before a board of inquiry ruakura development plan ... - epa...border, the border and continues...

Before a Board of Inquiry Ruakura Development Plan Change

IN THE MATTER of the Resource Management Act 1991

AND

IN THE MATTER of a Board of Inquiry appointed under section 149J of the Resource Management Act 1991 to consider a Plan Change requested by Tainui Group Holdings Limited and Chedworth Properties Limited

Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd

25 February 2014

Summary

1. Biosecurity in New Zealand is not a single line of defence at the border;

rather it is a multi–layer system that begins offshore and incorporates

pre-border, the border and continues post-border. Within this system,

the Ruakura Inland Port proposal fits as part of New Zealand's layer of

border interventions; specifically it would form part of a network of

transitional facilities, the purpose of which is to hold uncleared risk

goods for inspection, secure storage or treatment until they receive

biosecurity clearance or are re-shipped or destroyed. The Ruakura

Inland Port would deal specifically with clearance of sea containers and

associated cargo within transitional facilities.

2. This evidence addresses points raised in submissions on biosecurity

matters relating to the inland port provided for by the Plan Change.

3. There are currently approximately 6500 approved transitional facilities

widely distributed across New Zealand, with 205 of these already

located in Hamilton. All transitional facilities are not equal. Among

these, there is significant variation in terms of quality of facilities,

systems and capability of facility operators. So the border is already

'diffuse', and increased spread, variability and number of transitional

facilities weakens New Zealand’s border biosecurity arrangements.

4. In my opinion a better outcome for NZ's biosecurity system would be

consolidation and aggregation of transitional facilities that operate to a

higher standard.

5. The Ruakura Inland Port as proposed will achieve consolidation and

aggregation at a scale that represents a significant opportunity to more

tightly control biosecurity risk. The integrated nature of the proposal

(i.e. where sea containers, once they arrive, are handled and cleared

within a single and secure biosecurity facility) creates further

opportunity for such tightening. This represents a strategic opportunity

to strengthen border biosecurity that is of both regional and national

significance in my opinion.

16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd

1

Introduction

6. My name is Andrew Harrison. I am an independent expert on

biosecurity, with experience working as a biosecurity specialist for

approximately 13 years.

7. Between 2002 and 2004 I was senior technical support officer

(biosecurity) for the Department of Conservation (DOC); responsible for

its biosecurity surveillance and response activities, as well as

representing DOC in the development of Tiakina Aotearoa Protect New

Zealand: The Biosecurity Strategy for New Zealand 2003 (hereafter

referred to as The Biosecurity Strategy for NZ).

8. From 2004-2012 I held various roles in the Ministry of Agriculture and

Fisheries (MAF) Biosecurity New Zealand including: as a senior policy

analyst within the MAF Biosecurity Strategic Unit, as part of the team

that lead implementation of The Biosecurity Strategy for NZ; as group

manager responsible for leading national pest management; and as

acting (for a significant period) group manager for biosecurity and

animal welfare policy. My experience included leading MAF Biosecurity

New Zealand's biosecurity law reform programme (directly resulting in

the Biosecurity Law Reform Act 2012), participation in developing its

strategic direction and change programmes for border and post-border

biosecurity, managing biosecurity policy and operations functions, and

serving as a national biosecurity regulator (as ‘deputy chief technical

officer’ and ‘chief technical officer’ under the Biosecurity Act 1993;

hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’).

9. In mid-2012 I established AHC Limited, a consultancy specialising in

biosecurity strategy, policy, planning and technical advice. I currently

contract to Kiwifruit Vine Health for which I have been its biosecurity

programmes manager since mid-2012. In this role I developed the

National Psa-V Pest Management Plan and lead wider biosecurity

programmes on behalf of the kiwifruit industry; the latter includes

working closely with port communities and biosecurity agencies to

strengthen New Zealand's pre-border and border biosecurity

arrangements. I also contract to the Nursery and Garden Industry New

Zealand, for which I am independent chair of its board and lead its 16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd

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engagement on Government Industry Agreements on Biosecurity

Readiness and Response.

10. My qualifications include a Bachelor of Science in Ecology and

Environmental Science (Massey University) and a Master of Science in

Resource Management (Lincoln University), and I am a member of the

New Zealand Biosecurity Institute.

11. In this report I provide background on NZ's biosecurity system and how

the Ruakura Inland Port proposal fits in relation to this. I then set out a

strategic view of the proposal and its biosecurity impact from local,

regional and national perspectives, and provide evidence in relation to

biosecurity matters raised during the submissions process and

directions from the Board for information to be provided.

12. Specifically, this submission addresses the Board’s direction 17 dated 3

February 2014 for the Applicants to discuss ‘the appropriateness of the

activity in the proposed location from a biosecurity perspective’ (which

is the overall focus of this evidence), and ‘if the proposal proceeds,

what risks this creates for residents both from direct biosecurity

impacts, and from the management of biosecurity risks’ (which is

addressed in paragraphs 51-56 of this evidence).

