beardsley, monroe - on the generality of critical reasons

8/10/2019 Beardsley, Monroe - On the Generality of Critical Reasons

1/11

Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

On the Generality of Critical ReasonsAuthor(s): Monroe C. BeardsleySource: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 59, No. 18 (Aug. 30, 1962), pp. 477-486Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2023219.

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2/11

VOLUME

LIX, No.

18

AUGUST 30,

1962

THE

JOURNAL OF

PHILOSOPHY

ON THE

GENERALITY

OF CRITICAL REASONS

*

IF

giving

reasons for an

assertion consists in

making

other

asser-

tions and also

asserting

that they

support

it, then critics

evi-

dently give

reasons

for their

judgments

of art.

To

doubt

this

is

to urge a

stricter

concept of

reason-giving, according

to which

not

every

proposition that

is

alleged to be a

reason

actually is one.

But

then, using

the

narrower

definition, we

can still say

that

critics

wish to give

reasons,

and think

they are

doing so, whether

or

not they

succeed.

Whichever way

we put

it, the critic

im-

plicitly

makes the same

essential

claim: namely, that

his

judgments

can

be supported in

some

way by other

propositions.

This

claim is

challenged by

the

Critical Skeptic.

The

form

of

his

challenge

depends on the

latitude

given to the term

'reason',

but

its

substance is the

same. A few

years

ago, a colleague

of

mine

and

I

engaged

in

correspondence

with an

English

gentleman,

author of a monograph entitled Shakespeare's Hyphens,' who

pointed out

to us that

Shakespeare

used a great

many

hyphenated

words

and that this

practice was also

followed

by Walt Whitman

and

Dylan

Thomas. Our

correspondent

argued at one point:

the

more hyphens,

the

greater the poet.

Now,

suppose a

critic

were

to

propose the

following:

This

poem is poor,

because

it is

deficient in

hyphens.

We

may choose

to say

that this is not

a

reason

at all,

because it is

so wildly

irrelevant;

in this sense

of

reason, the skeptic's position is that no reasons can be given

for

critical

judgments. On

the

other hand, we

may

take

a more

charitable

view, and

call

this a reason

simply

because it is

offered

as

one;

in

this

broad sense, the

skeptic's

position is

that no

good,

or

cogent,

reasons can be

given

for critical

judgments.

The

critical

skeptic may

remind us of

Wordsworth's

assurance,

in

his 1800

Preface,

that he was

not

principally

influenced by

the

selfish

and foolish

hope of

reasoning him

[i.e.,

the reader] into

an

approbation of these

particular Poems.

2

Now

this was a

some-

*

This

paper

was

presented at the

Northwest

Division

of the

American

Society for

Aesthetics,

Washington

State

University,

April 20-21,

1962.

1

L. C.

Thompson,

Shakespeare's

Hyphens

(London:

Amalgamated

Authors).

2

Preface

to

the

Lyrical

Ballads

(1800),

in

Complete

Poetical

Works

(Bos-

ton:

Houghton

Mifflin,

1911),

vol.

X, p. 5.

?

Copyright

1962

by

Journal

of

Philosophy,

Inc.

477


3/11

478

THE

JOURNAL

OF PHILOSOPH1Y

what peculiar remark

in the first place.

The hope of

reasoning

someone into an approbation

might conceivably be selfish (if

Wordsworth were merely

aiming to increase his royalties), but

it is foolish only if we take 'approbation' in the sheer sense of

liking. How can anyone

be argued into liking Wordsworth's

'We are Seven'? the

skeptic asks. But I should

think that the

aim

of the reasoner-that

is, the critic armed with reasons-is

not to get people to like

the poem, but to get them to acknowledge

that it is good. And the question is whether

his reasons-or

alleged reasons-are of service to him in this enterprise.

I

don't think

that the skeptic's position, Cartesian

though

it

may

in

some

respects

appear, can be disposed of by

a simple appeal

to paradigm cases.

We might try this argument against him:

Granted that the number of

hyphens does

not

make

a poem poor

(or

good),

still that's

not the sort of thing critics

usually say.

