bayan abolishpork dap petition

8/13/2019 Bayan Abolishpork Dap Petition

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO,Chairperson, Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,JUDY M. TAGUIWALO, Professor,University of the Philippines Diliman, Co-Chairperson, Pagbabago, HENRI KAHN,Concerned Citizens Movement, REP. LUZILAGAN, Gabriela Womens Party

Representative, REP. TERRY L. RIDON,Kabataan Partylist Representative, REP.CARLOS ISAGANI ZARATE, Bayan MunaParty-list Representative, RENATO M.REYES, JR., Secretary General of BAYAN,MANUEL K. DAYRIT, Chairman, AngKapatiran Party, VENCER MARI E.CRISOSTOMO, Chairperson, Anakbayan,VICTOR L. VILLANUEVA, Convenor, Youth

Act Now, Petitioners,

-versus- GR No. ________Petition for Certiorari andProhibition with Applicationfor a Temporary RestrainingOrder and/or PreliminaryInjunction

BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,President of the Republic of the Philippines,PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., ExecutiveSecretary, and FLORENCIO B. ABAD,Secretary of the Department of Budget andManagement,

Respondents.

x-------------------------------------------------------x

PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITIONWITH PRAYER FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION


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Petitioners, by counsels, unto the Honorable Supreme Court,most respectfully state that:

PREFATORY

"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belongingto no one in particular, i.e. public funds, provide an even greatertemptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This, evidently,was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution inmeticulously prescribing the rules regarding the appropriation anddisposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18 ofArticle VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on therelease of money from the treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on

the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the prohibitionto transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and therequirement of specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were allsafeguards designed to forestall abuses in the expenditure of publicfunds. (Demetria v. Alba, G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987)

PARTIES

Petitioners_________

1. All of the petitioners are of legal age and Filipinos, andsuing in their capacity as concerned citizens, taxpayers andlegislators, to wit:

a. MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO is the Chairperson ofBagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN);

b. JUDY M. TAGUIWALO is a Professor of the University of

the Philippines Diliman and also the Co-Chairperson ofPagbabago;

c. HENRI KAHN is a member of the Concerned CitizensMovement;

d. REP. LUZ ILAGAN is Gabriela Womens PartyRepresentative for the 16thCongress;

e. REP. TERRY L. RIDON is Kabataan PartylistRepresentative for the 16thCongress;

f. REP. CARLOS ZARATE is Bayan Muna Party-list

Representative for the 16

th

Congress;g. MANUEL K. DAYRIT is the Chairman, of the AngKapatiran Party;

h. VENCER MARI E. CRISOSTOMO is the Chairperson ofAnakbayan;

i. VICTOR L. VILLANUEVA is the Convenor of Youth ActNow.


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2. All petitioners may be served notices, orders, and otherprocesses of this Honorable Court at the address of the undersignedcounsels.

3. As taxpayers, Petitioners are filing this Petition againstPublic Respondents in accordance with this Honorable Courts rulingin Paguia vs. Office of the President (621 SCRA 600) that taxpayerscontributions to the states coffers entitle them to questionappropriations for expenditures which are claimed to beunconstitutional or illegal.

4. Petitioners Ilagan, Ridon and Zarate are also suing asMembers of the House of Representatives, possesses locus standi,

which is defined as a personal and substantial interest in the casesuch that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as aresult of the governmental act that is being challenged.

Public Respondents_________________

5. Public Respondent BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III,President of the Republic of the Philippines. His office is at the Officeof the President, New Executive Building, Malacanang Palace, J.P.Laurel St., San Miguel, Manila, where he may be served notices,orders, and other processes of this Honorable Court.

6. Public Respondent PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR., ExecutiveSecretary, is the primary alter ego of the President who is the head ofthe executive department with the duty to implement the laws of theland. His office is at the Office of the Executive Secretary, NewExecutive Building, Malacanang Palace, J.P. Laurel St., San Miguel,Manila, where he may be served notices, orders, and other

processes of this Honorable Court.

7. Public Respondent FLORENCIO B. ABAD is theSecretary of the Department of Budget and Management under theexecutive department. His office is at General Solano St., SanMiguel, Manila, where he may be served notices, orders, and otherprocesses of this Honorable Court.

NATURE OF THE PETITION

8. This is a special civil action for Certiorari and Prohibition,with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining orderand/or preliminary injunction, brought under Rule 65 of the Rules ofCourt.


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9. In filing this Petition, Petitioner is not only invoking thepower of this Honorable Court to strike down acts that violate theConstitution, but also the judicial power of this Honorable Court underSection 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one SupremeCourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settleactual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or notthere has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentalityof the Government.(Emphasis ours)

10. The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) isofficially embodied in the DBM National Budget Circular No. 5411dated July 18, 2012 which declared that due to the under-spendingof various agencies, the President ordered on June 27, 2012 thewithdrawal of all unobligated allotments of all agencies with low levelof obligations as of June 30, 2012 both for continuing and currentallotment

11. The said withdrawn funds were deemed as savings byPres. Benigno S. Aquino and DBM Sec. Florencio Abad andrealigned, in blatant defiance of the Constitution and the GeneralAppropriations Act passed by Congress, to Augment existingprograms and projects of other agencies and Fund priority programsand projects not considered in the 2012 budget but expected to bestarted or implemented within the current year.

12. Petitioners contend that said funds could not be artificiallydeemed as savings as defined by the DBM and the General

Appropriations Act of 2012 since there could be not savings in themiddle of a fiscal year, especially if the projects or programs for whichthese funds were allocated by law, have not been completed,discontinued or abandoned.

13. The resolution of the issue whether NBC Circular 541 orthe DAP violates the Constitution, the EO 292 or the AdministrativeCode and the appropriations law is surely not political, because thisno longer pertains to the wisdom or discretionary act of a public

official. Rather the issue in this case is the constitutionality andlegality of withdrawing funds from duly-enacted budgetary allocationsand then realigning these funds to other budgetary items includingthose that were not even provided under the General AppropriationsAct.