Code of Conduct

13. I confirm that I have read the ‘Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses’

as contained in the Environment Court Practice Note 2011. I agree to

comply with this Code of Conduct. In particular, unless I state

otherwise, this evidence is within my sphere of expertise and I have not

omitted to consider material facts known to me that might alter or

detract from the opinions I express.

Scope of Evidence

14. The scope of my evidence covers all aspects of biosecurity associated

with the Ruakura Inland Port proposal. It briefly covers the connection

between biosecurity and other New Zealand border services (e.g.,

Customs), and the nature of collaboration between border agencies,


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however, the operation of border services other than biosecurity is

beyond the scope of my evidence and outside my area of expertise.

15. In relation to operational aspects of the proposal (e.g., how Ruakura

Inland Port will develop over time and operate, including the predicted

nature and scale of logistics activities over time and space), I rely on

the Evidence in Chief of Tony Boyle. Where this is the case I have

clearly identified this in my evidence.

Methodology and Limitations

16. In preparing this evidence I have:

i. Undertaken a site visit to understand layout and characteristics of

the Ruakura site (i.e. the plan change area) and immediately

surrounding areas;

ii. Reviewed the relevant MPI standards and guidelines that are

applicable to the Ruakura Proposal (e.g., relevant Import Health

Standards, Transitional Facilities standards and supporting

guidelines or reference documents);

iii. Considered findings of relevant government reviews, including:

the Auditor General’s performance reports on ‘Ministry for

Primary Industries: Preparing for and responding to biosecurity

incursions’, and ‘Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry:

Management of Biosecurity Risks’ and ‘Ministry of Agriculture and

Forestry: Managing biosecurity risks associated with high-risk sea

containers’; and the Sea Container Review: MAF Discussion

Paper No:35; and Biosecurity Risk Management of Entry

Pathways for Pasture Pests: MPI Technical Paper 2013/58;

iv. Sourced relevant data from MPI relating to New Zealand’s

transitional facilities; and

v. Discussed the proposal with MPI personnel (from parts of MPI

responsible for standard setting, border operations and

surveillance and investigation), to understand any issues or


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opportunities associated with the Ruakura Inland Port proposal

from a regulatory perspective.

17. Where quoting documents that refer to MAF, MAF Biosecurity

Authority, MAF Biosecurity New Zealand or MAFBNZ, I have altered

such references to instead refer to the ‘Ministry of Primary Industries’ or

‘MPI’, which is the successor to these agencies, for simplicity.

How New Zealand's biosecurity system operates – high level overview

18. The NZ Biosecurity Strategy defines biosecurity as the exclusion,

eradication or effective management of risks posed by pests and

diseases to the economy, environment and human health. All New

Zealanders benefit from a biosecurity system that functions effectively.


rather it is a multi–layer system that begins offshore, incorporates pre-

border, the border and continues post-border into New Zealand where

it becomes a joint effort between central government, regional councils,

industry, community groups, and all New Zealanders.

20. MPI is the agency tasked with the lead role for biosecurity in New

Zealand. MPI describes the system as consisting of a number of layers

as follows (also refer to Figure 1):

• International Plant and Animal Health Standard Development -

New Zealand actively influences international standards to

protect human plant and animal health without unnecessarily

restricting trade.

• Trade and Bilateral Arrangements - MPI provides technical

expertise in the negotiation of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS)

chapters in free trade agreements (i.e. Chapters relating to the

application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures in

accordance with The WTO Agreement on the Application of

Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures) and implements these

chapters once the agreements are in place.


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• Risk Assessment and Import Health Standard Development -

Risk assessment is the process used to determine likelihood an

organism or disease could enter, establish, or spread in New

Zealand, potential impacts if this were to occur, and risk

management options. Import Health Standards (IHSs) then

specify requirements that importers must meet to manage these

risks (e.g., requirement for heat treatment of some imported

foods). Exporting countries must then verify the requirements in

New Zealand's IHSs have been met and give an official

assurance of this to MPI.

• Border Interventions - border activity is targeted at ensuring risk

goods comply with requirements of IHSs, and preventing the

entry of pests and diseases. Once they arrive in New Zealand

craft, cargo, passengers and mail must receive biosecurity

clearance either at their ‘place of first arrival’ (e.g., a sea port in

the case of sea containers) or at one of approximately 6500

approved transitional facilities across New Zealand. A more

detailed description of New Zealand's border biosecurity

arrangements is provided in paragraphs 24-30 below.