Consider

a

principle enunciated by Cleanth Brooks:

A

poem, then, to sum up, is to be judged, not by the truth

or falsity

as

such,

of

the idea which it incorporates,

but rather by its character as

drama-by

its

coherence, sensitivity, depth,

richness, and tough-mindedness.3

Now, suppose the critic says, This poem is poor

because it

is

incoherent. If that is not a good reason for condemning a poem,

what

could be

a

good reason? Doesn't critical

skepticism imply

that the expression 'good

reason' has no application

at all

in

critical

discourse?

But

surely this term must have

some applica-

tion,

or

we would never

have learned how to use it.

If this sort of argument

is ever persuasive,

I'm afraid that

aesthetics is the last place

in which to employ it. Probably a fair

number of philosophers would be quite ready to

label the whole

body of critical reasoning a misuse of language. Let us assume

that

there must be some

examples of good reasons,

if

we can speak

intelligibly

of

good reasons; but it might well

be

that all

of

the

examples

are

to

be found

in other

fields

than

criticism, and

that

none of

the arguments

in, say, The Well Wrought

Urn, come near

to

meeting

the

high

standards

that are

exemplified

in

legal reason-

ing, or ethics, or the

game-theory of nuclear deterrence. No-

if

we are going to be

able to make sense of what the critic does

when

he

gives reasons,

and back

him

up

with a

philosophical

ac-

count

of

how those

reasons

really work,

we

must

grapple

more

closely

with the

skeptic's

arguments.

I

The

general problem

of

justifying

the

critic's

appeal

to

reasons

is,

of

course, large

and

complex.

I

propose

to

deal

with

only

one

3

The

Well

Wrought

Um (New York: Reynal

and

Hitchcock, 1947),

p.

229.


4/11

OUN

THE

GENERALITY OF CRITICAL

REASONS 479

of its

parts-but one

that

has received

some attention

in

the

past

few years.

To pass over a

number

of

preliminary

matters,

let

me

first

say

that I hold that the critic does make value judgments and does

sometimes adequately

support

them

by good

reasons.

A

reason

is

some descriptive

or

interpretive proposition

about

the

work under

consideration-

The

poem is incoherent,

for

example. Thus

a

reason always cites

some property

of the

work, and we may say

that this

property is then employed as

a

criterion

of

value

by

the

critic

who

presents

that reason.

Criteria cited

in

reasons

sup-

porting favorable judgments

are

merits;

criteria

cited

on behalf

of

unfavorable

judgments

are

defects.

If

the critic says, This

poem is poor because

(among

other

things)

is it incoherent,

then

he is

treating incoherence

as a

poetic defect.

A

critical

criterion

is thus a

feature

that

helps

to make the

work

good

or

bad,

better

or

worse;

it

adds

to or

detracts

from its aesthetic

goodness.

This is the position

that

the

skeptic rejects.

He

holds

that,

in

the

sense proposed, there are no criteria of aesthetic

value,

that is,

of

goodness

or

badness

in

poems,

paintings, plays,

music, etc.

Some

skeptics

like to invoke

John

Wisdom's

distinction,

in another

context, between what he called dull and interesting ways of

talking

about

art.

A

book about

art, says Wisdom, is dull

when

it tries

to set out

in

general terms what

makes

a

good picture

good'

by

giving rules '

or canons. '

This,

by itself,

is

something

of

an

obiter dictum, but

it

can be

given plausible and perhaps

rather

convincing support.

If

one proposition

is a reason for

another,

in

the sense of

actu-

ally

supporting it,

then

there must

be

a

logical connection

of

some

sort

between them.

And, being

a

logical connection,

it must

relate

general

concepts

in an abstract

way.

Thus,

for

example, if

a

certain

degree

of

sharpness

is

a merit

in

knives (we can think

of

a

particular sort

of

knife,

such as the

butcher's), then to

say that

a

knife has

that

degree

of

sharpness

must

always

be a reason

to

support

the

conclusion

that it is

good,

and

it

must

apply to all

knives

of

the relevant sort. This reason

may

not

be

enough to

prove that

the

knife is

good,

since

the

merit

may be

outweighed

by

serious

defects,

but

sharpness

to that

degree

will

always

make

its contribution to the goodness of the knife. It will, at least,

never

be

a fault

in a knife: that

is,

we

cannot

say,

That knife

is poor, just

because

it

is

exactly

that

sharp. And,

of

two knives

similar

in

all

other

respects,

if one

is

sharp

and the

other

is

not,

the former will be a

better

knife

than the

other.