1Attached as Annex A


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14. Additionally, the general issue of the constitutionality ofthe pork barrelboth the PDAF and the lump sum funds, whetherin the budget or off-budget which are considered PresidentialPorkcan never be deemed a political issue as it strikes deep intothe constitutional power of Congress to approve the national budget.We define pork barrel as public funds, usually in lump sumamounts, the disposition of which is subject solely to the discretion ofthe pork holder as to the selection of the projects and thebeneficiaries.

15. Are acts of legislators in intervening in the implementationor execution of the General Appropriations Act through themechanism of selection of projects and/or its beneficiaries

constitutional and legal? Petitioners contend that not only does suchintervention go beyond the constitutional mandate of Congress butalso compromise the integrity of Congress role as the approvingauthority of the budget.

16. Are lump sum amounts in the budget, which ceased to bemerely in the nature of a contingency fund considering that theseamounts are so substantial that these are larger than if not equal tothe regular budget of the agencies, constitutional? Lump sumamounts in the budget not only makes it impossible for Congress tobe apprised of what items in the budget they are approving, but also,practically grants the President the power to approve theseappropriations instead of Congress.

17. Both these issues are not questions of wisdom (even ifPetitioners believe this kind of budgeting process is surely not wise)but touches on the violation of the constitutional canalization of thepowers of the executive and the legislative and, the constitutionalchecks and balances required in a republican system of government.

18. Petitioners believe that this Honorable Court has thepower, and more importantly the duty, to resolve these issues if onlyeliminate a scourge in the disposition of public funds that have solong been a source of graft and corruption and patronage politics.

19. The discussion in Daza vs. Singson (G.R. No. 86344December 21, 1989) regarding judicial powers of this HonorableCourt is very enlightening, thus:

At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of theConstitution providing as follows:

Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointmentsconsisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman,twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of


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Representatives, elected by each House on the basis ofproportional representation from the political parties and partiesor organizations registered under the party-list systemrepresented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall notvote, except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on allappointments submitted to it within thirty session days of theCongress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by amajority vote of all the Members.

Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary tothe respondent's assertion, the Court has the competence to acton the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not adiscretionary act of the House of Representatives that may notbe reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is

involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of thatchamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission onAppointments. That is not a political question because, as ChiefJustice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco. 6

... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what itmeans in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. Inother words, ... it refers "to those questions which, under theConstitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign

capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority hasbeen delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of theGovernment." It is concerned with issues dependent upon thewisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by thepetitioners therein to annul the election of two members of theSenate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground thatthey had not been validly nominated. The Senate then consistedof 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as

the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M.Tanada nominated only himself as the minority representative inthe Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators MarianoJ. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, tocomplete the nine-man composition of the Tribunal as providedfor in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this Court,contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, thesix legislative members of the Tribunal were to be chosen by theSenate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest

number of votes and three of the party having the second largestnumber of votes therein." As the majority party in the Senate, theNacionalista Party could nominate only three members and couldnot also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.

By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondentscontended inter alia that the subject of the petition was an


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internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Courtrejected this argument, holding that what was involved was notthe wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but thelegality of the choice in light of the requirement of theConstitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner offilling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in doing so.The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a politicalquestion, x x x X x x

Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition wasmade in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the manner orlegality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments,not the wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice of itsrepresentatives.

In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomeseven less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if wewere to assume that the issue presented before us was politicalin nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it underthe expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, inproper cases, even the political question. Article VIII, Section 1,of the Constitution clearly provides:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one SupremeCourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settleactual controversies involving rights which are legallydemandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or notthere has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack orexcess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentalityof the Government.

x x x, we have held as early as in the Emergency PowersCases 7that where serious constitutional questions are involved,"the transcendental importance to the public of these casesdemands that they be settled promptly and definitely brushingaside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policyhas since then been consistently followed by the Court, as inGonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8where we held throughChief Justice Fernando:X x x x

The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await thedecision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering,therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumedand to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policydemand that [its] constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It maylikewise be added that the exceptional character of the situation


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that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and theundeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections beingbarely six months away, reinforce our stand. It would appearundeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate invocationof our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an allegedunconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we mustact on the matter.

20. Moreover, the Honorable Court ought to exercise judicialreview over this Petition, because the questioned executive acts area matter of transcendental importance, of overarching significance tosociety, and of paramount public interest.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

21. On August 5, 2013 during the official budget deliberationof the Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) and theDepartment of Budget Management (DBM) Rep. Neri Colmenares ofBayan Muna Party-list inquired from the DBM Secretary, RespondentFlorencio Abad about the nature of the DBM National Budget CircularNo. 541 (NBC 541 hereafter). Sec. Abad informed the AppropriationsCommittee that NBC 541 is intended to accelerate disbursementunder a then unknown Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAPhereafter) by withdrawing unobligated allotments from under-spending agencies.

22. When asked by Rep. Colmenares whether NBC 541 isconstitutional considering that authorizes withdrawal of funds midyearand realigns it to other projects, Sec. Abad maintained that it is onlyintended to be realigned for existing projects anyway. He further

stated that if the withdrawn funds will be spent on projects notcontained in the General Appropriations Act then indeed it would beunconstitutional.

23. When Sec. Abad was again asked how much was alreadywithdrawn and realigned under DAP he answered that P75 Billionwas realigned in 2011 and another P27 Billion in 2012. He confirmedthat these funds came from slow moving agencies particularly theDENR, DPWH, DOTC, DOH, DSWD, DAR, DepEd, and the DA.

24. On September 25, 2013 Senator Jinggoy Estradarevealed in his Privilege Speech that he and other senators, thensiting as senator-judges in the Impeachment Trial of former SupremeCourt Chief Justice Renato Corona, were offered P50 Million each inexchange for a vote of conviction against Corona.


