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First edition 1989

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bauer, Yehuda Out of the ashes: the impact of American Jews on post-holocaust European Jewry/by Yehuda Bauer.—1st ed. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Holocaust survivors—Europe. 2. Refugees, Jewish—Europe. 3. jews—United States—Charities. 4. American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. I. Title. D804.3.B37 1988 940.53' 15'039240—dcl9 88-25412

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Bauer, Yehuda Out of the ashes: the impact of American Jews on post-holocaust European Jewry. 1. Europe. Jews. Assistance from Jews in the United States, 1945-1949 I. Title 940.55'4'004924

ISBN 0-08-036504-3

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Preface

The volume presented here is an attempt to describe and evaluate the contribution of American Jewry to the continued survival in Europe and, later, elsewhere, of the remnant of European Jewry, the She'erit Hapletah (Surviving Remnant). It is based on a combination of archival sources, secondary sources, and oral interviews. The main source was the archives of JDC, where Mrs Rose Klepfisz and later Ms Denise Gluck were instru-mental in making the work there both possible and pleasant. The JDC archives are large, and underwent transformation in the years this research was being prepared, hence not all file designations may be up-to-date. As they contained also a great deal of the HIAS and O R T files, and there is literature on these organizations, it was felt that because of the overwhelm-ing weight of JDC's work the JDC archives would suffice for primary documentation. Many aspects of the survivors' lives in different countries are not dealt with—such as the contribution of the Palestinian Jewish Relief Units in Germany; the internal struggles and problems in countries such as Hungary, Romania, Poland, and France; the British Jewish Relief Units; and many other topics. I concentrated on the American Jewish aspect, but not on the American end. In other words, I have not explored either the American Jewish community and the role of JDC and other organizations within it, or American governmental attitudes, except inso-far as they were pertinent to the major theme of this book: the American Jewish impact on the Jewish survivors in Europe, and to a certain extent the impact of the survivors on the American Jews who came to Europe to help them.

I received tremendous help from JDC: from my dear, late friend Samuel L. Haber, from my good friend (may he live a long and good life) Herbert Katzki, from Dr Ralph Goldman, and many others. They never tried to influence me, nor did they ever prevent me from using any material in any way I wished. I did not receive any funds from them, because I never asked for them. My previous books dealing with JDC—My Brother's Keeper (1974) and American Jewry and the Holocaust (1980)—had been supported by JDC, but there, too, no attempts had been made to influence my conclusions. I received full collaboration from the surviving Advisers to the US Forces in Germany, and from rabbis who had served as chaplains in the American Army, especially from Rabbi Abraham J. Klausner. My

vi Preface task was made easier by some of the PhD theses that were written, largely under my direction, relating to parts of the theme discussed here.

Part of this book was written while I chaired a group of Holocaust researchers at the Institute of Advanced Research at the Hebrew Univer-sity, and I wish to thank the Institute for this help, and my colleagues for the wonderful discussions we had there. Another part was written in Hawaii, and I wish to thank my friend Dr Robert J. Littman as well as the research aids there who helped me a great deal, especially Mrs Roxanne Rice-Barth.

The last sections were written while staying at Yarnton Manor, at the Oxford Centre for Hebrew Studies, which is ably directed by Dr David Patterson.

Lastly, my long-suffering family, Shula, Anat, and Danit, their hus-bands, and Lior and Tal deserve special mention. "He" wasn't at home, but writing in odd places, and when he was there, he was grumpy and unpleasant. Hard is the fate of historians' families. In the end, it is up to the reader to decide whether it was worth it, as I hope it was.

Contents List of Illustrations ix

Introduction xi

1. Liberation in Eastern Europe 1

2. Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 23

3. The DP Camps 1945-16 45

4. Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria:

A People on the Move 71

5. The Great Exodus 104

6. Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 133

7. Communist Eastern Europe 159

8. Interagency Problems 181

9. The DP Camps in Germany and Austria—1947 193

10. Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 237

11. The Dissolution of the DP Camps 261

Selected Bibliography 300

Name Index 301

Subject Index 307

About the Author 319

vii

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m

I m s s i ^ ^

PLATE 1. PLATE 2. PLATE 3. PLATE 4. PLATE 5. PLATE 6. PLATE 7. PLATE 8.

PLATE 9.

PLATE 10.

PLATE 11. PLATE 12.

PLATE 13.

PLATE 14.

PLATE 15. PLATE 16. PLATE 17. PLATE 18. PLATE 19.

List of Illustrations

Dr. Joseph J. Schwartz. James P. Rice, AJDC Director for Austria, 1945-46. Edward M. M. Warburg, AJDC Chairman, 1948. Moses A. Leavitt, AJDC Secretary, 1947. Saly Mayer, AJDC Representative in Switzerland. William Bein, AJDC Director for Poland, 1946-49. Harold Trobe, AJDC Director for Austria, 1948. Dr. William Haber (left), Jewish Adviser to the US Army in Germany and Austria, 1947-48, and Samuel L. Haber (right), AJDC Director for Germany from 1947. "La Colline", COJASOR's old age home for Jewish survivors of Nazi concentration camps in Nice, France (1948). ORT workshop run by Jewish displaced persons in Landsberg, Germany (1948). Solidarnosd store in Lodz, Poland (1948). A local warehouse in Munich used for distribution of winter clothing (1948). Jewish refugees from Poland preparing to leave Nachod, Czechoslovakia, for UNRRA camps in Germany and Austria (1946). Jewish refugees from Poland make their farewells at Nachod, Czechoslovakia (1946). Jewish displaced persons leaving Munich for Israel (1948). Zones of Occupation in Europe. Postwar killings and the flight of the survivors, 1944-48. Concentration and extermination camps. Survivors of the camps leave continental Europe, 1945-50.

O O A - A * ix

Introduction

As American troops invaded North Africa in the fall of 1942, then became the major partner in the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily and mainland Italy in 1943, and finally invaded France on D-Day (June 6, 1944), the effects of the Holocaust were slowly uncovered to an unbelieving world. In North Africa, realpolitik was permitted to determine action, which meant that the old collaborationist French Vichyite army and civilian bureaucracy were allowed to rule, and antisemitic laws were not removed from the statute book until March 7, 1943. Indeed, official discrimination was removed only in November 1943. Foreign Jews and others, chiefly Spanish Republicans, were kept in Saharan slave labor camps that were actually death traps, for months after liberation. It was only due to ener-getic Jewish intervention in Washington, followed by a public outcry, that the situation changed. But the discrimination and physical persecution of Jews in North Africa was the "normal" kind of persecution of targeted groups that the American public could understand, though it might protest against it. In Italy, Jews were first discovered, in any large numbers, in the liberated detention camp of Ferramonti, south of Naples. They, too, had been exposed to discrimination and maltreatment, but had also experi-enced some sympathy from their Italian captors; again, this was not some-thing outside of American experience. In France and in Northern Italy, more Jews and other victims of Nazism were uncovered, and unbelievable stories began to circulate about the Nazi policy of mass murder. Survivors of Auschwitz reached France in the spring of 1945, before the end of the war, but their stories were received with incredulity. Then the invasion of Germany began, and on April 5, 1945 the first major unevacuated Nazi camp, Ohrdruf, was liberated. The stories of mass murder, of thousands of skeletal corpses lying about, of evidence of the Nazi policies, began to invade the Western mind. Buchenwald was liberated on April 11, Bergen-Belsen on April 15, Dachau on April 29. Before the war ended on May 8, the truth, more horrible than anything previously imagined, became known.

Had it not been known before? After all, there had been an Allied resolution of December 17, 1942, acknowledging the mass murder of the Jewish people of Europe; American newspapers had brought to the public's attention fairly detailed descriptions of the Nazi murder policies in 1943 and 1944. In November 1944, the press published the Auschwitz

xi

xii Introduction

protocols: direct evidence by four eye-witnesses who had escaped from Auschwitz in April and June 1944, and whose testimonies had been smug-gled to Sweden and Switzerland. All Americans, Jews and non-Jews, had at their disposal detailed press descriptions of concentration camps, and even of the killing process. Yet, as we shall see, almost all the American soldiers; Gentiles and Jews, Christian and Jewish chaplains, officers and men, protested after the event that they had had absolutely no prior knowl-edge about the destruction and had been totally surprised and shocked at what they saw when they occupied Germany.

The gap between the information that was available and that which most of these soldiers must have seen, and the knowledge of which they were apparently innocent, can only be explained in psychological terms: what must not be true is not true. The stories had been dismissed as exagger-ation, and the British Foreign Office bureaucrats who ascribed much of the evidence to the natural Jewish tendency to hysterical overreaction were by no means alone. There were of course individuals who believed that the information was true, such as Rabbi Stephen S. Wise, leader of American Zionists; Peter Bergson (the alias of Hillel Kook), his opponent1; and some of the Gentile friends of the Jews such as John W. Pehle and Roswell D. McClelland of the War Refugee Board. Very few dared to express their doubts publicly; most of the writers and readers of the press thought that this was good war propaganda, though clearly much exaggerated.

When the truth was revealed, American Jewish reaction was one of stupor, of shocked silence. There were no mass meetings or massive acts of mourning. The time was not ripe for that, because after all the war in Europe had ended, and the war in the Pacific was approaching its end. The joy at the defeat of a terrible enemy and the final effort to defeat Japan took priority. The reaction was, in a sense, pragmatic: reports by Jewish chaplains had to be dealt with, and Jewish agencies mobilized to help the survivors.

There were a number of American Jewish agencies that tried to deal with "overseas relief," as it was then called: the Va'ad Hahatzalah, a rabbinic organization originally established in 1939 to aid war-torn yeshivot (tal-mudic academies), whose emissaries had, during the Holocaust, tried to help and rescue orthodox Jews by legal and semi-legal means; the World

1 Cf. David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews, New York (1985). Bergson-Kook was the head of a small group of Palestinian supporters of the right-wing nationalist Irgun, who used typically American publicity methods to bring the Holocaust to the attention of the general public. They were opposed by the more traditional, convention-bound Zionists, headed by Wise. The combined efforts of the two bodies, however, make it even more clear that the American public was given plenty of information.1

John W. Pehle was the director of the War Refugee Board, established by Roosevelt in January 1944, in order to break through the barriers of bureaucracy to help Jews and other threatened groups under the Nazi regime. McClelland was the Board's representative in Switzerland.

Introduction xiii

Jewish Congress (and its American affiliate, the American Jewish Con-gress) which had been founded in 1936 as a worldwide Jewish organization dedicated to fighting antisemitism and Nazism; old-established organi-zations such as HIAS (Hebrew Sheltering and Immigrant Aid Society), which dealt with emigration, and ORT (Organization for Rehabilitation and Training) which organized vocational schooling (see Chapter 8). How-ever, by far the most important group was the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, founded in 1914 and popularly known as the "Joint", or JDC, which saw itself as the embodiment of whatever Amer-ican Jewry was willing to do for its fellow Jews overseas. The history of that organization prior to and during World War II has been told else-where,2 and it was JDC which had to assume most of the responsibility for aiding the survivors.

The question can be asked—why did American Jews feel obligated to help at all? They were, after all, American citizens who had volunteered and fought beyond their proportion in the population in the war, and on the face of it had no greater obligation to the Jews of Europe than Catholics or Protestants had towards their coreligionists there. Indeed, the record of the non-Jewish groups in the United States regarding help to their coreligionists was pretty poor. The answer is that Jews were more than a religious group, they were—and are-—a group with a distinct ethnic culture and a past that included religion, but went beyond it. Jews—even accultu-rated and assimilated Jews—spoke of "the Jewish people", and in Yiddish, the language that most Jewish immigrants to America spoke originally, the expression dos Yiddishe folk meant a society, Jewish languages, a tra-dition and a culture which both adjusted to host cultures and yet kept its individuality. It was perhaps no longer a "nation that dwelleth on its own and is not taken note of by others" (am levadadyishkon uva'goyim lo yitchashav). It had become part and parcel of Western civilization, and of its American variant. But while its members were loyal American citizens, most of them also thought of themselves as belonging to that same Yiddishe folk of their forebears, and saw no contradiction between the two. Interpretations differed widely, and ranged from total identification with American culture and society spiced with a remnant of feeling for Jews elsewhere, to Jewish nationalism with an emphasis on the idea of recreating a Jewish State in Palestine while acting out loyal citizenship to the Amer-ican republic.

American Jewry was never a "community". It had, and has, no central organs, democratically or otherwise elected, and it was, and is, rent by the most wide-ranging differences on every possible issue. Antisemitic lore had argued for many centuries that Jews were an international, well-organ-ized cabal. To that the only response, again in the expressive Yiddish

2 Yehuda Bauer, My Brother's Keeper, Philadelphia (1974); idem, American Jewry and the Holocaust, Detroit (1981).

xiv Introduction

language, could have been: hallevay (were it only so!). Not only was there no international Jewry; in most places, including America, there was not even a national Jewry. Had there been an international Jewry, Jews would not have been so helpless when faced with the Holocaust.

In the 1940s, American Jewry's social structure was determined by the still lingering difference between the German-Jewish element, which had immigrated to America from the mid-nineteenth century on, and the East European element, who were the vast and overwhelming majority, and who had come with the mass waves of immigration from the early 1880s onward. The German-Jewish group had by that time become thoroughly Americanized, and was the mainstay of the Reform movement in the United States, which offered an interpretation of the Jewish religion that did away with most of the characteristics of traditional Jewish orthodoxy. Jews of German origin were the "uptown" people, the middle and upper-middle class. The East Europeans, in their tenements and sweatshops, had either stuck to their orthodox Jewish upbringing or, for the most part, were abandoning orthodoxy for a secularized Judaism in which socialist and liberal values were unconsciously modelled on Jewish traditions. In the midst of this, a religious movement of the middle road, the Conserva-tive trend, was gaining ground amongst those identified religiously.

HIAS and ORT were the product of East European immigrants (see Chap-ter 8). Va'ad Hahatzalah was composed to a large extent of recent East European immigrant rabbis. JDC, by contrast, was led by the representa-tives of the German-Jewish upper classes. However, with truly aristocratic wisdom, these people consciously sought a wider consensus, and included in the group that decided on JDC's policies, people of East European origin, including orthodox and socialist leaders. This was the composition of the leading group in the early 1940s as it had been since JDC's foun-dation. As the war drew to its close, the JDC chairman was Paul Baerwald, an older man bom in Germany, a banker and philanthropist. He was part of the circle around the Warburg family, which had been in the leadership of what was vaguely known as American Jewry since the 1920s. Felix M. Warburg had founded JDC and stayed at its head until his death in 1937. His son, Edward M. M. Warburg, at first continued in his father's position until America's entry into the war. JDC's executive committee contained names such as Jaretzki, Leidesdorf, Lieberman, Linder, Rosenberg, Rosenwald—all people of that same social group—but also Morris Rothen-berg (a Zionist), Alexander Kahn, Rabbi Leo Jung, Adolph Held, who were all members of that other, more recent, leadership group of orthodox and socialist-liberals.

In 1944, then, most of the lay leadership of JDC was still conservative, largely German-Jewish, and patriotically American. However, the pro-fessional group that was in charge of day-to-day activities and gaining

Introduction xv

more and more influence in the policymaking counsels of the agency, was increasingly second-generation East European, and middle class. More and more people entered JDC whose outlook reflected the general trend among the Jewish population of the United States, that is to say they were inclined to be more liberal, less convention-bound, more pro-Zionist. They were no less American in their cultural outlook and ways of behavior and thinking, yet at the same time they were inclined to put greater empha-sis on their Jewishness and identify personally with their fellow Jews wher-ever they were sent. These of course are generalizations, to which there were exceptions. With the tremendous expansion of JDC's work during and immediately following the war, these people naturally tended to be younger. A growing number were also college-educated and professionally qualified: social workers, nurses, doctors, accountants, teachers, and so on.

At the head of JDC's hierarchy stood three men who personified JDC to European Jews. Moses A. Leavitt was the Secretary, soon to become Vice Chairman, residing in New York. Originally a chemical engineer, a first-rate organizer and administrator, he was very much a family man. He ruled the New York office with an iron hand, representing the conserva-tive, humanitarian, and philanthropic outlook of the lay leadership. His relationship with Baerwald was friendly and correct. Edward Warburg, the main lay leader, who had resigned his chairmanship when he joined the Army as a private, but who would soon resume the task after demobiliz-ation, was of a different outlook, much less form-bound, much more given to change in accordance with the new times. It seems that Warburg found Leavitt an excellent aide, but relied on the judgment of another pro-fessional, Dr Joseph J. Schwartz, arguably the greatest American Jewish leader of the war and postwar period. Born in the Ukraine and brought to America as a small child, Schwartz was trained as an orthodox rabbi, but abandoned that calling as well as orthodoxy and took a PhD degree in Oriental Studies after a stay in Cairo. He could read both Hebrew and Arabic as well as French and German and, of course, Yiddish. He was a rare mixture of a scholar and a man of action, gifted with a natural flair for warm human relationships.

Schwartz had joined JDC in 1938 from the Brooklyn Jewish social wel-fare set-up after he had been unable to find a permanent job as an academic, and soon became Deputy Secretary of JDC. In 1939 he was sent to Paris to be second-in-charge to Morris C. Troper, the head of JDC's accoun-tants' firm and Chairman of JDC's European Executive. In 1940, he became European Chairman, moved to Lisbon when France was occupied, and was responsible for JDC's European and Middle Eastern activities throughout the war. Without actually ever engaging in a fight with the New York office—he was very loyal to the agency, and much too subtle to require confrontation—he slowly changed JDC's policy and political

xvi Introduction

outlook. He did not always ask for permission to engage in work that was on the borderline of legality, and while he always reported the general oudine of his policies to New York, he asked for and, as the man on the spot, was given the right to decide at any particular juncture what was best. Slowly, imperceptibly, Schwartz became JDC to all intents and pur-poses. In a careful survey of the deliberations of JDC's decision-making bodies, the Executive and Administration Committees, one rarely finds any recommendation by Schwartz that was even seriously opposed, never mind challenged and rejected.3 .'. >

During the war, there were in fact three JDC's. The New York office was responsible for fund-raising and relations with the community (I am using the term although, as pointed out above, no Jewish community as an organized body can be said to have existed). Also, and very importantly, the New York office was in constant touch with the Administration and its offshoots. "When in doubt, ask the State Department," was Baerwald's motto. In Europe, Schwartz was a second JDC, desperately trying to help wherever and in whatever way he could. In the countries under Nazism, JDC had been represented by responsible, devoted individuals whose con-tacts with America were cut off by the war, leaving them on their own. They had been given a certain leeway in raising local funds in return for promises that the funds given to them would be repaid by JDC, in dollars, after the war. Most of these local leaders interpreted this temporary and limited permit very widely, often in direct contradiction to frightened and peremptory orders from New York to cease doing it. As a result, a third JDC developed during the war, one which became a small ray of hope in a world of total destruction. JDC workers, led by Isaac Gitermann, Emmanuel Ringelblum, Leib Neustadt, and David Guzik, organized a vast system of social welfare in the Warsaw ghetto, and ended up by financing the ghetto uprising—not only in Warsaw, but in Bialystok as well. The leader of Slovakia's JDC Committee, Gizi Fleischmann, became one of the great heroines of the Holocaust, negotiating with the Nazis for the rescue of Jews. Reszoe Kastner in Hungary, Marie Schmolka in Prague, Dyka (Jules) Jeffroykin and Maurice Brenner in France, Wilhelm Filderman in Romania, were in the forefront of rescue attempts in the name of JDC, usually without the knowledge of JDC in New York and sometimes without Schwartz's knowledge as well. In most of these cases, daring underground actions were attempted, to which the New York office would never have agreed. But, as the war ended, and these stories slowly came out, JDC was proud to have inspired these individuals and groups. During the war, JDC also needed an outpost in a neutral country through which funds could be funnelled into Nazi-occupied Europe. In 1940 Saly Mayer, then the head of the Swiss Jewish community, agreed to serve as

3 1 have dealt with his growing influence and personality in some detail in my American Jewry and the Holocaust (see previous note).

Introduction xvii

JDC representative. Until the end of the war and beyond, Mayer was responsible for sending whatever funds he had to Jews in occupied countr-ies. He was told, however, that he was on his own, that he would have to make decisions without referring them to Lisbon, and that officially he was not entitled to act in the name of JDC unless he obtained authorization, which he would be able to do only in rare cases. Schwartz trusted Mayer, a conservative, straitlaced Jew with a religious bent and an unsuspected flair for semi-legal operations.4

JDC's outlook in 1944 was still rather conservative. Its main association was with the Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds (CJFWF), an association of Jewish communities, formed mainly for fund-raising purposes and dominated by the upper-middle class in the various towns and cities. Its political background was that of the conservative American Jewish Committee; JDC itself forswore all political involvement, by which it usually meant taking an attitude of neutrality—at first hostile, then more friendly—towards Zionism. It had regarded Palestine as just another haven for Jewish refugees, but that was quickly changing. During the war, the claim to be totally nonpolitical made little sense, and in the postwar world this began to mean that JDC was a loyal American organization which did not identify with any one Jewish faction or group, though the individuals working for it would of course have their opinions. Most of them were religiously Reform, or Conservative, secular or unidentified. Yet JDC behaved with deference to the orthodox community, supporting yeshivot and rabbinical groups wherever it could.

In 1934, and again since 1939, JDC was part of the United Jewish Appeal, an alliance of Palestine-oriented and non-Zionist fund-raising groups. The CJFWF had more or less forced the two warring agencies, JDC and the Zionists of the United Palestine Appeal, to collaborate by sharing in the fund-raising and in the allocation of what was raised. Jews in the organized communities did not want to have dozens of agencies knocking at their doors. That was the basic sentiment and JDC and UPA had to honor it. The usual arrangement in those years was for JDC to get 60 percent of the funds allocated to overseas causes; UPA and a service agency for new immigrants to the States got the other 40 percent—the rest went to the upkeep of local charities and causes.

Between 1939 and 1945, JDC received $73,460,688 for its work over-seas:

TABLE 1. JDC's Overall Expenditures (in millions of dollars)

1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

8.44 6.179 5.7 '.. 6.3 8.47 15.21 23

4 Ibid., passim, for the names mentioned and detailed description of their activities.

xviii Introduction

The increasing amount of funds was due to a number of factors: more accurate, and frightening, information; better fund-raising techniques; the general war atmosphere in which people were expected to make sacrifices; and an increas-ing feeling of not having done enough to save European Jewry. It must be stressed that at no time did JDC hide any information it had, or use it in any but the most effective way it knew how to produce identification with the plight of European Jewry on the part of American Jews.

However, when the pictures of the camps were released, together with press reports and Congressional testimonies, when Jewish and non-Jewish GIs began coming back and reporting what they had seen, UJA's appeal evoked a growing response. Suddenly, American Jewry found it had the money which, had it been found in 1936-42, might have saved many, many lives. A bad conscience, a desire to make amends and help wherever possible, and an improving fund-raising organization all helped to produce what was then considered amazing results. In 1945-48, JDC received $194,332,033 from American Jewry and between 1945 and 1951 it spent its money thus:

TABLE 2. JDC Annual Expenditure (in millions of dollars)

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951

28.3 . 54.1 75.7 70.6 54.7 36.9 21.5

TABLE 3. JDC Annual Expenditures by Countries (in US $)

1945 1946 1947 1948 i

Austria and Germany 317,000 3,979,500 9,012,000 7,320,000 ® e f u m 1,917,000 1,801,000 1,354,000 1,024,000

r l - L u . 1 6>0 0 0 619,000 , 360,000 Cyprus 1,620,000

F r̂lovakia m • f i s s s Greece ' ' H 2,831,000 5,906,000 3,583,000 Holland 4 M S K 1 2 3 > 0 0 0 1 1 5 > 0 0 ° Hungary 534,000 330,000 Italy 9,499,000 10,898,000 8,463,000 North Africa t £ 5 K ^ 2 , 0 0 0 2,027,000 2,776,000 Poland 1 684 Onn - , 2 4 7 ' 0 0 0 280,000 Spain and Portugal 322000 7 ^ 6 6 ' 0 0 0 5,603,000 2,995,000 Romania 3 519 000 , ^ 2 > 0 0 0 340,000 Switzerland 1,919000 I ' S H ' 0 0 0 3,174,000 4,669,000 Yugoslavia «126,000 - V l S ' S X 1,835,000 Relief in Transit 635,000 440,000 Emigration 965,000 Supplies 3,650,000 Reconstruction, Credit 20,000,000

Co-ops, etc. 5,000,000

Introduction xix

In addition to the funds received from the States, certain contributions were also received from the South African Jewish Appeal,5 and smaller sums from Latin American countries. They are included in the expendi-tures shown.6

Some of the items are really code words for certain types of work done by JDC. Relief in Transit is direct contributions to Brichah,7 whereas Emigration apparently covers part of the outlays for illegal immigration to Palestine.

The figures include additional funds that JDC received from various sources. One of these sources was the Intergovernmental Committee, originally founded at the ill-fated Evian Conference in July 1938, and revamped in April 1943 at the equally disastrous Bermuda Conference. At the head of IGC stood a kind, but verbose and bureaucratically inclined typical British civil servant, Sir Herbert Emerson. As long as he could be convinced that some expenditure fell within his strictly defined area of operations, he would be willing to consider helping. He used to address long memoranda to the Foreign Office's Refugee Section and generally followed the advice he received from that quarter. The IGC was supposed to deal with stateless unrepatriable refugees and with enemy aliens who had anti-Nazi records. It is difficult to compute the sums that were made available to JDC from IGC, but in 1944-45 a sum of at least $2.78 million was made available to JDC, which spent it on behalf of IGC (IGC had no apparatus of its own to spend the money).8

In 1946, long and protracted negotiations began with Emerson to get money for Jewish refugees out of the international fund, and JDC asked for $9.7 million. By the end of 1947, as the IGC was intending to go out of business and had over its task to the IRO, less than $800,000 were actually obtained.9

There were other funds which JDC tried to obtain in the aftermath of the war. There were $492,000 which had been deposited in New York in the name of the Manfred Weiss combine in Hungary and the Erno Vincze leather factory, also in Hungary, and which actually represented JDC funds, contributed by Hungarian Jews up to 1942. JDC tried to unblock the account and obtain its money. It is not quite clear whether they were successful, but apparently the money was obtained in the end.

5 Adcom 6/14/46—$1.6 million in 1947-57. 6 There are serious discrepancies between the figures as shown above, most of which rely

on a Loeb and Troper (the auditors of JDC) report of 1970, and contemporary figures. In most cases the reasons seem to be that Relief in Transit was often included in the country expenditure figures (but sometimes they were not), that sums were spent in one year and then accounted for in another year, and that supplies shipped into different countries were valued differently by different offices.

7 "Flight" in Hebrew, the illegal organization that engineered Jewish mass movements in the period under review (see Chapter 1).

8 Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust, p. 439. ' JDC/IGC, 1/31/47, letter and memo by Moses W. Beckelman; Adcom 10/28/47.

xxii Introduction xix Another sum from Hungary was the so-called Becher deposit. This

was a collection of money and valuables which formed part of the ransom paid by Hungarian Jews to the SS in Budapest in 1944 in order to save their lives. Colonel Kurt Becher of the SS, Himmler's economic adviser, had conducted negotiations with Saly Mayer who tried to obtain the rescue of Jews in return for promises to the Nazis. Becher had handed these monies and valuables over at the end of the war by releasing a Hungarian Zionist underground worker, Moshe Schweiger, from the concentration camp of Mauthausen, and giving him the money, most probably to establish a pro-Jewish alibi for himself. Schweiger handed the money over to an American Field Intelligence unit, and it is not quite clear what happened then. It is possible that the valuables were pardy appropriated by individuals or groups in the American and French intelligence units through whose hands they passed. The rest was delivered to JDC in Switzerland, and a relatively paltry sum of about $25,000 was realized from them.

Yet another treasure originating in Hungary was found after the war, a few train carriages in Austria containing Nazi loot from Hungarian Jews who were no longer alive. This treasure, known as "the gold train", was to be turned over to the IGC, with the Jewish Agency and JDC sharing in the proceeds: the JDC share was to be one third. The Hungarian Jewish community also claimed a share in this. When JDC finally received its share, most of the items were found to be unsaleable in the postwar con-ditions.

JDC also laid claim to German assets confiscated in Sweden and Switzer-land. The governments of the two countries declared themselves willing to contribute $12.5 million each to IGC and IRO, and JDC demanded a major share of these funds. The willingness of the two governments began to be hedged and conditional in 1947, but in the end several million dollars were shared between the Jewish Agency and JDC on the same basis as that of the gold train.10

JDC looked to voluntary help from the community beyond just money. This was so, first and foremost, in its recruitment of hundreds of American Jews to devote time to work with Jews in Europe, the Middle East and Shanghai. The salaries were not very impressive, and the work was no nine-to-five desk job. Most people agreed to go abroad out of idealism, or adventure-seeking, or both, but as most of them could not take their usually young families with them, they did not wish to stay for more than a limited period of time. The bane of JDC was this constant rapid change of personnel, which did not allow for people to utilize their experience once it had accumulated. But there was no way out of the impasse. Amer-ican Jewry, even in those years, did not provide enough money to permit planning for longer periods of employment for any but the most central

10 Excom, 1/7/47, 3/25/47; Adcom. 4/1/47,4/22/47, 12/23/47.

Introduction xxi

positions in the JDC hierarchy. Schwartz's deputy, Moses W. Beckelman, another central figure in the European set-up; Herbert Katzki, a responsible and seasoned administrator and adviser; Samuel L. Haber, the director for Germany from 1947 onward; Charles H. Jordan, the JDC man in Shanghai; and a few others, were the exceptions to this general rule.

In order to recruit new forces in the community and bring about per-sonal identification of the American Jew with Jews overseas, a group of 16 New York women's organizations started a campaign late in 1945 to send supplies abroad through JDC on a voluntary basis. Under the leadership of Blanche Gilman, and with the cooperation of Jewish organizations in different trades and professions, a network of voluntary societies through-out the country began collecting items to send abroad. The organization was called Supplies for Overseas Survivors (SOS), and began shipping its contributions abroad in early 1946. A great deal of criticism was levelled at SOS at first: clothing was old and worn; old, tattered shoes were sent, sometimes only unmatched single shoes; layettes for babies were slow in arriving; important items such as underwear and blankets were missing. In some places up to two thirds of the supplies sent had to be discarded, sometimes because they contained clothing unsuitable to the conditions of war-torn Europe, for example, high-heeled women's shoes and old party dresses. Some complaints spoke of the self-esteem of Jewish survivors being undermined by such gifts. One must, however, understand that that was not the spirit in which these things were sent. People in Ohio, Brook-lyn, or Seattle had no clear picture of the life of Jews in Europe or Shang-hai, and sent what they could spare, and felt proud doing so.

In time, the criticisms came back and changes were consequently made. Items were carefully screened and selected, special collections for particu-lar needs were organized: in 1947, 35,000 pairs of new shoes were sent, 7000 pounds of dental tools and equipment, 3 million cans of priority foods such as milk, juices, fruits, meats, fish, cocoa, fats and oils; dozens of torah scrolls, X-ray machines, and the like. Robert Dolins, National Director for SOS, received praise for changing the image of SOS in 1947, and especially in 1948. On the whole, despite the original disasters in 1946 and the first half of 1947, the balance was very positive. A total of some 26 million pounds of relief supplies had been collected by the time SOS was dissolved in April 1949, with the progressive closing of the DP (displaced persons) camps in Central Europe. Of this, 14 million pounds had consisted of foods, and the rest was clothing, medical supplies and similar items. What was even more important was the fact that through 419 committees all over the United States, many thousands of voluntary workers were recruited (in Boston alone, 8000 people in 1500 cars and trucks in 1948!) who wanted to demonstrate their identification with their European fellow Jews. Through

xxii Introduction

them, JDC managed to become an organization with massive popular support behind it.11 -

The period of 1945 to 1953, with which the present volume deals, was the great period of American Jewish intervention in the Jewish world, aimed at reconstructing and rehabilitating the destroyed Jewish existence in the wake of the Holocaust. We shall see the politics and mechanics of this in the following chapters.

The present book deals with the communities that survived the Holo-caust. Hence the concentration on Europe, and Shanghai, where Jewish refugees from Central and Eastern Europe spent the war under the rule of Germany's Japanese ally. We shall not deal with Palestine, the Middle East, Yemen, North Africa, and Latin America, where JDC, HIAS and ORT also worked and helped. In some of these countries, especially North Africa, Yemen, Iran and, of course, Israel, American Jews would devote great effort at helping after the post-Holocaust emergency was over. Old emphases were changing, as evidenced in the slow demise of a pet project of the non- and anti-Zionist elements in JDC, the Sosua settlement in the Dominican Republic, started in 1938 by the dictator Rafael Trujillo. As late as 1947, JDC was still squandering $315,000 for a few homesteads of "farmers" who would seek emigration to the United States as soon as possible. Other similar projects in Bolivia and the Philippines had also been liquidated, and the policy in 1947-48 was either regular immigration into developed or partly developed countries where Jews might follow their traditional occupations, or immigration to Palestine-Israel.

American Jewry's great effort to help post-Holocaust Jewish Europe was not made in a vacuum. America, and not only American Jewry, was extending a helping hand to devastated societies and peoples. The Marshall Plan, an example of enlightened self-interest of the American way of life, resuscitated a prostrate West European economy and enabled the countries which received aid from it from 1947 on, to rebuild their democratic systems of government, as well as their economies. Jews were in the fore-front of such universalistic steps.

JDC's relationship with the Zionists, through the United Palestine Appeal, was not easy. JDC and UPA (later United Israel Appeal—UIA) were, as we have seen, partners in UJA, and the problem of how to distrib-ute between them the money collected from American Jews was a political problem of the first magnitude. Up until early 1948, the tremendous needs of the survivors in Europe, East and West, were clearly predominant. The struggle against Britain for the right to establish a Jewish State in Palestine had not yet been won, and illegal immigration was the only means Jews could realistically use to get there. JDC, as we shall see, supported this illegal immigration, though not always, and only with a great deal of

" "JDC in 1948," New York, 1949; Excom 11/26/46, 10/15/47,4/12/49, and elsewhere in the minutes of Excom.

Introduction xxiii

soul-searching: it believed that the Truman Administration supported its policy. But the bulk of the Jewish population in Europe, though eager to emigrate, could not find havens. Hence the success of JDC in demanding a lion's share of the funds collected.

In February 1948, as the war in Palestine became grimmer, David Ben-Gurion, Israel's future premier, sent Golda Myerson (Meir), another future prime minister, to collect funds in America because otherwise Pale-stinian Jewry would not survive the Arab attack. She came to raise $25-30 million, in cash! JDC was less than enthusiastic, but in the end agreed that this would be an acceleration drive, that is, funds that already had been promised or would be promised should come in in cash immediately, but would remain part of the regular campaign for 1948. After some nego-tiations, JDC agreed that this acceleration should be on the basis of 50 percent for UPA and 50 percent for JDC and USNA (United Service for New Americans—the immigrants' absorption service in the States). A new principle was beginning to develop, which found an even clearer expression in May 1948. Henry Morgenthau Jr., former US Secretary of the Treasury and now Chairman of the UJA, asked Golda Myerson to return to America to raise more money, because the cash was not coming in fast enough to help Israel in its military effort. Israel was not using UJA money for military outlay, but for immigration and absorption, which released other resources for the military expenditure, without which the enemy forces could not be repelled.

When Golda (only JDC called her Mrs Myerson) arrived, she declared that $100 million must be raised, because Israel needed $75 million of that now. The proportions would have to change again, and it was more important to help Israel overcome the emergency than to deal with other pressing problems, in Europe and elsewhere/Schwartz intervened in the discussions and suggested a formula which gave UPA about 60 percent of the money that would be raised. Harold Linder, an important member of the conservative German-Jewish leadership group, objected. Behind the practical issues there were the old struggles for and against the Zionist contention that Palestine-Israel should be the center of Jewish endeavors. A vote was taken, and Schwartz's position was approved, with only Linder voting against it.12 The vote had more significance than just the issue of money. It signalled the change in the mood of American Jewry, which would in 1950 be translated into an agreement between Ben-Gurion and Jacob Blaustein, the leader of the American Jewish Committee, the embodiment of American Jewish conservatism. The Zionist movement as such would decline—what use would there be for a Zionist structure when Israel was already in existence? On the other hand, most Jews would become pro-Israel, which was a "pro-Zionist" position, of course. The Zionist organization itself would simply become one of the pro-Israel

12 Adcom, 5/25, 5/27/48.

xxiv Introduction

bodies. Israel would become the lever through which funds could be raised. No great excitement could be mustered by appealing for an old age home or a hospital in New York, Los Angeles, or Louisville. Israel, however, was a different matter. People wanted to be involved in helping it, and through the appeal for Israel local needs would be seen to as well.

JDC also had a story to tell; but it was less glamorous, less appealing. In 1948, the survivors in Europe were either emigrating, or settling down, by and large. The new challenges that would arise would, in one way or another, be related to Israel: Yemenite Jewry was to be flown to Israel: North African Jews were on their way to Israel and to France; and later on other areas would come into the picture in much the same way. JDC had to take second place. The period covered by this volume deals with the heroic period of American Jewish activity in Europe and Shanghai to aid the survivors. But it also touches the divide from which Israel became the predominant issue in the Jewish world, in America no less than every-where else.

The same development and change of positions will be seen when we discuss the work of the Jewish Advisers to the Commanding General, United States Forces European Theater (the appellation underwent a num-ber of changes). These personalities represented American Jews to the US Army in Germany and Austria, and played a central part in our story. They were independent people, unattached to JDC or any other organi-zation: two rabbis, two judges, a professor of economics, a social worker, and an army lawyer. They represented the best, most civilized and heart-warming in American Jewry of their day, and they made a tremendous contribution. But without the organizations, especially JDC, they would not have succeeded. Some of them were also hesitant about Zionist claims, and they too changed dramatically after Israel's independence was announced.

Indeed, the very reaction of JDC to the establishment of the Jewish State is significant in this context. On May 18, 1948, the JDC Administration Committee passed a resolution, later approved by the Executive Commit-tee and the Board of Directors, which hailed the establishment of Israel as an event of great significance in Jewish and world history, and referred to it as "a beacon of light" raised for the Jewish displaced persons in Europe. Israel was seen as home for the homeless Jews. This was in line with JDC ideology: Palestine-Israel as a haven, not as a political center for the Jewish people. The carefully worded resolution could also satisfy the Zionists, however, because of the praise lavished on Israel as the future democratic state with justice for all, and for the same reason could be accepted by the non-Zionist Labor element in JDC's leadership.

These were politics; important, indeed essential, but JDC's task, along with the other organizations, was to help the survivors and their communi-ties to begin to rebuild shattered lives. In this specifically Jewish sphere,

Introduction xxv

JDC, HIAS, and ORT did proportionately more than their non-Jewish American contemporaries because the fate of the Jews and the identifi-cation of Jews with Jews had special and unique characteristics that demanded a deeper and more energetic response. By far the most impor-tant vehicle for this was JDC, hence the central position this agency must have in any description and analysis of what happened. JDC passed the test of the postwar years with flying colors. It helped and rescued. But one should not exaggerate: the real heroes of the story were the survivors. It was quite amazing to see a people who, by all rights, should have wallowed in self-pity and despondency in the wake of the terrible destruction, rise from the ashes. Had it not been for the determination of the survivors, no JDC would have made any difference. But, in line with Jewish philosophy, which is life-affirming and optimistic by its very nature, the surviving remnants She'erit Hapletah started rebuilding their individual and collec-tive lives immediately upon their liberation. They would not, in Emil Fackenheim's unforgettable expression, grant a posthumous victory to Hitler. They would notj and they did not.

CHAPTER 1

Liberation in Eastern Europe

Poland and the Soviet Union

As the Soviet armies reconquered territories occupied by the Germans, the Jewish tragedy began to unfold. In early 1944, the eastern borders of prewar Poland had been reached, and in June 1944, the Soviet summer offensive began, during which large parts of the Baltic territories and all of eastern Poland up to the Vistula River were liberated. In all these areas, very substantial Jewish populations had existed prior to the war. Now, in early 1945, a mere 7000 were estimated to be still alive in all of eastern Poland. A few thousand more emerged from hiding places and from the forests, where they had fought as partisans or had lived in so-called "family camps" in the Baltic areas and western Byelorussia and the Ukraine. They looked for their families and their communities, but they found only destruction. In addition, they were met with murderous hatred by the overwhelming majority of their erstwhile neighbors. Dov Levin, a young partisan from Kovno (Kaunas) in Lithuania, put it thus:

Who will release us from the pain in our hearts, from the lonesomeness and destruction that call out at us from every street and every clod of earth? Around us victory trumpets are blown every day. There is a tremendous desire to live again, and we—we try to run away from ourselves. Can one demand that we eat food at the altar of death? When we heard of the liberation of Kovno, we rushed there like mad. Each one went to his home with a pounding heart. We went to our house in Milados 7. Heaps of rubble and burnt bricks—that is all that remained . . . An enamel-covered plaque, with the number 7 inscribed on it in shining white, remained, as though to protest the destruction of the house and its occupants.1

The hatred of the neighbors was all around the survivors. In Eisiskes, a town in the Vilna area, also in Lithuania:

Five of the few Jews who had survived were found murdered. Their bodies were brought to Vilna for burial. In the pockets of their clothes the following inscription, in Polish, was found: "This will be the fate of all surviving Jews" (Taki los spotka wssystkich Pozostalych Zydow): and the authorities are contemplating a concentration of all the Jews in Vilna because they are incapable of protecting them in the small towns and villages from bands of Polish and Lithuanian nationalists.2

The first major town in Poland liberated by the Soviets and their Polish 1 Dov Levin, Sefer Hapartizanim, Tel-Aviv (1962), p. 257.

Ruzhka Korczak, Lehavot Ba'efer, Merhavia (1965), p. 304.

i 1

2 Out of the Ashes

leftist allies was Lublin (July 23,1944). The Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), soon to become the leftist government of Poland, set up its headquarters there. When the committee had been created in Moscow, the Soviets must have felt the need for a Jewish representative, and so they hauled out from one of their concentration camps an old Zionist leader from Galicia in southeast Poland. Dr Emil Sommerstein was in fact a centrist and a member of the General Zionist party. In Lublin, Sommerstein became responsible for reconstruction, but much of his attention was directed towards the affairs of the Jewish remnant. With the help of the new authorities, an asylum and a soup kitchen were established and named the Peretz-Heim, and a committee was set up. It was a sorry affair. The parties that had been supported by masses of Jews before the Holocaust now tried to re-establish themselves more or less out of nothing. Leftist anti-Zionist Bundists were still talking of the masses of the Jewish workers when these no longer existed. The Zionists, too, split into fac-tions, and were conducting party politics. Slowly, representatives of the Zionist youth movements, who had been in the forefront of the Jewish armed uprisings, gained influence. Their basic attitude was that Jews had to leave this graveyard which Poland had become. Their leaders were the charismatic figures of Abba Kovner, poet and head of the Jewish partisans in Vilna and, later, in the forests of Rudniki in eastern Lithuania, and Yitzhak Zuckermann, the legendary deputy commander of the Warsaw ghetto rebellion. From about December 1944 they organized a movement which they called "Brichah" (Flight). They were determined to lead out their own supporters, and anyone who cared to join them, to Palestine. The road there, they believed, would lead through Romania, and so, in early 1945, they forged their way via the Polish-Slovak border, illegally of course, to that country. A growing number of people, not only partisans and recent returnees from the Soviet Union, began to join them.3

The resources with which Sommerstein could operate were almost non-existent. The new Polish regime had no money, the USSR had been bled white by the tremendous effort to repel the Germans and by the terrible destruction the Germans had wrought in the territories they had occupied. Sommerstein therefore appealed to whomever he could. The fact that the cables were transmitted by the Soviets meant that he had obtained Soviet approval. This was hardly surprising: Sommerstein was a frightened old man, who did not know whether or when the Soviets would return him to the camp from which they had freed him.

The Soviets had conducted negotiations with the JDC to receive aid in food and, mainly, medicines, for the Soviet territories. On August 24, 1944, Sommerstein cabled the Jewish Agency in Palestine and, parallel to that, the JDC in New York.4

J Cf. Yehuda Bauer, Flight and Rescue, New York (1970), pp. 3-32. 4 Central Zionist Archives (CZA) S26/1248.

Liberation in Eastern Europe 3

The problem of relationships with the Soviets and, as the war was draw-ing towards an end, Soviet-controlled regimes, had exercised the minds of the JDC leaders for some time. One of the old-time stalwarts of the JDC was James N. Rosenberg, a political conservative who had waxed enthusi-astic in the 1920s about Jewish settlement in the USSR and JDC support of it. Under his aegis, a major JDC effort had seen the establishment of Jewish colonies in the Crimea, in the late 1920s and early 1930s, as well as major aid to the USSR and Soviet Jews generally. An anti-Zionist, Rosenberg wanted to prove to an antisemitic world that Jews could be good citizens of their respective countries and pioneers in agriculture in places other than Palestine. His views of the USSR and the communist regime were naive and idealistic, and he never quite understood how it had come about that the Crimean colonies had disintegrated under the double impact of Soviet industrialization on the one hand, which had attracted Jewish settlers from the vassalage of the state-run colonies, and the blows delivered by the OGPU (forerunner of the NKVD and the KGB) to the attempts at Jewish autonomy in the settlements on the other.

During the war, Rosenberg became associated with fund-raising in the USA to support the Soviet war effort. In 1944 he thought that JDC should become active again in the USSR (it had been booted out in 1938 as an imperialist agency). The JDC had indeed been sending parcels to Polish Jewish refugees in Soviet Central Asia from a post it had established together with the Jewish Agency in Teheran. Up to the end of September 1944,99,666 parcels were sent.5 In addition, it had sent equipment for a hospital and penicillin supplies, and a total of half a million dollars had been committed to this. But on May 23, 1944, Rosenberg suggested that the JDC contact Soviet Consul-General Kisselev in New York, and offer to him aid for a massive resettlement of Jews in the Crimea. "Only" 35,000 Jews remained there, he said, and JDC should ask how it could be of help. It is hard to say where Rosenberg got his figures from. There were in fact almost no survivors in the Crimea, the settlements had been largely dissolved even prior to the war, and the whole approach stood in glaring contradiction to reports published in the New York Times of the massive murder of Soviet Jews. The other leaders, after a long argument, turned Rosenberg's proposal into a decision to ask Soviet representatives for infor-mation about Soviet Jews.6 However, this was not to be the end of it. Rosenberg's persistence caused these negotiations to continue. The result was that, in 1945, another $505,648 was spent through the Russian War Relief on food and medical supplies to the general Soviet population from JDC funds.

The Teheran parcels were of real help, of course. They went to desig-nated individuals who were refugees in Central Asia (HIAS operated a

5 JDC/Russia, Accountants' staff, 25/9/44, Teheran parcels. 6 JDC Administration Committee (Adcom), 5/23/44, 10/31/44, 12/19/44.

4 Out of the Ashes

much smaller service of the same kind from New York). The Soviets realized that JDC would support any program supposedly intended for the Crimea, and Paul Baerwald, JDC chairman, in effect hinted as much in his letter of May 28,1945 to the Acting Consul-General Pavel P. Mikhai-Jov. The JDC never got a clear answer to its inquiry regarding the Jewish population in the Crimea, but in the end another $1 million was commit-ted. Following Mikhailov's suggestion, 50 percent were to be allocated to the Ukraine, and 50 percent to the Crimea, "to which," he stated, "Jews are returning". In effect, as Schwartz said, JDC was purchasing Russian good will. "It would be extremely harmful," he said, "to fail to fulfil this commitment in view of the present attitude of the Russian authorities to the JDC." There was no control over these expenditures, needless to say.7

On the basis of such contacts, Soviet agreement to have Sommerstein plead for money becomes understandable. Even before the receipt of Som-merstein's cable on August 3, the JDC had applied to Andrej Gromyko for permission for Schwartz to go to Russia. There was, of course, no response to this application. The State Department strongly advised the JDC not to have anything to do with the Lublin regime. But this time the JDC insisted, and finally Washington gave its approval, in October, to send Lend-Lease supplies to the tune of $100,000 to Lublin. By the end of the year, 50 tons of supplies had been sent. This had increased to 200 tons by the end of the war in May 1945.8 Did the supplies make any difference? Naturally, yes, despite the fact that a high proportion was confiscated by the Soviets. And yet, with the liberation of Western Poland as a result of the next Soviet offensive that began in January 1945, the misery and suffering were such that the couple of hundred of tons of supplies, for a population of some 80,000 Jews in Poland by the end of the war, had to be viewed as no more than a drop in the ocean.

Romania

The story of Romania during the Holocaust is one that is little known to the English-reading public.9 The Jews of Bessarabia and northern Buko-vina were either murdered by the Romanians and Germans in the summer

7 JDC/Russia, Press Release, 7/25/45; ibid., "Relief Supplies, 1945 Report"; AC, Baer-wald to Mikhailov, 5/28/45; also AC 10/16/45, 11/27/45 (Mikhailov quote), 12/11/45 (Schwartz quote).

8 J DC/Poland, 1944, for letter to Gromyko and the "advice" of the US State Department of 8/17/44; ibid., Sommerstein's cables, between 8/25 and 9/21; State's final approval, 10/20; and JDC's cable to Sommerstein advising him of the sending of supplies, 10/23; Poland, 1945, Buchman to Myeroff, 5/17/45, summarizing the work done so far.

9 Detailed information on the fate of Romanian Jews during the Holocaust is contained largely in three Hebrew-language PhD theses at the Hebrew University: Avigdor Shahan's PhD on the deportation of Romanian Jews to Transnistria, Ephraim Ofir's PhD on the Zionist movement between 1938 and 1944, and Jean Ancel's work on Romanian Jews, 1944-48. Ancel has also collected and published a collection of documents on Romanian Jews during the Antonescu period. None of this had become available in English as of 1987.

Liberation in Eastern Europe 5

of 1941, or deported to the region between the Dniester and the Bug rivers, called Transnistria by the Romanian occupiers. Some 150,000 people per-ished in the direct murder campaign, and 146,555 were deported, of whom 47,378 were alive at the end of 1943 according to an unreliable IRC report (the number was probably larger). There are no accurate figures for sur-vivors at the end of the war, but the estimate is of 62,000, of whom 45,000 returned from Transnistria, and 17,000 survived in Cernauti, Bukovina's capital, from which they had not been deported.

In 1940, Romania lost its northern Transylvanian province to Hungary, and of its 150,000 Jews some 6000 had survived by the time the Romanian and Soviet armies reoccupied the region in late 1944. Yet most of the Jews of the old Romanian heartland survived, with the exception of those from the Dorohoi district adjoining Bukovina who were swept up into the mael-strom of the Transnistrian deportations. Why this should have been so, in a country which was probably more antisemitic than any other in Europe, has been dealt with elsewhere.10 Suffice it to say that in a corrupt and unstable dictatorship, political and military arguments against the mass murder of Jews prevailed at a time when doubts began to arise whether the Axis powers would win the war. However, a role, albeit possibly a minor one, was played by the courageous intervention of an undaunted Jewish leadership.

Romanian Jewry in 1938 was organized in the Federation of the Unions of Jewish Communities (legally recognized in 1928),11 under the leadership of Dr Wilhelm Filderman, a Bucharest lawyer. Filderman was a political liberal-conservative, a non-Zionist, a wealthy attorney with tremendous personal courage. A schoolmate of dictator Ion Antonescu, he fought a battle of memoranda, petitions, and personal talks with important poli-ticos, aided by an unequalled knowledge of Romanian society. His persist-ence in arguing against the increasing anti-Jewish pressure in 1941-43 earned him a deportation order to Transnistria, but he came back from there when the fascist regime realized that without him there was no possibility of dealing with the Jews. A government-appointed leadership, the Judenzentrale (Centrala Evreilor), simply failed; the communities would not accept their orders. Filderman allied himself with both his Zionist opponents and the religious leadership under Rabbi Abraham Saf-ran, in order to establish an underground committee which carried on the work of the Federation, despite the fact that it and the Zionist organization had become illegal.

A major part of the underground committee's work consisted of relief. Jews in Transnistria were not abandoned and though, at first, aid sent there was minimal, this increased as time went on under the aegis of

10 Cf. Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust, Detroit (1981), pp. 335-55. 11 See FildermanY memorandum to the JDC, n.d. (early 1945), on the Federation,

J DC/Romania, general, 1945.

6 Out of the Ashes

Filderman's skilled collaborator, Fred Saraga. In the Romanian heartland, called the Regal (comprising the two provinces of Moldovia and Walla-chia), Jewish men had been called up for forced labor, many thousands had been evicted from small villages and town and concentrated in larger cities, and a pogrom in the town of Jasi in 1941 had left many thousands destitute. In addition Jews suffered, just like the Romanians, from the effects of Allied bombardment: unlike Gentiles, however, they had no legal right to work in most of the professions in which they had been working until the war. There were still some wealthy Jews around during the war, but their numbers and their wealth had been diminished.

To cope with all that, Filderman had established a social aid committee. Before the war he had been, in effect, the local leader recognized by JDC; from January 1942, with the departure of S. Bertrand Jacobson, an American Jew representing the JDC in Romania and Hungary, Filderman became JDC's representative.

It was not until 1943 that JDC's Saly Mayer in Switzerland found a way to transfer funds to Romania. Until then, Filderman had used the "apres" method, whereby wealthy individuals deposited their Romanian lei with him in return for an undertaking that the JDC would repay the money after the war (apres la guerre) in dollars. In addition, Filderman received relatively small sums from the Jewish Agency representatives in Istanbul through his Zionist colleagues, and the rest he managed to scrounge some-how from local people. When all was said and done, the money he had available was pitifully inadequate.

In 1943, an International Red Cross delegation from Switzerland began charitable operations in Romania, dealing with the distress of civilians, in addition to the IRC's main mandate of looking after POWs. Charles Kolb and other IRC delegates now received Swiss money from Mayer through the IRC offices in Geneva, and changed this into lei, which they gave to the "Joint Committee" headed by Filderman. Within the committee, Filderman maintained collaboration even with political opponents such as Dr Wilhelm Fischer, representative of the World Jewish Congress, which was really the arm of the Zionist movement for political Jewish affairs in the diaspora. Mayer transmitted the funds to Fischer, believing that as he was a member of the committee, this would guarantee Filderman's control. It did, in a way, but tensions existed. They were exacerbated by inter-vention on Schwartz's side after Romania had been liberated. Schwartz was still fighting his battles against the WJC and the participation of Fischer, an official WJC representative, as an active member of the Romanian "Joint Committee" was a thorn in his side. When the WJC-Zionist members became very influential in late 1944, and a separate group was organized under Dr Erno Marton (see below) to deal with relief problems in countries adjacent to Romania, Schwartz intervened to make sure that Filderman was in sole charge. He asked Mayer in January 1945

Liberation in Eastern Europe 7

to send a cable to Bucharest to this effect. Mayer did, but he was less committed to the internecine warfare of Jewish organizations, and so in April he intervened again to announce that Filderman was responsible, but that the committee should include Fischer.12

Meanwhile, King Michael of Romania had staged a palace revolution against Ion Antonescu on August 23,1944, and Romania joined the Allies. The Germans, taken by surprise, were driven out of most of the country very quickly by Romanian and Soviet troops. The takeover by the Soviets proved to be a grim affair. The armistice terms provided not only for the handing over of sophisticated weapons and the whole merchant marine to the Soviets, but also for the requisitioning, indeed plundering, of the Romanian industries. The Soviet forces were living off the land and Romania became an impoverished country. With the increase in the influence of the communists, the middle classes were squeezed out of the economy, and of course the Jews were a very important part of the lower-middle class especially. Shopkeepers, small traders and peddlers were worse off now than workers. Internally, the Jewish community became increasingly radicalized. In order to escape from the increasing poverty, and in the face of a persistent antisemitism, many Jews joined the left-wing parties, and especially the communists, in order to build a better future on socialist principles. But the majority reacted quite differently: the Zionist movement became increasingly popular, and the hope of emi-gration to Palestine became very real.

In the midst of all this, desperate efforts had to be made to save people from starvation—the golden age of communism was far removed from reality, and the strife in Palestine precluded the realization of the dream of emigration there. American Jewry was the only factor that could help. Palestinian Jews were engaged in 1945 in the beginning of the bitter struggle that would end three years later in the establishment of Israel, and were in no shape to aid Romanian Jewry. American Jewry was rep-resented by JDC. True, there was a HICEM office in Bucharest manned by that same S. Bertrand Jacobson who had represented JDC earlier on; but HICEM dealt with emigration to places other than Palestine, and there were not too many opportunities for Romanian Jews. HICEM's operation in Bucharest was, of necessity, small. In effect, therefore, for Romania, American Jewry was JDC.

When the Romanian revolution occurred in August 1944, the sources of funds for Filderman were still with Saly Mayer and the IRC via Fischer. The Soviet takeover meant that banks were now even more strictly con-trolled, so the IRC remained the only possible conduit. JDC provided Saly

12 See, for instance: Roswell McClelland to Saly Mayer (incorporating an enraged message from Joseph J. Schwartz to Mayer), JDC/SM-55,1/11/45; for a very unfriendly critique of Fischer and his connections with the IRC, see S. Bertrand Jacobson's report of 5/7/45, in JDC/ Romania, general, 1945. For Schwartz's intervention see McClelland to Mayer, JDC/ SM 55, 1/16/45; Mayer/s cable of 4/12/45 to Filderman is in the same file. OOA— B

8 Out of the Ashes

Mayer with funds in Switzerland, and Mayer had to decide how to respond. The interesting thing is that while JDC left itself with a veto power over Mayer's decisions, in actual fact it left them up to him. It was Mayer's judgment that decided where and how much of the money at his disposal should be spent. Mayer became very impressed with Filderman's reports. One such report, prepared by Dr Baruch E. Costiner, an old employee of the JDC, and bearing the date of October 2,1944, must have reached Mayer about a fortnight later.13 The report presented a dismal— but unfortunately very accurate—picture of the needs. The most pro-ductive elements in the Jewish population, Costiner said, men between the ages of 18 and 50 had been "degraded both physically and morally." An estimated 30,000 men had been in forced labor camps, and an additional 10,000 in various other forms of prison or internment. They had returned to their families exhausted and sick, and were quite incapable, in many cases, of productive work. Besides, there was high unemployment, and Jews were not exactly the first to receive employment even in post-liberation Romania. From its own resources, the local committee provided 4000 lei per person for 15,000 only (4000 lei in late 1944 was equivalent to roughly one dollar). Multiplied by four to include the families, these desti-tute Jews numbered about 120,000 to 180,000. ;

Some 17,000 starving and sick people had returned from the terrible ghettoes of Transnistria by October. Again, the problem was one of demo-ralization, to which was added the objective difficulties of finding employ-ment. In addition, 2000 orphans had come from Transnistria in special trains. The Soviets demanded that about half of these should be returned to their care because they had been born in Bessarabia, which was formerly Romanian and now Soviet. Ultimately, most of these orphans were to be saved from that fate and were to arrive in Palestine. In the meantime, they constituted a primary obligation of the community.

A total of 30,000 Jews had been driven from their homes in small towns and villages by the fascist regime. Of these, Costiner estimated that 20,000 would need help. . In addition, some towns such as Falticeni, Pascani, Targu Neamt and Targu Frumos had been completely evacuated of Jews. The homeless refugees from these places numbered 15,000. Costiner could not estimate the number of bombed-out people, whose position was similar to that of their Romanian neighbors. One has to assume that there were additional thousands in that category. According to Costiner's figures, the number to be supported should have come to at least 159,000 and probably over 200,000. But the figure he gives in his report is 140,000. The discrep-ancy is unexplained, but he was not exaggerating. The funds he was asking for came to 3,325 million lei (roughly $750,000) for a three-month period until the end of 1944. He asked the government to give them 250 million

" JDC/ Romania, general, 1945.

Liberation in Eastern Europe 9

lei monthly; some additional money would still have to come from the few rich Jews who were left, and the rest to come from JDC.

This was but the first alarming report. On 12 October Filderman himself transmitted a cry for help through the IRC. The same figure of 140,000 destitute was mentioned (plus refugees from Hungary and Poland, esti-mated to be about 4000). His financial requirements were 5 million Swiss francs (or close to $1.5 million) on the assumption that another sum of SFR 5 million would be covered from other sources. In addition, he asked for equipment for tailor shops, laundries, shoemakers and furniture-makers, "etc." Filderman was aware that vocational retraining would have to be started.14

The most interesting of these reports was one from the Palestinian emiss-ary Moshe Averbuch, a central figure in the Mossad, the agency for "ille-gal" immigration to Palestine. Out of the 290,000 Jews remaining in Romania (others put the figure at 280,000 or 285,000), only 20 percent were economically secure. The rest had been uprooted by the fascist regime and were now being forced to change again by the new, leftist-oriented government. The result, Averbuch said, was a tremendous desire for emigration. With the whole world closed, only the hope of Palestine remained, he argued. The difference in approach between Averbuch and Filderman was clear—should the leadership aim at reintegration or emi-gration?15

Mayer, very typically, ignored these differences. In his own unique, convoluted, stilted nineteenth-century German style he wrote to the IRC. Using the imperialist "we," he thought that "in the face of an imminent catastrophe we cannot work on theories, but considering the morale of our friends and especially of their leaders we must see what we can do to help immediately." And again: "we wish to support our friends in every way and encourage them in their difficult task, so they should be able to perse-vere."16 Concretely (or "in concreto," in Mayer's language), Mayer made available SFR 700,000 by the end of October, and then increased this to SFR 2 millions by the end of the year. This was the second largest amount that Mayer sent out (only Hungary received more in 1944). The IRC people in Bucharest supported Filderman's demands, and Mayer justified his attitude to JDC in New York by saying "Intercross has checked fig-ures." He thought SFR 6 million would have to be spent feeding 200,000 Jews, and an additional SFR 1.6 million would have to go for clothes for a three-month period—some $750,000 a month. By the time he sent this report (late October), he was fully aware of the fact that the Romanian government had rescinded the antisemitic legislation in name only and that no practical steps had been taken to restore most of the property

M JDC/ SM 55, cable of 10/12/44. "JDC/ SM 55, 10/13/44. 16 JDC/ SM 55, Mayer letters to the CICR (IRC), 10/27 and 11/21/44.

10 Out of the Ashes

confiscated from Jews.17 Mayer did not have the SFR 6 million, but by the end of the year he had made available SFR 4 million. In addition, clothes, especially shoes, were being prepared for shipment to Romania from Istanbul by Charles Passman, JDC's representative in the Middle East. From January 1945, Mayer sent SFR 2 million each month. It can be said without exaggeration that this help saved many tens of thousands from starvation and debilitating disease.

As a reward for changing sides in time, Romania reoccupied the North-ern Transylvanian region which had been annexed by Hungary in 1940. A group of Zionist-inclined refugees in Romania from that region organized a North Transylvanian Refugees' Committee in August 1944, with the bless-ing of the IRC in Bucharest. The committee was led by Dr Erno Marton, and by November they had found out that only 6000 Jews had survived, largely because they had been in Hungarian labor battalions while their families were being deported to their deaths. Additional survivors were taken prisoner by the Soviets as Hungarian soldiers and shipped to the

, Soviet interior to do slave labor. Behind Marton stood Averbuch (now Moshe Agami, of Kibbutz Kfar Gil'adi) and Fischer of the WJC. The idea emerged of bringing to Romania remnants of Jews from Hungary and, especially, Poland. What happened then sounds like a script for a cheap thriller. Marton and Averbuch established a new committee, known by its Romanian acronym as DEFAB, supposedly to bring home deported Romanian citizens from the neighboring countries. The IRC delegation supported the venture, and Filderman probably thought he had no choice but to support it as well. Somehow, Averbuch got the Communist Party to agree to this and one of their Jewish members, Yaakov Schmetterer, who was in fact less of a communist than his party colleagues thought, was put in charge of a Red Cross train. Marton asked for aid from JDC, and Mayer rather reluctantly agreed that JDC funds should be used for this venture. Schwartz saw in Marton's venture another conspiracy engineered by the World Jewish Congress to enter the area of relief in competition with JDC. But the IRC helped, and the Romanian government supplied the train, the driver, and coal.

Preparations took some time, but on March 24, 1945, the train moved, complete with nurses, doctors, and supervisors from the CP. Schmetterer was back in early April, having been in Hungary, eastern Slovakia, and Poland, and brought back hundreds of refugees. Several more journeys took place, one of them reaching liberated Auschwitz on 7 May. In all> about 5000 people were brought to Romania, including hundreds of chil-dren and young survivors with amputated limbs.18

By the end of the war in May 1945, the Romanian communities found themselves under increasing pressure from the communists. Jewish com-

" JDC/ SM 55, WRB cable, 10/28/44. 14 Bauer, Flight and Rescue, pp. 32—35.

Liberation in Eastern Europe 11

munists were introduced into Jewish organizations in order to control them, but the process was not over yet. Filderman and his group were still in control, and the Marton committee was occupied with the train. Relative harmony reigned between the different noncommunist factions and, con-trary to Filderman's prediction, most of the money, exchanged extremely favorably at over 2000 lei per Swiss franc, went to the support of the Polish, Hungarian, and Transnistrian refugees, and a relatively smaller proportion was used for local Jews. This in itself was a proof of the selflessness and high social standards of the Romanian committee and its leadership. A children's center and hospital (set up by Dr Cornel Iancu and his equally active wife, Mela), homes for the homeless, supplies of clothing, services mediating job opportunities, support for Zionist-orient-ed groups preparing for agricultural work in Palestine—all these were the work of the American-assisted Romanian Jewish communities.19

Hungary

The tragedy of Hungarian Jewry has been the subject of a number of detailed studies.20 Between May 14 and July 9, 1944,437,000 Jews from the Hungarian provinces had been deported to Auschwitz, where the vast majority had been murdered on arrival. The others, probably about 100,000, were put to work, mostly in factories in Germany. Of these— mostly women, because the men were called up to serve in labor bat-talions—many perished from overwork, starvation, and disease. On October 15, 1944, the conservative authoritarian rule of the Hungarian Regent, Nicholas Horthy, was overthrown by the Germans, who nomi-nated their puppet, Ferenc Szalasi, an outright fascist, to rule Hungary on their behalf. The Jews of Budapest—the only ones left in the country— were shut up in a ghetto. Between November 8 and 27, about 38,000 remaining men and women from the ghetto in Budapest and those men from labor battalions who looked as though they were capable of working (and many who were quite unable to work) were marched, without food or rest, to the Austrian border to build fortifications. Between seven and ten thousand people, mostly older men and women from the ghetto, died on these marches and additional thousands in Budapest itself, where they were shot by the fascist Arrow Cross militias on the banks of the Danube.

In those last months before liberation, with food and medicines running out, a tremendous rescue operation was carried out by two groups: the neutral diplomats (or Jews who posed as such) and the underground Zion-

19 JDC/SM 55, Romanian report to Mayer via the IRC, 2/26/45; ibid., Mayer's telephone conversations with Lisbon, 2/12 and 2/13/45; ibid., Schwartz to Leavitt, n.d., on Romania, from Hotel Cornavin, Geneva.