• Surveillance - Surveillance involves looking for unwanted pests

and diseases to detect any new incursions early, to support pest

management activities (e.g., to determine distribution or

abundance), and to provide trading partners with official

assurance that NZ or parts of NZ are free of specified pests or

diseases. It includes programmes targeting both ‘high risk pests’

(e.g., Asian gypsy moth, exotic ants, fruit flies, mosquitoes) and

‘high risk sites’ (i.e. surveying for a range of potential pests or

diseases within or in close proximity to international airports,

commercial seaports, transitional facilities and first-night tourist

campsites).

• Readiness and Response - New Zealand maintains a capability

to respond to incursions (e.g., recent Queensland fruit fly

response in Whangarei), and responds to eradicate these


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where possible and reduce impacts on the NZ economy,

environment and human health.

• Pest Management - New Zealand has a pest management

system in place to contain or reduce the impact of unwanted

pests and diseases that have established here. This includes

managing pests and diseases of national interest (e.g.,

management of Psa-V and bovine Tb under national pest

management plans), of regional interest (e.g., managing old

man’s beard under a regional pest management plan) and of

local or individual interest (e.g., a home owner controlling ants).

It also includes managing pathways of national or regional

interest (e.g., movement of weed seeds on farm machinery and

equipment) to prevent the spread of pests or diseases.

• Export Assurance – New Zealand is a contracting party to

international agreements relating to export certification (e.g., the

International Plant Protection Convention). MPI operates an

export certification system to give assurance to importing

countries that their phytosanitary requirements have been met

by New Zealand exporters. This system operates through the

delegation of authority by MPI to authorised Independent

Verification Agencies and approved Organisations to carry out

certification services and activities on behalf of MPI.


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Figure 1: Illustration of New Zealand's biosecurity system (prepared by MPI). The Ruakura Inland Port proposal is part of the 'border interventions' layer and relates specifically to the 'cargo' pathway (biosecurity pressure).

How the Ruakura Inland Port proposal fits in relation to New Zealand's biosecurity system

21. With respect to how the Ruakura Inland Port will operate, and how the

operation will develop over time (e.g., in terms of transport patterns and

cargo capacity) I rely on the Evidence in Chief of Tony Boyle. In

summary, the proposal entails sea containers and associated cargo

transported from Ports of Auckland and Port of Tauranga via rail (and

some via road transport at earlier stages of the development) to

Ruakura Inland Port, from where these will be moved to and devanned

within commercial facilities in the warehousing and distribution area.

The Inland Port and warehousing and distribution areas will be located

within a border security boundary (refer to Appendix 1), such that all of

the movements, devanning and further biosecurity clearance activities

(i.e. further to clearance activities carried out at the sea port; also refer

to paragraphs 25-29) occur within the border security boundary.

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‘Assured’ New Zealand Exports

THE MULTIPLE LAYERS OF NEW ZEALAND’S BIOSECURITY SYSTEM


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22. The area within the border biosecurity boundary will be established as

a ‘transitional facility’ (an overview of transitional facilities and the

relevant standards and operating requirements these must meet is

provided in paragraph 33). A routine approach would then be that

individual commercial facilities within the warehousing and distribution

area are established as individual transitional facilities (e.g., this

approach is currently used for storage facilities within airport

boundaries and at some sea ports). However, a more integrated

arrangement (e.g., a single or highly rationalised number of transitional

facilities, aligned with equivalent customs arrangements) is likely to be

a better option, in my opinion and based on initial discussions with MPI

personnel (this is discussed further in paragraphs 30 and 68).

23. The Ruakura Inland Port proposal fits within the 'border interventions'

layer of New Zealand's biosecurity system (as described in paragraph

20 and illustrated in Figure 1), forms part of New Zealand’s network of

transitional facilities, and deals specifically with biosecurity clearance at

transitional facilities for sea containers and associated cargo only.

How New Zealand’s biosecurity border operates for sea containers and associated packaging and cargo

24. Borders are diffuse and do not only include the point of entry (e.g., a

marine port or international airport). For example, containers unloaded

at ports may be opened and inspected at one of approximately 6500

transitional facilities around the country.

25. When a sea container arrives at a sea port, the container itself and

associated packaging material must comply with requirements set out

in the Import Health Standard for Sea Containers. A biosecurity

clearance is issued (pursuant to section 26 of the Act) when a container

meets the requirements of this IHS, either by an ‘MPI Inspector’ or a

non-MPI ‘accredited person’ (a person appointed by a MPI chief

technical officer as an ‘accredited person’, pursuant to section 103(7) of

the Act).

26. The cargo inside the container must meet requirements of the relevant

IHS (e.g., imported fresh produce must meet requirements in IHS


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152.02: Importation and clearance of fresh fruit and vegetables into

New Zealand), and be given a further and separate biosecurity

clearance.

27. MPI Inspectors assess all sea containers at the sea port and designate

which of these are of ‘high’ or ‘low’ regulatory interest; this is based on

risk profiling (including risk associated with country of origin) and

completeness of accompanying documentation. MPI Inspectors then

give directions as to inspection requirements, including: whether sea

containers of high regulatory interest are to be inspected by or in the

presence of either an MPI inspector or a non-MPI accredited person;

the level of inspection; and whether this is to occur at the sea port or at

an approved transitional facility.