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25. Estrada said that after the conviction of Corona in May2012, those who voted to convict him were allotted an additional P50Million, as provided in a private and confidential letter memorandumby the then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee. In hisspeech, Estrada dubbed the additional amount as incentive forCoronas ouster.

26. It will be recalled that at the height of the ImpeachmentTrial against Corona in February 2012, his lawyer Atty. Jose Roy,claimed that Malacanang, through Pres. Aquinos ExecutiveSecretary, Respondent Paquito Ochoa, offered senators P100 Millionworth of projects in exchange for defying the Supreme Courttemporary restraining order on the opening of bank accounts underCoronas name. Atty. Roy was cited for contempt and reprimanded by

the Impeachment Court for making such a claim. It turned out a yearafter that there is basis for Atty. Roys expose.

27. On September 27, 2013, during the Plenary Deliberationfor the approval of the 2014 Budget on Second Reading, Rep. NeriColmenares again inquired about NBC 541 from the Office of thePresident, then represented by Respondent Ochoa and on the floorby Appropriations Committee Chairman Rep. Isidro Ungab. Rep.Colmenares was informed by Respondent Ochoa that indeed theDisbursement Acceleration Program exists but it was intended torealign funds from under-spending agencies in order to accelerategrowth, thereby confirming not only that the DAP exists but also that itwas with the approval of Pres. Aquino.

28. On September 28, 2013 Sec. Abad issued a statementthrough the DBM website explaining the purpose of the additionalfund releases to senators as mentioned in the speech of Sen.Estrada and said that the same came from the DisbursementAcceleration Program (DAP). According to Sec. Abad these funds

were not bribes, but were necessary to help accelerate economicexpansion.

29. This NBC 541 was issued on July 18, 2012 by the DBM.Pertinent provisions are as follows:

3.0 Coverage3.1 These guidelines shall cover the withdrawal of unobligatedallotments as of June 30, 2012 of all national government

agencies (NGAs) charged against FY 2011 ContinuingAppropriation (RA No.10147) and FY 2012 CurrentAppropriation (RA No. 10155)

xxx


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3.2 The withdrawal of unobligated allotments may cover theidentified programs, projects and activities of thedepartments/agencies reflected in the DBM list shown as AnnexA or specific programs and projects as may be identified by theagencies.

xxx

5.7 The withdrawn allotments may be:5.7.1 Reissued for the original programs and projects of theagencies/OUs concerned, from which the allotments werewithdrawn;5.7.2 Realigned to cover additional funding for other existingprograms and projects of the agency/OU; or

5.7.3 Used to augment existing programs and projects of anyagency and to fund priority programs and projects notconsidered in the 2012 budget but expected to be started orimplemented during the current year. (Emphasis theirs)

30. The DBM in its website admits, however, that in 2011,long before the issuance of DBM National Budget Circular 541, theDisbursement Acceleration Program has been implemented and theExecutive has been withdrawing funds and realigning appropriationsapproved by Congress. The DBM website2 as well as the OfficialGazette website3published the following information on the DAP:

Frequently Asked Questions about the DisbursementAcceleration Program (DAP)

A. About the DAP

1. What is DAP?

The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) is a stimuluspackage under the Aquino administration designed to fast-trackpublic spending and push economic growth. This covers high-impact budgetary programs and projects which will beaugmented out of the savings generated during the year andadditional revenue sources. The DAP was approved by thePresident on October 12, 2011 upon the recommendation of theDevelopment Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) and theCabinet Clusters.

2 Frequently Asked Quest!ns" a#ala$le at htt%&''((()d$*)+!#)%h',%a+e-d.7362)

/ast accessed ct!$er 11" 20133 QA !n the s$urse*ent Accelerat!n r!+ra*" %u$lshed !n ct!$er 7" 2013"

a#ala$le at htt%&''((()+!#)%h'2013'10'07'qa!ntheds$urse*ent

accelerat!n%r!+ra*') /ast accessed ct!$er 11" 2013


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2. What was the context when DAP was introduced?

The DAP was conceptualized in September 2011 and introducedin October 2011, in the context of the prevailing underspendingin government disbursements for the first eight months of 2011that dampened the countrys economic growth. Such governmentintervention was needed as key programs and projects, mostnotably public infrastructure, were moving slowly. The need toaccelerate public spending was also brought about by the globaleconomic situation as well as the financial toll of calamities inthat year. While the economy has generally improved in 2012and 2013, the use of DAP was continued to sustain the pace ofpublic spending as well as economic expansion.

B. Amounts and Purposes Funded through DAP

1. How much were the programs and projects fundedthrough DAP in 2011, 2012, and 2013?

For 2011-2012, a total of P142.23 Billion was released forprograms and projects identified through the DAP, of whichP83.53 Billion is for 2011 and 58.70 Billion is for 2012. In 2011,the amount was used to provide additional funds for

programs/projects such as healthcare, public works, housing andresettlement, and agriculture, among others. While in 2012,these were used to augment tourism road infrastructure, schoolinfrastructure, rehabilitation and extension of light rail transitsystems, and sitio electrification, among others.

In 2013, about P15.13 Billion has been approved for the hiring ofpolicemen, additional funds for the modernization of PNP, theredevelopment of Roxas Boulevard, and funding for the TyphoonPablo rehabilitation projects for Compostela Valley and Davao

Oriental.

2. What kind of projects are funded through the DAP?

The programs and projects submitted to the DBM must meet thefollowing conditions:

a) Fast-moving or quick-disbursing, e.g. the payment ofobligations incurred from premium subsidy for indigent families in

the National Health Insurance Program;b) Urgent or priority in terms of social and economicdevelopment objectives, e.g. the upgrading of equipment andfacilities for specialty hospitals, rehabilitation of Light Rail Transitand Metro Rail Transit, and the Disaster Risk and ExposureAssessment for Mitigation (DREAM) program of DOST;


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c) Programs or projects performing well and could delivermore services to the public with the additional funds e.g. Trainingfor Work Scholarship Program of DOLE-TESDA.Some of the items funded through the DAP are expenditureswhich are mandated by law, such as capital infusion for theBangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (R.A. 7653, Section 2) out of theaugmented Budgetary Support to Government Corporations-Others.

