Joseph Owens, C .S s .R .
159
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
4/12
based upon the nature of the finite thing and also upon the general notion of
actuality under which the thing's being is conceptualized. Effortto read the
opening section of that argument as quidditatively as possible can extend
only to the side ofessence. To view the finite thing's being as quidditatively
as possible means not to view it quidditatively at all. At no stageof the
reasoning can a finite thing be viewed in the way
suggested
by Dewan (p.
11.26-27) as a composite both components of which are 'natures'.
I I .
A differently worded though intimately related issue is whether I am
maintaining the possibility thatth realdistinction is at first grasped in an
imperfect way, through its signs in the domain of conceptualization and
judgment (Dewan, p. 4.17-19). F o rDewan this might be called a confused
knowledge,' a knowledge of arealdistinction not yet clearly distinguishable
froma conceptual distinction (p. 4.19-21). A linguistic difficulty may arise
here. Distinct and confused arecontraries. To the
extent
something is
confused it is not distinct, and to the
extent
it is distinct it is not confused. A
realdistinction confusedly or imperfectly known (p. 4.23-24) would seem to
imply
that the difference
between
its two terms is known distinctly up to a
point, but without penetrating further into the
full
meaning of that same
distinction.
I s
that the case in the present question? The
essence
of a man or of a
phoenix is known in a concept that reveals nothing about existence or non
existence. Thisconcept is distinct from the concept of what has already been
attained through the judgment that the thing exists. The two concepts are
distinct from each other. Accordingly the two teims, thing and being, are
known as conceptually distinct.
Does a more searching examination of this distinction finally make
manifest that the two terms are really distinct from each other? Thereare
writerswho havecriticallyexamined the argument andstill
fail
to see that it
does.4 The ultimate ground of the conceptual distinction is the failure of a
finiteessenceto include being in its concept. No matter how penetratingly
that ground is examinedjustin itself, the results
still
remain in the conceptual
order. They reveal nothing more than that the concept of a finiteessence
doesnotaffirmor deny the thing's existence. They do not show whether in
realitythe thing is identical or not with its being. Thatquestion is left open,
no matter how deeply the conceptual distinction is probed.
Cornelio
Fabro,
La
nozione metafisica
di accepted this
initial
argument
in
isolation
from
what
partecipazione secondo
S
Tommaso d Aquino,
2nd follows it, while other
writers,
both proponents and
ed.
Turin:Societa
Editrice
Internazionale, 1950), adversaries of the
real
distinction, many be found
pp.
218-219, notes how
Thomist
manuals have who argue against its validity.
160
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
5/12
Eachof the two terms of the distinction, thing and being, can of course
be examined more closely in itself and in its relations to other things. The
essence
in question can be proven to bereallydependent upon somethingelse
for its being, and ultimately upon being as a nature in
God.
When being has
in
this way been demonstrated to exist as arealnature, a new ground for
reasoning to another
kind
of distinction
between
being and thing in creatures
has been reached. Because being is a
real
nature infinite in content it has to
remainreally other than anything into which it may be received in thereal
world. No longer is failure to include being in the concept ofessencethe
ground for making a further distinction
between
the terms. The ground is
now the positive nature of being. Instead of bringing out the implications
confused in a conceptual distinction, this consideration shows that a new
distinction has been reached on a new ground. Itis not a distinction
between
different concepts of the same thing, but
between
two entitative components
of that thing. Whatis meant is not that therealdistinction is atirstgrasped
in
an imperfect way (Dewan, p. 4.17-18), but rather that it is not grasped at
all in the opening stageof the argument. The conceptual distinction is a
distinctionbetweendifferent concepts of what may or may not be the one and
the same thing. Itis not arealdistinction confusedly or imperfectly known
(p. 4.23-25).