28. The biosecurity requirements relevant to clearance for sea containers

and associated packaging (but not the cargo inside these), as these

progress through the port and are transported to transitional facilities

for further clearance as follows (from the Import Health Standard for

Sea Containers):

Ports: A container must not be removed from the first port of

discharge - including movement to transitional facilities, inland

depots or for transhipment by road or rail - until all container

information is received and assessed by MPI and directions

actioned by MPI or relevant parties. Containers for transshipment

by sea must be inspected or checked at the first port of discharge

where they will remain on that port for longer than 12 hours.

Transportation: For all uncleared containers being transported

from a port to a transitional facility or between transitional

facilities for devanning, treatment or other action, the importer or

importer’s agent must provide all relevant information and MPI

directions about the container to the transport operator and the

transitional facility.

Transitional Facilities: No person is permitted to open or devan a

container until notification of MPI requirements has been received

at the transitional facility. Containers must be devanned at the


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transitional facility in the presence of a MPI Inspector or an

accredited person (as directed by MPI).

29. The overall ‘system’ approach to cargo clearance entails use of

intelligence-based risk profiling, with cargo of highest biosecurity risk

cleared under directly control of MPI and typically at the ‘place of first

arrival’, and with cargo of lowest biosecurity risk cleared in the

presence of non-MPI accredited person within transitional facilities.

30. Border biosecurity forms part of New Zealand's border services, where

the main border agencies (MPI, New Zealand Customs Service and

Immigration New Zealand) are increasingly collaborating, including

development of shared processes, common infrastructure, joint

technology investments and coordinated delivery of frontline services.

This operates under a significant whole-of-government programme to

change the way New Zealand's border services are delivered in order

to achieve the Governments 'Future Directions for the Border Sector'

[EDC (12) 020 refers]. This is relevant as a number of border agencies,

including the Ministry of Primary Industries and New Zealand Customs

Service, will have roles in relation to the Ruakura Inland Port and are

likely to consider a whole-of-government approach to delivery of border

services at the Ruakura Inland Port.

The role of transitional facilities and requirements that apply to them

31. Transitional facilities hold uncleared risk goods for inspection, secure

storage or treatment until they receive biosecurity clearance or are re-

shipped or destroyed.

32. Transitional facilities must be approved pursuant to section 39(3) of the

Act, and are approved for a specific purpose, scope and activities (e.g.,

approved for specified types of goods that will be held and activities

that will be conducted). They must either meet requirements set out in

the MPI Standard for General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared

Goods (the standard likely to apply to most if not all transitional facilities

in the Ruakura Inland Port), or must meet requirements of a specific

MPI standard for transitional facilities if importing specified plants, plant


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products, animal products or animals (e.g., Standard for Cat and Dog

Transitional Facilities).

33. The general requirements a transitional facility must meet include:

• having an approved Operator (pursuant to section 40(6) of the

Act;

• having an accredited person available at all times for the

unpacking of imported risk goods;

• meeting training requirements for transitional facility Operators

and accredited persons;

• having an Operating Manual approved by MPI, which is readily

accessible to TF staff and a MPI Inspector at all times;

• being in a suitable location (e.g., with access to public sewer

and mains power);

• having signage (that meets MPI specifications);

• having a system for controlling access to ensure the security of

uncleared goods;

• meeting hygiene requirements;

• controlling pests, vermin and weeds;

• maintaining contingency plans’

• providing inspection facilities;

• having an auditable system for tracking uncleared risk goods ‘in’

and ‘out’, and ensuring correct documentation is in place’;

• keeping auditable records (that meet MPI information

requirements); and


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• carrying out regular internal assessments, and reviewing the

Operational Plan on an annual basis.

34. MPI Inspectors carry out external assessments of all transitional

facilities, with frequency of such assessments varying between 6-18

months depending upon the compliance history and risk status of any

given transitional facility.

Strategic view of the proposal (national and regional interest)

35. Of the approximately 6500 approved transitional facilities widely

distributed across New Zealand, approximately 5740 process imported

cargo. Approximately 268 of these are located in the Waikato region,

205 of which are in Hamilton (based on data from MPI's Quancargo

database as at September 2013; refer to Table 1).

36. All transitional facilities are not equal. Among these there is significant

variation in terms of the scale of operation (e.g., from processing

several containers per annum to many thousands). Table 1 highlights

this scale variation in relation to volume of consignments devanned

within transitional facilities, and shows that a large percentage of

transitional facilities (approximately 65%) are processing 'very low' or

'low' levels of consignments.