20 Cf. Randolph L. Braham, Politics of Genocide, New York (1981); Hungarian Jewish Studies, 3 vols., New York (1966, 1969); and many others. See also my American Jewry and the Holocaust, pp. 380-99.

12 Out of the Ashes

ist groups. The foreign diplomatic effort was begun during the first period of mass deportations in the late spring by Charles Lutz, the Swiss vice-consul. In July, the Swedes sent Raul Wallenberg, a banker and a humani-tarian financed by JDC through the War Refugee Board set up by the Roosevelt Administration in January 1944, to open a special department in the Swedish legation that would try to rescue Jews. Wallenberg's exploits have since become legend. The basis of these legends is quite solid: he expanded an original agreement to protect 400 Hungarian Jews having business or family connections with Sweden by issuing Swedish protection papers (Schutzbriefe) to 4500 such people. He risked his own life innumerable times, as for instance when he rescued individuals from the death marches in November by going out on the road himself and taking people physically from the march. He also extended the protection of the Swedish legation to a number of safe houses, including children's homes.

While Wallenberg's efforts were heroic indeed, the main rescue work was done by the Swiss. Lutz extended his protection to a building called "the glass house" on Vadas Street in Budapest, where at the peak of the Arrow Cross incursions thousands found refuge. While not exposing himself to personal danger to the extent that Wallenberg did (though he, too, had a number of narrow escapes), he provided 7800 protection papers and worked together with IRC delegates from Switzerland, especially with Friedrich Bom. The IRC set up its own protection net, consisting in the main of children's homes. Other neutrals joined in: the Portuguese minis-ter and his Jewish aide, the Spanish representative, the Papal Nunciature, even the Turkish representative, all issued protection papers in varying quantities.

All these attempts would probably have failed, had there not been a Jewish group available which formed the counterpart to the neutrals. These were the Zionist youth movements, organized loosely but efficiently around a small group of young leaders—Rafi Friedl (Ben-Shalom, later Israeli ambassador to various Third World countries), Moshe Alpan (nick-named "Pi/"—elephant), Efra Teicher (Agmon), and others. They estab-lished a machinery for forging protection documents. One of the forgers was Shraga Weil, later one of Israel's foremost painters. They issued around 100,000 protection papers, false identity cards, and medical cer-tificates to protect people from forced labor. Wallenberg, Lutz, and other neutrals were aware of this and did nothing to stop it. The youth leaders ran the "glass house" and kept 92 children's homes supplied with food and medicines by the most daring exploits. They dressed in fascist militia uniforms and entered prisons or took away children being led to execution on the banks of the Danube, pretending they were carrying out orders given by the fascists. Their total strength did not exceed a few hundred members, and most of them were Slovak and Polish refugees. In a few

Liberation in Eastern Europe 13

instances their identities were discovered by the militia and they were forced to fight it out with them.21

These rescue efforts were financed in part by local sources, but these were rapidly running dry by the autumn months of 1944. JDC, in the person of Mayer, was financing most of the activity by transferring Swiss francs through the IRC or by the "apres" methods described above.22

Despite all this work and self-sacrifice by Jews and non-Jews alike, tens of thousands of people could not be saved by these means. As the Soviets encircled Budapest and the conquest of the city proceeded in December 1944 and January 1945, food became well-nigh unobtainable, medicines ran out, and the fascist regime became ever more murderous and vicious in its death throes. Thousands died of hunger or from fascist bullets before liberation. Although the youth movements devoted their best efforts to keeping the children alive, some children's homes could no longer be reached or supplied; many children died in the last few weeks before liberation or were killed in the fighting. The general population suffered a great deal too. But they were not endangered by the Arrow Cross people, and they had reserves. Many died, many more suffered, but their suffering bore no comparison with that of the 120,000 or so Jews.

Pest was liberated on January 18 and Buda on February 13. Hungarians were starving too. But many of them had contacts or relatives among the farming population from which they could obtain food. Also, they were physically in a much better condition than the Jews. Jews would not dare to go to a village for fear of murderous antisemitism and they had been emaciated by long sojourns in the enclosed ghetto or in protected houses. People were eating horsemeat as a delicacy and even rodents were eaten. Starvation among the Jews was killing off thousands after liberation. Even the youth movements, now threatened by Soviet measures because of their Zionism, seemed helpless. Most of the survivors were women and children because the men were locked away in the labor battalions. Many adults had been hiding in the last few weeks in caves and in small forested areas in the immediate vicinity of the capital. They were now returning with frozen limbs that had to be amputated in the most primitive conditions. The Soviet Army intervened and gave, from its very limited supplies, medicaments, operation theatres, and other essential equipment. Soviet medical teams contributed powerfully to the rescue work. Jews partici-pated very actively in essential reconstruction work in the capital's ruins. Jewish engineers were active in the rebuilding of electricity grids, and some of the few men left volunteered for the new national army. The first synagogue was opened for worship on February 13 in Pest.23

*f See Robert Rozett, Rescue and Rebellion in Slovakia and Hungary, PhD thesis, Hebrew University (1987); also Rafi Ben-Shalom, Ne'evaknu lema'an hahayim, Tel-Aviv (1977); also Asher Cohen, Mahteret halutzit be'Hungaria, Haifa (1984).

22 See Bauer, loc. cit. 23 JDC/Hungary, general, Report Ungam, 2/14/45.

14 Out of the Ashes

In Bucharest, Filderman and his committee had realized the problem even before the liberation of Budapest. They sent Marton to Debrecen, the temporary capital of liberated Hungary, to find out what was needed most. As early as January, Filderman sent a wagon of tomato soup as a first aid measure—it was the only thing he could get. Figures of the remain-ing Jewish population were hard to come by. Comparing the various esti-mates, the best guess seems to be that 60,000 came out of the ghetto, 50,000 came out of hiding or from protected houses. In later weeks additional thousands arrived from the labor battalions (insofar as they were not, as in Romania, deported by the Soviets to do slave labor in the USSR), and still later from deportation in Germany. Of the 110,000-120,000 liberated in February, probably at least 12,000 died of starvation and its aftereffects, despite the help that was immediately organized.24

The new Hungarian government was even more under Soviet influence than the Romanian one. Though there was a small Hungarian army fight-ing on the Allied side, the Soviet military were in total control. One of the immediate results was the arrest of Raul Wallenberg by the Soviets. What happened to him afterwards is a still unsolved mystery. He paid the heav-iest price imaginable for his unequalled humanity, probably tortured for years in Soviet jails until he died.

At first, in the flush of victory, the Soviets and Hungarian antifascists wreaked vengeance on the functionaries and torturers of the Arrow Cross regime, and also on some of the leaders of the previous authoritarian Horthy regime. Among those who were sentenced and executed were some of the worst killers of Jews, for while the Germans had planned the murder of Jews, they received the fullest cooperation from a very large number of Hungarian soldiers, gendarmes, policemen, and bureaucrats. In those first weeks, Lieutenant Colonel Gyulai, amongst others, was publicly executed in Budapest for murdering his Jewish labor battalion conscripts. In Mis-kolc, Captain Halmay, who was responsible for the shooting of 22 Jews, was also publicly executed. Similar acts took place all over Hungary.25

The first problem was to create a machinery that would again take up the work that had been undertaken by those who had done their best under the occupation to save the remnants. JDC funds had been channeled largely via the IRC delegation in Budapest during the occupation. The delegates had then given the money to designated groups: the official Judenrat (Jewish Council) which was under total German control; the Zionist Rescue Committee (Va'adah le'Ezrah Ve'Hatzalah), led by the

head of the Zionist organization, Otto Komoly, but mainly run by his

24 Interview with Dr Frederick Goeroeg, 4/19/68, O H D ; JDC/Sm 55, Fischer to Riegnjjj 2/10/45. Fischer calculates that there were 120,000 Jews alive on liberation, of whom 20, 0W died of starvation. He reported that an additional 36,000 kilos of foodstuffs had been senf "parditachement croix-rouge internationale collaboration Joint nouveaux ditachements en cours. Braham, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 1143-49.

25 See above, note 23.

Liberation in Eastern Europe 15

deputy, Dr Reszoe Rudolf Kastner; and to Kastner's opponent, the head of the religious Zionist group, Miklos Kraus, who had introduced Lutz into the business of protection papers and who, from his hiding place in the Swiss legation, had been instrumental in getting the neutrals' action going.

The Judenrat represented the type of leadership with whom the JDC was most comfortable: wealthy older people representing religious groups of different orientations, with great experience in running community life. They tended to be devoted public servants who were largely conservative in outlook and had some influence with the political heads of the country. This leadership in Hungary was represented by the heads of the orthodox and neologue (conservative-liberal) religious communities, men like Court Counsellor Samuel Stern, Karol Wilhelm, Ernoe Petoe. Unfortunately, it was precisely this leadership which had failed the Hungarian Jews. Turned into a cowed Judenrat, not understanding what was happening around them, these well-meaning men had facilitated German designs by their naivete. Personally brave, they prevented any kind of counter-action by the Jewish people. For the leadership of JDC even people like Kraus were preferable to individuals such as Kastner. A brilliant journalist, totally unknown in the community, he turned his committee into the major rescue agency under Nazi rule. He tried to negotiate for the ransom of the Hung-arian Jews, and it was his initiative that led to the discussions that took place in 1944-45 between Mayer and SS representatives, which have been described elsewhere.26 Kastner, on the other hand, was not very good as an administrator or bookkeeper, he was an improviser with a mercurial energy. His committee was formally associated with the youth movements, though the youth leaders mistrusted Kastner and never confided in him. While Mayer sent money to all groups, he had a weakness for youth groups and their leaders. But when he got to know Kastner's successor in Buda-pest, Andreas Biss, he developed a deep mistrust, and later a violent ani-mosity, to both of them. They were not his type of people—they did not know how to keep accounts, they seemed to be irresponsible with other people's money. What would Mayer do now, after liberation?

Well, there was the IRC. A new man, Hans Weyermann, was being sent to Budapest. In February he was still cooling his heels in Debrecen. Mayer and Schwartz both thought that the best strategy would be to leave the job of supplying Budapest to Filderman. Filderman would also nominate a committee in Budapest—he was nearer and would be in a better position to make decisions. The problem was that Filderman had to rely on Marton and his group to tell him what the best solutions would be for Hungary. Marton was joined from Budapest by Biss and, from within the crumbling Nazi empire, Kastner wrote to Mayer on February 15 that Komoly and three members of the Va'adah, together with the least compromised of the

26 Bauer, op. cit., pp. 408-34. OOA—8*

16 Out of the Ashes

old ieaders, Karol WiJhelm, should form the committee. The trouble was that Komoly had been murdered before liberation and the three Zionists were unknown figures.27

The type of personality that arises, apparently out of nowhere, in such circumstances is very interesting. Dr Frigyes Goeroeg was a lawyer and a bank director in Budapest before the war, presumably an assimilated Jew. As a result of the sharp anti-Jewish course the Hungarians embarked upon, he became increasingly involved in Jewish affairs and founded and ran a fund-raising organization for the neologue community to meet the increas-ing needs. He was more attuned to contacts with the Jewish world, not being an anti-Zionist like Stern, but in communal elections in 1941 he was defeated. Nevertheless, he became a kind of neologue liaison with Kastner's group. Goeroeg refused to become a member of the Judenrat, but remained in touch with its leadership, and it was he who helped Kastner get money from Stern for ransom payments to the Nazis. Because of his standing in Hungarian society, Goeroeg received special permission from Horthy not to wear the Jewish star and to move freely in Budapest. He helped the Zionist youth obtain Swiss seals so they could forge papers, and did other similar jobs for his young friends.

Upon liberation, Marton appeared in Budapest and nominated Goeroeg to head the JDC committee in Filderman's name. His committee consisted of the heads of the neologue and orthodox communities, Karol Wilhelm and a Zionist representative, Mihaly Salomon. The neologue was Lajos Stoeckler, who was replacing the discredited Stern group. The problem with Stoeckler was, as it turned out, that he was in effect an agent of the new regime, and was later seen largely as a collaborator with the communists. All this happened in February, and caused a great deal of commotion, primarily because Marton tried to have Biss on the committee, but Biss and other members of the erstwhile Va'adah were out.

It seems that Goeroeg remained unaware of the increasing tensions between Marton's organization, the Oeuvre de Secours Sud-Est Europe el Centrale, which operated under IRC's auspices, and Filderman, who had opened a branch of his committee at Timisoara on the Hungarian border and was in fact sending food to Budapest. Filderman, too, was working with the IRC. Marton's Budapest committee was formally a sub-commit-tee of the Bucharest Joint committee, with which Marton was at logger-heads. The Budapest group went under the name of "Croix Rougc--Section Secours, American Joint Distribution Committee." The only sol-ution Mayer could find was to tell the IRC at the end of March that the Budapest committee would be under Filderman. However, Mayer also approved of the Marton committee in Budapest, whereupon Filderman replied angrily on April 7 that he would withdraw unless a committee nominated by him and also headed by Goeroeg but with other members

* JDC/ SM 55 Kastner to Mayer, 2/15/45.

Liberation in Eastern Europe 17

was appointed. Schwartz intervened and rather peremptorily told Mayer to leave these things in Filderman's hands until a permanent JDC delegate arrived. Mayer complied, and at a meeting in Bucharest with the IRC, Filderman got his committee nominated and Marton, who also partici-pated, got Biss back into the picture. However, Filderman insisted that henceforth Marton's Oeuvre should have nothing to do with Budapest. The next thing that happened was that Biss arrived in Budapest with a letter from the IRC in Bucharest, according to which the committee was to consist of Wilhelm, Biss and Offenbach (a former Va*adah member). In the meantime, Weyermann was in disgrace because of a shady financial deal he had consummated with JDC funds. On 22 June, the Goeroeg committee was reconstituted. Mayer convinced Schwartz to have the IRC supervise Budapest until a permanent solution was found and so Marc Leclerc of the IRC went to Budapest to sort things out. On August 11 the parties met and a committee was constituted which received the approval of Mayer, the IRC, and finally of Schwartz: Wilhelm, Stoeckler, Offen-bach, the orthodox representative Samuel Kahan-Frankl, the Zionist rep-resentative Albert Geyer, and Goeroeg as director. Biss was out, and government pressure, through Stoeckler, was in. Bucharest control over what was happening in Budapest had ceased and Goeroeg proved himself to be an efficient and committed administrator.28

The importance of these maneuvers does not lie in the details. It lies in the rather pathetic power struggle of people, all of whom were trying to help but, vanity being what it is, wanted to be credited with whatever results would be achieved. In a real sense, these internal squabbles were a reflection of two realities. One was the chaos and disorder resulting from the terrible destruction wrought in these communities, which left people disoriented, still continuing their political fights in a vacuum, no longer representing anyone. In a way, their infighting was a way of preserving their sanity by reverting to the practices of the past. The second reality was that of the progressive takeover of the society—and with it, of the small Jewish remnant—by the communists. As the weeks passed, party members were introduced into the communal work, openly or covertly. The communities, and their American backers, were helpless in the face of these tactics.

Goeroeg's committee worked very hard. A first soup kitchen was estab-lished eight days after the liberation of Budapest. In early February, the first trainload of foodstuffs (after the tomato soup) arrived from Romania

"Interviews with Dr F. Goeroeg, 3/14 and 4/19/68; J DC/Romania, general, 1945, S. Bertrand Jacobson report, 5/17/45; JDC/ Hungary, general, 1945, Leclerc (IRC) to Mayer, 3/20/45; ibid., Filderman cable to Mayer, 4/7/45; JDC/ SM 55, Lisbon conversation 4/9/45; ibid., resignation letter of K. Wilhelm to Mayer, no date, probably late August 1945. He had had enough of the interminable intrigues, and he left all public work. Other relevant material will be found in the files cited above. Braham, op. cit., p. 1149. "ProtokoW of the 8/11/45 session in Budapest in JDC/SM Hungary files.

18 Out of the Ashes ("three days too late," as Goeroeg said in his reminiscences; many who could have been saved from starvation had died).29 An attempt was made to transfer 3000 children to the countryside, but Matyas Rakosi, the com-munist boss, said he did not want any Jewish children in the countryside. They would only stir up antisemitism. The first hospitals were equipped, food was distributed, and JDC supplied funds under IRC supervision at first, and then directly from Switzerland. By the late summer, 72,000 people had returned from Germany in 26 transports; some were people who had been deported to Auschwitz, and some men from the labor bat-talions who had been put into Nazi concentration camps. Some more came back from the USSR, and the total number of Jews was estimated at 190,000. Some 20,000 of these were converts to Christianity, either because they had thought this would protect them from deportation, or because of a real conviction. Most of these people quietly came back to the Jewish fold. Cynics argued that Jews in immediate postwar Hungary received food from the JDC, while Gentiles had no JDC. In addition, there were antisemitic pogroms, excused and tolerated by the communists. For many Jews this was a sign that the close association of Jews with the Hungarian people and its civilization was at an end.30

Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia

The tragedy of Greek Jews during the Holocaust was centered around the Jewish communities in Saloniki and the Greek Islands (mainly Rhodes and Corfu). Around 60,000 people were deported to Auschwitz and Treblinka where, except for slightly over 2000 who returned, they all perished. The large Jewish community in Saloniki, one of the oldest in the world with its working population of dockers and sailors, was destroyed. The much smaller community of Athens was saved, partly because of its members refusal to cooperate in their own destruction, partly because of significant aid received from the Church and ordinary Greeks, and partly because oi the protection afforded by the Italians and the Spanish consul.

During the bitter civil war between the royalists and conservatives (actively supported by the British) and the communists, the Jews, a tiny

29 See above, Goeroeg interviews. • r 30 Shari Reuveni, Antisemitism in Post-war Hungary, Hebrew University, I n s t i t u t eo fW.

temporary Jewry, seminar paper (1986). See Goeroeg Interviews. The figure of 72,i returnees is based on a summary of the organization of Hungarian Jewish ex-deportc » 8/31/45, in JDC/Hungary, 1945 CZusammenfassender Ausweis). According to this, 52,* returned from Germany, 2353 directly from Auschwitz, 1413 from Lichtenwoert, 14,025 from the labor battalions. Another 2100 persons were "foreigners," P r"j?"L s C , non-Hungarian Jews who had been living in Hungary before their deportation. 0 1 t ^ 37,766 were men, 34,338 women. The largest number came in June (25,678), but ev August, 9909 came back. Braham (loc. cit.) says that 11,000 came back to postwar H u n g ^ from the labor battalions, 9000 more returned to areas ceded by Hungary. 40,000 retiii $ to the provinces from Germany, 20,000 remained in Budapest, for a total of60,000 retu from the camps. The figures are very similar.

Liberation in Eastern Europe 19

remnant of some 7000 souls, played little part—though some 600 Jews had fought as guerillas, mainly in the communist ELAS/EAM forces. The Jewish Agency had a team in Greece, within an UNRRA (actually MERRA, the Middle East version of UNRRA) framework. While the Palestinian Jews could be of personal help as administrators, teachers, or medical personnel, they had no money and were subject to MERRA discipline. Hence the desire of the Athenian community, the only one that functioned reasonably well, to have American representatives come in. After some time, Israel G. Jacobson (later Gaynor I. Jacobson) was sent to Greece in March 1945 from Italy. His budget was small—$50,000 a month—but it proved sufficient for him to help reopen communal insti-tutions, establish a much-needed orphanage, and help the local community to revive its spirits. The main problem, there as elsewhere, was the resti-tution of property. Greeks had occupied Jewish houses and apartments, had acquired their shops and household goods, and had no intention of giving all this back. Unlike in Poland, where peasants tended to solve the problem by murdering the returning Jews, the Greeks simply refused to give anything back. Returnees from Nazi camps in Saloniki were forced to sleep on the floor and benches of the synagogue as late as August 1945. In the end, Jacobson persuaded the Regent, Archbishop Damaskinos, to order a return of Jewish properties to returnees, and discussions were begun on the fate of the "heirless" Jewish property, that which had belonged to Jews who had been killed. The government official who went to Saloniki to implement the order came back in a hurry; he had been threatened by those in possession that he would be killed. It took strong measures on the part of the central government to get the properties returned, slowly, over a period of time. A typical incident was that of the ornate candelabra which had been the pride of the ancient synagogue. The Archbishop of Saloniki had appropriated it to grace his own cathedral. He argued that the candelabra had been bought to grace God, which it was now doing in his cathedral. Jacobson's reply that it had not been bought to serve God in the Archbishop's cathedral, but in the synagogue, was politely ignored. In the end $100 was paid, and the candelabra restored to the community. The picture that emerges is not, however, one of a passive community being organized by an outsider, but of a community struggling to regain its feet and being helped where it needed help. Jacobson's chief aide was a young girl, Lydia Eskenazi, who 40 years later was still a member of JDC's staff and the representative of JDC in Greece.31

Bulgaria was a different story again. While 13,000 Jews in territories conquered by the Bulgarians in Greece and Yugoslavia were deported to their deaths in March 1943, the Jews of Bulgaria did not share that fate. That was due to a number of factors, chiefly the realization of the Bulgari-

31 JDC/Greece, 1945. Also, Herbert Katzki interviews, JDC (HK), interview with Gaynor I. Jacobson, 4/21/81.

20 Out of the Ashes

ans, after Germany's defeats in North Africa and Stalingrad, that the outcome of the war was by no means certain, and that it would be best to hedge their bets. The Church, the Court, the underground opposition, even significant parts of the fascist establishment, did not like the idea of deporting Jews to their deaths. It was, however, Jewish initiative—an appeal of the Jews of the town of Kyustendil to "their" fascist representa-tive in the sejm (parliament)—that began moving all these elements. Econ-omic persecutions, however, persisted. The Jews of Sofia were banned from the capital, forced labor was instituted, there were restrictions on professions and confiscations of property. All this persisted until liber-ation.

When liberation finally came with the Bulgarian surrender in early Sep-tember 1944, the Jews were destitute. The new regime, controlled by the Soviet army, dealt with everyone equally: both the local population, who had survived the war more or less intact, and the Jews, who had no jobs, no houses, and no funds. There were around 50,000 Jews in the country, with a strong Zionist element now strengthened by the desperate economic situation. No one could get into Bulgaria. The Anglo-American Mission there was helpless. But the Jewish Agency obtained permission for some of its emissaries to enter the country, and they not only began an intensive educational and social self-help program, but managed to bring in David Ben-Gurion, the towering figure of Palestinian Jewry and chairman of the Jewish Agency executive. Ben-Gurion arrived in November and his diary on the visit reflects the shock he experienced on seeing the abysmal poverty and hopelessness of the poor Jews in the slums of Sofia. His reaction was to ask the JDC to send someone to Sofia. Until then Mayer had supplied some funds to the community from Switzerland. JDC sent Manny Siegal to Bulgaria and, though increasingly under communist control, he began working to reestablish the community with JDC funds.32

American Jewish representation failed at first to get into Yugoslavia after liberation. The surviving Jews were looked after largely by Jewish Agency emissaries, by their own rather friendly government, and whatever help was needed in the first few months arrived from Switzerland. A local JDC committee was established there in July 1945, and 9919 survivors were counted.

The story, then, of the remnants of East European Jewry and the impart American Jews had on them in the months between their liberation and the end of the war, is basically one of uncertain gropings. The shock o the Holocaust was too great, both for the survivors and for the Jews outsid Europe fully to grasp the reality of what had happened. People behave as if in a trance—repeating motions that had had meaning in the Prevva

32 On Bulgaria, see also Tuvia Friling, Ben-Gurion and the Holocaust, P h D thesis, Hebrew University (1989).

Liberation in Eastern Europe 21

era in their inner-party and political struggles, in their social behavior. Testimonies dating from those days dealing with the Holocaust itself show the same type of emotionless, practical, seemingly callous attitude: "my family disappeared, now I am back," and so on. Statements were brief, as if from people who could not possibly utter what they had seen. Local leadership was either in the hands of ex-partisans and soldiers who had not gone through the experience of the camps, or in the hands of people who, while persecuted, had not been incarcerated. Kovner in Poland, Filderman in Romania, Goeroeg in Hungary, Eskenazi in Greece, and many others belonged to these categories. Survivors of the camps would take more time, with some very notable exceptions.

JDC New York stuck to the methods it had employed during the war. Washington was asked for approval for policies and allocation of human resources; the advice coming from there was followed in order to protect the legality of everything JDC was doing. The rationale was that if that line was not followed, JDC would not be able to help the multitudes. But JDC began to utilize the fact that the Jews were becoming a pressure group in American society, and this would slowly become apparent as 1945 progressed. The European end of the operation remained firmly in the hands of Schwartz and his chief lieutenants, such as Arthur Greenleigh and Herbert Katzki. Schwartz remained much more flexible, and also much more authoritative in his dealings with New York. He almost always got his way, and he came to realize early in 1945 that illegal movements of Jews were afoot in Europe, and it was not JDC's business to stop them. Jews had to be helped wherever they were, and the term "relief in transit" became accepted terminology for helping Jews who were wandering across and between "green" borders.

Liberation in Eastern Europe undoubtedly showed up the strength of the Zionists. Not only did most survivors accept the Zionist solution as the only realistic one in the face of the refusal of the Western countries to accept Jewish emigration, but young Zionists had had a major share in both fighting and rescue. Their prestige emerged unimpaired. Their struggle was now, largely, with the communist elements and these, after all, were imposed from the outside. Yet one should not underestimate the attractions of the communist solution to the remnants. Palestine was remote and dangerous; and in Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, regimes were emerging that might forever ban the spectre of antisemitism and build a socialist society of free women and men, based on the collective ownership of the means of production. There were hopes of real fellowship with the host populations, which would dissipate the strong antisemitic feelings. Communist support of antisemitic tendencies, as in Slovakia and Hungary, were mere tactical moves, until the dictatorship of the proletariat triumphed. Rich Jews, including rich American Jews, had to be opposed and rendered powerless,

22 Out of the Ashes

although their money could be utilized in the interim. This kind of think-ing attracted an important minority, and the rebuilding of the communities was colored by this problem.

An important role in all this was played by Saly Mayer. A strange man, he was undoubtedly until May 1945 largely preoccupied with the problem of how to save those who were not as yet free; a problem he defined as "11.59," or one minute to midnight, the last moment to save the remaining Jews. His handling of internal crises, such as the committee problem in Hungary, showed his weakness in analyzing internal Jewish situations. His predilection for Swiss accuracy, cleanliness, and honesty did not always serve him well. Under the surface, he was a very emotional man, with a flaring temper and a tendency to irrationality on occasion. Yet he performed his difficult task with great conscientiousness, ignoring the many enemies he made and loyally providing the funds put at his disposal to those who needed them most. His judgment on this last point cannot be gainsaid: he provided help to Romania and Hungary, where indeed were most of the European survivors of the Holocaust: 280-290,000 in Romania, and 180-190,000 in Hungary. Contrary to popular imagination, that is where most of the help provided by American Jewry went, not only in early 1945, but later as well.

CHAPTER 2

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender

The West

Armies at war do not normally welcome the intrusion of civilians into what they consider to be war zones. The forces under General Dwight D. Eisenhower that invaded France in June 1944, and had liberated the country by late August, were no exception. The same applied to Italy, where Field Marshal Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and Lord Alexander were of a similar frame of mind. American voluntary agencies were kept at arm's length as long as possible.

The basis for the treatment of what was termed "the displaced persons problem" had been defined in a series of decisions and memoranda since the founding of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (UNRRA) on November 9, 1943. Displaced persons (DPs) were defined as persons of Allied nationality living outside their countries as a result of the war. A Displaced Persons branch was set up at Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), which completed its basic instructions to the armed forces in the nick of time on June 4, 1944, two days before the D-Day invasion of France. But that order and the instructions that followed did not really involve UNRRA, with whom an agreement was signed as late as November 25, 1944. The problem was complicated by the refusal of the French Gaullist authorities to invite UNRRA to take part in the administration of French DP affairs. The French decided that they could handle on their own French DPs and foreigners who had lived in France prior to their deportation and who were now returning to France. Essentially, therefore, it was the Army that dealt with the DPs.

Typically, a group of 1500 refugees would be evacuated by train from the combat area to a selected school or public building in the interior. The train, of about thirty third-class coaches or straw-lined boxcars, would be controlled and serviced by one civil affairs officer, several soldiers, one French physician, two French nurses, and two French welfare officers. Cars were usually provided with a container for chlori-nated drinking water and a refuse can. One hot and one cold meal per day would be provided, and warm milk would be obtained for infants. . . . Train travel during

23

24 Out of the Ashes this winter was slow. A journey of no more than 100 miles frequently required several days, and severe hardship was experienced by the refugees in the unheated boxcars.

The DPs would then be led to an assembly center (usually unheated), where scuffles would occur for the allocation of rooms. Sometimes force had to be used to assure equitable distribution. Local French authorities "showed surprising skill" in administering the centers. Civil affairs personnel of the Army supplied the bare necessities such as bunks, mattresses, blankets, and so forth, but the burden of the work was borne by the local welfare people, and they performed work "for which little in the way of thanks was received from the refugees, and scant note was taken by the national authorities in Paris and Brussels."1

From a Jewish point of view, the Army's handling of the situation was typified by a statistic they published of the "Foreign Refugees" in liberated Western Europe until February 1, 1945. The total number was 247,000, among whom there were 49,700 Soviet citizens, 39,700 Poles, 31,500 Italians, 74,000 people of other nationalities, 52,100 "unspecified," and no Jews.2 There were. Jews, of course, though we do not know the number. But as early as February 1944, it had been agreed by those responsible for planning policy regarding the DPs, that Jews were not a nationality, and should neither be listed separately nor segregated in separate camps. This was largely the result of British pressure. Eisenhower's deputy in this area was Sir Frederick Morgan, no great lover of Jews, who reflected British anti-Zionist policy which had to assume—in contradiction to British policy at the time of the establishment of the Palestine Mandate after World War I—that no such thing as a Jewish people or nationality existed. Any other position would have been inconsistent with that policy.

In addition to the problem of DPs, however, there was the problem in France and Belgium of internal refugees, people displaced from their prewar homes and unable to find living quarters. Most surviving Jews in France—some 175,000—had been in hiding. They no longer owned homes. Most of them had no means to acquire homes, or for that matter to get employment. There were thousands of orphaned children who had nowhere to go. The problem was exacerbated by the fact that about one-half of the Jews in France were not French-born. Most of these had lost their French citizenship when they were disfranchised by the collaborationist Vichy government. Others had never obtained French citizenship and were considered aliens who had little claim on the generosity of France. As the autumn of 1944 turned into winter, the first few survivors of Nazi camps began trickling back to France,

1 Both this and the previous passage are from Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees, London (1957), pp. 125-26.

2 Ibid., p. 121.

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 25

liberated by the Soviets in Eastern Poland. These people belonged mostly to the latter categories, too.

From this general point of view the situation in Italy was somewhat easier. From the invasion of Sicily on July 10, 1943, and until Rome was liberated in June 1944, 50,000 non-Italian refugees were uncovered, among them about 7000 Jews, of whom 1400 had been held at the Italian camp of Ferramonti. Later, in Rome, 12,000 more Jews were found, of whom 2000 were refugees from outside Italy. By December, JDC counted 22,000 Jews in Italy.3 Before the arrival of JDC, there was the Jewish Brigade from Palestine as part of the British Army, as well as other Palestinian units. The Palestinians established in October 1944, a Center for the Diaspora (Merkaz Lagolah) composed of represen-tatives of the different units in order to have a framework of aid to those Jews they had uncovered and would uncover in the future. This unique body (it was unheard of for soldiers in combat to establish an interunit committee for aid to civilians without official authorization) extended essential aid to the Ferramonti refugees as well as to the very small Jewish communities uncovered in the southern part of Italy. The major communities in the North were to remain under German control until the end of the war.

In Italy too, the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (IGC), established in 1938 to aid stateless refugees, became active. Most non-Italian Jewish refugees were of course stateless, and the JDC for one saw to it that the IGC should not be unaware of its obligation to these people. JDC could not "undertake basic relief in liberated areas which should remain [the] responsibility [of] governmental bodies."4 There was no way whereby JDC could send representatives under its own flag to Italy. An arrangement was therefore reached with the IGC that its head in Italy, Sir Clifford Heathcote-Smith, "a rather vacuous gentle-man" as Gaynor I. Jacobson would later recall, would be the nominal chief of JDC's representatives there. IGC's Patrick S. Malin had written to the British officer for civilian affairs in Italy on February 19 that outside aid to refugees would bring disproportionately big advantages, "for example, the diminution of petty thievery and Zionist political agitation."5 Schwartz sent two men, Arthur Greenleigh and Max S. Pearlman (both of whom participated at the founding of the Merkaz Lagolah in October), and funds were provided to reestablish communi-ties. Relations between JDC and the Palestinian soldiers were very h

3 Bauer, Flight and Rescue, p. 63. Most of the Ferramonti refugees had been part of an "illegal immigration" transport to Palestine back in 1940, and their ship, the Pencho, had been shipwrecked on Rhodes. They were then transferred to Italy. For the figures, see JDC/Italy, August-December 1944, Greenleigh report, 9/25/44; and ibid., Release, n.d. (December) 1944.

* J DC/ibid., Leavitt to Pilpel, 6/2/44. 5 JDC/Italy, 1941-44.

26 Out of the Ashes

cordial at this stage. Originally, the Palestinians loaned funds to JDC until JDC's money arrived (they lent 1.7 million lire to Greenleigh). Later, the Palestinians did the work with JDC funds, $250,000 worth of which arrived in September, while Greenleigh was smoothing adminis-trative problems with the Army and the Italian administration. Some schools were reestablished, synagogues reconsecrated, and the refugees supplied with essentials.6

In October 1944, when Greenleigh was moved to France, JDC sent Reuben B. Reznik to Italy. They sent Jacobson to join him in Italy in December. The relationship between the two men was decidedly uneasy, and Jacobson remained for only four months. Camps for refugees who were now arriving from Yugoslavia were established in the south at and near Bari. A first ship with 900 legal immigrants was . made ready for Palestine. Jacobson's relationships with both the Palestinians and with the local Italian communities were very good. Italian Jews had helped Jewish refugees from elsewhere during the war, and had established a special committee, DELASEM, for that purpose. Poor themselves, living in unheated Rome slum apartments in the winter, these natural aristocrats gave unselfishly of themselves for the refugees in the camps. A school was founded in Rome, a hospital was reestablished, an old age home was set up, with relatively little money. The DPs set up their own committees in each camp, and insisted on being treated with respect. With considerable ingenuity they bettered their material con-ditions, largely by themselves, a phenomenon that would later be repeated in Germany and Austria. The relations with the US Army were excellent, and Jacobson had no problems with procuring the small amount of supplies he needed.7 i

Back in France, the situation was much more difficult. The numbers were much larger, the persecution had been incomparably harder and longer. There, were, however, local organizations emerging from the underground without whom total chaos would have reigned. Under German rule, a Judenrat had been established as in other countries in 1941. In France it was called the UGIF, (Union Generate des Israelites de France) and it had a history of attempts at maintaining independence on the one hand, and of yielding to German demands on the other. It was not as discredited as some of the Judenraete in Eastern Europe because it had developed parallel, illegal, bodies to its official, legal

6 J DC/Italy, August-December 1944, Greenleigh reports, 9/19,10/21,10/22, Pearlman, 9/11/44. However, even Greenleigh was eager to maintain JDC's supremacy in the welfare field. On 8/20 he wrote that "Max has also written to you about the assistance given refugee5

by Palestinian units before we were permitted in Italy. The impression is given in some quarters that the Palestinians are doing the job for which JDC exists. They have been very friendly with us and cooperative but the inference is nevertheless there."

7 JDC/ Interview with Gaynor I. Jacobson (HK), 4/14/81. Also ibid., Italy, general. 1944-45.

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 27

departments. The main Jewish prewar welfare organization, the CAR (Comite dyAssistance aux Refugies), had become a department of the UGIF, and maintained that function until liberation for those French Jews who had no other choice but to turn to the UGIF despite the fact that the Germans in 1943-44 were picking up any Jews who came to officially recognized and known offices. JDC had supported CAR as part of UGIF. JDC had also supported the underground bodies, such as the CGD (Comite Generale de Defense), established by the FSJ (Feder-ation des Societes Juives), the pro-Zionist organization of East European Jews in France, the socialist Bund group, and the communists. The latter, without outside help, had conducted large-scale welfare work among the hidden Jews. JDC, on the other hand, had supported the armed, non-communist underground, such as the AJ (.Armeejuive, also known as the Organisation Juive de Combat) led by Zionists; the Scouts (.Eclaireurs), a traditionally-minded Jewish youth movement with increas-ingly pro-Zionist tendencies; and, mainly, the OSE (Oeuvre Secours pour Enfants).8

Faced with this welter of factional organizations, JDC had maintained a policy of general support to all but the communist groups (who, incidentally, never requested any help). Contrary to New York's policy, Schwartz had not only supported the AJ, an armed underground, but had nominated its treasurer, Jules (Dyka) Jeffroykin, who was also a leader of FSJ, to be the treasurer of the underground JDC. When Dyka left France in May 1944, Maurice Brenner assumed both responsibilities. When Paris was liberated in August, therefore, Brenner was in the city using the remnants of funds that had remained with him from the clandestine period.

It so happened that the son of JDC's founder, Edward M. M. Warburg, landed in France as an officer of the US Army six days after D-Day. Warburg had served as chairman of JDC until the United States entered the war. He then enlisted as an ordinary private, went through basic training and then became an officer in the DP division of the army. His story is best told in his own words:

The first night we were ashore, we had 3000 people to take care of and they represented 47 nationalities, including a Chinese gentleman who somehow got mixed into it. The War Department in its great brilliance had a DP form which you were meant to fill out in triplicate, and was to be filled out in the language of the registrant. . . . I had great delight in turning to this poor overworked enlisted man and [I] had him hand these cards to everybody . . . and the Chinese gentleman wrote across the face of all the questions, with possibly some violent sentiments about the Americans— I don't know, I could not read Chinese—and after he got all through with making

8 See Leo Wulman, In Fight for the Health of the Jewish People, New York (1968). OSE was founded in Russia in 1912 as the Obshchestvo Zdravoochranenya Evreev (Organization for the Protection of the Health of Jews), and had for over 20 years engaged in general medical work—in Poland through its affiliate, T O Z . In France it had developed largely into a child care agency.

28 Out of the Ashes these beautiful characters all over the face of this thing, I handed it over to the Corporal and said, "OK, make that in triplicate." We came to Paris [on September 9J. My cousin Eric Warburg, Max Warburg's son,9 was a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army, although he had been a citizen in Germany . . . He probably became the most important interrogation officer, both in North Africa and later in Europe . . . and he ended up with the 48-hour interrogation of Goering. . . . [In Paris] I suddenly saw at the Petite Palais the sign of the 8th Air Force . . . he was with the 8th Air F o r c e . . . I stopped my jeep, got out of the car and looked into the basement windows which have these big grills and, of all the funny things, I saw my cousin Eric, fast asleep on the floor. So I screamed "Attention!" and he jumped to his feet in a good Prussian way and then saw who it was and said, "My God, what are you doing here," and I said, "I don't know, and what are you?" And he said, "Oh no . . . you have got to do something about the Jewish refugees in this town." . . . So I went to the Rue de Teheran, to the JDC office. Here I was in my helmet, the clothes I had been sleeping in for almost a month, and my .45 on my belt and I walked in there and there was an old gentleman with an ear trumpet sitting in there, and I asked "Who is in charge here?" And he said "Mr . Brenner" . . . Brenner came over and I said to him, "By agreement between us before the w a r . . . you would borrow money on the basis of last month's budge t . . . Have you tried to borrow money since liberation?" And he said, " N o . " I said, "Could you?" And he said "I think I could, but I have not the authority" and I said, " I will give you the authority," and he said, "Who are you?" and I said, " I am Captain Warburg." Then he did the nicest thing that ever happened to me in my whole life because I have always existed in the reflected glory of somebody else.10 He said to me, "What relation are you to Edward Warburg?""

According to Warburg's reminiscences, Brenner managed to borrow about $60,000 and the SHAEF administration in Paris was glad to be rid of the Jewish problem: Brenner opened a soup kitchen immediately and others soon followed. Warburg got the authorization from JDC in New York by sending a message to Paul Baerwald through a British Army Officer, Lord Victor Rothschild, who had the cable sent from London. "So here," Warburg said 20 years later, "here are the Roths-childs and Warburgs playing games again in an entirely different field."

From the point of view of the Jewish refugees, as well as from that of the Army, France and Belgium were one uniti The sweep of the Allied attack in the late summer of 1944 had liberated Belgium and a small corner of Holland, and Army administration was basically the same in both countries. The fate of the Jews of Belgium during the Holocaust bore many similarities to that of the Jews in France. In Belgium, the percentage of foreigners was much larger than in France. In France, it was roughly half, whereas in Belgium only 7 percent of the Jews had been Belgian citizens in 1940. Of the 66,000 Jews in Belgium in October 1940, about 29,000 had been deported and only an insignificant number were to come back. The rest had been saved by a

' The Warburg family (originally a Sephardic family that had come to Germany from Italy) were living in Hamburg, owners of one of the largest private banks in Germany. There were five brothers, one of them was Felix M. Warburg, founder of the JDC: another was Max Warburg, who remained with the Hamburg branch until he was forced to flee to the United States in 1938. His son is Eric Warburg.

10 The allusion is to his father, of course. " Interview with Edward M. M. Warburg, 4/18/67, O H D .

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 29

combination of Jewish initiative and massive Belgian support. At the head of the underground agency that had organized the rescue of adults and children, the CDJ (Comite de Defense des Juifs) stood a non-Jewish Belgian Professor, Emile Allard. The Jewish members of the committee, which had been set up by the Jewish communist leader, Abraham Ghert Jospa, came from the different ideological groups which there, as everywhere else, characterized Jewish public life. .

Many Jews tried to leave Belgium after liberation, and it seems that the number of those which remained was about 23,000. Of these, initially 2900 were children who had to be looked after, 800 of whom were orphans. More children, however, were still in Gentile homes or Christian institutions, and a problem arose that became one of the central issues in all of JDC's work: how to return to the Jewish people children who had been handed over to non-Jewish families or institutions by desperate parents who feared deportation and death. In many cases the foster-families claimed they had been told by the parents not to surrender the children except to them on their return. Meanwhile, bonds had been established between the foster-parents and the children, and neither of them were inclined to leave each other. In some cases the parents had said—possibly in order to save their children—that the children should be kept until their parents' return, but if the parents were not to return, they agreed that the children could be raised as Christians, perhaps because the parents had no wish to have their children suffer what was happening to them. The other side of the story was, of course, that the Jewish groups and representatives saw the destruction of their people continuing, though in a "nice" way: not only were the parents murdered, but the children were to be enticed away from their heritage. In Belgium, as well as in France, some children had been converted while in hiding—they did not, of course, have any choice in the matter. Slowly, with the help of sympathetic Gentiles, children were brought back into the Jewish fold, either by paying compensation for the effort and money and time the hiding of the children had cost the rescuers, or by outright ransom, and sometimes by instituting legal action. The preferred way was to find a relative who would come and claim the child.

By early 1945, the number of children in Belgium had grown to 3100. In addition, 7000 adults had to be fed and supported and JDC did not get an American representative into Belgium until early in 1945. The monthly allocation by JDC was $70,000 in the autumn, and this grew to $85,000 during the first months of 1945. However, JDC was not sure whether its 1945 expenditure could be maintained at the same levels as those of the previous year. For May, June, and July of 1945 the budget was going to be progressively cut. In April, Schwartz demanded a minimum of $91,000, and by that time JDC had been able to send

30 Out of the Ashes

Laura Margolis to take over the Belgian program. Margolis demanded more money in very persuasive messages. JDC decided to send over its representative from London, a member of the Executive and Adminis-tration Committees, Commander Harold F. Linder. Linder advised that there was no choice: JDC could not abandon the Belgian community, and the figure was raised to $110,000. That money was used to maintain soup kitchens and some of it was also allocated to ransom the children. In New York, this was opposed by many of the lay leaders of JDC. This was missionary work, they said. Schwartz was enraged. He con-fronted his lay people back home and forced them to agree to put a major emphasis on this program.12 The pattern was the same as in Italy and, as we shall see, in France: children had priority, then came feeding the hungry, spiritual needs, clothing, and long-term programs such as education.13 Again, as in Greece, for instance, the actual work was done by the local community. They were forceful and well-organized from their underground days. But they needed both the funds and the American prestige with the newly reconstituted Belgian authorities. Also, as Allard pointed out very forcefully to Schwartz, antisemitism was prevalent in Belgian society because of German propaganda, and because of the strains and stresses of the occupation period which caused an increase of xenophobic tendencies generally. American prestige could help there as well.14

Generally, getting American personnel "called forward" from Paris was a big problem. As we have seen, the Army was not inclined to have these civilians getting into its way, and it took another intervention on the part of Warburg, together with pressure from New York, to get Margolis to Belgium at the end of March 1945.15 The first weeks of her work there were consumed, as we have seen, with the problem of the children and basic feeding of the survivors. But soon, even before the war had ended, repatriated Jews began to arrive, very small numbers of persons who were being sent back from Nazi camps as these were liberated by the Allied armies. They came by train or even, later on, by plane. Again, a situation arose—and what was true of Belgium was equally true of France—that is best described by a personal memoir:

u Interview with Joseph J. Schwartz, 5/14/68, O H D . lJ J DC/AC, 10/31/44,5/16 and 5/22/45; Excom, 6/20/45, report by Schwartz. " Ib id . 15 Interview with Edward M. M. Warburg: "I t became very obvious to me that they

needed very much to have a Jewish presence. . . . I realized that it was essential that the JDC come in soon and so I started things going through military channels and coordinated with Baerwald who started it going through Jack McCloy in Washington, and finally Joe Schwartz came over and after that Laura Margolis was assigned to Belgium." T h e descrip-tion may not be totally accurate, but it gives a sense of the pressures needed f rom both sides to get JDC personnel into the liberated areas. It provides some kind of an answer to the often heard complaint of survivors that JDC tarried so long and was not there at the begin-ning when it was so sorely needed.

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 31 . . T h e railroad station was jammed with relatives, certain that this trainload, or

this planeload, would contain the missing members of their families. And after all these fantastically moving reunions took place, there always stood at the end of the platform there, a small group of people whom you knew did not have any relatives. Their relatives were part of the ash heaps of the crematoria, and they had no place to go because, if they had homes in Brussels, the chances were that we were living in them, we, the mili tary, because we took over the Germans ' billets and they had taken them f rom the Jews for the most p a r t . . . They looked out—these walking skeletons in their striped uniforms—looked out at the conscience of the world and you could practically hear it being said, " w h o the hell gives a d a m n . ' " 6

The situation in France was more complicated than that in Belgium, although Arthur Greenleigh had been working for JDC there since October 1944. As had so often been the case in its prewar work, JDC had to assume the role of the mediator and organizer in a factionalized Jewish community. Despite attempts at cooperation during clandestine oper-ations, there were bitter disputes between the resistance factions, and between them and what remained of the old social elite of French Jewry. The government had taken over a welfare agency established during the occupation by the underground to look after the welfare problem of the "resistants" and the victims of Nazi persecutions, called COSOR (Comite Social des Oeuvres de la Resistance). But the assistance given was not on a monthly basis and, more importantly, COSOR discriminated against foreign-born people. While this affected Italians, Poles, and others, the numbers of Jews who had claim to such assistance was very considerable, and COSOR argued it did not have the funds to help. After protracted negotiations, COSOR finally agreed not to discriminate between French-born and aliens in Paris, but it still did so in the provinces. Again, COSOR only gave single payments. JDC had to look after the Jewish victims on a permanent basis, first by giving them food, medication, and housing, and then by helping them rebuild their lives. But JDC was not, at least in France, an operating agency. It distributed its funds to others who did the actual work, and then supervised and monitored their activities. JDC estimated that in the last three months of 1944, 35,000 persons had received regular monthly assistance. The total amount spent by JDC in France during that period was over $800,000 (FFR 40 million). The child care program was just falling into place, but there were 8000 children to

16 Interview with Edward M. M. Warburg. The fact of the amazing recovery and vitality of the majority of these survivors is not the subject of this work, but is brought out very well in a story Warburg relates (ibid.): " I remember many years later being at a very dull reception at the American Legation in Tel-Aviv, and having to shake hands with endless numbers of people, Israelis as well as American functionaries. And suddenly a man came up to me and said, 'Well, Mr. Warburg, do you remember m e ? ' . . . and I said 'No, I 'm afraid I can't remember. Help me out, what is your name?' He said, 'No , no, do you remember my face?' I said 'I will have to admit that I don't even remember that , ' and he said, 'Thank God. ' And I said, 'What do you mean, thank God?' 'Well, ' he said, ' the last time we saw each other, you carried my stretcher. ' And he had been one of the persons that I carried out of the railroad station. And here he was, a very prosperous, functioning . . . healthy, delightful man, having made the transition; how, one never knows."

r

32 Out of the Ashes

be taken care of, many of them orphans, and here lay, as we have seen already, a main emphasis of the JDC. With both adults and children, JDC supported all groups that were of any help, from the Lubavicher Chassidim (AID—Association des Israelites Pratiquants) to the communist UJRE (Union des Juifs pour la Resistance et VEntr'Aide). For the purpose of recovering Jewish children from Christian homes and institutions, a special committee was set up at JDC's request through the Consistoire, the traditional religious organization of French Jewry.17

The main child care agency was the OSE, who set up three children's homes in the south immediately upon liberation. The Swiss government, who had sheltered Jewish children during the occupation, immediately began returning these children to France before anyone was ready to receive them. In batches of 75, they were brought to Lyon and there was really no one to look after them. In Paris, in the meantime, a central OSE office was set up, headed by Georges Garel, the wartime hero who had organized the hiding of thousands of children. Quickly, eleven homes and four medico-social centers for children and adults were opened and OSE began caring for 750 orphans. There was no problem about returning children from deportation; after the end of the war, only one child came back of the tens of thousands that had been deported. Because of the close relations between OSE and tht Eclaireurs (Scouts), additional facilities were set up in cooperation between these two agencies.18

As 1945 progressed towards the end of hostilities, Greenleigh was trying hard to get more help from the French government and unite the warring agencies for more effective action. In a polite but sharp encounter with COSOR in April, JDC was told that COSOR would have to discontinue aid to non-French families, whereupon Greenleigh announced that JDC for its part would discontinue any aid to families of deportees after the end of May. "I find that I have to play a bit of poker with these agencies or we shall never get from under a load that should never be ours. Naturally you know that if nothing is done for our people, I shall find some excuse to go on giving them assistance on a temporary basis." The "temporary basis" was to last a long time. Another problem was the fact that in France, just as in most other liberated countries, the government was in no hurry to return their confiscated property to the Jews. "Alien" Jews, those who were either non-French born or without French citizenship, who had been living in France before the war, were in an even worse position. Many were arrested because they had false papers from their underground days. German Jews who had managed to elude the Gestapo during the occu-pation were now considered to be enemy aliens and some of them were arrested and put into the infamous Drancy camp from which tens of thou-sands of Jews had been deported to their deaths in Poland, and which now

17 JDC/France, general, 1944-47, Report for France for last quarter , 1944. 11 Wulman, op.cit., pp. 75-85.

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 33

held pro-Nazi French collaborationists.19 To change this situation was not really JDC's job, and Greenleigh recognized this. American pressure would be counter-productive, but finally, after a long process, French Jews and non- Jewish French intervention brought about the return of the property. The importance of this for all the Jewish welfare agencies was obvious: as long as Jews had no economic basis from which to start rebuild-ing their lives, the call on outside bodies such as the JDC would be over-whelming.

As for the internal struggles of Jewish agencies, these were motivated largely by ideology. Each group engaged in "empire-building," repeating services already offered by others, in order to increase what in many cases was political influence on the recipients of this help. Thus, a subagency of FSJ, for instance, was planning to aid children who were already with their parents (JDC was channeling aid through the parents), and to duplicate medical centers already operating in the same areas by OSE.20

One of Greenleigh's main tasks, therefore, was to try and unite the Jewish agencies. There were, in January 1945, three main agencies: CAR, CGD, and FSJ (which had split off from the Bundist and communist-oriented CGD). With Greenleigh acting as mediator, a united agency was set up in lengthy negotiations, called COJASOR (Comite Juif d'Action Sociale etde Reconstruction). Its director general was Maurice Brenner, and it became operative in March. By 30 June, its case load was 24,287, of whom 3453 were returnees from camps and ex-POWs. In effect, the case load had remained constant since earlier in the year and it meant that close to 15 percent of French Jewry were on relief. Of these, about 35 percent were French-born, and 65 percent were not. Nearly one-third of the recipi-ents were children. The number of 8000 children aided had not been reduced. COJASOR operated four shelters for the homeless and two convalescent homes for returnees from deportation. This in itself was a reflection of the government's policy on these returnees: they were given a shelter for two days and a single payment of 7000 francs ($140). For French people this was enough—there was a family, there were friends, there were local communities to reestablish the person in civilian life. For obvious reasons, this was not so for Jews. Also, aliens did not have labor permits and Jewish agencies had a hard time solving that problem. The basic policy was that COJASOR served as a central agency through whom JDC channeled its funds. The level of JDC expenditure had been reduced from $800,000 in the first quarter of 1945 to $200,000 in July, but by then JDC had become better organized.21

19 Jewish Telegraphic Agency (JTA), February 1945, reports by Victor M. Bienstock. Also ibid., 9/26/44.

20 See above, note 8. 21 See footnotes 12 and 13 above and JDC/F ranee 1944—47, "Relief Situation in France,

January through June 1945"; also, ibid., Greenleigh to Leavitt, 4/7/45.

34 Out of the Ashes

Germany and Austria On January 12,1945, the great Soviet offensive began that liberated most of Poland within a week, and which then switched to Hungary and Austria. Despite the setback in the West caused by the German Ardennes offensive in December, Hitler's Thousand-Year Reich was nearing its end. In the steadily contracting territory still under Nazi sway, there were millions of slave workers, deportees and concentration camp inmates. The size of the problem was overwhelming. A count made after liberation of United Nations civilians that needed care and/or repatriation came to 13,664,660 persons liberated by the Western Allies and the Soviets. Among them were those freed from the concentration camps. Their number is very hard to calculate, because no accurate statistics were kept of these people. In order to find out the fate of the Jews among this group and how they fared upon liberation, we must take a look at their history in the last months prior to May 8, 1945.22

The number of concentration camp inmates for January 1945 was given by the Nazis themselves as 714,211 (511,537 men and 145,119 women). However, this figure is not credible for May 1945. The reasons are that, firstly, the January count had been held in circumstances that did not enable the Germans to have real control over their figures. Second, the count clearly did not include many of the slave labor camps that were attached to concentration camps or became assimilated to them in the last months of the war. Third, additional multitudes were caught up in the concentration system during these months: for instance, Hungarian Jew-ish labor battalions, an estimated 60,000 of whom were sent to the Maut-hausen concentration camp in Austria together with other Jews. German civilians, mainly women, were sent to the camps because of the dissatis-faction they expressed with the war; Soviet POWs who had been in special camps were now sent to concentration camps. For all these reasons it is logical to assume that the number of concentration camp inmates was larger in January, and then increased until March-April—the total might well have been around the one million mark—but diminished as a result of events that we now have to describe.23 .

On July 24,1944, the Soviets liberated the concentration camp of Mai-danek at Lublin in eastern Poland. Western as well as Soviet journalists reported on the horrors uncovered there, but while some of this was reported in the Western press, it is safe to say that little of it was believed. Nevertheless, there appear to be some indications that the Germans decided, in the wake of Maidanek, not to let any concentration camp prisoners fall into the hands of the Allies. We do not have any explicit overall German orders in our hands that would clarify this picture. What

11 Proudfoot, op.cit., p. 159. " For this and the following paragraphs, see Yehuda Bauer, "Death Marches," in: Mod-

em Judaism, Vo\. 3, no. 1 (February 1983), pp. 1-22.

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 35

is clear, however, is that orders were given to camp commanders to evacu-ate the prisoners if Allied forces were too near. Yet there were some contra-dictions: thus, in Auschwitz and a few other places the sick were left to be liberated by the Allies, which would contradict a German policy of not permitting the truth about the camps to be revealed. On the other hand, the evacuation policy itself presents the problem as to what the Germans intended to do with the prisoners. German behavior made the use of pris-oners for slave labor unlikely. Long columns of prisoners were marched across the diminishing Reich, or were loaded onto open boxcars in the wintry conditions without food or even water and shunted back and forth over the deteriorating railroad network of the Nazi domain. On the foot-marches, anyone lagging behind was summarily shot. On the waggons, the dead were occasionally removed and disposed of, usually between stations.

The large-scale marches started with the evacuation of Auschwitz on January 18, where 60,020 prisoners were marched off into the snow and ice of western Poland and east Germany equipped with a small loaf of bread and some marmalade. During the next weeks they did not receive much else. Evacuations then proceeded from camps such as Stutthof on the Baltic, Gross-Rosen in Silesia, various small camps in east Germany and Bohemia, then from Flossenbiirg in Bavaria, Buchenwald in Thurin-gia, and a host of other, subsidiary camps. These marches, by prisoners dressed in thin striped pajamas and wearing wooden shoes, caused the most terrible suffering one can imagine. The columns were guarded in part by experienced SS guards from the camps of origin, but increasingly by newly-recruited personnel, men and women who were brought into the SS specifically for that purpose. Although it should have been clear to them that the war was drawing to an end—and perhaps it was clear to them—their behavior was brutal in the extreme. Only weeks previously, they had been schoolboys or schoolgirls, ordinary soldiers or housewives: now they were sadistic murderers.

The question must be asked as to the purpose of these marches: why did they not just transfer the groups to reception camps? Why did they transport people from Flossenbiirg to Regensburg, a distance of 80 kilo-meters to the south, by marching them for three weeks north and then south, a total distance of 420 kilometers. Of course, of the 800 prisoners, only a small remnant was alive by that time. Why were about 1000 Jewish girls marched from Nowa Sol (Neusalz) in Silesia to Bergen-Belsen in the north of Germany from January 21 to March 24, with less than a half reaching their destination, having wandered through south Germany and then in open waggons through the whole of the country. Why was another trans-port of 1000 Jewish girls marched from Neustadt in northern Silesia to near Plzen in western Bohemia, crisscrossing northern Bohemia several times, until after two months of marching only 108 girls were left? They

36 Out of the Ashes

were shot at a place called Nyrsko in Bohemia, but 14 girls escaped to tell the story.

The only acceptable explanation for this behavior is that the Nazis wanted to get rid of as many "enemies of the Reich" as possible. They no longer had gassing installations at their disposal, and mass-shootings on German territory might have provoked untoward reactions. The alterna-tive was marching people to death. There had been a precedent for this in the Armenian massacres in Turkey in 1915-16, but whether in early 1945 the Nazis were conscious of this precedent is not clear. The death marches were therefore the means of executing a policy of mass murder. The Allies must have known about these marches, but a fairly detailed examination of intelligence sources of the Western Allies has failed to unearth more than a few hints here and there. Allied attention was directed towards their POWs, who were also marched from their camps inward into Germany, sometimes in the same trains or even foot marches as the camp inmates— though the POWs received food and drink, of course. For the Allies, the camp inmates were simply of no interest.

An analysis of those death marches that we have so far been able to undertake shows that almost all camp inmates had to undergo this awful experience—the exceptions being some of the prisoners at Buchenwald, and the inmates of Bergen-Belsen (that is those who were there before February 1945) and perhaps some inmates in a few smaller camps. But the majority of the one million detainees were marched. The second point is that in this case, mass murder was directed at all "enemies of the Reich," not specifically at Jews—though we do find that in many places Jews were treated worse, given even less bread than others and, in a number of cases, simply segregated from the others and murdered. Moreover, as Jews had been the lowest of the low in the camps, they probably incurred more fatalities than the rest.

How many Jews were there in the camps before the death marches started and how many were added in the months up to liberation? From various indications it would seem there were over half a million. A rough calculation of the percentages of victims in those death marches on which we have figures would indicate that some 59 percent of the marchers and those in the camps in the last stages (including 50,000 at Bergen-Belsen) died. If, however, the losses among Jews were bigger, then we must assume that over 60 percent of the Jews perished. That figure tallies with the approximate figure of the Jews who were finally liberated from among the camp inmates: 200,000. Over 70,000 of these were Hungarian Jews.24

Liberation of the camp inmates and marchers was a chaotic process. Most of it occurred in the period between early April and May, because

14 Ibid. More research is needed on many of these points. In my book Flight and Rescue I have estimated the number of Jewish camp survivors at 75,000 (p. 43). This is definitely erroneous.

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 37

the Nazis had brought them into the interior area of the Reich. People were liberated from trains, on the edge of woods and in small German villages, usually after their guards had made a getaway at the last minute. Many of them fled from their captors at the very last moment. The camps were liberated and the scenes in them have remained a matter of record. Auschwitz had been liberated on January 27, Buchenwald on April 11-12, Bergen-Belsen on April 15, Dachau on April 29, and Mauthausen on May 3. Theresienstadt was not liberated until one day after the end of the war on May 9.

We have seen that the free world, including the Jews, had detailed information about the fate of the Jews in the concentration camps, and about the mass murder that occurred in the death camps. But there was a gap between that information and knowledge, that is, the acceptance of the information as true. One could read what was happening in the camps in the New York Times or in the Chicago Tribune. Jewish periodicals carried further details. The World Jewish Congress did a splendid job in trying to make this information available to all and sundry. But only relatively few people, especially in the US Army, actually believed the stories. Despite all the preparations, Gentiles and Jews both reacted with shock, and claimed they had known nothing about what was being uncovered. The reaction was generally one of enraged numbness. Did the soldiers, the politicians, the representatives of organizations who seemed to be so unprepared for what they now saw, really not know what they were about to discover? In a deeper psychological sense, they really did not know, despite all the information they had received. When a Jewish chaplain in the US Army claimed he had not been prepared for what he saw in the camps, he was being truthful. He had read about the camps, but had repressed the infor-mation which, if true, might have rendered him incapable of doing what he was doing. Realizing this situation, General Eisenhower, on uncovering the first SS camp in the American area of operations (Ohrdruf on April 5), ordered his generals to come and view it themselves. When Buchenwald was liberated, Eisenhower took the initiative to ask soldiers, pressmen, and Congress people from Washington to come and see it, so that nobody should ever be able to say that the horror had been invented or exaggerated. It helped a bit, but not much. Gaynor I. Jacobson was to recall much later of his Quaker friends in Italy:

although they were very helpful in the camps [they] refused to believe the Holocaust had taken placc. . . . We were dealing with survivors—there would be husbands talking about their dead wives and children killed by the Nazis, or orphans telling about their murdered parents and siblings. And I recall sitting around a wood-burning stove with my Quaker friends and I'll never forget we were discussing the Jewish refugees, displaced concentration camp victims, and they—the Quakers—to a person, refused to believe that—remember this is March 1945—that there were killings of Jews in the camps. And they kept saying that this is not anything but propaganda, like the stories of what happened with the Belgians in World War I. And no matter what I would say, they would say, "well, they've been taught to say that." I said: "talk to people, where are

38 Out of the Ashes their wives and children?" They said, "oh well, they'll show u p , " that sort of thing. . . . these were well-meaning goyim, non-Jews, Quakers.25

This gap between information and knowledge was not peculiar to "goyim." Dr Benjamin N. Brook, a devoted and successful JDC worker in Italy in 1945, claimed "that certainly in the United States, I don't think we knew about it. . . .There had always been pogroms, persecutions. . . . But the qualitative difference between this and what had taken place in the camps. . . . Speaking for myself, I certainly didn't know about it. . . . if we had had more open communications—you see, I think some of these things came in to the United States and were hidden. . . . People were just unaware, and when they heard something pretty awful they either thought it was exceptional or an exaggeration." The speaker was himself unaware of the contradiction in what he was saying: there were "pretty awful" stories, after all, so it was not "hidden."26 Another relevant story appeared in the London Daily Mail on April 28, 1945. Major General Templer, the British Director of Military Government and Civil Affairs at Montgo-mery's headquarters, spoke at a press conference in Paris. He had had a conversation with his barber that morning. "About those atrocity stories and those terrible pictures," said the barber, "is there any truth in them?" General Templer confessed he was shocked. The barber then said he was skeptical, and added that when he went into a pub in Wimbledon none of his friends there believed a word of the stories from Belsen, Gotha and Buchenwald.

People tend to reject knowledge that may endanger their mental, social, or cultural balance, or their hope for life. Young people will believe more easily than older ones, poets and visionaries may be easier to convince than others, but even seeing things with their own eyes does not always suffice. Even when the facts of the Holocaust were accepted, officials and army personnel often wanted to get over this knowledge quickly, and move on to everyday considerations. This was a serious problem for American Jewish representatives.

When the horrors were revealed, Jewish reaction tended to go to the other extreme. We find leaders—in Jewish Palestine, for instance—saying that these survivors were destroyed physically and morally, and that they would remain an endless burden on the Jewish people. In fact, the opposite was true. Survivors showed remarkable resilience, and organization for the post-liberation period took place in some cases before liberation. In

25 JDC/ Jacobson interview (HK), 4/14/81, p . 14. 26 JDC/Interview with Dr Benjamin N. Brook (HK) , pp. 15-16. See also JDC/France,

1944,9/8/44 letter of Maurice Brenner to Schwartz—"Over 100,000 were deported to an unknown destination, which must have meant death to many [sic] of them. . . . Problem of tracing the 100,000 deportees is also very important ." And Dyka Jeffroykin reported on 11/24 (ibid.) that "it is impossible to obtain any direct or indirect word in regard to those who were deported." Three weeks previous to this, the New York Times printed the harrowing Auschwitz report which directly related to the death of almost all the deportees.

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 39

Dachau, a group of Lithuanian Zionists wrote a newspaper by hand, called Nitzotz (Glimmer), before liberation. On June 9, a Zionist group was founded in Bavaria by Yitzhak Rattner, of the Dachau group, while he was still recovering in hospital. In Bergen-Belsen, within the first week after liberation, a camp committee emerged under the leadership of Yos-sele Rosensaft, a doughty survivor of Auschwitz. In most camps Jewish committees were established that tried to organize the survivors.

One of the major influences on the survivors was exercised by the Jewish chaplains in the US Army, and to a lesser extent by their equivalents in the British Forces. This was already true in Italy and France, though the possibilities of action by rabbis in uniform were extremely limited there. American chaplains had been recruited through the Jewish Welfare Board under Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein from the three main denominations— Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform. Their main task was to look after the spiritual well-being of Jewish soldiers. They had not been prepared for looking after skeletons from concentration camps. Yet, in the absence of any Jewish organization in "forward areas" on VE-Day, they became, willy-nilly, the representatives of the Jewish world to the survivors. Most of them were second generation Americans with some knowledge of the Yiddish language, and they could therefore make themselves understood to the survivors. Some were first generation Americans, themselves from the countries and the communities of the survivors. Their Army uniforms bore the insignia of the tablets of the Law, and they were the first Allied soldiers identified as Jews that many of the survivors saw. The morale boost they provided was inestimable. Their behavior towards the sur-vivors, in almost all cases, was exemplary. For the first time, many of the people they came in touch with felt a deep human concern with their fate.