I fone wishes to use the notion directly
verified
(Dewan, p. 4.16-17),
the verification here lies rather in the fact that one sensible thing is really
distinct from the others. The sensible things are not absorbed into the
Parmenidean
unity of being. Their real distinction from one another
verifies that. One may agree that in order to
arrive
at the existence of
God,we must know firstthat arealdistinction lies behind the 'conceptual
distinction' (p. 4.24-26). But thatrealdistinction is the distinctionbetween
individualthings and percipients in the sensible world, and not that
between
their
essence
and their being. Without knowledge of the realdistinction
between
theindividuals,one could not know that the sensible things can exist
both in themselves and in the cognition of a knower and are therefore
conceptually different from any existence they may
possess.
The norm that
the objects of the conceptual distinction...arenot the same astheirgrounds in
reahty
(p.4.12-14 is thereby safeguarded, just as in the case of notional
multiplicity
(p. 4.10-11 where really different individuals share the same
specific and generic forms though without real distinction
between
the
individual
and the generic and specific natures in each.
In
the case of the difference
between
being and thing, consequently, the
further ground for the real distinction prevents agreement with Dewan's
Being and Natures in Aquinas
Joseph Owens,
C . S s .R .
161
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
6/12
assertion I see no reason to withhold the designation 'real' from the
distinction as originallyknown (p. 12.22-23).
Even
after the demonstration
of that
real
distinction has been completed, one may look back at the
conceptual distinction and still find that it gives no intuition of real
distinction
between
its terms. Therealdistinction is something to which one
reasons, not something one can behold or envisage. The concepts stillyield
only a conceptual distinction, even though on another ground one has
alreadyreached the
firm
conclusion that there is arealdistinction
between
the
two components. But the conceptual distinction, no matter how closely
examined,
does
not reveal that fact. The conceptual distinction
does
not
unfold itself as an imperfectly known or confusedly knownrealdistinction.
Rather,
for Aquinas the twofold activity of the intellect through
judgment and conceptualization provides two different cognitional routes
into the sensible world. The problem is whether the two reach what is really
the same object, or whether they
arrive
at really different objects. Any
observable thinga table, a plant, a catis known both by way of
conceptualization and by way of judgment. Those are two different routes.
By
them one knows respectively what the thing is and that it exists. What is
reached
by way of conceptualization is the thing's nature. What is reached
by way of judgment is its existence or being.
L ike
morning star and evening
star, these are conceptually distinct objects. In the case of the star, real
distinction or
real
identity has to be based upon astronomical findings, not
upon further scrutiny of the conceptual distinction. The Countess of
Flanders
and the Duchess of
Brabant
are conceptually distinct, but whether
Aquinas' letter
Epistola
ad
Ducissam rabantiae
{Op. Cm. Leonine ed.,
42.375-378) was addressed to one and the samerealperson recorded under
those two names, or to two really different persons, has to be settled by
paleographical
and historical evidence, and not by perfecting the conceptual
distinction.
I I I
Perhapstheratherabstruse issues in the above two sections of this paper,
as they would appear from the viewpoints of current thought, might be
graphicallyillustrated and driven home by a bit of fantasy. At least it might
help to raise the broad outlines above the mass of
detail,
and keep thewoods
fromgettinglost in the trees.
Historyhas not recorded the exact words ofChristopherColumbus as
he first viewed the land that had been sighted by the watch in the wee morning
hours of October 12, 1492. But one can readily picture the glow of long
awaited triumph as, a faithful Sancho at his side, Columbus would
come
on
deck to gazein waking reality on the shoreline of his dreams. My dear
162
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
7/12
Sancho,"
one may imagine him saying, "at last we have reached from the east
the Indies that
people
before us have reached only from the west "
"Not so fast, SenorAlmirante,"would
come
the quick reply from an
analyticallytrained Sancho, "how can you be so sure that the 'Indies reached
from
the east' are really identical with the 'Indies reached from the west'?"