Thus

sharpness

is

a

general

merit

in

knives.

4

See his paper in

the symposium on

Things

and

Persons,

Proceedings

of the

Aristotelian Society,

Supplement,

22

(1948):

207.


5/11

480

THE

JOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

Generality

of this

sort appears

to be

essential

to

reasons

in

the

logical

sense,

and

if critical

criteria

are defined

as features

citable

in reasons,

then

there

must

be an important

sense

in which

such

criteria are

general,

too. Thus the

view

that there are reasons that

support

the critic 's judgment

entails

the view that

there

are general

criteria

of evaluation.

Let

us

call this

view the General

Criterion

Theory.

It is a

main

target

of the critical

skeptic's

attack.

As my

main

text

for

examination,

I

shall

select

the

very

forthright

statement

by

Mr.

William

E. Kennick,

in his

article,

Does Traditional

Aesthetics

Rest

on

a

Mistake

?

5

In

this

article,

Mr. Kennick

holds

that there

are

no

general

rules,

standards, criteria, canons, or laws applicable to all works of

art by

which

alone

such critical appraisals

can

be

supported

(329).

And

he goes

on to say

this:

Ordinarily

we

feel

no constraint

in

praising

one

novel

for

its

verisimilitude,

another

for its

humour,

and still

another

for its

plot

or

characterization....

Botticelli 's

lyric grace

is his glory,

but Giotto

and

Chardin are

not to

be

condemned

because

their

poetry

is

of

a

different

order.

.

.

.

Different

works

of art are,

or

may

be,

praiseworthy

or

blameworthy

for different reasons,

and

not

always

for the same

reasons.

A

quality

that is praiseworthy

in

one

painting may be blameworthy in another; realism is not always a virtue,

but

this

does

not mean

that it is

not sometimes

a

virtue

(331).6

The

problem,

then,

is

this:

Do critical

reasons

have a kind

of

generality

of

application,

so

that it makes sense

to

try

to

formulate

principles

of criticism?

I

believe

they do.

Mr. Kennick,

like

a

number

of

other

recent

writers, believes

they do not.

Now, if they

do not,

there

are two possibilities.

Some

philosophers,

including

Mr. Kennick,

hold

that we can

still

talk of

giving

reasons

in

particular

cases

(that

is,

supporting

the

judgment

that this or

that

poem

is good

or

poor),

without

committing

ourselves

to

any

gen-

eral

principles

at

all.

Others,

however,

hold

(and

I

think

with

more reason)

that

some

form of

generality

is essential

to reason-

giving

and,

therefore,

that

if

there are

no

general

criteria, there

can be

no critical

criteria

at all.

My

aim is to

examine

the

arguments

against

the

General

Criterion

Theory.

Before

coming

to

them,

however,

it

may

be helpful

to remind

ourselves

that the issue

has

two close

analogues

in other

fields of

philosophy, no less troublesome elsewhere than this is here. First,

there is

the

problem

of

the universalizability

of

ethical

judgments.

5

Mind,

67

(1958):

317-334.

6

Cf.

Mary

Mothersill,

Critical

Reasons,

Philosophical

Quarterly,

11

(1961):

74-79;

this

is

a

reply

to

Dorothy Walsh,

Critical

Reasons,

Philo-

sophical

Beview,

69

(1960):

386-393:

There

is no

characteristic

which

is

amenable

to

independent

explanation

and which

by

its

presence

enhances

the

aesthetic

value

of

paintings

or of any

sub-class

of

paintings

(77).


6/11

ON THE GENERALITY OF CRITICAL

REASONS 481

Some

writers have

contended that it is precisely

the

difference

between ethical judgment and critical judgment that

one is general

and the other is not,7 but there does seem to be a similar problem

in ethics. When we blame a man for not keeping an appoint-

ment, are we committed to the universalization of an

implicit prin-

ciple? Most moral philosophers would say we are;

and the prin-

ciple is something

like:

Anyone else in circumstances

that do not

differ

in

relevant ways

from

this one would be equally to blame.

The problem is to provide an adequate criterion

of relevance,

without circularity. We want to say, for example,

that having a

different

color

skin is not relevant, while having

been knocked

down by a truck is relevant. Is there an analogous kind of implicit

commitment involved in criticism? (And I don't mean when we

blame the

painter, but when we set a low estimate

on his work.)

