being a study in metaphysics

8/12/2019 Being a Study in Metaphysics

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CONTENTS

^ PAGEIntroduction vii

CHAPTER

I The Term Being i

II Unity and Commonness of Being...

13

III Unity of Being Not Real 24

IV Inclusion of the Modes in Being...

49

V Being Not a Genus 54VI Composition of Being With Its Modes

article 1

Composition of Being With Its ModesNot Metaphysical 60

article 2

Composition of Being With Its ModesLogical j6

VII Unity of Being Imperfect 84VIII Analogousness of Being

article i

Notion of Analogy 90

ARTICLE 2

Intrinsic Metaphysical Analogy of Be-ng

107

article 3Analogy of Being Analogy of Attribu-ion

in


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PREFACE

The treatiseon

Being herein sub-itted

isan attempt to simplify

asubject

veryimportant to the

student of philosophy. In making

the attempt, the author has pur-ued

the method adopted by him in

his treatiseon

Certitude.


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INTRODUCTION

The solidity of a building depends mainly onthe stability of its foundation. When this ispoorly laid, the building is unsafe ; when this be-omes

undermined, the edifice is sure to toppleto the ground and bury its inmates under itsruins. Now, what the foundation is to abuilding, that metaphysics is to philosophy. Itsnotions and principles form the groundwork ofall knowledge. One single error in mattersmetaphysical is often enough to bring about thetotal downfall of all true science and leave doubt

and falsehood in its place. And not only doesthe fate of the natural sciences hinge upon cor-ect

metaphysical tenets : supernatural religionitself is dependent upon them ; for faith must bereasonable ; and how can it be so when first prin-iples

are perverted and denied ?We need but cast a glance at the History of

Philosophy to fmcl ample proof for our con-ention.All the false philosophy of modern

times, which has wrought such frightful havocin the realm of truth, starts with erroneousviews upon metaphysical questions. Thus, togive just a few instances, Hegel bases his mon-

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viii Introduction

strous doctrine of philosophy on a wrong con-eptionof indeterminate being (ens ut sic).

Spinoza builds his wild speculations on an ar-itrarydefinition of substance. Kant endeav-rs

to show that the existence of God cannot becertainly known by the things that are made,for the reason that with him both the conceptof cause and the principle of causality arepurely subjective, and hence not applicable tothings in themselves. Locke, by making per-onality

consist in actual self-consciousness,renders two of the most fundamental mysteriesof our faith self-contradictory, namely, theTrinity of persons in the Godhead, and the unityof person in Christ. Descartes, as far as lay inhim, dealt the deathblow to metaphysics by histeaching on the origin of possible being : andthis same Descartes is the father of the modernphilosophical movement from Spinoza to Hegel.

From this we can see how important it is, tolay the foundation of philosophy broad and deepby expounding and safeguarding metaphysicalnotions and principles, however subtle and ab-truse

they may be.Considerations such as these have encouraged

us to undertake a systematic development of theconcept of BEING, the most metaphysical ofall metaphysical concepts : with what success, thefollowing pages will show.


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BEING

CHAPTER FIRST

The Term Being

Summary: The province of metaphysics The no-ionof being Being and ens compared

Being employed as a participle and asa participial adjective Ens as a nounand as a participle Chimerical being Wholly indefinite being described Syn-nyms

of being The opposite of beingor nothing.

i. The Province of Metaphysics. Thescience of metaphysics opens with the consider-tion

of the idea of being. For metaphysics in-estigatthose notions which possess the most

far-reaching universality. Some of these notionsare literally common to all things : as, being,unity, truth, goodness; whilst the others occurin pairs of opposites or correlatives, which divideall things between themselves in such wise thateither the one or the other of the two associatednotions is predicable of any object whatsoever:as, cause and effect, substance and accident,

I


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2 Being

potency and existence. Hence these latter con-eptsmight be called disjunctivelycommon to all

things. St. Thomas says that the subject-mat-erof metaphysics is ens et ea quae ipsum con-

sequuntur, that is, being and those thingswhich are consequent upon being.

Metaphysics, then, examines the broadest, andtherefore the most fundamental, of notions. Thereign of these notions is felt throughout the vastrealm of existence and possibility. He who layssacrilegious hands on any one of them by call-ng

its objective validity into question, therebybrings the edifice of knowledge crashing about hishead ; nay more, such a one would reduce all be-ng

to absolute nothingness, did its existence de-endon his denial. Father Balmes expresses

this fundamental necessity in his own strikingand graceful way :

Ontology, he says, circu-ates

like life-giving fluid through all the othersciences (Fund. Phil. v. 2, n. 288). Henceit is that metaphysics has been called the queenof sciences. These considerations prove the follyof those who belittle and discountenance thestudy of metaphysics. They tell us, metaphysicsis intangible, obscure, and prosaic. It is not in-angible

but it is abstruse; and how could it beotherwise considering that it deals with the mostextensive and most universal of notions. It isnot obscure, but profound ; for it descends to thelowest depths of reality and thought, to the last


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The Term Being 3causes, which lie buried away down as the foun-ations

and basis of all things. Metaphysics,finally,is not prosaic ; but it is sublime. True, itdoes not lay claim to that attractiveness and fas-ination

which truths, clothed with all the witch-ryof fancy, possess: for the concrete only can

present itself to man with all that fulness of per-ectionwhich appeals to the sense of the beauti-ul

: but metaphysics is vast, it is comprehensive,it eludes whatever the fancy in its wildest flightscan conjure up ; and these are some of the char-cteristics

of the sublime.2. The notion of being. The foregoingconsiderations indicate that being is the most

metaphysical of all metaphysical notions ; for itis a term which may be applied to whatever hasreality; and this is the reason, too, why thescience of metaphysics begins with the analysisof being.

3. Being and ens compared. But here weare forced into an awkward situation. We areconcerned here with the meaning of the Englishword being/' and not with the Greek termov, or the Latin ens. Now, we are apt toascribe to being all that the old philosophers sayof ov and of ens. Are we justifiedin doingso? Is being the exact equivalent of the Latin ens, which is the literal rendering of the Greekov r

But perhaps some one might ask, why refer


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4 Beingto the meaning of the Latin ens at all ? Weare not discussing this subject in Latin, but inEnglish.

There are several reasons why we should takeparticular notice of the Latin term ens in thisconnection. For, in the first place, the subject ofbeing has been, and still is sifted most thoroughlyin Latin works, which expound the teaching ofthe schoolmen; and hence a comparison of theLatin ens and the English being, cannot butbe very useful to all familiar with the originalLatin sources. Moreover, very much of the phil-sophic

thought stored up in English treatises hasbeen garnered from the Scholastics. Lastly, theword ens has been incorporated into the Eng-ish

language, as any of our larger dictionarieswill attest. Thus, one of them, the CenturyDictionary, gives the following quotation underens ;

To thee, Creator uncreate,O ens entium, divinely great. 1

1 It sometimes happens that scholarly students whoare fond of the language of Virgil, Horace, and Ciceroare shocked at meeting such a solecism or Latin mon-trosity

as the present participle of the verb esse,and feel inclined perhaps to look with contempt uponthe Schoolmen for using this and similar incorrect anduncouth expressions. We should not judge the scho-astic

philosophers too harshly for this apparent as-aultupon the purity of the Latin. For it must be

admitted that this tongue is not rich in convenientphilosophic terms and phrases, and that it lacks suitableexpressions for some of the most ordinary and funda-ental

ideas of speculative thought. Thus, such words


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The Term Being 5Let us now return to the question just mooted,

Are the Latin word ens and the English term being synonymous ?

To settle this point, let us first determine themeaning of being, and then compare it withthe various acceptations of ens.