3. How much were the programs and projects that wereendorsed by legislators?

The legislators have also endorsed programs and projects for thesocial and economic benefit of their constituents, such as

medical assistance and local infrastructure projects. Theproposals were funded through DAP as they are existingbudgetary items in the GAA and compliant with the conditionsstated above.

Of the total DAP approved by OP for 2011-2012 amounting to atotal of P142.23 Billion only 9 percent was released to programsand projects identified by legislators. These were not releaseddirectly to legislators but to implementing agencies.

C. Sourcing of Funds for DAP

1. How were funds sourced?

Funds used for programs and projects identified through DAPwere sourced from savings generated by the government, therealignment of which is subject to the approval of the President;as well as the Unprogrammed Fund that can be tapped whengovernment has windfall revenue collections, e.g., unexpected

remittance of dividends from the GOCCs and GovernmentFinancial Institutions (GFIs), sale of government assets.

2. Where did savings come from?

Savings were sourced from:a) the pooling of unreleased appropriations such asunreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse atthe end of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving

projects and discontinued projects per Zero-Based Budgetingfindings; andb) the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, also for slow-moving programs and projects, which have earlier been releasedto national government agencies.In line with laws on the use of savings (see below), DBM ensuredthat programs and projects funded through DAP have an


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C. THE DAP AND DBM 541 VIOLATE SEC. 25 (5), ART. VI OF THE1987 CONSTITUTIOND. THE DAP AND NBC 541 VIOLATE SEC. 27 ART. VI OF THE1987 CONSTITUTION

DISCUSSION

32. This Honorable Court has previously stated, that publicfunds provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation andembezzlement.5 Thus, meticulous rules regarding the appropriationand disposition of public funds were embodied in our Constitution.

33. The 1987 Constitution provides for such meticulous rules.

Thus Section 25 (5), Article VI provides for an absolute prohibitionregarding transfer of appropriations, with the sole exception ofsavings:

Sec. 25 (5), Article VI, 1987 ConstitutionSection 25 (5). No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer

of appropriations; however, the President, the President of theSenate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional

Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item inthe general appropriations law for their respective offices fromsavings in other items of their respective appropriations.

34. Likewise, another Constitutional safeguard provides for anabsolute prohibition regarding paying out public funds from thenational treasury it must be made ONLY in pursuance of anappropriation law. Thus,

Sec. 29 (1), Article VI, 1987 Constitution

No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except inpursuance of an appropriation made by law.

35. The Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) and theNational Budget Circular No. 541 (NBC 541) both infringe on theaforesaid Constitutional limits regarding appropriation and dispositionand public funds.

A. THE DAP AND THE NBC 541 VIOLATE SEC. 29 (1), ART. VI

OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

36. Per the DBM website mentioned above, Respondentsjustification for the creation and implementation of the DAP are (1)Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, (2) Sec. 49 and 38,

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Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order No. 292, (3) use of savingsprovisions found in the General Appropriation Acts for Fiscal Years2011, 2012 and 2013.

37. These cited provisions do not suffice to provide for thelegal bases in the creation and implementation of the DAP.

38. No less than the Constitution mandates that public fundswill not be paid out of the national treasury exception through anappropriation law enacted by Congress. Congress alone canauthorize the expenditure of public funds through its power toappropriate. The power to appropriate carries with it the power tospecify not just the amount that may be spent but also the purpose

for which it may be spent.6

39. In the case of DAP, no appropriation law was enactedstating the amount that may be spent for it, as well as the purpose forwhich the DAP may be spent. No appropriation law was enacted byCongress creating DAP. The cited provisions by Respondents do notamount to an appropriation law, but merely a futile and belatedattempt to justify an illegal appropriation and disbursement of publicfunds and usurpation of the legislatives power to appropriate publicfunds.

40. DBM 541 also suffers from this Constitutional infirmity.

41. Tantamount to appropriating public funds, the DBM 541authorizes the funding priority programs and projects not consideredin the 2012 budget but expected to be started or implemented duringthe fiscal year. (5.7.3, NBC 541)

42. Clearly, the DBM 541 is an appropriation of public funds

by the Executive, which did not originate in the House ofRepresentatives as mandated by Sec. 24, Art. VI of the 1987Constitution which provides:

Sec. 24, Art. VI of the 1987 ConstitutionAll appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing theincrease of the public debt, bills of local application, and privatebills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives,but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

B. NO DELEGATION OF POWER OF APPROPRIATIONS

6Fr) !aqun ernas" 1987 :!nsttut!n ! the e%u$lc ! the hl%%nes&

:!**entary 2003 edt!n)


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43. Neither was there any delegation of the power toappropriate to Respondents.

44. The cited laws by Respondents to justify DAP Sec. 49and 38, Chapter 5, Book VI of Executive Order No. 292, and the useof savings provisions found in the General Appropriation Acts forFiscal Years 2011, 2012 and 2013 could never be the source ofdelegated powers by the Legislature to the Executive.

45. Likewise, the cited laws to justify DBM 541 do notconstitute delegated powers. In 1.0 Rationale, the DBM mentionsSections 38 and 39, Chapter 5 Book VI of EO 292 as the basis for thePresidents power to impound funds allotted for any agency orexpenditure authorized in the General Appropriations Act, as well as

the power to withdraw and pool unutilized allotment releases (See1.0, DBM 541)

46. Simply put, both DAP and DBM 541 harp on the power ofthe President to Impound, and the Use of Savings.

47. Section 38, Chapter 5 Book VI of EO 292 provided thelimit to the power of the President to suspend expenditure ofappropriation, that is, when such limit or restriction is provided in theGeneral Appropriations Act, thus

Section 38. Suspension of Expenditure of Appropriations. -Except as otherwise provided in the General Appropriations Actand whenever in his judgment the public interest so requires, thePresident, upon notice to the head of office concerned, isauthorized to suspend or otherwise stop further expenditure offunds allotted for any agency, or any other expenditureauthorized in the General Appropriations Act, except for personalservices appropriations used for permanent officials and

employees.