Second, there

is

the

problem

of the relation

between

singular

causal statements and

general

laws.

According

to the

traditional

view, singular

causal statements

(such as, 'Dropping

caused that

pitcher to break') are, and must be, applications

of

universal law-

like statements,

even

if

we

cannot

formulate

the

latter

completely

('Whenever

a

pitcher

of

this

sort is

dropped

in

this

way,

it

will

break'). But in recent years some philosophers have suggested

that

we may

be able

to know

singular

causal

statements,

without

relying on any general laws. Historical explanations

are some-

times alleged

to be of this sort.

I

would

be

happy

to avoid this

broad and complicated issue,

but

there

is

more

than

an

analogy be-

tween

my

aesthetic

problem

and

the causal

problem:

the former

is in fact a special case of the latter. For, speaking

very

sketchily,

I

conceive the peculiar aesthetic goodness

of

a work

of art to con-

sist of its capacity to provide experiences with certain desirable

qualities;

and the criteria

of critical

evaluation are

simply features

that

tend to contribute

to or

detract

from this

capacity. Hence,

according

to

my theory,

there is

a causal

relationship involved in

the notion

of critical

criteria.

And

since

I

side

with

those

who

think

that

some

generalized

lawful

relationships

are

essential

to

individual causal actions, by

the same

token

I

must

suppose that

a criterion can be relevant

to the value of a

particular

work

of art

only

if some

generality

of

bearing

lurks

(so

to

speak)

in

the

background.

II

A

fundamental

point alleged against

the General

Criterion

Theory

is

that

works

of art are

unique. Frequent

repetition

has

7

The

writer

most

often

quoted

is Stuart Hampshire, Logic

and

Appre-

ciation,

in

William

Elton, ed.,

Aesthetics

and

Language

(Oxford:

Black-

well,

1954).


7/11


8/11

ON THE

GENERALITY

OF

CRITICAL

REASONS

483

The

first

argument

is this:

the

General

Criterion

Theory can't

be true

because there

are no

single

features

of

poetry,

for

example,

that are

either

necessary or

sufficient

conditions

of

goodness.'0

That

no

single

feature

is

sufficient

I

am

prepared to

grant at once.

That

there

is

no

necessary

feature I

am

not

prepared to grant

without

qualification:

for

example,

I

have

argued

that

some

degree

of

coherence

is

a

necessary

condition

of

being a

poem at

all,

and a

fortiori of

being

a

good

poem.

I

suppose,

however, that

it

could

be

replied,

by way

of

putting

this

qualification in

its

place, that

no

special

degree of

coherence

is

necessary to

make

a

poem

a

good

poem. In

any case,

I

shall

waive

my

objection

and

concede

for the sake of argument that there are no necessary or sufficient

single

conditions of

poetic

goodness.

Does it

follow

that

the

Gen-

eral

Criterion

Theory

is

wrong?

The

answer

seems

sufficiently

obvious.

Though a

given

feature

may

be

present in

some

poor poems

and absent

from some

good ones,

so

that

it

neither

guarantees

poetic

goodness

nor is

indispensable

to

it,

nevertheless

it

may

contribute to

the

goodness

of

any poem

that

contains it

and, thus,

may be

citable as a

merit

wherever

it

can

be

found. A

man

may

be good

without being magnanimous,

and he

may

be

magnanimous

without

being

good;

but

that doesn't

show that

magnanimity

is

not a

virtue in

anyone who

has

it, and

to

the

degree in

which

he

has it.

So, too,

not

every

good poem

has

depth, to

recall one

of

the terms

quoted

from

Cleanth

Brooks

above,

and

not

every

deep

poem is

good-yet

depth

may

always

be

a

good

thing, as

far as

it

goes.

The

second

argument

given

by

Mr. Kennick

involves a

shift

of

ground:

What

if

different

features are

merits

in

different

contexts?

-humor in one case, he suggests, tragic intensity in another. Or

lyric

grace

in

one

painting,

heroic

strength

in

another.

Does

this

refute the

possibility of

general criteria?

I

think

not.