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Region Very low (0-5)

Low (6-20)

Mid (21-50)

High (51+)

Total

Auckland 1139 950 541 635 3265 Canterbury 318 255 153 140 866 Wellington 113 107 58 75 353 Bay of Plenty 101 87 41 39 268 Waikato 110 84 39 29 262 Hawkes Bay 49 47 25 22 143 Otago 44 30 27 12 113 Manawatu 34 36 16 16 102 Taranaki 43 19 14 8 84 Nelson 22 26 13 8 69 Southland 24 19 6 4 53 Northland 11 9 7 4 31 Marlborough 11 10 3 1 25 East Cape 13 6 1 0 20 Wanganui 1 7 4 4 16 Horowhenua 7 6 1 2 16 Wairarapa 9 3 2 2 16 Kapiti Coast 4 6 1 1 12 Thames 4 4 0 1 9 West Coast 4 1 0 0 5 Rangitikei 2 1 0 1 4 Tasman 4 0 0 0 4 Central Otago 1 0 1 1 3 Counties

Manukau 2 0 0 0 2

Total 2070 1713 953 1005 5741

Table 1. Number of transitional facilities, and the profile in relation to scale of imported cargo. This information is based on numbers of consignments from the Quancargo database for the period 1st October 2010 to the 30th September 2013 for those facilities that are approved to the MPI Standard for General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Goods

37. In my opinion there is also significant variation in quality of facilities,

systems and capability of operators. In large part this relates to ‘scale’;

for smaller transitional facilities biosecurity is a minor activity and the

‘Operator’ or ‘accredited person’ roles are a minor proportion of a staff

member’s total responsibilities, while for larger transitional facilities

biosecurity is a major activity and the ‘Operator’ or ‘accredited person’

roles are the dominant or sole responsibility for staff. Within 200 metres

of where I work in Tauranga in one direction there is a very small

transitional facility where ‘controlled access’ constitutes a sign, open 16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd

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access, and personnel keep an eye out for visitors during the course of

their work; while in the other direction is the Port of Tauranga (with

multiple transitional facilities) where the boundary is security fenced

and patrolled, and access is tightly controlled at gated entry points

operated 24/7 by dedicated personnel.

38. New Zealand’s imports and exports are growing over time and

containerised trade volumes are increasing (NZIER 2010). I refer to the

Evidence in Chief of Tony Boyle, which explains that the container

volume in New Zealand is projected to increase by 5% per annum and

will result in increased pressure on capacity of existing New Zealand

port infrastructure.

39. This same growth will also increase pressure on New Zealand’s

transitional facility arrangements. Any further spread of transitional

facilities will mean the border becomes even more diffuse. In my

opinion increased spread, variability and number of transitional facilities

weakens New Zealand’s border biosecurity arrangements, and the

current regulatory approach and associated standards for transitional

facilities will not be sustainable in light of future projected growth in

trade volumes. This is a strategic issue in my view that needs to be

addressed, and my understanding is that MPI is already carefully

considering this issue.

40. A better outcome for NZ's biosecurity system in my opinion would be

consolidation and aggregation of transitional facilities that operate to a

higher standard.

41. In my opinion the Ruakura Inland Port as proposed will achieve

consolidation and aggregation at a scale (i.e. capacity up to 1 million

Twenty-Foot Equivalent Units or 'TEUs' – refer to Evidence in Chief of

Tony Boyle) that represents a significant opportunity to more tightly

control biosecurity risk. The scale and integrated nature of the proposal

- i.e. where the transport of sea containers from the intermodal terminal

to the warehousing and distribution area and biosecurity clearance

activities all occur within a secure biosecurity facility – creates further

opportunity for such tightening.


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42. A strategic opportunity associated with the Ruakura Inland Port

proposal, as a greenfield development of significant scale, is also to

implement best practice biosecurity from the outset. I cover this further

in paragraphs 65-69 of this evidence.

43. There are secondary ‘efficiency’ and ‘effectiveness’ benefits associated

with consolidation and aggregation from a biosecurity perspective,

including:

• aggregation lends itself to more targeted, efficient and effective

surveillance activities to detect risk organism early (e.g.,

targeted fruit fly trapping within and surrounding the inland port);

• efficiencies for MPI Inspectors (considerable savings in time

and travel, freeing up more time for frontline inspection and

clearance activities);

• potential economies of scale in terms of investment in security

(system for controlling access) and other biosecurity systems,

and potential opportunities associated with a having pool of

skilled Operators and accredited persons in close proximity

(e.g., opportunities for training and up skilling or operating a

pool of such personnel across facilities).

44. Considering the proposal from a local perspective, consolidation and

aggregation of transitional facilities brings a bigger and more visible

part of New Zealand’s border “into the neighbourhood”. Increased

numbers of containers and biosecurity clearance activities close by

may increase localised biosecurity risk. This level of localised

biosecurity risk is manageable and can be reduced by adopting best

practice (covered in paragraphs 65-69).