48. The 2012 GAA provides:

Sec. 64. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. Noappropriations authorized under this Act shall be impoundedthrough retention or deduction, unless in accordance with therules and regulations to be issued by the DBM: PROVIDED, Thatall the funds appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects

and activities authorized under this Act, except those coveredunder the Unprogrammed Fund, shall be released pursuant toSection 33 (3), Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.

Sec. 65. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit.Retention or deduction of appropriations authorized in this Act


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shall be effected only in cases where there is an unmanageablenational government budget deficit.

Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used inthis section shall be construed to mean that (i) the actualNational Government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterlybudget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target deficit asindicated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources ofFinancing submitted by the President and approved by Congresspursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, or (ii) thereare clear economic indications of an impending occurrence ofsuch condition, as determined by the Development BudgetCoordinating Committee and approved by the President.

49. Section 64 must be read together with Section 65. Inwhich case, Presidential power to impound can only be in exercisedin cases unmanageable national government budget deficit. In thiscase, Respondents failed to state any instance that warrants theexistence of an unmanageable national government budget deficit.Budgetary under-spending by government agencies cannot bedeemed an unmanageable budget deficit, but, on the contrary, mayeven result in savings, not deficit, if said funds remain unspent at theend of the year. This being the case, there is no justification for theenactment of both DAP and DBM 541, considering that there existsno unmanageable national government budget deficit that couldtrigger the exercise of the power to impound.

50. Section 39 and 49 Chapter 5 Book VI of EO 292 likewiseprovided the limit with respect to the use of savings, thus

Section 39. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to CoverDeficits. - Except as otherwise provided in the General

Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriationsauthorized in the General Appropriations Act for programs andprojects of any department, office or agency, may, with theapproval of the President, be used to cover a deficit in any otheritem of the regular appropriations: provided, that the creation ofnew positions or increase of salaries shall not be allowed to befunded from budgetary savings except when specificallyauthorized by law: provided, further, that whenever authorizedpositions are transferred from one program or project to another

within the same department, office or agency, the correspondingamounts appropriated for personal services are also deemedtransferred, without, however increasing the total outlay forpersonal services of the department, office or agency concerned.

Section 49. Authority to Use Savings for Certain Purposes. -Savings in the appropriations provided in the General


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Appropriations Act may be used for the settlement of thefollowing obligations incurred during a current fiscal year orprevious fiscal years as may be approved by Secretary inaccordance with rules and procedures as may be approved bythe President:(1) Claims of officials, employees and laborers who died or wereinjured in line of duty, including burial expenses as authorizedunder existing law;(2) Commutation of terminal leaves of employees due toretirement, resignation or separation from the service through nofault of their own in accordance with the provisions of existinglaw, including unpaid claims for commutation of maternity leaveof absence;(3) Payment of retirement gratuities or separation pay of

employees separated from the service due to governmentreorganization;(4) Payment of salaries of employees who have been suspendedor dismissed as a result of administrative or disciplinary action, orseparated from the service through no fault of their own and whohave been subsequently exonerated and reinstated by virtue ofdecisions of competent authority;(5) Cash awards to deserving officials and employees inaccordance with civil service law;

(6) Salary adjustments of officials and employees as a result ofclassification action under, and implementation of, the provisionsof the Compensation and Position Classification Act, includingpositions embraced under the Career Executive Service;(7) Peso support to any undertaking that may be entered into bythe government with international organizations, includingadministrative and other incidental expenses;(8) Covering any deficiency in peso counterpart fundcommitments for foreign assisted projects, as may be approvedby the President;

(9) Priority activities that will promote the economic well being ofthe nation, including food production, agrarian reform, energydevelopment, disaster relief, and rehabilitation.(10) Repair, improvement and renovation of governmentbuildings and infrastructure and other capital assets damaged bynatural calamities;(11) Expenses in connection with official participation in tradefairs, civic parades, celebrations, athletic competitions andcultural activities, and payment of expenses for the celebration of

regular or special official holidays;(12) Payment of obligations of the government or any of itsdepartments or agencies as a result of final judgment of theCourts; and(13) Payment of valid prior year's obligations of governmentagencies with any other government office or agency, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations.


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51. According to the DBM website, DAP is sourced fromsavings generated by the government. These savings were sourcedfrom (a) the pooling of unreleased appropriations such asunreleased Personnel Services appropriations which will lapse at theend of the year, unreleased appropriations of slow moving projectsand discontinued projects per Zero-Based Budgeting findings; and (b)the withdrawal of unobligated allotments, also for slow-movingprograms and projects, which have earlier been released to nationalgovernment agencies.

52. DBM 541 covers the withdrawal of unobligatedallotments as of June 30, 2012 of all national government agencies

(NGAs) charged against FY 2011 Continuing Appropriation (R.A. No.10147) and FY 2012 Current Appropriation (R.A. No. 10155). (3.0,DBM 541)

53. These funds that the DAP and the DBM 541 call assavings the unreleased appropriations and unobligated allotments

are not actually savings following the strict formulation of theGeneral Appropriation Laws passed by Congress through the years,thus

Sec. 53. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings refer toportions or balances of any programmed appropriation in this Actfree from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) stillavailable after the completion or final discontinuance orabandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which theappropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriation balancesarising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining tovacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii)from appropriation balances realized from the implementation of

measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies andthus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required orplanned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at alesser cost. xxx (GAA for FY 2013; The same definition is alsoprovided in the GAA for FY 2012 [see Sec. 54] and FY 2011 [seeSec. 60])

54. Following the above definition, there is no justification forthe DAP and DBM 541, simply because there are no savings in both

cases.