One of them, a young Reform rabbi, Abraham J. Klausner, accidentally happened to be assigned to the 116th Evacuation Hospital Unit which was stationed in Dachau. He arrived there probably in the third week of May. After a short period of disorientation and shock, he began, first of all, to collect the names of the survivors and then published them so that remain-ing family members might find each other. He then proceeded to help a group of survivors found in the hospital-monastery of St Ottilien in Bavaria at the end of hostilities. They gained control of the hospital, to which Klausner then transferred many of the sick from Dachau. Working together with a young Kovno doctor, Dr Zalman Grinberg, he then became instrumental in establishing on July 1, a Central Committee of Liberated Jews for the American Zone of Occupation in Germany and Austria (the Austrian camps soon set up an independent body). A first all-Jewish camp had come into existence at Feldafing, with Lieutenant Irving Smith (a Jew) as commander. Smith and Max Braude, the Jewish chaplain of the 7th Army, supported the idea of all-Jewish camps largely for prag-matic reasons—there were constant tensions between non-Jewish and Jew-OOA—C

40 Out of the Ashes

ish inmates of the camps. This was in direct contradiction to Army instructions which precluded any separate Jewish camps. Klausner then moved to Munich, where he took over the Deutsches Museum, a ruined but still imposing building in the city. In that building and under his protection as an American officer, the Central Committee of the Liberated Jews in Bavaria opened shop. The relationship between Klausner and "the people," as he called them, was unique. He completely identified with them and with their ways, and they accepted him as one of their own. Their drive was for independence, restoration of their human dignity, and they would not accept a condescending attitude from anyone. They were inventive and energetic. On the other hand, Klausner showed them ways of outwitting and circumventing Army bureaucracy in order to achieve Jewish autonomy in Jewish camps on their way to Palestine. Despite the existence of small Bundist groups, it was the Zionists who set the tone among the survivors. It seemed to the overwhelming majority of camp survivors that there was no future for Jews in Europe, and that their only hope lay in an opening of Palestine for Jewish immigration. Klausner shared this view. His methods were unorthodox, sometimes violent: he was an idealistic, forceful leader of bitter men and women. No wonder he would later clash with the JDC and American Jewish leaders generally.27

Klausner was not the only rabbi the survivors encountered. Rabbi Her-schel Schacter was active in the Frankfurt area, Rabbi Eugene J. Lipman worked on the Bavarian-Czech border, and there were many others. In the eyes of the survivors, both in contemporary records and in their remi-niscences, the rabbis played a major role in reestablishing confidence in a Jewish future and in a positive evaluation of American Jewry. There was an influence the other way, too. The rabbis wrote home to their families, sometimes to their congregations. These letters, earnest, critical, often tortured, described the survivors and their suffering, and helped in the creation of an atmosphere that became conducive both to major fund-raising and to an appreciation of world Jewish links.28

With the uncovering of the camps the post of the Jewish Theater Chap-lain, responsible for all the Jewish chaplains in the US Army in Europe, became central. The position was held by Rabbi Judah P. Nadich. Rabbi Nadich had been quite active in encouraging rabbis to take over DP problems if that did not clash with their major responsibility of providing religious services to Jewish soldiers. He was to play a major part in the creation of the post of a Jewish adviser at the US Commanding General in the European Theater which would express American Jewry's abiding

27 Cf. Bauer, Flight and Rescue, pp. 57-62. '"V 11 Alex Grobman, Jewish Chaplains and the Displaced Persons, P h D thesis, Hebrew Uni-

versity (1975).

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 41

interest in the fate of the "Surviving Remnant" (She'erit Hapletah), as the survivors called themselves.29

What role in all this did American Jewish voluntary agencies play? None, really. OSE, ORT, and HIAS were not equipped to deal with emergencies such as this. The British voluntary agency, the Jewish Relief Units set up by the Board of Deputies of British Jews had sent 35 people to Italy who had helped JDC and the Palestinians there. In fact, JDC at first had no trucks, and the JRU delegated two drivers (one of them was Hyman Yantian, of whom, more later) to drive "throughout Italy" and it is thanks to this that it was "possible to supply refugees and come generally with certain essential foods and clothing." Good relations existed between the JRU and JDC. In the British Zone of occupation in Germany, they had been called forward soon after the discovery of the Bergen-Belsen camp. But they could not operate at first in the much larger American Zone where most of the Jewish survivors congregated. It was therefore left to JDC to represent American Jewish agencies in the US Zone. Immedi-ately after the end of hostilities, Schwartz began to bombard SHAEF with repeated requests to have JDC teams brought to Germany, but to no avail. It was only on June 13, more than a month after liberation, that a JDC team was allowed into Buchenwald (two months after its liberation). It took until August 4 before a small team without supplies first arrived in Munich. Another small team, also without supplies, had arrived in Bergen-Belsen in early July. Everywhere it took months for JDC to arrive, and even when it did, it really had very litde to offer. From the point of view of the survivors at the time and in their memoirs, JDC is often represented as the agency that came too late. Rosensaft used to tell the story of when he asked the JDC man who had come in July what he had brought, and upon hearing the response, he had said "OK, if you can't give us things, give us some Yiddish typewriters so we can criticize the JDC to the Jews of the world."30, * Why did JDC arrive so late? The reason lay in the opposition of the Army to having "sectarian" organizations getting involved. They feared not only that Catholic and Protestant groups would similarly swamp the area, but that they would have additional troubles with the Jews, whom many of them did not like too much anyway. UNRRA was supposed to be the main civilian agency in Germany and Austria, and UNRRA was ridden with inefficiency. UNRRA was supposed to administer the camps and provide for supplementary articles such as toiletry, care for infants, books, educational facilities for children, whereas the Army was to supply basic food and, originally, clothes as well. This arrangement did not work

29 Judah Nadich, Eisenhower and the Jews, New York (1953), passim; Ze'ev Mankowitz, Politics and Ideology Among the She'erith Hapletah, PhD thesis, Hebrew University (1988); Bauer, Flight and Rescue, passim.

30 Abraham S. Hyman, The Undefeated, unpublished MS., p. 262.

42 Out of the Ashes

too well, and the Army did not want to have to deal with a host of smaller voluntary agencies. The upshot of all this was that JDC had a hard time in getting the Army agree to allow teams to be sent into the American Zone, and an even harder time convincing the Army that it should send supplies there. Survivors argued that, in that case, JDC should have come illegally. Schwartz, no stranger to unorthodox thinking, probably thought that it would be silly to endanger JDC's chance of large-scale help to the survivors by taking illegal action that would damage its reputation with the Army. The strength of JDC lay in its massive help wherever it was permitted to operate. The responsibility for the DPs was too large to endanger it by illegal escapades. But even Saly Mayer, a legalist if ever there was one, managed to visit Dachau in early June, and had seen to it that Red Cross parcels should reach that and many other camps in the south of Germany. These parcels later saved many lives. Could not similar moves have been made by JDC without endangering its future operations? This is a very difficult question to answer.31

While JDC was chafing at the bit, waiting to get into Germany and Austria, the Palestinian Jewish Brigade had moved up to Tarvisio in north-ern Italy. Four adventurous soldiers ventured—without permission, of course—into Austria, and returned on May 29, reporting that they had found Jews in camps. On the 30th, soldiers found a first group of 98 Jews in a camp at Villach just over the Austrian frontier. On June 1, emissaries arrived from the group of the Brichah under Kovner. They had been sent from Romania to contact the Brigade. Yet the lack of realization of what lay ahead, even at that stage, among people who were as deeply concerned with the fate of European Jews as the soldiers of the Brigade were, is best illustrated in the discussion that took place at Tarvisio on June 4, where most soldiers demanded that they should be returned to Palestine now that the war was over. On June 13, soldiers were sent to Bucharest to get in touch with Kovner's group there, and to propose that the survivors should come to Italy because there seemed to be little hope that they would be able to get to Palestine from Romania.

In the meantime, one of the leaders of the Mossad, the Jewish under-ground's "Organization for 'B' Immigration"—-or illegal immigration-Yehuda Arazi, arrived at Tarvisio in disguise. Arazi was a legendary figure, a right-winger (rather unusual in the Haganah at that time) who had smug-gled arms to the Haganah and was being sought by the British in Palestine. Posing as a sergeant in His Majesty's Service, he had arrived to organize illegal immigration to Palestine. He knew there were very few survivors and that the ones who would be found would probably be demoralized and mentally sick. He hoped, nevertheless, to find up to 5000 people who would be willing to risk a clandestine journey to P a l e s t i n e — a n o t h e r

M See Mayer's cable in JDC/ SM 56,6/4/45; Interview with Joseph J. Schwartz, OHD, 1968. ' -v.- ' ft hi • . , i

The Liberation of Western Europe and the German Surrender 43

example of the lack of comprehension of even sophisticated Jewish organi-zation representatives of the reality in Europe. Needless to say, 69,000 Jews were to risk their lives on the illegal ships until May 1948, when Israel was established. There would have been many more but for the lack of ships. In order to find his 5000, Arazi sent a camouflaged delegation into Austria and Germany. Ostensibly looking for relatives of soldiers, the delegation left Tarvisio on June 20, saw camps in Austria, and reached Munich on the 22nd. There they linked up with Klausner's efforts to set up the Central Committee, visited St Ottilien, and participated at a moving commemorative ceremony at the Munich Hofbraeukeller where Hitler had started his movement. They then proceeded to Frankfurt where the delegation's leader, Captain Aharon Hoter-Yishai, intervened—without authorization, of course—with sympathetic American officers to protest cases where Jewish survivors from Eastern Europe were being forced to go back to their countries of origin. Probably influenced by this inter-vention, as well as by reports from the field, an order went out from SHAEF headquarters at Frankfurt on June 29, repeating a previous direc-tive of April 16, whereby DPs were not to be forced to return to their countries with the exception of Soviet citizens. This did not always help: in mid-July, Jews whom Klausner had managed to put into the ex-German military barracks of the Flak-Kaserne at Munich were told they would be repatriated forcibly. Klausner says he went to the officer in charge and told him that, as chaplain, he was unable to persuade the people to comply. He was then ordered to appear before the commanding officer in Munich who had orders from General George Patton to clear Munich of the DPs. The colonel, Klausner relates, claimed he had no Jews at all—only Poles, Lithuanians, and so on; he pointed to the official list of nationalities to prove his point—no Jews were listed there. When Klausner asked who, if this was the case, was causing the trouble at Flak-Kaserne, the colonel dismissed him. Klausner then reported to "the people." As a result, when the trucks arrived next day to pick up the candidates for repatriation, only a few dozen out of the original 1200 were there.

The Jewish Brigade soldiers then moved up into the British Zone to Bergen-Belsen. The situation was even grimmer there. A later memor-andum of the Chief of Staff of the Zone Command (not dated, but probably from October-November) stated that "it is undesirable to accept the Nazi theory that the Jews are a separate race. Jews, in common with all other religious sects, should be treated according to their nationality rather than as a race or a religious sect." Because of this—intentional—mix-up between nationality and citizenship, those who had been citizens of coun-tries like Poland or Lithuania, but of Jewish nationality, were to be dealt with as Poles or Lithuanians. The soldiers fortified the resolve of Yossele Rosensaft and his committee, now strengthened by the representative of

44 Out of the Ashes

local German Jews, Norbert Wollheim, to fight for Jewish autonomy and Jewish rights.

The Palestinian soldiers had neither money nor political influence to offer. Just as in Italy in the early months of the year, their influence was moral and spiritual. They did supply whatever they could—they stole gasoline and tires from British Army stores and gave them to Klausner. They worked as educators, helped in administration and organization, gave of their own radons to help feed a few more mouths, but they could not take the place of UNRRA or JDC. What they did do, however, paral-lels the work of the chaplains: they were there, they brought their Jewish insignia with a yellow Star of David—the same star that had served as a badge of shame under the Nazis—and thereby helped to reestablish pride, self-assurance and hope in the hearts of the survivors. Their message was frankly political: they told the survivors that there was no hope anywhere else, that people had to struggle to open the gates of Palestine to Jewish refugees. They fortified the already strong Zionist movement in the camps. They did even more for the image of Palestine Jewry than the chaplains did for the image of American Jewry.32

" For the preceding, I have relied heavily on my book Flight and Rescue, especially Chapter 2, pp. 43-74, which has a bibliography at the end containing the sources t o n statements in the text.

CHAPTER 3

The DP Camps 1945-46

Germany—The US Zone

On September 25, 1945, there were, according to statistics prepared by UNRRA, 1,488,007 DPs in Germany, Austria, and Italy. Of these, 53,322 were Jews, or 3.6%.1 Who were all the others? Some 900,000 were Poles, 140,000 were Baits, 121,000 were Hungarians, and the rest were of differ-ent European nationalities. Many of them had been collaborators with the Nazi regime, others had voluntarily gone to Germany in the hope of finding employment with the Nazis, others again had fled from the Soviets, or had been Soviet soldiers and volunteered for the German war machine. Some had been forced laborers, deported to Germany to do slave labor, or lured there by promises and then in effect incarcerated by their German masters. It was a motley collection of people, persecuted and persecutors thrown together by the Nazi regime. Some of them were sadists and murderers, a small number of whom would be under investigation in the US 40 years later for their crimes. Many of them shared theit Orman masters' hatred for Jews.

The approximately 1.5 million DPs were the residue of the vast numbers that the Allies found when Germany surrendered. Over 10 million people, mostly genuine displaced persons, had been repatriated by then. Of these, about 4.5 million were returned to their home countries by the US Army. This tremendous job was accomplished with unequalled speed by armies that were organized for fighting and not for dealing with refugees. After the surrender of Germany, the problem of how to deal with these masses of humanity became an overwhelming concern for the military. However, they lacked the training, and many lacked a minimum of understanding for this job. As we have seen in the British Zone, the ideological stance was taken that Jews should not be discriminated against. That meant that German Jews should be considered Germans and receive low rations, just like their persecutors.2 Austrian Jews from the Buchenwald concentration 1 Proudfoot, op. cit., p. 238.

2 Sec for instance JDC/ Germany, general, 1945,6/11/45, Callman to E. M. M. Warburg. German Jews "are treated by the Military Administration as well as by UNRRA and the Red Cross like German Nazis." "The IRC is not allowed to give food parcels to German Jews or political refugees of German nationality because they are German . . . The result is

45

46 Out of the Ashes

camp were rounded up and forced into labor battalions by the British, together with German nationals.3 Hungarian Jews were similarly treated— they were all considered "enemy nationals." At Landsberg 6200 Jews were incarcerated in a camp which had been rejected as a site for German POWs. Electrified barbed wire existed in a number of places, and the military thought that the best way to deal with DPs would be to establish military discipline with reveilles and severe punishments for lack of cleanliness or disobedience. Leonard Dinnerstein quotes a report by an American woman who saw two children, only one of whom had a pass, trying to get out of the barbed wire enclosure of camp Fohrenwald. The first one left and then smuggled the pass to his friend; they were both caught and imprisoned by the American guard for two days.4 Incidents like that abounded, especially in the area controlled by the Third Army General George S. Patton, whose diary shows that he was very unsympathetic to DPs generally and that he hated Jews.5

What happened then is still somewhat of a mystery. It is clear that reports on how the US Army was treating the people it had supposedly liberated filtered back to the States. How exactly this happened, and how it reached official quarters as quickly as it did is not at all clear. Chaplains wrote back to their families, friends, and congregations, soldiers to their families and, perhaps more importantly, high officers sometimes had the opportunity to make their opinions known to those with some influence back home. From Dinnerstein's account it is clear that Jewish Congress-man Emanuel Celler of New York organized a collective protest by Jewish members of the House to the War Department, and that Jewish leaders such as Stephen S. Wise and Nahum Goldman contacted George Warren of the State Department to alert him to the situation. Meyer Weisgall, Chaim Weizmann's confidant in the United States, approached Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau Jr. Morgenthau, who had been instru-mental in early January 1944 in getting Roosevelt to appoint the War Refugee Board that, belatedly, attempted to rescue Jews in Europe, first asked the new President, Harry S. Truman, to appoint a Cabinet Commit-tee to look into the matter, but his proposal was rejected. He then proposed

that people like [Norbert] Wollheim [representative of German Jews in the British Zone and last surviving member of the Jewish governing bodies before the Holocaust! are depen-dent upon the German civilian authorities, who have to provide shelter and food on the basis of the German food rations, which are completely insufficient for people who need special care after years of concentration camps." - .. ? . v .

1 For this and the next paragraphs, I am relying on Leonard Dinnerstein, America and The Survivors of the Holocaust, New York (1982), pp . 9 17; also on Bauer , Flight and Rescue, pp. 77-81. The figure I gave there of 820,000 DPs "by the time August had passed" was based on an UNRRA estimate and is patently wrong. For general descriptions see a number of memoirs utilized by Ze'ev Mankowitz, op. cit . , pass .v \ -

4 Dinnerstein, op. cit., p. 15. 5 Many people believed, he said, "that the Displaced Person is a human being, which he

is not, and this applied particularly to the Jews who are lower than animals ." Cf. Martin Blumenson, The Patton Papers, 1940-45, p . 751, quoted in: Dinners te in , op . ci t . , p.

The DP Camps 1945^46 47

that Earl G. Harrison, formerly Commissioner of Immigration and at the time Dean of the Pennsylvania Law School and American representative on the IGCR, be appointed to investigate the camps. Morgenthau then contacted Joseph C. Grew, the acting Secretary of State and a meeting was called with John Pehle, Warren and Harrison, out of which came an assignment for Harrison to investigate the DP camps in the American Zones in Germany and Austria, with special attention to the Jews. Grew informed Truman of this on June 21, and asked Truman to sign a letter to Harrison giving presidential support to his investigation, which the president did.6

Harrison asked Schwartz to accompany him to the camps, and he also took two members of the IGCR staff to help him, Patrick M. Malin, and Herbert Katzki, who had been working for the WRB in 1944-45. JDC presence in the Harrison mission was therefore considerable, but we have no really detailed account of what exactly the mission saw and where, and how it reached the conclusions it did. However, we do have one account which appears to be crucial: Klausner, in his testimony, relates how he was alerted to Harrison's visit in Bavaria by a friend, and how he arranged to see Harrison in a hotel. According to Klausner, the visit had been planned by the military in a way that would have sanitized Harrison's impressions very considerably. Klausner saw to it that Harrison saw the right places, and accompanied him.7 Schwartz appears to have visited other areas, and then submitted his impressions to Harrison. Again, what is remarkable is the speed with which the mission got going and the report was prepared. Though the mission cannot have reached Germany before July 20 or thereabouts, a first interim report confirming the disturbing information which had caused the sending of the mission in the first place came from Harrison on July 28, and on August 3, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson sent a cable to Eisenhower advising him that the report would be very grim and that the government was very concerned. The British got wind of the general tenor of the report at the same time, though Schwartz submitted his part of the report to Harrison on August 19 and

6 1 have followed Dinnerstein in a part of this story—see his book, pp. 34-35. See also Ze'ev Mankowitz's unpublished PhD thesis, The Politics and Ideology of Survivors of the Holocaust in the American Zone of Occupied Germany, 1945/46, Hebrew University (1988) (Hebrew), p. 63. But neither of these accounts nor my earlier one in Flight and Rescue (pp. 76-77) explains how the news got to Wise or Weisgall as quickly as it did. Grew's memo to Truman is dated June 21, Truman's signature was affixed on the 22nd. There was censorship on mail from Europe and the mail in any case was slow. For senior members of a cumber-some bureaucracy to get working on an unpopular subject such as investigating a victorious army, needs some prodding. Dinnerstein explains Truman's willingness to go along by his obligation to his Jewish voters. This may explain Truman's attitude, but not that of the State Department, nor the speed with which action was taken. I can offer no explanation at this point.

7 Rabbi Abraham J. Klausner, Interview, OHD. The few details we have are contained in Dinnerstein, op. cit., p. 40. OOA-C*

48 Out of the Ashes

the final report was not sent up to Truman until August 24. Press reports emerged a month later.8

Harrison's strictures of the Army were very severe. He accused the Army of treating the Jews in the same way they were treated by the SS, except that the Americans were not killing them. He was critical of the insufficient food and of its poor nutritional quality, he was enraged about the lack of clothing—the Jews were still walking around in their pajama uniforms provided by the Nazis, or else they had been given SS uniforms to wear—he saw camps with electrified barbed wire still surrounding then. He also brought out the fact that as long as the Jews were not segregated, as almost all of them wished to be, they would suffer from the hostility of the people amongst whom they had lived before: Poles, Baits, and others. He proposed that separate camps for Jews be set up, that the food and clothing situations be radically improved, and that Army discipline should not be used on these civilians. In addition, he dropped a political bomb-shell by suggesting that 100,000 Jews be admitted to Palestine by the British.9

We do not know who suggested the 100,000 proposal to Harrison. It could have been Klausner, but it could also have come from Schwartz or one of the DP committees. The point is, of course, that this was not a new proposal. The Jewish Agency, searching for a practical slogan in its struggle to open the gates of Palestine to Jewish immigration, had adopted the idea in its memorandum to the British government of June 18, 1945. From an American point of view, it was an ideal proposition: it would put the burden of action on the British and it would liberate the United States from further responsibility for the Jewish DPs—in other words, it would get rid of them. Indeed, the numbers of Jewish DPs were such as to make the idea very attractive.

The total number of Jews both within and outside of DP camps in Germany and Austria was probably around the 50,000 mark in August, of whom 14-15,000 were in Bavaria, 7000 in Vienna, 13,000 in Belsen and 8000 in Berlin.10 An emigration of 100,000 would have solved not only the Jewish DP problem, but the Jewish problem in Poland as well because it would have made emigration possible for the majority of the 80,000 Jews then in Poland who wanted to leave that country. It would have made a great deal of sense from a British, anti-Zionist, point of view as well. The Jewish Agency would have been busy for a long time integrating the new immigrants and Zionist agitation all over the world, especially in America, would have subsided. But when Truman suggested to the British on August 31 that they should allow 100,000 Jews to go to Palestine and that it would not prejudice the future of that country, he met with a chilly

1 Dinnerstein, op. cit., p. 44; Bauer, op. cit., p. 79. * The Harrison Report, New York Times, 9/30/45. 10 Bauer, op. cit., p. 55.1 see no reason to change the estimate.

The DP Camps 1945^46 49

response from the newly elected labor Prime Minister, Clement Attlee. On September 16, Attlee placed the ball firmly in America's court by asking Truman for help in solving the Palestine dilemma. British policy in Palestine was determined five days later when a Cabinet meeting approved of Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin's suggestion that Jewish immi-gration to Palestine should be kept, as in the preceding months, to a figure of 1500 per month. The Jewish Agency had opposed this and refused to discuss the 1500 figure, but the Arab countries would not agree to even that trickle. It was, in fact, Arab opposition that led the British to their decision. British officials thought that the Arab League, representing the independent or semi-independent countries of the Arab Mid-East, was more powerful than the Jews. Arab sabotage might cause serious trouble to the weakened British position in the area, and the sea and land routes to India might then be obstructed. Soviet aspirations in the Arab world might receive a boost from disgruntled Arab factions. The Jews, on the other hand, were dependent on British protection because they could never muster the forces to stand up against an Arab onslaught. Being the weaker group, they would have to yield.

This mistaken evaluation was to cost the British Palestine, though the argument could be advanced that, as the days of colonialism were over in any case, they would have had to abandon Palestine sooner or later even had they not miscalculated. As it was, the British refusal gave the Jewish Agency a good cause and an enemy. "The period of struggle," as it is called in Zionist history, commenced and was to end with the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948. Immediately following the British decision, which did not remain secret, Ben-Gurion and Dr Moshe Sneh, the com-mander of the Haganah, gave orders to attack the British. The first action, on October 10, which freed inmates of the internment camp of Atlith near Haifa, where "illegal" immigrants were kept, was followed by a long string of actions designed to show the British that the Jews would not agree to having the gates of Palestine remain closed.

The internal problems of the Yishuv (the Palestine Jewish community) bore a direct relation to the situation of the Holocaust survivors in Europe, and must therefore be briefly mentioned. Jewish armed resistance to the British was carried on from October 1945 and until July 1946 by three mutually hostile underground groups who had formed a temporary alliance: Haganah, IZL (Irgun Tsva'iLe'umi or National Military Organi-zation), and the FFI (Lohamey Herut Yisrael or Israel Freedom Fighters, also known as the "Stern Group"). The Haganah (Hebrew for "Defense") was a mass organization to which the vast majority of the Yishuv belonged or gave allegiance. It was run by the Jewish Agency through a High Com-mand that had a political head (Sneh, a member of the Agency governing body) and a military commander (Ya'akov Dori). It had a reasonably well-trained militia (HISH) and a striking force (PALMACH) numbering about

50 Out of the Ashes

1500 men and women which was well-trained by any standard. Haganah's policy was to concentrate on attacks against British forces poised to hamper "illegal" immigration or settlement, and against selected government tar-gets in order to make it clear to the British that it would be in their own interest to come to terms with the Jews. Great care was taken not to cause civilian British casualties and to keep British military casualties to a minimum. The idea was to force a bad partner to become a good partner. The Agency was convinced the British should stay in Palestine, and no unbridgeable gulf should be created between them and the Jews so that a Jewish State might be established with the help of the Anglo-American powers. The IZL, with a few hundred fighters, believed that the British should be forced out of the country if they would not leave by themselves, in order to establish a Jewish State. Any and every government targets should be attacked, but no civilians must be hurt. The FFI numbered about 150 persons and were dedicated to a Jewish State which would be achieved by terror attacks on any and all British persons and targets in Palestine and outside.

If terrorism is the attempt to influence political situations by attacking civilians, then FFI were terrorists and the IZL and the Haganah were not. In charge of IZL was a young lawyer by the name of Menahem Begin, and in charge of FFI was a triumvirate, with the military leadership in the hands of Yitzhak Yezernitzky (now Shamir, the current Israeli Prime Minister). As the Holocaust survivors oriented themselves to what was happening in the Jewish world with their attention naturally fixed on Palestine, the vast majority identified with the Agency, the left and center party coalition that was in charge of it, and the Haganah. The right-wing youth movement Betar, which identified with the IZL, had a number of strongholds in Poland and the DP camps, and it participated in movements such as Brichah as a small minority. The FFI were all but non-existent in Europe during the first two or three postwar years. American Jews were largely unaware of the complications of internal Zionist politics, and really did not care very much about them. To them, the Yishuv was one body (in much the same way as Israel is in the 1980s). Zionist leaders in America who did know and did care, identified, just as Holocaust survivors did, with the Agency. They brought pressure on the Administration to demand the entry of the 100,000 into Palestine, although they were aware, no less than their colleagues in Jerusalem, of the pitfalls of that position. For the Holocaust survivors, the 100,000 became a rallying slogan of great importance, a symbol of their all too realistic need to find a pragmatic solution to their plight.

The Harrison Report was, to be honest, not quite fair to the Army. Truman demanded immediate correction of the situation in a sharply worded censure sent to Eisenhower on August 31 but, as Eisenhower pointed out in two communications to Washington of August 10 and

The DP Camps 1945^46 51

October 6, much had been done even before that and, in any case, some of Harrison's comments were exaggerated. Most Jews had been moved from the former concentration camps to DP camps, food was bad but not inedible, and to say that the Americans treated the Jews as the SS had done was simply not true. Eisenhower also pointed to the fact that the Jews were a tiny minority of the DPs, that the main task of the Army had been to see to it that the vast majority should be repatriated, and that it had fulfilled this task amazingly successfully. However, Eisenhower did not leave things where they were. He personally visited Feldafing on Sep-tember 17, and made clear his desire to see improvements; in a military world that meant that anyone who did not follow orders to treat the Jews differently would have to face unpleasant consequences. Patton was trans-ferred in October, rations were increased to 2500 calories per person per day, barbed wire was removed, freedom of movement was slowly permit-ted, and ways were examined to prevent the repetition of another Harrison Report. The fact that a non-Jew, an expert in refugee and legal matters, had damaged the Army's reputation was an important event. There was probably more dislike of Jews among officers than among most other Americans, and the exercise of civilian control over the Army, which is what the Harrison affair really meant, corrected that imbalance. In the future, the Army would handle all Jewish problems very gingerly.

One of the main effects of the report was the entry of JDC into the camps. It was clear that in order to avoid future criticism, it would be best to cooperate with an established, respectable Jewish welfare agency, whose loyalty to the government and the Army was beyond doubt; JDC was ideally suited to "interpret" the wishes and attitudes of the Jewish DPs to the military.

We have seen that the first JDC team was sent to Buchenwald and arrived there on June 13. The camp had been liberated in April, so that here, too, two months had passed before the team had arrived. There were several hundreds of Jewish children in Buchenwald, mostly young boys who had been marched there from Auschwitz. They were in a terrible state of physical and mental health, and had to be rescued immediately. Mayer arranged for some of them to go to Switzerland, and JDC persuaded the French government to take over 441 children from Buchenwald and 94 others who had been rescued from a train deporting them from Bergen-Belsen in the last week before their liberation. What the Nazi purpose was is difficult to fathom, but the train, one of three, was liberated by Americans, whose attitude to the rescued was apparently deplorable. A Red Cross nurse, Sylvia Neulander, who had contacts with the Mossad in Paris, took charge of 94 unaccompanied children from the train and brought them to Buchenwald to join the others for France. On arrival in France, the French government authorities and some Catholic Church officials tried to get the children into their custody, hoping apparently to

52 Out of the Ashes

make good French Christians out of them. There was definite mutual dislike between Neulander and JDC, but it seems from the contradictory accounts that an attempt to steal the children, or some of them, was made, and stopped on the spot by some of the children's leaders, by Neulander, and subsequently by JDC as well.11

Teams were sent out to the 1 st and 12th Army areas in the northern part of the US Zone, but there were very few Jews there. In July, a team was sent to Bergen-Belsen in the British Zone, and on August 4, a team headed by Eli Rock finally reached Munich, the seat of the Central Committee (ZK) which had in the meantime been established there. They were five people on an army truck, with no supplies for the DPs, and they were supposed to go into Feldafing. This was the first Jewish camp in the Zone, established against Army instructions on a purely pragmatic basis by Lieutenant Irving Smith, who had moved a large number of barely living Hungarian Jewish women from Bad Tutzing, where they had been liber-ated, to the former Nazi political school. Feldafing consisted of eight stone barracks and some wooden structures, and was opened as a DP camp on May 1, 1945. Chaplain Max Braude of the 7th Army was largely respon-sible for enabling Smith to move out the non-Jews to other camps and establish Feldafing as a Jewish camp. By the time the JDC people arrived, it had over 6000 people in it, instead of the 2000 it was equipped to house. JDC was faced with insurmountable problems: they did not know how many people they had in this or any other camp: people would switch camps in order to find relatives, or because word got around that the other camp was better. No one knew how many went back to Poland to look for relatives, how many came back, and soon afterwards they would not know how many new arrivals from the East had appeared.

The first JDC team in a DP camp were Dr Henry Heitan and his wife, Ruth, French Jews who had been recruited by JDC. Dr Heitan established a medical program in the camp, and he and his wife devoted themselves especially to the few surviving children. After some only partly successful attempts, they managed to open a school there, in the autumn. The basic problem of course was that they could not offer any larger amounts of food and other supplies.12

JDC teams, in Feldafing and later in the other camps, had the task, first of all, of finding relatives. Again, a personal testimony will serve to illus-trate this. Eli Rock recalled, many years later:

One day a man camc in and said, "Will you try to contact my family in Chicago . . • I have an aunt there called Hannah Weinberg" . . . a woman named Hannah Weinberg, who in the meantime had changed her name to Anne and Weinberg to Winnet or something, so that i t was like a needle in the haystack . . . B u t s o m e t i m e s y o u get results,

11 Schwartz Interview; Sylvia Neulander's account of the liberation of the train is in the Central Zionist Archive (CZA), S26/1296, dated 6/9/45; Haganah Archive (HA), Mossad, Ruth Kluger, cable of 6/11/45. Parallel reports will be found in JDCV France.

12 Juliane Vfft\zt\,Juedisches Leben inMuenchen, 1945-1951, Munich (1987), pp. 234, ff-

The DP Camps 1945^46 53 quite often through Jewish organizations . . . he would tell us where he was from in Poland and where she was from . . . It might have been several weeks later, yes, the aunt was alive in Chicago. So we put a notice on the board . . . somebody Weinberg. We didn't have the first name in this case. "Your aunt Hannah Weinberg in Chicago has been found, please report to us immediately". . . That day a man comes in and says, "My name is Weinberg. I read a notice about my aunt in Chicago. Wonderful, wonder-ful. JDC has her address. How did you know I had an aunt in Chicago?" We said, "Well, we had a request f rom somebody in the camp, someone called Weinberg." At that point he gave a cry, " M y God, it 's my brother. He's alive, I didn't know i t ." By this time the brother had l e f t . . . Now we had to find his brother.13

To quote Rock once again, he said that his experience in Munich, Fel-dafing, and other places—he was trying to obtain more camps and better camps for his Jewish DPs from a still unwilling and unsympathetic 3rd Army under Patton—was "more dramatic, more wearying, less satisfying, because I could do much less" than at his later assignments. He was the only American; the other four team members were French Jewish (the Heitans) and Polish Jewish. In Feldafing, Dr Heitan even did some repatri-ation, chiefly of Hungarian Jews returning to Hungary. The doctor went with them. "Many of them came back, later." In the meantime, new Jewish camps were set up, largely as a result of the Harrison Report. The chief ones were Landsberg and Fohrenwald. Landsberg, where stood the prison in which Hitler had written Mein Kampf, was declared to be a Jewish camp at the end of August, but the exodus of the non-Jewish DPs only began in late September. The Army barracks were totally unsuited for a civilian population, and as in Feldafing, it was planned to house 2500 persons; in September there were 6000 people there. Fortunately, the Army appointed a sympathetic Jewish officer to command the camp, Major Irving Heymont, and it was thanks to him that life there became bearable. Landsberg was the first camp to elect a committee through a properly organized democratic process, in October.14 It functioned under the leadership of Dr Samuel Gringauz, and Landsberg became a "model" camp, which meant that, while conditions were very hard and degrading, they were just tolerable. A similar development took place at Fohrenwald (a small workers' settlement at Wolfratshausen near Munich), where physical conditions were somewhat better. It became a Jewish DP camp in October. Fohrenwald became a concentration point for Jewish children arriving in the Zone, and hence a central point for JDC work early on.15

In the five and a half months that Rock was in Munich he worked extremely hard at alleviating the suffering of the DPs, with the help of some sympathetic UNRRA officials, "and yet I was terribly frustrated, because the main thing we needed was supplies and emigration, and we could supply neither." Rock was also present when Eisenhower inspected Feldafing on September 17, and heard Patton blatantly lying to Eisen-

,J Interview with Eli Rock, O H D , 9/23/67. 14 Mankowitz, op. cit., p. 22. 15 Wetzel, op. cit., pp. 220, ff . , and pp. 244, ff.

54 Out of the Ashes

hower, saying that he had been to visit Feldafing before, which of course he had never done. Again, another one of Rock's stories rings very true:

We came to a room where there was a bunch of sewing machines, just the machine part, the heads without a table . . .And Eisenhower said, " W h o is the officer in charge here?" Irving Smith was. "Lieutenant," he said, "what are all these sewing machines doing there; why aren't they being used?". . . maybe Abe [Klausner] had gotten them—Abe [ was constantly breaking into German warehouses and saying, " I am confiscating this in the name of the Army". . . And Smith said, "Well, General, we can' t use them." "Why can't you use them?" "Well, we need tables to put them o n . " "Are the tables available?" "They are; there are some tables in a warehouse in Munich ." " D i d you try to get them?" "Yes, Sir." "What did you do?" "I put in a request through channels and I told them I needed this, and—" "How long ago did you do this?" " O h , several weeks ago." "And haven't you gotten them yet?" "No, Sir." At this point Eisenhower turned to Patton and said, "George, if we had a gun here and a gun carriage there, neither one of those things would be any good by themselves, would they, George?" And Patton said, "Right, General" . . . Eisenhower turned to Smith, he said, "Well , L i e u t e n a n t . . . I 'd go to the officer in charge of G-5 in Munich and hold him to account for this, is that right?" At this point Smith would have liked to have fallen through the floor, because that fellow was standing right behind Eisenhower. Gulp, he said, "Yes, Sir."1 6

As a result of this visit, and the later firing of Patton, the attitude of Army officers changed. Rock tells the story of a talk he had with a Colonel Polk, a direct descendant of President Polk, a Texan, a West Pointer, who was in charge of the area in which Rock was working. The Colonel said, "Look . . . my career is in the army and I want to make a career of the army, and these stories that are going back to the States . . . probably from people like yourself, are hurting m e . . . If anything is wrong, I want you to come and tell me about it and if you need anything, let me know. I don't want a black mark on my record for this.", Before he left, Patton, through his Chief of Staff, tried to make Rock

issue a public announcement that the situation in the camps was not as bad as had been reported. Rock was in a difficult situation, because although by that time some things had changed for the better, there was still a great deal of room for criticism. On the other hand he had to work with the Army. He stalled, and Patton's departure took him off the hook. The incident demonstrated JDC's difficult and precarious situation in a mili-tary zone.

Klausner's testimony and other material fully bears out Rock's story. The two men found common ground, although Klausner constantiy stormed against JDC for not bringing in supplies. This, we have seen, was Rock's complaint too, and beyond that they appreciated each other's devotion for the cause of the DPs.

In the third week of August, Rock and his little group left Feldafing and obtained from the Army a building in Munich, at Siebertstrasse 3, which was to be the headquarters of JDC for the next few years. The ZK was nearby, and friendly relations developed. At about that time Rock obtained his first consignment of supplies—a dozen or so trucks with Red

14 Ibid. ~

The DP Camps 1945^46 55 Cross packages that Mayer had brought in Switzerland, but which the US Army under Patton had refused to accept and distribute in Bavaria. The parcels were brought to Landsberg on September 15 and then distributed. The prestige of JDC increased as a result. But the picture in these last months of 1945 was one of disappointment of the DPs with JDC. For instance, people like Rock spoke little Yiddish. JDC could not bring over Yiddish-speaking people from America because of obstruction by the Army, so it had to take demobilized GIs such as Rock, and send them into the field with survivors to represent JDC. Despite Rock's tremendous efforts, he had to report to Paris on November 20 that, of the 4500 Jews then at Feldafing, 150 children still had no shoes. Elsewhere, at the same time, the situation was even worse: in the area of the 19th Corps two-thirds of the Jews had no overcoats, or lacked shoes. l l Nevertheless, the relations with the DPs were surprisingly good.

The obvious question to ask is: why did JDC not send supplies earlier? The reason is equally obvious and answers all the criticisms and objections: American military bureaucracy simply forbade the shipping of supplies for civilians during those months. In fact, JDC appropriated $250,000 as early as June 26 for supplies to German camps, but the amount of supplies they could send in was limited to 139 tons of clothing, textiles, and food from Switzerland and Sweden and $75,000 worth of local supplies brought up by Rock.18 Individuals could have been smuggled through into Ger-many but with bulky supplies even this was impossible. The fact that even JDC was unable to do more than it did indicates the strict limitations of its influence.

A special problem in Bavaria was that of the surviving German Jews. Only 84 of them had survived the Holocaust in Munich (out of some 11,000 who had lived there before the Nazis came to power), and in October 1945, after some had come back from the camps and a few had returned from abroad, 1500 Bavarian Jews lived in the land (in 1933 there had been 46,000). The US Military Government approved the reestablishment of a Jewish community in Munich in July, and a committee was elected. A rabbi, Dr Aron Ohrenstein, had survived and became the rabbi of Bavaria. An immediate conflict of interests developed between the community and the DPs. The German Jews did not want to be swamped by the East European Jewish DPs, whereas these in their turn rejected any idea of a return to Jewish life in Germany. The DPs demanded that former Jewish property in Bavaria be handed over to them, while the German Jews under-standably demanded that this be handed over to the remnant of the original community that had survived. Slowly, too, DPs began to settle in Munich, despite ideological opposition from their fellows, and some of them demanded to become members of the Munich community. The German

" JDC/ Germany, DPs, 1945/6, report from Paris, 11/20/45. JDC/ Germany, general 1945, cable from Paris to New York, 9/18/45.

56 Out of the Ashes

Jews objected—an echo of prewar animosity towards the Eastern Jews ((Ostjuden). In the end, Ohrenstein had to give in, and DPs became mem-bers of the community.

Considerable criticism was directed against JDC for not supplementing the German Jewish rations, which consisted of the basic German ration and a supplement given to all who had suffered under the Nazi regime. JDC had supported the reestablishment of communal institutions, but only in mid-1947 did it begin to give food to the communities. The reason was simple: there were not sufficient supplies, and the DPs criticized JDC for lack of supplies no less than the German Jews did. Elsewhere, as in Berlin or Vienna, where some supplies were available, JDC did not hesitate to support local Jews. In Bavaria, it took time before this policy could be implemented.19

Despite the difficulties and obstacles, American Jewry was not absent from DP camps. The chaplains were there, and their influence was very considerable. In many places it was the chaplain who guided the camp inmates in the election of their first committees and who gave them a morale boost. But individual Jewish soldiers and officers, too, helped and inspired. For example there was Harry A. Freidenberg of Los Angeles, administrative officer of the Military Government Section at US Army Area Command, Vienna. From attending synagogue services in the city he started a mail and package service for the survivors in Vienna. Or Max Helvarg, a Jewish soldier in Berlin, who was one of those who opened and ran JDC services there.

The situation in Berlin was even more complicated than that in Bavaria. The city, divided into four sectors, each administered by one of the four powers, had three transit camps in the summer of 1945, two of them in the Russian sector. In the US Zone, a first UNRRA camp, at Zehlendorf, was opened in October by Charles J. Taylor. The first problem was to reestablish the Berlin Jewish community. Some 7000 survivors gathered there, of whom 1628 had returned from concentration camps, 1321 had emerged from hiding in the city, and 4121 had been married to non-Jews and therefore protected from deportation. The rest were non-German Jews who had arrived in Berlin after the end of hostilities. Initially, it was the remnant of the community that was supposed to look after the camps, and it did so with the active help of a few Jewish GIs. In addition, a transport of 29 trucks from Sweden arrived one day, quite unexpectedly, with JDC food and medicines for the Berlin Jews. Leader of the transport was a Swedish woman by the name of Kersten Felix. But with her and support-ing her was Ragnar Gottfarb, JDC's representative in Sweden, who had organized the transport with his sister Inga and was in Berlin with the trucks.20 However, the problem soon grew to proportions where help by

"Wetzel, op. cit., p. 15. 20 JDC/ Interview with Ragnar and Inga Gottfarb, 5/21/84, (HK).

The DP Camps 1945^46 57

individuals was simply no answer anymore. The problem arose not in Berlin, but in Poland.12

From March 1945, the Brichah organization set up by Kovner in Poland was run by a succession of young men and women who had returned from the Soviet Union where they had fled in 1941 when the Germans invaded Russia. These people had been members of left-wing Zionist youth move-ments of the same kind that had produced the main ghetto rebellions. Their return to Poland in late 1944 and early 1945 was strictly illegal. The idea of returning to Poland was motivated by their desire ultimately to get to Palestine. To achieve that, the new commanders of the Brichah, men like Moshe Meiri (Ben) and Tuvia Cohen, established "points" on the Polish-Slovak border, forged documents proving the people in flight to be Greeks returning southwards to their country, and smuggled small groups through Slovakia into Romania. However, when Kovner and his group from Romania saw that there was no hope of an early immigration to Palestine from Romanian harbors, they turned to Italy and the Brigade. At a very dramatic meeting on July 17, 1945, at Tarvisio in northern Italy, Kovner spoke to the soldiers of his visions of another Holocaust, which could only be faced if the Jewish people, without illusions, prepared for it by establishing a secure homeland in Palestine. He spurred the soldiers into bringing into Italy, on the way to Palestine, as many Jewish survivors as possible. This the soldiers proceeded to do, bringing into Italy some 15,000 survivors from Austria, Hungary, and Romania. Some of these were survivors from the camps. But a growing proportion were Polish Jews, who were now directed by the Brichah not to Romania, but through Hungary to Austria. A few thousand of them congregated in Graz, in the British Zone, and it was only after a protracted struggle against local British commanders, that they managed to cross the border into Italy. By August the Polish Brichah had to realize that that road was no longer feasible: British obstruction of the movement, combined with the fact that the Italian camps were full and "illegal" immigration was still a tiny trickle, made the Polish Brichah decide to direct the flow into Germany.

The reason for this diversion had a great deal to do with the Harrison Report and its after-effects. Murderous antisemitism prevailed in Poland, and thousands of Jews wanted to flee that country at all costs. Brichah was a Zionist movement, but they had to be realistic: no other place but defeated ex-Nazi Germany, now occupied by what had turned out to be a basically friendly power, would guarantee the fleeing Jews food and shelter until—as the Brichah leaders hoped—an opportunity would arise for the people to reach Palestine. A coordination committee for the Brichah was established in Bratislava in Slovakia by Levi Argov, a Palestine emissary, the nearest thing to an overall center for the Brichah that the organization was to have until late 1946. Argov, too, was in favor of the diversion, as

21 Bauer, Flight and Rescue, pp . 132-33.

58 Out of the Ashes

were the Brigade soldiers, also for pragmatic reasons. In August 1945 one of them, Zvi Shiloah, who had stayed behind in Munich to work with the survivors, persuaded his friends of the Dror movement, one of the two large youth movements in Poland, to direct its members to Germany.22

The decision was made easier by an incident that occurred in August on the Czech-German border.

On August 21, Brichah people in Bohemia decided to send across into the US Zone of Germany four trainloads totalling 650 people. When local Army commanders asked for permission to let them through, Patton's HQ refused, and ordered them to be returned to Poland. The 8th Armoured Division tried to do that on August 24. According to newspaper reports, "pitiful scenes" ensued. Blows were administered, heads were bloodied, and all this was reported in the American press. The people were shipped back over the Czech border, but they returned to Germany on foot, in small groups. The outcry in the press made this the last attempt by the American Army to stop Jewish refugees. Brichah was quite serious: Jewish refugees could only be stopped by force, and after the Harrison Report no American unit would shoot at Jews. More Jews entering the US Zone might be inconvenient, but with hundreds of thousands of DPs still on hand, the additional few thousand Jews were not worth the scandals and the trouble. Brichah now had free entry into Germany.23

Polish Brichah was now more tightly organized by a Central Committee under Tuvia Cohen and a number of others, mainly returnees from Central Asia. They sent people via Bohemia, but at that stage, up until November, 7000 people were sent to Berlin via the fomerly German port of Szczecin (Stettin), by truck usually. A Brichah man was sent to Berlin to receive the transports. The influx of thousands of refugees meant that new camps had to be opened, and that a Jewish welfare agency would be sorely needed. The supplies sent in as early as June with the Swedish trucks, mentioned above, really went already to the first refugees from Poland.24

JDC arrived in Berlin, in the person of Philip S. Skorneck, on October 15. He absorbed into his office a Jewish GI, David J. Eisenberg, who had on his own started a parcels service based on his friends and contacts in the States. He also engaged Larry Lubetsky, a Polish refugee, who opened an information and search bureau of great importance because, as we have seen, people were looking for contacts with whatever remained of their families. But Skorneck's main problem was how to ship the arriving refu-gees out to the Western Zones, because they could not remain in divided

22Mankowitz, op. cit., p. 81. 23 Bauer, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 24 See above, note 20. "The Jewish people fled from Poland to Berlin, and we had to

distribute all this. It was a problem, b u t . . . we distributed cod liver oil to people who had no spoons . . . [we] had big barrels of butter and of course how do you distribute a barrel of butter to people with nothing to put it in? In their hands?" The best thing they did was to distribute lipsticks to women—it restored their self-respect and bolstered their morale.

The DP Camps 1945^46 59 and starving Berlin. The French opened a camp in their part of the city, at Wittenau, on December 1, which was placed under UNRRA (later JDC took sole control over it). By arrangement with Taylor of Berlin UNRRA, it was agreed that 50 Jews should be shipped to the West each day; the figure soon increased to 140 and 200, and by the end of the year, 500 Jews had been sent westwards, supposedly as German citizens returning to their home towns. Everyone knew this was a fiction, but it worked. In December, however, the movement of Jews out of Poland increased, and there were again 5000 Jews in the city, who received starvation rations of 1600 calories daily. The Russians said they were not interested in the problem. The British argued that these were Poles who should be forced to return to their country. The Americans said they did not have a Jewish DP problem in their zone, and would see to it that the problem should not arise. The French were sympathetic, but had no resources. In the end, the Russians forced a solution: on January 4,1946, they told the 2500 Jews in two transit camps in their zone that they would be shipped to a camp in East Germany. There was no surer way of making the Jews leave the Soviet Zone—everyone who had been to Russia knew what being sent to a Soviet camp meant, and next day all these refugees went either to Wittenau or to a new house called the Swedish pavilion, which Skorneck had obtained from a wealthy German Jew, in the suburb of Wannsee.

Mr Skorneck reported: "I notified the US Military Government auth-orities that a Committee of Jews had come to tell me that they had estab-lished themselves in the US Sector." The US authorities were convinced that JDC had organized the move from Poland and the move from the Soviet Zone, and "for two days they refused to do anything except to order us to curtail our activities. We were ordered not to operate in any sector but the US Sector. I was personally ordered to work completely through military channels and not to see anyone outside these channels without prior permission." They "ordered us to discontinue our mail service, the petrol allowances for our vehicles were discontinued because of a technical-ity, and we were subjected to an investigation from a large group of CIC agents, our telephones were monitored, our mail was opened and read," but no proof emerged as to JDC's complicity in the movement of Jews. Indeed, there was none. While Skorneck maintained contact with the Brichah, ultimately with a soldier of the Brigade, Yitzhak Ram (who later became the Chief of Police in Jerusalem), he was not told of any moves before they occurred, and he did not ask too many questions. He helped to accommodate the refugees, which was a tremendous task by itself. Jews questioned by CIC said that JDC had told them that help would not be given because the Kommandatura (the Allied City Council) had ordered that Jews were not to move from one sector to the other. In the end, American resistance was broken by the panic-stricken refusal of some two hundred pregnant Jewish women to return to the Soviet Zone, where their

60 Out of the Ashes

husbands were being held. UNRRA on its part refused to move them by force, and the US military gave up: a new camp was opened in their sector, called Schlachtensee. It was simply not possible for the Americans to deny their basic commitment to behave differently from their Russian or British allies.

Supplies had been coming into Berlin from JDC, supplementing the meager rations of 1600 calories provided by the Army by agreement with UNRRA, and providing basic comforts as well as a minimum of education. By the end of the year, 84 tons of supplies had come in, and another 65 arrived in January 1946. Much of this was due to the forceful personality of Skorneck who, in a way not unlike Klausner, knew how to circumvent bureaucracies or, if there were no other choice, to confront them. The methods were different, because Skorneck represented an official, loyal, American agency. He did nothing that was in contravention to the orders of the military; but acted in a way which made a continuation of the Army's policy, in this instance, impossible.25 The complications inherent in these and similar situations, the results of the Harrison Report, combined with the pressure many United States military people felt was coming from Truman to alleviate the conditions of those who had suffered most under the Nazis, caused Eisenhower to reconsider his overall policies towards the Jews. The War Department had informed him, in early August, of the suggestion by Jewish leaders to appoint a Jewish liaison officer at his HQ, but Eisenhower had refused.26 Under the impact of the Harrison Report, he now changed his mind, and appointed his Jewish Theater Chaplain, Rabbi (Major) Judah P. Nadich, as the temporary liaison officer, pending the appointment of a permanent representative. In the meantime, a group of five organizations had formed, after a great deal of negotiations, to represent the Jews of America vis-a-vis their government on DP questions. They were the American Jewish Conference (uniting the Zionists and B'nai B'rith), the Jewish Agency, the World Jewish Congress, the Amer-ican Jewish Committee, and JDC. JDC was not very happy with the idea, but as the American Jewish Committee participated, and welfare problems were uppermost in the minds of the groups at the time, JDC agreed to take part as well.

Nadich took on his job on August 24, and immediately set out to inspect nine major camps, and Berlin. His report, filed S e p t e m b e r 16, a month after Harrison, was another blistering attack on the way the Army treated both the Jewish DPs and the German Jews who had survived the Holo-caust. Preceded by and concluding with praises for the Army for what

" Bauer, op. cit., pp. 132-34. " T h e original suggestion had been made in May 1945 by the London Committee for

Jews in Germany to the British Government. When the British refused, the British Jews proposed to the American Jewish Committee to make a parallel approach in the States. The AJC suggested the idea to Grew on July 23. See Chaim Genizi, Yoetz u'Mekim, Tel-Aviv (1987), pp. 21-22.

The DP Camps 1945^46 61 had been done—without specifying—Nadich related what he saw in the camps:

Feldafing has 4900 Jews with rooms containing from 20 to 40 people in each . . . wooden barracks are also utilized, completely uninhabitable for cold weather . . . The roofs leak with every rain, wetting the entire contents of each room, each of which contains 28 people. The maximum capacity of this camp should be no more than 2000 . . . Landsberg has 6319 inhabitants of whom 5075 are Jews . . . some people must sleep two in a bed. Low water pressure makes living conditions unsanitary on the third floor . . . At S t u t t g a r t . . . some people are sleeping on the floor . . . The 2000 calorie diet has been reached in all the camps visited, but this goal, originally intended as a minimum, is being looked upon as a maximum . . . in Landsberg, for example, 1500 calories of the 2000 calories are made up of bread and potatoes . . . the diet lacks pro-teins, minerals, and fats . . . Red Cross parcels . . . d o not supplement the 2000 calories, but go towards making it up . . . no differentiation has been made among DPs as to those liberated from concentration camps and those who came to Germany as voluntary or involuntary laborers.

He included in his recommendations a very strong call for the Army to invite JDC to send teams to the Jewish camps, and he did so especially for Berlin. It was probably this recommendation that made it possible for Skorneck to be sent there.27

The five organizations proposed Judge Simon H. Rifkind of New York, a well-respected figure in both Jewish and general society, to be Eisen-hower's Adviser on Jewish Affairs, and Eisenhower gladly accepted the proposal. Rifkind arrived in Frankfurt on October 20. On October 15, JDC's secretary, Moses A. Leavitt, had written to him proposing that the Army supply winter clothing to the DPs, and that an efficient Tracing Bureau be set up. This indeed became one of the major tasks of JDC's liaison office with the American Army at Hoechst near Frankfurt, manned by Jacob L. Trobe, who became the Director for Germany. Rifkind saw to it immediately that wherever opposition still existed to JDC teams being called forward, this opposition should be broken. He established good relations with the ZK in Munich, and even Klausner had good things to say about him. Supplies could be sent in now, and the hope was that the situation would become stabilized. They reckoned without the Brichah; and no one in Brichah foresaw the tremendous desire of Jews returning to Poland from the Soviet Union to leave that country.28

The most significant involvement of JDC with the British Zone at this time was at Bergen-Belsen. The first JDC team to reach Bergen-Belsen in July was led by Maurice Eigen, and his place was taken later by David Wodlinger. In October, the first JDC supplies came in. JDC's program in the British Zone, not only for Belsen but also for some smaller camps and for the German Jews living outside of camps, was quite considerable. JDC dealt with education, emigration, counselling and, after October, it gave

" JDC/ Germany, DPs, 1945,9/16/45, Nadich Report; also Genizi, op. cit., p. 24, ff. JDQ Germany, general, 1945, Leavitt to Rifkind, 10/15/45; Leo W. Schwartz, The

Redeemers, New York (1953), pp. 42-45. Nadich stayed on until November 11 (Genizi, op. «t., p. 26, ff.).

62 Out of the Ashes

supplies to Rosensaft's committee who then distributed it. Warburg came up there, and resented Rosensaft lecturing him on the failures of American Jewry . Schwartz came and tried to establish good relations, and there were other American Jewish dignitaries who at various times tried to see how they could relate to Rosensaft and his people. Rosensaft was one of those charismatic figures that arose in the wake of the Holocaust. He was accused of any number of sins—none of which was easy to prove—but the main point was that he had a heroic record from the Nazi period, and he was adored by a majority of the camp inhabitants. There were those who opposed him, of course, including the religious establishment in the camp, who received their supplies, after July, from the British Chief Rabbi's office, representing the orthodox Rescue Committee (Va'ad Hahatzalah) in the United States. In the British Zone, too, there operated the Jewish Relief Units of British Jews under the formidable Lady Henriques, and because they had easier access to British officers, they were the chief "interpreters" of Jewish wishes to the Army. Despite the bulk of JDC supplies there, and the extent of JDC work, American Jewry was a little more distant than in the American Zone.

Austria

When liberation came, first for Vienna in April 1945, and then for Upper Austria in May, the Allies found vast numbers of suffering humanity in the many concentration camps and slave labor camps there. The most notorious was Mauthausen, not far from Linz, basically a stone quarry which had been transformed into a camp where "extermination through labor" was practiced by the Nazis. Dutch and Czech Jews had been brought there in 1941-43 but none of these had survived. In 1944, and especially in early 1945, large numbers of Hungarian Jews were brought there, and death marches from Auschwitz and other camps reached Mauthausen and its satellite camps. The numbers are impossible to deter-mine, but there must have been at least 70-80,000 Jews in the Austrian camps close to liberation.

In Vienna, a different problem arose. There, a sorry remnant of the once proud Viennese community (IKG—Israelitische Kultusgemeinde), mainly composed of Jews married to non-Jews, survived around the community's hospital. The person responsible for the hospital was Dr Emil Tuchmann, who had of course been nominated for his post by the Gestapo. Dr Josef Loewenherz, the head of IKG under the Nazis; Rabbi Benjamin Mur-melstein, his deputy who became the head of the Judenrat in Theresien-stadt; and Tuchmann, were all people who thought they were serving their community by doing what the Nazis asked them to do, in the hope that they could cushion the Nazis' blows. They were of course sadly mistaken, and the price was paid by the people whom they sought to represent.

The DP Camps 1945^46 63

Tuchmann was to be accused by a number of former inmates of the hospital of dictatorial behavior, of physical violence against people he didn't like, and of determining who should go on the dreaded transports to Poland or to Theresienstadt. Some defended him, though it was said (by the Vien-nese police who investigated Tuchmann in September 1945) that this was because they were wealthy, old people, and Tuchmann protected them for a consideration. Others defended him because he did actually save them, or treated them well as a doctor. In the summer of 1944 Tuchmann also had to assume responsibility for a large number of Hungarian Jews, about 16,000, who were sent to Strasshof and a number of smaller places in and around Vienna instead of to Auschwitz, in order to work there. These people came with their families, and were put under the command of Hermann Krumey, Eichmann's man, who saw that the war was nearing its end and used this opportunity to try to create an alibi for himself by treating the Jews in a relatively milder manner than was the norm with the SS.

Prodded by Kastner, Mayer in Switzerland saw that the only way he could help the Viennese remnant and the Hungarian Jews would be to send medical aid and foodstuff to Tuchmann. The intermediaries would be the IRC people. Mayer's contact and friend, Marc Leclerc, head of the IRC department for help to civilians, went to Vienna in December 1944, accompanied by two other IRC men. They met with a "certain Dr Ebner" (did they not know he was the head of the Gestapo in Vienna?) and Police President Delbruegge who "is a higher SS-official and is a gendeman in every respect." Equipped with this brilliant insight into the psychology of the Nazi mind, the Red Cross people nevertheless brought foodstuffs with money from Mayer for the suffering Jews: 28 tons of food, and several tons of clothing. Most of this apparently did reach the Jews, and Tuchmann was the person who distributed it.29 Mayer did not really understand what was happening in Nazi Europe, apart from his deep hatred of Nazism and his equally deep concern for what he called Klal (Hebrew for "the general community"), that is, opposition to factionalism. Tuchmann was, after all, a respectable physician, a "responsible" leader in the old, prewar mold.

When Vienna was liberated by the Soviets, the small Communist Party achieved its moment of greatness: a large number of people joined it, "red-painted fascists," as Kurt Schumacher, the German Social-Democratic leader, was to call them. Jews had been members of the small communist underground, and now more Jews, disillusioned with all the other ideolog-ies, joined. An attempt was made to take over the IKG. Loewenherz was arrested, then freed; he went to Prague, and thence to the US. His deputy,

29 For the preceding, sec Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust, pp. 449-50; JDC/ SM-11, report by Rudolf Schirmer, n.d. (December, 1944); JDC/ SM-75, Bericht, Polizei-direktion Wien, 10/8/45.

64 Out of the Ashes

one Wilhelm Bienenfeld, tried to maintain the old IKG traditions, but the incipient Austrian administration appointed an old physician, Professor Heinrich Schur, as temporary president. In the meantime some Jews, estimated in August at 1373, came back from Theresienstadt, and some 600-700 people who had hidden in Vienna (so-called "submarines") emerged. A few returned from abroad, and the total of returnees was 2073 (out of 29,000 deportees). All the others were converted Jews or people who, through their marriage to non-Jews, had cut off their ties to the community, but had been persecuted as racial Jews. The grand total was close to 7000. In the first months after liberation they received 8-900 calories of food per day (2500 is the minimum for a healthy person). 60-70 percent of Viennese Jews were over 50 years old. The IKG tried to re-establish its old age homes and orphanages, with some minimal success, but due to Tuchmann the old Jewish hospital, the Rothschild Hospital, was regained. It was half destroyed, but Tuchmann and his co-workers restored it so it could function, more or less. Jews did not get their property back and, as in so many other countries, the appearance of the rightful owners sparked an increased antisemitism.30

There was urgent need to help the Viennese Jews, and apart from the IRC, Mayer had no way to reach them. Individual American Jewish sol-diers tried to help, and wrote back home demanding that JDC appear in Vienna. Finally, at the end of July, Mayer managed to persuade IRC to go to Vienna and bring food and clothing, as well as establish a JDC Committee. The only name Mayer knew was Tuchmann, and he invested Tuchmann with the responsibility of setting up a JDC committee. The supplies were to be distributed not by the committee, but by IKG under Tuchmann's supervision. Mayer's instructions were transmitted by Leclerc to Tuchmann in the presence of Schur and Bienenfeld on August 5, and on August 12 Tuchmann called for a meeting with IKG to elect a committee. The meeting developed into a violent attack by the leftist leaders and Tuchmann's erstwhile victims against the whole wartime Jew-ish bureaucracy. Schur left the meeting, and a committee was elected that effectively took away control from Tuchmann. Immediately afterwards Schur resigned, and Adolf D. Brill, a communist and camp victim, was appointed president of IKG. Brill now tried to put his hands on the 75 tons of JDC supplies, but he was thwarted by his opponents. Tuchmann was then arrested as a collaborator, and was interrogated by the Viennese police. When he finally emerged from prison, his reputation tarnished, he disappeared. Bienenfeld was in effective charge of the supplies, but he was

50 JDC/ Austria, general, 1945, 9/11/45, Tuchmann's testimony to the Vienesse police, ibid., Tuchmann's report on Vienna, n.d. (August, 1945); ibid., unsigned (BienenfieW report, 5/22/45.

The DP Camps 1945^46 65

an older man who had no choice but to distribute the supplies through IKG.31

In the meantime, as elsewhere, the situation was about to be changed by an exterior factor—Brichah. At first, the problem of Hungarian, Romanian, and some Czech Jews who were liberated in Austria had to be faced. A committee, led by Dr Viktor Schwarz, a Hungarian Jew who had been deported to Strasshof, was set up to organize the return of these people to their erstwhile homes. But soon, in June, the Hungarian branch of Brichah intervened, in the opposite direction. The Polish Brichah had sent some of its activists to Budapest to organize a "point" there through which Polish Jews could go to Austria in order to reach Italy. In Budapest they quickly made contact with the Zionist leaders who had organized rescue work before liberation. Together they drew on the resources of the youth movements, and found that a growing number of especially young Hungarian Jews wanted to use Brichah to escape from the after-effects of the Holocaust and the growing communist influence in Hungary to the West. Brichah sent a young Polish partisan to Vienna, but he apparently did not manage well. To bolster him up, they sent another, older man there, Bronislaw (Bruce) Teicholz. Teicholz had been an official in the Lwow (Lviv, Lemberg) Judenrat, has spent some time in the forests on the Polish-Ruthenian border, had escaped to Budapest and had become the key man in the Polish Jewish committee there. He had been in touch with the Zionist youth movements, had obtained a post of sorts with the Hungarian Red Cross, and seemed to be ideal for the wheeling and dealing that would be necessary in Vienna. He was under strict Brichah discipline; the young people of the Brichah did not quite trust him.

Teicholz quickly united Schwarz's committee with some smaller com-mittees that had sprung up in the meantime, and while IKG was busy with infighting, founded a committee of his own—the International Committee for Transient Concentration Camp Victims and Refugees, or IK for short, on August 21: Some leftists from IKG were on it, and through them he received the recognition of a reputedly antisemitic Socialist Minister of the Interior. The DP section of the American Military Government was still hesitant about Teicholz, but they gave some food and blankets and, with Tuchmann's disappearance, Teicholz "occupied" the Rothschild Hospital. The argument was that it was better a local committee handled the transients than that the Army should have to deal with them. The people who came across from Czechoslovakia (a tram-ride away) and Hun-gary were partly Brichah transients, and partly simply Jews who were fleeing to the West. They received 1500 calories from the Army, and

11 J DC/Austria, general, 1945, Report, n.d., no signature (Tuchmann, August) "Vorsch-laege des Jointvertreters fuer Oesterreichminutes of a meeting with IRC (German), 8/4/45; minutes of a Jewish Roundtable discussion (German), 8/12/45; and ibid., SM-75, for the police interrogation and summary (10/8/45).