Lyric

grace

may

nevertheless

always

be a

good

thing when

it can

be

had,

and

heroic

strength

likewise-only it

may turn

out that

they

can-

not both

be

had

in

the

same

painting, or

not

without

being

watered

down or

confused.

The

General

Criterion

Theory

certainly

need

not

deny that

there are

qualitatively different

merits

that cannot

always be combined. We admire one person's physical courage

and

another

person's

sensitivity to

others,

but

we find

few, if

any,

who

combine both

of

these

virtues to a

high degree.

So with two

10

This

seems

to be the

main

point of A.

G.

Pleydell-Pearce,

On the

Limits

and Use of

'Aesthetic

Criteria',

Philosophical

Quarterly, 9

(1959):

29-45.

11

See The

Definitions

of

the Arts,

Journal

of Aesthetics

and Art

Criticism,

20

(Winter,

1961):

175-187.


9/11

484 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

of Brooks's criteria-'- sensitivity and tough-mindedness :

poems that excel in one of these are perhaps not likely to excel in

the

other.

The third argument is also Mr. Kennick's-and this time he

belongs to a larger company.12 What if there are features that are

merits in some works, but not merits at all in other works? Take

realism, Mr. Kennick suggests: sometimes it is a merit, sometimes

not. But this does not tell against the General Criterion Theory

if

we complicate the theory in an easy and convenient way.

There are features of poems, and there are pairs and clusters of

features. And some contribute value, so to speak, on their own,

while others do so only in combination. This principle has an

application in many walks of life, as G. E. Moore pointed out some

time ago. It's like saying that you don't want butter without

bread, or bread without butter, but only the two together. We can

say that bread is not desirable, and butter is not desirable, but

bread-and-butter is desirable; or we can say that butter is some-

times desirable (namely, when there's bread) and sometimes not

(namely, when there isn't).

Thus we should

not

be surprised

to

find specific

features

that

may be good in one poem

but neutral

in

another:

their

goodness

depends upon

association

with other

cooperative

features.

Mr.

Kennick's example, realism, is

a broad

notion, so

it's not

clear

exactly

what sort of

judgment

he has

in

mind

when he

says

that

Realism is

not

always

a virtue.

In

some

of its

senses,

I'm

not sure that realism is ever a strictly literary

virtue

(or, as

I

would prefer

to

say,

merit-Mr.

Kennick's moralistic terms 'virtue'

and 'blameworthy' do

not

seem

to me

appropriate

to

the

eritical

context). But a critic might justifiably cite an author's discrimi-

nating

ear

for four-letter

words

as a

merit

in, say, Tropic of

Cancer, where

certain

types

of situation

and

character

are

present,

though

he

would not,

of

course,

wish

to

say

that

their introduction

would

improve

The

Wings

of

the

Dove or

The

Mill

on the

Floss.

III

The

fourth

argument against

the

General

Criterion

Theory

takes us a little beyond the third-though, in fact, the examples

I

have

just given

would serve

for it as well.

Suppose

there are

features that

are

merits

in

one

work

and

actually defects

in

an-

other. The touch

of humor

that

is

just right

in

one

play

is

just

12

For

example, Helen

Knight, The Use of

'Good' in

Aesthetic Judg-

ments,

in

William Elton,

ed., op. cit., pp. 155-156;

J. A. Passmore,

The

Dreariness

of Aesthetics, ibid., 49,

51-52; J. Kemp,

Generalization

in

the

Philosophy

of Art,

Philosophy,

33

(1958): 152.


10/11

ON

THE

GENERALITY

OF CRITICAL REASONS 485

exactly wrong

in

another-and so with the four-letter words.

How then can there

be any general criteria, or true propositions

of the form: 'Humor is always a good-enhancing feature'? The

General Criterion Theory can meet this objection by one more

complication that is

natural and sensible. Some criteria are sub-

ordinate to others, as

constituting their perceptual conditions.

For

example, suppose the touch of humor (the grave-digger's gags,

the drunken porter

at the gate) is a merit in one context because

it heightens the

dramatic tension, but a defect in another con-

text, where it lets

the tension down.