45. The fact that there are already approximately 275 transitional facilities

operating in the Waikato region, with 205 of these within Hamilton itself,

all of variable scale and quality and widely distributed, also needs to be

considered here.


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46. Considering the proposal from regional and national perspectives, in

my opinion the scale of consolidation and aggregation (fewer and larger

facilities in close proximity) envisaged within the Ruakura Inland Port

proposal, along with integration that enables greater control of

biosecurity activities within a relatively small and more secure area,

creates a strategic opportunity to strengthen border biosecurity that is

of both regional and national significance.

Evidence in relation to matters raised in submissions

47. I have reviewed all submissions that raise issues or discuss matters

relating to biosecurity, and I have addressed them in accordance with

general submission points below.

Submission point A: Proximity to vulnerable land uses and areas where pests

and diseases can establish

48. Related matters raised in submissions include:

• the volume of containers travelling across high value

horticultural land and pastoral farmland;

• risk associated with processing containers in close proximity to

susceptible farmland as well as to amenity plantings around the

university and research centre campuses;

• that such large scale container ports should be centred well

within inhospitable industrial areas, preferably at least 2km

away from farmland and housing; and

• that biosecurity risks at inland ports, where incursions can move

in any of 360 degree direction is worse than coastal ports where

terrestrial incursions can only move inland.

49. The land use surrounding the Ruakura Inland Port site is a mix of

commercial, residential and rural (including lifestyle blocks) properties,

and amenity plantings.


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50. Ideally any place of first arrival or transitional facility would be located in

inhospitable areas (i.e. where if pests arrive they are unlikely to

establish). However, in practice this is extremely difficult if not

impossible to achieve, and is not the case for the approximately 6500

transitional facilities and 15 ‘places of first arrival’ in New Zealand. The

proposed Ruakura Inland Port is not at all unique in this respect. An

illustration of this is provided in Appendix 2, which compares

surrounding land use across Ruakura Inland Port, MetroPort, Port of

Tauranga and Christchurch International Airport, and shows that each

of these is proximate to sensitive land uses including residential, rural,

business, industry and open space (amenity).

Submission point B: Impacts of incursions

51. Issues raised in submissions relating to this matter include:

• Exposure to multiple eradication operations when serious pests

establish; and

• Health effects associated with aerial spray to eradicate pests,

with reference to ‘Tussock moth scare in Hamilton’ (sic. – this is

likely a reference to the 2003 Asian Gypsy Moth incursion in

Hamilton).

52. The Board has also directed (direction 17, 3 February 2014) the

Applicants to discuss what risks the Ruakura Inland Port creates for

residents both from direct biosecurity impacts, and from the

management of biosecurity risks.

53. Biosecurity risks for local residents are the risks associated with an

incursion of an exotic pest or disease, including any direct impacts of

the organism and any impacts of its management. The nature of such

impacts will depend on the organism concerned, and the range of

potential organisms concerned is vast. To give a sense of scale, on

average New Zealand deals with between 30 and 40 incursions a year.

54. Five examples of New Zealand’s highest risk pests (or groups of pests)

that could spread through an imported sea container pathway are


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outlined below, to illustrate the extreme end of potential risks for local

residents:

i. Invasive Ants (e.g., Red Imported Fire Ants, Cray Ants, Yellow

Crazy Ants, Tropical Fire Ants) can be a serious household

nuisance, and some sting or bite. A response to an invasive ant

incursion involves ground baiting, surveillance, and movement

controls (i.e. restricting the movement of high risk materials,

such as green waste). Movement controls are likely to create

moderate business disruption and inconvenience for local

residents (e.g., a 2km movement control boundary around the

incursion site, over a three-year period was used for the 2006

Red Imported Fire Ant eradication programme in Whirinaki,

North of Napier).

ii. Fruit flies lay their eggs in ripening fruit and some vegetables,

which develop into larvae that cause these to ripen prematurely,

rot and drop to the ground. This damage can make affected fruit

and vegetables inedible. Response to a fruit fly find or incursion

typically involves trapping, checking and removal of host

material, and movement controls that apply to fresh fruit and

vegetables (except for leafy vegetables and root vegetables). If

an established population is confirmed response management

can also include targeted spraying of insecticides. Movement

controls are likely to create a low level of inconvenience for local

residents (e.g., a 1.5 km movement control boundary around

the incursion site over a two-week period was used for the 2014

Queensland Fruit Fly response in Whangarei).

iii. Exotic mosquitos can both have nuisance impacts (e.g., biting),

and serious public health impacts (e.g., as a vector of diseases,

such as malaria or dengue), or both. Response to a mosquito

incursion typically involves a combination of larval habitat

surveys, high density trapping, habitat modification (removal of

water and thick vegetation) and/or treatment with S-methoprene

(a growth regulator that is non-toxic to humans).