66 Out of the Ashes

Teicholz had doctors look after the sick, again with Army medical sup-plies. By December he had dealt with 8661 transients, according to his own figures.32 -

The central importance of Teicholz's operation for JDC was to emerge later, but in the early autumn it was still very difficult for JDC to obtain Army approval of having a permanent person work in Vienna for it. The director for Italy at that point was Reuben B. Reznick, who was being criticized by many other JDC personnel, but he was in charge of the Austrian operation as well, and paid a few flying visits to Vienna. Nothing much could be achieved in this way, except for the exclusion of Mayer from the scene. In October, James P. Rice, who inherited Reznick's position in Austria, also paid a visit or two, but it was not until late in October that Norman Winestine, and then Ralph Segalman came to the city for JDC. From then on, food and medicines were distributed primarily to those belonging to the Jewish community. Prior to that, IKG tended to treat Jewish survivors on a par with people who had stayed in Vienna, been discriminated against, but had not suffered the fate of deportation; these people very largely did not identify themselves as Jews in the postwar period. A percentage of the supplies was given over to non-Jews or less persecuted ex-Jews. An old age home, a kosher kitchen, a mail package service from Western countries to individuals (no regular mail service was in effect as yet), and a search and welfare department were operated. JDC moved the remnants of the Jewish hospital away from Teicholz, and established a new hospital in another location. Of course, Teicholz asked for JDC help. In a letter of September 13 to Mayer, the IK asked for aid, and from October they received it from JDC's representatives. It is unlikely that the young American Jews there really understood the compli-cated relationships of IK, Brichah, and IKG, but they saw refugees and naturally decided to help. In fact, the IK became what the Brichah had intended it should be, a branch of Brichah activities now directed in Austria by Asher Ben-Natan (Arthur), who arrived on November 1, officially as a journalist of a Hebrew paper. He was a Mossad agent, owned a genuine Austrian passport (he had been born in Vienna), and quickly became the arbiter of things Jewish in the Austrian capital. By the end of the year, JDC personnel had become aware of his existence, and developed a very close relationship with him.33

The first person from the Jewish free world to reach the camps in Upper Austria and Salzburg was a member of the British Jewish Relief Units from Italy, Hyman Yantian. From May 27 until June 5, he travelled through Austria and Bavaria and saw the pitiful conditions of the surviving Jews. After him came the Jewish Brigade soldiers, as we have seen, in late

JJ Bauer, Flight and Rescue, pp. 157-62. • . 33 Ibid., pp. 161-63; also, J DC/Austria, 1945-46, "Report of Vienna Office, September,

1945-August, 1946".

The DP Camps 1945^46 67

June. What happened afterwards is not entirely clear, but it appears that Reznick received permission to establish an office in Salzburg, probably late in July or early in August. Reznick made a number of serious blunders, one of which was to put an English-speaking German secretary in his office, who wore a prominently displayed cross, and who took care of Jewish survivors when Reznick was on one of his very frequent trips. Those trips were another mistake, because he could not really control the different areas and he did not find people to whom he could or wished to delegate authority.34 The situation in the US Zone of Austria was that there were two US divisions, one in Land Salzburg, the 42nd, under Major-General Harry J. Collins, and the other at Linz, for Upper Austria, the 26th, under General Rinehart. The 42nd had liberated Dachau, and it had a Jewish Chaplain, Rabbi Eli Bohnen (later of Providence, Rhode Island). Bohnen, like so many other chaplains, instituted an unofficial mail service for the Jewish DPs, established good contacts with a number of his fellow-officers and, with the benevolent support of General Collins, tried his best to get a minimum of food to the Jews in the liberated camps. There was no chaplain with the 26th, the officers were either indifferent or hostile, and despite the valiant efforts of Sergeant Jack Katzman (later a Zionist leader in the States) and a Jewish lieutenant, Jews in the area lived in muddy, dilapidated camps in leaky buildings with a totally insuf-ficient food supply, while German refugees and ex-Nazis were living in good quarters and were receiving reasonable food supplies from the Amer-ican Army.

The 42nd had an Assistant Military Government Officer, Stanley K. Nowinski, a Catholic Polish-American, who in Austria became the Dis-placed Persons Control Officer. His task was to coordinate between the military and the Austrian civilian authorities, mainly to assure a speedy repatriation of the DPs who were in his area. Despite difficulties and the addition of more DPs (about 100,000 in the end), the task seemed to have been more or less accomplished by late August, when only a camp for repatriated Italians, Camp Riedenburg, still existed. People were shipped from there in weekly batches of about 500, to Italy of course. However, rumors began reaching Nowinski that there were not Italians at all; when he visited the camp he was met by a young man who represented, suppos-edly, an IRC Committee for Repatriation of Italians and Greeks. Nowinski soon found out that these "Greeks" and "Italians" were Jews. After some time, the young man left and another one came in his place, Aba Weinstein

34 See, for instance, a letter from a Jewish GI, JDC/ Austria, general, 1945-46, 9/10/45, from Horsching near Linz. Describing terrible conditions at Linz, "we asked what had Reuben Reznick . . . done for them. We were told nothing . . . Whenever they go to his office he is [not] there. They have one great condemnation . . . Some of us went personally to Reznick's [sic] office to ask him as Jews . . . Unfortunately, no one was in." The soldier then asked his relatives to send packages. For confirmation, see JDC/ interview with James. P. Rice (HK).

68 Out of the Ashes

(today Gefen, one-time Israeli Ambassador to Romania), a Jewish partisan from the Lithuanian forests, representing Brichah. He had come from Poland, and his job was to smuggle Jews to Italy. Nowinski saw the dedi-cation and enthusiasm of these people, and helped them as best he could. He obtained official recognition for Weinstein, and though vigilant control by the British on the Austro-Italian border in the end made further large-scale smuggling impossible, they continued their cooperation. With Now-inski's help the DPs were divided into two categories: those that wanted to stay in Austria temporarily, until the situation regarding emigration was clarified, and those who wished to press on, either to Italy, via the French Zone of Austria (the Innsbruck area) or into the US Zone in Germany. British protests caused a CIC investigation of Nowinski's work, but the conclusion of the CIC was that Nowinski was doing a good job and should carry on doing it. By October, there were two camps for the first category, one in Salzburg, called New Palestine, consisting of small apartments that housed about 1000 people initially; the other was in the holiday resort of Bad Gastein, with about the same number of people initially. By that time, a new director for the US Zone in Austria had taken Reznick's place, James P. Rice of Cleveland.

Rice, like many others, had to confront the lack of supplies from JDC as his major obstacle. He was told that JDC was working on it—which was true—but that could not satisfy the DPs. Rice therefore organized, again like so many others, a private mail and parcels service, with the help of his wife back in America. In addition, very soon after his arrival, he had to confront a very dangerous situation in the Linz area. Two terrible camps at Haag and Hart housed 640 Jews, and were recommended by the Army for closing "because of overcrowding and poor sanitary conditions." A family housing project nearby, at Bindermichl, could have accommo-dated many of the Jewish refugees, but the Army would have them there only if they accepted a 1200 calories ration (which was contrary to Eisen-hower's directives); also it was designated for families only, and there were very few families among the Jews. The Jews were then told that they would have to move to a place called "Camp 55," which was worse than Hart and Haag—and they refused. The anti-Jewish officers of the 26th Division then explained that the Jews should agree to be repatriated to Poland and the USSR, and if they did not want to then they would have to accept whatever accommodation was offered. An UNRRA welfare officer man-aged to postpone the move from October 3,1946, to October 6. Efforts to persuade the officer in charge to desist were fruitless and he threatened to have live ammunition issued to his soldiers and use it to force the Jews to move. Rice was ordered to persuade the Jews to agree to go. He was in a difficult position. Officially he was subject to Army discipline, yet at the same time he was supposed to "interpret" the DPs' problems to the Army> and his sympathies obviously were with them. He made the required

The DP Camps 1945^46 69

speech, and the result was that the Jews no longer trusted him. On the 5th, they staged a dignified demonstration in front of the division's offices in Linz. A major of the DP section showed understanding and the Jews agreed to move to Bindermichl, and accept 1200 calories a day. In the afternoon of the 5th, Rice dispatched a cable to JDC in Paris reporting the affair, and said he had vainly tried to persuade the Army to postpone movement "to avoid any incident," and that the Army had refused. The demonstration had led to the cancellation of the order to move, and then he added: "believe situation in whole Upper Austria requires close atten-tion at this time."

This, of course, was two months after Harrison (who had never visited Austria). The General in command of US Forces in Austria, in a semi-independent position from Eisenhower, was Mark Clark. Unlike his sub-ordinates, he understood very well that another scandal about the Jews would hurt the Army badly, and might even endanger his own position. Not surprisingly, perhaps, he called Rice personally in the middle of the night of the 6th, and asked him to withhold the cable until he had a chance to talk it over with him. Next morning, Clark's Chief of Staff came to Linz, collected the senior officers of the division, and reprimanded them severely for having "failed to carry out the program [Clark] had ordered on behalf of the DPs, especially the Jewish refugees."

On the 7th, Clark summoned all the senior officers of both divisions, the Vienna officers, Rice, Bohnen, and a representative of the Jewish DPs, a Hungarian Jew by the name of George Brachfeld, to Vienna. In a very unusual move, Clark stated that "he intended that President Truman's orders shall be carried out in the US Zone of Austria not only because they were orders, but because he himself was in sympathy with the principle that the Jews had been most persecuted by the Nazis and would therefore be entitled to first consideration." In accordance with Eisenhower's instructions, Jews should get both the Bindermichl apartments and 2000 calories. Collins could point out the achievements in this sphere in the area of the 42nd Division, and Rice had an interview with Clark in which Clark stated that the solution of the DP problem now had top priority. Rice should ask for the help of the highest Army authorities, if necessary. A committee composed of General Hume (G-5), Bohnen, and Rice were to choose new sites for camps—that was the origin of the Bad Gastein camp mentioned previously.35

By the end of 1945, American Jewish presence with the Jewish DPs took the form of contacts and help by individual soldiers, and especially by the Jewish chaplains. But as the months wore on, JDC appeared on the scene more and more forcefully. Overcoming serious hitches, in particular

" Bauer, op. cit., pp. 83-86; JDC/ Interview with James P. Rice (HK), 1982; ibid., The Will to Live, by Stanley Nowinski, (HK); Aba Gefen, The Unholy Alliance, Jerusalem (1973), esp. pp. 117-25.

70 Out of the Ashes

the reluctance of Army authorities to the shipment of supplies and the entry of these civilians into the Army—UNRRA structure, JDC had estab-lished itself with a real program by the end of the year. There had been rumblings that had prodded JDC to ever greater efforts. Some of these had come from chaplains and soldiers who had returned home and made their views clear to JDC officers. But some came from within the organi-zation. Irving H. Sherman, a respected member of the Administration and Executive Committees visited Paris and sent back a cable (September 23) which stated that "we are not doing the gorgeous job that the publicity indicates and plenty of chaplains and GIs are saying so and so writing home . . . There are important spots which we have not covered and there are no signs of definite knowledge of what supplies from the State[s] will be forthcoming and when. I am not unmindful of the difficulties and our achievements but only in the light of the facts." The Administrative Committee meeting on September 25th did not try to contradict Sherman; Leavitt merely stated that the claims were made not by JDC and not in authorized publications.36

The interesting point is that JDC was quite self-critical, and therefore capable of overcoming serious problems. If it wanted to carry on enjoying the trust of American Jewry, it had to.

M JDC/ Germany, general, 1945, Sherman cable, 9/23/45; and AC, 9/25/45. Complaints by chaplains had been dealt with in an understanding and apologetic way much earlier. See JDC/ AC 7/3/45. The problem, Baerwald said, was that the chaplains were unaware of the lack of permission to JDC to enter Germany. As a result, there had been "repercussions on the part of these people. Also 7/31/45, ibid.

CHAPTER 4

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria: A People on the Move

The Situation in Poland

There had been 3.3 million Jews in Poland before the war; now, a couple of months after the end of the fighting, about 83,000 remained: 70,000 civilians, and some 13,000 Jewish soldiers in the leftist Polish Army who were slowly being demobilized. The civilians were usually single indivi-duals whose families had been killed. Some of them were returnees from camps or had hidden among Polish people, others had existed on false papers, others again returned from the forests where they had fought the Nazis. A report in June 1945 estimated that there were about 60 percent women to 40 percent men. The reason for this was that women had a greater chance of survival: Jewish men could easily be identified because they were circumcised. The survivors concentrated in the larger towns, such as Lodz, Warsaw, Cracow, or Radom. Those who tried to return to their homes in the smaller places or villages were met with murderous antisemitism largely caused by the fact that Jewish property had either been left with Polish neighbors, or these neighbors had simply taken the property. Now, of course, they did not want to give it back. It was much easier if the few Jews who were returning were driven out or killed. According to official figures, 351 Jews were murdered between November 1944 and October 1945—which may have been an understatement. Jews were thrown out of railway carriages or murdered on the road. As a result, most Jews who had been living on false papers continued to do so after liberation, because their lives were in no less danger than before.1

The reason behind the insecurity of Jews was not only the simple fact that now there were less than 3 percent of the Jews left of those who had been there before, but chiefly because of the general political situation in the country. The leftist government of Boleslaw Bierut, based on an alliance of communists and left-wing socialists, had very little support in Poland, and was kept in power by the bayonets of the Soviet forces. The

1 Bauer, op. cit., p. 115; JDC/Poland, 6/22/45, S. Bertrand Jacobson to Isaac Asofsky (HIAS); Yisrael Gutman, The Jews in Poland After World War II (Hebrew), Jerusalem (1985), pp. 27-34. OOA—D yj

72 Out of the Ashes

considerable prewar liberal segment that had stood between the extremes of right and left had been wasted away by the cruelties and disasters of war. The major wartime underground armed force, the Armia Krajowa, a basically right-wing organization, had been replaced by an anticommunist underground, among whom the NSZ {Narodowe Sily Zbrojne), a fascist group, played an important role. These armed groups saw the Jews as enemies, based on their extreme antisemitic stand even under German occupation. However, they now added the argument that the new regime was a Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy against the Polish people. This idea, which had been one of the major Nazi propaganda tools, had also been current in prewar Poland. The new regime did indeed use a number of people of Jewish origin in its bureaucratic apparatus. As mentioned already, its popular standing was shaky, and very reluctantly the govern-ment availed itself of the services of Jews, who could at least be relied upon not to make an alliance with their deadly enemies. Two centrally important economic tasks were given to Jewish members of the Cabinet: Jakub Berman and Hilary Mine. Although the total number of Jews in government posts was small, they were represented in proportionately much higher ratios than their part in the population. In addition, one should remember that in prewar Poland there had been no Jews in govern-ment at all, despite the fact that at that time they constituted one tenth of Poland's population. The right-wing antigovernment rebels saw the hated communist-controlled regime as being identical with the equally hated Jews. The Jews, in this situation, really had no choice but to identify with a regime that was obliged to defend them. The result of this combination of personal and political tragedies was that a large number of Jews wanted to leave Poland.2

The physical, mental, and organizational situation of the Jews was desperate. Many of them literally had no homes. The devastation of the country's houses had caused a scramble for the accommodation still avail-able. Poles were naturally quick to enter houses in the larger cities in which the Jews were now trying to settle. In the first months, many Jews were living in hotels of sorts. The returnees from camps were suffering from a variety of diseases, the chief ones being TB and the after-effects of typhoid. Weak and dispirited, they were mostly unable to find useful employment, although those who were able often entered government employment, as has been shown. The Polish government tried to help, but it really had no means at its disposal. Not only did it rule over a hostile population, but it had to deal with the terrible ravages of the war, and on top of that it had to preside over a vast exchange of populations. Millions of Poles from the former eastern provinces of Poland, now annexed by the Soviet Union, were moving west; Ukrainians and Byelorussians from the ethnic Polish areas were moving east. Germans from the new Polish territories of former

2 Bauer, op. cit., pp. 113-15.

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 73

East Germany, up to the Oder, were being expelled, and Poles were sought who would resettle the area. Returnees both from concentration camps and from POW camps, Poles as well as Jews, were treated with disdain and hostility by the local Polish population—something the postwar histor-ies tried to ignore.3

Some homes for Jewish children were set up with government aid, and a very insufficient aid program for returnees from camps included Jews as well. But in essence, Jews were expected to help themselves. Sommerstein received support from Teheran, as we have seen, and then in late 1944 he began receiving a certain minimum of supplies, also through Teheran. Medical equipment worth 19,000 Swedish crowns, mainly morphine and syringes, was sent to Lublin from Sweden via Finland, with the Soviets paying for the transport. Sommerstein's complaint that he had received little or no help was therefore not quite true, though a partial explanation may lie in the fact that Sommerstein was forced to give a not inconsiderable amount from the help he received to the Gentile population in order to avoid antisemitic repercussions. Considering the tremendous difficultues in sending anything from America to Poland in late 1944 or early 1945, and even after the end of the war, it was surprising that as much got in as did. But the need was desperate indeed. Sommerstein's Central Commit-tee, composed of communists, Bundists, and Zionists did not succeed in establishing a single hospital for Jews. Religious life was being organized by the Polish Army Rabbi, David Kahane, quite successfully, but welfare work fell far behind. The economic outlook in the summer of 1945 was anything but bright. Only about 5 percent of normal consumption was provided by the official rations, and the rest, bought on the free market, cost about 15 times as much. Inflation had pushed the zloty to the point where the official rate was 12 zloty to the dollar, and the unofficial was near the 300 mark.4

We have already described the working of Brichah in late 1944 and early 1945. At first, this was an organization that intended to enable young ex-fighters and returnees from the Soviet Union to reach Palestine via Romania, and then via Hungary, Austria, and Italy. As time went on, however, more and more of the survivors wanted to utilize the illegal exit route. Organization was very loose: there was a Central Committee representing the different Zionist youth movements, which had its head-quarters in Cracow or Katowice, maintaining a fairly strict conspiratorial regime; the Polish police never managed to penetrate it. Groups went across the border organized by factions, or movements, not so much for political reasons, as to ensure secrecy and cohesion. These groups were organized in so-called kibbutzim, inspired by the Palestinian kibbutz move-ment. Some of these were indeed preparing themselves for life on a Pale-

3 IDC/Sweden, 1945, Ragnar Gottfarb to Leavitt, 7/31/45. 4 Gottfarb to Leavitt, as in note 3; and JDC/interview with Ragnar Gottfarb (HK), p.5.

74 Out of the Ashes

stinian kibbutz, though most were temporary but rather well-knit groups that came together to share possessions and fate for the duration. The reason they came together was, despite appearances to the contrary, not primarily political. Most of the people did not understand the finer points of Zionist factionalism in any case. They came together because they were yearning for warmth and friendship in a world that had deprived them of their families and friends. They bonded out of sheer psychological neces-sity, and the "kibbutzim" answered their innermost needs.

Two representatives of youth movements on the Central Committee for Polish Jewry headed by Sommerstein, Israel Glazer and Yitzhak (Antek) Zuckermann, the famed deputy commander of the Warsaw Ghetto Rebel-lion, in effect represented Brichah. The CC received small sums of money, and was the scene for infighting between the Zionists and the communists; but the action lay undoubtedly with Brichah, even before the big exodus started in 1946. It is almost impossible to find out exactly how many Jews left Poland until July 1945, but some 2800 crossed into Romania, another 2-3000 left with the Schmetterer trains, and 5-6000 at least went via Hungary, for a vague estimate of about 10,000 people. This was done under "Ben" (Moshe Meiri), an unknown returnee from Central Asia, who directed Brichah from May until September 1945, when he was suc-ceeded by Tuvia Cohen. For the latter part of 1945, we have figures pre-pared by the Brichah command in Poland: 33,280 between July 1 and December 31. In addition, there was what was called the "wild" Brichah, mainly via Szczecin or the middle part of East Germany. This was a half-organized movement directed by passeurs who did this for money. Usually they attached themselves to Brichah routes, and served those people who did not bother to go through the well-organized and disciplined Brichah procedures. There may have been about 5000 who utilized this route until the end of 1945. Between January and the end of June 1946, another 14,826 left by Brichah, and perhaps another 5000 to 10,000 with the "wild" Brichah. It would be fair to say that, from its inception until June 1946, some 70,000 Jews had left Poland. Clearly, therefore, Brichah overshadowed anything that was done in Poland at the time.

The Jewish communists were of course well aware of what was going on. It stood in direct opposition to their aim of having the Jews as a component in the rebuilding of a communist Poland, and Brichah's success would undercut their position vis-a-vis their non-Jewish colleagues. A bitter struggle therefore ensued. In this fight, Brichah did not have to produce any propaganda at all. In fact, the existence of "wild" movements meant that people had no patience for Brichah's more meticulous and responsible operations. There were always many more candidates for Brichah than the organization could manage. The interesting point was, however, that the government in effect put no serious obstacles in the way of Brichah, of whose existence it of course knew. This attitude seemed to

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 75

stem from two sources: first, a genuine understanding of the Jewish situ-ation by some of the top leaders, and the realization that many Jews pre-ferred to go to a country they could call their own. However, the second point was probably more persuasive—there was no opposition to the migration on the part of the Soviets, as long as no Soviet soldiers deserted to join the exodus. Soviet Jewish soldiers did desert and did join, but they were so well hidden by Brichah that no case was ever discovered. Soviet acquiescence may have been motivated by the desire to cause trouble for the British in Palestine by having all these Jews try to go there. It may also have been motivated by the realization that because of the prevalent antisemitism in Poland the presence of Jews there was a destabilizing factor, and the more that got out, the better. In addition, communist ideology at the time decreed that, while in the Soviet Union socialism had been established and, therefore, by definition, the Jewish problem was solved (hence no emigration was necessary), Poland was a "People's Democracy," a preparatory stage before socialism, and national problems like the Jewish one still existed and could be solved by voluntary emi-gration.

Brichah was paid, until the summer of 1945, largely by the Jewish Agency's Rescue Committee (established in 1943). According to the Jeru-salem figures, a total of about £300,000, or roughly $1.2 million, as pro-vided by Jerusalem for rescue and migration activities in Europe, of which the Brichah received a significant share, though we do not know the exact figure. Money came from Paris, where Mossad had an office, and Geneva, where a treasurer responsible to the Jewish Agency had funds which he distributed as needed.5

In Brichah work, there was a small but important American Jewish input. It consisted of the active participation of Jewish GIs and, mainly, of Jewish chaplains with the American Army. There were, at that early stage, two main places where this collaboration took place. One was on the Czech-Bavarian border, where Sylvia Neulander had been sent by Ruth Kluger of the Paris Mossad, to help get refugees from Poland and Czechoslovakia into the American Zone. Neulander found a young Reform rabbi, Eugene J. Lipman of the 18th Corps who, during July 1945, smug-gled 2000 Czech and Polish Jews to Austria, and later Germany. In the process, and thanks to cooperation with a Jewish Army off@icer and the Prague Brichah office, another 700 old people were taken out of the former Nazi ghetto of Theresienstadt to the American DP camp at Deggendorf in Bavaria. The Soviet commander of Theresienstadt and head of the Soviet medical mission there, which saved the lives of thousands by their courageous and devoted care of the ex-inmates who were mostly sick with

s The whole preceding section is based on Bauer, op. cit., pp. 113-29.

76 Out of the Ashes

typhoid, even gave the Americans an official document which said the Jews were being repatriated, "only to Palestine."6

The other instance was in Berlin. In early 1946, Rabbi Herbert Fried-man started his tour of duty in the city. In his house he stored tires, gasoline, and spare parts for the Brichah, and solicited gifts of cigarettes, the customary method of payment from Jewish GIs to the Soviet soldiers who allowed the convoys to pass. All this was, formally speaking, not illegal, but neither was it actually permitted or, strictly speaking, an Army chaplain's job. His work with the Brichah was continued after July 1946 by Rabbi Meyer Abramowitz. By 1946, JDC had of course become fully operative in Germany and Poland, and chaplains sometimes found them-selves collaborating with both Brichah and JDC. The fact that many JDC workers also helped Brichah made their position relatively easy.7

With the end of the war, the Polish CC urged JDC to get into the country. Schwartz did his best to get someone into Poland, but the Soviets must have been behind the difficulties JDC experienced in getting person-nel to Warsaw. However, in this case a good solution seemed to have been found. There was one survivor of prewar JDC's Warsaw office, namely David Guzik, the treasurer. Guzik had been a central figure in the attempts of JDC to look after the suffering Jewish population in the Polish ghettoes before the mass killing in 1942. He had arranged for relatively large sums of "apres" loans, which had enabled JDC to operate children's homes, soup kitchens, and cultural activities, that had helped, to some extent, in alleviating the ravages of famine and disease. In addition, Guzik had been instrumental in funding the underground activities that peaked in the Warsaw Ghetto Rebellion. The revolt was financed by JDC, through Guzik, who became the treasurer of the rebels. After liberation, he had a full record of the loans he had received, and for which he had handed out little slips of paper in lieu of receipts, which he signed with a pencil with the word kaftor (Hebrew for button,Guzik is "button" in Polish). He seemed an obvious choice for JDC representative in Poland, and this is indeed what he became. In May 1945, he sent a cable to New York: "Ready to continue work, 40,000 Jews need help badly. Awaiting your instructions."8 His first estimate of the needs in Poland, about $1.5 million, reached New York in July. But neither Sommerstein nor Guzik really wanted cash to be sent, because money in Poland would be fairly useless. Instead, supplies had to be sent that could be exchanged for food, clothes, or money when needed. This would be apart f r o m individual packages that could be sent by individuals, and were usually handled by HIAS. In July, Sommerstein was permitted to leave for London, where

* Ibid., pp. 109-10. 7 Ibid., pp. 140-41. 1 Elizabeth Ford, "Adventure in Charity," This Month, JDC Magazine for January

(JDC Library). > : :

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 77

he also attended a crucial Zionist conference. There he met with JDC representatives, and then Schwartz went to Warsaw to check the situation on the spot. He there estimated the budget at $370,000 monthly, at 100 zloty per dollar, about three times the real value of the Polish currency. In addition, $500,000 would be needed for "reconstruction." Under government prodding, the CC had to consider rebuilding Jewish life, especially in areas cleared of the German population, where Jews, so they hoped, might rebuild their lives on a permanent basis. Much of this allo-cation, in the form of supplies, was already on the high seas in November, from the United States, South Africa, where the Jewish community tra-ditionally contributed to JDC, and South America.9

Cash payments to the CC in 1945 came to $370,000 (37 million zloty): another $130,000 were given to the Zionist "kibbutzim," or training sta-tions—in effect, largely to Brichah—and to the religious organizations who were not represented on the CC. Supplies were calculated at $1,461,234. Some $36,000 were distributed to people from certain locali-ties (landsleit) by groups in the United States originating from these places (Landsmanschaftn). Of all these contributions, $140,000 went to support 4350 children in homes or with families, and $250,000 was spent on attempts to find employment. $96,000 went to direct doles, and $48,000 to medical work. Among those supported were 2000 invalids from the concentration camps, and about 1000 demobilized soldiers in the first stages of their readjustment. Until February 1946 a total of 18 transports of supplies had arrived in Poland. They contained 176,387 pounds of clothes and shoes, 287,273 pounds of food, medicines, sewing machines, carpenters' and shoemakers' tools as well as machine tools and raw materials such as raw wool, sheepskins, and the like. Also included was equipment for two 100-bed hospitals. The raw wool came from Australia, because the Australian Jews were not permitted to send cash; it was spun, combed, and then exchanged for things Polish Jews needed.

American critics of JDC, such as the journalist Ben-Zion Goldberg, writing for the Yiddish journal Der Tog (The Day) thought help did not arrive soon enough or massively enough; they saw the suffering Polish Jews and claimed they were proof of JDC's failure. An examination of the facts seems to indicate the opposite conclusion: in the face of insoluble problems, the only hope for the starving and desperate Polish Jews was help through JDC. The distribution of this aid was done through the CC, the Zionist groups and the orthodox. We do not know too much about Guzik's method of operation, because unfortunately, tragedy struck on March 5,1946. Guzik and Gertrude Pinsky, a brilliant young JDC worker, were killed in an airplane crash at Prague airport. The whole Polish oper-ation had to be quickly restructured. Schwartz rerouted William Bein, who had served for JDC since 1920, and in fact had been in Poland in the

9 B&uer, American Jewty and the Holocaust, pp. 324-29; JDC/Excom, 7/24,9/26,11/21/45.

78 Out of the Ashes

1920s, from his intended post in Hungary to Poland, where he arrived in April. Faced with the vast problems of the Polish operation, Bein made a quick adjustment. While his relations with the American Ambassador, Bliss Lane, were far from cordial—Lane was a conservative with anti-Jewish leanings—he maintained excellent contact with the senior staff of the embassy, and with the French charge d'affaires, Raymond Laporte, a pro-Jewish, liberal and very bright maverick, with an impressive record of defending Jews in a French POW camp in Germany during the war. It was more difficult to remain on good terms with Gitler-Barski, his local deputy, and in fact the agent of the government in JDC. Bein did it by maintaining a small staff of about 60 employees all told, who supervised the stores and kept the accounting in shape. The rest was a matter of negotiations with the CC, which was slowly becoming more and more of a communist-influenced body. Bein was careful to maintain a stance of independence of the political factions. He supported not only the insti-tutions run by government-controlled bodies, but also those of the Zion-ists: their vocational training farms (hachsharot) as well as their children's homes and cultural institutions. Nor did he neglect the religious establish-ment with its schools, children's homes, and synagogues. This was a con-dition for JDC's work, and the government, for whom the dollars sent in by JDC were an important factor in their foreign currency budget, acquiesced.10

As we shall see, JDC was nowhere near a position where it could respond adequately to the great needs of Polish Jews. The CC in March 1946 asked for a $1 million monthly budget, but Schwartz could only approve a $475,000 monthly allocation, after $1.4 million had been sent during the first quarter. The reason for the increasing urgency of the demands of the CC was the repatriation to Poland of 20,000 Jews in 1945, and 157,000 Jews between February and the end of June 1946. These were the bulk of the Polish Jews who had fled into the Soviet Union when the war between Germany and Russia broke out in June 1941, and some 250,000 of whom had survived the war. Tens of thousands of others had perished in Central Asia of hunger and disease, or had served as soldiers in the Red Army and had fallen in battle. A first agreement for the return of Poles and Jews to Poland had been reached in July 1945, between the Soviets and their left-wing Polish allies. On June 20, the Jewish intellectual Ber Mark had so informed the CC from Moscow. No one knew when this agreement would be implemented, and to what extent. In February 1946, when the number of Jews in Poland was estimated at 80,000, the trains began to roll into

10 Interview with William Bein, 2/14/67, O H D ; JDC/Poland, general, 1946, Report of 5/22/46; ibid., 2/16/46, "Meeting on Poland" between Schwartz, Guzik, and Shargo, and other material in the same file. See also, ibid., "Notes re Warhaftig Observations", 4/1/46. Warhaftig was a representative of the religious Zionists who visited Poland and found that the orthodox communities were receiving no aid from the CC on which they were not represented, and were therefore dependent on JDC help. •

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 79

Poland. By the end of June, an official count estimated the number of Jews in Poland at 240,489.11 The CG tried to prepare places in Silesia for the reception of these returnees, because it would simply not be feasible to settle them in the larger towns. Silesia had been largely cleared of Germans, and the Jews could enter empty houses in towns and villages. There was, also, a vision of a semi-autonomous Jewish area of settlement in socialist Poland. Communists and Bundists tried to persuade the returnees to settle in these places.

The people who came back from Russia usually travelled in open cattle carriages on slow trains for a long time, without sufficient food. The train engineers received instructions not to stop in larger cities such as Lodz and to head straight for Silesia or Szczecin. Usually, though, these engin-eers were bribed to stop in Lodz or Warsaw or Cracow. The people wanted to find out, first of all, what had happened to their relatives in the places they had lived in before. When the tragedy had become palpable, they sometimes managed to stay in the large cities, sometimes they let them-selves be led to Silesia, and sometimes they made straight for the border with Brichah. In the rail stations, one could often see competing teams of representatives of the communists and the Zionists explaining to bewil-dered returnees opposite points of view on what they should do now.

The problems of the newcomers were exacerbated by the difficulty in getting their prewar property returned. There were laws establishing their right to do that, but Polish courts were not eager to translate these rights into practice; in addition, local hostility to any such steps was such that to go to Polish courts with a restitution claim involved real physical danger, Jewish communal property was largely confiscated and used by the State.12

These repatriated Polish Jews were quite unlike the survivors who con-stituted the Jewish community in Poland up until then. They came not as individuals, but in families, sometimes large ones, and suddenly there was a major problem of children to be educated, and old people to be looked after.13 Another problem was that we know today how many people ulti-mately came, but at the time it was anyone's guess. In May, for instance, Schwartz reported that 60,000 had come so far, and nobody knew how many more would arrive. It was this tremendous flow of people that com-pletely upset all budgetary plans and forced JDC to improvise once again.

11 Gutman, op. cit., pp. 12-13. Mankowitz (op. cit., p. 18) has different figures: 195,000 Jews had returned to Poland by mid-1946, of whom 25,000 had returned from the USSR in 1945,29,000 (sic) were soldiers, and 157,420 returned in 1946 (this actually totals 201,000— Y.B.). If we add the 70,000 civilians who were said to have been in Poland in August 1945, presumably before any appreciable number came back from Russia, and subtract the 70,000 who had left with the Brichah by July 1946, we have some 40,000 less than the 241,000 cited by Gutman. I have not been able to-reconcile the figures, but if one has to choose between the two sets, Gutman's seems the more solid, based as they are on detailed research into the CC's and Polish accounts.

12 Gutman, op. cit., pp. 60-61. 13 Bauer, Flight and Rescue, pp. 124-26; Gutman, loc. cit.

OOA—D*

80 Out of the Ashes

The mental state of many of these survivors and repatriated Jews was captured well by a report from an American Jewish journalist who visited with a family in Poland. The husband had lost his wife, and the wife had lost her husband in the Holocaust. Each of them had saved one of their children, and they had adopted his niece who had become an orphan. The visitors brought food and stockings from his brother-in-law in America, thinking that would be well received.

The husband shoved the food back at us, snarling, "we can get all these things in the black market." He picked up the stockings and tossed them onto the table contemptu-ously—"tell my wife's brother that my wife wears only silk stockings." At that we blew up. In the stormy argument that followed, the reason for such behavior became clear. He wanted only one thing from his American relatives: assistance in quitting Poland-nothing short of t h a t . . . " I have written we need nothing," he stormed. " N o food, no

. money, no stockings, nothing but to leave."14

There was yet another need that could not be met with money or sup-plies: that was the need for direct communication with the Jewish world, from which the Jews of Poland had been cut off for six terrible years. For the Zionists, this need was met, in part, by the Zionist World Conference, which took place in London in August 1945. The representatives of the remnants of the ghetto fighters, Antek Zuckermann and Chaika Grossman went there, as did Sommerstein. Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann laid down the program for the coming years. In the shadow of the Holocaust they would have to fight for a Jewish State in Palestine, or for Palestine as a Jewish State. Both leaders emphasized that they were skeptical about the possibility of the new Labor government fulfilling the British Labour Party's promises to the Jews, promises that included the establishment of such a State. For both the Zionists and the non-Zionists, however, contact with American Jewry was no less important. Jewish leaders such as Jacob Pat of the Bund visited Poland in the spring of 1946; journalists came, misunderstood what was happening, and reported what they thought they had seen. In May, Sommerstein came to New York. His remarks to the JDC leadership were pathetic. On the one hand he complained that "months had elapsed before help came from abroad, and when it arrived, it was not in proportion to the size of the tragedy." On the other hand, he praised JDC for what it had done and, of course, demanded increases in that help. How could any aid have been commensurate with the tragedy? And how could anyone have sent help to Poland in late 1944 and early 1945 more than JDC did, from Sweden and from Teheran? And of course, JDC's obligations included the DP camps, Hungary, Romania, France, and a host of other areas. The funds provided were never enough. Somm-erstein himself, a sick old man, remained in the States, and died there. The increases he demanded were based on the assumption that despite the desire of many to move out of Poland, the bulk of the people would remain.

14 Samuel Lubell, The Second Exodus, in: Elizabeth Ford, op. cit., passim. 15 Excom, 6/19/46.

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 81

It was true that the Brichah figures for May and June showed a steep rise—3502 in May, and 8000 in June—nevertheless, the masses of arrivals would, hopefully, stay. Then, on July 4, 1946, the pogrom of Kielce took place.

On the morning of that day, a nine-year-old boy, Henryk Blaszczyk, a cobbler's son, went to the local militia (police) station and said he had been captured by Jews, held at their center at Planta Street No. 7, and had just managed to run away from them. He said that he had seen there other Christian children who had been murdered by the Jews, presumably for ritual purposes. This fantastic story was believed—was it not "well known" that Jews killed Christian children for ritual purposes?—and soon afterwards a mob gathered around the house in Planta Street, the seat of the local Jewish committee and the gathering place for a "kibbutz" of young people about to leave Poland. Jews were dragged out and killed. Phone calls to the local bishop elicited the reply that the dignitary was "out of town." The manager of a ("socialist") government-owned factory gathered his workers and went to join in the fun. Adults and children were beaten, tortured, and then killed. A group of Army soldiers took away the few licensed small arms the Jews had, then themselves ordered the Jews outside, where more were killed. The rest broke away and barricaded themselves. In the meantime, other Jews were cornered and killed in other places in the town, especially at the railway station/and in one or two small places near Kielce. Finally, another Army detachment came and stopped the killing. Forty-one Jews had been killed in a ritual murder pogrom a year after the end of Hitler's regime, in a "socialist" country, and in a town which was the seat of a Catholic bishop.

The head of the Jewish religious establishment in Poland, Rabbi David Kahane, had tried to intervene with the Primate of Poland, Cardinal August Hlond, before Kielce, and tried to get a pastoral letter against victimizing Jews—after hundreds had been killed all over Poland—but got nowhere with him. Dr Joseph Tennenbaum, a representative of the American Federation of Polish Jews, came from the United States and also turned to the Cardinal, but returned empty-handed. On July 11, Hlond held a press conference, at which he announced that the Church was against all murder, whether of Poles or of Jews. There had been no racism behind the pogrom, he said. The local bishop had shown great circumspec-tion, had helped the authorities and had read a message in church the following Sunday calling for peace and order. Poles, he said, had saved Jews from the Nazis at the risk of their lives. However, he added, antisemi-tism in Poland was "to a great extent due to the Jews who today occupy leading positions in Poland's government and endeavor to introduce a governmental structure that a majority of the people do not desire." This was dangerous to the Jews, and they might have to pay for it dearly.

82 Out of the Ashes

While it was true that Jews were suffering, Poles today were suffering incomparably more. Hlond did not condemn the pogrom or call on Poles to desist from killing Jews. He indicated clearly that he thought that all Jews were acting in concert, that they were all communists or supporters of communism, and that the pogrom was their own fault.16

Antek Zuckermann, Rabbi Kahane, and others flew to Kielce with government help, and supervised the shipping out of the wounded to Lodz by an Army train under heavy security. Government officials descended on Kielce, and summary trials were held. It turned out that the boy Henryk Blaszczyk had been carefully trained and prepared for his role by members of the right-wing groups that were fighting the government. An anti-Jew-ish pogrom was good in itself and would help them in mobilizing support for their armed struggle. A number of participants in the pogrom were caught and sentenced, nine of them being executed on July 14.

The reaction of Polish Jewry to the Kielce pogrom was one of panic. True, individual killings had taken place in Poland ever since liberation, and had been accumulating throughout the year prior to Kielce. But the pogrom showed not only the depth of murderous antisemitism in the country; it also showed that medieval prejudices—the ritual murder accusation—were still prevalent. It was hard to believe that this could happen in a supposedly civilized country a year after Hitler's downfall. The government appeared helpless in its attempts to protect the small Jewish minority. Moreover, the participation in the pogrom of govern-ment officials, and the thundering silence of the Church, made it clear to many Jews that they would have no future in Poland. Brichah was now swamped with Jews demanding to be taken out of Poland. All Brichah's modes of operation up to that point proved to be inadequate. 19,000 Jews left Poland with Brichah in July. In August, 33,346 left, and in September 12,379. We must estimate the number of those who left with the "wild" Brichah at another 10,000, for a total of some 77,000 in those three months.

Two main routes were followed by the refugees: one was the Szczecin-Berlin trail, and the other led through Silesia into Czechoslovakia. The Berlin route was more dangerous, because of the unpredictability of the Russians who controlled the roads, and it was used also by the "wild" Brichah smugglers, who were not always the best or the safest partners for Brichah. Brichah therefore tended to concentrate on the Silesian "points," especially the ones leading to the Czech town of Nachod, where friendly Czech officials, and a couple of local Jews, known only as "Pick and Beck, provided a congenial atmosphere for the thousands who fled there from Poland.

16 Bauer, op. cit., pp. 206-11. Some stories have been circulating as though the pogrom had been instigated by the government's own secret services. No proof has been adduced, and it does not seem very likely.

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 83

The German DP Camps and the Problem of Palestine

The decision of the British Labour government to abandon the Jews and deny them immigration to Palestine was, as we have seen, met by the hardening of Jewish opposition to Britain. The guiding spirit in this was undoubtedly David Ben-Gurion, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Execu-tive and Labor leader. Having given the Haganah the green light to attack the British in Palestine, he left London and went to Paris, where Mossad Le'Aliyah Bet (Mossad for short), the Haganah's branch for "illegal immi-gration," which aimed to control Brichah (but did not succeed), had its center. At the head of Mossad stood Shaul Avigur, one of the original founders of the Haganah, and Ruth Kluger, one of his main aides. With the help of Ruth Kluger, Ben-Gurion arranged a visit to Germany, accompanied by Kluger and Rabbi Nadich, which began on October 19, 1945. A detailed diary and copious notes, as well as letters to his wife and to his colleagues make it possible to reconstruct the impact the DP camps he visited made on him. He saw quite a number of these, and he observed very shrewdly what was happening in them. He came away with the clear notion that the DPs stood, overwhelmingly, with the Zionist movement in the fight for a Jewish State in Palestine. The accepted wisdom among Palestine Jews was that these DPs were demoralized, physical and mental wrecks. "5000 Jews such as these in Palestine . . . can turn the country into one big lunatic asylum."17

Ben-Gurion reached the opposite conclusion. On November 21, after his return to Jerusalem, he told the Executive Committee of the Jewish Agency (JA) that he had never been so encouraged as by his visit to the camps. These were people who had agreed to walk to the shores of the Mediterranean if that could get them to Palestine. Nothing was further from Ben-Gurion than naivete. He was well aware of the fact that many DPs, unemployed and sullen, underfed and housed in barracks, were exchanging rations for goods, engaging in trade with Germans and GIs, engaging in fact in what was called the "black market." Needless to say, the whole German economy was one big grey-black market, and the main culprits were the American soldiers, who could buy anything their hearts desired with cigarettes, stockings, and other goods which they could get cheaply from their PX stores. But many Jews were disturbed by this; they were not concerned about what was happening to the German economy but they were worried about the demoralization that might creep into Jewish social life as a result of this situation. Ben-Gurion had an answer to this: Zionism, the urge and the activity toward emigration to Palestine. That would save the people from demoralization.

Ben-Gurion was received like a king everywhere he went—he was the first Jewish leader of world stature who had visited the DPs. He came

17 Interview with Aharon Hoter-Yishai, OHD, p. 10.

84 Out of the Ashes

before Rifldnd's appointment could have made much of a difference— Rifkind had just arrived in Frankfurt—and before either the Jewish Agency's Rescue Groups (of whom more below) arrived in November, or the JDC's efforts to get more teams and more supplies into Germany had much effect. In a sense he had the opportunity of being the first major outside influence, and he used it to great effect. He visited Landsberg, for instance.

To the people he is God. It seems that he represents all of their hopes of getting to Palestine... The first I knew of his coming was when we noticed the people streaming out to line the street leading from Munich. They were carrying flowers and hastily improvised banners and signs. The camp itself blossomed out with decorations of all sons. Never had we seen such energy displayed in the camp. I don't think that a visit by President Truman could cause as much excitement.18

Ben-Gurion, accompanied by Nadich and Rifkind, saw Eisenhower and his Chief of Staff, General Walter Beddell-Smith, on October 19, and submitted a memorandum to them on the 25th. He proposed a measure of autonomy for the Jewish camps, emphasized the need for cultural work, asked for paramilitary training of the DPs, and suggested that an area be set aside in Germany for Jews to concentrate in preparation for their emigration to Palestine. This latter proposal was rejected, luckily for the Agency, probably, because a concentration like that might have aroused tremendous opposition from the Germans or, conversely, might have had the effect of keeping the Jews in Germany. But the main achievement of Ben-Gurion was not written down: to Heymont, and after that to the Jewish Agency Executive, he quoted Beddell-Smith who promised that the Americans would not stop the infiltrees from coming in. Clearly, Ben-Gurion discussed this problem with the generals at some length. After that talk he instructed his liaison with Brichah that Polish Jews should be sent to Germany. Conditions might be difficult, but the Americans would not return them to Poland.19

Another major factor in the shaping of the fate of Jewish DPs was the developing political situation in relation to Palestine. The refusal of the British to accept Truman's proposal to allow 100,000 Jews to emigrate to Palestine was accompanied by a plea to the United States to join Britain in determining the future of the country as well as the future of the DPs. This has been dealt with exhaustively elsewhere, and only a brief reminder is needed here.20 On October 19, the British suggested to the Americans that a committee be established to investigate the DP problem and suggest solutions, in Palestine and elsewhere. As to Palestine, the committee was to find out what the conditions were there and how many Jews could be

" The diary of (Major) Irving Heymont, Army commander of Landsberg DP camp, copy in the author's private possession.

" Bauer, op. cit., pp. 94-96. ; P«.« 20 See Michael J. Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, Princeton University I KM

(1982).

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 85 absorbed. Truman insisted on giving the link between DPs and Palestine a more prominent place in the committee's labors. On November 13 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin could announce that an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry would be set up to investigate Jewish DPs and Palestine. Bevin left no one in doubt as to where his sympathies lay. The Jewish problem had been created by Hitler, he intimated, and had ended with his downfall. Now the Jews should return to their different countries of origin. Palestine could not absorb all these people in any case. It was also clear from his statement that he fervently hoped the Americans would reach the same conclusion, and that thereby the Zionist issue would be buried once and for all. In the course of a brief press conference following his announcement, he added that the Jews should not jump to the head of the queue, and was promptly accused of harboring antisemitic prejudices. The political motivation behind this policy was the perceived weakness of the British position in the Middle East vis-a-vis Arab nationalism laying claim to Palestine and the threat of Soviet intrusion. Britain had become a second-class power, was on the point of giving up India and possibly other parts of the Empire, and believed it could handle Jewish unrest much easier than Arab opposition.

Six British and six American members of the Committee began their hearings in Washington on January 5, 1946, and then moved to London for more hearings. In February they split into a number of groups and visited Germany, Austria, and Poland, paying special attention to the DP camps. The impression they gained was that the Jews overwhelmingly opted for Palestine, and that they most emphatically refused to return to their former homelands. Dr Leo Srole, a psychologist working with the UNRRA team at Landsberg, told Committee members that the survivors had suffered severe psychological damage through their Holocaust experi-ence, and that living conditions in Germany had caused further damage. And yet, he said, there were few clinical cases, intimating that the damage had not impaired the survivors' individual and social functioning. They knew what they wanted.21 Gideon Rufer [Raphael] was sent by the JA to "prepare" the DPs for the Committee's visit. There was clearly a political propaganda machine put into action to have the Committee receive the right impression. But one must add that, given the stubborn and indepen-dent frame of mind of the DPs, it is quite unthinkable that they would have said anything they did not want to say. Rufer really had no status at all, except that with which he was invested by the DPs themselves. J A had no means to coerce anyone. Yet the pressure put on the Committee members almost proved counter-productive. One of them, touring Czechoslovakia in the company of Rufer's agent, declared that if the Jewish attempt to influence him had lasted much longer he would have definitely turned against the Jews.

J l Mankowitz, op. cit., pp. 24-25.

86 Out of the Ashes

The real mood of the DPs was told in a quite possibly apocryphal story about a DP in a camp street in Belsen, who was asked by a Committee member where he wanted to go, and answered "kin Eretz Yisroel" (to Palestine). Whereupon it was discovered that he had registered to emigrate to Uruguay. Pulled up before the Committee about the inconsistency, he then said, "You don't understand: the Jewish people should go to Pale-stine. I am going to Montevideo." The reason he is supposed to have given is equally instructive: his only surviving relative lived there. The importance of the story lies not in its accuracy, but in the fact that it was told.22 The DP Section of the US Army informed the committee that an UNRRA questionnaire in the Jewish camps had elicited the response that out of 19,311 persons, 96.8 percent wanted to go to Palestine. Colonel Stanley R. Mickelson, Chief of the DP Section, estimated that if a really free choice was given, 60 percent would choose Palestine, 20 percent would choose to go elsewhere, and 14 percent were undecided. Only one percent might be persuaded to return to former homelands. This was probably nearer the real situation than the official polls. In September 1945, a poll at Landsberg resulted in similar figures: out of 4976 inhabitants polled, 3112 (62.5 percent) wanted to go to Palestine, 884 (17.7 percent) to the United States, and the rest elsewhere. However, at the same time, at the same camp, Heymont wrote that despite official investigations and the like, there was among the DPs a "Drang nach Amerika", as he put it.23 Yet the trend towards Palestine was quite genuine; the gates of America would most likely remain open only to the few, and Jewish national sentiment was strong, even among those who would not end up in Palestine. All this could not but influence the members of the Anglo-American Committee. After dramatic hearings in Palestine itself, they reported to their two governments on April 22. The upshot of their report was to recommend a binational status for Palestine, and approve of the immigration of the 100,000 as soon as possible.

The report came as a shock to the British government, which had, informally but in a binding way, promised to abide by the report's recom-mendations if they were unanimous. They were, and the British were in a difficult dilemma. The dilemma was made even more difficult by the fact that the Harrison proposal of the 100,000 would no longer meet the requirements in the way Harrison had anticipated. Both the returnees from the USSR to Poland and the activities of Brichah had changed the demographic situation. At the end of 1945, the number of Jewish DPs was estimated at 43,800 in the US Zone in Germany alone, and more were coming in from Poland and other countries each day. A long process of prevarication began, whereby the British tried to get out of their commit-

22 Private information from the late Yossele Rosensaft. 21J DC/Germany, DP camps, 1945, The Jewish Community of Bavaria, 10/1/45; Yehuda

Bauer, The Jewish Emergence from Powerlessness, Toronto (1979), p. 67.

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 87

ment and prevent, at almost any cost, the immigration of Jews to Palestine. In April-May 1946, however, before the refusal of the British to accept the recommendations had become clear, high hopes were raised among the DPs and an appreciable improvement in morale was noticed. JDC and other groups now had to prepare for the transportation to Palestine and absorption there of 100,000 Jews.

Parallel with the efforts to open Palestine, Truman also issued a direc-tive, on December 22, 1945, that gave preference to the immigration of DPs to the United States within the existing quota system. As of June 30, 1947, out of 22,950 visas given to DPs, 15,478 had been given to Jews.24

While, therefore, there was a definite trend towards immigration to Pale-stine, and an idealistic fight against immigration elsewhere, there can be no doubt but that a proportion of the Jewish DPs, whether a third or, as Mickelson thought, 40 percent, would have gone elsewhere, given the opportunity. For many, quite apart from the expected hardships and pos-sible fighting in Palestine, and the prospects of a better life in the goldene medine ("golden state," or the United States), continued stay in the camps was unbearable.

The Influx into the DP Camps

The United States authorities realized of course that Polish (and soon other) Jews were arriving in their Zone, unscheduled and unpredictably. It was estimated in November 1945 that the influx was reaching 150 a day, in the Third Army area in Bavaria. Jacob L. Trobe reported from Germany that the main camps at Feldafing, Fohrenwald, and Landsberg were "again" faced with serious overcrowding. In October, a new camp for Jews was being mooted by the Army, and JDC was so informed, but it appears that the Army had second thoughts. Would not the establishment of new camps only encourage a further influx? A new policy was evolving, that stood in contradiction to Beddell-Smith's promise to Ben-Gurion. In November, Eisenhower returned to the States, and General Joseph T. McNarney succeeded him. New winds began to blow. In the Munich area, meat and other rations for DPs were quietly reduced. Red Cross parcels that had been received there from JDC in Switzerland were distributed, not as additional supplies, but instead of the rations. The Army decided not to pay Jews for labor they performed, whether in the camps or outside them, if they were inmates of such camps. Clearly, the Army, or many officers at least, took the view that if further intrusion of Jews was to be avoided, the situation of Jewish DPs in Germany should be made as

24 Dinnerstein, op. cit., pp. 113-14, 163.

88 Out of the Ashes

uncomfortable as possible, without involving the Army in more scandals, naturally.25

The Jewish population in the Third Army Area was estimated at 36,499 at the end of the year. Another 7300 were estimated to live elsewhere in the US Zone of Germany, to make a total of about 43,800, compared with 14,000 in August. And the influx was increasing. By May 1946, 60,689 Jews were listed in the US Zone, of whom some 70 percent had been born in Poland. There were an additional 14,000 in the British Zone, 8700 in Berlin (the figure for March 1946), and 9000 in the US Zone of Austria, (including Vienna and the DP camps).26 The first result of the migration was suffering and deprivation. The groups that had to deal with this situ-ation first of all were the Central Committee in Munich (ZK) and JDC. They had to deal with unpredictable numbers of refugees arriving in Bava-ria, and find shelter and food by arguing with and cajoling Army officers and UNRRA directors of DP camps. Eli Rock went to Berlin for his new assignment, and JDC sent Lavy M. Becker to take charge of the whole US Zone, after Trobe had left his post as the person in command for all of Germany in January. Becker, a Canadian, was an experienced social worker and had served as a rabbi as well. He was to stay on only until April, to be followed by Leo W. Schwartz, a writer and well-known public figure in American Jewish life. Both had to deal with the tremendous refugee wave. For the ZK, Dr Zalman Grinberg, the chairman, and his colleagues, Dr Samuel Gringauz, David Treger and Dr Avraham Blumo-vicz (Atzmon) worked night and day to establish the newcomers in con-ditions as bearable as possible.

In Landsberg, as elsewhere, the camp was bursting at the seams. A respected New York psychiatrist, Dr Leo Srole, worked with the UNRRA team. In early December he tendered his resignation, and the camp inmates protested vociferously. They said "that at long last they had with them an American who understood their problems"; the ZK too demanded to know the reasons for his resignation. Srole, in his letter, alleged that there was a danger of epidemics in the camp because of over-crowding and the fact that two or more people were sleeping in one bed. He protested against the use of "dark cellars, cold corridors and wooden

" JDC/Germany, DP camps, 1945, Trobe to Rifkind, 11/11/45; and Rock Report, 11/8/45.

26 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946, reports for 12/31/45 and 1/22/46; Excom, 5/15/46. Nathan Reich, JDC Primer, New York, 1946 (JDC Library) has different figures: he counted 26,643 in camps in the US Zone, 7400 in the British Zone, and 380 in the French Zone, for a total of 34,423 Jews in camps in Germany.

At the end of May, there were 920,000 DPs in camps in all sectors of Germany, Austria, and Italy. Of these, UNRRA cared for 754,411 in Germany. According to JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946, March 5, the total population of Jewish DPs in Germany and Austria was 95,000, of whom 5050 were in Vienna, 12,100 in the rest of Austria, 8700 in Berlin, 17,500 in the British Zone and 50,750 in the US Zone. The others were in the French and Soviet Zones. The reason why all figures for DPs were mutually conflicting approximations at best is discussed below.

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shacks condemned as unfit for the use of German POWs." The diet was unbalanced and the clothing (in the winter conditions of 1945) was inad-equate. This could have caused another Harrison scandal.

On December 6, therefore, Beddell-Smith (who was still in Germany after Eisenhower's departure) arrived for a surprise inspection at Landsberg, accompanied by his Surgeon-General, and by General Lucian Truscott, commander of the Third Army in whose area Landsberg was. He also brought with him Judge Simon H. Rifkind, and journalists. The investigation found that Srole's charges had been exaggerated. There was no more of a danger of epidemics in Landsberg than in many other camps. The diet was palatable, though not varied. There was admittedly over-crowding, but according to Heymont, who was present, Srole could have made much more carefully balanced charges which would have been entirely valid. Yet, as he added, "perhaps Dr Srole is much smarter than we appreciate. He has not caused any real harm—in fact he may be respon-sible for accelerating the establishment of additional camps to care for the newcomers." At the end of his visit, Beddell-Smith explained that the Army had been moving from the rescue phase of basic feeding, housing, clothing, and medical attention to the rehabilitation program in expec-tation of longer term solutions, when the newcomers started coming. "The Army," he said, "felt that the rehabilitation program could only be con-tinued if the newcomers were denied admittance to the camps." If they were permitted to come—and did anyone suggest that they should be kept out by force, he asked—resources would only permit another rescue phase. This prompted Truscott to say that he was "surprised" that his men had not yet set up new camps for the infiltrees. Immediately following the visit, Military Government Law 161 was issued, specifying that new centers for the victims of persecution from the East should be set up, with somewhat lower daily rations than in the established DP camps.27

JDC was very careful not to cause any panic among Army officers by exaggerating the numbers of the arriving persecutees. Rifkind was less circumspect, and having asked a number of agencies and individuals, came up with a figure of 250,000 to 300,000 refugees who might be expected to arrive in the US Zone in the immediate future. Stars and Stripes, the Army newspaper, in its December 8 issue, even said that 100,000 Jews might be expected during the winter, and the total might add up to 350,000. The paper's conclusion was that there were three alternatives in dealing with the influx: close the border, leave it only "relatively" open, or offer the Zone as a staging area for the refugees until a permanent solution was found. It added that this last possibility "is regarded as most compatible with American official aims."

The question the Americans and British, as well as UNRRA, were 27 Heymont Diary, esp. pp. 186, 242; Beddell-Smith, Memorandum for Lieutenant

General Frederick E. Morgan, n.d. (12/7/45), copy in author's possession.

90 Out of the Ashes

asking themselves, was who was behind this mass movement of Jews out of Poland? On January 2, 1946, the head of UNRRA in Germany, British Lieutenant General Sir Frederick E. Morgan, held a press conference to alert the public to the danger that lay in the fact that the remaining 400,000 DPs in Germany were homeless. Governments were urged to find perma-nent solutions, because, Morgan said with some exaggeration, this might be the seed of another war. In response to reporters' questions, the General then made known his views regarding the influx of Jews. His personal impression of the Berlin situation was that these Jews were well dressed, well fed and had pockets bulging with money. UNRRA did not know of a single pogrom in Poland to justify the movement. One reporter quoted him as saying that "the Jews seem to have organized a plan enabling them to become a world power—a weak force numerically, but one which will have a generating power for getting what they want." The movement was, he said, organized, and the idea was to extrude the Jews out of Europe.28

In the storm that followed, J DC uncharacteristically took a stand .While Jews and non-Jews were accusing the General of antisemitism, other Jews such as New York Times correspondent L. S. B. Shapiro came to his defense. He had been quoted out of context, he was really a decent fellow, and he did not dislike Jews. It appears that the US Army intimated to Rifkind that if Morgan was forced out of his job because of his interview, relations with the Jews would suffer. On January 4, Jacob L. Trobe, JDC director for Germany, went to see Morgan, at the latter's invitation. Trobe says he told Morgan some harsh things about his statements but added that the General's resignation could produce an untoward reaction if the perception was gained that "certain groups" (meaning the Jews) were out to get him. Trobe's report got into the press, and in late March he was reassigned to Italy. But he was not censured by Schwartz or anyone e l s e -he had in fact uttered JDC policy. In a way, this was a retreat to the prewar JDC attitudes: play along, don't create a bad impression, lest the Jews be accused of being too powerful—even if the statements (which Morgan never retracted) were clearly anti-Jewish, such as the one about Jews being a world power, which is a standard antisemitic slogan.29

Morgan then went to America, to see Herbert Lehman, head of UNRRA and a JDC stalwart. Lehman essentially followed the same line that Trobe had taken. On January 28, a statement appeared in the New York Times, in which Morgan did not retract anything he had said, but merely stated that he was full of good intentions, and would fulfil his job impartially.

The scandal over the Morgan interview did not endear the Jews to the Army. In an UNRRA report on January 18, Jay B. Krane, head

" For this, and the following paragraph, see the London Evening Standard, 1/2/46; London Star, 1/3/46; News Chronicle, 1/5/46; Manchester Guardian, 1/5/46; and New York Times, 1/1/7/46.

n Interview with Jacob L. Trobe, OHD, p. 4; YIVO, Leo Schwartz files, Trobe cable to New York JDC, 1/4/46.

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of UNRRA's research division, stated that there was indeed widespread antisemitism in Poland, but the movement of Jews out of Poland was not spontaneous; it was organized to bring the question of the future of the Jews and of Zionism to a head.30 It was clear that the existence of Brichah could not be hidden, but the fact is that the Army never discovered its elusive structure or identified the people who led it. Ben in Poland; Arthur in Austria; Ephraim Frank, a Palestinian emissary who arrived in Munich in the late autumn of 1945 to take over responsibility for Germany; Yitzhak Ram in Berlin; and Levi Argov in Bratislava, who coordinated the mass movements out of Poland and into Austria and Germany, remained totally unknown.31 They received no salaries (they received money only for food and, sometimes, for clothes), accumulated no wealth, no power, or influence. Of all of idealistic Zionism's heroes, they were perhaps the most effective and the least lauded, then and afterwards. Part of the answer to this lies in a fact that is still hotly disputed, because it is difficult to accept in Israeli historiography: Brichah was not initiated by the Palestine Yishuv, but by the survivors themselves. T h e first emissaries from Palestine, Isser Ben-Zvi and Zvi Netzer , reached Poland in September 1945, after Brichah had been in existence for some nine months . There was no competition between them and the founders of Brichah—the locals accepted the auth-ority of the Palestine Haganah and its Mossad organization, which had sent the emissaries. T h e Palestinians accepted the fact that they were working within a g roup and that decisions were reachcd by consultation, not by orders . Brichah was a non-hierarchic organization, based on consen-sus, not on mili tary discipline. Yet its discipline was exemplary. I t was inspired by the k ibbutz-or iented Zionist youth movements . W h e n it failed, it failed because of objective reasons, not because of internal squab-bles or policy fai lures.

Army attitudes, then, towards the new infiltrators were at least ambiva-lent. In the wake of the Morgan scandal, and as McNamey, who continued the sympathetic attitude to the Jews that had been established by his predecessor, imposed his personality on the Army, an order went out in February that all Jews who had infiltrated into the US Zone were to be provided for in Jewish centers with the same standards of food, shelter, and care as were the old DPs.32 In response, new camps were indeed established but the attitude of middle rank officers could not thereby be

30 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946, Harry Viteles Report, 5/11/46. 31 In a sense, they remain unknown till today. Ben (Moshe Mciri) was a bookkeeper for

a kibbutz publishing company, and is now a member of Kibbutz Mcssilot in Israel. Levi Argov left his kibbutz and now lives in Moshav Kidron in Israel. Ram was a police officcr and is now retired. Frank is a functionary of the Takam kibbutz movement in Israel, Arthur Ben-Natan was an unsuccessful candidate for the post of mayor of Tel-Aviv, after a distinguished diplomatic career for Israel. Tuvia Cohen is a member of Kibbutz Amir in the Galilee. The hundreds of people who staffed the "points" arc even less known.

32 Cf. Colonel Harold E. Potter, Army Chief Historian, on "Displaced Persons", in: Occupation Forces in Europe Series, 1945-1946, Washington, n.d. ,

92 Out of the Ashes

changed. Apart from anything else the Army argued that Jews were engaged in black market activities, that they were an undisciplined lot, and should be treated with severity. A series of incidents then occurred in which the Army, often supporting German police, clashed with Jewish DPs. In March, a fight between Jews and Germans at Oberammingen deteriorated into a scuffle with the military. On the same day, American military beat up some Jews at Fohrenwald. At Landsberg, at the end of April, 20 Jews were arrested in the aftermath of a mass protest against the disappearance of two young Jews (who were later found unharmed—they had simply left without telling anyone). On March 25, a group of Jews was transferred from Furth to Bamberg in rather grim conditions. On March 29, a Jew was killed in Stuttgart in a fight that involved German police and American MPs. Similar occurrences took place at Cham, Munich, and elsewhere. Zalman Grinberg declared on June 9 that the attitude of the military had worsened appreciably. The statistics bore him out. An internal Army poll of 1790 soldiers in early 1946 had shown some frightening results: 51 percent of those polled said that there had been some positive elements in Hitler's policies, 22 percent justified the Nazi policy of the "Final Solution," and 19 percent justified Germany in its war.33 Yet the Jews kept on coming to the Zone.34

The role of the chaplains was getting less important, with some notable exceptions, such as Rabbi Klausner. HIAS began operating in Germany to facilitate emigration to countries other than Palestine. ORT had estab-lished a presence—typically, in the wake of local initiative by a Landsberg survivor, Jacob Oleiski, who started a highly successful program of vocational training which he was to continue after his immigration to Palestine. But the burden of American Jewish presence increasingly fell on JDC. JDC began to "interpret" Jewish DP concerns to Washington as well as to the Army in Germany. New York succeeded in achieving pro-gress using the legalistic approach of the past, but Schwartz intervened directly with United States military in the field to facilitate the influx of the refugees.

The type of work that was done by JDC's people in Germany can per-haps be exemplified by one of the many reports received in New York, in this case from Lavy Becker in Munich. On December 28, he reported that some days previously he had received information from James Rice in Salzburg that 130 children and 20 leaders were ready to leave Salzburg for Munich. "After some quick communication with the regional UNRRA office," he told Rice that the transport should go to Ainring, a camp just across the border in Germany, but Rice reported that the group refused to go anywhere but Munich (in Poland they were all told to go to Munich).

51 Mankowitz, op. cit., p. 359. M Schwartz, op. cit., pp. 104-10; YIVO, Schwarz material, file 22, legal aid report by O.

A. Mintzer, 5/30/46.

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 93

Consequently, Becker decided to go to Salzburg (on Christmas Eve) to "interpret" the situation. "I found that the American Army was receiving infiltrees across the Czech border into Vienna, housing them in a transient camp [i.e., the Rothschild Hospital, under Teicholz], moving them on to another transient camp at Linz and again to another transient camp at Salzburg [this one under Nowinski and Weinstein]." Rice was well aware of all this and had excellent relations with the 42nd Division and with the infiltrees. "As most of these groups are self-organized in order to move step-by-step to Palestine," they inform their "friends" at each point of their arrival. Becker met with the group's "leaders"—the Brichah people—and persuaded them to have the group move to Ainring rather than to overcrowded Munich. He wanted, he said, to control the move-ment into properly established new camps. UNRRA was understanding, JDC supplied clothes and additional food, and the children were brought to Germany. In a parallel report by the historian Koppel S. Pinson, then educational officer of JDC in the northern part of the American Zone, the situation in one of these infiltree camps is graphically portrayed. The camp, Lampertheim, opened in mid-December, now had 700 inhabitants. The people, from Poland, White Russia, and Lithuania, had left their homes in mortal fear of Polish antisemitic bands. Some of them "are not even Zionists." The UNRRA team in charge was under a sympathetic and energetic Norwegian woman, who "is adored by all the Jews in the camp," and is assisted by a survivor, a girl who is also very efficient and helpful. The type of educational work—apart from supplementary food and clothing—that JDC did in a camp like this was to establish an elementary school, a library, a reading room for journals and newspapers, and adult classes teaching English and Hebrew as well as Jewish history. A camp committee established by the people cooperated fully and utilized what-ever JDC could offer.35

Many of the JDC workers—there were 60 of them in Germany and Austria at the end of 1945—became passionate advocates of the DPs, their courage and inventiveness, without closing their eyes to some less endearing features, and were very popular among them. A good example was Joseph Levine, who was sent to Regensburg to look after DPs in camps and towns in the area. In January 1946, he reported that he had 1100 people in Regensburg, of whom 200 were recent infiltrees. A Committee to represent all 6000. Jews of the region had been elected. Work along educational lines was being planned. "The food and clothing received from the Joint has been negligible so far." But he could distribute financial support, which he did. The package system instituted by Rabbi Lipman was in operation, and Levine's task was basically that of an organizer with

JJ JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946, reports by Lavy M. Becker, 12/28/45, and Koppel S. Pin-son, 1/16/46.