C. THE DAP AND DBM 541 VIOLATE SEC. 25 (5), ART. VI OFTHE 1987 CONSTITUTION

55. Section 25 (5) Article VI of the 1987 Constitution prohibitstransfer of appropriations. This simply means that once Congress


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passes the General Appropriation Act (GAA) or any appropriationlaw, with or without any veto from the President, the same remainsunalterable and must be executed to the letter.

56. The appropriations law becomes the law of the land, aproduct of the collective effort of the representatives of the peopleand the different government agencies. Not even Congress whopassed it can alter the same, without under going the same tediousprocess of enacting a law. Such is the wisdom of our Constitution.

57. As a limited grant nevertheless, the Constitution allowsthe President, President of the Senate, Speaker of the House, ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional

Commissions, to transfer of appropriations ONLY in specificcircumstances: (1) if there is a law; (2) if there are savings; and (3)only to augment any item in the general appropriations law for theirrespective offices.

58. The creation and implementation of the DAP and the NCB541 violate the above-stated provision.

a. THERE IS NO APPROPRATION LAW CREATING THEDAP

THERE IS NO LAW AUTHORIZING THE WITHDRAWALAND TRANSFER OF UNRELEASEDAPPROPRIATIONS AND UNOBLIGATEDALLOTMENTS

59. There is no appropriation law mandating the DAP.

60. Based on the DBM website the DAP is a stimulus

package under the AQUINO administration. It was approved by thePresident on October 12, 2011 upon the recommendation of theDevelopment Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) and theCabinet Clusters.

61. While being peddled as a stimulus package, the DAP isactually an appropriation law which seeks to set aside public funds forpublic use. As discussed above, Sec. 24 Art. VI of the 1987Constitution requires that all appropriation bills shall originate

exclusively in the House of Representatives. The DAP, not beinginitiated by the House of Representatives, is unconstitutional.

62. Neither is there any law that authorizes Respondents towithdraw and transfer appropriations.


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63. Respondents claim that the provisions of EO 292 andGAA for FY 2012 and 2013 on impoundment and use of savings aresufficient legal basis for the creation and implementation of DAP andNBC 541. They are wrong.

64. Regarding the authority to impound, the GAA restricts theexercise of impoundment, and only allows it in case of the existenceof an unmanageable national government budget deficit.

Sec. 64. Prohibition Against Impoundment of Appropriations. Noappropriations authorized under this Act shall be impoundedthrough retention or deduction, unless in accordance with therules and regulations to be issued by the DBM: PROVIDED, Thatall the funds appropriated for the purposes, programs, projects

and activities authorized under this Act, except those coveredunder the Unprogrammed Fund, shall be released pursuant toSection 33 (3), Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.

Sec. 65. Unmanageable National Government Budget Deficit.Retention or deduction of appropriations authorized in this Actshall be effected only in cases where there is an unmanageablenational government budget deficit.

Unmanageable national government budget deficit as used inthis section shall be construed to mean that (i) the actualNational Government budget deficit has exceeded the quarterlybudget deficit targets consistent with the full-year target deficit asindicated in the Budget of Expenditures and Sources ofFinancing submitted by the President and approved by Congresspursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution, or (ii) thereare clear economic indications of an impending occurrence ofsuch condition, as determined by the Development BudgetCoordinating Committee and approved by the President.

65. In this case, there was no actual budget deficit which hasexceeded the quarterly budget deficit targets nor clear economicindications of an impending occurrence of such condition whichwould justify DAP and NBC 541.

b. THERE ARE NO SAVINGS WHATSOEVER

66. Respondents claim that the DAP and the NBC 541 pertainto funds coming from savings. The funds that the DAP and the DBM541 call as savings the unreleased appropriations and unobligatedallotments are not actually savings and could never becomesavings.


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67. A study of the definition of savings in our appropriationslaw through the years would show that the interpretation ofRespondents is so flawed and so contrary to the definition of savingsthat it amounts to bad faith and malice.

Sec. 53. Meaning of Savings and Augmentation. Savings referto portions or balances of any programmed appropriation in thisAct free from any obligation or encumbrance which are: (i) stillavailable after the completion or final discontinuance orabandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which theappropriation is authorized; (ii) from appropriation balancesarising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertainingto vacant positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii)from appropriation balances realized from the implementation

of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies andthus enabled agencies to meet and deliver the required orplanned targets, programs and services approved in this Act ata lesser cost. xxx (GAA for FY 2013; The same definition isalso provided in the GAA for FY 2012 [see Sec. 54] and FY2011 [see Sec. 60])

68. In essence, savings could only happen when the projectfor which the fund was appropriated was ACTUALLY implemented whether the same was completed, discontinued or abandoned lateron. The important element is the actual execution of the project.

69. In the case of unreleased appropriations and unobligatedallotments, the project for which the funds was appropriated wasnever executed or was deferred, making it impossible for thedepartment or agency to realize savings through that project.

70. Further, savings can never be realized with certainty atthe middle of fiscal year, or even before the end of the fiscal year.

This interpretation is even seconded and acknowledged by the Officeof the President during the budget deliberation of the said Office forits 2014 budget in the House of Representatives in September 2013.

c. THE TRANSFER OF SAVINGS WILL BE TOAGENCIES/DEPARTMENTS OTHER THAN THEAGENCIES/DEPARTMENTS ACCUMULATINGTHE SAVINGS IN CONTRAVENTION OF THECONSTITUTION

71. Section 25(5) Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution is explicitand categorical when it states the limitations on transfer ofappropriations.


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72. As an exception, the President, the President of theSenate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of ConstitutionalCommissions may, by law, beauthorized to augment any item inthe general appropriations law for their respective offices fromsavings in other items of their respective appropriations.