4. Being employed as a participle and asa participial adjective. Being, as here under-tood,although it has the ending of a participle,is, in reality,a verbal noun with a twofold mean-as essentia, existentia, possibilitas, individ-ation

personalitas, causalitas, certitudo, mo-tivum, and many others will be looked for in vain inclassical writers. The Romans were a war-like na-ion,

a practical people: they did not care much forsubtle theorizing. This would explain the comparativebarrenness of their language in terms and phrases forconveying abstract philosophic notions. The Greeks,on the contrary, were the very antipodes of theRomans in their relation to philosophy; for, theirtongue teems with a wonderful wealth of clear-cut,metaphysical words and expressions, and justly gloriesin a surpassing suppleness and pliability for com-unicating

the nicest shades of meaning. What thenwere the Scholastic philosophers to do? The Latinwas the established medium of thought of those earnestand deep thinkers. It was not feasible to substitutethe Greek tongue in place of the Latin ; they did notthink it wise to transplant Greek idioms unchangedinto another language. Hence they felt themselvescompelled to coin certain words and phrases, as weourselves are doing constantly. As regards the fre-uent

occurrence of the present participle of esse,ens, which may seem to some a barbarism for which

no apology can be offered, something can be said indefence and palliation of Scholastic usage. For, asAndrew's Latin Dictionary tells us, the part. pres.ens is used by Caesar according to Prise, p. 1140 P.and by Sergius Flavius according to Quint. 8. 3. 33.


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6 Beinging, namely that of a participle and that of aparticipial adjective. For the sake of greaterclearness, let us first state the difference betweena participleand a participial adjective in general,and then apply it to our case.

The participial adjective denotes capacity, fit-ess,ability,readiness for the performance of

an action ; whilst the participleas such expressesthe actualization or exercise of that capacity,fitness, abilityand readiness.

Thus, when I say, the physician is observ-ng or the gladiator is daring I mean that

the former possesses the power of observation toa marked degree, and the latter is ready or pre-ared

to face danger. But when I declare thatthe physician is observing the symptoms of hispatient or the gladiator daring the lion, I wantto denote the actualization of that power orreadiness, in a word, the actual performance ofan action.

Now let us transfer this to being. Mind, wedo not say that being is a participle or a par-icipial

adjective; but that it may have the forceof either. For it sometimes denotes merelyreality,capacity for existence, that which canexist, regardless of the fact of its actual exist-nce

or non-existence. In this case, being hasthe force of a participialadjective; for exam-le,

when I say, God is infinite being. It isused in this way especially where it performs


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The Term Being 7the office of objective case to the verb to have,as in the following propositions, A blade ofgrass has being, A dew-drop has being.

But being very frequently signifies the actu-lizationof the capacity for existence. It is

plain that in this instance, it has the force ofthe participle existing ; for that which actu-lizes

the capacity for existence, is, of course,existence itself. A case in point would be thesentence, The Guardian Angels are loving, de-oted

beings, i. e. loving, devoted, existing reali-ies.

5. Ens as a noun and as a participle. TheLatin word ens is likewise used in two ways,namely as a noun and as a participle. Whenemployed as a participle,it is equivalent in mean-ng

to existing, and hence corresponds to theEnglish being in one of the acceptations justgiven. As a noun, ens has the same significa-ion

as the English participialadjective ; for inLatin, participlesare often used as nouns to ex-ress

capacity for something, as when I say, Omne vivens est substantia.

Let us now note in what being and ens differ.In the first place, being is in common use in oureveryday language, whereas ens is a purely phil-sophica

term of middle age Latin.As regards the meaning of the two, it would

seem that in English, being, in its ordinary ac-eptation,denotes the same as that which exists.


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8 BeingThis also is the prevailing significationof theword ens in Latin. Thus, St. Thomas tells usthat the word ens is chiefly used to desig-ate

the existent, whilst the term res is re-ervedfor expressing essence in its most abstract

form or the mere capability for existence.However, as hinted before, ens may also

be used as a noun, and being in the senseof a participial adjective, provided it appearsfrom the context or in some other way that suchuse is intended.

Being is also frequently taken as the pres-ntparticiple of the auxiliary verb

to be, asin the sentence, The enterprise is being carriedout ; and very often, it is employed in placeof the copula is in participialconstructions ;e. g. This being so . . Of course, ens is never used in this manner.

The above comparison shows that, exceptingthe last two acceptations of being, ens and being are substantially equivalents.

Let us now analyze a little more accurately thenature of being as having the force of a parti-ipial

adjective. For it is with being in thissense only, that we are at present concerned.

6. Chimerical being. But before enteringupon our analysis of being thus taken, we mustfirst somewhat restrict its meaning. For beingcan exist in a twofold state, namely, in the realand in the logical state. At present, our busi-


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The Term Being 9tiess is with real being, that is being whichcan exist apart from the mind, and not with logical being or being whose existence isconfined to the region of mere thought. Beingof this latter sort is called ens rationis, amere creature or figment of the mind, which isnever to be found outside of cognition. Thus,should I conceive a triangular square as some-hing,

or attribute being to a number of animalssitting in council and making speeches, or torocks and stocks listeningin rapture to Orpheus'lute it is plain that in all these cases the be-ng

signified can have existence nowhere ex-eptin the mind : being of this sort is a meremental product or figment, and might not unfit-ingly

be called chimerical being. For, ac-ordingto Webster, chimerical in one of its

meanings denotes the same as

having or capa-leof having no existence except in thought.7. Wholly indefinite being described. Our

concern here, then, is not with this kind of be-ng,but with real being, and that in its most

general acceptation, that is, as shorn of all de-erminatand specifications whatsoever.

Hence, we abstract even from the circumstance,as to whether it is actual or merely possible.Being as here taken, is the most indeterminateconcept conceivable; it is a concept in whichabstraction has been pushed to its ultimate limit,a concept stript of whatever discriminates or


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The Term Being n nothing, of which beinglessness and noth-ngness

form the abstract names.Nothing or non-being admits of a twofold

meaning, according to the sense in which wetake thing or being which it negatives.If these stand for that which actually exists,then nothing merely denotes the non-exist-nt,

and includes whatever is not, yet can be:thus understood nothing is not an emptyconcept, as might perhaps seem at first sight,but the plenitude of all possible reality. Noth-ng

taken in this sense is technically known as

positive

nothing. It has this meaning in thefollowing verse found in the second book ofMachabees : I beseech thee, my son, look uponheaven and earth and all that is in them, andconsider that God made them out of nothing andmankind also.

But nothing has also another signification.It sometimes denotes the negation of thing or being in its broadest acceptation as thatwhich can be ; in this case, it conveys the samemeaning as the impossible, or that which neitherexists nor can exist, and is, in philosophicalterminology, styled absolute nothing. To thisregion of absolute beinglessness must be rele-ated

all absurdities, contradictions and incon-eivabilitie; as a square circle,a thinking block

of wood, a tree suffering pain, a finite God, andthe like. They are all included under the fig-


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12 Being

ments of the mind (entia rationis), mentionedbefore. Beinglessness of this sort is entirelybarren; the very conception of a state of abso-ute

nothingness ever obtaining, is itself an ab-urdity.For had such ever been the case, noth-ng

would or could exist.


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CHAPTER SECOND

Unity and Commonness of Being

Summary: Inquiry outlined Comprehension and ex-ensionof ideas

Thesis : Concept of be-ng

one in itself and common to all things Preliminary remarks to thesis Twoexceptions taken Proofs of thesis An-wer

to exceptions.

10. Inquiry outlined. After having thus ex-lainedthe meaning of being and its opposite

nothing, let us now enter a little more deeplyinto this matter by determining some of theproperties of being.