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access to the crucial Army and UNRRA personnel, who were the only ones from whom he could cajole and beg food, clothing, and accommodation.36

"Essentially," Leavitt explained to his committee in New York, "the work of the JDC staff representatives in Germany consists of protecting the rights of the people in the camps and representing them before military and other authorities; secondly, supplementing with food, clothing, and other supplies; thirdly, providing essential welfare services" such as educa-tion, health, religious items, personal counseling, emigration and mail— there was no civilian mail service in Germany until May 1946.37 In addition, Schwartz represented JDC to the Anglo-American Committee, and his impressive testimony related directly to the need of the DPs to find a place to emigrate. Schwartz presented an urgent case for an immediate solution.

As JDC's program in Germany improved, the relationship with the camp committees and the ZK in Munich, the Committee in Belsen, and their Austrian equivalents became more complicated. Joseph C. Hyman, the veteran Vice-Chairman of JDC in New York, formulated the organiz-ation's policy well when he said that it consisted of developing the ZK and its constituents to the point where the people might attain the maximum degree of self-government and self-sustenance in an occupied territory. To American Jewish ears this sounded very liberal. To DPs it had a conde-scending ring—they did not need American Jews to "develop" them toward self-government. They had a tradition of self-government in Poland and Lithuania of which American Jewish developments were an offshoot. That is why they loved Klausner, who was a doer. He was also a charismatic speaker. It was not that he was less authoritarian in his ways than JDC workers—the opposite was true—but his identification with the DPs made him a tremendous influence on them. The flavor of Klausner can perhaps be recaptured from his introduction to the volume oiSharit Ha-Platah, his first great achievement, a chronicle of survivors in Bavaria:

I close my eyes and the jew appears. He stands listlessly in the striped camp uniform given him by his former master. Day follows day and he struggles with his freedom. He takes hold of it and it eludes him. He measures it and it is lost. The people who gave it to him grow strange. He is free, but painfully lonely in his freedom . . . The thought gains momentum and drives the lonely Jew. "Go! Eternal Wanderer, seek thy dead and give them life!"

It was not easy to compete with such language in German DP camps.38

The ZK responded in kind. Klausner, they said, had "brought us forth from the shadow of death and planted our feet solidly on the path of life . . . in the face of indifference, callousness, and opposition."

It was, therefore, Klausner again who was instrumental in helping his DP friends to organize the first Congress of Jewish DPs in the US Zone

56 Excom; 1/16/46, and JDC/Germany, DPs 1/5/46, letter from J. Levine to Leavitt. " JDC/Excom, 3/20/46. 38 Sharit Ha-Platah, Volume I, Munich, 1946.

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of Germany, in order to make their demands heard, and to demonstrate their determination to press for the opening of Palestine's doors. Elections were held all over the Zone, and the Congress took place on January 27-29, 1946, in Munich. Ben-Gurion arrived from Palestine, and with his acute political sense he realized that here was one of the main factors that might lead to the achievement of the Zionists' political goals. In a scathing, sarcastic attack on Morgan and Bevin, delivered in English for the benefit of the attending journalists, he said that the "secret" organization that was bringing the Jews into Germany was the Zionist Organization which had been recognized by the British decades ago. He thereby admitted the organizing role that the Army and UNRRA claimed for the Zionists in being behind the influx. Of course, for those who in their ignorance thought that JDC and the Zionists were one, there was not much difference between what Ben-Gurion was saying and what they read in their reports. Others understood better, and some heat was taken off JDC. The Congress was an outstanding success. American military, the German mayor of Munich, Jewish dignitaries from Britain and America, all were orches-trated by Klausner, Grinberg, Gringauz, and Treger. A new ZK was elected, with the old leaders overwhelmingly re-elected to their positions, and with some newcomers from Poland and the non-Bavarian camps enter-ing the ZK structure. Income of the ZK until January was given as 639,341 marks, of which 58 percent had come from JDC, and the rest from dues and contributions by a variety of groups and organizations.39

Parallel with the Congress, and utilizing the participation of many JDC workers in it, Lavy Becker held a conference in Munich, on January 28-29, of JDC representatives in Bavaria. He summarized the opening of new camps by the military: Eschwegen, Lautersheim, Fiirth, Bamberg, Pock-ing, and Leitheim were the main ones. It became clear that the functions of JDC workers were interpreted differently in different places. In places like Landsberg or Deggendorf (the camp to which survivors from Theresi-enstadt had been brought), UNRRA personnel were very good and JDC was not required to do administration or welfare work. In most other camps JDC was needed for these tasks as well. Everywhere JDC people were considered to be the representatives of Jewish DPs and problems of consultation, emigration, education and medical care were referred to them. What emerged, however, as the focal point of discussion was the question of how to handle JDC supplies that were coming in. In some cases, supplies were distributed by the camp committee, with the concur-rence of the local UNRRA supply officer, without JDC—the source of the supply—having any say in the matter. In other places, JDC and UNRRA supplies were pooled, and distributed by UNRAA alone. In other camps

" Schwartz, op . ci t . , pp . 81-88; Klausner Interview, O H D ; and a film which was pro-duced to commemorate the occasion, now at the Jewish Film Archive, Institute of Contem-porary Jewry, Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

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again JDC was bringing in supplies and distributing them with the help of the camp committee. Other combinations existed in other places. Sup-ply to the camps until then had been determined in effect by the ZK, and charges of discrimination had been raised. A new system was decided upon: all supplies would come to Munich, and then be distributed to the regional UNRRA warehouses by the ZK and JDC in consultation. Loc-ally, it was deemed to have been an error to devolve the distribution on local camp committees almost exclusively. "Though there had been only mild abuse," in the future JDC and the camp committee, in conjunction with UNRRA, would decide on the distribution.40

Another issue that emerged at the conference was that of the religious needs of the survivors. Rabbi Samuel A. Snieg, formerly the chief chaplain of the Lithuanian Army, was the head of ZK's religious committee. With the influx of Jews who had spent the war in the USSR, the number of religious people was growing. The urge to re-establish normalcy led to a very large number of marriages being contracted. Proof had to be produced by the many widows and widowers that the former spouses had died in the Holocaust, and that was often very difficult to do. Couples then went to chaplains, who were usually of the Reform or Conservative persuasion, and the marriages they performed were not recognized by their orthodox colleagues. JDC was asked to intervene. Rabbi Alexander Rosenberg, a JDC worker, took upon himself the task, together with Rabbi Snieg, of regularizing marriages by consultation with rabbinical and civilian auth-orities. Many other issues of practical importance were also discussed: the status of German Jews, DPs living outside camps who had to be looked after by JDC, and problems of education and medical aid. But the main issue remained that of the supply arrangements. After the DP Congress ended, and as the ZK became aware of the decisions taken by JDC, a major quarrel erupted: who would control the supplies? The ZK's prestige with the communities rested on its control of JDC supplies. The idea that there were even "mild abuses" was repugnant to the ZK. They were not accepting charity, but help from fellow Jews who had not gone through the Holocaust. They were no less entitled to deal with problems of distri-bution than the Americans. It was a question of self-esteem, of pride, and of politics. It was to become a major headache.

The problem of legal defense of the DPs was another major issue, especially as relations with military authorities deteriorated. As early as December 1945, Becker complained to Trobe that the military were pre-venting him from sending his representative to jails to see what was happening with arrested Jews. Judge Rifkind left his post in late March, and the vacuum that ensued caused a further deterioration. Another Jew-ish Adviser was urgently needed. Greenleigh reported from Paris in some

40 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946, reports by Blanche Bernstein, 2/18/46, and from the Paris Office, 3/18/46.

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panic, in early April, that the situation was becoming increasingly tense and that incidents were occurring almost daily. "Our Munich office has been raided and our staff subjected to indignities." Klausner sent another cable to JDC, and demanded intervention in Washington. On April 4, a major DP demonstration was held in Stuttgart, and mass meetings took place in many camps. The press received a communique. All this was organized by the ZK. But McNarney had already realized the danger of the situation. On April 9, he declared that, in the future, no German police would be permitted to enter Jewish DP camps. This was not very well received among many of his officers, but that was the decision, and the Army abided by it.41

In Washington, the Administration was becoming tired of the manifold problems with the DPs. They had not only Jews on their hands, but Poles and Baits as well, and a decision was being mooted that would close all the camps in Germany except for those of the "persecutees"—presumably mainly Jews. Catholic and Protestant welfare organizations were up in arms about this, and asked JDC to join them in a protest in Washington. But JDC had a long-standing policy of not intervening in any action that had a political slant to it—a policy which was not always adhered to, but which was publicly known and which JDC could legitimately cite if it wished to. In this case, and in fact in all cases where a protest had to be made in the United States, JDC backed away. The American Jewish Committee, JDC said, was the proper body to turn to in this case, as indeed it was. The threatened closure never happened.42

With the continued flow of Jews from the East, however, the heat was on as far as the continued willingness of the United States was concerned to accept them into their Zone. In Washington, there were divided coun-sels. The War Department was trying to reduce its obligations in Germany, not increase them. The State Department was hoping that something would come out of the Anglo-American Committee's recommendation of sending 100,000 Jews from Europe to Palestine. The Jews had a warm friend in General John H. Hildring, an Assistant Secretary responsible for Germany at the State Department. On May 13, a meeting took place between the Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Hildring, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, and others, and a group of Jewish leaders that included the five organizations that had just chosen Philip S. Bernstein, conservative rabbi from Rochester, as successor to Judge Rifkind as Jewish Adviser in Germany. The officials did not threaten closing the borders, but the numbers of infiltrators were about 5000 a month, and this was placing a heavy burden on the Army. There was no decision to close the borders, but a stampede had to be avoided, and the Jewish leaders were

41 Schwartz, op. ci t . , pp . 109-10; J DC/AC 4/2/46; ibid. , Germany, DPs , 1946, Greenleigh cable, 4/9/46. .

42 J DC/AC 2/4/46; Germany, DPs , 1946, Hyman to U n d e r , 4/4/46.

98 Out of the Ashes

invited to present ideas as to how this should be done.43 They really did not have any, nor could they have.

In the meantime, the Jewish Agency's Rescue Groups, officially attached to UNRRA for welfare work with the DPs, had arrived from Palestine in November 1945. They were educators, psychologists, youth leaders, and the like. Their leader was a very circumspect, careful future diplomat with marked educational talents, Haim Hoffmann (Yahil), who quickly established exemplary relations with the ZK and JDC. Hoffmann was not hierarchically superior to Frank, head of Brichah in Germany, but his influence was very great, Frank and he were close friends, and between them they joined Klausner as the political factors behind the ZK. With the increase of Brichah to Germany in June to 8000, Hoffmann thought that the flow would increase rather than decrease, especially as some move to Palestine was likely in the wake of the Anglo-American Committee's report. He probably feared—with good reason—that the Americans might make emigration from Germany to Palestine conditional on the stoppage of the flow from the East, and advocated increased pressure on the borders. This accorded well with the dramatic increase in the move, which could not have been stopped in any case, not even by Brichah, and which was to increase considerably, as we have seen, after Kielce. Everything, he said, had to be done to avoid clashing with the Americans, except for stopping Brichah. Now Bernstein came to Europe, and was immediately faced with the infiltration problem. He asked Hoffmann to come to Frank-furt, and heard from him that 200,000 Jews might be on the move, 40,000 of them in the next three months. This was going to break the 5000 a month figure, which had quietly been agreed to by McNarney before. On June 26, Bernstein told Hoffmann that McNarney had agreed to take in the 40,000. Bernstein saw this, rightly, as a great concession from a sympathetic general with State Department support. But then came Kielce.44

In May, as the prospect of immediate emigration from Germany receded, morale in the camps deteriorated again. Zalman Grinberg wrote to Edward M. M. Warburg on May 22 that in his view the work of JDC had markedly improved, but the basic situation had not changed. The camps, despite the opening of new ones, were still overcrowded, just as in October 1945, when Warburg had seen them. The ration was 2200 calor-ies, all of which was tinned food, no fresh milk, no eggs, no fresh fruit, no butter. The picture he painted was only slightly exaggerated, and in some camps it was really bad. Thus, for instance, at Cham, on the Bavari-an-Czech border, the infiltrees experienced rough treatment at the hand

4J J DC/AC 5/14/46. 44 Interview with Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein, OHD; Haim Yahil, Brichah, n.d. (1947), in

the Haganah Archive, Tel-Aviv (ATH); JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946, Bernstein to Kenen, 6/29/46.

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 99

of the military, in a tent city encrusted in mud. A hunger strike took place there in early May, and only after the affair had reached the press did the situation improve.45 Bernstein's influence had something to do with the improvement in some aspects of the DP situation. The Army's hostility to the ZK was bothering him. He arrived in May. By the end of June he had suggested to McNarney to grant official recognition to the ZK, so as to avoid future friction. This, however, was to take some time.

In the British Zone, JDC was the only American organization. Maurice Eigen had come there in the summer of 1945, but had to leave in November. His relations with Rosensaft and his committee were generally good, but there was little food he could offer. On the other hand, he managed to organize a mail service, grudgingly tolerated by the British authorities, who were generally unfriendly. In November they reiterated their policy not to recognize the Jews as a separate group for the purpose of establishing separate camps. This did not deter Rosensaft. Tenaciously he fought the British, until a de facto situation was established where Belsen became a Jewish camp. Eigen had to fight his own battles with the British, who would not agree that he distribute supplies to Jews o n l y -there were after all no "Jews" in their Zone, only Poles, Lithuanians, and so on. Under Eigen's successor, David B. Wodlinger, a registration of all Belsen camp inmates was attempted. It is not clear whether Wodlinger's results were very accurate. One of the ways developed to an art by Rosen-saft, but practiced all over Germany and Austria, was to supplement the rations by using the names of people who had left, or died, and keeping them on camp rolls. These were known as the malochim, or angels. The more malochim a camp had, the better the food situation was. Rosensaft was not going to allow a JDC worker with a penchant for exact reporting to deprive his people of food. It is not clear precisely what the subterfuges were to which the camp people resorted, but the fact is that there was never, then or afterwards, any exact figure for the Belsen camp.

JDC was sending clothes to the Zone, and Wodlinger complained, as so many other JDC workers did, about the shoddy quality and insufficient quantities of most of the things that arrived in late 1945 and early 1946. Food supplied by JDC, especially to German Jews, was very good and important in keeping these tiny communities going.46

Rosensaft and his friend, the representative of German Jews on his committee, Norbert Wollheim, were asked to come to the UJA Conference in Atlantic City in late 1945, together with Dr Boris Pliskin of the ZK in Munich. Grinberg's invitation was botched by the UJA. Rosensaft made a tremendous impression on the delegates. His fiery speeches both accused American Jewry for its slow response to the Holocaust and its survivors, \

45 JDC/Germany, DPs 1946, Grinberg to Warburg, 5/22/46; JTA, 5/9/46; and Der Najer Moment, 5/7/46.

46 Excom, 11/21/45; JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946, Wodlinger to Eigen, 5/2/46.

100 Out of the Ashes

and praised it for what it had done. More was expected of it, and he spelled it out: get the Jews out of Germany, and alleviate their condition while they are there. In his appearance before the Executive Committee of JDC he repeated these themes. He received a polite hearing, and it is clear from all the evidence that JDC accepted him as a necessary evil. He was not their kind of man, but this never bothered Rosensaft particularly.

JDC sent a special investigation team to the British Zone, together with the London Jewish Committee for Relief Abroad, the parent organization of the JRUs. JDC's representative was Harry Viteles, an old JDC worker who lived in Palestine. In his detailed report, he estimated the DP popu-lation at 10,600, the majority of whom lived in Belsen, and the German Jews at 4000. This was apart from infiltrees who were presumably on the move, and numbered in the neighborhood of 5000. The figures, as explained above, should be taken with a grain of salt. Viteles explained, as well as anyone, the negative traits outsiders saw in the DPs. He explained that people who lived in barracks that reminded them of the Nazi camps were not likely to keep clean, nor was cleanliness and order a marked characteristic of bachelors and unmarried women, as many of the DPs were. Lack of privacy and lack of employment were not making the situation any easier. What the military called the "black market" was simply a way to accumulate some essential material goods by people who had been deprived of literally everything. His basic recommendation was to send more JDC personnel to the Zone.47 But before this was to happen. Wodlinger entered into a confrontation with Rosensaft over supplies, against much the same background as was happening in Munich. Wodlinger had "strong objections to the lack of system and administration manifested by the Central Committee," and while he was "not anxious" to rob Rosensaft "of his prestige and political power," he established a JDC warehouse at Bremen, whence supplies would henceforth be distrib-uted by JDC directly. This was in June, and a fight was in the offing.48

The Situation in Austria

In Austria, too, JDC was the only American Jewish organization, though the collaboration of Jewish chaplains must always be emphasized. At first, JDC representatives were, in Rice's words, treated "with interest" by some, with hostility by others, and with apathy by most people, because they felt they had been let down by "the Joint." After the Linz incident of early October, Army cooperation in improving the lot of the Jews was assured. Until March 1946, JDC brought in 450 tons of food and other items. This certainly improved not only the lot of the the Jews somewhat, but also raised the prestige of JDC. Five Jewish DP camps existed in

47 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946, Viteles Report, 4/1/46. 41 JDC/Germany, general, 1945-1946, Wodlinger to Warburg, 6/23/46.

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 101

Austria; the three important ones were Bindermichl at Linz, New Pale-stine at Salzburg, and the five hotels in Bad Gastein, which together with two smaller camps housed 4809 DPs in February, and 5301 in March. There were 4500 Austrian Jews, almost all of whom (4418) lived in Vienna. The reduction in the figures from 1945 stemmed from the fact that now only Jews belonging to the Jewish community were registered. Half-Jews who did not choose to belong to the community, and others who were not members, were not counted. There were 1100 DPs in the British Zone and 1000 in the French Zone, for a total of about 12,000 in all of Austria.

Relations were not always easy. Jews were reluctant to move anywhere, even if the new quarters were better than the former ones. Sometimes this threatened to become a riot, and the chaplain and the JDC worker were asked to solve the situation. People were difficult, partly because they had established black market connections with the surrounding population, or because in their Holocaust experience any move elsewhere had always been for the worse. In November, a new worker was sent to Vienna, Dr J. Benson Saks. Tuchmann was finally fired, the old supplies taken over, and a new leaf was turned in the capital. The problem with the IKG remained unsolved: David Adolf Brill was the head of the community, until he was removed by a first election in March 1946. Schwartz came in and after a conference with top Army officers it was agreed that JDC workers would become official advisers to the Army on Jewish matters. That meant that in Austria JDC was not subject to UNRRA discipline. As far as food was concerned, Jews received 1700 calories from the Austrians through the Army. An additional 800 calories were obtained from Amer-ican Red Cross packages. Clothing came from captured enemy stocks and Red Cross supplies. Until early in the year, JDC could only supply some additional food, as we have seen, but little clothing. JDC in New York did not permit the institution of a package system suggested by Rice, which was a mistake. However, from January 1946, more supplies became avail-able, and the situation for the permanent DPs in the camps mentioned improved.49 ;

While JDC tried to improve life for the DPs, the major headache was increasingly the problem of the infiltrees—the people sent by Brichah. These travelled from Nachod or other points in Czechoslovakia, as well as from Hungary, into Vienna. There they were put up temporarily by Teicholz in the Rothschild Hospital, and then shipped to the US Zone, generally to Salzburg. From there, Nowinski and Weinstein would direct them either to Germany or via Innsbruck to Italy. Despite all the efforts, however, not all of them could be shipped in this way, and an increasing number remained in Austria.

49 JDC/Austria, general, 1945-46, report by James P. Rice, 3/15/46; ibid., Saks to Mayer, 1/14/46; ibid., Saks to Gen. Clark, 1/8/46 and 3/18/46; ibid., Bernstein to Schwartz, 3/25/46; and Austria, general, 1945, Tuchmann to Mayer, 11/15/45.

102 Out of the Ashes

American military authorities began to fear that an additional uncon-trolled influx of Jews from the East might upset the delicate balance they had achieved with the DPs they had liberated at the war's end. In early November 1945, a crisis situation developed, when Clark's Chief of Staff, General Foster Tate, told JDC's Rice and Saks that it might be necessary to jail all newcomers, because the Army could not accommodate them, and the crossings were of course illegal. Schwartz came and tried to influence the generals; in fact, Greenleigh reported from Paris that Schwartz had arranged for the infiltrees to enter. But the Americans tried to stop the flow nevertheless. On November 25, they prevented a group of 150 Jews from crossing the border between the American and the Russian Zones. The Jews were shipped back to Vienna. Arthur Ben-Natan decided to react vigorously, and demonstrations and disorders occurred in Linz. The officer responsible for DP affairs in Vienna then instituted talks with Ben-Natan—which showed that he knew who he was dealing with—but made no headway. The Brichah commander demanded point blank free entry into the US Zone; if not, the Americans would have to shoot at the Jews. The Army yielded, and a conference was held with JDC's represen-tatives. The Army would provide transient shelters for the infiltrees, pro-vided they did not filter into the already established settlements for the existing DPs. The transients would move on. Schwartz came to Vienna again and discussed the issue with Ben-Natan. Brichah made a commit-ment to adhere to the Army's conditions, and the infiltrees continued to come.50 By the end of 1945,8661 infiltrees had passed through the Roths-child Hospital on their way to Linz and Salzburg.

By that time, too, the situation in the British Zone had cleared. At Graz, close to 12,000 Polish and Hungarian Jews had been assembled by Brichah in an effort to get into Italy. However, the British prevented any crossing of the border, and the Jews had to live in very bad conditions in makeshift camps around Graz. Brichah sent another of the people who had spent the war years in Central Asia, Yisrael Eichenwald, to save the situation. Eichenwald organized the group, had them elect a committee, and helped them organize a demand for better conditions. In a clash with local anti-semitic Austrian policemen, in which the latter were beaten up badly by Eichenwald's partisans who had fought the Nazis in the Russian forests, the point was made that Jews could not be pushed around. In the end, with the help of Italian police, the Jews were smuggled across the border, until at the end of the year a small remnant of 2000 was left in the Graz area. No American Jews were involved in this remarkable episode.51

Clashes with Russians and Americans could not be avoided, and Brichah 50 JDC/Austria, general, 1945^6, 11/4/45, Greenleigh to New York; interview with

Asher Ben-Natan (Anhur), OHD; report of Ben-Natan to Brichah command, 6/29/46, ATH; JDC/Austria, general, 1946, n.d. (May 1946?) by J. P. Rice—Brichat (sic) or Alyiah Bet; interviews with J. J. Schwartz and J. P. Rice, OHD.

51 Bauer, Flight and Rescue, pp. 103-05.

Post-Liberation Poland, Germany and Austria 103

in any case had no choice—the Jews would come in with or without Brichah's help. In March 1946, the Americans again tried to stop a train-load of Jews at the zonal border. Again, they had to let them through in the end. The movement carried on until Kielce. In May, Weinstein esti-mated that since November, about 10,000 Jews had passed through his "point" in Salzburg. One thousand remained in the area, 2332 crossed into Italy, and the rest went to Germany, in a series of transports which, though pardy at least illegal, were looked at with favor by the Americans in Austria, because they rid them of the infiltrees. As the troops in Bavaria were less than happy about this, a peculiar situation arose in which the transit to Germany was permitted by the "Austrian" Americans, and dis-couraged by the "Bavarian" Americans. The moves were facilitated by local arrangements, forgery of documents, and other practices that were justified by Brichah because they had to get the people to safety. In June, 5000 people passed through Salzburg, and in July 11,000.52

With this kind of movement, the loose Brichah organization of Poland and other countries was not appropriate for the situation in Austria. Ben-Natan, an emissary from Palestine with close ties to the Palestinian Jewish soldiers in the British Army, who were an important part of the Brichah set-up, established total Brichah control over the camps, whether transi-ent, such as at Mulln near Linz, or the "permanent" ones. Camp commit-tees had to follow his orders; all movement between the camps was subject to his control. JDC and the Army were unaware of this—only Nowinski knew, of course, because by that time he himself had become an integral part of Brichah. Ben-Natan's control over the Austrian camps was to pay handsome dividends when the Kielce pogrom brought a deluge of panic-stricken refugees into his area, who could be helped by others, but would move to safety only in accordance with his instructions. It goes without saying that in a chaotic situation like the one in Austria, the people them-selves had absolute confidence in the organization that had brought them out of pogrom-stricken Poland, and gladly accepted the leadership of the young people who constituted the Brichah teams. In March 1946, a first conference of Jewish DPs in the US Zone of Austria took place at Salzburg. One hundred and fifty delegates and guests participated, and a Central Committee was elected, which accepted Arthur's guidance. It never, in fact, gained any importance comparable to the ZK in Munich or Belsen. Food and clothing, educational materials and health services the DPs received from JDC and the Army, but guidance and hope came from Brichah.

52 Bauer, ibid., pp. 169-71, 176-78. O O A - E

CHAPTER 5

The Great Exodus

Czechoslovakia

Out of about 370,000 Jews in prewar Czechoslovakia, 15,500 local Jews had survived and returned to the Czech lands, as Bohemia and Moravia were known, where they were living in 61 communities. In addition, there were 8000-9000 refugees in late 1945, mostly Jews who had survived or had returned to Subcarpathian Russia, the former eastern section of the country, now annexed by the USSR. In Slovakia, 28,500 survived in 81 communities, and there were at any time about 2000-3000 refugees. The total was in the neighborhood of 50,000-55,000 persons. Of these, 5640 were half-Jews in the Czech lands, and in Slovakia 5000-6000 had formally converted to Christianity during the Holocaust in the hope that this would save their lives. The survivors, most of them people who had been deported to Theresienstadt and Auschwitz, had serious health problems; many were suffering from TB. The total relief "load" was estimated at 17,000. The first problem was how to send relief quickly, and this was done by JDC. The first food shipments (in June, August, and November) were hardly enough to make any impact, and people were complaining that none of the Jewish organizations had come to help. People have "all these years been living in the hope to be liberated, and now nothing is done to alleviate their sufferings."1 From the autumn onwards, shipments at a rate of $300,000 monthly began arriving. As with everywhere else, the problem of property restitution was a tricky business. The new govern-ment, an uneasy coalition of communists, socialists, and liberals, refused to pay out to Jews monies confiscated from them by the Gestapo, but after some negotiations agreed to give loans against future property restitutions. These never took place, and in effect the government was paying the communities interest from robbed properties.

The Jewish community of Prague was reformed immediately following liberation, and Arnost Frischer, who had represented the Jews on the Czech National Council in exile in London, was the first head. A commit-tee for welfare, calling itself the JDC committee, announced its existence

1 Excom, 1/16/46, and JDC/Czechoslovakia, 1945, letter by Charles H . Newton to Henry Unterman and de Sola Pool, 6/18/45.

104

The Great Exodus 105 on July 6, 1945, and one of its members, Dr Adolf Benes, was to remain JDC's local man until his emigration to Palestine, where he worked for JDC until his retirement.

The situation in Slovakia proved more difficult. In the conditions of the underground before liberation, Dr Juraj Revesz, linked to the under-ground leadership of Slovak Jewry, was the organizer. The IRC's represen-tative there, George Dunant, received money from Saly Mayer, then gave it to Revesz who distributed it to the Jews in hiding in Bratislava, the Slovak capital. Some of the money remained, and on the day following liberation the "Joint" soup kitchen was opened. Bratislava immediately became the hub for transients, including Jews. Many of these were Hun-garian Jews returning from camps, some were Jewish partisans returning from the mountains, often fearful for their lives, because Slovak fascists had joined the partisans at the last moment so they could appear pro-Ally, and used their short stay with the resisters to murder Jews. In eastern Slovakia, Josef Reich was active, and he went to Bucharest to contact Erno Marton. Marton and Filderman sent help, probably in the form of food, and appointed a JDC subcommittee locally. Neither Mayer nor, of course, New York had any control over all this. Finally, the two committees united, and JDC had acquired a representative group for all of Czecho-slovakia. In September, Schwartz sent Harold Trobe, Jacob Trobe's brother, to Czechoslovakia, to represent JDC. Then in November-De-cember, Harry Viteles visited the country, made an assessment of the JDC program there, and made suggestions. Two children's homes were set up for the surviving orphans, an old age home was established for the Theresienstadt elderly, and an intensive health program was developed for over 1000 tubercular patients.2

Upon liberation, Czechoslovakia immediately became a transit country for Brichah, including "wild" Brichah movements. These included not only Polish Jews, but Hungarian Jews coming out of Hungary via Slovakia into Austria, and local Slovak and Czech Jews. The situation in Slovakia especially turned very sour. On September 24, 1945, a pogrom took place at Topolciany, a resort in western Slovakia. A Jewish doctor was accused of ritual murder of Christian children, and a local "antifascist" newspaper, the Vestniky reported three days later the "reason": the Jews had poisoned the children. A total of 49 persons were wounded. Communist officials there, as in Hungary, tended to draw Slovak fascists into their ranks in order to smooth their road to power. This could not be done without catering to their antisemitic practices. Other communist officials, such as the later victim of the Slansky trial in Prague, Vlado Clementis, opposed these tendencies, but were not very successful. Despite the punishment of a number of individuals, the pogrom and other, smaller disturbances

2 Excom 1/16/46 for the Trobe and Viteles reports; JDC/Czechoslovakia, 1945, reports of 7/6/45,7/7/45; JDC/SM, Revesz to Mayer, 6/22/45; Interview with Harold Trobe (HK).

106 Out of the Ashes

that followed it certainly strengthened the desire of many Jews to leave. But the main movement, nevertheless, was from Poland, over the moun-tains of Slovakia, or through Nachod. In September, a report from Prague stated that "migration from Poland will continue irrespective of any improvements which there may be in Poland and/or irrespective of any measures which may be taken to stop the inflow and outflow."3

In June, a Brichah office was opened in the offices of the renascent Jewish community in Prague by Bubu Landau, a young Slovak Jewish underground fighter. He was responsible to Argov in Bratislava. Hoter-Yishai of the Jewish Brigade appeared in Prague in early July, and arrange-ments were worked out how and where to transfer the people sent from Poland into Austria and Germany. Some of them went via As in western Bohemia to Bavaria, others were helped by Lipman and Neulander, others went via Bohemia to Bratislava. These included some of the Theresienstadt survivors. All these people were helped by the Czech government's Minis-try for Social Welfare, headed by a friendly communist, Jan Soltez. Food and camp accommodation were provided by the government, as this was expected to be a short-term problem. At first, people from Poland came via Nachod camouflaged as Greeks, and the Czechs sent an official there to investigate who all these Greeks were. The story is told that the report said, in truly Czech manner, that it could not be proved that these people were not Greeks. The government never considered closing the border, but it demanded payment for its considerable outlays. It was there that American Jewry, in the person of JDC's Harry Viteles, intervened. On December 14, he had a talk with Jan Masaryk, the Foreign Minister and a great friend of the Jews, at which he asked for free entry for Polish Jews. Czech UNRRA was asking London UNRRA whether UNRRA would pay for the transients. To ease the situation, the Jews were described as being "unsuccessfully repatriated," that is, they had been repatriated to Poland, but had not succeeded in getting settled there. Viteles was helped by Dr Elfan Rees, the Welsh deputy director of UNRRA in Czechoslovakia, serving under a dour and unfriendly Russian. Masaryk said the govern-ment would be satisfied with an UNRRA undertaking to repay the money at some future date, and on January 17,1946, Viteles cabled that somehow Czech UNRRA received approval to become responsible for the "unsuc-cessfully repatriated."4

In October, the Palestinian Mossad sent emissaries to Prague, as it had in the case of Austria. Bratislava was the seat of Argov's office, and he worked with a number of Polish Brichah people. In Bratislava, too, good relations were established with some of the local officials, and a run-down hotel, the Jelen, was taken over as a transient camp. Trains from Nachod

' IDC/Czechoslovakia, 1945, report by Rosenberg, 9/24/45. 4 Interview with Z. Landau, OHD; JDC/ Czech Refugees, 1945-46, cables of 12/10,

12/14/45, and 1/17/46. Also testimony by Levi Argov, OHD.

The Great Exodus 107

or from Hungary, or people who had come over the Slovak mountains, . would arrive in Bratislava, and were then moved across a wooden bridge over the Danube intended for local peasants, near Devinskd Nov£ Ves, into Austria.

Money and political support were needed, and only JDC could provide that. In March 1946, JDC sent Gaynor I. Jacobson to Czechoslovakia, to take Trobe's place. In Slovakia, another American, Philip Ruby, was working. It is interesting how the same situation was reflected in different perceptions. Landau, Argov, and other Brichah workers in Czechoslo-vakia reported that the JDC officials had been drawn into Brichah work, and that in fact Brichah operated through JDC; JDC was an auxiliary to Brichah. Jacobson reported it the other way around: he talked about "our Brichah unit, officially attached to JDC, officially part of our organiz-ation." In a sense, both were right: JDC and Brichah needed each other, and used each other by mutual consent. This was of course a far cry from the careful, legalistic procedures favored by New York. It was clear that JDC's work in Czechoslovakia had two aspects: the less important one was to look after the local communities, see to it that medical and children's programs were maintained, and that matzot be sent at Passover (a difficult problem in Slovakia, where the government-approved Rabbi, Armin Fri-eder, a neologue, was recognized by religious Zionists but not by the orthodox, who would refuse to eat matzot approved by him). Several hach-sharot of Zionist youth preparing for Palestine were also maintained by JDC. But the second task was much more daunting—to see to it that Jewish refugees should be able to pass through Czechoslovakia without hindrance, and be fed and looked after on their way.5

There is no doubt at all that the crucial task in the mass movement of Jews through Europe was that of assuring the safe passage of Jewish refu-gees through Czechoslovakia. The person responsible for that was Gaynor I. Jacobson, a social worker sympathetic to Zionism, who was JDC's rep-resentative in Prague at the time. His problem was that the Czechs con-tinued paying very considerable sums for the trains going between Nachod and Bratislava. The January announcement that somehow UNRRA would be paying, sometime, was not really satisfactory. On June 1, apparendy, before the great influx began, Rees gave a verbal undertaking that UNRRA would pay. This eased the minds of the lower Czech officials who were approving of outlays without any real basis.

Jacobson had no great liking for the role of serving as "front" for Brichah; on the other hand, Brichah did not let him in on the actual operations, as much to protect him as anything else. The less he knew the better for him, in case he got into trouble. The refugees were coming, however, and Jacobson saw it as his duty to do everything in his power to secure them a safe passage through the country. His contacts were with

5 Ibid.; and interview with Gaynor I. Jacobson (HK), p. 30.

108 Out of the Ashes

Masaryk, and with ZdenSk Nejedly, the successor of Soltez as Minister of Social Welfare. However, his most important diplomatic work was with Dr Zoltan Toman (originally Asher-Zelig Goldberger), a Jewish communist responsible for political police work in the Ministry of Interior. Jacobson became friendly with Toman, which was very useful in the delicate situ-ations that were about to develop.

On July 7—three days after the Kielce pogrom—Mary Gibbons, Deputy Director-General of UNRRA, visited Prague. Asked by anxious Czech officials whether UNRRA would pay for the "unsuccessfully repatriated," she answered that there was a misunderstanding: the Czech government would have to pay. This of course created a crisis situation. On July 16, a Czechslovak government meeting took place, at which Masaryk, so Jacob-son was informed, "told the Cabinet that Czechoslovakia must remain a haven of refuge for these Jews fleeing from terror. If Czechoslovakia was to close its borders he, Minister Masaryk, would resign." Whether this is the way he put it or not, Masaryk clearly supported the Jews. The govern-ment decided not to close the border, but to press for payment by anyone— UNRRA or JDC. Jacobson turned to Schwartz who alerted New York. JDC head office got to work on the State Department and UNRRA. On July 15, Schwartz was told that Czech UNRRA was expected to pay, and that the Czech government was entitled, in lieu of its payments, to demand additional supplies from UNRRA. Even the Russian head of Czech UNRRA was willing to ask the government not to close its borders. Nej-edly, too, was friendly, and so was Toman, but there was a problem: Polish right-wingers and anti-Soviet Ukrainians might infiltrate under a Jewish guise and endanger Czechoslovakia's safety. He proposed at first to move the refugees from Nachod via AS straight to the US Zone in Germany, rather than use the more expensive and tortuous route via Bratislava and Vienna. Schwartz even asked General McNarney about such a possibility, but the Americans refused. To agree to Toman's plan would have meant inviting the Jews to move to the US Zone in Germany. The Americans were willing not to resist entry into Germany, but to invite the Jews to come was another matter altogether.6

The Czechs then told Jacobson that they would bill UNRRA for 21 million crowns (about $400,000 at the official rate), but this was in July, when the mass movement was just beginning. On July 26, the crucial Cabinet meeting took place, at which it was decided that refugees should not stay on Czechoslovak soil more than the absolute minimum of time; that the Western governments should be approached and pressed to find a solution to the problem, that the Polish government should be

6 In this and the following paragraphs I am relying, among other sources, on a comparison between various statements and reports of Jacobson: YlVO-Schwarz Material, file 57, Report by Jacobson, n.d.; JDC/Czechoslovakia, General, 1946-47, Reports by Jacobson, May and June, 1946; idem, "Saving Europe's Jews", n.d.; ATH-Brichah Archive, n.d.; Interview with Jacobson, OHD; Interview with Jacobson (HK); and JDC/AC 8/15/46.

The Great Exodus 109

approached for its views, and the UNRRA be asked to pay. But the upshot of it was that the Czech government would transport the Jews and take care of them while they were on Czech territory. The reason for this behavior can perhaps be sought primarily in a genuine humanitarian con-cern, secondly in the political support many Czech politicians were willing to give to Jewish national aspirations; and the fact that the Soviets seemed not to object was a crucial point for the large communist group in the Cabinet. Finally, after long negotiations, UNRRA paid the Czechs a sum of $250,000, in the fall, when the mass movement was nearing its com-pletion. In actual fact, the Czechs had spent over a million dollars by that time, and they never got back the rest of the money. In all these contacts, Jacobson played the major part. It was he who ran between the government and UNRRA, and it was also he who negotiated with Palestinian emissaries and Schwartz. Schwartz was asked to increase the budget for the transients appreciably, which he did: he cabled New York for an allocation, and Leavitt told the Administration Committee of JDC that in order to cover "the emergency needs for Bricha [sic]" a total of $245,000 would be sent to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. Toman supported the move, which was a decisive factor in influencing the communist vote at the Cabi-net meeting.7

The figures were frightening: in July, 17,903 Polish Jews came through Nachod. In August, 32,441 came through, in September 15,682, in October 5682, and in November 2017, or 73,725 just through that one main point from Poland. But the direct expenditure of JDC for these people in Czechoslovakia itself was in fact minimal: a total of $120,000, because the transportation was paid for by the Czechs. JDC took care of meals, medical care on the journey, and other incidentals. During the journey, which took from 14 to 36 hours between Nachod and Bratislava, the trains stopped at the Moravian capital of Brno, usually in the middle of the night, where hot meals were served by a totally selfless Jewish community service financed by JDC. JDC's role was central, because it was the recognized representative of these multitudes, though it had absolutely no control over the movement itself.

Another aspect of these mass moves was the Czech determination to expel all Germans from their country, though they had been living there for some seven centuries. This included even anti-Nazi Germans, who were asked to leave under better conditions than the rest. It also included 3200 Jews, who in 1930 had declared themselves to be of German national-ity. In September, JDC put great pressure on the Czech government not to expel these Jews, and in the end they stayed. Yet another aspect was the transit of special groups who did not travel the ordinary Nachod to Bratislava route. For people such as these, JDC maintained some elemen-tary hotel accommodation in Prague; and two camps near the city. These

7 Sec especially the two interviews with Jacobson, OHD and HK; JDC/AC, 7/16/46.

110 Out of the Ashes

were used, in part, by orthodox groups who demanded direct transit to Germany, which did not exacdy endear them to Brichah, Jacobson, or the Czechs.

In August, too, a special group of children was brought to Prague from Poland by Palestine's Chief Rabbi Yitzhak Halevi Herzog. On the 28th, Herzog brought 488 children and 101 adults to look after them, with full permission from the Polish government. Herzog claimed he had per-mission from the French to bring these children to France in the first instance, and from the Czechs to look after them in Prague for six weeks. "Although Rabbi Herzog had informed us," Jacobson wrote, "that every-thing had been arranged with the Czech authorities and with UNRRA to provide all that was necessary for the children, this did not prove to be the case." The children arrived in a very poor state, and Brichah people had to look after them. The French visas were not forthcoming, and on Sep-tember 24 the Czechs demanded that the children move. The American orthodox organization, Va'ad Hahatzalah, tried to get Belgian visas, but these were not obtained either. In early October the French relented, and the children were shipped to France, where again nothing had been done to prepare for their arrival. All the very considerable expenses for this rather futile trip—the children would have got out of Poland with the usual Brichah transports, under orthodox supervision—devolved on JDC.8

Another problem involving orthodox Jews was that of kashrut—obser-vation of the dietary laws. Different groups of orthodox Jews would not rely on the kashrut provided by other orthodox people, and special kitchens had to be set up to accommodate everyone. The one group that stood out in its internal discipline and in its modesty was that of the Lubavitcher Hassidim, who came out of Russia at the time. The head of the sect, the Lubavitcher Rebbe in New York, originally opposed their exit from Russia at the time, because of the reports of pogroms in Poland. Apparently he thought they would be safer in the Soviet Union for the time being. How-ever, when he received word of the real conditions, and the opportunity of crossing the borders, he agreed that his group should leave. The Luba-vitcher first tried to leave Poland with a private smuggling organization set up by the ultra-orthodox Agudat Israel, but they failed them, and it proved easier for the Lubavitcher to cooperate with Brichah, dominated by largely atheistic, left-wing Zionists. They brought their own funds out of Russia, but these were far from sufficient, and JDC had to help out. Many of them were not, like the rest, Polish Jews who had lived in the Soviet Union during the war, but Russian Jews, adherents of the sect, who utilized the opportunity of the repatriation of Poles to join clandestinely.

1 S. Z. Shragai, Massa Hatzalah (an account of Rabbi Herzog's trip to Europe in 1946), Jerusalem, 1947; YlVO-loc.cit., Jacobson report; JDC/Czechoslovakia, general, 1946, cables of 10/8/ and 12/26/46; also Jacobson interview (HK).

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About 3000 Lubavicher came across with Brichah at the time, in groups of 150 to 200 persons; they shunned no work, and insisted on equality— no one in their groups would touch their own food until every one of the 800 people then in Nachod had received theirs.9

The main route via Nachod was, however, not the only one that had to be dealt with. Parallel to the exodus from Poland, a similar, though much smaller exodus took place from Hungary, including some people from Romania and Subcarpathian Russia. 13,635 came to Bratislava on trains from Hungary, and they too had to be accommodated and looked after, though their stay was much shorter. This was the job of Ruby for JDC, and of Argov and his central Brichah crew in Bratislava. Contrary to the Prague situation, JDC could not influence the political side of this move, because here it was a question of persuading the Russians who controlled that part of Austria adjoining Slovakia, to let the Jews through to Vienna and beyond. These matters were handled by Argov's people, but JDC, of course, paid for it.10

A total of at least 90,000 Jews came through Czechoslovakia between July and November 1946. Most, but not all of them, came from Poland, and others came from Poland who did not go through Czechoslovakia, but took the northern route through Berlin. How did they get out of Poland, en masse?

Poland

As we have already seen, the situation in Poland before Kielce was deteriorating. The struggle between the political parties became increas-ingly bitter, and Polish officials admitted that during June "political murders and murders of Jews had increased 100 percent and they expected that these murders and acts of violence would undoubtedly continue" until the referendum which would decide about the supremacy in Polish politics was held. One must understand also why, even under these conditions, so many Jews wanted to leave. The repatriated Jews from Russia suffered from bad health and destitution: their clothes were rags, they came from Russia hungry and emaciated, and when they got to Poland they found that nothing remained of their families and towns. In addition to all this, they argued very often that in Russia, despite all the deprivation, they had at least been physically secure; there was no danger in wandering at night in a Soviet town. In Poland they were constantly being threatened only because they were Jews, and were living in an atmosphere of fear. Bearded men, especially, feared for

9 Jacobson interview, OHD; Notes on interview with Rabbi S. Gorodetzky, 4/17/67, OHD. .

10 Jacobson interviews, passim; interviews with Argov, Ofri, Sela, OHD. OOA—E*

112 Out of the Ashes

their lives because their Jewishness was so obvious. Faced with this situation, no wonder they wanted to flee.11

In June and July, before and immediately after Kielce, the movement out of Poland was essentially illegal. Polish guards at the border were either bribed, or bypassed, in situations that could, and sometimes did, become dangerous. The crossing to Nachod and another place on the Czech border, Broumov, was done from three "points" on the Polish side. Brichah workers looked after the Polish end, but in Czechoslovakia, apart from the Czech officials and some local Jews, JDC workers did most of the work. While the sums involved may not have been very large, the personal commitment was considerable. Ann Liepah was one of those JDC workers who had to prepare places for exhausted people to have some rest before moving on, had to supply them with food, look after children, administer first aid, and so on. Again, direct involvement of American Jews took forms other than just administering welfare.

In Szczecin, a different route was utilized, without any American Jewish involvement. Brichah had a large contingent of people there, and they used the fact that the Polish Repatriation Committee, known as PUR, was expelling Germans from Poland, in order to ship Jews who wanted to get out of Poland straight to the British Zone in Germany. Parallel to this, the old truck route was used, although it was becoming more and more dangerous. Originally, 13,000 Jews were "settled" in Sczeczin by the Poles, and the number grew to 20,000 by early July. They had to be moved out. Probably some 6000-8000 people had reached Berlin from Szczeczin up to July, and then from August to November Brichah estimated that 16,000 travelled that road, apart from the PUR transports which must have numbered another 10,000. Statistics were hard to come by, but the whole Sczeczin operation probably accounted for over 30,000 people in 1946.12

All these subterfuges and illegal or semi-legal methods were not good enough to accommodate the panic movement that started with Kielce, and other ways had to be found. Unknown to Jacobson and the Czechoslovak government, similar contacts and negotiations as took place in Prague also took place in Warsaw. They were initiated by Antek Zuckermann, and according to his statement they began on the plane on the way back from the burial of the Kielce victims. It was clear that the Polish security organs, the UB, were fully aware of the illegal crossings, and they were looking for a way to legalize them, so as to control them. This could not be done through the Polish Foreign Office, because the officials there were harassed by the British who were doing everything they could to stop a Jewish exodus that would increase the pressure to open up Palestine for the Jews. Zuckermann was known to be the representative of the Zionist youth

11J DC/AC 8/15/46, Schwartz's speech. 12 Bauer, op. cit., pp. 232-40.

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movements, and in effect of the Brichah, on the CC, and he was asked to contact Marshal Marian Spychalski, the Defense Minister, with whom Zuckermann had a friendly relationship dating from the days of the under-ground. Together with another left-wing Zionist, Dr Adolf Berman, who happened to be the brother of communist strong-man Jakub Berman, he met with Spychalski, probably a few days after Kielce. Spychalski immediately agreed to open the frontier without involving the Foreign Office, and both of them handed the practical handling of the arrange-ments to their respective officials. On the Polish side this involved the border guards, commanded by a Soviet officer of Polish extraction, who obviously would not do anything without approval by the Soviets. The reason for this policy has been explained above. Zuckermann on his part contacted the Brichah command—he had not done so before his meeting with the Poles—and Brichah delegated Zvi Netzer, one of the Palestinian emissaries, to go to the border and make the arrangements. At two main points on the Silesian border, opposite Nachod and Broumov, customs points were set up. Foreign currency, jewelry, and cigarettes could not be taken over, and Brichah had to promise to prevent the crossing of anti-government Poles or others who might pretend to be Jews. In fact, a few individuals like that were caught, including a Nazi German who was immediately killed by Brichah men.13

Jacobson recorded that the Polish border was opened on July 30. There were, in mid-August, interruptions, stemming from differences between the Poles and Brichah, and some mishaps. Jacobson's interventions with the Czechoslovak government settled the issue from the Czech angle, but problems arose in Poland, due to British pressure to close the borders to Jewish refugees. British papers published stories representing the Jewish refugees as hoodlums influenced by Jewish terrorists fighting the British in Palestine. But of course the main direction of British pressure was towards the American government.

We have seen already that the new Jewish Adviser to General McNarney was Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein. In the wake of Kielce a crisis meeting of Brichah leaders was held in Germany, and Hoffman of the J A Rescue Teams had to go to Bernstein and tell him that his figure of40,000 refugees that would come to the US Zones in the next three months had to be radically revised. 80,000 to 100,000 was the more likely figure, Hoffman said. Bernstein was now in an awkward situation. He had to go back on his own estimate; moreover, he was now an official of the American Army, and his primary loyalty had to be to the Army. He himself had stated when he came to Germany, that if a clash ensued between his Army loyalty and his Jewish conscience, he would resign. The Army, he clearly saw, would have great difficulties in absorbing a large influx.14 At this point, Henry ; " For a full description, see ibid., pp. 219-28.

M JDC/ Leavitt to Isaac Levy, 7/18/46; Yahil (Hoffman), loc.cit. .

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Montor, of the Zionist section of the UJA, suggested that Bernstein go to Poland himself to find out what was happening there. This also was to be a face-saving device for Bernstein: on the strength of new impressions he could suggest new ideas to McNarney. Bernstein went to Poland on July 23, accompanied by Rabbi Herbert Friedman, and stayed for a week. He found that there were probably about 160,000 Jews in Poland, and 100,000 of them would move out within a year; of these he thought 60,000 would leave between August and October. Actually, a higher number than that was to leave in that period of time, as we have already seen. Bernstein, in his report to McNarney of August 2, urged that no panic about "saving the Jews" of Poland should be encouraged, and thought that it would be unwise to plan for a total abandonment of Poland by its Jews. Many Jews wanted to stay, especially in Silesia, and if an official plan was promoted for Jews to leave the country, this would only encourage the antisemitic elements and provoke pogroms to speed up the Jewish departure. In this, Bernstein repeated fears and attitudes that had been typical of American Jewish leadership in the prewar era, and reflected, most probably, a deep feeling of insecurity among Jews even in liberal cultures. However, the final recommendation to Joseph T. McNarney was:

that under the auspices of and at the initiative of the Commander General, USFET [United States Forces European Theater], plans be explored and undertaken for the accommodation of 60,000 additional Jewish displaced persons in the coming three months and of an additional 40,000 over the winter months; that these plans include the expansion of facilities for such care in the U.S. Zone in Austria, the British and French Zones, France, Italy, and other countries, and that the resources of private agencies [such] as the AJDC and the Jewish agencies for Palestine be fully utilized in the extension of this program; that the Commanding General, USFET, undertake to prepare accom-modations for such incoming Jewish persecutees as cannot be cared for in other places. ,s

Parallel with Bernstein's visit, pressure was exerted by the State Depart-ment on the Jewish organizations to do something to stop the inflow— again on the assumption that these groups had influence on the situation, which of course they did not. On July 22, the five Jewish organizations that had approved of Bernstein's appointment in Germany met with the Secretaries of State and War, who said that if the influx continued unabated, sooner or later the borders would have to be closed. Because of the disagreement between them—the War Department was more anxious than the State Department to close the border—they decided to leave the decision to the President. The Jewish organizations went to Congress and lobbied a number of influential senators, who intervened with Truman to keep the borders open. Presidential Assistant David Niles told the senators that while the border from Poland was likely to remain open, the thought was to close the borders to the British and French Zones, on the assump-tion that whereas there was justification for Jews to flee from Poland, there

15 J DC/Poland, general, 1946, Bernstein Report to McNarney, 8/2/46; Bauer, op. cit., pp. 244-46.

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was no reason to accept Jewish DPs from other Zones. A similar line was taken by Hilldring. In a letter of July 31, he pleaded for a stop to the movement, but he also reiterated the administration's commitment to keep the borders open, at least for the time being. JDC's reply went straight to the point and emphasized that "JDC has never participated in any organiz-ing of this movement. However, it is our policy to assist wherever possible, to the fullest extent of our resources" those Jews who would be forced to move from one place to another. This was in fact what was happening, even in places such as Czechoslovakia, where Jacobson was involved in diplomatic negotiations to smoothe the passage of the refugees, but was in no way responsible for the organization of the movement.16

Yet British pressure persisted. On August 6, McNarney yielded to it to the extent of publicly declaring that "all organized movement of Jewish refugees will be turned back from the American zones of Germany and Austria in the future . . . [the] United States had never adopted a policy of the American zone being a station on the way to Palestine or any other place." However, this applied only to "organized" movement. Unorgan-ized movement would be permitted as heretofore. The British declared on August 9 that the British Zones would be closed to all Jews from the East. The British, and even some of the American press, supported these moves. The London Daily Mail declared that no German war criminals had been found amongst the Jewish refugees "yet." Though McNarney did not go to the extremes, of . the British attitudes—the Briush deprived the 5000 Jewish infiltrees in their Zone of their DP rations—his declaration was bitterly attacked by the Jewish organizations in the United States. Rabbi Stephen S. Wise went to Frankfurt to see McNarney, Bernstein went to Washington to speak to the State Department. It appears that Washington made McNarney retreat, largely because it was clear that implementation of his declaration would be very complicated—how did one distinguish between organized and unorganized infiltration?—and because it might well mean armed confrontation with masses of refugees from persecution, something the American public might not welcome. On August 21, there-fore, McNarney "explained" his previous statements away. He would not agree to movements above 100 persons—these were the "organized" ones—and he would not agree to take refugees from the British or French Zones. Apart from that, the borders would remain open. Brichah adjusted to this by sending convoys of 99 persons across the borders. After a while, even this rather silly game was abandoned, and the move continued as before.17

: The situation in Austria was worse than in Germany. It was the main 16 JDC/ General files, Hildring to JDC, 7/31/46; ibid., Warburg to Hildring, 8/23/46;

interview with Moses A. Leavitt, OHD; J DC/AC, 7/30/46; and Wahl to Grossman, 7/23/46; and McCormack to Truman, 7/22/46.

" Daily Mail, 7/9/46; New York Times, 8/10/46; JTA, 10/12/46; interview with Joseph J. Schwartz, OHD (8/14/62).

116 Out of the Ashes

transit route, and the US Army was quite incapable of looking after the masses that began arriving there hoping to travel to Germany. In early August General Mark Clark informed McNarney that he had 27,000 Jew-ish infiltrees and he could not absorb more than that. After some nego-tiations the maximum figure was fixed at 30,000, and McNarney agreed to take over any number beyond that. In this way, Bavaria received 33,860 Jewish infiltrees between August 12 and the end of September. An additional 7000 or so were smuggled across by Brichah. Clark was facing a very real problem, because he simply had not sufficient food or accommo-dations. The interesting thing was that in his dilemma Clark turned to Schwartz! Clark and Tate told Schwartz about August 10 that while they would do everything possible to accommodate infiltrees passing through Austria, JDC should try to persuade the infiltrees to go direcdy to Germany via As rather than via Bratislava-Vienna-Salzburg to Bavaria. In addition, the two generals asked the Jewish voluntary agency to "exert every influence" with USFET in Germany to get permission for the infiltrees to pass from Austria to Germany. They may have thought that JDC was Jewish and Jews were capable of anything—a kind of reverse anti-Jewish-ness. But it is clear that they approached JDC with the best of humane intentions and must have been surprised to discover how powerless JDC was either to regulate Brichah or convince USFET of something the Army had hesitations about. In any case, Clark pressed Washington to intervene with the Poles and the Czechs to stop the flow temporarily until he could get organized; if the flow was reduced, so much the better. These inter-ventions took place on August 19 and 20 in Warsaw, and also in Prague.

Bein in Warsaw and Jacobson in Prague were told by the United States embassies to do their best to regulate the flow, but as in Vienna, they had no influence over these things. In New York, JDC agreed to the idea of regulation. The Polish government even nominated a liaison between the Jews, the Americans, and itself, but nothing much could be done. Thou-sands of people were accumulating on the Silesian border waiting to cross, and though on August 10-13 the Czech border was closed, and again in late September, these were but temporary halts; there was no way to stop this movement unless force was used, and even then one had to doubt whether this would really help. Both the Czechs and the Poles were in a quandary: many of the government officials had real sympathy for the Jewish refugees, and they were not in any case very accommodating to British and even American interventions. The Polish consul-general in New York declared that the crossing of the border by "Jews who do not want to wait for the legal procedure"—a wonderful use of language— would not be prevented. On the other hand, if the Poles disregarded American wishes they might find themselves with many thousands of Jews on their hands, and without American help.18

Bernstein, as the representative of American Jewry, had to find a way

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that would make his recommendations more palatable to the Army. He therefore came up with a plan to have 10,000 Jews accepted in Czechoslo-vakia for a period of time, and negotiate with the Italians for the acceptance of 25,000 more. He failed in both countries. In Czechoslovakia he nego-tiated from September 3, when he saw Prime Minister Klement Gottwald, until early December, when the Czechs finally accepted the scheme, but by that time Brichah movements out of Poland had died down, and the scheme was no longer needed. On Italy, Bernstein clashed sharply with JDC. When the Italian government refused to consider his proposal, Bernstein reduced the figure he proposed to 10,000 Jews to be accepted by Italy, but they argued that they did not have enough food for such a number (there were to be 23,000 Jewish DPs in Italy by the end of 1946, of whom 13,000 came in 1946). Bernstein then demanded that JDC supply the food, but JDC refused. On September 8, Bernstein wrote an angry letter to JDC and said that JDC was preventing an accommodation to the Army's wishes, because settling 10,000 in Italy would ease the whole atmosphere considerably. Schwartz's reply, transmitted by Leavitt to Bernstein, was that the scheme would cost $210,000 a month, which Schwartz did not have, and in any case by that time (end of September) the flow from Poland was abating and the Italian scheme was no longer needed. It was, in fact, quietly dropped.

Bernstein also intervened with the Pope. He elicited a promise to convey to the Polish Church the Holy See's hope that pogroms would cease, and to intervene with the Italian government regarding the 10,000. We do not yet know whether that is what the Pope did, but if he did what he prom-ised, it remained ineffective.19 What was important to Bernstein, indeed to American Jewry, was the support of the President for all these moves— the acceptance of Jews into the American Zones, and the efforts to settle them in various places. Bernstein met with Truman on October 11, and reported on his work and on the situation in Germany. From the record of the meeting it would appear that Truman fully approved of the stand that had been taken by Bernstein. This of course was important from the point of view of relations with the Army.20 &

Aside from the central issue of the exodus from Poland, JDC had to face all the problems of those who chose to stay, temporarily or otherwise. As far as the support of Brichah was concerned, Bein in Warsaw, while of course fully aware of what was going on, kept his distance from the actual operation. He supported "hachsharot" and "kibbutzim," and knew that as

" J DC/Poland, general, 1946, Bein reports and letters, 8/19, 8/20, 8/23/46. In a cable from Paris (JDC/Czechoslovakia, 1946), Schwartz referred to "Island pressure" and "the desire [of] Pat's boys" (the War Department) "for brief respite." See also Jacobson inter-views, OHD and (HK).

Bauer, op. cit., pp. 252-54. 0 Bernstein memos to McNarney, 9/14/46, on the audience with Pius XII, and of 10/18/46

on his interview with Truman. Both documents are from Rabbi Bernstein's private archive.

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each group left, it took all the blankets, cooking utensils, in fact everything that was not nailed down, with them. JDC was expected to make available to the next group the same material equipment. Bein's problem was the CC, and its relationships to the other groups. The CC was composed, in 1946, of 23 members, of whom 12 were Zionists. Nevertheless, with the increasing control of the country by the communists, communist influence was getting stronger. In accordance with established JDC tradition, a Loan Kassa was set up: a bank that gave small loans with a low interest rate to start businesses, establish people in professions, or help artisans open shop. Also very important were cooperatives that were set up with the Kassa's help. JDC supplied $610,000 to the Loan Kassa, and with the help of these funds, until September 1946 over 2000 loans were handed out. Another new JDC venture was the "Economic Center" (Centrala Gospodarcza) which was supplying Jewish cooperatives of artisans with raw materials. With the help of JDC, 134 cooperatives were established in Poland by the end of 1946, with 3115 members.

The CC itself was of course largely a welfare institution, and cash sub-ventions from JDC enabled it to take care of soup kitchens, children's and old age homes, and the like. An indication of the importance of American Jewish support was the fact that between January and October 1946, the CC had received from JDC some 400 million zloty, out of a total budget of 528 million.

These programs, and others that will be explained shortly, were depen-dent on difficult negotiations regarding the value of the dollars supplied. In all Eastern countries there was a vast discrepancy between the official and the unofficial rate of exchange. The Polish government was not willing to grant JDC more than 100 zloty per dollar, whereas the unofficial rate was about three times as much. With tremendous difficulty, Schwartz in June managed to increase the Polish offer to 140 zloty, and in the end JDC dollars were exchanged for 170 zloty, making JDC the only foreign organization in Poland to receive this kind of a deal from the government. Obviously, more could be done with a better exchange rate.21

Apart from immediate cash relief, the most important part of JDC's work in Poland was that which concerned children. Each major trend— the CC, representing communist and Bundist tendencies; the Zionist roof organization for children, the Koordinatzia; and the orthodox congre-gations—had its own children's homes. There were a total of 32 such places in September 1946, with 2821 children. Of these, 1080 were orphans and 1057 were half-orphans. Only 754 of the children had been in Poland during the war, the others had come from the Soviet Union. These were a part of a total of 17,224 children, most of whom were living with families, who were cared for by JDC-financed institutions. About 13 percent of total cash disbursements went to this work, and another 16 percent for

" J DC/Poland, general, 1946,6/16/46.

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"vocational training," part of which was the support of kibbutzim and hachsharot, and most of which went in fact to Brichah. Important work was also done in the area of medical aid. Cash relief and soup kitchens also accounted for about 16 percent of the total. An important element in JDC work at this point was the Location and Search service. As in Germany, research was needed to uncover relatives abroad of Polish Jewish survivors, and vice versa: relatives abroad were searching for survivors in Poland. A special service organized by JDC dealt with these matters. Education and religious affairs were another important element. The CC of course wanted to bring all this under its control but, at least in 1946, it failed. This permitted JDC to do things that the communist regime later would disal-low. When Bein had occasion to look back on what JDC had done in Poland in 1946, he could see that $4,559,000 had been spent in zloty, and 3.9 million pounds of supplies worth $2,221,000 had been shipped in; it had made a difference.22

It is easy to criticize JDC and Rabbi Bernstein, and accuse them of shortsightedness, when they supported programs in Poland that looked towards the Jews staying there. In the light of later developments, all these notions of Jews remaining in Poland proved to be chimeras. But, from the point of view of 1946, this was not so at all. It seemed that, indeed, many would leave, but also that many would stay. American Jews wished to look after those who stayed no less than those who left. And that was what JDC did.

Germany and Austria The problem of who would control the increasing amounts of supplies that JDC was bringing into Germany became really important as the influx of infiltrees changed the whole situation in the DP camps beginning in June-July 1946. In Bavaria, where the bulk of the people went, the ZK saw its hold over the population transferred to American Jews represenung a philanthropic attitude—or so they thought—which was different from their highly political approach to their own future. This would lie in their successful political action and its influence on the Powers. In order to do that, they would have to have full control over the most essential aspects of the people's lives. The JDC supplies were the most tangible element in this. In addition, there was the problem of the ZK members and adminis-trators being paid by JDC in the form of goods or cigarettes, and they wanted both to be paid and to retain their independence. In addition, JDC seemed to them to insist on the supremacy of all things American. They, on the other hand, were certain that they were in no need of tutelage or guidance: they were perfectly capable of running their own lives them-p

22 J DC/Poland, general, 1946, 2/5/47, "Report for January-September 1946"; ibid., Sobel to Pekarsky, 12/19/46.

120 Out of the Ashes

selves. Because they were deprived of the opportunity of making a living, and were in effect in forced residence in Germany, they needed JDC help. But help was different from tutelage.

Leo W. Schwarz, who had replaced Lavy Becker as director in Munich, and Herbert Katzki, who was responsible for the whole German operation, saw things differently. They saw factionalism in the ZK, and a danger to impartial sharing of whatever was available. They had to contend with UNRRA and Army supervision, and had to account for everything that was shipped in. They found that camp committees sometimes could not be relied upon to distribute fairly, and they believed that JDC, as the agency responsible for bringing the supplies into Germany also had the responsibility of seeing to equitable distribution. JDC had obtained the use of hangars at Schleissheim airfield near Munich for its stores. This was, at least formally, under UNRRA, and could not be handed over to the ZK. In 1946, supplies were coming in in increasing quantities, and among other sources JDC could now count on Army surpluses, which the Army sold cheaply in Paris from about May 1946.23

It was against this background that the struggle between the ZK and JDC first occurred in early July 1946. It was, as we have seen, not a struggle over supplies, but over independence, self-esteem, efficiency, equity in distribution, and issues of that nature. The ZK demanded that all supplies be turned over to them, and that JDC should have no say or supervisory powers whatsoever in the distribution/ Schwarz and Katzki refused point blank, and the ZK responded by severing all contact with JDC on July 15. There was an additional problem. Rabbi Klausner had been recalled, and the ZK suspected, not entirely without foundation apparently, that JDC had not exactly defended Klausner's plea to be per-mitted to remain with the DPs. He was a maverick, a thorn in the side of traditional authority, and was loved by the DPs precisely for that. The ZK appealed to UJA, whose director, Henry Montor, was in Europe at that time. But Montor, while expressing his view that there was "much justice" in the ZK's position, was not prepared to intervene, and stated that the issue was one for JDC to resolve. It seems that the ZK representa-tives, Samuel Gringauz and Boris Pliskin, were shaken by what they heard at a meeting on July 23, where Army and UNRRA representatives talked about the way supplies were handled in the Zone generally, and it appears that it became clear that the ZK's proposals were unrealistic. Discussions in Paris with Joseph J. Schwartz followed, and on August 3 a compromise was agreed to by the ZK, that would leave the distribution and control of supplies to joint management of JDC and the ZK. This was pretty much

" Leavitt at JDC's Annual Meeting, 1/11-12/47, "JDC in 1946," New York, 1947. The US War Assets Administration sold such items as 33,000 blankets, 100 trucks, etc.