"Tut,tut, Sancho," would the now
admiral
of the ocean
seas
rejoin, Iam a
sailor,not a philosopher. Thecriteriaof identity that the philosophers talk
about merely bore me. I have worked as a chartmaker in times when the
sailing
business was slack, and I know that experts say I grossly
underestimate the distance westwardfromthe
Canaries
toChina . But unless
someone
can first prove to me that there are a thousand nautical miles of
ocean between the 'Indies reached from the west' and the 'Indies reached
fromthe east,' Iwillcontinue to maintain that the two are really the same
thing."
Sancho had to be a patient man. Quietly he would begin his laborious
analysis. "Youdo recognize, DonCristobal,that 'Indies reached from the
east' and 'Indies reached from the west' are distinct concepts. Letus agree to
callthe Indies reached from the east the 'WestIndies,'for they face you from
the west; and the Indies reached from the west the 'EastIndies,'for they face
you from the east. Indies should be described from the side of the islands,
not
from
the way the sailors face them. You see, you have to understand the
logic of
our
language,
else
you
will
be
tricked
by words.
I n
point of fact, you
have the conceptual distinction already, and as
soon
as
someone
can prove to
you the presence of the thousand miles of intervening ocean youwillconclude
that the distinction
between
the two Indies is real. The conceptual
distinctionwill metamorphose before youreyesinto areal distinction."
Columbus
would not be impressed. "I think in terms of islands. My
Santa Maria could never be wrecked by crashing against a distinction, yet it
could by crashing into an island. But you hypostatize distinctions as the
object of your discourse, like the majesty of
Ferdinand
and the majesty of
Isabella
walking around in separate persons with only marriage melding the
two majesties into one. To use your language, distinctions are second order
objects. Youcanmetamorphose them to suit your viewpoint of the moment.
Butislands are stubborn things. They stand in their own right. They are
what I keep as the objects of mythinking,and I abide by thephrasingthat the
two Indiesare conceptually distinct. If you could demonstrate the presence
of the intervening ocean I would of course then say that they are really
distinct. If for you that means metamorphosing my conceptual distinction
into a real one, like a caterpillar into a butterfly, so be it. But the
Being and Natures in quinas
Joseph Owens, C .S s .R .
163
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
8/12
metamorphosing can take place only after the proof that an ocean intervenes.
T i l l
then, I know the varmint only as a caterpillar.
A t
that, Sancho would
give
up. He would content himself with
remarkinghow beautiful the moonlit night really was.
*
* *
Being
and thing, then, are objects as conceptually distinct ad Indies
reachedfrom the east and Indies reached from the west. T h e basis of the
distinction is the same, namely the different routes. For Aristotle and for
Suarezand for numerous others
these
objects have coincided in the onereal
thing. They were different ways of naming or of conceiving the same reality.
I n
Aquinas they were proven to be really different from each other, but only
after the infinite ocean of subsistent being had played its intervening role in
the long process of reasoning.
Insofar as any conclusion is implicitly contained in its premises,
knowledge of therealdistinctionbetweenthing and being may be regarded as
contained in embryo in what is known of the sensible thing through judgment
an d conceptualization. The openessenceattained in its concept and thereal
existence grasped in the judgment provide the grounds for reasoning with
cogency to existence as subsistent and accordingly as a real nature. It is
there, and only roughly, that the simile of metamorphosis applies. The
existence known in sensible things as an object other than any nature has to
metamorphose into the nature of existence in the mind's reasoning about it.
With
existence recognized for what it is in its own nature, in
^O n the way Aquinas regards Damascene's
ocean of
being
(ousias) seeSent.,
1.8.1.1
ad 4m ;I,
196.
In
the body of
the article
{Quarta ratio;p. 195)
the path to the existence of God follows the same
lines as in the
De
Ente
et
Essentia.
^ e
Ente,
c. 4; ed. Leonine,X L I I I , 376-377.94
143. A discussion on the reasoning to an efficient
cause may be found in my article TheCausal
PropositionPrinciple or Conclusion ? The
Modern Schoolman, 32 (1955), 159-71; 257-70; 323
39. Eventhe conceptual distinctionbetweenathing
and itsbeingisthe
result
ofareasoning process. The
same thing is found to exist in the
realworid
and in
human cognition. Consequently it cannot be
identical
with either way of existing. Dewan (pp.