In examining the concept of being, we areat once struck with its absolute universality.For the term being can be applied to everything.The question now forces itself upon the inquirer,Is being as thus referable to all things one andthe same concept throughout, or is it manifoldin its signification ?v

ii. Comprehension and extension of ideas.But before going any further in our expositionof being, we must first briefly recall from Dia-ectics

a few notions which we shall have fre-uentoccasion of using and which, unless clearly

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14 Being

grasped, would seriously hamper us in our in-estigatnamely the notions comprehen-ion

and extension in their logicalmeaning.By the comprehension of a notion (or con-ept)

we understand that which the notioncomprises, namely the sum total of the attributeswhich go to make up its meaning. Thus thecomprehension of eagle, for instance, is, cor-oreal,

living, irrational, feathered, rapaciousbiped, having strong talons and beak, remarkablefor strength, size, graceful figure, keenness ofvision, extraordinary flight,etc. Another namefor the comprehension of a notion is content.In fact, this term seems preferable, since its pre-ailing

meaning suggests more readily than com-rehension,the sum total of the attributes con-tituting

a given notion. For comprehension,according to its primary signification,enotes theact of grasping an object with the mind, whereasthe radical meaning of content is all that whicha thing contains. It also appears from the aboveexplanation that the content of a notion is reallynothing else than its meaning or definition;forwhat is the meaning or definition of a concep-ion

but the totalityof notes constituting it ?Extension, the other term to be explained,

stands in very close relationship to content. Ithas a twofold meaning. In its primary signifi-ation

it denotes the capacity which an ideapossesses, of representing a greater or smaller


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Unity and Commonness of Being 15number of kinds, species, or individuals; or, toexpress it somewhat differently, it is the ap-licabilit

of an idea to a more or less widerange of objects.

Thus understood, extension is a property ofideas. It is, as it were, the measure of an idea,its scope, breadth or sphere. Hence the terms scope, breadth, sphere, when predicatedof ideas, are used synonymously with extension.

The word extension is chosen in the abovelogicalsignification,ecause for an idea to applyto a subject, is, after a manner, to extendto it.

To illustrate what we have just said by anexample: the idea tree has a larger exten-ion

than the idea oak, because the predica-bilityof the former is greater than that of thelatter ; in fact,

oak-tree is contained withinthe scope of tree.

But it is not unusual to employ the word ex-ension for the objects themselves which can

be ranked under a given concept. Thus the en-ireaggregate of trees viewed either as groups

or as individuals makes up the extension of tree.

The objects classed under a certain idea arecalled the subjects of that idea, because theidea in question is predicable of these objectsas its subjects. They are also sometimes namedthe subordinate parts or simply the subordinates


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1 6 Beingof the idea comprising them. Thus, when I say, The oak and the elm are trees, I regard oak and elm as subjects, subordinate tothe concept tree.

Hitherto we have viewed comprehension andextension, each in itself. Considering them asrelated to one another, we discover this pecul-arity

about them, that the two vary in an in-erseratio, that is to say, if the comprehension

of an idea increases, its extension diminishes,and vice versa. For example, take the notion man, and add to it the note white ; it isplain at once that by thus making the sumtotal of predicates larger, I narrow down thesphere of the applicabilityof the concept man.For white man embraces fewer individualsthan man alone.

This inverse ratio between comprehensionand extension, however, does not obtain, exceptwhen the new attribute (or mark) joined issuch as belongs only to some of the individualsto which it is annexed : in other words whenthe mark in question is restrictive.

For if it is not restrictive, but merely ex-licative,that is, involved in the concept to

which it is united, although not distinctly ex-ressedby it,then the above law regarding the

inverse ratio of content and extension does nothold. Thus take the concept rational being and modify it by the accession of endowed


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Unity and Commonness of Being lywith the power of speech, capable of per-eiving

the incongruous and giving expression tothis perception by laughter : we do not therebylessen the number of individuals, of which thenotion rational being alone is affirmable.

12. Being one in itself and common to ailthings. After this interruption, let us again takeup the thread of our discussion where we beganto inquire whether being as predicable of anything whatever, is one and the same conceptwherever applied, or whether it is manifold inits signification. It will serve the purpose ofclearness to formulate in a thesis what we haveto say on this subject.

THESIS i

The concept being is one in itself andcommon to all things.

13. Preliminary remarks. When we affirmthat the concept of being is one in itself, wewant to say that it does not exhibit in its con-ent

any of the determinations differentiatingtheobjects of which it is predicated, but abstractsfrom all of them. We state this in refutationof certain philosophers who consider being as asort of mosaic or agglomeration of all the ob-ects

to which it can be applied. According tothem, when I conceive being, I really represent to


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2o Beinghandiwork are something: the one towering toinfinite hights, it is true, and the other justrising above the abyss of nothingness : yet bothhave this in common that they are real, thatthey are not nothing. The human soul is asomething, and so are its thoughts and aspira-ions

which come and go whilst itself endures.However much the permanent soul and the fleet-ng

thought and affection may differ, they aresimilar in this, that they are set over againstthe void of nothingness.

There is then an element in which all thingsagree. But for the mind to conceive all thingsunder one aspect, it is not enough that theyshould be alike in something; the intellect must,moreover, be able to disentangle the commonfeature from the multiform differences which

diversify it: and this it can do. For it pos-essesthe power of abstraction in its highestperfection. By the aid of this power, the in-ellectu

faculty can lop off, one after another,all the differentiatingmarks between things, untilit arrives at a concept, simple, all-embracing, inwhich all entities agree. And this is the con-ept

of totally indeterminate being, of being ingeneral, of ens ut sic, in the Schoolmen'sphrase. Take, for example, the concept man:drop, one by one, all his distinguishing char-cteristics

such as rational, sensitive, living, cor-oreal,substantial, and you will come to the no-


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Unity and Commonness of Being 21tion being, beyond which you cannot go. Theconcept of being then is one in itself and com-on

to all things.16. Second proof of the unity and com-onness

of being. In the argument just given,we deduced our conclusion from a considerationof the things of which being is predicated. Wecan arrive at the same result by analyzing theconcept of being itself.

If we gaze attentively at our stock of ideas,we shall discover amongst them one which dif-ers

from all the rest in this, that it is entirelyindeterminate, stripped of all specifications andparticularizations whatever; it is neither Godnor creature, substance, nor accident : it expressesmere opposition to nothing; it represents not-nothing, something, being in general. That wepossess

such an idea, depicting just that andnothing more, is a fact of consciousness, whichno sincere observer looking into himself, willdeny. Now, this concept thus limited in its con-ent

to a minimum, is for that very reason broad-stin its applicabilityto determinate realities;

for content and breadth of an idea, are in in-erseratio (No. 12). There cannot be anything

of which it is not predicable. For whatever hasreality,is by this very fact placed in oppositionto nothing. Whence we infer that one and thesame concept being is common to all things.

From the preceding proofs, it follows by way


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22 Beingof corollary, that being is a simple concept, not inthe sense that, like spirit,it is without physicalparts, but in this sense that it expresses andcomprises but one note or attribute, irresolvableinto any other notes or attributes. For were itnot so, it could not be the common predicateof all things, since nothing can be affirmed ofits own parts.

17. Answer to the two exceptions takento the unity and commonness of being. Wemust now reply to the two difficulties set downat the beginning of the thesis. We stated therethat if the concept of being is of altogether com-onpredicability,then it must likewise includethe differences discriminating one thing fromanother, since they, too, are something; but ifso, being apparently ceases to be one; hence itwould seem impossible for being to be one initself and yet common to all things.

In answer to this, we readily grant that beingmust comprise the differences of things ; not,however, just as differences, but as being,that is, in so far as even these differences arealike. Thus take the two marks distinguishingGod and creatures, viz. self-existent and de-iving

existence from another. The concept be-ngcomprises both of them as being, but not

just as determining attributes. Hence we seethat being can embrace all the differences, andyet remain one in itself.


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CHAPTER THIRD

Unity Of Being Not Real

Summary: Question stated Concept of unity Divisions of unity Real unity Individ-al

unity Essential unity Logicalunity Manner of obtaining concepts pos-essing

logical unity Prescision subjec-iveand objective Distinction real and

logical -Logical distinction purely mentaland not purely mental Foundation ofdistinction not purely mental Foundationeither perfect or imperfect Foundationof objective prescision Purely mentaldistinction in its relation to prescision Being not really distinct from its modes Introductory remarks to proofs Meaning of term mode Modes of be-ng

four in number

Proofs of thesis

Some objections answered.

18. Question stated. We have then shownthe concept of being to be one in itself; it stillremains for us to prove that the kind of unityattributed to it, is logical unity, and not real.