Then

we may admit that

the touch of humor is not a general merit, but only because we

also admit that something else is a general merit (in a play, that

is)-namely, high

dramatic tension. Remember that this does

not mean that

dramatic tension is either a necessary or sufficient

condition of being a

good play,

nor

does

it

mean

that

this desirable

feature can be

combined with all other desirable features, nor does

it mean that all plays

that lack a high degree of it would necessarily

become better by increasing it, for some plays might thereby lose

some other quality

that especially adorns them.

The

point is that

the General Criterion

Theory can easily take account

of

such varia-

tions as the skeptic

points out-providing it is allowed

to fall

back upon more general

and,

so to

speak,

more fundamental

criteria.

We

may distinguish two ranks

of

critical

criteria, then,

in the

following way: Let

us

say that the properties A, B, C

are the

primary (positive)

criteria of aesthetic value

if

the addition

of

any one of them or an

increase in it, without

a

decrease

in

any

of

the others, will

always make the work a better one. And let

us

say that a given property X is a secondary (positive) criterion of

aesthetic value if there is a certain set of other properties such

that, whenever they are present, the addition of X or an increase

in it

will

always

produce

an

increase

in

one

or

more of the

primary

criteria.

Notice that each of

these definitions is formulated in such a way

that it contains

the word 'always'

in an

important position and,

therefore,

that

they both define general criteria

in an

important

sense. But the secondary criteria are subordinate and conditional:

it

is only

in

certain

contexts that,

for

example, elegant variation

is a fault

of

style.

(However, some

of

these secondary

criteria

are quite broad

in

their

relevance.)

The

primary criteria,

on

the other

hand, always

contribute

positively

to

the

value

of

a

work,

in

so

far

as

they

are

present. And

their

absence

is

always

a

deficiency,

however it

may be made up

in

other

ways.

Thus

I

think

that Paul

Ziff

is

precisely

correct

when

he

says:


11/11

486

THE

JOURNAL

OF

PHILOSOPHY

Some good paintings

are somewhat

disorganized; they

are good in spite

of

the fact

that they are somewhat

disorganized. But no painting is

good

because

it is

disorganized,

and many are bad

primarily

because they are

dis-

organized.13

Disorganization,

by this exact description,

is a primary

(negative)

critical

criterion.

There is a danger

that such

a discussion as this

may unintention-

ally confirm John

Wisdom

's remark that talk

about

canons

and rules is

dull.

I don 't insist that it

is interesting-

only that it

is

possible

and

reasonable. The act

of judging-in

the sense of appraising-works

of art is certainly

not a

purely

intellectual act, and many elements of talent and training are

required

to perform it well.

But it

is, in part, a rational

act,

for

it

involves reasoning.

MONROE

C.

BEARDSLEY

SWARTHMORE COLLEGE

COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

THE

IDENTITY

OF

MIND

AND

BODY

cfc1

OULD

mental

states

be brain processes?

This

is

the

title

'

question

of an article

by

Jerome

Shaffer.*

Before

attempt-

ing

to

answer

this

question

we

should

first consider

what

kind

of

question

it

is.

That

is, what

kind

of

approach

is

required

in

order

to arrive

at

a satisfactory

answer?

Is

it,

for

example,

an

empirical

question? That is, is arriving at a satisfactory answer an empirical

matter?

Shaffer

seems

to

think

that

it

is and

also

claims

that

those

who

hold

the

Identity

Theory,

i.e.,

the

theory

that

mental

states

are

identical

with

certain

physical

processes

such

as brain

processes,

consider

the

problem

expressed

by

the

question

to

be

a

matter

of empirical

fact.

But

let

us

see

whether

it is or

not.

One

necessary

condition

of the

identity

of

mental

phenomena

with

some

kind

of physical

phenomena

is that

there

be,

using

Feigl's

terminology,

a

one-to-one

simultaneity-correspondence

be-

tween

the

mental

and

the physical.

However, this one-to-one

correspondence

need

not

be between

each

mental

phenomenon

and

some

one physical

phenomenon.

It

might

be between.

each

mental

13

Reasons

in

Criticism,

in

Israel

Scheffler,

ed., Philosophy

and

Edu-

ration (Boston: Allvn

and

Bacon,

1958),

p.

220.

*

Could

Mental

States

be

Brain

Processes

I,

this

JOURNAL,

58 (1961),

26:

813.

Unless

otherwise

noted,

all page

references

will

be

to

this

article.

beardsley, monroe - on the generality of critical reasons

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