151-153) hesitates to use the term demonstration
in this regard. He suggests rather,that the
distinction is knows as acommunis animi conceptio.
In thetextofInBoeth.deTrin.,lect. 2,Calcaterra
nos. 31-32, an immediately evident distinction
between
the abstract (see nos. 22; 25) and the
concrete is applied to existents.
In
simple things the
two differ in their notions, but in composite things
they differreally. Thisis said to follow from what
has
been statedearlier
no. 25),
where being itself was
shown to be without composition. The
tenet
that
the distinction incompositesisrealis accordingly
not presented as immediately evident, but as
following from what had been said. Ergoandideo
(no. 32) are used for the conclusion.
7Disp. Metaph.,
19.1.20-40;c d.Vivcs,X X V I ,27a-
33b. The impossibility of existing in virtue of its
own self
m ay
readily be called a
real
condition in
thecreature. Bu tthat need not,and forSuarezdoes
not, imply that the existence is a really different
component. Aquinas
{ e
pot. 9.1.c) can use the
expression secundum rem to describe the
differencebetween essenceandindividualinmaterial
substances, sinceinonerealindividualtheessenceis
really separated from the essence in the other
individuals,though it remains notionally the same.
Bu tnorealdistinctionbetweentwo components of
the thing is thereby implied. In immaterial
substances, on the other hand,
essence
and
individualcoincide
from
the
view
point of
reality,
for
there is no separation into individuals.
164
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
9/12
tradistinction
to its status as the actuation of some other nature, the
requirement of arealdistinction between it and anything it actuates in the
finite
world
is shown.
But
the metamorphosis has to take place inone'sthought before the real
distinction between being and thing in creatures can be demonstrated. The
butterfly may be said to be present in the
caterpillar,
but the conclusion that it
canfly can hardly be
drawn
from what is recognized in the
larva.
The simile
limps,
because the substantial nature is the same incaterpillarand butterfly
while existence is in no way present as a nature in the finite world.
I V
Father
Dewan finds that two difficulties result from this way of
understanding
Aquinas'
reasoning. The first of
these
difficulties concerns
the validity of the causal argument for the existence ofGod (Dewan, p. 6.6
7). The claim is that the precise need for a cause... is the reality of the
distinction between the factors (p. 151).
This
is applied obviously enough
to the present problem in thesensethat there must berealdistinction between
thing and being.
Yet
in the context Aquinas makes no mention ofarequirement that the
distinction has to be real. In his reasoning in the
De
Ente
et
Essentia the
precise need for an efficient cause is rather that the essence of a finite thing
does
not contain existence and cannot bring itself into existence. This
combined accidental andpriorrole of existence makes the thing dependent
upon somethingelsefor its being, and ultimately upon subsistent existence.
No
initial
requirement ofrealdistinction between thingandbeing is brought
into play for launching the demonstration. Aristotle{Metaph., 2.2.994a5-7;
12.6-7.1071b3-1072b30; Ph.
7-8,241b24
ff.) had long before reasoned to a
first efficient cause without making use ofadistinction of thatkind.
Three
centuries after the time of Aquinas, Suarez
still
could develop his
metaphysical argument for God's existence without requiring that
distinction. The existence isreal, the dependence isreal,the cause isreal.
Butwhat ground emerges for the contention that 'cause' in anyrealsense
cannot enter into the picture withoutreallackofper
se
unity between a thing
anditsesse''(Dewan, p. 153)i freallackofper
se
unity meansrealdistinction
between the components?
I f
one wishes to term the accidental character of being in finite things a
reallackofper
se
unity between a thing and itsesse, no basic objection need
arise. Per se refers to what the thing requires in virtue of its own self.
Thoughfrom one viewpoint nothing is more essential to a thing than its
Being andNatures in Aquinas
Joseph Owens, C S s R
165
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
10/12
being/ in virtue of its own self a sensible thingdoesnot require being in the
realworld. It was generated, it is perishable. At one time it did not exist,
and
it can
still
cease to exist.