19. Concept of unity. But in order to havea clearer understanding and a firmer grasp ofthe question of the unity of being, a question

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Unity of Being Not Real 27illustrate our definition by an example it isimpossible for the nature (or essence) of a stag,as long as it remains the nature of a stag, to bethat of a wolf or serpent or butterfly.

23. Logical unity. Logical unity, which weopposed to real, is the unity proper to a conceptexpressive of a nature common to many thingsand multipliable in them. Thus man as ageneral concept, has logical unity. For it is oneas existing in the ideal or logical order throughabstraction; and it is capable of being multipliedor becoming many in the individuals of which itcan be affirmed.

These few, brief remarks on the kinds of unitywill suffice here. A fuller account of them isgiven in the treatise on the Attributes of Be-ng.

24. Manner of obtaining concepts possess-nglogical unity. But there is still another

point, closely connected with logical unity, whichmust be touched on here, before we can give anintelligent exposition of many of the subtlerquestions about being. It regards the manner ofobtaining concepts possessing logical unity.

25. Prescision in metaphysics. ScholasticPhilosophers tell us that concepts possessing log-cal

unity are obtained by what they call ob-ectiveprescision, a rather strange sounding and

at first sight meaningless expression. I^et us


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28 Beingfirst explain what is meant by the phrase andthen see how we can best clothe the thoughtunderlying it in words.

If we inspect our store of ideas with care, wewill discover that amongst them there are a goodmany which, though different in content or mean-ng,

yet relate to attributes that are altogetheridentical in the object itself. Thus take the twoconcepts, substance and corporeal : it isplain that as verified in bodies, they are identical,since substance itself is corporeal. Yet the mean-ngs

of the two are quite different. For sub-tance

denotes independence of a subject ofinhesion and corporeal is the same as havingparts.

26. Subjective Prescision. The mind thenhas the power to separate or break up what isone and the same in the physical order, into twoor more distinct concepts, or, if you will, it isable to prescind or abstract one of two or moreattributes which are physically identical. To ex-ress

the same under still another form : themind can represent one of several attributeswhich are in reality identical, and disregard orturn away from the rest. Now this process ofconsidering apart from each other attributes iden-ified

in the object we call subjective pre-cision.

This so-called subjective prescision is reallynothing else than a species of abstraction; for


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Unity of Being Not Reed 31same time such of their properties, as bear onthe matter at issue.

Distinction is opposed to identity, andhence denotes an absence or want of identity;or, to give a definition of it in the concrete, wemight say, that whenever one entity is not theother, we have distinction of some sort.

29. Distinction real and conceptual. Dis-inctionis either real or conceptual ac-ordingas the lack of identity belongs to the

things in themselves independently of themind, or else is only in the concepts, whichthe intellect forms regarding the

same thing.Thus one of two apples is not the same as theother, without any reference to the intellect ; but Demosthenes and the greatest orator of an-ient

Greece are really identical ; and the dis-inctionexists only in the two concepts which I

have of the same man.30. Division of conceptual distinction.

Conceptual, sometimes named logical, distinctionmay be divided into two further classes, of pri-ary

importance in matters philosophical,knownin Scholastic phraseology as the distinctio ra-tionis ratiocinantis and the distinctio rationisratiocinatae, expressions which are sometimesmet with in their Latin form in English treatises.

31. Conceptual distinction purely mental.The distinctio rationis ratiocinantis (literally,the distinction of the thinking or reasoning


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32 Beingmind), is called in English purely conceptualor purely mental distinction, as being the re-ult

altogether of the action of the reasoningpower without any grounds for the distinctionexcept such as are extrinsic to the object. Wesimply repeat the same idea or make one ideado duty for two, with some slightchange in themode of expression.

Thus, the foundation for my distinguishingbetween the two ideas Napoleon and Bona-arte/'

is the fact that the French Emperorbears two names; and this circumstance is, ofcourse, external to the person signified. Thesame is to be said in regard to the distinctionbetween the object defined (e. g. man) and itsdefinition (rational animal), and, in general, be-ween

two or more concepts having the samecontent, but each emphasizing a different notein that content ; as when I conceive the sameright angled triangle by two ideas, the one mak-ng

the right angle stand out clearly, and theother throwing the hypotenuse into strong re-ief,

without, however, altogether shutting outthe remaining constituents of the figure in ques-ion.

For, in these cases, the basis for the dis-inctionbetween the two (or more) concepts, is

not anything in the object itself,but, it is to belooked for in something extrinsic to it, namelythe greater or less clearness and distinctnesswith which the attributes composing the contents


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Unity of Being Not Real 33of the ideas present themselves to the mind.

32. Conceptual distinction not purely men-al.We now come to the distinction which is

called distinctio rationis ratiocinatae in Scho-asticterminology, and, in English, conceptual

distinction not purely mental.It differs from the preceding in this, that here

the foundation for forming several concepts ofone and the same reality,is not outside, but in the object itself. Hence it is, that phi-osophe

often style it conceptual distinctionfounded on reality (i. e. the object).

33. Foundation of conceptual distinctionnot purely mental. But what is the foundationin the thing itself which gives rise to this dis-inction?

In other words, what is the suitable-esson the part of the object which renders it

possible for the intellect to distinguish attributesthat are physically indistinct? This is the prob-emthat awaits our solution.

To clear up this point, we must first directattention to the fact that every object is pos-essed

ofmany perfections which are physicallyidentical. The same object is,as it were, equiva-ent

to many realities which exist in it in perfectidentity,yet may be found separate and differ-ntly

combined in other objects. Thus take ahuman individual : it is made up of the perfec-ions,

bodily substance, life, sensation and reason, all identified. Yet bodily sub-


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Unity of Being Not Real 35sentient, is altogether different from that of ra-ionality,

which is the character of being ra-ional.

Let us add an instance where the foundationfor the distinction between two concepts is im-erfect.

Take the two attributes of God, Justiceand Mercy; they are, indeed, conceivable onewithout the other, yet not perfectly. For if weanalyze God's Mercy, we will find that, beingdivine, it is infinite,and therefore includes allother possible perfections, one of which is, ofcourse, Justice. It is also plain that, unlike e. g.animality, which exists outside of man in brutebeasts, none of the Divine attributes can everbe found in any other being except God. It isthis kind of distinction, which obtains betweenbeing and its determinations.

35.Foundation of objective prescision.

Let us now return to objective prescision orthe separation of physically identical attributes.Its explanation is now clear, since what holdstrue of conceptual distinction not purely mental,applies likewise to the separation of physicallyidentical attributes by the mind : both the oneand the other have the same foundation; for iftwo qualitiesidentical in themselves, can be ren-ered

distinct in conception, it is plain that oneof them can exist apart in thought from theother. Hence the foundation for the separationof physically identical attributes (or objective


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36 Beingprescision) is likewise the equivalence of oneand the same object to two or more perfections.

The separation of physically identical attributesin the ideal order taking place, as it does, invirtue of something in the object, is also some-imes

called virtual prescision by the Schoolmen ;just as the distinction which paves the way toit,is styled virtual distinction.

Note also, that, according as the aforenamedfoundation is perfect or imperfect, the separationexisting between the identical attributes of anobject in conception, is likewise accounted per-ect

or imperfect, just as distinction on the samescore is divided into perfect and imperfect.

36. Purely mental distinction in its rela-ionto prescision. The purely mental distinc-ion(rationis ratio cinantis) likewise involves

some sort of prescision which, however, impliesno separation of identical attributes, but consistsin this, that of two concepts having altogetherthe same contents, the one emphasizes some at-ribute

(or attributes), which the other repre-entsonly in a somewhat dim and less marked

manner. Hence, the process of prescinding, inthis last case, means merely this, that one no-ion

represents less clearly and distinctlycertainattributes which another brings out prominently.Thus domestic animal of the feline kind, fondof mice, characterized by a plaintive cry, calledmewing, and sometimes amusing itself by pur-


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Unity of Being Not Real 37ring, expresses the same as cat, the onlydifference between the two being, that cat conveys only obscurely the marks and peculiari-ies,

on which the other more explicit conceptlays stress.