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the same idea as that agreed on in January by Becker. The compromise held for a while.24

The ZK's position was greatly strengthened by the Army's willingness to give it official recognition as representing the Jewish DPs in the US Zone. The reasons for this willingness were not hard to find. Ever since the early spring, the US Army in Germany was being reduced from a strength of one million to less than a third of that number. The intract-ability of the Palestine-DP problem, coupled with the volatile nature of the Jewish population, might produce security problems that could be eased if there was a group, recognized by the Army, that would speak in their name. McNarney ordered an investigation into the feasibility of recognizing the ZK in late May, but it took a long ume to solve complicated legal and presdge problems. The Army was reluctant to give any kind of political recognition, and wanted to limit the ZK to welfare and representa-tive functions. The ZK, for its part, saw itself primarily as a political body. The go-between was of course Rabbi Bernstein, who smoothed the way for both sides. In the end, the letter of recognidon, together with a letter of explanation and interpretation signed by General Clarence R. Huebner, McNarney's Chief of Staff, provided for an interpretadon that the ZK could accept and the Army could live with. The ZK's general interests— interpreted by it as political—in the future of the Jewish DPs were recog-nized. The ZK, with the active help of Emmanuel Rackman, a young orthodox rabbi working for Bernstein, rewrote its constitution. At a meet-ing in Frankfurt on August 23, the ZK met with two of the heads of the Jewish Agency, Stephen S. Wise and Nahum Goldman, who came from Paris after having had there a crucial meeting of the Zionist leadership. At that meeting, faced with the exodus from Poland, Wise and Ben-Gurion, who had opposed the idea of a partition of Palestine up to that point, agreed that if a partition were to be offered to the J A, they would consider it (see below, Chapter 9). It was essential for them to get full support from the DPs, and the meeting in Frankfurt was designed both to assure that support and also to smoothe the way to Army recognition of the ZK: the ZK would then become an even more influential body politically, and a vehicle for Zionist policy. The ZK leaders were only too eager to fulfil that role. The final act came on September 7, when McNarney recognized the ZK in a ceremony at Frankfurt.25

The crux of the problem between JDC and the ZK was contained in the minutes of a meeting in Paris between Joseph Schwartz, Katzki, Leo Schwarz and Louis Sobel, Leavitt's deputy in New York, on September 26/27. Schwarz, reporting on the recognition of the ZK, said that it "may

24 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946-47; 7/9/46, Greenleigh to New York; 7/8/46 Central Com-mittee to Warburg; 7/12/46, Central Committee to Leavitt; 7/12/46, Montor to UPA. Also Leo Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 131-33.

Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 148-56. Professor Rackman was to become, many years later, the President of Bar-Ilan University in Israel.

122 Out of the Ashes

mean that it [the ZK] will be required to assume a greater obligation in connection with the administration of refugee affairs for which it may not be ready." In a report of March 1947, the JDC supply officer, Hy (Hyman) Wachtel, said that the ZK:

refuses to recognize the fact that the people from Joint are here to help the situation and help the people. It is their mistrust . . . that makes them so wary and so anxious to have power. Furthermore we must realize that the Central Committee is a political organization and as such must have a slush fund. The slush fund in Germany happens to be the supplementary rations that AJDC brings into Germany . . . In the list of employees which the Central Committee has, there are 408 political workers of different organizations and they are paid with the supplementary rations brought into this countiy. It is a known fact that the workers of the Central Committee, Regional Commit-tees and Camp and Community Committees which comprise about 4000 people, receive 40-50 percent of the entire allocations that are given for 150,000 people.

The report went on to say that the people would surely rebel against the ZK because of this, and JDC should not be in a position of having defended the ZK's bureaucracy. The kind of things JDC criticized can be seen from a report by Abraham Cohen, JDC regional director at Regensburg. People were elected to the regional committee on party lists, and not because they were either popular or fitted for their assigned tasks.

It is quite reliably reported that the new head of the cultural department can neither read nor write above an elementary level in any language . . . the former head of the finance department, an excellent bookkeeper who has been doing a splendid job has been made subordinate to a man who knows nothing about bookkeeping . . . the newly elected revisions committee has proved itself to be a handicap and a demoralizing fac-t o r . . . The head of the legal department is a chemist by training, and if the resolutions of the Central Committee were observed, he would be barred from public office because of his personal life.

And so on. JDC workers saw the ZK and its regional and local committees as faction-ridden, inefficient, and unpopular politicians.26

What the ZK thought of JDC was made clear in a memorandum signed by three ZK members on a visit to the United States (but significantly, not by the representative from the British Zone, Norbert Wollheim), on January 28, 1947. JDC could not have begun operating out of Munich without the help of Klausner and the ZK. The offices of JDC and those of ZK were opened at the same address. The first shipment of supplies was poor in quality and quantity, and the second did not come until the Passover of 1946. The matzot and wine shipped over then did not suffice for the camp population. Even after that, "the total quantities of supplies in either food or clothing has been insufficient to supply even a fraction of the needs of the people. The quality of the items delivered has been so poor as to embarrass the giver and the recipient." The greatest scandal was that of the layettes, in the face of the tremendous birth-rate in the camps. Even Dr Schwartz had to report to the UJA that "children were

24 JDC/Germany, general, 1947-1, reports on American Zone for March 1947; ibid., Germany, general, 1946, minutes of Paris meeting, 9/26-27/46, p. 1.

The Great Exodus 123

being wrapped in newspapers upon birth. There is no excuse for this." Children from Poland had to be kept indoors because JDC had no shoes to give them. The quality of clothes was poor, and people were forced to add other items and then exchange them on the black market for clothes they could wear. Food for transients had to be obtained from the rations of DPs in German camps, because JDC did not have the food. Instances were quoted of Brichah transports being fed from DP hospital radons. It was admitted, though, that "at different times, under different directors, or under one of the many supply chieftains who were constantly being replaced, some foods were supplied when available."

ZK officialdom had to be increased in order to look after the large number of refugees who were coming in. These officials were working people, and they could not be paid; their only reward was JDC rations, and JDC was reluctant to pay these. JDC was charged with an "unsympathetic approach." The main charge related to the frequent turnover of JDC personnel, not enabling them to get accustomed to the mentality and needs of the DPs. "There was no desire on the part of the Joint directors to utilize the abilities of the displaced persons themselves." Hospitals were functioning, teachers were teaching, rabbis were looking after the religious needs, and then JDC sent in competing individuals who had no contact with the DPs' world. Duplication resulted: why should JDC have a medi-cal director, or a rabbi, or a cultural officer, when all this was being done much better by the DPs themselves? The doctor employed by JDC, so it was said, was a DP who now received $90 a month, which was more than the total amount all the DP doctors not employed by JDC were getting. JDC had supported General Morgan (this referred to Trobe's defence of the General in January 1946); it had turned over precious penicillin to UNRRA which had refused to give it to the DPs' Munich hospital. Gener-ally, JDC's statement that it was not a political organization contradicted reality: all the problems JDC was facing were in fact political, and nothing practical could be achieved with this kind of attitude.27

Reading the material both of the ZK and the committees and of JDC,28

one is struck by opposite perceptions of the same issues. JDC could not ship in supplies before the Army and UNRRA permitted it. The quantity of food and clothing was a function of the funds at JDC's disposal. The quality equally was affected by the budget. Should better and more expens-ive goods be sent, or more of the simple clothing? Clearly, some of the supplies, especially those sent by the SOS, were indeed of poor quality. The layette situation was certainly scandalous. The turnover of personnel was also much too frequent for a sustained and well-organized program.

27 Leon Retter, Samuel Shlomowitz and Dr Boris Pliskin's memorandum of 1/28/47 to the American Jewish Conference; and Kenen to Warburg, 2/4/47, in JDC/Germany, general,

2> See Mankowitz, op. cit.; and material at YIVO, in the Schwarz files and the DP camps' collection.

124 Out of the Ashes

But one is also impressed by the enthusiasm of the DPs with a large number of American Jews serving with JDC. Duplicauon there was, and not all the DPs' talents were utilized as they should have been. Caught between Army, UNRRA, and DP pressure, these American Jews saw themselves as serving their people, not as bureaucrats; they had volun-teered for a difficult job, for a limited time, usually leaving their families behind. The failures and failings of the ZK itself were not, of course, mentioned in the January ZK memo.

The question must be asked whether the ZK representatives really rep-resented their organization, because Pliskin's radicalism was not reflected by the much more moderate attitude of Blumovicz in Munich. In October 1946, Schwartz had visited Munich in order to prepare for a new era in the camps. The influx of people was slowing down, but on the other hand the British government was showing no signs of readiness to take the 100,000 DPs to Palestine, as the Anglo-American Committee had demanded in April-May. The prospect was of years of camp life in Ger-many: both the United States and Palestine appeared to be closed, and there was nowhere else to go. Not only JDC, but representatives of the JA as well, argued that without a serious employment program in the DP camps, the population there would deteriorate morally. The ZK recog-nized this as its main program, but there was no willingness to work in the German economy. Dr Abraham Blumovicz, a central figure in the ZK set-up, spearheaded an employment program which would be financed and paid for by JDC, but whose results would in fact decrease JDC's obli-gations because the produce of an employment campaign would benefit the camps and reduce the amounts of money and supplies JDC would have to bring in. Schwartz thought that this should be carefully and sympatheti-cally considered. On the other main issue, the ZK's supply chief, Moses Segalson, complained that JDC's operations had remained bureaucratic, and the agreement of combined supervision was not working out. As a result, somewhat confused negotiations took place, in Munich and Paris in October, and then in New York, where the above-mentioned delegation arrived in late December.

The ZK now demanded to know in advance what the JDC's budget for Germany would be. They wanted the employment program implemented, with the help of the JA, ORT, the Army, and UNRRA. They asked for only quality supplies to be sent, or manufactured, in and from Europe. They demanded a drastic cut in JDC personnel, and devolution of responsibility on the DPs, and asked for a political recognition of the ZK by JDC. In addition, they thought that the role of the ZK had been downplayed by JDC public relations. The ZK, they believed, had done most of the work for the DPs, and JDC's contribution, while important, had been much overstressed.

It is easy to understand that these proposals were met with some reser-

The Great Exodus 125

vations. JDC could not foretell what its budget was going to be, in a situation that changed every few months. It depended on the good will of the American Jews, and could not foresee what monies would be made available. Political recognition of the ZK was totally out of the question for a non-political welfare organization. And cutting the number of JDC personnel would indeed have meant handing over the German operation to the ZK. For reasons explained above, this was precisely what JDC was not prepared to do, though they were willing to hand over certain elements of the program. One of these concerned education, which was handed over not to the ZK, but to the JA teams, who had Palestinian Jewish educators who were competent to handle the job. As to the rest, JDC stuck to the formula of collaboration, which inevitably meant duplication, thus justifying some of the ZK's criticism.

On January 20, 1947, the delegation of the ZK in the United States presented their demands to JDC, more or less in the form of an ultimatum. Schwartz, who had been in New York but had returned to Paris, concurred in the rejection of these demands by Leavitt and Warburg. The ZK del-egation tried to use the other four agencies that together with JDC were responsible for all German DP matters, especially the Zionists—the Amer-ican Jewish Conference and the World Jewish Congress—against JDC, but they failed.

In the involved negotiations with the ZK three things happened in Europe. On January 12, Schwartz cabled from Paris that he had reached an agreement with the Blumovicz wing of the ZK on the basis of preliminary agreements with Schwarz in Munich, which in effect acceded to the employment program of the ZK in a more moderate form. At the same time, the balance between the two groups in controlling supplies was to shift decisively in favor of the ZK, again in accordance with an agreement reached between Leo Schwarz and the ZK. However, the agreements, negotiated in Paris in January, remained unsigned, because of second thoughts and hesitations by Schwartz and his collaborators. And third, the second Congress of the She'erit Hapletah (the DPs in the US Zone) took place at the end of February 1947, at Bad Reichenhall in Bavaria. At that meeting David Treger, Avraham Blumovicz, and Leon Retter were the triumvirate elected to the central posts. Pliskin and Segalson were out, and the less radical group had won.

In early March, Leo W. Schwarz was on his way back to the States, and Charles S. Passman, formerly the man responsible for the Teheran parcels program and a resident of Palestine, was to take Schwarz's place—as it turned out, for a very short time only. Passman went to Munich in mid-March, and saw that the situation had got out of hand. The employment and supply plans were unworkable, unless JDC decided to abdicate all responsibility in the Zone. A sympathetic observer, Samuel L. Haber,

126 Out of the Ashes

who came into the picture in April as associate director, described the situation thus:

The relationship between the JDC and the Central Committee can only be described as one of tension. The Central Committee people tried to find themselves and one way of doing so was to express in their own way their own tremendous desires and capacity for survival and to feel as human beings again. The JDC, in a sense, stood in their way and they wanted to take over the warehouses and the office and in effect to tell the J D C people they were going to run the organization . . . it would have meant that I was working for the Central Committee, and [that] I was not the JDC Director.

Passman, who at least nominally was in charge, was the prime mover in the abrogation of the agreements, and was supported by Katzki and, ultimately, Schwartz. Haber was given the task of breaking the news to the ZK. On his first day on the job (April 26, 1947), "I went across the street and I found proud, strong, combative people at the Central Committee . . . I was very glad that I did not find a group of people who were sort of holding out their hands for something." As to the Schwarz agreement:

We were given clear instructions to deny that there was such an agreement. My statement resulted in quite a hassle . . . [but] I was not at all upse t . . . 1 told the members of the Central Committee that it was not my intention to fight the Jews whom I had come over to help . . . I stood up and suggested to Herbert Katzki that we leave the room . . . Within 30 minutes or so the President of the Central Committee, Mr Treger, called me and said in Yiddish—Freint [Friend] Haber, you took our discussion much too seriously. Can we meet again? Of course I was delighted and I said yes.

Over strong protests from Leo Schwarz in America, JDC decided to abrogate the agreements. A new agreement was negotiated, which left ultimate control of the supplies in JDC hands, and proposed a much more modest employment program, one which JDC could financially support and handle. At a meeting on June 16, Haber proposed the new arrange-ment, and it was accepted, with many misgivings, by the ZK a few days later. They wanted to counterbalance JDC by appealing to the World Jewish Congress as an alternative source of financial support—but the WJC was a very weak reed, and nothing came of the move. JDC had won.29

During the months of the great migration and well into the winter of 1946-47, only relief and emergency care could be contemplated. In the field, JDC and ZK and JA representatives collaborated fully to do what-ever could be done to make the conditions livable. In early October, Bernstein estimated the number of Jewish DPs in camps in the US Zone

19 Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 195-221; JDC/ Germany, DPs, 1946 and 1947-1, ZK memo to JDC, 12/11/46; ditto, 12/17/46; ditto, 1/17/47; Paris JDC to New York, 1/20/47, AC 1/21/47; Schwartz to New York, 1/27/47; Sobel to Paris, 1/31/47; Leavitt to ZK, 1/22/47; American Jewish Conference to JDC, 2/5/47; Schwartz to New York, 2/12/47; minutes of meeting in Paris with Passman, 3/1-2/47; Passman to Schwartz, 3/14/47; Leo Schwarz to Joseph Schwartz, 4/14/47. The first agreement, in Paris, was initialled on February 9 by Schwartz, Beckelman, Schwarz, Blumovicz and Segalson; OHD, Interview with S. L . Haber, 6/18/68; JDC/ Interview with S. L. Haber, 12/15/80.

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of Germany at 130,000. In early December, he thought that the figure was 127,035, but added 34,708 DPs who were living outside of camps, in towns, for a total of 161,743. Despite the apparent greater detail of the latter figure, the lower estimate seems to be more trustworthy, because one had to take into account the malochim. Nevertheless, the overcrowding and the terrible conditions that prevailed almost everywhere were a great cause for worry. On August 23, at the peak of the mass movement, Joseph Levine reported from Regensburg on the temporary camp near Cham. That morning, 1200 new infiltree had been added to the 700 who had arrived a week previously.

What they found is a tent city built on an air field. About three hundred tents were put up and each contains six army cots. Each person was issued two blankets and nothing else. There is no running water and a row of latrines was built in the middle of the camp. Field kitchens are used to feed the people . . . We found the hundreds of people walking around the field tired and with no spirit. They had been brought here in box c a r s . . .

. travelling for weeks f rom Russia and Poland. All of them were poorly dressed and had few belongings . . . There are a little more than 200 children in this group and the army had no special food for them. W e saw long lines of people standing in the rain for their food . . . There are no lights as yet in the camp and when it rains, the field of course is flooded. T h e army men assigned to establishing the camp were doing a good job . . . they were interested in doing all they could under the circumstances and I liked the spirit with which they were trying to help the people . . . Believe me, Mr Leavitt, I never thought that I would see this sight here. One year ago, when I found hundreds of our people in need of housing, it was possible to displace Germans and our people did get better homes. Today . . . thousands of Germans are coming and the military government must provide space for them. N o Germans are living in tent cities . .

The kind of situation that emerged and the steps taken to remedy it can perhaps be imagined from a few items that appear in the contemporary record. As to food, though the 2200 calories radon was maintained, most of it came from the German economy and consisted of starches, whereas proteins and fats, formerly brought in from the United States, were now in low supply. Coal was in short supply everywhere in Europe, and the report added sadly that this would "affect the DP camps, also." The clothing situation was such that an urgent appeal went out to the Army. McNarney ordered a speedy delivery of Army stores to the DPs—an action for which it is hard to find a precedent in the history of military units—so that with the onslaught of winter practically all DPs had at least overcoats, one suit, and two shirts.

The Army set up additional camps. Some of these, such as Cham, were temporary and caused a great deal of suffering. Some, such as Heilbron, had to be closed because they were simply impossible to live in. New camps for some 11,000 people were established in August, and additional thousands cramped into existing ones. More camps were added later. A special children's transit center for some 3000 unaccompanied children was set up at Rosenheim, and these children were then put into more

30 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946,8/23/46, Levine to Leavitt; ibid., Bernstein's address at the Bilunore Hotel, New York, 10/1/46; and ibid., "confidential report" by Bernstein, 12/6/46.

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permanent installations. JDC, Bernstein, and local Jewish GIs and chap-lains again did everything in their power to make conditions relatively tolerable.31

JDC saw Berlin as a separate operation from that of the US, the British, and the French Zones (the one in the French Zone concerned only a few hundred DPs and one larger camp, Biberach, and did not really play any significant role). The work of JDC and the chaplains in Berlin was really determined by the success Brichah had in bringing people in from Szczecin. The PUR route described above circumvented the city and led straight to the British Zone at Luebeck, but the truck and boat routes led to Berlin. Since early 1946, Brichah in Berlin had been under control of Yitzhak Ram, the ex-Brigade Palestinian, and a number of Polish Brichah members who worked with him. Between December 1945, and March 1946,8000 Jews were smuggled in, whereas only half that number could be brought out to the British Zone, illegally, during that time. Between April and August, more thousands were brought in, though we do not have reliable figures. Suffice it to say that 13,000 were sent out to the British Zone between March and June, and Schlachtensee remained full.

The kind of people coming into Berlin were different from those who came to the US Zone. Some of them came with private smugglers; there were fewer children, and more unsavory types. However, the kind of tighdy-knit families that were so typical of the returnees from Russia were also to be found in large numbers. JDC, under Eli Rock, spent a great deal of effort in establishing a camp self-government, and a committee was elected at Schlachtensee. Educational work with children and youngsters was conducted by an older man known as "Krochmalnik," who became a legend for his tremendous moral and educational influence on his pupils. JDC's role was, of course, not just educational. The Berlin infiltrators received 1600 calories from a hard-pressed Army, and the rest had to be made up from JDC supplies that came in in large quantities. The kinds of accusation that had been coming from Munich against JDC were not heard in Berlin.

After Kielce, Szczecin got its share of panic-stricken refugees, to be transferred to Berlin. From July 20, after a break caused by Russian coun-ter-measures against Brichah, the movement restarted. Schlachtensee soon had 5000 inhabitants instead of the 3000 for which it had been planned. There was no choice: the Army opened up another camp in their Zone, at Templehof, on August 15; two weeks later 4000 people had filled that camp beyond its capacity. Brichah movements into Berlin continued until September 15, when they were almost completely stopped by ruthless Soviet intervention. Arrests were made, and Brichah members were sent to Siberia; some of them came back after 12 years. Between August and

31 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946, Leo Schwarz to Jack Whiting (UNRRA), 9/1/46; and the two Bernstein reports quoted in note 30, above.

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November 1946, 16,000 people came to Berlin. Brichah, together with JDC and two sympathetic UNRRA directors, managed to ship some 10,000 out, most of them directly to the US Zone in Germany. At the end of the year, 6670 Jewish DPs remained in the two DP camps in the US sector, and in the old Wittenau camp in the French sector of Berlin.32

Berlin was actually a good example of the kind of work JDC was doing at the end of 1946 all over Germany: there were six departments: adminis-tration (including legal consultations), supplies, emigration, welfare, trac-ing, and medical. These services were there for both the DPs and the 7779 local Jews, composed of the remnants of the prewar Berlin community and recent arrivals from the East who refused to go to the camps. A hospital with 80 beds was set up; X-ray examinations of children in the camps conducted; TB patients, children and adults, sent to the JDC TB hospital in Switzerland. The emigration department dealt with emigration to the United States, to Latin America and, in conjuncuon with a JA representa-tive, to Palestine. Six children's kitchens were established for the local children, summer camps for both local and refugee children planned, an old age home with 140 inmates was administered, and over a thousand welfare cases in the local community investigated. The task of "interpre-ting" the refugees in the camps to the authorities was of course the main preoccupation, but the day-to-day work could not be overlooked for a moment. As everywhere else, the staff, whether local or American, was overworked and imbued with the idea of service to the people. The organi-zation created among its members an intense loyalty and justified pride in its achievements, and in many places, such as Berlin, the people recipro-cated with expressions of gratitude.33

The problems faced by the DPs and their American Jewish helpers in the British Zone in North Germany were of a different kind. The British did not recognize Jews as a separate group—at least in theory, because in practice they could not avoid dealing with the Jewish committee in the Belsen camp. Nor did they treat the German Jews separately from Ger-mans; all they agreed to was to give them some small advantages as "vic-tims of fascism." The totally inadequate diet had to be complemented from JDC stocks. Nor did UNRRA provide any help to German Jews. Infiltrees who had come to the Zone with Brichah and stayed on were not given any status at all, had to live on German rations, and were not permit-ted to be looked after by UNRRA. At the end of 1946, JDC estimated that there were 12,250 DPs in camps, mainly at Belsen (8000), 10,250 outside of camps, of whom 2000 were infiltrees. These figures were, as so often, approximations. Infiltrees entered Belsen, were given rations of malochim, and then smuggled across into the US Zone. The figures for the Belsen camp were therefore purely conjectural. JDC had to look after a children's

n Bauer, op. cit., 139-42, 236-39. M JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947-1, Report by Rock, January 1947.

130 Out of the Ashes

home at Blankensee, a Warburg property handed over for that purpose, an agricultural hachsharah and a fishing hachsharah. Then there were the communities, where near starvation and constant struggles with both the German authorities and the British had to be waged. Most of the supplies-food, clothing, medical supplies, and educational materials—went to the infiltrees and the German Jews; however, 40 percent went to the DPs, especially medical and educational materials. The J A teams and the English-based JRUs were active in these areas. When towards the end of 1946, UNRRA finally decided to "legalize" 2300 of the infiltrees, sup-plementary foodstuffs were distributed by JDC.

JDC operations in the British Zone also had the distinction of represent-ing an American Jewish agency but being made up of almost no Americans. The team consisted of Canadian, British, and other Jews, and a large number of DPs. The British, increasingly disturbed by the continuing influx of Jews into their Zone, decided to discourage refugees from coming in. In November 1946, Bernstein informed 1.1. Kenen of the American Jewish Conference, that the British suggested to the Americans that hence-forth in both Zones DPs should get German rations, and the import of additional food from outside of Germany should be forbidden; that all DPs should be compelled to work in the German economy; and that they should be placed under the jurisdiction of German courts. UNRRA was up in arms, and the US Army refused to consider the British proposal. The British could hardly afford to go it alone, and the proposal collapsed. But the attitude of the British was made clear in this plan, which would in fact have caused the greatest upheaval and discomfort to thousands of those who had been persecuted the harshest under the Nazi regime.34

Relations between JDC and Yossel Rosensaft and his committee were shaping up very well. There was a tendency among Belsen committee members to object to the way JDC supplies were handled, under JDC auspices from a central warehouse. But other counsels prevailed. Wollheim had gone to America with members of the Munich committee in December 1946, but in the end disassociated himself from Pliskin's harsh critique of JDC. On the contrary, Rosensaft and Wollheim wrote later, relations with JDC were good, and there were no basic complaints. The reason behind this was that in the harsh conditions of the British Zone, help from Jews outside was appreciated more, even though there were occasional problems.35 .

In Austria, Bernstein reported in December 1946, there were 30,372 Jewish DPs, including the "settled" ones in Bad Gastein and Bindermichl. Of these, close to 24,000 were in the US Zone, 3500 in the British Zone,

M JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946-7, Wodlinger Report, 9/20/46; ibid., Cohen to UNRRA London, November, 1946; Bernstein to Kenen, 12/7/46. .

» JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947-1, letters to Warburg and Schwartz by Rosensaft ana Wollheim.

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and 1430 in the French Zone (the rest were transients in the Rothschild Hospital in Vienna). Official UNRRA numbers were higher—35,000— but then the problem of the malochim was taken into account more in figures from Jewish sources. The numbers had gone down slightly as transfers to Germany slowly reduced the load in Austria, despite new arrivals. The extent of the problem, and of the logistics involved, can be gleaned from the Salzburg Brichah figures: between May 1946 and January 1947, 62,950 transients were registered, of which 11,700 stayed on, and 45,000 left for Germany, legally and illegally, 5500 went to Italy and 750 went to France and Belgium on legal documents but under false preten-ses—to get nearer to illegal immigration opportunities for Palestine, with JDC's help.

The food situation in Austria was grim—1200 calories were provided from Austrian stocks by the Army, and 800 calories by JDC. There was therefore a real incentive for Brichah and the Army to move people on. The situation in the British and French Zones was even worse. JDC established children's homes in the Salzburg area, near the German border, and opened a TB sanatorium near Graz in the British Zone—where in any case it had to support Jewish DPs with 1200 calories a day, because the British only gave them a minimum of 800. Generally speaking, the US Army under General Clark was friendlier than anywhere else, but also much more powerless to help.

The relationship between Teicholz and JDC was not too good; JDC saw in him primarily an "operator," and a person not to be trusted. In retrospect, the new country director, Joseph S. Silber, who arrived in March 1946, would only admit that Teicholz had a part to play, but that JDC always had their people at the Rothschild Hospital, the center where all these transients heading for Salzburg passed through. But Teicholz's organization was not a paper tiger. JDC gave him material help, grudgingly it seems, but the work was done by his people. Elsewhere, the camps were run, in effect, by Brichah. Silber's attitude was liberal: the Jews should be enabled to go wherever they wanted, not necessarily to Palestine, as the Brichah demanded. He was not, therefore, trusted by them. But on the other hand, he had the money and the supplies, and so a modus vivendi was reached: JDC did not interfere with movement of Jews, unless it was asked to facilitate them. On the other hand, its help was appreciated. As in Belsen, there were no clashes.36

The great exodus, then, brought some 90-95,000 out of Poland, and some 14,000 out of Hungary via Bratislava, and a small number from Hungary to Graz. The total, for the June-November period, must have been in the neighborhood of 110,000. American Jewish involvement, as we have seen, was heavy, and it consisted primarily of the tremendous

* Interview with Joseph S. Silber, 4/1/68, OHD. Other material taken from Austrian Files, JDC; see also Bernstein Report, 12/6/46, in JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946.

132 Out of the Ashes

rescue and aid operation mounted by JDC, and the personal investment of strength and ability by people like Rabbi Bernstein, Army chaplains such as Friedman, Klausner, and their colleagues, and some help by others. It is quite clear that without the massive aid of American Jewry, this move might have ended in disaster. As it was, and with the sympath-etic attitude of the American Army, it turned into a force which was to be a prime factor in the establishment of the State of Israel. At the end of 1946, Bernstein estimated the number of Jewish DPs in Germany, Austria, Italy, France, and Belgium at 218,000. They were a force to be reckoned with.

The peculiar thing about JDC's operations in this context is the fact that in terms of ouday, Germany and Austria did not figure at the top of the list. In its publication JDC in 1946, the agency reported that it had spent $5.9 million in these two countries in 1946, and another $1,364 million in Italy. In Poland, $9 million had been spent. This compared with expenditures in Hungary—$12,321 million, Czechoslovakia—$3 million, Romania—$1,732 million, France and Belgium—$5.8 million. The differ-ence lay in the fact that in the DP countries there was massive personal investment of energies and devoted work by relatively large numbers of American Jews which could not be and was not measured in monetary terms. The total expenditure in 1946 came to $58.9 million, the largest amount spent up until then in JDC history. Yet everyone was complaining that too little had been done. The DP countries were the main subject of JDC public relations, though they were not the place where most of the funds were spent. The reason for that is not hard to find. We shall see why the catastrophic situation in Hungary demanded more money; but the government there prevented any influx of American Jewish personnel. In the East European countries the problems were quite different from those in Central Europe. Schwartz was fond of pointing out that the batde in Eastern Europe was about the exchange rate of the dollar—better rate, less suffering. In the DP countries, money was worthless; what mattered were supplies and despite their late arrival, JDC supplies made a vast difference. Without the supplementary JDC rations the underfed Jews would have starved and their health would have suffered because of lack of proteins, vitamins, and fats.

But the story of 1946 was the story of the mass exodus. In collaboration with non-American agencies such as the Jewish Agency and the Jewish Relief Units, who had no money but participated and often led in personal sacrifice, and in cooperation with Brichah, the great exodus was accom-plished with discomfort, stress, but no losses in precious human lives. Of its part in this, American Jews, and especially their aid and rescue agency, could be proud.

CHAPTER 6

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania

Hungary ' Not too much propaganda was made by the JDC for Hungary, bccause of the fact that

in this case money was spent behind the Iron Curtain. On the other hand, the Hungarians did not wish to have American largesse in Hungary publicized. Leavitt was of the opinion that it would be bad publicity for JDC in the United States to tell the Hungarian story. All these factors [were] felt to have caused the largest JDC operation ever to go almost unnoticed. At one point, one of the chief officers in the accounting d e p a r t m e n t . . . . told Dr Goeroeg frankly that many people in the JDC might be opposed in principle to sending money to Hungary. Much of the funds were therefore not debited to Hungary

• but to items like "Aid in Transit ."

This is how Dr Frigyes Goeroeg, head of JDC's operation in Hungary, evaluated the tremendous effort made by the American Jewish agency for over three years, during which he estimated that $35 million reached Budapest, in cash and in supplies.1

There can hardly be any doubt that this indeed was the largest operation in JDC's whole history. In effect, a whole community of 180,000 Jews were more or less totally dependent on the little help that JDC could provide. The help was of necessity small, because divided over three years and by the large numbers of the needy, the $35 million could make a difference between serious physical danger and borderline hunger, but not much more than that. Yet even that was extraordinary, because it maintained these people, at least, alive.

As we have seen, it took until August 1945, to settle the problem of who would be responsible for the Hungarian operation. JDC was trying to get an American into Budapest, a solution that would have been welcomed by Hungarian Jews, because they would have felt more protected by an American representative; also, the internal squabbling would have abated—the parties would have had an impartial adjudicator to turn to. But although the Hungarian government was to promise time and again that Herbert Katzki, who was designated for the spot, would be allowed to come in, he never got the visa. It was to take until 1947 before an

1 Interview with F. Goeroeg, 4/19/68, OHD.

133

134 Out of the Ashes

American was finally appointed. Until then, Goeroeg was in effective charge.

The first problem was how to get money and goods into the country, still under Soviet military occupation, and with a growing communist influence. The free-wheeling way in which Mayer allowed for credits to be placed against promises of repayment in Switzerland, or sent Swiss francs to be exchanged on the "free" market, were opposed by the newly established Hungarian National Bank. In order to put their hands on these Swiss francs and, hopefully, on real American dollars, they announced in August that henceforth JDC funds would have to come in officially and be exchanged at the National Bank for pengos (the local currency). The problem was the rate of exchange in a situation of escalating inflation. The representative of the Bank came to Switzerland to discuss the issue with the IRC and Mayer. The ploy was not even very subde. Constantin Tak-acsy simply said that if JDC did not do something for the non-Jews, there would be antisemitism. It was a sentiment that had been expressed a few days before that by IRC's Leclerc in Budapest. The idea that the Jews had suffered considerably more than the Hungarians—who had been the Germans' willing accomplices—was not acceptable to Takacsy. Mayer stated that 10 percent of JDC's funds would be the maximum he could agree to be used for non-Jews. These would go only to medical aid. The hint that JDC should not create "a Jewish problem" Mayer answered by saying that a Jewish problem already existed. It would remain until the Hungarians returned to the Jews the properties they had confiscated from them. In any case, Mayer said, the responsibility for the Jews rested with the Hungarian government, the JDC's role was temporary, until the government began looking after its citizens. He would inform JDC about the Hungarians' fear that aid to Jews would endanger them in democratic Hungary. The government should see to it that there was no Jew-hatred, not JDC. And, said Mayer, why did the government not turn to the non-Jewish Hungarians in the United States to mount an aid campaign to help their compatriots in Hungary? As an outcome of these pressures, in June 1946 JDC reported that a total of 5 percent of its allocation to Hungary went to "nonsectarian" operations.2

Then of course there was the problem of the converted Jews, variously estimated at up to 20 percent of the Hungarian Jewish population. Some of them, who had converted because they thought that might save them from deportation, returned to the Jewish fold. But many felt more secure in their non-Jewish guise than before, and did not return to Judaism in any form. However, as racially persecuted people, they demanded a share

2 JDC/SM 55,8/20/45; AC, 6/21/46. It seems, however, that JDC simply could not fulfil its promise to give 5 percent of its outlays to nonsectarian causes. In December 1946, Goeroeg was to report that sometimes his contributions were only 1 percent, and that the average was about 4.2 percent. See below, note 11, discussions with Schwartz and Leavitt, 12/5 and 12/11/46.

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 135

of JDC's support for Hungarian Jewry. Goeroeg worked on the basis of a compromise: some help would be given to the converted, though less than that given to full Jews. This was rejected by both sides, but Goeroeg persevered, and in the end the clamor calmed down.

Another problem was Mayer's insistence that the Budapest committee not call itself by the JDC name. Goeroeg acceded, and the committee became known as the Country Relief Committee for Jews (Orszagos Zsido Segitor Bizottsag), but also as the "Confidence Committee" of the JDC in Budapest. In terms of actual work, Goeroeg could record in September 1945, that his committee was looking after 6000 children, and a total of 75 percent of the 180,000 Jews (at the end of the year there would be between 190 and 200,000). Of these, there were some 10-15,000 "foreign" Jews. In addition, 50,000 people had been brought in by late autumn as "trans-ients" in the Brichah operation, and these had to be supported as well. The clothing situation was particularly bad, and significant JDC consig-ments did not arrive until much later.3 The terrible situation was brought home by one figure: at the end of 1945, the Hungarian ration card entitled its holder to exactly 556 calories (out of the 2500 a healthy person required). Hungarians had relatives in the countryside, and they had not come back from ghettoes or camps. The Jews had no food, no strength, and as a result they could not find employment. Greater help was urgently required, but with the difficulties in transmitting funds and the slowness in getting supplies to Hungary, total JDC expenditure for 1945 amounted only to $3,815,000. But that amount had kept the Hungarian Jews from starving to death.4

On September 15 in his conversation with Leavitt, and again on the 20th in his conversation with Leclerc, Mayer declared that "priority over all other countries must be given to Hungary!" He figured that 110,000 Jews were dependent on JDC to feed them, and JDC must not fail.5 In New York, this was taken up seriously by the Administration Committee at its meeting of September 18, and a long discussion ensued on the ques-tion whether massive support for Hungarian Jews would not relieve the Hungarian government of its primary responsibility for the well-being of its Jewish citizens. This was made more problematic by the fact that no American supervision could be exercised in Hungary. However, the majority of the participants argued that "if the principle of insisting upon governmental support was to be followed absolutely, many Jews would die of starvation." Takacsy's arguments surfaced in the discussion, too:

Some members made the point that the Jews in the liberated countries are not the only elements in need, and if they are made the recipients of a larger measure of assistance than the non-Jewish population, it would lead to antisemitism. In this connection, it

J DC/Hungary, general, 1945, Goeroeg to B. S. Jacobson, 9/10/45. * JDC/Hungary, general, 1945, memo of 1/21/46. 5 JDC/SM 55, 9/15 and 9/20/45.

OOA—F

136 Out of the Ashes was emphasized that the Jews had been discriminated against throughout the occupation and deprived of everything, while non-Jews still had some means of subsistence.

The majority were behind Leavitt and Warburg, and voted to put Hungary on top of the list of priorities.

Representatives of the Hungarian community were permitted to go to London in September, and they met with Schwartz. He, too, was impressed by the arguments presented, but he wanted to see for himself. He managed to get into Hungary in November, and used extraordinarily strong language to describe what he saw: "conditions especially Budapest most distressing." Close to 90,000 people were being fed in canteens in 278 communities. In addition, in Budapest alone 35,000 people were receiving cash relief on top of the food. There was a terrible shortage of food; the "clothing situation is disastrous . . . and with winter months the situation becoming unbearable."6

In early 1946, the supply situation changed somewhat, and the massive influx of funds began to make itself felt. This translated itself first of all to the care of children. 9100 children were cared for in early 1946; of these, 3500 were cared for in homes, 32 percent being orphans, and 57 percent half orphans. A tremendous effort was made, under a professor of history and literature, Geza Varszanyi, who headed the Children's Department, to provide physicians, nurses, and teachers for these homes. Other, ambu-latory, help was provided for 5600 children in the capital and in the prov-inces. The figures rose during 1946: by June, 4500 children were in homes, and 8000 were being cared for in their own homes by ambulatory means.7

The changing situation also enabled JDC to improve its medical pro-gram. When the former ghetto inhabitants were examined, it was shown that the weight loss during the preliberation days had been between 50 and 60 pounds on the average. A Jewish hospital with 600 beds was established, where half of the beds were reserved for JDC cases of malnutrition, TB, and other illnesses produced by the Nazi occupation. Yet as late as Sep-tember 1946, Dr William M. Schmidt, JDS's medical expert, reported that Jewish patients in the hospital were getting no more than 55 percent of their caloric requirements. By June 1946, 63,000 people were still on cash relief, because no employment was found for them, and 48,000 were fed in canteens. 40,000 more received food parcels. While there was an overlap in those figures, it is safe to say that the situation had not improved materially since 1945. Some 90,000 Jews at least, or half of the Jewish population, still could not exist without JDC help. Dr Schmidt put the figure at two thirds. In November 1946, Goeroeg reported that the number had risen to 100,000: 55,000 in Budapest, and 45,000 in the provinces.

4 JDC/Hungary, general, 1945, 11/29/45, Schwartz to New York. . 7 JDC/Hungary, general, 1946, "Report on Child Care in Hungary," 1/8/46, ibJd,

general, 1947, report by B. Bernstein, 12/1/46.

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 137

20,000 persons had received some clothes from JDC supplies. The average supplementary ration provided by JDC through its programs to those who received it, was about 600 calories.8

The emphasis of JDC work could not remain on relief. If Hungary was not to become a continuous sore spot in Jewish postwar adjustment, a breakthrough had to be achieved in employment and integration of the Jews into Hungarian economic life—or else people had to be assisted in moving out. In a sense, both things happened. JDC did not support the movement out of Hungary in any political or ideological sense, but of course it aided those who were escaping from Hungary by providing food. It appears that some 15,000 Jews left Hungary in 1946, or about 8 percent of the total number. Goeroeg began supplying the Hungarian Brichah with money—a matter of $10,000 a month, and then a larger sum of $28,000— but Schwartz intervened and stopped it. Schwartz was subsidizing Brichah through the Brichah office in Geneva, and there was no reason to subsidize the Hungarian Brichah separately.

The main effort of JDC was directed towards the re-establishment of the Jews in the economy. Restitution laws were very liberal, but the effect was near zero; courts of law and administrations in urban centers did very little to restore Jewish property rights. JDC's legal department tried to help, but it was a Sisyphean task. JDC tried to emulate its Polish program, and established cooperatives in traditional Jewish trades such as tailoring, shoemaking, and others. By the fall of 1946, 95 co-ops had been set up, with close to 4000 members/Industrial—as opposed to artisan—co-ops numbered 33, with 1420 members. In addition, Zionist agricultural train-ing groups (hachsharot) had 31 training centers with 1170 trainees. All this looked good on paper, but Leavitt had to report that "they do not possess the same skill nor the stamina of the Jews in Poland. Their efforts are therefore much more primitive and the co-ops are less highly developed."9

The growth in support and the added exertions of Goeroeg and his team did not necessarily reflect a growing need—rather, they reflected the fact that in the first postwar year of its operation in Hungary, JDC was unable to satisfy even the minimal demands, in the face of so much suffering. The work done in 1946 meant that JDC was able to divert a higher proportion of its means to Hungary—without, as we have seen, making too much ado about it. Nevertheless, a large number of complaints came in. People returning from the camps received the equivalent of 50 cents and some rice, in the summer of 1945. Clothes were received that were shoddy, old, and a disgrace to the wearers. Bureaucracy was blamed, and JDC workers were accused of appropriating the best clothing items. Orthodox insti-tutions complained that they had not received their fair share of the

* Ibid., and JDC/Hungary, general, 1946, report by W. H. Schmidt, September, 1946; Excom, 11/26/46.

9 JDC/AC 7/1/47, JDC/Hungary, general, 1946, S. Grossman report of September, 1946.

138 Out of the Ashes

funds—in fact, everyone thought that the influx of JDC funds was even larger than it actually was. JDC in New York was very worried about these complaints, because they might affect fund-raising in the United States, and hence result in lesser amounts sent to help Jews in places like Hungary. Goeroeg, in a detailed letter in May 1946, explained some of the problems encountered.

First of all came the problem of exchange. Schwartz, during his November 1945 visit to Budapest, had arrived at an agreement with the National Bank whereby JDC would change its foreign currency allocation into pengo on a daily basis, because inflation was such that the rates changed several times a day. Nevertheless, losses were inevitably incurred because the black market rate was even higher, and by the time expendi-tures were made, the pengo had lost again. In May, the official rate of the pengo exceeded 1.2 billion pengo per dollar. In this intolerable situation, Zionist pressure to emigrate was growing, and all the training camps and hachsharot had to be supported.

In a tragic situation like that in Hungary, rumors spread, and the bitter-ness of the survivors manifested itself in wild allegations; of course, occasionally complaints were well-founded. Goeroeg took pains to investi-gate them and correct mistakes where they had been made, but it could not be denied that as time progressed, the machinery that he built became increasingly cumbersome and bureaucratic, and as a result more and more of the complaints were justified.

What really worried everyone, including Goeroeg, were the justified complaints about clothing, essentially the same complaints that were heard in Germany and elsewhere. InFebuary 19<-' 63 railway wagons of clothing had arrived, and then another four. But only 30 percent of the clothes could be distributed; 60 percent needed mending, and 10 percent were unusable. Only 20 percent of the shoes were usable, 30-33 percent could be repaired, the others were useless. Men especially were in great need, yet 60 percent of the clothes were women's clothes, 30 percent children's clothes, linen accounted for 4 percent and men's wear for only 6 percent. What they wanted in Budapest was textiles, which could be made up into clothes locally. An example of a helpful consignment was the sending over of 38 trucks, most of which went to pay various institutions and organizations for food and clothes. Another example was the sending of matzot for Passover in the spring of 1946, though the consignment almost came too late. The matzot were of such good quality that large numbers of non-Jews tried to get hold of them by hook or by crook, and fights also occurred among Jews over the distribution. Yet another major event was the arrival of three wagons of medical supplies in early 1946, because these contained penicillin and insulin, as well as serum against diphtheria. The serum was delivered to a grateful Hungarian Ministry of Health for general use, and the other items largely used in Jewish hospitals (which also

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 139

accepted non-Jewish patients). The kind of problem encountered in Hun-gary was related years later, when Goeroeg told of a private supply of penicillin to a Hungarian general's wife,who had been raped by a Russian soldier and had become infected with venereal disease.10

Another major crisis hit JDC in Hungary on August 1,1946, when the currency was stabilized by government intervention at 11.5 forint (the currency which replaced the pengo) per dollar. The sudden deflationary move pauperized the middle class—which was what was intended—wiped out savings, and caused JDC to be faced with another wave of massive unemployment among the Jewish population. In September, Stoeckler, the supposedly neologue procommunist representative on the JDC com-mittee, resigned because, he said, of the wasteful program of JDC in Hungary. JDC had 800 employees, and wasted its funds on these rather than the whole Jewish population. Stoeckler nominated a deputy, Dr Laszlo Benedek, a communist doctor, to represent him on the committee, and as a result his influence grew. Goeroeg explained the situation thus: rather than pay for food and cash relief to everyone, he took 800 people off the relief rolls and put them to work for JDC, as teachers, clerks, drivers, accountants, and so on. The money and resources expended were the same, but these people were enabled to work for their living, rather than receive doles. With the progressive communization of Hungary, such tactics were to become neither necessary nor possible, but that still lay in the future.11

At the end of 1946, JDC policy, not only towards Hungary but towards all of Eastern and Central Europe, was defined by Dr Joseph J. Schwartz in an important statement to JDC's Execuuve Committee. There had been a lot of wild talk, he said, about the desire of all the Jews of Europe to migrate to Palestine and other places. Many had thought that there was therefore no point in trying to reconstruct Jewish life in the European countries. However, both in the DP countries of Germany, Austria, and Italy, and elsewhere, it had to be recognized that emigration was going to be a relatively slow process. "It is going to take a long time," Schwartz said. This was having a stabilizing effect on the Jews in the various coun-tries: "there has been a general recognition that the Jews, whether they like it or not, will have to settle down in Europe for some time to come in larger numbers than was envisaged." The Anglo-American Committee's recommendations had been relegated to the dustbin; America had barely opened a crack in its doors, and other countries were closed. Schwartz seemed to be right. Neither he nor anyone else, except for determined visionaries such as Ben Gurion, could have foreseen that within 17 months

10 JDC/Hungary, general, 1946, Goeroeg to Schwartz, 5/16/46; also Goeroeg interview, OHD.

11 JDC/Hungary, general, 1946,9/18/46, Stoeckler to Schwartz and 10/18/46 Schwartz to Stoeckler; ibid., matters discussed by Dr Schwartz and Mr Leavitt with Dr Goeroeg, 12/5 and 12/11/46; Goeroeg interview, OHD.

140 Out of the Ashes

a Jewish State would be created, and the doors of America would open, even if only slightly at first. But as far as Hungary was concerned, that meant that efforts at re-establishing economic and social life for Jews had to take priority—JDC could not support a whole community on a relief basis forever.12

As 1947 progressed, and despite the emphasis that Schwartz demanded should be put on reconstruction, relief still seemed to be an absolute neces-sity. Only slowly the real damage to the Jewish survivors became apparent. A survey in May indicated that JDC was supporting 3000 pauents in TB hospitals, 4500 in convalescent homes, and another 6000 who needed immediate medical attenuon of various kinds. This was some 7-8 percent of the population. The feeding and cash relief continued, and the report indicated that 75 percent of Hungarian Jews wanted to leave. In Hungary, the facts seemed to contradict Schwartz's policy.13

Schwartz's hopeful predictions were given another jolt with a sudden emergency that erupted onto the Hungarian, and then the Austrian and German, stage in April 1947. As we shall see, the situation of Romanian Jews was no better than that of the Hungarian Jews. A serious drought in the provinces adjoining Hungary had caused dangerous rumblings of anti-Jewish sentiments. Driven by hunger and the fear of pogroms ("not those of yesterday but of tomorrow"), some of these Jews started to abandon their homes and flee to Hungary. Brichah did not create that movement, and for a short time actually tried to oppose it. But there was no stopping these frightened people. Between April and November 1947, some 19,000 people crossed the border into Hungary on their way to Austria. Brichah had no choice but to look after them as best it could. JDC obtained a house in Budapest for them from the orthodox community, which was supposed to house 60 people, but in fact sometimes housed up to 600. Leavitt himself saw 400 people crammed into ten rooms. JDC supplied food, illegally, but there was no other choice. The Hungarian authorities were approached by JDC to legalize the transit, but they refused, though they did not seriously try to stop the movement. People arrived in rags, hungry and scared, and Brichah had the task of bringing them to Vienna where, as will be seen, the Americans were decidedly disinclined to accept them. Leavitt happened to be witness to one of these movements, and he described it graphically: there was one group "who were stranded on a bridge for eight days. The JDC with difficulty were able to send trucks to feed them. They were then brought to a village in Hungary, were arrested, others disappearing and trying again to cross the border." Schwartz demanded that expenditures for these refugees be carried within the regular Hungarian budget, and the result was to create more difficulties for the regular program. In fact,

"Excom, 12/11/46. "Excom, 5/21/47, Kahan-Frankl's statement.

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 141

"Mr Leavitt unofficially asked the Brichah to get them [the Romanians] out of Hungary."14

To the outsider the Hungarian program was very impressive. Leavitt "saw

. . . . an operation so vast it amazed me. One can truthfully say that the Hungarian Jews are alive and in health today, because of JDC aid . . . . I went into department store after department store and did not see a single customer . . . . I . . . . asked why the people were not buying. They said they did not have the money . . . . People earn barely enough for their basic living needs. Prices are so high they do not have money to buy household supplies, clothing or shoes. Jews in Hungary who work have to be given clothing because with their earnings they cannot buy a pair of shoes, a suit, shirt, or set of underwear.

JDC had already given out 265,000 outfits, by the end of June. But, Leavitt "saw some of the used clothing we sent in and [I] was ashamed that Jews in this country sent such things." Yet even the unusable stuff was "repro-cessed into yarn and the yarn again woven into cloth."1?

On August 1, 1947, the government inaugurated its three-year plan, the main item of which was the nationalization of all farms of over 100 hectares of land. But what affected the Jews was the decision to squeeze out the retailers: in the new plan, there would be room for only 1000 out of the 19,000 Jewish textile retailers. Hence the need to employ ever more people in the cooperative movement.

Slowly, the co-ops began to improve, under the leadership of Szandor Grossman, giving employment to merchants who had been driven out of their occupation by the communist-inspired changes in the economy. At the expense of a dip in the standard of living, Hungarian industry began to recover, and unemployment began to decline. Jews found work, in conditions described by Leavitt, and the purely relief part of the JDC program showed signs of declining. 20,000 individuals had become gain-fully employed. By the end of 1947, the number of those receiving meals was 16,000, and food parcels were given to 46,000. Though still consid-erable, this total of 62,000 was considerably lower than at the beginning of the year. 3992 children were living in 68 homes, and an additional 14,447 were being cared for in their parents' homes. Loans were given to people to become self-supporting, presumably mainly as craftspeople or professionals, and Zionist hachsliarot had an enrollment of 4400. The pro-gram was still vast when the Hungarian government, still under an uneasy coalition of the communists with the Smallholders Party, finally decided that it would permit an American to come in. Gaynor I. Jacobson arrived in September 1947, together with Aaron Berkowitz, an expert in recon-struction programs, on a two-week visa. This was then extended for three months. Jacobson stayed for almost two and a half years, and after a while brought in his wife, Florence Jacobson, who was a trained social worker ;

" Bauer, op. cit., pp. 297-99; AC, 7/1/47. 15 Excom, 7/15/47.

Out of the Ashes

and who took over the Welfare Department in Budapest. Rumor—prob-ably well-founded rumor—had it that Goeroeg was less than happy to give up his leadership of the Hungarian JDC to Jacobson. The arrival of an American could mean a retrenchment in outlay, and hence less dollars for the Hungarian treasury, which may have been a factor in the lateness of Jacobson's arrival. On the other hand, Goeroeg, a banker, was not on very good terms with the extreme Stalinist Hungarian Jew who was the number two man in the communist party, Laszlo Rajk. It was thought that Jacob-son would develop better relations with Rajk, which indeed he did, and which was ultimately to result in Jacobson's arrest at the end of 1949. In any case, the proposed arrangement for Hungary of an American country director, and the head of the local committee acting in cooperation,- did not work out. Jacobson decided that the Hungarian program was too top-heavy and that dismissal of large numbers of employees was essential. Goeroeg opposed this. He appealed to Schwartz, but Schwartz backed up Jacobson. In February 1948, Goeroeg resigned, and became Honorary Director; shortly afterwards, he left Hungary, and setded in New York.

Jacobson encountered other personnel problems: a deputy country director who was sent to him from Paris became so unpopular with the local committees because of her overbearing behavior that he had to send her back. In the spring of 1948 he had to intervene in a fight between the Zionists and the neologues, as a result of which the Zionists received 35 percent of the positions in the neologue community.

The problem of relationships with the Hungarian authorities was to become the main problem of JDC in Hungary. The central positions in the communist party were held by persons of Jewish descent who were extreme Stalinists and anti-Zionists, and totally out of sympathy with both Jewish concerns of any kind and with humanitarian considerations generally. One of these was Zoltan Vas, the mayor of Budapest, who received Jacobson, saying that "if we have to deal with an imperialist, we don't want to deal with the representative [meaning Goeroeg] but will deal with him directly.'!

Jacobson, who had completed an extremely successful and impressive tour of duty in Czechoslovakia, settled down quickly. In the light of JDC's multiple obligations in so many countries, the Hungarian budget had been cut, and instead of spending another $12 million in 1947 as had originally been planned, $8,245,000 had been spent, and the proposed expenditure for 1948 was $8.4 million. In actual fact, only $6.1 million were to be spent. Still, this was a huge program, and for the Hungarians it was one of the largest items in "foreign earnings." But the first rumblings of the Stalinist attack on all contacts with the West could be heard already, and J DC could not be sure how long it would be permitted to operate in Eastern Europe.16 The way Jacobson was forced to operate was indicative of the new winds that were blowing. Benedek became the supervisor on behalf

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 143

of the party; in addition, there were actual, open supervisory organs in the very building of JDC. No decision of the JDC committee was final until it had been approved by Benedek and by the in-house government agents. This became even more marked after the establishment of diplomatic relations between Hungary and Israel, when JDC was suspected of serving Israeli interests. The paranoia of Hungarian Stalinists went to great lengths. It was totally foreign to their way of thinking that the United States government would agree to a purely philanthropic role of an Amer-ican agency, and that they would not utilize an American representative in a communist country for spying and/or subversion. Philanthropy, in their eyes, was nothing but a cover-up. JDC, on its part, was very strict on this matter: it was a non-political agency, and its workers would have absolutely nothing to do with even United States security organs. The price to be paid for doing anything else would have been too high.

Reductions in JDC staff did indeed take place—from a bloated 2792 when Jacobson came, to 2471 during the first five months of his tour of duty. They were complicated by the necessity of paying large severance payments, and by the opposition of trade unions. The government seems to have supported Jacobson, possibly because it was suffering from a labor shortage and believed additional workers would be recruited from among those dismissed by JDC. Dismissals were to carry on during the next year and a half, with some younger and better trained people taken on.

As regards welfare, the principle adopted by Florence Jacobson was to increase individual support for those who had to be supported, and limit their numbers. Cash relief was now available only for people over 60, but the amount was multiplied by four. Those who were too old to look after themselves were placed in old age homes that catered for 700 persons. Meals to younger persons were given once daily, but each meal contained over 1300 calories, on the assumption that 7-800 additional calories would be available to the recipients from the Hungarian economy. The number of welfare workers was cut down, but their training intensified, and standards current in the United States employed. Priority was given to the handi-capped, to widows with children, and to those who had suffered more than others during the occupation. The number of children cared for was also reduced, because those who had grown older left in any case—many of them illegally to Palestine-Israel. By mid-1948,2368 children were cared for by 394 adults, a considerable reduction in both categories, and at the end of the year there were 1842 children cared for by 355 adults. The amount of food they received was increased considerably and the homes re-equipped. Yet, despite the decrease in the number of children in the homes, in many cases it simply meant that support was shifted to the

16 Excom, 9/17/47; Goeroeg and Jacobson interviews, OHD, and Jacobson interview (HK); Statistical Abstract, 1946-47, JDC; ibid., Budget, 1947. On Goeroeg's resignation, and the other material contained in the next paragraphs, see JDC/Hungary, 1948. OOA—F*

144 Out of the Ashes

same children in their parents' homes, though that was, of course, less expensive. At the end of 1948, there were still 15,000 on cash relief and 55,000 who were being fed in canteens or had food parcels distributed to them.17

In order to avoid conflict with the authorities, Jacobson strictly enforced the 5 percent rule originated by Mayer, of giving that percentage of the support that was coming in to "nonsectarian" social needs, essentially to hospitals and child care agencies. In 1948, the economic situation was slowly improving, but the Jewish situation was far from rosy. Jews were being forced out of their traditional middle-class occupations. The nation-alization law of the summer of 1948 decreed that all establishments with 100 or more workers were to be taken over by the government, and also those with less than 100 workers, if they were important to the economy. This was, of course, a tremendous upheaval, and only slowly did Jews begin to find employment in these government-run industries and trades. One of the problems was that there was a great numerical preponderance of women over men: in Budapest, 61.2 percent of the Jews were women, because few men had returned from Auschwitz, and there had been severe losses among the labor battalions, so that a significant segment of the population consisted of widows and children. The producers' cooperatives that were being set up—in late 1948 one per week—were composed of a majority of women, and reflected their professional training or capabilities.

In retrospect, all these efforts really served to smooth the transition of those Jews who stayed in Hungary into a communist economic regime. New institutions were set up by JDC, and in February 1948 a fund-raising campaign was started by Hungarian Jewish organizations to add $170,000 worth of forints to the JDC dollars coming in from America. JDC estab-lished the Reconstruction Credit Cooperative, a bank which supported producers' cooperatives, and therefore also received, in part government financial backing. As a temporary concession, 25 percent of the loans could be given to individuals. Free Loan Societies were set up, on the old JDC prewar model, to provide interest-free loans to old people, widows, and invalids, to tide them over until other help arrived. And, of course, there were the producers' cooperatives. All these societies and agencies existed, effectively and more or less independently, for about two or three years. After that, they were no longer needed, and JDC was not there anymore to protect them. One cannot say that JDC workers were unaware of the possibility of this development. But there was a moral principle involved: American Jewry had given money to support European Jews, and as long as JDC was allowed to operate in the East European countries, this trust had to be fulfilled. Clearly, in the Hungarian conditions, a mixture of relief, child care, loans and producers' co-ops were the best one could

17 JDC/Hungary, General, 1948a—Reports.

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 145

manage, whether it was part of a communist government's takeover strat-egy or not.

Another important aspect of JDC work was the retraining program, in which the government was interested. JDC and ORT placed emphasis on this in 1948, and a few thousand Jews were trained to become skilled workers in various industries. This undoubtedly made a great difference. ORT was the agency doing some of the vocational training in Hungary, mainly directed to women, in dressmaking, knitting, radio repair, cer-amics, and so on. As long as the Zionist groups remained legal, they engaged in agricultural training (hachsharot) and industrial collectives (plugot). At any one time, well over one thousand young people received their training there.

The problem of emigration was central, and became so even more after the establishment of Israel in May 1948. It is very difficult to estimate the number of Jews who left Hungary illegally in 1948-49, but it could not have been much less than 30,000. The organization was in the hands of Brichah, now organized hierarchically under Mossad supervision. Meir Sapir was sent from Israel in 1948 to guide Brichah from his post in Vienna. In this problem of emigrauon the Hungarian authorities took a stand which was different from that of Bulgaria, or even Poland and Romania. Why, asked Vas, should anyone want to leave Hungary? Emigrating without property, they would find life much more difficult abroad.18 JDC took great care not to be involved in this, but the support of the migrants with food was inevitable. Jacobson really carried on what had been customary in 1947, and housed the migrants in orthodox houses. They received food there, and could contact Jacobson clandestinely. But these contacts were kept at a minimum, and indeed, were to surface as part of the allegations against Jacobson at the end of 1949.

There was, one must admit, a good measure of naivete in the approach of the JDC leaders in New York to European problems. Unconsciously, perhaps, it was assumed that standards of conduct and relationship would conform to those prevalent in some of the better-class establishments of Manhattan or the Chicago Loop. In April 1949 the statement was made that "the JDC enjoys the greatest measure of prestige and is looked upon with the greatest amount of favor in Hungary . . . . JDC is permitted to function freely." Schwartz and Jacobson received medals and honors, but Schwartz also had to tell his people that legal emigration had stopped, there was increased uneasiness among Jews, "and there is a keen desire of people to get out at all costs." JDC took up the challenge, and Schwartz proposed to Zoltan Vas that JDC would pay $2 million in return for the emigration of 25,000 Jews. This ransom proposal was utilized by the other side, the Hungarians proposing to let 5000 Jews go in return for $1 million. Some of the money would be used to put more Jews in cooperatives.

JDC/Hungary, 1948a, interview of Jacobson and Norman with Vas, December 1948.

146 Out of the Ashes

Parallel with the JDC negotiations, Vas also negotiated with the Israeli representative in Budapest, and there the offer of 5000 was reduced to 2-3000 persons, men over 50 and women over 40. But the Hungarians wanted a proportionate amount of the million dollars for any number they would let go. Nothing came of these schemes, but they indicated the line some of the governments in Eastern Europe would take in the future: it was worthwhile, sometimes, to sell Jews for good money.19

In actual fact, of course, Brichah was taking out people illegally, in large numbers. In the fall of 1949, after September, the tightening of the border surveillance by the Hungarians put an end to the mass exodus. In October, Jacobson reported to Paris that between 140,000 and 160,000 Jews were left in Hungary. The lower figure was the more likely one. The lopsided gender structure, and the fact that a quarter of the Jews were over 60 years of age still presented great difficulties. Producers' cooperatives had provided 1600 heads of families with employment. At the end of the year, 57,000 people were still getting food parcels, or were fed in canteens, or received cash relief. The number of children in homes had again risen to 2700, and 11,000 were being cared for in their homes. 100,000 had received their Passover matzot and, Jacobson said, 25,000 to 50,000 wanted to leave. No wonder.20

In December 1949 Jacobson was arrested as he came back from a vacation in the United States, held incommunicado for twelve days, then suddenly released. While in prison, he was grilled as to his supposed spying activities for the United States. His secretary was forced to "admit" he was a spy by hearing a woman scream in the next room and being told it was his mother. He was then brought in to confront Jacobson and "prove" his boss to be a spy. Jacobson was also accused of facilitating illegal exit of Jews, but that was the less important accusation.

The background to all this was that an anti-Titoist campaign had been decreed in Moscow. The Yugoslav leader had declared his independence of the Soviet Union in 1948, and the Soviet dictator replied by purging the communist parties in the satellite countries of Titoism. In fact, no such thing existed in the strictly regimented parties of Czechoslovakia, Poland, or Hungary, but the purges were designed to satisfy the paranoia of Stalin on the one hand, and strengthen his control of the satellite countries by a reign of unprecedented terror on the other hand. In line with Stalin's aggressive antisemitism, many of the victims were Jews, and Zionism became the archenemy, allied with American imperialism—though at first this did not seem to affect the good relations between Israel and the Soviet Bloc. The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, paradoxically a non-Zionist agency devoted to social welfare and aid to the weak, was

"JDC/Hungary, general, 1949, Beckelman to Schwartz, 6/22/49; ditto, 6/16/49; AC, 4/19/49.

* Statistical Abstract, 1949, JDC; Excom, 11/22/49.

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 147

picked upon as the symbol of Zionist imperialism. Soviet antisemitism has always adopted the traditional line of accusing the Jews of being a sinister world power, sometimes the sinister power behind imperialism itself, and JDC with its worldwide interests in aid and rescue fitted the bill perfectly. The Elders of Zion, a creation of the Tsarist Secret Police, supposedly planning to take over the world, came home to Leningrad and Moscow to roost. The gentle and conservative businessmen and philanthropists of New York, Boston, and Chicago became the satanic rabbis of the Tsarist police in their Stalinist garb. In Hungary, the sacrificial lamb was to be Gaynor I. Jacobson.

Shortly before his arrest, though, the Hungarians had arrested Robert Vogler, another American in Hungary. His role, and the background to his arrest, are not clear to this day. Jacobson was linked to him—though he never met him—and to Rajk, the Jewish communist picked by the Stalinist investigators from Moscow as the "Titoist" in Hungary. Rajk, a Tito-hater and a devoted Stalinist himself, was the most unlikely victim, but he was conditioned well in the torture cellars of the secret police and performed his role as expected. How, then, did Jacobson get free? Was the Soviet dictator, or his Hungerian viceroy, Matthias Rakosi—also a jew—reluctant to take on the Americans? Was Jacobson not the right person to represent the imperialist Satan? Jacobson himself thought that Rakosi, who was in the Soviet Union when he was arrested, intervened and brought about his release. In any case, Jacobson was set free, after having experienced the way Soviet investigators got everyone in their power to say exactly what they wanted them to say.

Jacobson's deputy, Aaron Berkowitz, remained free, and the Hungari-ans said after Jacobson's release that JDC was "free" to continue oper-ations in Hungary. Schwartz and Moses W. Beckelman, his deputy, realized that ultimately JDC would have to leave Hungary. But the responsibility for the well-being of many thousands of Jews who were dependent on JDC's help caused them to prolong JDC's work in Hungary. They would hand over JDC's operations to the local Jewish community, and beat what amounted to an orderly retreat, one that would cause as little harm as possible to the suffering Hungarian Jews.21

Under party supervision, and with JDC funds effectively used by the Hungarian regime, the social work of JDC continued throughout 1950. It was no longer an American-controlled or supervised operation. Funds were sent to Hungary, in effect to Jewish party officials, in the hope that those who deserved to be helped would be helped. For a number of months the relief work was carried on in more or less the same manner as before, and with the same number of assisted persons. The producers' coopera-tives slowly declined; they were no longer needed. In May 1950, all JDC's work was turned over to the Union of Jewish Communities, which had

21 Jacobson interviews, (HK) and OHD.

148 Out of the Ashes

taken the place of the former neologue and orthodox communities. Mon-thly subventions decreased from $425,000 a month to $250,000. As time went on, the Hungarian government slowly took over the burden of the relief work. Yet in late 1949, there were sdll two Jewish hospitals in Budapest supported by JDC, though they were soon to be taken over. In early 1951, 27,500 Jews were still reported as receiving cash relief, and there were 23 children's homes and 37 homes for the aged, according to the people in charge in Budapest. The children's homes were taken over towards the end of that year.22 JDC supported the local community in 1952 as well. $2.2 million were appropriated for Hungary. The mass feeding was discontinued, the people had to find their place in the Hungarian economy; however, there were still five canteens, and 38 old age homes.23 Finally, on January 22,1952, Warburg declared that "JDC has scrupulously refrained from political activities and has never deviated from its principle of exclus-ive adherence to its humanitarian role. . . . In the light of present develop-ments in Hungary, it is no longer possible to continue to operate and it is therefore ceasing its relief activities in that country as of this date."24 '

The story ended, temporarily at least. Stalinism had won another vic-tory. The old people died off. The younger ones found employment in the new industries. There was still a lot of suffering but JDC could not help. The phase of help to the survivors was over.