In
virtue of its own
self it
does
not necessitate its
union withrealexistence.
That
condition isrealenough. It is there in the
realthing. But itdoesnot immediately make manifest anyrealdistinction
betweenthe thing and is being.
A l l
that isrequiredforrealdependence upon
anefficient cause really other than itself
is
therealdependence shown by the
consideration that its naturedoesnot include being. The demonstration of
the existence of God by way of efficient causality is perfectly secure without
the presupposition ofa realdistinctionbetweenbeing and thing in creatures.
Intherealthing, then, there is nop r s unitybetweenwhat is grasped
through conceptualization and what is known through judgment. But is
what is grasped through judgment an actuality really over and above the
thing?
Or is itjustthe same thing approached in another perspective? The
question can
still
be asked whether the Indies reached from the east are really
the same thing as theIndiesreachedfromthe west. Lackof
per
s unity in the
case of thing and beingdoesnot immediately showrealdistinctionbetween
the two entitative components.
Dewan's second difficulty (p. 153) is even more surprising. Its
concern
is not precisely with the existence but rather with the unicity of
subsistent being. The contention is that one can conclude to the unicity of
subsistent being only by premising arealdistinction (p. 153), understood in
thesenseofa realdistinctionbetweena finite thing and its being. The nature
of being has to manifest itself
from
the start: One
sees
this need to premise
realdistinction when one considers the nature of esse as entering into the
premises (p. 153).
In this approach, obviously, being has to appear immediately as a
nature.
Even
more pertinently, it is looked upon as a common feature within
the nature of things: 'Esse' must be the name of something in the nature
of things which, in its own nature, is simple and common (p. 154).
The general problem had accordingly been phrased: What if we take
something which
w
experience ascommon
to
many, and attempt to posit it as
existing in its purity: will it still be envisagable as a multiplicity of
individuals ?(p. 154). The
particular
answer given for the realm of being is:
I fitis simply a name for the concrete thing, then it is'pure'in every concrete
thing, and is as many as they are (p. 155).
Thisreasoningsuggeststhat what is other than a nature can be only a
name. But being, though not originally known as a nature through
conceptualization, is grasped through judgment as an actuality. When that
^..cum
nihil
sit essentialius
rei
quam suum
esse
creature,
supposito tamen
influxu
Dei
(57,1.104.1,
{Sent 1.8, cxp. lac partis tcxtus; I, 209. Cf. ad im.).
Dicendumquodesseper se consequitur formam
166
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
11/12
actuality
is conceptualized, it gives rise to a concept different from the
concept of
any
finite nature. It is proven to be conceptually distinct from the
thing it actualizes. Yet it is not thereby held to be really the same as that
thing.
Real
identity orrealdistinctionwillremain open for demonstration.
Priorto the demonstration it is incorrect to maintain with Dewan that
anyone who denies the distinction ofesse from the subsisting thingwillsay
there are as many instances of ^^ -subsisting as there are things . People
who deny the distinction need not make being subsist. But after the
conclusion has been reached that being is a nature in God, the consequence
emerges
that it could not be apartof
any
other nature without absorption of
that nature into itself. It has toremainreally other than what it actuates. If
itdid not stayreallydistinct, then there would be indeed as many instances of
subsistent existence as there are thingsexactly one.
Reasoning to a conclusion like that, however, is self-destructive and
hardlyavoids the ridiculous. But it makes the point of the difficulty quite
clear.