Prescision thus taken is a purely subjectivemethod of procedure with no foundation in theobject.

37. Being not really distinct from itsmodes. These remarks having been premised,we shall now gradually unfold our teaching inregard to the kind of unity possessed by being.

Let us start our investigation of this subjectwith the following thesis.

THESIS 2

It is self-contradictory to supposethat there exists an extra-mental dis-inction

of any sort between beingand its determinations.

38. Introductory remarks to proofs. Inthis thesis we deny that indeterminate being ispossessed of real or physical unity or, in otherwords, that it is really and physically distinctfrom its modes or determinations. We say thisto refute the Scotists (or followers of DunScotus) who hold that there exists an extra-mental distinction between being and any of its


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3 Beingmodes, v. g. existing in itself. This distinc-ion

they choose to style distinctio formalisex natura rei. They use the term formalis to point out the distinction between what theycall formalities or metaphysical grades (No.57), as rationalityand animality. The qualifyingphrase ex natura rei means the same as inexternal nature

and may be rendered into Eng-ishby extra-mental.

But before taking up the proofs of our thesisand discussing the objections, we shall explainthe meaning of the term mode.

39. Meaning of term mode. Mode, inits widest signification, denotes the same asmodification or limitation; it is something whichhas no independent existence, but clings to an-ther

as its determination. Thus, e. g., we saythat heat is a mode of motion, figure a mode ofan extended body, fluidityand soliditymodes ofthe existence of metals, and the like.

But in the present case we regard mode ina specific sense. We mean by it a concept de-erminin

or modifying another, and that in avery particular manner. To understand this,note that a modifying concept is generally ofsuch a nature as to amplify or enlarge the con-ents

of the notion to which it is affixed; itexpresses something new, not contained in theconcept to which it is added. A qualifying con-ept

of this kind is called a differentia and


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Unity of Being Not Real 39the qualified notion, a genus. But it some-imes

happens, that the concept joined to anotheras a determination of its meaning, does not en-arge

its contents; it adds nothing new, butmerely brings out clearly the various states andconditions in which a thing can be found. Now,whenever one concept qualifies another in thisway, it is called a

mode

in contradistinctionto a differentia.

To illustrate : if I say, The soul is a spiritualsubstance, the concept spiritual adds some-hing

new to the notion substance ; somethingnot included in it before ; hence,

spiritual is

a true differentia relatively to substance.But when I state God is an absolutely inde-endent

being (ens a se), and creature is abeing existing dependency on God (ens abalio), the additions absolutely independentand existing in dependence on another, do notamplify the content of the concept being ;they add nothing new to being or distinct fromit: they merely make known to us the mannerin which God and creatures

possess being. Theforce of this last Example will perhaps not befully appreciated until we have gone a little fur-her

in our investigations, when this point willbe professedly treated.

40. Modes of being four in number. Themodes with which we have to do in this treatiseare four, namely, self-existent (a se), de-


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40 Being

riving existence from another (ab alio), ex-stingin itself (per se), and existing in

another as in a subject (in alio); for thesefour qualifications affect being immediately,since being as being is either self-existent or de-ived

from another, independent of a subject ofinhesion or dependent on such a subject: hencethey are determinations of being as being or ofbeing properly so called. Other additions to be-ng

(such as spiritual,bodily, living, sensitive,rational) are modifications of more or less deter-inate

being, and consequently are determina-ionsof being only in an improper sense.Whenever, then, we speak of determinations of

being, the expression is to be understood in itsstrict meaning, unless the contrary is expresslystated, or the context warrants a different ac-eptation.

Should any one feel annoyed at the many un-rovedassertions we have been making, let him

bear in mind that, at this stage of our disquisi-ion,we are merely explaining and defining;

afterwards we hope to substantiate our now un-upportedstatements.

41. There is no extra-mental distinctionbetween being and its modes: First proof.We are now ready to prove our thesis, namelythat there is no extra-mental distinction betweenbeing and its modes. The two arguments whichwe shall give, though applying to all modifica-


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Unity of Being Not Real 41tions of being whatsoever, are principally intro-uced

to shed light on the relation of being toits four so-called modes.

We proceed thus : If being is distinct fromits modes (or primary determinations) outsideof thought, then we rightly infer that, howeverclosely united it may be to them, still,when re-arded

in itself in the physical order, it is alto-etherclear of all of them ; and if clear of

them, it is likewise clear of all further modifica-ionssuperadded to them. Consequently, being

as it exists independently of the mind, wouldbe wholly indeterminate; we would, therefore,have to admit the presence of a reality whichpossesses physical universality: a thing which isutterably inconceivable.

Suppose there were such a thing as a universalanimal outside the mind, how would it look ?It would be an exceedingly strange being invery truth For it would neither be mammalnor bird nor fish nor reptile nor insect nor anyother kind of animal. It would neither be amyriapod nor a centipede nor a quadruped nora biped nor apodat Its skin would neither becovered with hair nor wool nor feathers norscales, nor would it be altogether bare. Thequeer creature would neither walk nor fly norswim nor crawl, nor would it be fixed to onespot. In a word, it would be destitute of every-hing

except what is common to all animals.


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Unity of Being Not Real 43be said, are not distinct in the external object,then it would follow that things are differen-iated

from one another by the very samereality in which they agree. For, to take a par-icular

instance, God and creatures agree in this,that both possess being, and they differ in this,that the being of God is altogether independent,and that of the creature wholly dependent onhim. Now if being is not distinct from its de-erminin

modes independent and depend-nt,then it would be at once the ground why

creatures resemble God and differ from him.But how can this be? Is not this a patent con-radiction?

In fact, our contention, it might befurther urged, would make God and creaturesidentical, since both would be undistinguishedfrom the same reality being.

The objection, subtle though it may seem, isby no means insolvable. It seems to hinge onan ambiguous use of the term agree. Forwhen we say that two things agree in something,we often mean that they are identical in a cer-ain

property or quality. Thus, if I tell youthat the two roses 1 hold in my hand agree incolor, I want to signify that they are identicalin color, i. e. that they can be represented bymeans of one common concept, viz. red color.The identity in this case is, of course, logical,not real.

It will be readily granted that in the meaning


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44 Beingjust given, there is no contradiction in supposingGod and creatures to agree and differ by rea-on

of the same reality. For agreement oridentity here, has reference to the logical, anddiversity to the real order; and there can be nocontradiction unless the same predicate is af-irmed

and denied of the same thing, and that,too, in the same sense.

But some one might demur at our answer andsay, how can there be identityin the logical orideal order, when there is only diversity in thereal?

We need not go far for a reply to this. Forin order to have such agreement or identity ofdivers things in the logical order, it is enoughthat there should be some foundation for it inreality: and such there is in the present case,namely resemblance between the objects con-eived

as identical.This leads us naturally to the other signification

of the word agree. Sometimes this term alsodenotes the same as resemble ; thus when I

regard two friends as agreeing in disposition,my meaning is,that they resemble each other intheir natural bent. Hence the statement Godand creatures agree in the very same entity bywhich they are distinguished, can mean thatthe same principle is at once the ground of thesimilarity and dissimilarity,or the resemblanceand the want of resemblance between God and


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Unity of Being Not Real 45creatures. This resemblance is, of course, onlyimperfect.

But here a serious difficultypresents itself.For as these two, similarity and dissimilarity,have both reference to the same real order, itwould seem, as if, in this second sense of theverb to agree, there were a contradictionafter all in asserting that the very same real-ty,

say of creatures, should be at once thereason why it resembles God and differs fromhim.

There is,however, nothing inconsistent in thisstatement. For one and the same realitymay beequivalent to different perfections of such acharacter, that on account of one of them it issimilar to something else, and on account ofanother, it is dissimilar to the same. Thus, white agrees with

red in color in gen-ral,but differs from red in what is peculiarto it,namely, whiteness, and this for the rea-on

that white embraces two perfections,color and whiteness, within itself,which differ,indeed, in concept to some extent, but are notexclusive of one another in reality. In the samemanner, God and the creature may resemble eachother in being and differ in the modes of being,although being and its modes are but one andthe same identical perfection. Hence there isno contradiction in the assertion that God andcreatures are distinguished by the same entity in


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Unity of Being Not Real 47thing is that with which it is identified. But ifso, there can be no variety and diversity amongthings, an inference altogether false.