73. What this provision only allows is augmentation7 andonly within the respective offices8of the President, President of theSenate, etc. Thus, AQUINO can only augment from savings derivedby the Office of the President the items also of the Office of thePresident. He cannot give it to other departments or agencies.

74. This interpretation is supported by the Supreme Court

decision in the case of Demetria v. Alba, which struck down asunconstitutional Sec. 44 of PD 1177 empowering the President toindiscriminately transfer funds. The questioned provision states

The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund,appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices andagencies of the Executive Department, which are included in theGeneral Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity ofany department, bureau, or office included in the General

Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

75. The Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional theabove provision saying

The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose andconditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e.transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an itemand such transfer may be made only if there are savings fromanother item in the appropriation of the government branch or

constitutional body.

7ec) 53 ;eann+ ! sa#n+s and au+*entat!n)

xxx

Au+*entat!n *%les the exstence n ths Act ! a %r!+ra*" act#ty" !r %r!GAA for FY 2013; The same

definition is also provided in the GAA for FY 2012 [see Sec. 5! and FY 2011 [see Sec.

"0!#

8ec) 2 ?ntr!duct!ry r!#s!ns

>9@ ce reers" (thn the ra*e(!rk ! +!#ern*ental !r+an=at!n" t! any *a

unct!nal unt ! a de%art*ent !r $ureau ncludn+ re+!nal !ces) ?t *ay als!

reer t! any %!st!n held !r !ccu%ed $y nd#dual %ers!ns" (h!se unct!ns are

dened $y la( !r re+ulat!n) > 292@


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Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extendsthe privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers thePresident to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to anyprogram, project or activity of any department, bureau or officeincluded in the General Appropriations Act or approved after itsenactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to betransferred are actually savings in the item from which the sameare to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purposeof augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. Itdoes not only completely disregard the standards set in thefundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation oflegislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.

Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision inquestion null and void.

76. DAP and NBC 541 utter fail to comply with theconstitutional limits with respect to the use of savings. DAP and NBC541 allow savings to augment budget items outside the respectiveoffices from which the savings were realized, and worse, to fund newbudget items not considered in the previous GAA.

77. The DBM website informs us

What kind of projects are funded through the DAP?

The programs and projects submitted to the DBM must meet thefollowing conditions:a) Fast-moving or quick-disbursing, e.g. the payment ofobligations incurred from premium subsidy for indigent families inthe National Health Insurance Program;b) Urgent or priority in terms of social and economic

development objectives, e.g. the upgrading of equipment andfacilities for specialty hospitals, rehabilitation of Light Rail Transitand Metro Rail Transit, and the Disaster Risk and ExposureAssessment for Mitigation (DREAM) program of DOST;c) Programs or projects performing well and could delivermore services to the public with the additional funds e.g. Trainingfor Work Scholarship Program of DOLE-TESDA.

Some of the items funded through the DAP are expenditures

which are mandated by law, such as capital infusion for theBangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (R.A. 7653, Section 2) out of theaugmented Budgetary Support to Government Corporations-Others. (Frequently Asked Questions about DAP)


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78. While the 5.7.3 of the NBC 541 authorizes the funding ofpriority programs and projects not considered in the 2012 budgetbut expected to be started or implemented during the current year.

79. Verily, transfer or realignment of savings to these kindsof programs and projects not considered in the 2012 budget are inutter violation of the constitution. It is tantamount to an appropriationlaw which is clearly a legislative mandate and not the function ofRespondents.

D. THE DAP AND NBC 541 VIOLATE SEC. 27 ART. VI OF THE1987 CONSTITUTION

80. Before the GAA becomes a law, the Constitution

mandates that the same be presented to the President, who has thepower to veto any particular item or items in the appropriation bill. Ifthe President exercises the veto power, Congress is given theopportunity to override the veto.

Sec. 27, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution(1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a

law, be presented to the President. If he approves the samehe shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the

same with his objections to the House where it originated,which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal andproceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to passthe bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to theother House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and ifapproved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, itshall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of eachHouse shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the namesof the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its

Journal. The President shall communicate his veto of any billto the House where it originated within thirty days after thedate of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as ifhe had signed it.

(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particularitem or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but theveto shall not affect the item or items to which he does notobject.

81. The President is given the power to item-veto theparticulars, details, the distinct and severable parts of theappropriation bill.

82. However, item-veto is available to the President onlybefore an appropriation bill becomes a law. If the President does notexercise the item-veto and the appropriation bill becomes a law, then


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he is bound to execute the law faithfully as is mandated to him by theConstitution.

83. The DAP and the NBC 541 are executive creations whichare noxious to this constitutional process. The funds from which theRespondents intended to impound and transfer, or were actuallyimpounded and transferred, were funds appropriated by Congressthrough the General Appropriations Acts for FY 2011, 2012 and 2013.

84. The DAP and the NBC 541 are actually unilateralexecutive amendments to duly enacted appropriation laws, whichRespondents have no authority or power to do. Not even Congresscan amend the appropriation laws without passing an amendatorylaw in accordance with the Constitutional procedures.

CONLUSION

85. The call to abolish the pork barrel system continue tointensify and the peoples actions take different forms -- through courtaction, mobilization, resort to peoples initiative, and if necessaryeven impeachment of the President. This present Petition questioningRespondents realignment of public funds amounting to billions ofpesos is also an effort contributing to the peoples call to abolish thepork barrel system.

86. The pork barrel system, we maintain, consists not only ofthe Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) currently beinglitigated by this Honorable Court, but also of the bigger presidentialpork barrel amounting to at least P900 Billion. As of the filing of thispresent Petition, the pork barrel system remains in the nationalbudget.