Being, if known originally as a nature, is from that viewpoint
comparable with heat or humanity. It is multiple in sensible things, the
starting
point of the demonstration. To do away with that multiplicity
would be to saw off the bough upon which one is seated during the whole
reasoning process. But an effort to posit heat or humanity as subsistent in
itself turns out to be impossible. Heat is by its nature an accident, and
therefore cannot subsist in itself. Humanity by its
essence
requires
individuationthrough matter. Itcan subsist only inindividuals. It is not an
angelicform,in which species would coincide with individuality. Humanity
doesnot subsist uniquely as anindividual. Conceived on that model, being
would not subsist in any unique instance. I twould,i fsubsistent, subsist in as
many instances as therearesubsistent things. Butif, on thecontrary,being is
not known as a nature in the first premise of the argument, itwillnot follow
the pattern ofanature when it is known to be subsistent.
There
is nothing of
its own nature in finite things for absorption into the instance that subsists.
It
leaves them all intact, while its own subsistent nature is not multiplied.
The
difficulty vanishes, therefore, if being is regarded as originally
known
not as a nature through conceptualization but as the object of a
judgment. As anature,it is not found in any finite thing. Whereit subsists it
has to be unique, for it is all-inclusive. Yet it
does
not thereby render the
existence of other things impossible, destroying the basis upon which the
process of reasoning to it rests. It is not found in finite things as anature,and
accordingly
doesnot absorb
those
things into itself as a subsistent nature in
the way an angelic form renders other instances of itself impossible. Rather,
Being and Natures in quinas
Joseph Owens,
C S s R
167
-
7/25/2019 Being and Natures in Aquinas, Owens
12/12
itmakes other natures be, without making them other instances of its own
nature,which is subsistent being.
The
unicity of subsistent being is in consequence left untouched, and at
the same time the multiplicity of
beings
remains safeguarded. Somewhat
ironically,in fact, it is the persistence of taking therealdistinction to mean
that a created nature is a composite both components of which are
'natures'
(Dewan, p. 156) thatgivesrise to this difficulty about unicity. If
the being that is grasped in creatures through judgment is recognized as
not present
in
any finite thing as a nature but always as an actuality other than
the nature, the difficulty disappears. The being is then not immediately
conceived as anature,nor as eitherreallydistinct from orreallyidentical with
the thing. Demonstration is accordingly required, and it shows that
subsistent being is unique.
V
These
considerations show how seriously thetenet
in
Aquinasthat being
is originally the object of judgment and not of conceptualization has to be
taken.
We have no original cognition of being as a nature. Onlythrough
demonstration can we know that being is a nature, a nature that subsists in
God
alone. Outside that unique instance it is never
a
natureandcan never be
viewed quidditatively, even in the most imperfect manner.
To interpret this explanation as though it meant that after the
demonstration ofGod'sexistence the various instances of being in creatures
are now visible as likenesses
of a nature
as Dewan presents it, leaves it
easily open to misunderstanding. The notion of likeness will have to be
undersood outside the quidditative order, if the term likeness is to be used.
When being is conceived as the actuality of all actualities, the words
themselves indicate likeness from the viewpoint of the more general notion of
actuality,
but not from the viewpoint of quiddity. To take being in creatures
seriously as the proper object of judgment is to leave it as quidditative solely
in
its
primary
instance, God. That truth sublime (Aquinas,SCG 1.22,
Hanc autem)
stillmerits careful study and discussion. In that light thereal
identity of being with God and itsrealdistinction in
creatures
is by no means,
as Dewan so laudably recalls in Gilson's phrasing, a topic to be banished
fromthe mind like a nagging thought.
'p.
160. C f
supra,
n. 3. A point at issue here is terminology, sec J. F. Wippel, The Relationship
that likeness between participated being and the Between Essence and Existence in
Late-Thirteenth-
nature
of being
in
terms of actualitydoesnot involve
CenturyThought:Giles
of
Rome,
Henry ofGhent,
likeness in terms of reality or thing {res between Godfrey of Fontaines, and James ofViterbo, in
participated
being
and
the
nature
that participates
it.
Philosophies
of
Existence Ancient
nd
Medieval,
ed.
Onthe notion ofthedistinction asbetweenres
and Parviz
Morewedge (NewYork:
FordhamUniversity
resand the subsequentstandardacceptance of that Press, 1982), pp. 138-141.
168