There are more flaws than one in this processof reasoning. For, in the first place, if beingis identified with its modes, the modes are alsoidentified with it; and hence, I have as muchright to say that, on this supposition, nothingexists except the modes, and that being vanishesfrom them altogether. This much by way of re-oinder.

But to answer directly: it would rather seemthat if two realities different in concept are iden-ified,

the result should be a third reality,sharingthe perfections of both. And so, in fact, it is.Thus if you combine being and self-exist-nt

into one, the outcome is God, who is at oncebeing and self-existent. In a similar manner,by uniting being and deriving existencefrom another, the compound concept creat-re

is formed, of which both being and deriving existence from another are predica-e.

To illustrate by a case not at all parallel, itis true, yet somewhat analogous ; if you pourwine and water into a goblet, the contents willnot be simply wine, nor simply water, but amixture of the two.

It further follows that by thus identifying being with self-existent and with deriv-


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48 Being

ing existence from another/' there result two

complete objects, God and creature, which aresimilar in the real order of things and identicalin the logical, just what we have contended forall along.


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CHAPTER FOURTH

Inclusion of the Modes in Being

Summary: The problem stated Thesis: Being in-ludesits modes at least as being, but it

expresses them only as being The meta-hysicalorder

Being in the metaphys-calorder

A concept may include a

perfection without expressing it Proof of thesis.

44. The problem stated. Being then is notphysically distinct from its determining modes ;but is it not so at least metaphysically? Ouranswer is, no. Let us state what we think onthis point more explicitly in the following thesis.

THESIS 3

The abstract concept of being, andhence being as it exists in the meta-hysical

order, contains the four pri-arymodes at least as being; but it

expresses them only as being, and inno other way.

45. The metaphysical order. Before weprove this proposition we must first explain what

49


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52 Beingrepresenting it, though not vice versa. Thus,the antecedent of a syllogism, indeed, containsthe conclusion, yet it does not express it as such ;for if it did, no process of ratiocination wouldbe needed for inferring it. To illustrate thispoint by a rather homely example : a purse maycontain money without necessarily indicating it. Perhaps you reply this is true, but then apurse is not a concept; it would seem that fora concept to include something and to express it,are altogether the same. We answer that thismay be so, when there is question of the sub-ective

concept (the purely mental representa-ion); but here we speak of the objective (the

object represented) ; and it is this which weaffirm can contain something without at the sametime expressing or presenting it to the mind.

48. Proof of thesis. Let it also be remarkedthat it is our intention here only, to settle whetherbeing contains its modes as being ; whether itcontains them in any other way, we shall decidein one of the following theses (thesis 5).

Our thesis is a direct corollary of what pre-edes;we show it thus: The concept of being,

as it exists in the metaphysical order, evidentlyincludes all reality: for otherwise it would notbe common to all things (thes. 1). Now themodes of being are, of course, real; since, werethey not so, they would be nothing (thes. 2).Hence being must include them at least as reality


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Inclusion of the Modes in Being 53

or as being, in the metaphysical order. And it

expresses them, too, not indeed as modes forin that case the concept of being would not beone in itself (thes. 1) but as being. We can-ot

free being of its modes by any amount ofabstraction : the connection between being andthem is of so close and unique a character, thatany attempt at complete separation is doomed tofailure; in fact, it would involve the very de-truction

of being, since being is nothing elsethan its determining modes vaguely and obscurelyconceived.

Such is not the case with most other notions

and their modifications. Take the concept ani-alwhich is determined by the addition of

rational. Animal, in no way, contains rational-;for rationality is not animality, whereas any ofthe modes of being is being. Animality is, in-eed,

identical with rationality in the physicalorder. But it does not include it in the meta-hysical.


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CHAPTER FIFTH

Being Not a Genus

Summary: Transition to a new thesis Thesis:Being not a genus Precise force ofterms, species, genus, and differentia Proofs of thesis

Confirmation of thesis

by the authority of St. Thomas Beingnot any of the five predicables.

49. Transition to a new thesis. The pre-edingconsiderations have paved the way for

our next thesis, viz. :

THESIS 4

The concept of being cannot be re-ardedas a genus.

50. Precise force of terms species, genus,and differentia. Before we show the intimateconnection between our present and the preced-ng

thesis, we must briefly explain the precisemeaning and force of the term genus aswell as of the related notions species and differentia ; for they all bear on the solutionof the question mooted.

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Being Not a Genus 55The species expresses the whole essence

of an object or group of objects; the genusrepresents the attributes common to two or morespecies ; and the differentia sets forth themark by which any one of these species differsfrom the others. Thus, vertebrate is thegenus under which mammals, birds, reptiles,amphibians etc., fall as species. The essentialelement distinguishing any one of these classesfrom the rest, is its differentia.

Now, for a genus to be truly such, it is re-uiredthat the differentiating marks added to

constitute the various classes under it, shouldbe altogether extrinsic to it,that is to say, neithercontain it nor be contained in it. If such is notthe case, the common attribute is not considereda genus in the proper sense of the word, but aquasi-genus, nor are the distinguishing marksaccounted true differentiae,but quasi-differentiae.

These two necessary requisites of the genusand the differentia must be carefully borne inmind, as a right understanding of this thesishinges on them.

51. Being is not a genus: First proof.The first argument to establish our thesis,

viz., that being is not a generic concept,, runsthus: Genus is understood to be a conceptwhich is not contained in the differentiae, andhence is not predicable of them ; thus animal is a true genus in respect to rational. For


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56 Being animal denotes an organized being endowedwith sensation, whilst rational signifiesthatin man from which his faculty of understandingand reasoning proceeds ; now it is plain that theformer concept is not involved in the latter ; andconsequently, I am not allowed to say, to berational is to possess the faculty of feeling.

But not so with being ; for it is essentiallyincluded in the concept of any entity, and hencealso in the limiting modes, so that it may trulyand really be predicated of, say, self-existence orcreatureship ; for this reason, it cannot be re-arded

as a

genus

in the technical sense ofthe word. Nor would it be proper to call themodes of being differentiae, without anyqualification,since it is agreed that a differentiamust not include that which it determines. Theymay be called quasi-differentiaer differentiae ina loose sense.

52. Being is not a genus: Second proof.Let us now pass on to our other proof; thisconsiders the differentiae in reference to the

genus,whereas the first viewed the genus rela-ively

to the differentiae. It proceeds thus: Asappears from what we said at the beginning ofthe thesis, the determinations of a true genuslie altogether outside of it and are therefore inno sense comprised within its contents. Thiswill be best understood by recurring to the ex-mple

given in the first argument. Animal


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Being Not a Genus 57is a genuine genus, since rationality in no wayenters the notion of animality. But with be-ng,

the case is quite different. For there canbe no determination whatever outside of being;because outside of being there is only nothing-ess,

and nothing cannot be a determination.Hence the modes of being are enclosed withinthe content of being, at least as being, andtherefore being is not a genus.

It is plain that the argument just given, is adirect application of the previous thesis (thes.3), to the matter under consideration. Thefirst proof we advanced also stands in intimaterelation both to the second argument and to thepreceding thesis. For being could not includeits modes, if it were not essentiallyand explicitlypredicable of them. We say this to show howclosely these last discussions are linked together.

53. Statement that being is not a genus,confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas.Let us corroborate our teaching in regard to thenon-generic character of being by two passagesfrom St. Thomas. He

says (lib.3. metaph. lect.8, parag. k.) : Non enim genus ponitur indefinitione differentiae,quia differentia non par-ticipat genus ; that is to say : The genusdoes not enter the definition of the differentia,because the differentia does not involve thegenus. And again he writes (1 p. 3. a. 5.): Ens non potest esse genus alicujus. Omne


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Being Not a Genus 59

reality fully constituted, whereas being lies atthe

very rootof everything, it is the most fun-amental

of all the constituents of an entity.Moreover, an accident can come and go, andthe thing of which it is an accident, remains.But not so with being; take away being, and

you have nothing left.