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Exotic moths can infest trees, stripping them clear of leaves and

exposing them to diseases. Some have hairs that can give rise

to an allergic reaction (e.g., urticating hairs on painted apple

moths). Response to a significant moth incursion involves a

combination of trapping and surveillance, movement controls on

plant material, ground spraying and/or aerial spray application.

The level on impact on businesses and residents can be high,

including restrictions on the movement of green waste and other

plant host material over large areas (e.g., refer to map of the

vegetation control and aerial spray areas for the 2003 Hamilton-

based Asian gypsy moth eradication programme in Figure 2),

and actual or perceived noise and health effects of aerial spray

applications (this is a very complex area relating to public health

and is not my area of expertise). There have been three moth

eradication programmes involving aerial spray applications in

New Zealand in the last twenty years, including the eradication

of Asian gypsy moth in Hamilton in between 2003 - 2005. 1.

Notably, sea containers were considered an unlikely source of

the 2003 Asian gypsy moth incursion; rather, Cabinet concluded

'It is considered highly probably that the [Asian gypsy month]

incursion is the result of an egg mass entering New Zealand on

an imported used vehicle' [EDC (03) 167 refers].

55. The risk of incursions has existed (the 2003 Asian gypsy moth

incursion being an example), and will continue to exist, given New

Zealanders value trade and travel. And an increasing volume of sea

containers will continue to need to be processed at transitional facilities

across New Zealand.


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Figure 2: Asian gypsy moth eradication programme map, showing the boundaries of the vegetation control area and targeted aerial spray operation

56. As explained in paragraphs 44-46, considering the Ruakura Inland Port

proposal from a local perspective, while there are risks these are

manageable and can be reduced by application of best practice, and

should be considered in the context of the wider network of transitional

facilities (and associated risk) already present in the Waikato region

and wider New Zealand. In my opinion the scale of consolidation and

aggregation envisaged within the Ruakura Inland Port proposal, along

with integration that enables greater control of biosecurity activities,

creates a strategic opportunity to reduce biosecurity risk of regional and

national significance.

Submission point C: Who pays for incursions?


• Who is going to pay for any remedial work or recovery? The tax

payer should not have to cover this given ‘immensity and extent’

of the inland port.


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58. MPI is the lead agency responsible for biosecurity and administration of

the Act, has an established approach to cost recovery set out in Part 6

of the Act, and is implementing a new approach to cost sharing and

decision with industry in relation to incursions (Government Industry

Agreements on Readiness and Response, as provided for in Part 5A of

the Act).

59. The proposed Ruakura Inland Port would be part of the network of

transitional facilities in New Zealand, and would be treated the same as

any other transitional facility in accordance with MPI cost recovery

approaches referred to in paragraph 58.

Submission point D: Relationship to national and regional biosecurity plans


• The role this activity could play in bringing invasive pest species

into the Waikato, then distributing them further afield;

• Other regions will be the source or destination of

goods/containers/equipment being handled at Ruakura, and

different regional pest management planning rules will apply;

and

• Request for recognition of the importance of biosecurity,

considering the Waikato region’s reliance on agriculture and

primary production, and to include provisions in the plan change

that identify biosecurity legislation and the Waikato Regional

Pest Management Plan. [Note: this is a resource management

planning consideration and beyond my area of expertise, and

therefore I will not comment on this matter]

61. Sea containers are already transported into the Waikato Region and

devanned at transitional facilities widely distributed across the Region,

and goods received and cleared in other regions will travel to the

Waikato anyway. The real issue in my opinion is, therefore, how

effective New Zealand’s overall system of border clearance is. Goods

inspected in Ruakura, other parts of Hamilton, or other parts New


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Zealand will all have a residual level of biosecurity risk. In my opinion

the consolidation and aggregation of transitional facilities, and the level

of integration under the Ruakura Inland Port proposal, represents a

better alternative in terms of biosecurity risk management to a growing

number of more widespread transitional facilities that are variable in

terms of quality of facilities, systems and operators.

62. In relation to the issue concerning ‘different regional pest management

planning rules will apply’, the perceived relevance of this is not entirely

clear to me. Once the biosecurity risk associated with cargo is

managed (that is, once it receives biosecurity clearance) the cargo is

then free to be transported to any part of NZ. This will apply to cargo

cleared within the Ruakura Inland Port, and cargo cleared within every

other transitional facility in New Zealand. I am not aware of any

regional planning rules under a regional pest management plan that

would apply to or restrict movement of imported cargo.

63. The land occupiers of the Ruakura Inland Port will be subject to

requirements of the Waikato Regional Pest Management Plan (e.g., the

land occupier requirement to destroy all banana passionfruit plants on

the land they occupy), and this is the case for all land occupiers across

the Waikato Region.

Submission point E: Best practice biosecurity


• Provide details of how biosecurity issues will be managed in

relation to the inland port and logistics area;

• We ask for “best practice” in biosecurity management at the

land port site.