87. The funds accumulated through the DAP and by virtue of

NBC 541 is also part of the presidential pork barrel, wherein AQUINOhas the sole discretion where the funds will go and used forpatronage politics. It is very apparent that the DAP was used forpatronage politics, if not graft and corruption. A concrete example ofthis is how P50 Million or more was given as incentive to senatorswho voted to impeach Corona, while the rest did not receive any.

88. Additionally, we cannot help but comment on the sorrystate of the Philippine budget system, characterized not only to fiscal

dictatorship by the President as exemplified by the unbridled andillegal realignment of funds discussed above, but also of fiscal hocuspocus. Yearly, national government agencies and departmentsrequest for hundreds of millions or billions of pesos, equipped as theywere for the grilling during the budget deliberations in Congress andfought tooth and nail to justify their request. And yet, at the end of the


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fiscal year these same agencies and departments accumulatemillions and/or billions worth of savings!

89. From the foregoing, it is necessary for this HonorableCourt to declare the illegality and unconstitutionality of the DAP andthe NBC 541.

GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAININGORDER AND/OR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

90. Petitioners likewise move for the issuance of a writ ofpreliminary injunction and/or a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoinRespondents from implementing the DAP in order to protect the

substantive rights and interests of Petitioners while the case ispending before this Honorable Court. Since Respondents alreadyreiterated that DAP will continue to be implemented, then there existsan extreme necessity for the Honorable Court to issue a writ or aTRO.

91. Public funds have already been disbursed much to theprejudice of the rights of Petitioners. The DBM reported a total ofP142.23 Billion spent so far under the DAP, with P83.53 Billionspent in 2011 and another P 58.7 Billion in 2012. These hugeamounts were spent on budgetary items many of which were not inthe 2011 or 2012 GAA passed by Congress. These items include thefollowing:

i. 15.13 Billion was released to the DILG formodernization of the PNP and redevelopment ofRoxas Boulevard.

ii. P4.5 Billionfor MRT 3 to purchase additional traincars, when in fact, according to the DOTC, therewill be no additional train cars until the end of the

term of Pres. Aquino.iii. P1.82 Billion for the CPLA and MNLF through the

amorphous PAMANA fund.iv. P26.9 Billion for GOCCs. These GOCCs have

Billions as budgetary support under the SpecialPurpose Funds of the GAA, and another Billions inthe Unprogrammed Funds, will again be given ahuge amount under DAP. This is surelyunconscionable.

v. P8.5 Billionstimulus fund for ARMM on top of itsregular budget of P11.8 Billion. These additionalBillions were not found in the 2012 budget

vi. P 625 Million just to conduct a survey on farmersand fisherfolks by DAR and DA


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vii. Billions given to legislators including the P50-100Million given to Senators as incentive in theimpeachment trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona.

viii. P1.29 Billion for Agrarian Reform CommunitiesProject 2 of the DAR.

92. Petitioners were able to clearly show that they are entitledto the issuance of an injunctive relief for having complied with therequirement set forth by the Rules, to wit: (a) the invasion of rightsought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of thecomplainant is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent andparamount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.9

93. Because of the usurpation by Respondents of thelegislatives power of appropriation and transfer of appropriationunder the Constitution, Petitioners rights as taxpayer and legislatorhave been violated. They sustained and will continue to sustainpersonal and substantial injury, necessitating the issuance of atemporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction against theimplementation of the DAP, in order to prevent further damage

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfullyprayed of this Honorable Court the following:

(1) That this Petition be given due course

(2) That a temporary restraining order and/or a preliminaryinjunction be issued to restrain the Respondents from

implementing the Disbursement Acceleration Program and theNational Budget Circular No. 541 during the pendency of thisPetition;

(3) That after notice and hearing, a final order be issued declaringas NULL AND VOID the Disbursement Acceleration Programand the National Budget Circular No. 541; and permanentlyenjoining Respondents from implementing the DAP and NBC541.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the circumstances arelikewise prayed for.

Respectfully submitted. Quezon City for Manila. October 11, 20

9A #s B!lentn!Cenl!" C)) D!) 159277 ece*$er 21" 2004)


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ATTY. JOVENCIO H. EVANGELISTAATTY. JOVENCIO H. EVANGELISTAATTY. JOVENCIO H. EVANGELISTAATTY. JOVENCIO H. EVANGELISTA

Counsel for PetitionersNo. 45 K-7thSt., Brgy. West Kamias, Quezon City

email: [email protected] No. 1444212; 01.10.13; ManilaIBP No. 836618; 01.10.13; Manila

MCLE Compliance No. IV-0007340; 08.10.12Attorneys Roll No. 42797

ATTY. VANESSA QUIAMBAO MAGUIGADATTY. VANESSA QUIAMBAO MAGUIGADATTY. VANESSA QUIAMBAO MAGUIGADATTY. VANESSA QUIAMBAO MAGUIGADCounsel for Petitioners

No. 45 K-7thSt., Brgy. West Kamias, Quezon CityMobile No. 0906-3288104

email: [email protected] No. 836619; 01.10.13, Manila Chapter III

PTR No. 1444212; 01.10.13, ManilaMCLE Compliance No. IV-0007341; 08.10.12

Attorneys Roll No. 58291, 05-04-10

MARIA CRISTINA P. YAMBOTMARIA CRISTINA P. YAMBOTMARIA CRISTINA P. YAMBOTMARIA CRISTINA P. YAMBOTCounsel for Petitioners

No. 45 K-7thSt., Brgy. West Kamias, Quezon CityPTR No. 9611432/01-07-13/RizalIBP No. 922644/01-08-13/Rizal

Roll No. 59700MCLE Compliance No. IV 0016616/04-11-13

EXPLANATION OF SERVICE OF PETITIONTHROUGH REGISTERED MAIL

The service of copies of the instant Petition is made throughregistered mail, as personal service thereof cannot be made due to

distance and lack of available personnel. This explanation is madepursuant to Rule 13, Section 11 of the Rules of Court.

MARIA CRISTINA P. YAMBOT

bayan abolishpork dap petition

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