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CHAPTER SIXTH

Composition of Being With Its Modes

ARTICLE i

Composition of Being With Its Modes NotMetaphysical

Summary: Inquiry outlined Meaning of restrictingthe applicability of a concept Metaphys-cal

grades General notion of composi-ion

Division of composition into meta-hysical,physical, and logical First

proof of thesis Preliminary remarks tosecond proof Adequate and inadequateconception of a perfection Second proof

An inference

An explanatory remark

A query answered Third proof Scholium.

55. Inquiry outlined. There now arises aserious difficulty from all we have said, whichdemands an answer. It cannot be denied, onthe one hand, that being may be determined ornarrowed down to more concrete concepts, as,e. g. to substance and accident. But how isthis possible if being has no differences, and if,moreover, it includes all being within itself?

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Composition of Being With Its Modes 61We shall evolve what is to be held on this

rather perplexing question in the next threetheses. It is found more convenient to begin thisdiscussion by showing that being is not deter-ined

in the manner in which concepts are ordi-arilyrendered definite. Hence the first thesis

on this phase of our subject will be of a negativecharacter.

THESIS 5The concept of being is not restrictedin its applicability, by adding to itanother concept adequately distinctfrom it, or, in technical language, by metaphysical composition.

56. Meaning of restricting the applicabilityof a concept. Before proceeding to the proofof the thesis, we must explain the meaning ofsome of the terms used in it; and first of all,let us make clear what we want to convey whenwe speak of restricting,limiting,contracting, ornarrowing down the^ applicabilityof a concept.We are said to restrict the applicabilityof aconcept when we determine its content and re-uce

its extent or scope of predication by theaddition of some distinguishing mark. Thus, Irestrict the notion living being by attaching sensitive, and I limit the latter by joining rational to it : and, if I choose, I can still


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Composition of Being With Its Modes 63aid of which the mind ascends from the par-icular

to the universal when analyzing a concept.The example given a few lines back, will serveto illustrate our meaning.

These grades are qualified as metaphysical,because by means of them what is physicallyone, becomes metaphysically many, in as muchas the mind projects into the object, distinctionswhich it contrives to create by its own innatepower of abstraction, where there are none inexternal reality. This pluralizing of physicallyidentical attributes, lying as it does, above andbeyond the physical, belongs, therefore, to themetaphysical order. Now, these metaphysicalgrades are mutually exclusive, and on this ac-ount,

exist in the ideal or metaphysical orderas entirely separate entities; in other words,any one of them prescinds altogether from therest constituting the same individual. That suchis the case, follows from the fact that any twoof these grades are reciprocally deniable, as whenI say, to be material is not to be substantial :nor can our right to do this be questioned; forthe definitions of the various metaphysical gradesof being are different; thus in the example justadduced, substantiality expresses independ-nce

of a subject of inhesion, and materiality denotes multiplicity of parts. These considera-ions

are fully set forth in the treatise on Unity, to which they properly belong.


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64 Being58. General notion of composition Divi-ion

of composition into metaphysical, physicaland logical. Let us now return to the subjectof composition and show its connection withthe determination and restriction of concepts.

Composition, in general, is the union of thingswhich are distinct. It is divided into real, meta-hysical

and logical. It is real, if the parts puttogether are really distinct,as e. g. the stem, theleaves, the sepals and the petals of a violet. Itis metaphysical, when the parts combined, thoughphysically identical,are conceptually distinct,andthat in such a way as to be mutually exclusiveof one another; in other words, metaphysicalcomposition is the union of metaphysical gradesof being.

The union of both physical and metaphysicalparts is composition strictlyso called. For, tohave genuine composition, it is required thattwo realities be added which are not mutuallyinclusive; and this condition is fulfilled in thetwo kinds of composition, termed physical andmetaphysical respectively.

But there is still a third sort of composition,called logical, which, however, falls short ofgenuine composition and can lay claim to thatname only by analogy. In it we also have twoconcepts which are put together, but these con-epts

are not distinct in the proper acceptationof the term. For they neither stand for two


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Composition of Being With Its Modes 67is added to it. What you see now was therefrom the very outset, though at first it wasperceived only in an indistinct manner. Butwith every step forward, what lay, as it were,hidden under the shadowy form, is brought outmore and more, till at last the noble figure ofthe great American statesman reveals itself toyou in all its details and minutiae. The sketchof which we spoke in the first example, was givendefiniteness by fillingin, so to speak; the pic-ure

just alluded to, is rendered determinate bymerely bringing into clearer view what was con-ained

in it all along.59. The composition o being with its

modes is not metaphysical: First argument.We are now ready to prove our thesis in whichwe state that being is not narrowed down to its

primary divisions by metaphysical composi-ion,

that is, by the addition of a concept ade-uatelyprescinded from being and exclusive of

it. What we are about to say, will, in fact,seem little else than a repetition of previousconclusions, and rightly so ; for the presentthesis is only a corollary of principles laid downbefore. Let us take our first proof from aconsideration of the modes of being in theirrelation to being in general.

We proceed thus: In order to have what iscalled metaphysical composition, we requiretwo concepts which are mutually exclusive.


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68 BeingNow, can we exclude being from its modes?No, this is impossible. For being is essentiallypredicable of all its modes, because self-exist-nt/'

deriving existence from another, etc.are something, and therefore possess being.Hence it follows that being cannot be shut outfrom its modes.

We can show this also from the absurd con-equencesimplied in the assumption that the

mind can take being from its determining modes.Let us make the attempt to do so. What is amode thus divested of being? Is it somethingor nothing? It cannot be maintained that it isnothing, since a mode is a determination, and nothing does not determine. If, on the otherhand, we suppose that the mode is something,then it is being; and hence I am just where Iwas at the outset. I can repeat the operation,but with the same result always, no matter howoften reiterated; and this is tantamount to say-ng

that the separation of being from its modescannot be effected. One might just as well un-ertake

to fill a barrel without a bottom withwater as to part being from its modes.

60. Preliminary remarks to second proofof thesis: Adequate and inadequate concep-ion

of a perfection. Let us now pass to an-therargument, based on the character of being

as inclusive of its modes. But before beginningthe proof, we must first call attention to a double


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Composition of Being With Its Modes 69

way of regarding the concept being. For, ashinted at in the wording of the thesis, being caneither be conceived adequately and perfectly, orelse inadequately and imperfectly. In generalthe conception of a perfection is said to be ade-uate

when it expresses all that is required, inorder that the perfection in question may existin the real order. Thus, I conceive man ade-uately,

when my mind represents all that hisessential definition implies, namely, rational, sen-itive,

and organic life together with bodily sub-tance.For these constituent elements suffice in

order that man may exist as man. But were Ito conceive man merely as a sensitive or cor-oreal

being, I would not apprehend him ade-uately,since more is required for man as man

to exist apart from thought. To know animal

perfectly, however, I need not think ration-lity

or irrationality. For these lie outsidethe concept of animal ; they are, indeed, requiredthat animal may exist as man or brute, but notprecisely as animal. Hence to conceive a per-ection

fully, it is enough to think just those at-ributeswhich go to make up the particular

grade of perfection under consideration, howeverlow in the scale of being that may be.

To apply what we have said to the case ofbeing. The mind knows being adequately whenit lays hold on all that without which being asbeing cannot exist in nature. Now it is plain


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jo Beingthat in order to conceive being as realizable apartfrom thought, we cannot set aside these modes,since they belong to the very essence of beingas being. For being as found in God is intrin-ically

different from that of creatures, becauseGod is being, or opposed to nothing in quite adifferent sense from creatures. Creatures, true,are not a non-entity, yet they may become so ;God also is not a non-entity, but it is utterlyimpossible for him ever to be reduced to nothing-ess.

The same holds true, mutatis mutan-is,of being as constituting substance and ac-ident.