Romania

It was almost impossible for an American representative to reach Romania after its liberation. However, it appears that the Romanian government would not object to Jews leaving the country, and this seems to have been the reason why it agreed, in November 1944, to the appointment of S. Bertrand Jacobson (not to be confused with Gaynor I. Jacobson in Hun-gary), formerly the JDC's representative in Romania, to represent HIAS and HICEM. JDC's attempts to get someone into the country met with rebuffs. The Romanian and the Hungarian situations were not dissimilar, as far as the general development of the communist takeover was con-cerned. The main objects of Jewish communist attack were the Union of Jewish Communities, headed by Wilhelm Filderman, and of course the dollars of JDC. The "Autonomous Assistance Committee," attached to the Union, was responsible for JDC-related work, and under Filderman's general supervision, was headed by Dr Elias B. Costiner. However, money could be transmitted only through credits from Switzerland, and Mayer felt much safer when he could delegate financial responsibility and super-vision to the IRC delegates in Bucharest. In January 1945, Section I of the

22 Excom 6/27/51; Harry Greenstein Report, 6/29/51. 2} Excom, 2/26/52; and all through May 1952. 24 Moses A. Leavitt, The JDC Story, 1914-1952, New York (1953), p. 17.

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 149

IRC delegation in Bucharest was charged with taking care of JDC interests, and Costiner was nominated director. At the same time, Marton's commit-tee also continued to function in Hungary, Subcarpathian Russian, North-ern Transylvania and, to a certain extent, in Yugoslavia, also on behalf of the IRC with JDC funding, through Filderman.

With the first rumblings of a communist rebellion within Filderman's Union, Schwartz and Leavitt decided to nominate Jacobson as their rep-resentative there, HIAS having agreed to share him with JDC. He was appointed on August 20,1945. The problems facing JDC in Romania were such that both Jacobson and Filderman demanded sums that simply could not be allocated. In early 1945 Romania was getting two million Swiss francs a month, but this had to suffice for Hungary and Subcarpathian Russia as well. Now, in July, Filderman was asking for 25 million Swiss francs for Romania alone. There was no way this demand could be met.25

Problems of funding abounded. Romanian Jews and non-Jews no longer wished to pay in leis to JDC-sponsored organizations in exchange for promises to be repaid in Switzerland or even the United States. Schemes of buying gold and then selling it in Romania fell through. In the late summer of 1945 the situation reached a crisis, because there was also no longer any way of transmitting cash in francs from Switzerland to Romania. Meanwhile, Jacobson began working and clashed violently with the Zionists and their supporters, now the predominant group in Romania. He demanded in effect that Marton's operation be discontinued, and cast aspersions on some of the Zionist leaders. Marton ceased operating as Budapest became independent, but now Jacobson clashed with the IRC delegation as well. Filderman kept the work going, and reported that in the first half of 1945, 7.7 billion lei, or about $1.2 million had been spent in Romania. The needs had not changed since liberation; on the contrary, they had become accentuated. He thought he had 8000 refugees on his hands, about half of whom were the Polish Brichah. In actual fact he was to find out that there were many more, and many thousands of repatriated Jews had come from Transnistria and the Nazi concentradon camps.26

On August 21,1945, Filderman was arrested on charges of collaboration with the Nazi-imposed Jewish Centrala; he was released, but it became clear that the struggle was not with the Romanian police but with a general trend in Romanian public life.

Shipments of medicines, food, and clothing began to arrive—one in August and a second, of 1250 tons of clothing, in November, and though these helped, the complaints about them were the same as about those to Hungary. Some of the food was sold in Romania, and in exchange clothing

" JDC/Hungary, general 1945, conversation with Burton Berry, 7/3/45. 6 JDC/Romania, general, 1945, Filderman to Schwartz, 8/20/45.

150 Out of the Ashes

was bought; shoes, especially, were in short supply. Despite all the diffi-culties, more credits were made available to Jacobson in the late autumn, at the rate of half a million dollars a month, and he managed to place most of them.

During the latter half of 1945, JDC spent another 11 billion lei—or about $1.6 million—of which 50 percent still went to immediate relief to those returning from camps, to refugees, and to people who had been expelled from their homes in towns and villages in Romania. As winter approached, and there was no money to buy fuel, and no warm clothes to put on, 10 percent of the budget went to special winter relief. Child care got 4.1 percent, but there was already a first attempt to provide loans to people to re-establish themselves economically; 11 percent of the budget went to these loans.

Early in 1946, matters came to a head between Jacobson and the IRC delegates. Amidst acrimonious charges and counter-charges, the IRC dis-continued its special JDC division in February, and Jacobson reverted to an old formula: he could not operate as JDC in a country like Romania and take direct responsibility for JDC's operations—nor was this necessary, because there was a committee which did this in a very satisfactory manner. On the other hand, he did not want to deliver funds to the Union, because he could not know how long Filderman would be able to maintain himself there. As a result, the Assistance Committee became a quasi-independent body, loosely attached to the Union, and Jacobson maintained his own office which merely supervised the Committee's work.

Jacobson and the Committee decided to put an emphasis on "recon-struction." In early 1946, that meant that 47 percent of their budget went to thirty kassas, small loan banks that hopefully would provide for the re-entry of Jews into the Romanian economy. Only one third of the budget went to direct relief. The price in human suffering had to be weighed against the impossibility of helping everyone, and the prospect that re-establishing people in the economy would thereby provide them with the measure of self-esteem that would enable them to function as members of their society. Yet the problems of relief were momentous, and the drought that hit Romania in 1945, and was to last until late in 1947, added to the misery that was encountered. In mid-1946, the count of suffering included 36,000 "old" repatriated Jews from the areas given up by Romania to the Soviet Union, and in addition there were 22,000 "new" repatriated Jews, who began coming across the Romanian border from these areas in early 1946. The people were arriving completely destitute, and the Romanian authorities forbade them to go to the main cities. The World Jewish Congress sent represen-tatives to help, but they had no money, and the refugees were not eager for ideology; JDC had to organize emergency relief and help settle these people in middle-sized towns.

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 151

This was not all. There were 21,000 refugees from Poland, Hungary, and elsewhere, 46,000 former forced laborers, 35,000 who had been dis-placed from towns and villages in the war years, 6000 widows and orphans of the 1941 pogrom of Jassy, and the 7000 survivors in Northern Transyl-vania, who had returned to empty homes and were destitute—a total of 173,000 candidates for relief, out of a Jewish population of 380,000.27 But, as we have seen, the amount of relief that was given was kept to the minimum required not to turn near starvation into total starvation.

The OSE program in Romania, directed by Cornel and Mela Iancu, and financed by JDC, continued to be a central point in JDC's work—though it did not figure in the financial reports with more than a few percentage points. Early in 1947 Schwartz fixed the monthly ceiling for OSE oper-ations in Romania at $18,000. In June 1946, 7780-children were being cared for in 50 institutions. Old age homes were kept in being by JDC's assistance, and medical work, especially in relation to TB patients and prophylactic treatment, was paid special attention. The 22 hospitals and several clinics that were established, and the medicines that were sent, stood in contrast to the general level of health care prevalent in Romania at the time. But apart from the "reconstruction" effort, or rather as a part of it, JDC paid special attention to the religious and cultural needs of the communities. In the destroyed communities of Northern Transylvania, JDC insisted on unifying religious service for areas and places where the Jewish population simply no longer existed—over the vocal protest of the religious functionaries of the region. But there and elsewhere, wherever possible, synagogues and ritual baths were restored, places of religious instruction re-established, and cemeteries repaired. This was done in 71 communities. Psychologically, this was most certainly part of the recon-struction effort.

By mid-1946, vocational training or retraining was receiving increased attention. Much of this was done by Hechalutz, the Zionist pioneering organization, which geared its efforts to the perceived needs of future immigrants in Palestine. Agudat Israel also participated in this work, which received the technical and pedagogical direction of ORT. There were 69 homes for apprentices and young workers, two industrial schools, one elementary vocational school, one school for agronomy, and ten agri-cultural hachsharot. The actual cash disbursements in Romania were kept low as a result of the runaway inflation—at $1,732,000 for 1946, with over 2.6 million pounds of supplies entering in addition.28

Early in 1947, after two years of drought, the starvation problem 27 AC, 6/14/46, 8/16/46. According to another estimate, 200,000 Jews were on the verge

of starvation in the spring of 1946; 100,000 of these were in need of immediate relief—cf. Excom., 4/24/46. Also, ibid., Goldstein to New York, 4/11/46, and Costiner's report for January-June, 1946, 8/5/46.

JDC/Romania, General, 1947, Bernstein to Beckelman, 3/28/47; ibid., General, 1946, report of 8/5/46.

152 Out of the Ashes

increased in severity. By March, the famine had reached catastrophic proportions, and affected especially the Moldavian provinces. We have seen that this had the effect of pushing those returning from Transnistria and others into a flight into Hungary and Austria, and that over the next half year 19,000 people fled in this way. The problem arose whether ship-ping grain to Jews would not arouse antisemidsm—after all, while the Jews had been the hardest hit by the events of the preceding years, they were not the only ones to starve. It took some time before the acuteness of the problem became clear to Schwartz and to the New York office. It became obvious that the Romanian government was in no position to provide the Jews with grain for the matzot for Passover. JDC therefore prepared to ship 80 tons of grain for Jewish communities to make matzot and sell them to those who could still pay. In addition, 950,000 pounds of grain would be shipped to provide for 47,000 persons who could not pay at all. But Jacobson, faced with the problem of Jewish-Romanian relation-ships, agreed to give the government ten of the 72 wagons of grain for matzot for the general population. In reply, the Prime Minister, Dr Petru Groza, demanded a quota of 30-50 percent of any future grain shipment that JDC would receive. He demanded it because of the second year of drought, and because of "a superior political interest," namely for proof of the loyalty of the Jewish citizens. The threat was not even implied, it was explicit.

JDC then decided to send 10,000 tons of grain, and in fact sent in the first 5,000 tons in early March. Of this, Jacobson was authorised to give one half to the government. In an interview the accuracy of which he later denied, Groza said that:

if the Jews of America would want to contribute, with say $100 million—which is nothing for them—in order to enable the Romanian Jewish relief organization to feed and clothe the Christians as well, this fact would put an end not only to famine, but also to the antisemitic movement, and not only for a few months, but for always. It is the only chance for the Jews to take preventive measures. . . because, if we are going to have a good crop, this chance will be lost.

Romanian Jewry was, by this time, the largest surviving Jewish com-munity in Europe, so JDC decided that, in addition, it would pay $420,000 in cash for the Romanians to buy wheat in the United States, and accepted a Romanian promise to repay in Romanian lei, with another deduction of 10 percent for government spending.

At first this promise was kept. The Romanians made their first two payments in lei on the $420,000, but in April they defaulted. In addition, they refused all Jacobson's requests to be permitted to leave Romania and return there, probably as a means to pressure JDC to agree to better conditions from their point of view. In the meantime, the needs of Romania mounted to astronomic proportions, and JDC was in no position to accede to the demands, Justified as they were. Instead, JDC continued

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 153

shipping cheap American wheat which, though partly donated—or con-fiscated—for "nonsectarian" purposes, could pay more effectively for its programs in Romania than cash would have done. Instead of the $12 million a year demanded by the Romanian Jewish communities, it spent in 1947 a total of only $1,572,000 in cash, but very large amounts of supplies were shipped in in addition. The American government kept its aid to the starving Romanian population at a political minimum; the Jewish voluntary organization gave a high proportion of its funds to the peasants and townspeople of famine-stricken Moldavia. The Jewish contributors to JDC had contributed their funds to a program specifically directed to Jewish poor; but the fact that a fair proportion was diverted to the "nonsec-tarian" needs was both right and proper, in these circumstances. Nobody could ignore the appeal made by Filderman in February: "The American Red Cross will bear me out that in the stomachs of the dead are found only leaves and earth. . . . Whatever the government, this problem could not be solved without assistance from abroad. . . . On behalf of the Jewish population in Romania, I appeal to the noble and generous people of the US and to its government," to send food to the Romanian people.29

In early 1947, for the first time since the end of the war, a Romanian Jew was permitted to visit the United States—he was Rabbi Dr Abraham Safran, the 37-year-old Chief Rabbi of Romania. He told his American audiences of his visit to Galatz, a Black Sea port, where he found "pale, starved Jewish children, the majority of them tubercular, barefoot, with-out a shirt on their bony backs. The canteens where the children of the poor are to get their food have no milk and no other nutritious food . . . the death rate . . . is high . . . Jewish schools have closed completely because of a dearth in fuel ." He was not exaggerating.30 As a result of JDC's efforts, about one half of the Jewish population of Romania, near the 190,000 mark, were getting relief of some sort in the spring of 1947, and the medical program was increased as well. The number of hospitals operating with JDC support was now 11, and an average of 12,000 people were cared for in them and in dispensaries and dental clinics monthly. Iancu's organization also intensified their operations—apart from 8000 children in children's homes, another 22,000 were looked after in their own homes. The cooperatives, the industrial and agricultural vocational training places, the religious establishments—all these were kept going on the 1946 level. Recent researches have shown that JDC literally kept alive large numbers of Romanian Jews by these means. An analysis of cash disbursements for the whole of 1947 showed that 25.9 percent of the expenditures went to relief of various sorts, 17.7 percent for child care,

29 Excom., 1/29/47; Adcom, 2/25 and 27/47; JDC/Romania, General, 1947, Groza (Draia) to JDC, 2/21/47; interview with Groza (n.d., March, 1947); ibid., report of 5/9/48; ibid., Filderman's appeal, in: Ringland to Leavitt, 3/24/47. The American Red Cross also helped, and appropriated $2.5 million.

30Ibid., article by Itschok Horowitz, 2/10/47.

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14.3 percent for vocational training, 5.5 percent for cultural, educational, and religious needs, and 5.3 percent for medical care and old age homes.31

It was only natural that the economic and political crisis of the Jews of Romania should express itself in dissensions and struggles. In the first half year of 1947, because of the drought and the famine, this came out less than later on. In the first stages Filderman was still in charge, and the communists were unable to replace him. At the other end of the political scale, Agudat Israel was making troubles for JDC, largely because it was completely dependent on JDC's financial backing and, paradoxically, was apparently using that situation to expand its work.

In the summer of1947, with the crop in, and a shortfall of750,000 bushels of wheat (in a country that had always been a net exporter of crops), the communist-dominated government stabilized its currency in very much the same way as the Hungarians did. The old currency became worthless, savings were wiped out, and JDC was faced with a new financial situation. It had increased its subsidy of the Romanian government to $ 1.5 million, and now it had to be repaid in new lei. The government was slow in repaying, but at the end of 1947, after a great deal of prodding and of cutting off of percentages that went to the Romanian economy, the debts were repaid. By that time, too, Jacobson had left Romania, having ended his tour of duty for both JDC and HIAS, and Costiner was appointed official representative of JDC—there was no chance of sending an American in.32 >

Towards the end of the year, although the rains promised a better crop in the coming season, the situation of Romanian Jews was much worse than it had been since liberation, despite all the JDC's efforts. As one account said: "the once rich, the middle class and die poor; the reformed Jews, even the converted Jews; the communist and the reactionary Jews, the liberal and the conservative Jews, the Jewish tradesmen, the small business men, the professional men and the middlemen. All, without exception, had one common cry, 'take us out of Romania'!" Antisemitism, the report said, had increased as a result of the economic disasters. Assist-ance, while essential, was just a "sleeping pill." The Jews, it said, should emigrate, their children be adopted, and those who remained should be socially "reclassified." Romanian Jewish professional stratification was even more lopsided in late 1947 than it had been before the war. City and government officials accounted for 5 percent of employed Jews, 4 percent were teachers and rabbis, 28 percent were employees in stores and offices, and the rest, 63 percent were merchants, peddlers, tradesmen, middle-men. The unemployed were not counted in this statistic. The conclusion was simple: either Jews would adjust to being government-employed

31 Angel, op. cit., passim; JDC/Romania, General, 1947, "From Uncle Sam To 'Joint'," press release, n.d. (late spring, 1947); ibid., 'Romania', summary, 3/3/47; ibid., Jacobson to Paris, 2/17/47; and report of 5/9/48, as in note 29.

" Ibid., Schwartz cable, 9/12/47; Schwartz letter to the Romanian government, 10/21/47; Costiner to Paris, 20/20/47; Excom, 9/17/47.

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 155

workers or employees, or they would have to seek to emigrate. In Romania, government policies kept the standard of living of employed workers at about the same level as during the preceding fascist regime, or slightly higher. The peasants had suffered from the drought, and efforts would be made to improve their conditions, but there were no Jewish peasants in any case. Government officialdom, as in all communist countries, would be the privileged stratum. The classical Jewish role as the middle group was over. The government made sure that private businesses, traders, even small peddlers and suchlike would be squeezed out by differential taxation and government harrassment. The result was that "today, the Romanian . . . Jews are a people of beggars. They sit at home and wait for the Joint to supply them with food, clothes, and all their work consists of spending their time in going to the canteens to pick up their food and waiting for somebody to take them out of the country." Not a very pleasant picture.33

In this situation it was inevitable that there should have been com-plaints—similar to those coming out of Hungary or the DP camps. In Romania they were directed mainly against the local committees, appointed by JDC, or in fact consisting of the local community officials. Charges were made that some of these officials were "rich" businessmen on whom JDC relied for distributing clothes and food. Some of these were charged with corruption, favoritism, and similar transgressions. There may have been cases like that, though we have evidence of some detailed investigations of concrete complaints, and these showed that there was not much substance to the charges. In retrospect, Romanian Jews declared that American Jewish help had kept many of them alive in those terrible years.34

In mid-1947, the Union of Romanian Jews, as the organization headed by Filderman was called, split, and the leftists' Union soon became the officially recognized one. Filderman resigned and left the country. Although the Union was now packed with communist representatives, as was the JDC Committee, the Union's chairmanship was given over to a respected TB specialist, Dr Maximilian Popper, closely associated with JDC through his medical work. With Popper's help, Costiner could still function into 1948. The stabilization of the lei in August 1947 caused a long process of renegotiating agreements with the government, and in the meantime JDC's till in Bucharest was becoming empty. In early 1948, when Schwartz visited, there was nothing left. An agreement was therefore reached, under pressure, to pour in dollars at a rate of exchange 20 percent above the official one, which worked to the government's advantage, as

| 3 JDC/Romania, General, 1947, Kremer Report, 10/19/47; the idea of the adoption of children may have been connected with a scheme whereby 435 children were actually taken out from Romania to Holland, as a preparatory step towards their emigration to Palestine— Excom, 11/19/47.

34 Cf. Yiddisher Kempfer (New York), article by Shlomo Bickel, 10/17/47.

156 Out of the Ashes

the official rate (150 new lei per dollar) was out of touch with reality. As Schwartz said:

With the stabilization of the Romanian currency . . . the blocking of funds and the nationalization of industry, practically the entire Jewish population had become depen-dent on the JDC. No local collections are possible . . . There is a great desire on the part of the Jews to leave Romania . . . Meanwhile, the kehillot [communities! are func-tioning, Jews have kosher meat, there are some rabbis still available, although many are leaving...

The main problem was that of retraining people to adjust to the new economic organization.35 . . '

As the nationalization was proceeding, credit cooperatives (kassas) were becoming less important, because they were designed to help independent businesses and professionals. A law of August 1948 finally abolished them . Instead, there was now a renewed emphasis on producers' cooperatives. Looking back, one can see how the government utilized JDC to help restratify the Jews. It becomes clear that the producers' cooperatives were intended as a temporary measure, until the growth of large-scale industry absorbed the small artels as the coops were called in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was indeed a conscious model. There, too, in the 1920s and early 1930s the Jews had gone through a very similar process of adjust-ment, also with JDC's help. From the point of view of JDC's oudook, this was quite justifiable: its task was, on behalf of American Jewry, to help those who wished to stay or could not leave to find a way to maintain themselves economically and socially in the changing society. It was not JDC's task to try and change systems or even influence them, nor was it JDC's task to influence the choices that Jews were making. It had to respect whatever choices were made and help Jews within those parameters. This is exactly what it did in a country like Romania, which had, by now, the largest number of Jews anywhere in Europe outside the Soviet Union, estimated at up to 400,000 Jews.

Quick readjustments were needed. The government was opposed to cash relief for Romanian citizens—they should fend for themselves. In mid-1948, cash payments were given only to Polish refugees. Some 13,500 persons were still being fed in 50 canteens, but that was on its way out as well. OSE's work was unchanged: 16,470 children were being cared for (607 of them in homes, the rest through medical centers), and another 2000 by other groups. In May, 33.6 percent of the budget was devoted to vocational retraining and to the cooperatives. By that time, despite the cloud under which the Zionists were operating, Hechalutz was the main vocational training group; this expressed, in very real terms, the desire to emigrate.36 The reduction in relief payments did not mean that the econ-omic situation of Jews was improving. Filderman made this point when he reached New York after having escaped from Romania via Hungary:

"AC, 3/9/48. 54 J DC/Romania, General, 1948, Pilpel to Research Department, 7/9/48.

Fighting Starvation: Hungary and Romania 157 Every citizen under 65 years of age has to work building roads, in the coal mines, etc. Formerly workers received pay for overtime; now there is no longer overtime pay . . . Old people and children are supposed to receive an allowance of bread and milk, but based on his own experience, he knows that his mother-in-law, who is 80 years of age, receives only bread.37

The main concern of most Romanian Jews—emigration—was not reported to the American welfare organization. But in 1948, prior to the establishment of Israel, many thousands of Romanian Jews left Romania with the agreement of the government. Mossad managed to organize a number of ships, including two very large ones carrying 15,000 persons each, which reached Palestine just before Israel came into existence. The main problem was how to get out, with the government less and less willing to let people go, as its own program demanded more and more labor. A further nationalization law at the end of 1948 left only OSE's children's homes still independent. Hospitals and clinics were nationalized, and JDC subventions for them stopped, with the result that the services declined, but were now made available to everyone, not only Jews. However, because of the weak state of health of the Jews, it was still the case that a large proportion of the patients were Jewish. At the end of 1948, while credit cooperatives were abolished and the problem of JDC was how to get back the investments it had made in them, vocational schools continued to exist, including the old, well-established ORT school "The Hammer" (Ciocanul) with 500 pupils.38 In the end, JDC had spent just $3,150,000 in Romania in 1948. It was to be its last full year of operation.

JDC hobbled along yet another two months into 1949, but the dice had been cast. On March 4, the government decided to take over what was left of JDC, OSE, and ORT operations in Romania. The funds and the sup-plies were handed over to the Union, which was supposed to distribute them in accordance with established JDC procedures. Schwartz had sent supplies into Romania, much against the advice of David Weingard, JDC's supply director in New York, as late as the end of 1948, precisely because he wanted the Union to have stocks which they might distribute among the Jewish population when JDC was forced out. However, he did not take into account communist bureaucracy. When JDC left, the warehouse was sealed. "They never opened that padlock until 20 years later. We found a million dollars worth of dust. Everything had disintegrated.39

The reasons for the abolition of JDC were, of course, connected to the changes in Soviet policies already described in relation to Hungary. These included the growing paranoia regarding Zionist activities. In line with Soviet attitudes, the communist strong-man in Bucharest at the time, Vasile Luca, the finance minister, accused Costiner in December 1948,

" A C , 11/9/48. 38 J DC/Romania, General, 1948, Pilpel to New York, 12/9/48; ibid., Costiner Report,

April, 1948. 39 JDC/Katzki interviews, Interview with David Weingard, 2/10/81, p. 8.

158 Out of the Ashes

point-blank, "What are you doing with your money? You assuredly are giving it to the Zionists."40 Costiner added another factor that may have been influential: the success of JDC in helping an impoverished populauon in a socialist country may have reflected too well upon the source of the aid—the United States—which was of course anathema to the regime. Yet even the official government-sponsored Jewish branch of the Party, the Jewish Democratic Committee, was included to arrive at a compromise that would enable JDC to continue to operate. However, the political considerations prevailed.

Parallel with the abolition of JDC in Romania went the elimination of the last vestiges of Zionist organizations, their agricultural and industrial vocational training programs and their preparations for emigration to Israel. And yet Costiner and Schwartz tried to save the situation by nego-tiating with the Romanians for the restarting of JDC operations. They suggested a number of schemes, but their efforts were in vain. With the preparations made in the Soviet bloc for the persecution of supposedly anti-Titoist organizations and for antisemitic trials directed against "Zion-ists," these proposals were of course rejected. It should be noted that the end of JDC operations in Romania preceded that in Hungary, so that these attempts seemed at the time to have more chance than they actually had. Filderman, from his Paris exile, asked JDC to consider an "unofficial" policy of help. He argued that even if such help would reach fewer people than would official help, it was nevertheless a moral imperative to try it. In effect, that is what JDC did in any case. Through a branch of the Jewish Agency, it began subsidizing purely relief functions of the Romanian Jew-ish institutions, who were probably unaware of the origin of the funds they received. They amounted, in 1949, to some $30,000 monthly. In this way, a vestige of JDC's work continued, but it was a far cry from the program that had been maintained there so long. In effect, there was little more that JDC could do: the economic change had not saved the Jews from poverty and starvation. They still wanted to leave, and in the next period of some 18 months, most of them did. JDC helped them to reach Israel by subsidizing the transportation; but JDC work in Romania was, for the moment, at an end. It would be renewed much later, under quite different circumstances.41

40 Costiner's Final Report, JDC/Romania, p. 30. y 41J DC/Romania, General, 1949, Levy to Sackler, 3/8/49; ibid., Costiner to Schwartz, 4/9/49; ibid., Filderman to JDC, 5/3/49; ibid., Passman to Grubel, 8/25/49.

CHAPTER 7

Communist Eastern Europe

Poland

By November 1946, Polish Jewry began to adjust to the two cataclysmic events that had taken place earlier in the year: the return to Poland of 157,420 Jews from exile in the Soviet Union by the end of June,1 and the flight of about 100,000 to the West. There can be no surprise at the fact that disorganization reigned. JDC was supporting the CC and another 24 organizations. The chief ones were, besides the CC itself, the Zionist groups, and the kehilot (the religious communities that were unaffiliated with the CC). The CC had established local and regional committees, and a whole network of children's homes, old age homes, nurseries, schools, canteens, and economic institutions such as loan kassas and cooperatives. The kehilot had rabbis, synagogues, religious functionaries, cemeteries, canteens, schools of their own, children's homes of their own—all geared to an observance of Jewish religious traditions. The Zionist organizations, divided into a number of independent factions, had children's homes, live-in collectives (kibbutzim), newspapers, cultural activities, and workshops, all of which were geared to emigration to Palestine. The Bund had similar activities and establishment, in this case geared to the continuation of Jewish life in a socialist Poland. When the time came to summarize JDC's work for 1946, it was found that 72 percent of its help had gone to the CC and the health organization TOZ (Towarzystwo Ochrony Zdrowia), which was "neutral" as between the CC, the Zionists, and the kehilot. The rest was divided between the other groups. William Bein, JDC's representative in Warsaw, thought he should try and simplify this whole array of compet-ing claims and activities. He also had to see how this could be financed in an inflationary situation, with an exhange rate that was definitely unfavor-able to JDC. He suggested importing raw materials to sell to the govern-ment, and using the proceeds to finance JDC's operations. This, to an extent, was what was done.2

As in other East European countries, insistence on terminating the j Purely relief phase and trying to rehabilitate the Jews economically so they /

1 Yisrael Gutman, op. cit., p. 23. I DC/Poland, "Budget, 1945-47," Bein to Schwartz, 11/1/46; ibid., Poland, General,

'947, report, n.d. "Poland-JDC-Supported Rehabilitation and Relief Activities." 159

160 Out of the Ashes

could become self-supporting, gained ground in the second half of 1946. Some 29 percent of JDC's outlay even in 1946 was already devoted to that task; 14 percent went to child care while 22 percent still went to relief. At the end of 1946, arguing that the exodus of so many Jews necessitated a reduction in the budget, Bein cut the allocations to Polish Jewish bodies; they complained, but they managed. Their situauon improved as the com-munist-dominated government attained greater control over the country.

* The right-wing opposition had resorted to antisemitism in order to gain j the adherence of the population, and as the government became stronger I it fought the right-wing groups and thereby decreased the danger to Jewish life. In January 1947 elections that were in part, at least, rigged, neverthe-less showed a marked decline in the strength of the anti-government forces; the population was tired of the civil war atmosphere, and was longing for

1 peace. At the same time, on February 22, 1947 the Poles stopped the legal Brichah via Silesia. They no longer saw any point in permitting an

' underground movement to take place in a hierarchically ordered state. The Polish Foreign Office especially was under constant British pressure, and as the Poles wanted to lay their hands on the gold held in Britain by the right-wing Polish rump government-in-exile, there was an additional incentive to accede to British demands and stop Brichah. Brichah reported on 7171 persons that it had moved out of Poland in the period of November 1946 to February 1947.

/ ; Tfre"c!osing of the border did not, of course, mean the automatic demise 'orBrichan. It still remained a factor in Jewish life in Poland, because duririg-1947,9315 persons or about 10 percent of the Jews of Poland, were taken out of Poland illegally. Most of these were young Zionists, who would not be scared by the prospect of jail; but Brichah began to encounter the opposition of the adult Zionist community in Poland, which wanted to emigrate legally, without endangering themselves and their work. This was done, in large part, through the JDC emigration office where a Brichah man was responsible for procuring Latin American and other visas that would enable the people to get out of Poland; they would then go to Palestine. Bein was vaguely aware of this, but he did not ask too many questions. The scheme did not work very well, and only about 1000 people left by these means in 1947. Illegal crossings became more jind more difficult as the border police improved their work. In 1948,jonly 2300. people left Poland by Brichah, which then ceased.its operations.3

The isolation from antisemitic central Poland of the newlysettledgile^. .^sian districts, where the Jews now formed an important part of the popu-

lation, seemed to promise a better prospect for future Jewish life in Poland. The Jews, figuratively speaking, still had their suitcases packed, but they were no longer standing by them, ready to go. They were sitting on them, waiting to see what would happen, and might unpack them if conditions

® Bauer, op. cit., pp. 286, ff.

Communist Eastern Europe 161

improved. The sense of American Jewish observers was that by mid-1947, "the approximately 100,000 Jews who remained in Poland have made up their minds that they want to stay there and they are rebuilding their lives and institutions with that objective in mind. There is little evidence of antisemitism there today." This assessment was shared by American Jew-ish visitors, who were in effect checking on JDC's work. Jews, they said, "were uniformly agreed that they have been well-treated in Poland; that the government is friendly and helpful and that antisemitism here has been gready reduced from prewar. Many say it has entirely disappeared; others, more thoughtful, say it is latent." In Silesia, "life is pioneer-like, with everyone a newcomer and with an American quality of lack of roots." Those who still wanted to go to Palestine were a "distinct minority." A non-Jewish observer came back with very similar impressions. No wonder therefore, thatJDC's emphasis was on three institutions geared towards reconstruction: the "Bank for Rehabilitation," in"essencc a traditional JDC loan kassa; the Economic Center mentioned above, and producers' cooperatives. The Center was a clearing house for raw materials for the co-ops, and also a sales agency for their products. Early in 1947, there were 164 producers'co^jps with close to 4000 members, so that some 10-12,000 people were connected with these ventures.4 This emphasis increased as time went on.

The background to this change lay not only in the increasing hold of the government on the country. Poland had become a one-natior^ country. Before the war, out of 32 mUlion^ITizensronly'20 million had been ethnic Poles. Now, there were 24 million people in Poland, almost all of whom were Poles—including Poles who had been living in the Soviet Union. The Jews ceased to be a central problem, or so it seemed at the time. Yet despite all the self-convincing that was done and that so impressed outside observers, the sense of insecurity was very strong. Otherwise, how could one explain the fact that all news regarding Palestine was eagerly swallowed and elicited strong reactions? Assurances that they had made up their minds to stay notwithstanding, Polish Jews would jump and start at any rumor spreading in the war-torn country. The government's success in overcoming some major economic obstacles was the second main cause-after the decline in antisemitic incidents—that encouraged people to tell visitors that they would stay on; what they really wanted to say was that they were tired of wandering, and if they could stay on, they would.

It was in this situation that Bein began to insist on streamlining the operations that JDC was supporting in Poland. Thus, children whose parents were alive were removed from children's homes and supported in their parents' homes. The CC was pressured to reduce the number of its _ 4 Excom, 7/15/47; Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds, report by M. Ezekiel, 8/17/47; PCIRO, Office in Poland, report by John S. Widdicombe, JDC/ Poland, General, 1947, 9/24/47.

162 Out of the Ashes

officials, emphasis was placed on finding employment for everyone, day care centers were set up to enable women to join the working force. Other economies and unifying trends were encouraged by the groups themselves, and by the government in whose interest it lay to deal with just one Jewish body and not with many. Among Zionist parties, mergers or agreements to cooperate were in the offing, and the kehilot began negotiations with the CC to join it. This again was prompted by the emigration of a number of the rabbis, leaving the kehilot without leadership. The principles of JDC's work, in line with the desires of most American Jews at the time, were clearly stated by Bein:

Our activities are by no means limited to the issuance of funds and supplies. We work with the organizations hand in hand, and JDC has a decided share in every phase of the progress the Jewish community has made since liberation. Moreover, our activities are based upon the principle of helping the Jews to become productive and healthy regardless of whether they wish to stay in the country or intend to leave and establish themselves in Palestine or elsewhere.'

Bein estimated the number of Jews in Poland at the end of 1947 at about 90,000. His first priority, as we have seen, were the three major Jewish economic institutions then in existence in Poland, and the activities they encouraged. In 1947, there were still some agricultural collectives— kibbutzim—maintained by Zionist groups. But the government did not favor true collectives, and they were soon to be abolished.6 JDC also dealt with some important, though seemingly marginal problems. One of these was to see to it that Poles who had saved the lives of Jews during the Holocaust should not be in need. Lists of these persons were drawn up, and as long as JDC was allowed to operate in Poland, these people were looked after. Apart from them, food was supplied to non-Jewish children's homes, and to monasteries that had harbored Jewish children during the war. Some more aid to non-Jews generally was engaged in in the same way

s\ y as in Hungary, for instance. \ I Another major area of concern was that of education. Jewish children • J for the most part did not attend Polish public schools: fear of antisemitism

\ was too great, and the desire to educate the next generation in a Jewish spirit too strong. But, of course, opinions differed sharply as to the Jewish

' content that was aspired to. The first Jewish school was established in Bialystok in 1945. In 1946, the Jewish school system was expanded con-siderably. In the 34 elementary schools, one high school, and one music school with a total enrollment of2942 pupils, run by the CC, a compromise was achieved whereby the language of instruction was Yiddish, but Polish and Hebrew were also taught and courses in Palestinography were featured

' J DC/Poland, General, 1948, Annual Report for 1947. 6 This may sound peculiar to the uninitiated, but this was the Soviet policy: truly collec-

tive life such as that practiced in Palestinian kibbutzim was frowned upon, because it was based on pure voluntarism and a communal democracy that could not flourish in a regi-mented society.

Communist Eastern Europe 163

as well as Jewish history, holidays, religious customs, and so on. In addition, there were 11 Tarbut schools of the Zionist-Hebrew trend with one thousand pupils, and 96 orthodox schools, the talmudei torah> with 1100 pupils.

Another area of work was that engineered by the contributions of the Landsmannschaftn—the organizations of people from the same towns— who sent money from America through JDC to their landsleit, people from their former localities. In 1947 these monies too came to be utilized in the same spirit of reconstruction as were the other funds. In addition, the Warsaw office of JDC boasted of a legal department dealing with problems of restitution and legal documentation of all sorts: birth certificates, proofs of death, citizenship papers, and the like, free of charge, of course. But perhaps the most important department of the JDC office was the Location and Search Service. As people returned from Soviet Russia, thousands of requests came to find missing family members. Unfortunately, not many were alive. In this situation, even distant relatives were sought. Six thou-sand reunions of individuals with their lost relatives could be registered in 1947, a service of great human importance.7

This short flowering of a seemingly renascent Jewish community in Poland is one of the more intriguing phenomena in the history of Holocaust survivors in Europe. In early 1948, there were some 50,000 Jews in Lower Silesia, roughly 50 percent of Polish Jewry. There were 700 farming fami-lies, 560 miners, and about 4000 people in government-run factories employed as laborers. An additional 4000-5000 were employees. Jewish cooperatives there and elsewhere with their 5500 members were an additional "productive" force. Cooperatives had been prepared by the returnees from the Soviet Union even before their arrival back in Poland. In fact, in 1947-49, Jewish cooperatives formed 20 percent of the total co-op movement in the country.

All this meant that the returning Jews had abandoned their prewar occupational preferences; the small traders, peddlers and artisans had, amazingly quickly, adjusted to the new circumstances, and were seemingly doing very well indeed. The CC—all its factions—supported this restruc-turing of Jewish occupations. It was helped along by the extreme antisem-itic stance of the Polish traders and merchants, who were prepared to fight their former Jewish competitors with just about every weapon they could think of. According to November 1946 statistics, 37 percent of the Jews were occupied in handicrafts, 13 percent were textile workers, 13 percent were in the civil service, 10 percent were social workers (communal workers and rabbis probably), and the rest in other occupations. By 1948, 46 percent of the Jewish population were engaged in industry and as arti-sans, 19 percent were employed in the government bureaucracy, and 15 > percent worked in the health system, were social workers, or engaged in

7 See above, note 5, 1947 Annual Report.

164 Out of the Ashes

education and cultural activities. This latter development was particularly evident in the newly reconstituted universities, where Jewish academics found jobs waiting for them. Many of these people were Jews who wished to become full Poles, and only a few, such as the poet Julian Tuwim, who defined himself as a "Jew Doloris Causa," had the courage to admit their Jewishness. Many Jews in academic and government positions took non-Jewish wives, in part so as to escape their Jewish origins. It did not help them: in 1957, and even more so in 1968, the majority of them were chased out of Poland as Jews. Their attempt to hide their Jewishness, paradoxically, increased antisemitism.

The integration of Jews achieved with the help of JDC and the ORT vocational schools that helped retrain many people, also had a negative side-effect: the jealousy of the Polish population was aroused by the help that the Jews were getting from abroad, though nothing prevented Polish-American groups from aiding their compatriots in Poland.

By 1948, no more individual help was given by JDC. All the support went through the subsidized organizations, of whom there were now only four: the CC, the Zionists, the kehilot, and the TOZ (the Jewish health society). The government, too, began subsidizing the Jewish organizations more than before, and it was viewed, rightiy, as being "friendly and help-ful," in internal reports. JDC's contribution to the budgets of the organi-zations it supported went down to about two thirds in 1948, and a full 20 percent of these budgets was covered by donations from Polish Jews in Poland. Unemployment was being wiped out by government measures, and the situation simply could not be compared to that obtaining in Hun-gary and Romania. Yet the insecurity, not surprisingly, remained. The ruins of Jewish life were everywhere. Polish Warsaw, to be sure, was in ruins, too, but the Polish people were rebuilding their city and would live in it again. Life in the Jewish townships, the shtetls, would never be revived. Emigration was being made increasingly difficult; the government wished to know who was there and who was not, and there was, ideolog-ically, no reason, so they thought, for Jews to leave. Some yielded to this line of thought. Others became nervous at the threat of being subjected to a Soviet-like regime from which there would be no escape to freedom. A government announcement that passports would be issued only up to March 31, 1948 caused a near-panic.

JDC's relationship with the various competing groups was apparendy very good. "We present them with the problem, inspire them, control them, we check them and we scold them, and sometimes we pet them, but we do not actually handle the program. We work on the principle of turning as much responsibility as possible over to local organizations so that we would rather make a mistake than be compelled as JDC to handle the program."

A good case in point was the developing children's program. The insti-

Communist Eastern Europe 165 tutions, claimed Bein, were on a par with those in the United States. Thus, in a model home in Warsaw, there was complete self-government of the children, presumably following the example of the wonderful experiments conducted in the Soviet Union in the early 1920s, and in the Palestine kibbutzim more recently. The children maintained a whole agricultural enterprise, with bees, cows, and domestic animals. A children's sana-torium nearby used the milk produced at the children's home. The day care centers had expanded to include 3500 children, whose parents were thereby enabled to go out to work. In addition, recreation-reading rooms for children of the elementary school age were activated, so that parents would not have to worry about their children in the afternoon hours while they were still at work.

Rationalization of the children's program was continued in 1948, and by October there were only eight homes run by the CC, as compared to eleven in the spring. The number of children had been reduced to 645 (compared to 782 earlier) and the personnel cut down to 170 from 228. The children that were sent home to their parents were now receiving stipends, and more money was invested in those who remained. One out of the three homes run by the Zionists was reserved purely for children returned from non-Jewish foster homes, and there were also four homes maintained by religious organizations. A whole system of summer camps was set up for close to 7500 children, taking in those who were in the greatest need of good nourishment and health care.

Jewish hospitals and an ambulatory system of Jewish health care was in place in 1948; government nationalization of health institutions did not as yet affect the work of TOZ, and health insurance only helped TOZ concentrate on the really serious health problems of camp survivors and people who came back from the Soviet Union with TB and other illnesses. Hospitals at Walbrzych and at Jar cared for these persons.

Relief still figured quite prominently in the activities of JDC, the CC, and the kehilot. In 1946, 123,849 persons received JDC relief, of whom 91,349 were returnees from the Soviet Union.

However, as we have seen, the emphasis of the CC, and of JDC, had shifted to efforts aimed at productivity and employment. The number of producers' co-ops grew to 202, most of them in the traditional Jewish trades of textiles, leather, furs, brushes, and wood. All this had to be seen, again, in the light of the general developments in Poland. Under communist pressure, the socialists were close to uniting with the Commu-nist Party. Collectivization, or more precisely cooperativization of agri-culture was close: a policy that was to fail miserably and was to be one of the root causes for the problems faced by the Polish economy in the coming decades. The private cooperatives were nationalized. On May 21, 1948 the entire cooperative system was revised. For every trade a cooperative center was established, under the general control of a "Central Union

166 Out of the Ashes

of Cooperatives" (CZS). In the Jewish sector the Economic Center was revamped and became the Solidamoic (not to be confused with the famous trade union movement that came into being decades later). The reason why the government agreed to a separate Jewish cooperative network is not difficult to understand. They were deriving benefits from JDC in the form of dollar credits and raw materials. If they merged the Jewish cooperatives with the Polish ones, JDC might lose interest and deprive the Poles of an important and cheap source of imports. In addition, Jewish cooperatives were, organizationally and technically, much better devel-oped than the Polish ones—there was a long tradition of Jewish co-ops from before the war—and if a merger took place too soon, the Polish economy might suffer from the decline of the Jewish co-ops. Nevertheless, 17 Jewish cooperatives in areas such as meat and fish production, and in the retail trade, were merged with the general co-ops, probably because there the raw material argument did not play any role. JDC continued to provide not only raw materials, but also modern machinery, improving modes of production and thereby increasing the chances of prosperity. Thirty outlet stores were operated by Solidamoic for the produce of the Jewish co-ops and these stores, which were usually run in an efficient manner, guaranteed a reasonable income to the producers. The peak of the success of Solidamoic came in 1949, when it had 15,445 members, and the value of its products came to 28 million zloty. Of course, non-Jewish persons tried to join the co-ops. Some were accepted, on a purely objective basis; but at first JDC insisted that because of their unique background, the overwhelmingly Jewish character of the co-ops should be kept. Amer-ican Jewry was interested in helping Polish Jews; the American govern-ment, or the Polish-American organizations, should be encouraged to look after others.8 This stance could not be maintained, however, and by 1949,the co-ops were Jewish in their managements and experts, but close to 75 percent of the members were non-Jews.

In the midst of all this, in May 1948, Israel came into existence, and there was public rejoicing by the Jewish population. An Israeli embassy was opened, and moves were started to convince the Polish government to release those Jews who wanted to go to the new state. Others chose to stay: a young Jewish communist told Bein that he would rather be a Jew in a socialist Poland than a socialist in a Jewish State and, Bein added, "there may be something to this."9 Inflation was again rising, and with the departure of especially young people the social burden consisting of the needs of older people would increase. However, as 1948 gave way to 1949, the inexorable logic of the effects of the communist hegemony in Poland combined with the onslaught of Stalinism to demolish Jewish econ-

1 J DC/Poland, Poland, General, 1948, Report on Poland by W. Bein, 3/8/48; ibid., B. Bernstein to Schwartz, 9/13/48; ibid., Bein Report for June-September, 1948.

* J DC/Poland, 1949, Leavitt to Warburg, 10/13/49.

? L A T E 2 ' I a m e s p - Rice, AJDC Director for Austria, 1945-46.

(Courtesy of JDC)

PLATE 4. Moses A. Leavitt, AJDC Secretary, 1 9 4 7 .

PLATE 5. Saly Mayer, AJDC Representative in Switzerland. (Courtesy of JDC)

(Courtesy of JDC)

PLATE 6. William Bein, AJDC Director for Poland, 1946-49.

T H R O U G H JAN - OCT

1946 1947 1948; s ' t M r t l l ' l " colon) : 4 « . H 0 0 t M j

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(Courtesy of JDC)

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PLATE 11. Solidarnosd store in Lodz, Poland (1948).

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Communist Eastern Europe 167

omic and cultural autonomy. The new state had no stomach for any auton-omous or discrete group. Nationalization of the health services became complete, as did the gradual abolition of the autonomy of Solidarnosc, until it was finally abolished in October 1949. This was not directed against the Jews, but was part of the general movement towards a Stalinist-oriented Soviet-type economy.

In the field of education, in early 1949 all the larger Jewish schools were taken over by the much less impressive Polish school system,and as a result the salaries of the teachers were reduced to the level customary in Polish schools. Only the smaller Jewish schools remained, for a short while.

Cultural Jewish life in Poland seemed to be on the upgrade in 1947, just as the economic and social life was. A Jewish theater was established in Lodz in 1947, and for a time it was directed by the two comic actors, Shimon Dzigan and Josef Szumacher. It was later taken over by the great Jewish actress Ida Kaminska, and developed into the Polish Jewish State Theatre, but Kaminska was ultimately forced out of Poland just like the others. The CC supported this and other important cultural ventures. One of these was the publishing company Yiddish Bukh. Another centrally important effort was directed towards the writing of the history of the Holocaust, to which American Jewish resources were funnelled direcdy and indirecdy. This had begun in Lublin in 1945. The persons who began the work of the Historical Commission there were to be the first pioneers of the later large-scale investigation into the history of the Holocaust.10 The Commission was later taken over by Ber Mark, who was more acceptable to the communist regime, though he showed some independence of spirit in his approach to the history of the Warsaw Ghetto Rebellion, which was his main area of research. In time, the Commission became the Jewish Historical Institute, a State-run institution. Cultural work seemed to be on a par with the apparent success of economic and social reconstruction. Schwartz, on one of his visits to Poland in 1947, testified to his enthusiasm about the general impression Jewish life in Poland had made upon him: "Nowhere in Europe have I seen such progress as I witnessed in Poland: economic work, social welfare, work with children, cultural activities,and so on. The one country that invites comparison with Palestine is Poland."11

However, in early 1949, the authorities suddenly_closed the emigration department of JDC. No emigration on any scale wouldbe allowed Tor y countries outside of Israel, and emigration to Israel was being negotiated' with the Israeli embassy. At the same time the CC, which had now absorbed the kehilot as well, was pressing JDC to send more dollars to Poland. But JDC was reducing its commitments. The Zionist parties were being closed, their kibbutzim dissolved, and the amount of work left for

10 They included Philip Friedman, Isaiah Trunk, Josef Wulf, Michael Borwicz, Nahman Blumenthal, Josef Kermisz. Later, Tatiana Bernstein, Aron Eizenbach, and others joined.

V Gutman, op. cit., p . 76. OOA—O

168 Out of the Ashes

the CC was diminishing, despite an increasing burden of looking after the older people. There was no justification for keeping up the accustomed level of JDC expenditures.

For the second half of 1949, the CC asked JDC to send $750,000, which was a reduction of 10 percent from the previous six months. But JDC reduced the sum further, and faced with the absorption of the producers* co-ops into the governmental system, began planning for the end of its work in Poland. The communization of the country and the increasing pressure of the authorities on the American Jewish agency presaged such an outcome. JDC's main problem now was to care for the 20,000 or so people who would form a hard core of social cases: Holocaust survivors, widows, old people, and invalids. Religious Jews would not be likely to receive adequate consideration from the regime's Jewish representatives; therefore, special attention had to be given to them. The Loan Kassa (Bank of Rehabilitation) was still functioning, and money was given to it to look after individual artisans, professionals, and employees, as well as the co-ops, now under increasing government supervision. Also, transfer of people from smaller centers to larger ones indicated that the idea of a spread of Jews in Lower Silesia was being abandoned.

| In the late summer of 1949, the government arrived at an agreement / with the Israeli embassy whereby people could leave for Israel, provided i they did so by the end of August 1950. It was estimated that about 15,000

would utilize the opportunity. By an arrangement with the Israeli govern-ment, JDC paid for the transport of these people to Israel. As the oppor-tunity to leave was to be limited in time, the movement of Polish Jews was a priority in JDC's calculations, and nothing was permitted to postpone it. With the Brichah operating as described above, and with legal emi-gration to other countries still continuing, the Jewish population was decreasing. Bein estimated it at 58,000 at the end of 1949. There may have been some more, because he could not take into account the "hidden" Jews, who denied their Jewishness (but would surface in 1956 and 1968 when the antisemitic persecutions restarted in Poland). The dream of an autonomous area in Silesia, or even of a solid Jewish population in Poland was swiftly nearing its end. The CC was no longer needed as a political representative of an important group. It would become a cultural advisory board for what was left of Jewish culture in Poland.

In November, Bein received a request from the government to liquidate all JDC's work by the end of the year. This, as we have seen in Hungary and Romania, was not a local decision, because the East European govern-ments derived great advantages from the presence of American Jewish organizations in their countries. But the Cold War, the increasing pressure of a paranoid Stalinism, and especially Soviet antisemitism, forced the Poles to evict JDC, just as the Hungarians and Romanians were being forced to do at the same time.

Communist Eastern Europe 169

Within about six weeks Bein managed to sell property, dispose of sup-plies, pay off employees, and get an accountant's report of his financial operations. The religious population received funds and supplies, as did the CC. Everything was liquidated in proper order, but the papers remained in Poland, probably because the authorities wanted to see whether they could utilize anything in them for propagandistic Stalinist purposes and show trials. Apparently nothing was found. After 30 years of operation in Poland, legally and under the Nazis, JDC had to go. On December 31, 1949, William Bein left Warsaw. A chapter had come to an end.12

With the liquidation of JDC's work in Poland, the idea of a permanent Jewish presence in Poland ended too. The Jews, or at least many of them, had as always been willing to stay. The fact that they were blind enough not to see that in a post-Nazi Eastern Europe there would be no place for a distinct and separate Jewish group speaks volumes about the lack of political sophistication among these supposedly sophisticated people. They asked for help from their American fellow Jews, and help they received. In the process, much of the naive expectations they had was shared by their American benefactors. Like the local Jews, American Jews waxed enthusiastic about the future prospects of the range of producers' co-ops and loan banks, about Jewish education and lack of antisemitism— a few months after Kielce. This could not be blamed on the American Jews; they did whatever they could to help Polish Jews to achieve whatever Polish Jews wanted. It was not their task to dispel Polish Jewish illusions. In the process, a combination of Polish and American Jewish initiative and drive created, very temporarily, economic castles in the air, and indeed social achievements out of nothing, with people who had suffered more than could be described. In the end what had been important was the massive intervention by JDC which kept body and soul together among Polish Jews and enabled them to survive, to move on. The whole recon-structive effort, on the other hand, had been useless. It became a memory, and perhaps a warning. Nothing else remained.

Czechoslovakia

While the general outlines of American Jewish intervention, largely through JDC, in the life of Jewish communities throughout Europe are similar, the greatly different local conditions made each intervention a separate adventure. The basic problem was the same, and we have seen it already in Hungary, Romania, and Poland: would it be possible to rebuild a viable Jewish community in each of the different countries of Europe? The largest survivors' communities were those of the three countries men-

12 Excom, 2/15/49, 4/12/49, 5/17/49, 8/17/49, 9/20/49, 10/19/49, Adcom, 11/15/49; Excom, 11/22/49; Adcom, 3/28/50; Excom, 2/21/50.

170 Out of the Ashes

tioned already (and of France), but in none of these three countries was it ultimately possible to revive die dry bones. The reason for this lay not so much in the desire of the people to leave these countries. Rather, it was the new regime with its attempt at total reconstruction of the social structure, coming on top of the physical and cultural destruction of the Holocaust, that made revival impossible. In all three countries, too, the Nazi period had left a strong legacy of antisemitism, and in all three the Jews were identified by the local population, tragically, with the communist system that destroyed the discrete character of their Jewishness. The communist attempt at reconstruction ultimately crippled the economies and stultified the social and cultural development in these countries; on the way, it destroyed Jewish life in them. The fate of JDC and the other American Jewish organizations, who were expelled from these countries in 1949, symbolized as well as any of the other developments the hopelessness of the Jewish situation.

However, Czechoslovakia seemed different. After all, the country had a proud democratic tradition, derived not only from the legacy of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk, its founder and guiding spirit during the interwar period, but further back, in the unyielding traditions of Czech resistance to Germanizing tendencies and political and cultural oppression. After World War II, the country seemed to be on the road to a democratic, multi-party system, in close alliance with the Soviet Union, but with a Western-type cultural and political outlook—in fact, not unlike Finland. The President, Eduard Bene§, and the Foreign Minister, Jan Masaryk, seemed to be the guarantors of a noncommunist, non-authoritarian regime. Practically speaking, in 1946, the Czechoslovak government had been the prime factor in enabling the masses of Jewish refugees guided by Brichah to leave Poland and reach the haven of the US Zones in Austria and Germany. The Czechs went far beyond what could be reasonably expected of them and, as we have seen, actually paid for much of the transport of many tens of thousands of people to whom they had no obli-gations whatsoever.

The difference between the social climates of the different countries was brought out in Leavitt's report on July 15, 1947. "In Germany and Austria," he said, "there is a hopelessness, a despair, a deadness which are stifling. Coming into Czechoslovakia, I saw business in operation, people working, stores open and stocked, and people smiling and behaving normally. Czechoslovakia is on its way to recovery." This was seven months before the communist takeover.13

In early 1947, as the Polish Brichah became reduced to a trickle, Jacob-son in Prague had a much easier task than before. It was relatively simple to accommodate the few hundred refugees that came from Poland each month, and move them on as occasions arose. Amongst these refugees

11 Excom, 7/15/47.

Communist Eastern Europe 171

there was always a group of orthodox people who required special atten-tion, but even that could be handled with relative ease. Nor was Czechoslo-vakia entirely free from the influx of refugees from Romania whose main aim was to reach Vienna (see Chapter 9). But many of the people who came in from Romania were actually Polish Jews who had found refuge in Romania during the war. Among them, too, there was a preponderance of orthodox people, with families of rabbis prominent among them. The problem they and the orthodox people from Poland presented for JDC was twofold: first, there was no control whereby JDC had any inkling of how many people would be coming and when, which was of importance because of the provision that had to be made for kosher food and the like. Also these people, both in Czechoslovakia and later in France where most of them went, usually refused to work and expected to be maintained so they could continue their studies. Second, there was the problem of rabbis leaving their countries and denuding them of rabbinical services. Leavitt complained in mid-1947 that there were at any one time 90-100 rabbis in Prague, in transit (though some of them pretended to be rabbis and were uncovered as impostors in the process), and their upkeep was dispro-portionate to their numbers.14

Attention turned to long-term planning, both for the possible resump-tion of the flow from Poland, and for the approximately 44,000 Jews who were left in 1947 (28,500 in Slovakia and 15,500 in the Czech lands). As far as planning for future refugee movements was concerned, JDC had to take into account the fact that there were still close to 100,000 Jews in Poland, and one could not tell if and when they would move out. The Jewish Adviser in Germany—Levinthal—and JDC were interested in eas-ing the position of the American Army and providing a possibility of refuge in Czechoslovakia for at least some of the prospective refugees. Jacobson and Schwartz therefore asked the Czech government to accept 10,000 Jews in the Sudeten area, temporarily (if they came) in line with Rabbi Bernstein's proposal earlier on. The Sudeten was the area from which Germans were being deported into Germany, and just like the Poles in Silesia, the Czechs had a problem in settling it. After protracted nego-tiations, the Czechoslovak government decided, in early 1947, to accede to the request: they would temporarily accommodate 10,000 Jews; General McNarney had agreed to take them into his Zones after July 1,1947. This was wise planning for the future, but in this case it did not lead to any practical results, because the influx of the refugees into Czechoslovakia never materialized.15

However, Jacobson had to deal with other problems not faced by country directors elsewhere. The easternmost section of the prewar Czechoslovak republic, Subcarpathian Russia, had been annexed by the

14 Adcom, 6/6/47. " Excom, 3/5/47.

172 Out of the Ashes

Soviet Union in 1945 following the usual "democratically expressed desire" of the local population "eager" to join the Soviet fatherland. The result was that of the surviving Jews, most chose to leave for western Czechoslovakia, and a large group concentrated in Bohemia. According to the agreement between the Czechs and the Soviets, non-Ruthenian eth-nics, specifically Czechs and Slovaks (Ruthenians and Ukrainians were the majority population in the annexed area) were given the right to choose Czechoslovak citizenship, provided certain conditions were fulfilled, such as birth certificates and the like. Jews could not provide such documents, and they of course were not Czechs or Slovaks. The Jewish community in Prague asked the government to accord Czechoslovak citizenship to people who had gone to Czech or Slovak schools or who had participated in Czech or Slovak cultural activities, whatever that meant. However, the Czechoslovak government was very careful not to antagonize the Soviets who might claim Jews from the Subcarpathian region as their nationals. The resulting impasse was in the end solved by a slow, gradual process of registration of Jews as Czechoslovak citizens, despite all the fears of the Czech officials. Again, humane considerations outbalanced realpolitik. It was the American Jewish representative who was one of the prime movers in this problem which involved some 6000-10,000 people.16

As elsewhere, the question of property restitution bothered the sur-vivors. On this matter the Czechs were not accommodating. Laws were passed which transferred most of the communal property to the State, and made restitution especially of businesses almost impossible. This was due not so much to any opposition to the Jews as to the progressive nationaliz-ation of private enterprises. In some cases, some restitution payments were made, in others not. A problem of antisemitism was encountered in a specific Czech form, namely in the accusation that Jews had become "Ger-manizing agents" in the prewar years. Hatred against anything German turned against the Jews, many of whom had indeed been a German-speak-ing element at home in German culture. There had of course been a very loyal German-speaking social-democratic and liberal element in the country, part of Masaryk's original political coalition, but the years of brutal German domination of the country had wiped out that memory. Paradoxically, Jews now suffered from identification with their murderers. Nevertheless, sympathetic Czech officials helped even there, and many Jews who had grown up in German culture and had voted, prior to 1939, for (democratic) German political parties, had their rights as Czechoslovak citizens recognized (and thus avoided being deported to Germany as Germans!).

We have seen already that the problem surfaced even with the unfreez-ing of the funds confiscated by the Nazis from Czech Jews who were shipped off to the ghetto of Theresienstadt (Terezin), and who had then

14 J DC/Paris Research Department, Report No. 41, Czechoslovakia, 1/27/48.

Communist Eastern Europe 173

been gassed at Auschwitz. It was not until May 1946 that the Czechs gave any money to the Jewish community in Prague from these funds, and when the government was approached again in early 1947, it was willing to release only a proportion of the money. After the communist takeover in February 1948, these funds were blocked by the government and in effect confiscated.

Another problem JDC was facing was that of internal dissensions, especially in Slovakia. However, due at least in part to some careful maneuvering on the part of JDC officials, a united Jewish Community Council (Svaz) was established in the autumn of 1947, in which the neo-logue and orthodox groups had equal representation. By contrast, in the Czech lands, the central community organization, the Rada, began looking after its own problems in 1947. JDC had to cover 50 percent of the welfare costs, but the other half, and the administrative expenses of the Rada, were already covered by local collections.

There was of course still, in 1947, a need for relief, by feeding and in cash, though it was getting progressively smaller. However, there was a special problem in Slovakia, where "real" antisemitism (as compared to the special Czech kind mentioned above) was prevalent, namely the fate of widows with and without children, and single young women who had returned from deportation. JDC started a number of producers' coopera-tives in the knitting and weaving trades, but had to provide the raw materials in a country in which consumer industries were relegated to second place and all the emphasis put on heavy industry. In the end, after much negotiating, the raw materials were provided and the co-ops lived for a couple of years, providing the women with much-needed income and a measure of self-esteem which was no less important. Co-ops were also set up for men, on the Polish model.17

As recovery proceeded, many of these women married and had children, and there was, later in the year, a sudden explosion in the birth-rate, which led to an increased demand for layettes and other supplies for young families. In 1947, these were demands that JDC could meet.

As in other countries, Zionist hachsharot (11 in the Czech lands and 17 in Slovakia, in 1948) were supported.18

Another important aspect of JDC's work in Czechoslovakia was the care of older people and of the sick. The government participated in the upkeep of two old age homes in the Czech lands (Bohemia and Moravia) and one in Bratislava, but JDC ended up by paying 30 percent of the costs of the former, and 80 percent of the latter. In Czechoslovakia, local hospitals were supported, supplied with X-ray and other equipment, and then supervised by a JDC doctor, rather than establish special Jewish hospitals.

17 Ibid. Also, Adcom, 6/16/47. u Excom, 3/16/48.

174 Out of the Ashes

But OSE,19 the child care agency supported by JDC which had an Amer-ican branch as well, and was mainly active in Western Europe, had a children's convalescent home of its own in the Tatra mountains of Slo-vakia, and there were two more homes there for children, directly run by JDC. There were few children left, but JDC supported the community in emphasizing the importance of protecting the precious remnant. The older youngsters were in part organized in hachsharot, largely industrial ones, and die numbers officially reported were 434, in late 1947, for all the Zionist youth movements combined. It was a weak reed, compared to the large numbers in the DP countries and, indeed, compared to the very impressive figures of late 1946, when over 7000 members had been claim-ed.20

J Until 1948, Czechoslovakia was ruled by an uneasy coalition of commu-I nist and noncommunist forces, but in February of that year, the commu-

nists under Klement Gottwald took over in a putsch that also resulted, after a short time, in the death of Jan Masaryk, the main liberal leader in the country and a friend of the Jews . Large and middle-sized industries were nationalized, as were the banks, and a sweeping tax reform increased the burden on private enterprise while easing it for employees and workers.

The immediate results of the putsch in the Jewish community was that a number of Jews—probably around one thousand—who were in some way politically identified with the previous regime, left the country. A few months later came the establishment of Israel, and with it a massive emigration wave. In between, a trickle of a few hundred people emigrated, and the situation was described as tense. JDC social and cultural work, though, carried on as before. Medical supplies especially were brought into the country, by air.

In line with communist policy, a Jewish Actions Committee represent-ing the new rulers in effect took over the Central Jewish Community Council (Rada), and all local fund-raising for local welfare needs stopped. JDC at first had to make up for the shortfall, and Julius Levine, Jacobson's replacement as JDC director, had a hard time. He was helped by an arrangement not unlike the ones in Poland and Romania: meat was imported into Czechoslovakia by JDC, sold to local firms with govern-ment approval, and the proceeds used to support JDC activities. Again, as in other countries, Jewish Agency funds—actually, Jewish National Fund monies collected to buy land in Palestine—were used locally by JDC and the equivalent returned to the Agency or the JNF in dollars. JDC had been planning to terminate its activities in Czechoslovakia from 1947 on,

" OSE—originally founded in Russia, in 1912, as Obshchestvo Zdravookhraneniya Yey-reyev, or organization for the Protection of Health of Jews. The same letters were used in Western Europe, when the agency moved its headquarters to France and Switzerland (Oeuvres Secours auxEnfants) and became concerned largely with child care. See Leo Wul-man, In Fight for the Health of the Jewish People, New York (1968).

20 Ibid.; and Excom, 4/16/47.

Communist Eastern Europe 175

because the local communities seemed increasingly more capable of look-ing after their problems—though in early 1948 the Slovak Svaz was still dependent on JDC for 85 percent of its finances. In a way, the new govern-ment helped JDC, because a sweeping social legislation made everyone entitled to a minimum wage or social support on the basis of need. On the other hand, the takeover meant that local communities would not be able to raise local funds or look after their institutions without government help. Already at the end of 1948, it became clear to at least some of JDC's leaders that the likelihood was that it would have to cease operations, there and in countries like Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, not because no further aid from JDC was required, but because the new governments would not have it.21 This was brought out clearly in the threat by the authorities in mid-1948, that they would not extend the permit for 2500 transients to stay on in Prague. Composed largely of orthodox people from Poland, this group became quite panicky, and demanded that it be moved into safety. Nor was the atmosphere in the special homes and camps for transient children, rabbis andyeshiva students cause for much self-congratulation.

The problem of the transients was indeed the major immediate issue for Henry Levy, the last JDC representative in Czechoslovakia. He managed to secure the emigration of about half of these transients by mid-1949, but as many of them disliked the notion of going to Israel, which was their only possible chance, the situation with the last 1100 people became seri-ous. Within the next six months JDC and the local Jewish community cajoled and threatened their mostly orthodox transients to accept visas for Israel; a minority went to the United States and France—all of them paid for by JDC.

Nationalization had affected health and welfare institutions, and in a way JDC was relieved of a burden. The atmosphere became more and more tense, as the Stalinist regime tightened its hold. By early 1949, of the 44,000 Jews in 1947, only 22,000 were left, and they began to leave for Israel at a rate of 2000 a month. By the end of the year, it was clear that no more than 12,000 would be left. The efforts of both JDC and the Israeli embassy in Prague were directed at organizing the emigration of the people as speedily as possible. In the meantime, JDC sought to liqui-date the producers' cooperatives (there was one in the Czech lands and one in Slovakia) in as orderly a fashion as possible. The old age homes and the two sanatoria in the Tatra mountains in Slovakia were handed over to the authorities. After November 30, all passports were withdrawn; people were locked in. At the end of the year Levy was told that he would have to leave at the end of January 1950. But JDC would have left anyway; there were almost no Jews left. They had fled from the land of Masaryk and Bene§.

21 J DC/Czechoslovakia, Paris Budget and Research Report No. 50, 7/12/48; Adcom, 11/23/48. OOA—G*

176 Out of the Ashes

Yugoslavia and Bulgaria

Out of a prewar Jewish population in Yugoslavia of some 75,000, only 12,000 remained when the war ended. Of these, about a third were unable to earn a living even two years after the end of the war. Until 1948, Yugoslavia was in the Soviet sphere of influence, and emigration was not permitted. On the other hand, Yugoslavia was in fact helping the Mossad in its "illegal immigration" program for Palestine, so that several thousand Jews from Poland and Romania were permitted to set sail from Dalmatian ports to break the British blockade of Palestine. In 1947, the official treaty of the big Powers with Yugoslavia was signed, and emigration became a legal possibility. Older people, who had no chance of being employed, saw emigration as their only hope. JDC maintained a limited presence in the country, helping especially with programs geared to children and old people, as well as the rebuilding of destroyed synagogues. On the other hand, the local community agreed to sell to the government the many communal buildings that were no longer needed, using the money to main-tain local institutions without recourse to overseas help.22 Recovery was very slow, and even in 1948,98.7 percent of the local relief committee's expenditures were still covered by JDC.