65. Requirements for managing biosecurity issues in relation to the inland

port and logistics area are specified in the MPI Standard for General

Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Goods and further explained in an

accompanying guidance document (Guidance document for the


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Standard for General Transitional Facilities for Uncleared Goods). A

summary of those requirements was provided in paragraph 33.

66. In my opinion best practice biosecurity within an inland port is about

achieving ‘a port community committed to biosecurity excellence’. It

entails:

• A workforce with a high level of awareness, understanding of,

and commitment to biosecurity, including highly trained and

experience personnel undertaking key biosecurity roles (ideally

with dedicated time, and where biosecurity is a primary focus of

such roles);

• Taking a risk-based approach, applying measures based on

best data available and assessment of risk (good

communication between MPI Inspectors and port staff being

essential to strengthen such assessments);

• Carrying out surveillance activities within, and in any high risk

areas surrounding, the port to enable early detection of high risk

pests and diseases;

• Establishing and maintaining a clean port environment and

minimising potential habitat for pests that may arrive (i.e. to

reduce risk of establishment). This includes minimising any

vegetation (e.g., landscape plantings) within and immediately

surrounding the biosecurity security boundary;

• Controlling established pests or vermin;

• Baiting or otherwise treating ‘hot spots’ where there is a history

of interceptions or higher risk of incursions (e.g., toxic baiting for

invasive ants at Ports of Auckland in specific areas that receive

high risk containers from the Pacific);

• Maintaining a high level of security to control access, to ensure

the security of uncleared goods;


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• Operating a high level of contingency planning, and maintaining

access to appropriate facilities to contain any suspect risk

organism or potential spillage or contamination;

• Operating a system of incentives, with tangible reward for

operators, facilities and personnel that consistently achieve high

levels of compliance or excellence, and corresponding

disincentives for those achieving low levels of compliance and

repeat offenders (e.g., tougher and more frequent audit

regimes);

• Maintaining robust systems, including clear policy, plans,

procedures and assignment of responsibilities, and regular

review and assessment (including against performance targets).

[Note this is how Ports typically operate in relation to their

Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) requirements, which

may serve as a useful model]

67. The Ruakura Inland Port proposal presents a strategic opportunity to

design and develop systems for best practice biosecurity from the

outset.

68. In my opinion there will be significant opportunity for the government's

border agencies (in particular MPI and the New Zealand Customs

Service) to develop a 'best practice' whole-of-government approach to

border services at the Ruakura Inland Port (e.g., a single or highly

rationalised number of transitional facilities, aligned with equivalent

customs arrangements), aligned with the Government's 'Future

Directions for Border Services'. My initial discussions with senior MPI

personnel suggest that MPI has clearly recognised this opportunity.

The details of any such approach will need to be carefully worked

through with, and be agreed by, the relevant border agencies.

69. In my opinion it is appropriate that such biosecurity arrangements and

systems be developed in accordance with the relevant statutory and

regulatory requirements, working closely with regulatory authorities

and, to the extent possible, with key commercial operators within the

Ruakura Inland Port as it is developed. 16118500_1 Statement of Evidence in Chief of Andrew Harrison on behalf of Tainui Group Holdings Ltd and Chedworth Properties Ltd

25

Conclusions


rather it is a multi–layer system that begins offshore and incorporates

pre-border, the border and continues post-border. The Ruakura Inland

Port proposal fits as part of New Zealand's layer of border

interventions; specifically it would form part of a network of transitional

facilities, and it would deal specifically with clearance of sea containers

and associated cargo.

71. In my opinion the scale of consolidation and aggregation envisaged

within the Ruakura Inland Port proposal (that is, fewer and larger

facilities operating in close proximity, operating long term to capacity up

to 1 million TEUs ), along with integration that enables greater control

of biosecurity activities (i.e. where the transport of sea containers from

the Inland Port to the warehousing and distribution area all occurs

within a single and secure biosecurity facility) represents a strategic

opportunity to strengthen border biosecurity that is of both regional and

national significance. This is a better alternative to the status quo,

where transitional facilities are widespread and highly variable in terms

of quality of facilities, systems and operators. This sort of development

better positions New Zealand for management of biosecurity risk in light

of increasing containerised trade volumes.

72. A greenfield development of the scale of the Ruakura Inland Port also

presents a strategic opportunity to implement best practice biosecurity,

including a coordinated approach across government border agencies,

and developing ‘a port community committed to biosecurity excellence’

and underpinning systems.

Andrew Harrison

25 February 2014


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Appendix 1: Map of the proposed Ruakura Inland Port showing location of the border security boundary


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Appendix 2: Maps comparing surrounding land uses across the proposed Ruakura Inland Port, MetroPort, Ports of Tauranga and Christchurch international Airport, illustrating that each of these is proximate to “sensitive” land uses


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before a board of inquiry ruakura development plan ... - epa...border, the border and continues...

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