Now, it is of the concept of being adequatelyviewed, or taken as to all it essentiallyimplies,that we are speaking in the following proof,whilst in the first thesis, where we discussed theunity of being, we dealt with the inadequate con-eptof being, which omits or fails to representsomething belonging to the very essence of be-ng,

viz. its modes. This inadequate concept isalso sometimes called the logical,and the ade-uate,

the metaphysical concept of being.6 1. The composition of being with itsmodes is not metaphysical: Second argu-ent.

We are now ready for the other proofof our thesis. In fact, we have already antici-ated

it to some extent, as we could not wellexplain the above notions without doing so. Ourargument runs thus :


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Composition of Being With Its Modes JiIf the composition of being with its modes

were of the metaphysical sort, then being ade-uatelyconsidered would be entirely clear of its

modes, and hence would be equally susceptibleof any of the various differentiations which maybe added to it: in other words, the very sameidentical being, which, when predicated of God,is joined to self-existent, could, when affirmedof creatures, be coupled with deriving existencefrom another. All this follows from the verydefinition of metaphysical composition as abovegiven. Consequently, when I say, God is be-ng,

the concept of being as thus realized inGod and exhaustively conceived as to all it in-ludesas being, would not involve self-existence ;

and when I state, Creatures are being, theidea of being as objectifiedin creatures and like-ise

fully considered in regard to all that is init, would not imply dependence on another.Now, either of these inferences is utterly un-enable.

For there is nothing in God which isnot under every respect unconditioned and self-existent, and there can be nothing in the creaturewhich is not wholly conditioned and dependenton God. For this reason, it is not correct tosay that being as predicated of God is so com-letely

denuded of its determining modes as notto include them. Whence it follows that whenI add self-existent to being as attributed toGod, or join dependent to being as affirmed


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Composition of Being With Its Modes 73its distinguishing modes as such, though, ofcourse, it never expresses them as such, evenobscurely. (The difference between a conceptincluding something and expressing the same,was given No. 47.) In technical language, beinginvolves its modes virtually but not form-lly

or explicitly.64. A query answered. But some one

might say, cannot all this be said of any genericconcept as well, e. g. of animal as predicatedof brute and man? Is not the animality asfound in man wholly rational,and as inherent inbrute entirely irrational? and might we not saythat if animality as predicated of man does notcontain rationality, there would be something inman which is not wholly and entirely rational?Our answer is, that there is something in manwhich is not wholly rational, in fact, not rationalat all. True, in the physical order, animalityand rationality are identified in man; yet thesetwo perfections are of such a nature that eachcan be fully or adequately conceived without theother ; and hencev in the metaphysical order,neither includes the other, whereas being in Godand self-existent, involve each other even in themetaphysical order.

65. The composition of being with itsmodes is not metaphysical: Third argument.To clear up this abstruse subject a little more,,we shall give a third proof, which, however, is


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j6 Beinga true metaphysical grade of being, a genuinegenus ; and this one concept can also be con-eived

by means of two partial concepts, be-ng and existing by itself, the former ex-ressing

substance according to its common char-cter,and, as it were, as a concrete subject, and

the latter representing the same as to the dis-riminatielement which determines the com-on

subject.66. Scholium. In our last proof we have

shown that being is not a genus because it in-ludesits modes as modes in the manner ex-lained;

in the third thesis we pointed out thatit has no claim to the name of genus, becauseit comprises its modes as being. These twostatements are very closely connected: in fact,as a little reflection will show, the reason whybeing includes the modes also as modes is, be-auseit contains them as being: for it followsfrom this,that being is of the very essence of themodes; and hence, just as being is inseparablefrom the modes, so are they from it.

ARTICLE 2The Composition of Being with Its Modes

Logical

Summary: Subject of inquiry stated Thesis: Com-ositionof being with its modes logical

Two proofs of thesis Manner in whichmodes of being are evolved out of being.


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Composition of Being With Its Modes JJ67. Subject of inquiry stated. We now

pass to the positive part of this phase of ourinvestigation, in which we shall show, how be-ng,

in matter of fact, is determined and nar-oweddown to its supreme subordinate mem-ers.Let us compress our teaching on this

point into the following thesis :

THESIS 6

Being is determined and narroweddown to its four supreme divisions,by what is known as logical com-osition,

that is to say, by a moredefinite conception o the vaguerreality being.

The meaning of our thesis in other words isthis : Being is not restricted in its applicabilityby adding something extrinsic to it, somethingfrom which it fully prescinds and which is fullyprescinded from it; but it is thus restricted bybringing out what the concept of being containsindeed, but does net express.

68. Two arguments to show that the com-ositionof being with its modes is logical.

We shall proceed at once to our arguments; forthey follow immediately and readily from ourprevious thesis.

Let us begin with an argument from exclu-


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Jo Beingsion : Composition, as is universally acknowl-dged,

is either physical, metaphysical or logical.Now as regards being and its modes, it is notphysical (thes. 3), nor metaphysical (thes. 4).Hence it must be logical. Thus we have provedour contention with little labor. Let it be noted,however, that such arguments as this, thoughperfectly convincing, yet are not very luminous,as they show only that an assertion is so, with-ut

at the time assigning the reason why it isso.

Let us then add another, more direct demon-tration,that will tell us something of thegrounds for our thesis. It runs thus :

Composition is logical, when two concepts areput together which, on the one hand, are notexclusive of one another, and, on the other, arenot altogether the same. That these two condi-ions

are required is plain; for where mutuallyexclusive concepts are joined together, the com-osition

is metaphysical: and where there is nodistinction at all between the notions broughtinto conjunction, there is no composition of anysort. For nothing is compounded with itself:thus it would be ridiculous to say, a stone isa bodily body. That the two requirements arefulfilled in the case of being, admits of no doubt.For the modes of being include being, and beingincludes them. On the other hand, being ingeneral differs from its modes; for, although it


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Composition of Being With Its Modes 79includes them, yet it does not express them assuch : and the modes differ from mere being,for they are being in general rendered definiteand precise. Now we can understand why thelogical composition of being is said to consistin the fuller expression and evolution of being;for the four primary modes are really nothingelse than the being to which they are added, butwithout its indefiniteness and vagueness : theyare, as it were, being lighted up from withinand thus rendered determinate and distinct.Being, then, is determined by what is calledlogical composition.69. Manner in which the modes of beingare evolved out of being. But some onemight ask, how is it possible to evolve the abovenamed modes out of being? Suggest the con-ept

of being to some one, and then leave himto himself; do you think that by the closestscrutiny and analysis of that notion, he coulddevelop the four primary modes from it?

To understand this the better, recall what wassaid before that a concept may include a givenperfection in two Ways. Sometimes it actuallyexpresses the entity under consideration, andthus contains it explicitly, as, for example, theconcept man in relation to its essential con-tituents,

bodily substance, life, sensation, andintellect. Now, in this case, mere analysis ofthe preceding notion suffices without going out-


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80 Beingside of it, to discover any of the notes com-rised

within the compass of its meaning. Lookattentively at the notion man, and you willperceive in it, substance, body, life, sensationand reason; these, then, are involved explicitlyor formally in the concept man, in as faras this latter expresses them, each according toits own peculiar form and character.

But there is still another way in which a con-eptmay comprise a perfection; not, indeed,

as before, by expressing it, but as including itvirtually or as containing it under its extension.In this case, the implied attribute cannot bedrawn out of the containing concept by a merelyanalytical process; but in order to perceive theinvolved perfection, I need outside information,gotten independently of the concept which I amcontemplating; and thus, and thus only, can Icome to a knowledge of the modes as includedin being. Inclusion of this sort is called vir-ual

in opposition to formal, because thecontaining concept possesses the virtue orpower, as it were, of expanding and unfoldingitself into what it bears within. The case isvery similar to what we meet with in the syl-ogism

or reasoning process. For the antecedentmay contain the conclusion either virtually or formally. The latter happens whenever wecan arrive at a knowledge of the consequent bymere analysis of the antecedent. Thus when I


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being a study in metaphysics

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