With Israel now offering a haven, most of the Yugoslav survivors decided to leave. In 1948-49, mass emigration to Israel took place: 7000 left, and a remnant of 5000 people officially identified as Jews remained in Yugoslavia. JDC was no longer required, and it liquidated its office in February 1950. However, it left Yugoslavia in a completely different atmosphere from the one in which it left—was expelled, in fact—from other East European countries. Frederick White, the JDC representative, was received by Marshall Tito in audience, he was given a medal in recog-nition of his services, and so on.

We have seen (above, Chapter 1) that on liberation, Bulgarian Jews were in desperate straits. The Bulgarian authorities had robbed the Jewish population of its property. In 1943, the entire Jewish population of the main towns, including Sofia and Varna, had been deported to the prov-inces, and their movable and immovable property either confiscated or sold in forced sales. All the men between 20 and 45 years of age were taken to do forced labor. The few wealthier Jews had to pay punitive taxes and were in effect deprived of their property. Immediately after the change of government following the Soviet occupation of the country, on September 9, 1944, Jews were allowed to return to the towns and insofar as their houses had not been destroyed in the aerial bombardments, they were returned to them. Whatever movable property had not been handed out to Bulgarians was returned, but that included only a small fraction of what had been taken. Ever since 1941, Jews had not been allowed to practice

12 Cf. Excom meetings for 1946-49.

Communist Eastern Europe 177 trade and business, and artisans were forced out of their crafts. The result was total impoverishment.

The causes behind this economic antisemitism are not quite clear. It is obvious, though, that the Jews, along with Greeks and Armenians, were in the way of a rising Bulgarian middle and intellectual class in a peasant country in which only 20 percent of the population were city dwellers, but which had probably the lowest illiteracy rate in the Balkans and could boast a well-developed cultural life. There was no large Jewish capitalist class; Jews were largely small traders and artisans who had no capital to fall back on. A dispute exists as to whether there was any antisemitism at all in Bulgaria, and the term used here of "economic antisemitism" is also questioned. Bulgarian and Bulgarian Jewish authorities alike deny that it existed as a recognizable phenomenon. Yet the facts outlined above would seem to justify the use of the term.

After liberation, in the hard conditions that now obtained, there ensued . a struggle between the ideologies of Zionism and communism among the young, well-educated children of this lower middle-class population.

In November 1944, Ben-Gurion visited Bulgaria. He saw the quarter of the poor Jews in Sofia and a similar area in Plovdiv, and was shocked by what he saw—grinding, hopeless poverty. He turned to JDC immediately upon his return and asked it to send help, which it did: it made available $50,000 in the form of a credit in December.23 As to the general quality of Jewish life in Bulgaria, he was convinced that the communist takeover would be speedy and total, and that that might well spell the closing in of the Jewish population, the majority of whom clearly favored Zionism. He was quite right on the first point, but as the future was to show, he was overly pessimistic regarding the second—ultimately, almost all Bulgarian Jews emigrated to Israel, with the blessing of the Bulgarian communists.24

The Jewish community's official representative body was the Consis-toire. After September 1944, communist influence slowly became evident, though the Jewish population was overwhelmingly Zionist-oriented. In May 1946, the Zionists were finally persuaded to join the Fatherland Front, the vehicle through which the communists were ultimately to attain complete control over the country's seven million inhabitants. Member-ship of the Fatherland Front, however, was only a means to infiltrate the various Zionist groups from the inside, and soon afterwards the Zionist leader, Vitali Haimoff, was arrested on trumped-up charges. The Consis-toire now had a formal majority of Zionist members, but in fact was terrorized and led by its secretary-general, Izak Francez, "commissar for Jews" of the Communist Party, as a JDC report called him, who proceeded

23 JDC/SM Files, 4, Schwartz to New York, 12/18/44. 24 Tuviah Friling, Ben-Gurion Veha'shoah, PhD thesis (unpublished), Hebrew Univer-

sity, Jerusalem (1989).

178 Out of the Ashes

to take total control over the JDC program. By the end of 1947, Henry L. Levy, then JDC's representative, was to report that Francez:

. . . is in close contact with the Ministry of the Interior and can arrest any Jew opposing the dictates of the Consistoire . . . He has completely and successfully intimidated the local staff of the JDC who regard him as their real employer. At any hour of the day or night he can order any Jew to come to his office for questioning . . . By specific orders from the Consistoire the JDC is not permitted to extend assistance of any kind to the two hachsharot. The two Zionist summer camps were not assisted by the JDC, despite its willingness and ability to do so.25,

He concluded that the regime instituted by the Jewish communists deprived JDC of any independence and any capability to carry on a realistic program.

In Bulgaria, as in countries such as Hungary and Romania, there was a JDC Committee. Originally this had been appointed by Saly Mayer, and was headed by a tobacco merchant named Maurice Marcus. After Bul-garia's capitulation, a merchant was no longer the right person to represent JDC, and Schwartz appointed Colonel Avram P. Tadjer, a 75-year-old, half-senile, nonpolitical figure, well respected in the community, and totally ineffective as a leader. The first postwar JDC representative to reach Sofia, on March 11, 1945, was Arthur Fishzohn. A consignment of clothing sent by JDC which arrived with him increased his standing in the community, until it turned out that the clothing was in large part useless— single unmatched shoes, old tattered clothes, and so on. Fishzohn had to accept the new JDC Committee, and add to it Zionist and communist representatives, including Francez. Soon the new Committee became a tool of the Communist Party, just like the Consistoire.

The fact that postwar Bulgarian governments were friendly towards Jews is less of a contradiction to what has just been described than might be imagined. A young Bulgarian Jew is reported to have made the incisive comment that "previously, all governments had been less liberal in their attitude towards the Jews than the [Bulgarian] people, while this govern-ment is one step ahead of the people in its liberal attitude towards the Jews."26 Interestingly enough, the non-Jews in the government were much more liberal than the Jewish communists, parallelling the experience in other East European countries. While therefore Jewish communists were eager to fight the desire of Jews to emigrate to Palestine, the government consistently honored Palestine visas and allowed people to leave the country. A slow emigration process began immediately after liberation, and within a year and a half some 1600 Jews had left; the number was limited by British policy, not by the Bulgarians. And while Bulgaria s relationship with the Western Powers deteriorated rapidly, no such deterioration was felt, at least initially, by JDC. JDC was introducing good dollars and, more importantly, machinery, tools, medical supplies, and

25 J DC/Bulgaria, Henry L. Levy's Report, 11/23/47. 24 J DC/Bulgaria, Fishzohn Report, 8/8/46.

Communist Eastern Europe 179

clothes into the country. After some struggle with a few ministers, JDC obtained the right to ship in supplies without customs or taxes, and achieved the return of the central Jewish hospital by the Army—no mean achievement in a country like Bulgaria.

The situation did not change for the better in 1947. Crop failures, in 1945 and 1946, did nothing to ease the situation, and the fact that the Bulgarian economy had to feed a large Soviet occupation force made the situation even worse. Yet the community refused to accept doles from JDC; it did ask for supplies that were lacking, and for help in setting up kassas and co-ops, so they could start earning their living. JDC failed to do this, by and large, in 1946, and there was a great deal of bitterness over promises that had been made and not kept regarding supplies that would arrive. As late as 1947, JDC had to report that "many families are still without blankets, shoes and clothing . . . the need is so great that only the poorest of the poor can be assisted. We have shipped to that country clothing, shoes, sugar, dried milk, blankets, medical supplies, etc."27 In early 1947 a change began to be felt, with useful and more plentiful sup-plies arriving in the country.

In Bulgaria, just as elsewhere, one of the main vehicles of reconstruction was the establishment of producers' cooperatives. By 1948, there were 16 of those, and they received some government help; JDC's share in financ-ing came to about 40 percent. The problem was not one of money, but of machines and tools, which were simply nonexistent in Bulgaria, and which were imported by JDC.

Poverty and slave labor had caused a tremendous child health problem. TB was rampant, and JDC was asked to build children's sanatoria and enable children to leave their homes to recuperate from the dread illness. One-time grants enabled community institutions to be rebuilt. A loan kassa was established which did a tremendous job in re-establishing a large number of petty traders and artisans in their occupations. Local social services were reorganized by Levy's wife, a trained social worker. A suc-cession of strong personalities representing JDC in Sofia—Fishzohn, Siegel, and Levy—helped in maintaining the agency there for longer than might have been expected.

Stalinism reigned in Bulgaria no less than in the other communist countries. But the Bulgarian version was friendly to the Zionist attitude of most of Bulgarian Jewry. Some 6500 had left Bulgaria on illegal and legal immigration prior to 1948. In 1948 and 1949,36,300 Bulgarian Jews went to Israel, with the blessing of the Bulgarian authorities. 7000 remained out of the 49,000 that had been there in 1944. JDC wound down its program, and its last representative, Fred Baker, closed shop on May 2, 1949. The main achievements of JDC in that country were in the area of health care: the building of the Jewish Memorial Hospital and the TB

27 Excom, 3/5/47.

180 Out of the Ashes

preventive clinic for children in Sofia, and the establishment of a polyclinic in Plovdiv. These were handed over to the government. The people had gone. JDC would meet some of them again in its geriatric programs in Israel.

The termination of JDC's work in Eastern Europe in 1949 was the result of two interconnected factors. One was the emigration of the large majority of Jews in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and the resulting winding down of JDC's traditional activities. In Hungary and Romania, Jews wanted to leave but many could not. Romanian emigration proceeded while JDC was still there, but a large number of those who wanted to leave did so after JDC had been told to go. The fact that these communities packed their bags was due not just to the attraction of Israel— a difficult country to go to for all except the young and the idealistic. It was in large measure due to the communist takeovers in these countries. Jews could exist in communist-dominated countries, but they could not live there. There was no place for Jewish culture, religion, politics, and literature or art. That was the second factor that forced JDC to leave: the Stalinist regimes identified JDC as the "lackey of American imperialism," in line with the Soviet regime's paranoiac antisemitic notion of a world Jewish conspiracy against "socialism." In part, therefore, JDC left because the Jews did. They did so because a regime was in power under which they would feel uncomfortable. And the same regime forced JDC out of places and at times when JDC still would have liked to remain, if only for a while. With the end of Jewish life in Eastern Europe a great chapter in Jewish existence was ended. The remnants that had survived the Holo-caust turned to other coasts and other lands. American Jewry and its organizations went with them.

CHAPTER 8

Interagency Problems

The Hebrew Immigrant and Aid Society (HIAS) was founded in 1909 by Russian Jews who had immigrated to the United States, in order to help their fellow Jews who had remained behind in Europe to emigrate to the free world. In the years between the wars HIAS had developed an expertise in bringing Jews from Europe, not only to the United States but to Latin America and other countries as well. It did not deal with migration to Palestine, because it was not a Zionist-orientated agency, and Palestine was in any case adequately covered by the Zionist movement. In 1927, HIAS joined forces with the Jewish Colonization Association (ICA), led by the English-Jewish aristocracy, in league with the inheritors of the estate of Baron Hirsch in France. Together with a smaller emigration agency, Emigdirect, they founded the HICEM (HIAS-ICA-Emigdirect), registered in France, which dealt with the European end of the migratory movements, and did important work in facilitating the movement of Jews from the Old World to the New. When war came in 1939, HICEM as a French organization could no longer deal with German Jews, and with the conquest of France by the Germans in 1940 it could no longer operate in Europe at all. JDC, which had paid for most of HICEM's expenses until then, now had to take over the practical side of emigration as well. Out of Lisbon, JDC organized ships, visas, dealt with individual applications, and together with HIAS in America collected funds from relatives to help save their people from Europe. This continued until the United States's entry into the war in December 1941. From then on migratory movements were largely illegal rescue operations, and the Jewish Agency dealt with these insofar as they were directed towards Palestine, whereas JDC did what little it could in relation to other escape routes.

When the war ended, HIAS re-entered the European field. By compari-son with JDC, it was a small organization. Its income in 1945 was $1,490,110, and was to rise to $1,964,309 in 1946 and to $2,032,215 in 1947. At first, the practical possibilities of emigration from the DP camps and from other European countries to the western hemisphere were slim. But soon a jurisdictional quarrel ensued between the two organizations. Part of this was against a purely American background. HIAS was not part of the UJA set-up, and received its funds from individuals and from

181

182 Out of the Ashes

welfare funds in a number of United States cities through special cam-paigns. These were frowned upon by UJA functionaries, representing both the Zionist groups and JDC. Also, HIAS had maintained its East European make-up. Its immediate past president was James Bernstein, of the original Russian Jewish group. The president in 1945 was Abraham Herman, the vice-president was Samuel A. Telsey, the executive director was Isaac L. Asofsky, and HIAS was well represented in Europe by Ilya M. Dijour and Lewis Neikrug—all of whom belonged to the same East European group. JDC was, as we have seen, made up of wealthy persons of German-Jewish, or Americanized East European background. One can feel, in the docu-ments, a perhaps unconscious tension between them. In the United States, JDC worked with the National Refugee Service and the National Council of Jewish Women, groups that were associated with UJA and with whom the JDC leaders easily found a common language. In 1945, NRS and NCJW were negotiating for a merger of their immigration services that dealt with the absorption of Jewish newcomers to the States. HIAS had a parallel service in the United States, which was not linked organically, as the NRS and NCJW were, to the local welfare funds. Immigrants spon-sored by HIAS could arrive at American ports, and then arrive at their relatives' homes without their federations or communities being aware of it. The tensions between NRS, NCJW, and JDC on the one hand, and HIAS on the other hand, grew.

In November 1945, ICA withdrew from HICEM, because according to British regulations, the London-based ICA could not transfer funds to a non-British organization. HIAS became the heir to the assets of HICEM, which were not worth very much, and it had lost its international support. Nevertheless, HIAS opened 37 branches in 16 countries in Europe, sent people to look after potential emigrants' interests, and did its best to facilitate immigration to the Americas, as well as look after "transmi-grants," especially in France, which was the seat of the European head-quarters of both HIAS and JDC. These transmigrants were people on temporary visas and were awaiting entry permits to overseas countries. Apart from its work in the United States, HIAS had a well-established Latin American network of offices dealing with prospects of immigration there and looking after arrivals who had received entry permits. But con-ditions were becoming more difficult for HIAS, because a wartime arrangement between JDC and HIAS whereby HIAS covered 20 percent and JDC 80 percent of transportation costs of migrants had lapsed, and HIAS would now have to pay for its visa-holders itself.

The first real breakthrough for Jewish emigration from Europe was the Truman Directive of December 1945. But it was only in May 1946 that the first two ships with European DPs cleared for immigration to the United States arrived in America. The two agencies had offered Jewish DPs two sets of parallel services, and were competing for the "business"

Interagency Problems 183

of emigration. Clearly, JDC said, emigration would be a central, if not the central task relative to the situation of Holocaust survivors, especially in the DP countries. If JDC gave up emigration to HIAS, it could not ask for funds the way it did. HIAS argued that it was the old and established emigration agency and had specialized in the field. JDC, it claimed was a purely welfare and relief agency. JDC countered by saying that it had in fact become an emigration agency during the war when HIAS-HICEM had been found unable to carry the burden of organizing migration. The argument that it was a purely welfare agency was misleading because in the case of post-Holocaust European Jewry "welfare" had sense only insofar as emigration was part of it. In actual fact, though, the struggle in Europe for emigration was a struggle for the continued existence for an indepen-dent HIAS on the one hand, and for the philanthropic dollar on the other hand. In such a struggle, JDC was bound to have the upper hand. On the first two ships to the United States there were 1215 Jewish immigrants. Of these JDC had brought 811 and spent $171,000 on them, whereas HIAS had spent $40,800 for 204 immigrants—more or less the same was spent on each immigrant.

Another major issue was the reception of the immigrants in the States. The NRS specialized in providing corporate affidavits for the prospective immigrants, and so did HIAS. JDC took over the cases handled by NRS, and the two groups tightened their alliance, which of course turned against HIAS. In addition, HIAS obtained individual affidavits for DPs, and such persons could also appear on a corporate affidavit obtained by the NRS. A chaotic situation thus developed. To make the situation worse, HIAS also acted as a transmitting agent for United States residents sending food, money, and clothes to their European relatives. In 1945, it shipped almost 20,000 packages and transmitted over $325,000 in cash. It also obtained $538,153 in 1945 in payments from relatives in the United States to pay for transportation costs of 1238 DPs.1 '

Prior to the dissolution of HICEM in November 1945, Warburg and Schwartz were seeking some kind of an accommodation. The idea was to get ICA back in with HIAS, thereby providing an important source of funds and saving money for JDC. HIAS would become the principal corre-spondent for emigration from Europe under an umbrella of ICA, NRS, and JDC. This would have meant avoidance of a competition which was bound to arouse the ire of the Federations back in the United States. But these proposals really would have meant merging HIAS with NRS, and in the end presumably with JDC. In any case, Leavitt and the Executive Committee of JDC would not agree to anything but a merger of NRS with

1 JDC/HIAS, 1946, Report by the CJFWF, July 1946. See also, HIAS Annual Reports,

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186 Out of the Ashes

immigration, legal and illegal. In June 1948, the American Congress passed its first DP Act, providing for entry of 200,000 DPs, mainly non-Jewish—at least this is what seems to have been intended, though it later turned out differently.7 Again, the problem arose as to who would deal with immigration, but this time there was a real prospect of dealing with reasonably large numbers. It seems that the prime mover for an accommo-dation with HIAS was Charles H. Jordan, a veteran JDC worker who had seen service in Cuba and Shanghai, and in 1948 was stationed in France. On October 2, 1948, he suggested a working arrangement for the DP countries, which he had negotiated with Lewis Neikrug, the HIAS rep-resentative. In essence, it provided for a technical division of labor, and for working from one central office in Germany which was to be run conjointly by the two agencies. This was accepted by both parent organi-zations and the USNA in Pittsburgh on October 23 in an aggreement that reads like a peace treaty between three warring parties.8 A coordinating office was set up at Frankfurt in January 1949, and things began running much more smoothly. In a letter to the administration of the new office, Charles H. Jordan for JDC and Lewis Neikrug for HIAS declared that they "are not interested in the great glory of any one agency. The agencies have agreed to put the client first, the interest of the agency second."9

Everywhere else but in the DP countries, the two agencies continued their separate ways. The compromise also provided for an accommodation of both groups with the USNA, which became the main American-based agency for dealing with the immigrants from Europe. The merger, which had been discussed for three years, was postponed. Another, quite serious dispute arose in March 1949, when HIAS decided to offer the International Refugee Organization (IRO) to transport Jews to Israel at about half the cost ($65 instead of $120) that JDC was spending. The problem was that JDC had been negotiating with IRO for a reimbursement of the expenses of moving Jewish DPs to Israel—a matter of some $9 million. Obviously, IRO would rather deal with an agency that demanded less. JDC, supported by the Jewish Agency, argued that the low figure was unrealistic, that the difference would have to be made up, in the end, by American Jewry, and that all HIAS wanted was a share in an operation in which it had never, or only marginally, participated—namely, immigration to Palestine-Israel. The Council of Jewish Federations and Welfare Funds intervened, and demanded an accommodation between the agencies, after angry comments had been received from local Jewish communities. In the end, HIAS with-drew.10 There was, and is, nothing more permanent, it seems, than Jewish organizational patriotism.

7 Dinnerstein, op. cit., pp. 163-82. * JDC/HIAS, 10/23/48. ' JDC/HIAS, 1949, 1/18/49. 10 JDC/HIAS, 1949, letters and materials for March-September 1949.

Interagency Problems 187 Another organization, a branch of which had transferred itself from the Old World to the New, was the ORT (Organization for Rehabilitation through Training), founded in Russia in 1880 to advance vocational schooling in agriculture, craft, and industry among the Jewish popu-lation.11 After the Bolshevik Revolution the headquarters of ORT moved to Berlin in 1921 and the money, which had originally been supplied by Russian Jewish financiers, was now donated largely by Central and West European Jews. In the interwar period a great deal of work was done in the Soviet Union, Poland and Romania especially, to train young Jewish / people both in traditional Jewish trades such as needlework, tailoring, and shoemaking, and also in radio, electromechanics, and agriculture. The organization was run by exiled Russian Jews, such as Leon Bramson, Dr David Lvovitch, and Dr Aaron Syngalowski, and when the Nazis came it was moved to Geneva.

In the meantime, an American branch was founded, and a prestigious American Jew, George Backer, who was associated with JDC, was elected president. The main figures in America were at first Russian Jews, but slowly Americanized Jewish leaders came to prominence. In the United States too, some attempts were made to propagate the idea of "rehabili-tation through training," and schools were set up.

The American branch fulfilled, naturally enough, the task of the main financing organization, a fact that was bound to produce certain tensions between branch and center.

When the war ended, ORT leaders all over devastated Europe began to pick up the pieces and re-establish with whatever means they could obtain vocational training for youngsters. One of these survivors was Jacob Ole-iski, who had been a central figure in ORT in prewar Lithuania. Liberated in Dachau, he established, out of literally nothing at all, an ORT vocational school in Landsberg as early as August 1945. He became a revered figure in the camps for his tremendous enthusiasm and drive, as well as for his very tangible achievements. In the spring of 1946 he established the ORT bureau in Munich, and hundreds of trainees went through his schools, having learnt carpentry, mechanics, tailoring, and so on. Oleiski was no easy man to deal with, and though he was on very good terms with Klausner and the first JDC teams, he got into trouble with the more organized and Americanized system of operations required of a large agency such as JDC in Germany in 1946. He also had no easy time with the ZK, because in Lithuania he had been known as a non-Zionist, and the ZK decided early on to oversee his schools for Zionist purity. An agreement signed between ZK and ORT in October 1946 provided that the schools should be run by a body called the "Administration of ORT Schools of the ZK,"1 2 consisting of three ORT functionaries and a delegate

J' Originally called Obshchestvo Rasprostrancniya Truda sredi Yevreev. 12 Wetzel, op. cit., pp. 99, ff: "Farwaltung fun ORT Fach-Schuln bajm ZK"

188 Out of the Ashes

from the ZK. Oleiski was the director for the US Zone, but in May 1947 a director for Germany and Austria, Louis J. Walinski, was nominated, sent by the American ORT. His task was to smooth relations with ZK and JDC, and in this he succeeded to some extent.

Curricula for ORT schools for Germany and Austria had to be devised by technically competent people, and these were provided by the Dean of the Munich Polytechnic, a German of course. ORT did not run into any trouble over this with the ZK. Impressive exhibitions of work done at the ORT schools were shown in 1946, 1947, 1948, and 1949 in the US Zone (at Landsberg, Bad Reichenhall, and Munich), and an ORT Congress for the DP countries was held in May 1947, also in Munich, at which the leading figures of the World ORT Union participated.

Despite these achievements, ORT budgets were very modest indeed, as some of the money needed was mobilized locally and the schools needed little additional financing from Geneva. The total spent in 1944 by World ORT was about $420,000, and while for 1945 a budget of $2,450,000 was projected, this was not attained. JDC at first did not help. After liberation, as JDC's operations in Europe developed, there was a growing tendency of JDC to work through the Jewish Agency representatives, who established themselves hachsharot for agricultural and artisan training and in fact com-peted with ORT. Of course, JA concentrated solely on training for Pale-stine, whereas ORT was nonpolitical and did not ask questions as to where the skills it taught were going to be used.

ORT was therefore in a quandary: in the United States it was not part of the UJA set-up and it found it increasingly difficult to raise its funds. In Europe the much larger JDC and J A threatened it with competition. JDC, on the other hand, was not eager to undertake vocational training, a very specialized field in which it had little experience. Also, any group that was eliminated from the fund-raising scene in the United States was a bonus to JDC. In January 1947, an agreement was reached between JDC and ORT whereby ORT ceased fund-raising in the United States but remained a membership organization which asked for membership fees. In return, JDC undertook to give ORT a $2 million subvention as a mini-mum, and handed over all vocational training work to it. World ORT on its part undertook to give JDC (in effect, Schwartz) the right to look into its budget, and consultations were to take place on all details and on future projects.13

ORT turned out to be an essentially weak partner, unable to stand up to JDC's pressure. In Germany, while Oleiski was, by all accounts except those of JDC, successfull locally, Leo Schwarz, the JDC man in Munich in early 1947, said the ORT's achievements in the DP camps "amounted to slightly above zero."14 Not all vocational work was controlled by ORT

,J JDC/ORT, 1945/47, especially the agreement of 1/16/47. . 14 JDC/ORT, 1945/47, Leavitt to Joffe, 3/17/47.

Interagency Problems 189

by any means. In France, for instance, an organization called HEFUD15

was not only supplying clothes to children of deportees but also training them in vocational schools subventioned by the French community and, in the end, mainly by JDC. In Romania, local communities set up their own vocational training programs and resented being taken over by ORT.16 On the other hand, ORT complained bitterly about the insuf-ficiency of JDC help to the students that took the courses. In Belgium, the local ORT chairman complained, children went hungry and could not therefore go to the ORT school. In Bulgaria, the situation was presented as being so lamentable that the ORT had to divert a part of its funds to support its students.

With all the usual backbiting, however, a great deal of work was done, especially in the DP countries. From Germany it was reported in Sep-tember 1947, at the peak of the DP existence there, that some 7225 stu-dents were taking ORT courses with 622 instructors. And while JDC internal memoranda thought these figures were much exaggerated, one could assume that a few thousand young Jewish men and women were getting vocational training of steadily improving quality. Much of the tightening up of administrative procedure and improved quality of training in Germany was due to Walinsky. He had a fight that lasted until he left Germany with Samuel L. Haber, the new JDC director in Munich, because of his sensitivity to some rather mild criticism which Haber voiced of ORT operations.17 On the whole, though, ORT was improving its operation, with a total of 27,364 students claimed all over Europe.

Towards the end of 1947, the same pressures that operated on HIAS could be felt by ORT as well. Its budget of $4,875,000 for 1947 was based on JDC covering $2 million at least, the rest was not at all assured. In addition, by the end of the year ORT found itself faced with an increasing deficit, and no resources to cover it. In the end, costs had to be cut, and ORT ended up having spent $2,275,000, and incurred a deficit of $170,000.18

What bothered O R T especially was the growing rift between the Amer-ican and the European ORT, which was effectively in control of World ORT's Geneva headquarters. The old guard of ORT workers, led by ' 15 Federation Interprofessionelle el Interoeuvre pour Vhabillement des Enfant des Fusillcs el Diportis.

16 Ibid., 6/9-12/47. t 17 JDC/ORT, 1948(11), Haber to Leavitt, 12/15/48. In late 1947, the new ORT director in Germany was reported to have said that JDC aid "is actually unhealthy and must have, sooner or later, demoralising effects," an observation that was shared by Palestinian Jewish leaders, though it later proved to have been erroneous. But, the ORT man said, "the only positive achievements and the bright points on the dark background in the life of the saved remnant in Germany, are the great achievements of O R T . " This was hardly the kind of stuff that would produce amity among the Jewish organizations. Cf. JDC/ORT, Haber to Beckelman, 12/28/47.

" World O R T Union, Weekly Summaries (New York), September-December 1947; JDC/ORT, 1948(1), Sard to Grubel, 4/2/48.

190 Out of the Ashes

Lvovitch and Syngalowski, were jealous of the growing influence of the American branch. The background to this appears to have been the fear that the "rich" Americans would dictate policy to the "real" experts, and the Europeans of course believed that the expertise lay with them. American-type organization often caused American ORT representatives to line up with local JDC workers rather than with their European ORT counterparts. Also, there was a struggle between Lvovitch and Syngalow-ski, with the first operating out of Paris and nominally at least responsible for Germany and Austria, and the latter responsible for all the other places.19 The internal squabbling inevitably reduced the efficiency of ORT at a crucial stage. JDC in its internal correspondence was skeptical regard-ing ORT figures of its students, but its main criticism was that in actual fact attendance of students was dependent on the receipt by them of JDC packages as a kind of payment. This of course showed the degree of demoralization that was creeping in with the seeming lack of emigration perspectives for the DPs.

A certain improvement, also financially, was obtained with the agree-ment between ORT and the international organization that inherited the mantle of UNRRA—PCIRO (the Preparatory Commission of the Inter-national Organization for Refugees)—at the end of 1947. PCIRO agreed to support the transfer of machinery to Palestine if and when emigration of the students became possible; it agreed to look for suitable facilities for ORT projects; and provided other aid which was indirectly responsible for an easing of the ORT situation.20

On the other hand, a problem developed with JDC which was typical of the situation in the DP countries at the time: ORT was paying its instruc-tors certain monies in pounds sterling, whereas JDC did not pay its DP officials in hard currency. The decision was therefore made by JDC that ORT would have to stop this practice. This, ORT argued, would cause their instructors to leave work. In the end, the payments were drawn out until August 1948. In the meantime, ORT students went on strike in Bavaria because they ceased to receive JDC food parcels, which, as we have seen, were an important incentive for them to attend school. The reasoning was that as PCIRO rations were now being obtained, there was no justification for getting food parcels as well.21 These details were, in retrospect, important only because they pointed to a basic problem: the increasing demoralization that was setting in in the DP camps because of the lack of hope for emigration.

Indeed, in late 1947, there seemed to be no end in sight of the DPs' wait for emigration, and grandiose plans were therefore made to increase vocational training in the DP countries in the interim. However, this

19 JDC/ORT, Haber to Bcckelman, 12/28/47. 20 World ORT Union, Weekly Summary, 1/23/48. 21 JDC/ORT, 1948(1).

Interagency Problems 191

situation changed completely as 1948 proceeded. From the ORT perspec-tive, courses had to be stopped in the middle because young men were recruited to fight in Israel's War of Independence; others were making preparations to go to other countries, especially after the passage in Con-gress of the first DP Bill in the summer of 1948. The problem now was how best to utilize the machinery that ORT schools had used in the DP countries, and the idea, already discussed in 1947, to ship it to the young State of Israel in order, there to establish a new network of ORT schools, could now be materialized. At first, JDC objected: ORT machinery should be used in Europe, especially in Eastern Europe, where thousands of young Jews needed vocational training to adjust themselves to the chang-ing societies. JDC had been a major contributor to the funds with which the machinery had been bought, and it objected to its being shipped to Israel without its concurrence.

The anxiety arose out of the fact that JDC itself did not have a significant program in Israel, aside from some aid to yeshivot. But this was about to change, as we shall see, and then the introduction of ORT machinery to Israel was to be a very welcome indeed. The shift to Israel, however, only began in 1948; it was to increase in the following years, and in the mean-time ORT in Europe was still active, and JDC still supported its programs there. On the whole, the arrangements worked out between the two agencies were satisfactory, despite complaints from JDC that ORT had not lived up to its commitment to consult with the larger agency. However, in 1949 vocational training in the DP countries became unimportant, and all American Jewish organizations were expelled from the East European countries. Serious doubts were raised by JDC whether the agreement with ORT should be continued, but in the end conciliatory counsels prevailed.22

ORT claimed that from 1945 to 1949, 35,000 Jews had received ORT training in Europe, and 9,000 had graduated from its schools.23 In a Europe in which over a million Jews still lived, that figure had to be explained. The background was that on the one hand there was the urge to migrate and emigrate that prevented any large-scale occupational restructuring; on the other hand, wherever Jews could, they tried to reoc-cupy their traditional positions as middlemen. Jews who stayed behind in Western Europe largely turned to trade and the free professions; those in Eastern Europe had in any case to adjust to the deep structural changes that took place in that part of the world. People in those countries were absorbed into industry and the bureaucracy, and the training that ORT could provide helped only marginally. All those brave efforts at coopera-tives in small-scale production and in agriculture, in Poland and elsewhere, did not last very long. ORT was to have a great impact in North Africa and in Israel, but its work there is beyond our scope. What ORT did do,

22 Adcom, 11/2/48. 21 JDC/ORT, 1948(11), article by H. Firsht with quotations from Oleiski, 11/26/48.

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196 Out of the Ashes

the DP camps. Who would wish to exchange a relatively free DP camp in Germany for the barbed wire of Cyprus?3

In the fall of 1946, after the Truman declaration, nothing seemed to happen to promise a solution to the combined Palestine-DP problem. In Palestine, the Irgun (IZL) continued its attacks on the British. "Illegal" ships continued to embark from Europe despite strenuous British attempts to stop the traffic by intervening with the littoral states, although France, Italy, Yugoslavia, and Greece either could not or did not want to stop the flow of Jewish refugees to their coasts and their embarkation to the land where they hoped their endless wanderings would finally be over. As the worst European winter for two generations began casting its cover of snow and ice on the shivering DP camps, the Jewish Agency again tried to negotiate with the British. In early October they met with British officials at the Foreign Office, but there were no results.

In December, the 22nd Zionist Congress, the first after the Holocaust, was called to Basle in Switzerland. On the face of it, the issues were whether to agree to partition, and whether to continue to negotiate with the British; but in reality it was a contest between Ben-Gurion and Silver on the one hand, and the moderates led by Weizmann on the other hand. Ben-Gurion won. It was no consolation to Weizmann, who resigned from the presidency of the Jewish Agency, that Ben-Gurion then proceeded to follow precisely what Weizmann had argued for: he accepted partition as the only practicable solution, and he went to London to negotiate with the British in January 1947.

In his radical stance, Ben-Gurion had the support of a majority of the DPs in Germany and Austria. A delegation, led by the Chairman of the Munich ZK, David Treger, appeared at the Congress and pronounced its enthusiastic support for the radical line. A minority, which identified with the much less nationalist-radical Zionist Left, supported the more moder-ate groups.

The January 1947 London talks between the Agency and the British, paralleled by official British-Arab discussions, broke down and General Clay, apparently following receipt of a letter from Truman, requested Rabbi Bernstein to go and see Bevin in London. Accompanied by Rabbi Herbert Friedman, Bernstein went in order to convince the British Foreign Secretary to permit Jewish DPs to go to Palestine. The conver-sation was not recorded, and Bevin "was sitting there in an overcoat. There was no heat in the building. He had a small electric heater by his feet. This was the Foreign Secretary of His Majesty's Government! You would think England had lost the war." Bevin's response, in Friedman's recollection "was a virulent, violent, profane, antisemitic explosion." Using totally unprintable language, Bevin said that he could not keep 100,000 troops in

» Central Zionist Archives, Z-4,15170; Z-5,1171; Weizmann Archives, Rehovot, Protocol of meeting at the Foreign Office, 10/1/46.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 197

India, and another 100,000 in Palestine. " 'Don't bring the Jewish ques-tion to me. I am going to dump it on the United Nations, the hell with it. And I am going to pull England out'. A tirade, wild."4 No agreed policy could be evolved. And indeed, the British announced in February that the whole intractable problem would be handed over to the United States. The Americans were not much more encouraging. A top-level JDC com-mittee met with Truman in February, and the President "spoke discourag-ingly as to the outlook regarding Palestine," nor did he think that there was much hope for entry into the United States.5

The DP Leadership

We left the DP scene in Germany with the struggle between the ZK and JDC over the control of supplies: in actual fact, over the amount of independence of the DP population from American Jewish philanthropy versus JDC's doubts regarding the capability of the DP leadership to guarantee the equitable distribution of these essential material props to the DPs' very existence. One of the thoughts expressed repeatedly by JDC representatives was that with the approaching elections to a new ZK and new regional and local committees, the old stiff-necked leadership might well be on the way out.6 Even those in JDC, however, who were most sympathetic to the ZK's positions, such as Leo W. Schwarz, Zone director until February 1947, quite unconsciously took a condescending attitude towards the DP leadership. The "professional objective of AJDC is to develop the Central Committee and all its constituents to the point where the people may attain the maximum degree of self-government and self-subsistence in an occupied territory," he said. The DPs' thinking was quite different: who were these American Jews to teach them how to run their affairs?7 The fact that JDC's attitude was unintended and uncon-scious is brought out by the fact that, on the other hand, JDC operations were being increasingly run by JDC's DP employees, under the super-vision of personnel from the United States. Joseph J. Schwartz combined the two approaches neatly in his statement that "there is a growing feeling that the DPs can take over more and more responsibility . . . It is being found that there is assistance to be had among the people." He then gave two examples, of Dr Israel Jochelson, who "is our Procurement Represen-tative and has saved JDC many thousands of dollars in procuring items

4 JDC/Interview with Herbert Friedman, 1981, p. 25. 5 Adcom,2/25/47.Non-ZionistsintheJDCleadershipnowrenewedtheirquestforalterna-

tive areas of settlement, with Lessing Rosenwald suggesting Czechoslovakia(i)—Adcom, 2/11/47.

6 "Suggest no action your end. Your information new Central Committee elections defi-nitely scheduled February 12 and present members unexpect reelection." JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947,1/22/47 cable from Paris to New York.

7 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947, Schwarz Report, 1/13/47.

198 Out of the Ashes

locally, making purchases through the Central Committee," and of Robert Prochnik, who was "so skilled in emigration that he has been loaned to the Paris office."8

Originally, the DPs, in their overwhelming demand for internal unity, had forced upon the emissaries of the different mutually antagonistic Pales-tinian Zionist parties a united list of candidates for their institutions. How-ever, with the onset of the big influx into Germany from the East, this facade of unity broke down. Behind it, so it was argued, the majority faction of Palestine Jewry, the moderate socialist Labor Party (Mapai), was in effect introducing a monopoly of power, excluding both the Right and the Left. The split came first among the youth movements, who in any case were the most active and morale-building element among the DPs. The Left especially, with its predominant influence among youth movement members, threatened to end the hegemony of Mapai. Towards the end of 1946 however, the Right, supporting the IZL campaign in Palestine, became a strong contender for leadership. Deprived of a pro-ductive existence, languishing in overcrowded huts or barracks, with no real prospect of emigrating from an increasingly antisemitic German environment, the DPs took to abstract politicking with gusto. For the January 1947 elections in the camps, political lists were set up that rep-resented the frustrations of the DPs no less than their political convictions.

The elections to the Second Congress of She*erit Hapletah were held on January 19, 1947, but had to be repeated in a number of places because of charges of fraud and disorder. Irving Kwasnik, the JDC man at Bamberg, reported:

political groups are acting as a bad influence since the propaganda of individual parties brought about a number of fights resulting in the hospitalization of opponents . . . an overall shady picture [emerged] of what should have been simple democratic procedure supposedly set up by the Munich Central Committee. Today, two weeks after the elections, about half of the same committee members are back in power not to better the conditions of their people but to continue their corrupt personal aims.

The ZK itself had a different version of these things, but JDC analysts noted that between March and December 1946, ZK had spent 7.2 million marks (of which 6.3 originated with JDC), and 36.5 percent of this money had been spent on "administration."9 ZK would have responded that administration meant the running of all the camp com-mittees and their work.

JDC hopes for a radical change in the make-up of the committees and the ZK were disappointed. The end result was a relative victory for the United Progressive Zionist List (in effect, Mapai), but the right-wing Revisionists received 18 percent of the vote and an absolute majority in Munich. The Left received over 30 percent. On February

' Ibid., Memorandum on Personnel Needs, Jacob Joslow, 3/26/47. • JDC/Germany, DPs, 1946, January abstract, 2/15/47, p. 11..

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 199

27, 1947, the Second Congress of She'erit Hapletah was opened in Bad Reichenhall, on the Bavarian-Austrian border.

It was a completely different type of Congress from the first one. None of the great, charismatic leaders were there to give stirring addresses. The people expressed their identification with the struggle for a Jewish State, but there was so little they could do about it. They were unaware of the impact they had had on the Zionist decision-making process, but even there it was the fear that the DPs would descend into a morass of demoralization that had moved the Agency leaders. Behind their concern regarding possible demoralization there lurked another basic fear of the Palestine emissaries: would the DPs hold on steadfast to the Zionist dream of emigration to Palestine and nowhere else? A growing interest was making itself manifest in the camps in emigration elsewhere, in fact anywhere, to escape the DP existence. People enquired about New Zealand and Australia, Canada and the United States. By mid-1947, 30,000 had registered for entry into the United States.10 Was this a trend? And what if no solution were to be found for immigration to Palestine for two or three years? In the meantime, the bulk of the DPs seemed to hold fast onto Palestine, again largely under the influence of the young people organized in the Zionist youth movements.

On this, the positive side of the ledger, one must note another development that was characteristic of DP life from its inception: the sense of self-reliance and determination that was so prevalent among the youth, but was not limited to them only. A demoralized, weak leadership would not have been able to stand up to JDC, UNRRA, and the Army, disregarding for the moment the question of whether they were right or wrong on the substance of the issues. In a way, American Jews—the chaplains, JDC, and the others—had contributed to the very possibility of the DPs challenging them, and they should have been pleased with that result, as indeed many of them were. But of course the primary credit for this is due to the people themselves, unbroken by the Nazis, and unbroken by the starvation in Central Asia. This was neatly summed up in a letter by one Herman Goldsmith, a JDC worker in Germany who wrote home saying that "the average leader of these various Jewish barracks, or camps, is a young, defiant, militant Jew. Honestly, Jews aren't afraid anymore . . . but they must have help, doors must be opened for them, soon. They can't wait very much longer." In the course of a minor disturbance, "I happened to place my hands on the shoulder of a meek-appearing Jew of about 35 or 38. He turned to me and said, lnemt arunter di hent fun mir> (take your hands off me!). It was not how he said it, it was the look in his eye of

10 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947-48, Report on the US Zone, 6/10/47. OOA-H

200 Out of the Ashes

defiance . . . I felt a sort of sadistic happiness, not for me but for him, for he wasn't afraid."11

The old-new leadership of the Congress passed the required resol-utions on Palestine. Apart from that, mundane problems of the difficult relationships with the Army, with JDC, and with the Germans were discussed, with no great practical results. Throughout the discussions one could discern a thread of growing despair. In those difficult, icy days, it was the youth movements that seemed the most solid element in the population. In the end, a leadership group was elected which was essentially identical with the central group that had led the ZK until then: David Treger, Dr Abrasha (Abraham) Blumovicz, Aryeh (Leon) Retter, Dr Samuel Gringauz. The old Lithuanian group still predomi-nated, though Retter, for instance, did not belong to it. This influence of the intellectuals from Lithuania was interesting, because a survey in late 1946 showed that 81 percent of the people came from Poland. While some individuals may have changed places or were not re-elected, the basic make-up of the leadership remained the same.12

JDC itself was faced with another reshuffle. Charles Passman became the US Zone Director in March 1947, after Leo Schwarz had left in February. But Passman became ill, and was absent from Germany for several months. In the meantime, Samuel L. Haber, who had worked for Military Government in Germany, joined JDC and became Associate Director in April, was effectively in charge of the operation. From the beginning of January 1947, the JDC Zone Director became responsible also for the Berlin enclave, the Bremen harbor where much of the supplies arrived, and for the small operation in the French Zone of Germany. Changes in JDC personnel were not limited to the top people. One of the chief complaints of Klausner, the ZK, and indeed many ordinary DPs was that there was little stability in the JDC operation. People came for a short time only, anything from a number of months to a couple of years. The constant changing of guards caused ill feeling among those for whom JDC was working. There were reasons for this changeover. These, usually young, American Jews could not normally bring their wives and children with them. After a while, they wanted to get back to their homes, and although their work was paid it was essentially a voluntary labor of love; there was a time limit on it.

We have seen already that JDC workers in various places complained that the new elections on party lists created the worst type of DP administration possible. People received their places on the committees not because they were suited for it, but because they were on the "right" party lists. As a result, it was claimed, inefficiency and corruption abounded. The cry of the new committees "The King is dead, long live

" Ibid., 1947,3/5/47, letter by Herman Goldsmith. 12 JDC/DPs 1947-48, Jaffe to Yeper, 9/26/47.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 201

the King" was met by the skeptical DPs with Jewish humor: (Aweg a ganevy gekummen a ganev" — (A thief has gone, another thief has come).13 Yet for all the cynicism, which was at least partly justified, the very process of elections in the totally unnatural situation of the DP camps was a unique example of a very ardent desire to order the DPs* life in accordance with basic democratic principles. This was not due to any influence of American Jews; it sprang quite easily from the people's East European background, from the ingrained, stubborn inde-pendence of mind and well-developed sense of organization of East European Jewry.

JDC Policies in Germany and Austria

There were certain parameters within which American Jewry's input into the DP situation through JDC had to operate. One, of course, was the financial situation. JDC was always short of funds, no matter how much money was raised in the United States. The needs were simply much bigger than any fund-raising could answer. Moreover, as we have already seen, there were populations in Europe—chiefly those of Romania and Hungary—that were depending on JDC even more than the DPs were, and there could be no allocation of funds for the DP countries at the expense of those people threatened with starvation. In Germany and Austria, the Army at least provided basic food rations, at any rate until mid-1947.

Another financial problem was that of the rising prices in that harsh European winter. This was an all-European phenomenon, but inflation did not mean a greater buying power for the dollar. Scarce food and scarcer industrial products cost more dollars and cents, and made JDC's task more daunting. JDC could not, after all, engage in black market operations which might have saved its precious dollars. This meant that the same amount of money was buying less supplies and services in Europe, and this was bound to affect the DP countries. Out of about $58 millions spent by JDC overall in 1946, some $18 million had been spent on supplies. The ratio would have to grow in 1947. Behind this very practical consideration lay the grim facts of the winter: "All stocks are now depleted. People are without clothing . . . the greatest need is the need of textiles and shoes . . . and those are very, very difficult items to buy ; . . There is also a marked increase in the birth rate in Jewish communities . . . That brings with it added requests for such items as layettes and infants' clothes and infants' foods and medicines."14

However the greatest headache for Schwartz in Paris was the demise ofUNRRA. UNRRA had hardly been an unqualified success story in

13 OHD, Yisrael Eichenwald Testimony, p. 14. 14 JDC/Excom, 12/11/46.

202 Out of the Ashes

terms of the actual help it provided for DPs. There had been a great deal of inefficiency and bungling, but it had fulfilled an important role nevertheless in looking after the DPs* needs in terms of education, welfare, medical programs and administration. It had eased JDC's task in all these fields by providing an administrative background, transportation, and some funds. Towards the end of 1946, excellent relations had developed between JDC and UNRRA's US Zone Director, Jack Whiting, and his deputy. UNRRA had agreed to JDC's approach-ing the Army directly through liaison in Heidelberg and Frankfurt, the seats of UNRRA and the Army respectively. JDC leaders in Germany were invited to attend UNRRA senior staff conferences. From early 1946 on, an UNRRA Council on Jewish Affairs had been an effective liaison instrument between UNRRA and the different Jewish agencies, including the ZK, and involving the Adviser, Rabbi Bernstein, as well.

At the end of 1946, UNRRA was on its way out, and Fiorello La Guardia, the last effective director, failed to convince the different nations to continue the organization. With a resolution of the United Nations on December 15, 1946, the International Refugee Organization (IRO) was established, which was to come into formal existence after 15 states had subscribed to it.15 By early 1947 it had become clear that it would take considerable time before those 15 states were found. Therefore, the Preparatory Commission of the IRO (PCIRO), estab-lished at the same time as IRO, was empowered to start operations in the meantime. UNRRA was due to cease its existence on June 30, 1947, and PCIRO was nowhere near a situation where it could undertake its tasks. Its budget had been fixed at $155.8 million, but as the winter passed and June came nearer, the sum had to be cut to $115,611,000 (of which $80.48 million would be available for care and maintenance), which was much less than had been spent up till then. In 1946-47, the United States were spending $100 million, the French and the British together another $50 million, and UNRRA $40 million, or $190 million altogether for the DP countries alone. The United States supplied 79 percent of the IRO budget, which meant that its contribution to the maintenance of the DPs had been reduced by about $20 million. According to IRO estimates, however, it had to deal with 704,850 DPs in the three DP countries eligible for care and maintenance in July 1947. Of these, according to the same estimates, there were 168,440 Jews. In addition, IRO was to provide legal services and other items to another 200,000-300,000 persons. It was to come in lieu of UNRRA and the Western states and armies and was then supposed to deal with refugees all over the world. In actual fact, IRO was to spend only $75.6 million in 1947-48, of which $42.6 million were spent on care and maintenance. This meant that all through the year JDC and other

15 Resolution of the UN, 12/15/46.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 203

groups experienced a continuous series of severe budgetary cuts, and no real planning could be based on IRO help.16

JDC was faced with the prospect of having to support DPs to a much larger extent than heretofore. However, basic support was out of the ques-tion for a voluntary agency. JDC was trying to persuade governmental authorities to assume such basic responsibilities, and yet it had to take into account the possibility of having to raise another $40 to $45 million over and above the monies raised in 1947 to prevent starvation in the DP countries. Early in the year UNRRA had already reduced its personnel in Germany by 40 percent, with JDC's internal reports recording expressions of regret at the fact that the best of the UNRRA personnel were leaving, with the prospect in view that the less useful officials would stay to be taken over by IRO. In the meantime, General McNarney had even investi-gated with Schwartz the possibility of JDC assuming full administrative control of the Jewish DP camps.17

JDC's own estimate of the best policies in the DP countries was contra-dictory at best. A conference of JDC country directors in Paris in February 1947 heard Schwartz declare that mass flights had come to an end, and that comparative stabilization would occur. Whether the Jews liked it or not, they would have to stay put. Yet he also said the exact opposite: many of the DPs:

"are becoming desperate and, in their desperation . . . they are going to do every pos-sible attempt [sic] to get to Palestine and the question of whether we like it or not will make no difference . . . There is simply no use in closing our eyes to the facts and in trying to believe that this is a passing phase and that everybody is going to settle down in Germany, in Austria and in Italy."1*

An important element in JDC's policies and actions were, naturally, the statistical facts of DP life. From some 50,000 or so DPs in Germany and Austria in mid-1945, and another 15,000 or so in Italy, the numbers had swelled to 232,000 in the three countries combined, according to JDC estimates in January 1947. The official UNRRA count in the US Zone was 160,000, and JDC estimated it at precisely 143,716, in 60 camps, 14 children's centers, 40 hospitals and sanatoria, 39 hachsharot; the figure also included the "free-living" people (close to 36,000 of them) in German towns and communities. An additional 14,006 were counted in Berlin, and 1,637 in the French Zone, for a total of 159,359. The total for all of West Germany, including the British Zone, was 180,000, with 22,000 in Italy and 30,000 in Austria. In addition, there were supposed to be 60,000 DPs

16 Institut fuer Besatzungsfragen, Das DP-Problem, JCB Mohr, Tuebingen, 1950, pp. 30-31. Figures for Jewish DPs were varied, to say the least. A Congressional Committee investigating the DP problem found 154,334 Jewish DPs in Germany, Austria, and Italy in August 1947 (Report of the Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washing-ton (1947), p. 8). Cf. Louise W. Holborn, The International Refugee Organisation, New York (1956), p. 123.

17 Ibid. 18 Excom, 3/5/47.

204 Out of the Ashes

in France. Of course, this does not take into account the problem, already mentioned above, of the malochim. With the decline in the quality of food, and the harsh winter, deceiving the authorities regarding the true number of camp inhabitants was a way of increasing the food ration. The real number of Jews in the US Zone in early 1947 was probably closer to 130,000, and proportionate reductions in reported numbers have to be made for Austria (probably around 25,000) and Italy (close to 15,000).19

This struggle for better conditions had another aspect as well, which was the subject of many official and unofficial soul-searchings, accusations, and explanations: what was described by the authorities as "the black market." This had existed in Germany from liberation on, and had affected the DP camps as well. After the large numbers of infiltrators from the East had arrived, it became a mass phenomenon in the camps. The basis of it was the lack of sufficient food and industrial articles to go around in Ger-many. Germans, non-Jewish DPs, and Jews traded parts of their rations

L for goods or food which they needed or desired. This was something that was happening all over Germany. As we have already noted, cigarettes became the general currency in Germany and Austria, and anything could be bought with them: from food to clothes, to sex, to political pull, to furniture. A large number of reports indicated that German antisemitism was on the rise again, against the background of the poverty and homeless-ness of many Germans: black marketeering, it was said, was concentrated among the Jews.20 Many middle-rank and lower-rank officers in the US Army accepted this view, and even some higher officers did. Yet it seems that the really big operators were Germans: the Jews fulfilled a relatively modest function in the operations of "black marketeering." The quotes are appropriate because the whole of Germany was one big black or grey market, and it was fed largely by the Army itself. Its PXs supplied ciga-rettes and other goods serving as currency.

Was there then no danger to the morale of the Jewish DPs from the "black market"? It certainly appears that there was. The enforced idleness brought inventive and adventurous spirits with good business instincts to engage in illicit trade not for the satisfaction of their immediate needs, but with the aim of capital accumulation. Charges were made that at the center of the worst cases of organized, big-time operations stood ex-block leaders from former Nazi camps, many of whom had remained in the postliber-ation camps and continued to maintain their former functions as block leaders. A person like that "takes a definite number of rations according to the number of souls which he claims to have in his block. He distributes these rations to 'his people.'. . . Everyone of the block leaders carries on

" See above, note 10. 20 Institut fuer Besatzungsfragen, Das DP-Problem, JCB Mohr, Tuebingen, 1950,

p. 89 . . . "it is possible to state that the DPs were and are responsible for a large part of the black market. The black market in Bavaria was monopolized by the DPs, certainly the large-scale deals."

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 205

a business with the shares that are le f t . . . The Joint generally distributes its shares and packages according to the same system . . . [which] applies also to camps of the Baltic and Polish DPs." Thus, by manipulating the malochim's rations they provided the essentials for the inhabitants, received their support, and scooped off large profits for themselves.21 The impression one gets from the various reports is that this indeed did happen in a number of places, and that it was a serious threat to the moral stability of the DP population. The accusation pointed to the major problem that the DPs encountered from late 1946 on, as mentioned already: the problem of sinking morale, of which the relatively few cases of large-scale illicit trading were not the cause but the effect.

On the basis of impressions of a visit to Germany and of what he had been told there by JDC workers, Leavitt described very comprehensively what the process of demoralization actually consisted of. Camp life was, he said, like prison life with an indeterminate sentence. The problem was the lack of any certainty about the future. Children were not affected because an organized school and youth movement life had created a barrier between them and the grim reality. There was a "hopeless apathy. People are sinking into despair . . . I am not at all concerned about an explosion in the camps, because I do not think there is sufficient spirit left in the people to explode." As for the future, Leavitt said that demoralization was proceeding so fast that "the people will not be fit for any country, whether it is Palestine or elsewhere . . . It will be very difficult to bring them back to [be] normal human beings." Something could still be done, if it were done quickly, "to salvage as much human material as possible."22 While this was vastly exaggerated, it was nevertheless one side of manifest reality.

It seems worthwhile to quote another, perhaps more objective, source— General Lucius D. Clay, McNarney's successor as American Commander in Germany. Reviewing the situation in the summer of 1947, he said that "the unsettled economic conditions in Germany have made barter trading and black-market operations a common problem. Even in this field, the Jewish DPs have not been conspicuous in their activities as compared to

21 Chaim Balzan, in Ha'aretz, 5/2/47. Cf. Adcom, 7/1/47, Leavitt's report: The DPs' "deterioration and demoralization is beyond conception," he said, but he seemed to be refer-ring largely to the problem of the malochim, which actually accounted for a better food situation in the camps. However, he continued that "some Jews . . . bought these cards and accumulated as many as 40 or 50 cards . . . The camps do not benefit nor do the people in the camps . . . Thus there are a group of people developing that resemble gangsters. They will stop at nothing and they will threaten to kill. They can consist of groups of 10 or 15 who virtually control the camp. This serves to demoralize the whole camp. People do not want to move now. They say that they can do better in the camps and do not feel they would fare better in the concentration camps in Cyprus. The Jewish Agency is concerned about this, in view of the calibre of the people who will emigrate to Palestine." There was no lack of volunteers to board the ships to Palestine and to the detention camps in Cyprus. And yet there was no exaggeration in the deep concern that JDC and Jewish Agency and, indeed, leaders of the ZK voiced regarding the phenomena described by Leavitt.

22 Excom, 7/15/47.

206 Out of the Ashes

other displaced persons groups, or, in fact, as compared to the German population itself.'23 The General took the overall view, and assessed the part played by the Jews. Leavitt was not concerned about the morale of other DPs or of the Germans; he was worried about his own people.

The real cause of all the troubles was, as we have seen, the apparent hopelessness of the DPs' situation. With no large-scale emigration in sight, the whole purpose and aim of both the DPs' internal organization and of JDC's plans had to be changed from a temporary program designed to bridge the time-gap until emigration, to a long-term program taking into account that DPs would live in Central Europe for the foreseeable future. In the most optimistic of scenarios, if Palestine were opened, four years would elapse before the Jews could be removed from Germany. And no solution on Palestine was in sight. Therefore, 1947 was a year devoted to building up a DP program for an indefinite stay in camps. The unpredict-ability of the situation is well illustrated by these programs: at liberation, only a few tens of thousands of survivors would have to be helped to survive before either they would return to their homes or find new ones. Then Brichah came and upset all the calculations; the population grew with the panic exodus from Poland, but the Anglo-American Committee promised to solve the main problem by its recommendation to have 100,000 persons immigrate to Palestine. At the end of 1946 these hopes were dashed. Rehabilitation and reconstruction, "to help the people help themselves," was the slogan now, and was to remain so until the next radical change which, in 1948, was to destroy all the well-meant and well-laid plans. Voices were heard that argued that if JDC concentrated on rehabilitation (that is, employment and work) and child care only, the money would be well spent.

The Army, too, was undergoing severe stresses in its handling of the DP situation. In early 1947, it estimated the total number of DPs in the US Zone of Germany at 518,000, of whom 153,000 were estimated to be Jews (which was exactly 10,000 more Jews in the US Zone than JDC estimated). The parallel figures for Austria were 70,000 and 31,000. The Army was faced with considerable problems in its program of supplying basic food rations. It was supplying 2000 calories a day to the "normal" DP and 2200 to the persecutees (persecutees were defined as persons per-secuted by the Axis or threatened with persecution for reason associated with the war, because of their race, religion, nationality, or assistance to the United Nations during the war—the Jews were obviously persecutees). Children, pregnant or lactating mothers, workers, and sick people received more. This compared with the official German ration of 1550 calories, and the 3900 calories intake of US soldiers in Germany .

In addition, the Army supplied m i n i m u m clothing n e e d s s u c h as a suit, trousers, and jacket, dyed Army un i fo rms , d resses , overcoa t s ,

" US Army Public Information Division, Rabbi Bernstein's Report, 10/26/47.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 207

shoes, shirts, underwear, gloves, and blankets, cleaning utensils, and so on. This, however, was at least in part theoretical; often these things were simply unavailable, and the DPs went without them. According to an agreement signed in 1946 with Britain, the United States was not permitted to take these items out of the German economy by requisition-ing. They could requisition goods, food for instance, only up to the 1550 calories limit which the Germans received. The difference between that and the food the DPs actually received had to be imported from outside Germany. The cost of a DP in Germany to the Army was about 60 cents a day; in Austria it was 23 cents for the "normal" DP and 43 cents for the Jewish refugee. This required appropriations from Con-gress, and the Army was asking for an additional $50 million for Germany, and $5 million in Austria. But the new Republican Congress, elected in November 1946, was in no hurry to approve appropriations that would cover these essential needs. As a result, the Army reduced the rations to Jewish DPs to 2000 in April 1947, and JDC was saddled with an additional outlay.24 A JDC report from Paris stated that "as you may know, [the] army for some time pas\ has been entirely without funds for the procurement of supplies necessary for DP operations." Major George C. Carl, Chief of the Army's Stock Control Branch at G-5, was sent to Washington to persuade reluctant legislators that one could not let the DPs starve. In its quandary, the Army began cultivating the voluntary agencies in order to persuade them to undertake more responsibilities.25 In October 1946, an Army directive said that "the military authorities recognize the necessity for programs of rehabilitation for Jewish and other displaced persons. It is prepared to support such programs as may be developed by UNRRA and other agency personnel to the extent of available resources."26

In general, these difficulties and problems were known to the DPs. Yet to describe only the declining morale, though this undoubtedly existed, would do injustice to the teeming life in the Jewish DP camps. One of the positive indices in judging morale was the tremendous increase in the birth rate, already described. The average seems to have been in the neighborhood of 49 per thousand. Whereas in 1945, the pathetically few surviving children were dealt with like the precious treasure they were, the baby boom of 1946 and the influx of the families from the East had increased the number of children and youngsters up to 17 years of age to 27,000, an unusually high proportion of the general camp population.

Also, one has to differentiate between the DPs living in camps and 24 J DC/DPs, 1/47-5/48,2/1/47, address by Lt. Col. Robert Fisher to the Jewish Labor Com-

mittee; Excom, 3/5/47. In May 1947, UNRRA counted 641,144 DPs, of whom 138,086 were Jews, of whom again 124,096 were counted in the US Zone of Germany.

25 JDC/Germany, DPs 1947-48, Katzki letter to New York, 1/27/47. 26 USFET Directive, GEC-DP 383.7, 10/2/46.

O O A - H '

208 Out of the Ashes

the so-called "free-living" ones. There were 35,950 of these people in February 1947, who had decided to leave the camps and try to subsist in the German environment. They did not of course receive the full support that the camp inmates received, but they did get the rations, and had some chance of employment. Despite the ideological opposition of the DPs to participating in any way in the rebuilding of the German economy, many DPs did work within that sphere, both from among the "free-living" and from among the camp population. There is no indication regarding any differences between the morale of the two groups.

Help to the DP Camps

A major problem, which JDC could solve because it was in fact part of the American occupation force, was the availability of supplies. As we have seen, during the first year of American Jewish activity in the DP countries, not very much had come in in the way of food, clothing, and other essentials because the European harbors were closed to any but essential military shipping. It was not until towards the end of 1946 that supplies could be sent in in large quantities. By the end of the year they were running at 450 tons a month for the US Zone in Germany alone, and increased to 750 a month after March 1947. As these were items supplementary , to basic Army feeding and lodging (the Army also supplied hygienic, educational, and medical supplies in smaller quantities), the impact could be considerable. The fight over the control of these supplies between the ZK and JDC took place against the background of JDC attempts to overcome UNRRA bureaucracy and establish efficient transportation and storage facilities. The supplies originated in the United States, Italy, Switzerland and Scandinavia. Thus, for instance, JDC bought fruit, cereals, and sugar from Italy; baby food, butter, eggs, and cheese from Denmark; and so on. It was not until late in 1946 that JDC finally got control of two main warehouses, Schleissheim near Munich, and the river port of Hanau, the former taking in largely supplies that had come by rail, the latter taking in goods that had been brought by boat. In addition, JDC had facilities at Bremen, the United States enclave in northern Germany to receive goods arriving from the States, from where they were shipped by rail to Schleissheim.

In the United States, the whole supply operation was organized, as we have seen, by David Weingard. It was run on a business-like basis, and the results began to be felt as the year progressed. Weingard saw this as a mission:

It was a very heavy operation. It kept you busy not eight hours a day, but fourteen, fifteen hours a day. The romance of it was that at a time when supplies were hard

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 209 to get, you were getting them. It was needed overseas, and you were getting it there. It was serving a purpose . . . It wasn't like you were buying things to sell for a profit. You were buying things to help people exist.27

By early 1947, camp committees had a very important say in the actual distribution, and charges were levelled against them that they were appropriating a high percentage of the goods for members and employees of the committees. Of course, one must remember that a very high percentage of all those who were engaged on any kind of work were regarded as committee employees, and "workers" were a category that received additional JDC supplies.

One of the most encouraging elements in the situation, already briefly mentioned, were the youth movements. These were Palestine-oriented Zionist groups, the majority Leftist. They were attached to and guided by Palestinian kibbutz organizations: Noham, a Center-Left group, were attached to the Afapat-controlled kibbutzim; Dror, further to the Left, were guided by the kibbutzim belonging to the Ahdut Ha'avodah party which opposed partition. The extreme Left was represented by HashomerHatzair, a Zionist-Marxist youth movement associated with the kibbutz movement and political party of the same name, which was opposed to partition and advocated a binational, Arab-Jewish solution of the Palestine problem on the basis of political parity and free Jewish immigration. To the Right there were several small movements, as well as a religiously-oriented group which was also connected with a parallel, small religious kibbutz movement in Palestine. On the extreme Right stood Betar, the youth movement of the Revisionist Party which in Europe supported the IZL in Palestine, and advocated a Jewish State in all of Palestine and Transjordan. Except for Betar, all the others were in one way or the other engaged in preparation for agricultural life in Palestine. They founded hachsharot (literally "prepara-tions"), groups that would go out to farms provided by the Army to found kibbutzim there, and prepare themselves for life in the Land of Israel, work-ing and learning Hebrew, as well as Jewish and general subjects. In early 1947, there were 3000 youngsters in these farming communities, and they were undoubtedly the pick and the pride of the She'erit Hapletah. They received aid from JDC to enable them to fulfil their appointed tasks. The Jewish Agency emissaries were of course particularly active in these com-munities, and provided the cadre of educators and leaders.

It should be remembered that in these youth movements the political 27 J DC/Interview with David Weingard ,3/10/81. "There were times of the year, when they

were formulating the open-to-buy lists. The open-to-buy list was really a budget of what items they needed. There was an amusing incident once. Blanche Bernstein . . . in early 1947 had to buy sanitary napkins for the women in the camps. She figured out how many napkins they would need and put it down on the l i s t . . .Ted Lazarus, who was then purchasing the amenity supplies for the J DC, got it and ordered it, and in due time it was shipped. The only hitch was that when Blanche put down the numbers, she was ordering single units. Sanitary napkins on the wholesale market are by the gross. So Ted purchased it by the gross. When they got the napkins, they had enough for every woman in every camp for 144 years."

210 Out of the Ashes

aspect, with all its apparent importance, was not the main topic around which educational efforts turned. General humanistic education was aspired to, with a remarkable emphasis on moral values to be inculcated in the individual and the obligations one had towards the community. This was sought by a concentration on late nineteenth century and early twentieth century literature—Yiddish, Hebrew, Polish, and German in the main.28

Education was another area in which JDC, the ZK, and the Agency invested a great deal of effort. One must not forget that the Nazis had killed most teachers and intellectuals; the people who returned from the Soviet Union hailed largely from the eastern part of Poland and had a small pro-portion of teachers among them to start with. Six years had passed, and young persons who survived, either in Nazi Europe or under the harsh con-ditions of wartime Russia, had had little or no opportunity for schooling. In 1945-46, under the most daunting circumstances, but driven by the typ-ically Jewish urge to provide education for children and young people, schools were established in the DP countries. Untrained teachers, without textbooks for themselves or copybooks for the children, started classes; skilled laborers started vocational classes; adult education groups devel-oped, optimistically calling themselves People's Universities. In most camps Yiddish newspapers and journals appeared, sometimes more than one per camp. For lack of Hebrew type, these were printed in Roman letters with Polish spelling. In some camps, notably at Deggendorf and Feldafing, theatres were founded.

In the area of education, JDC was to a large extent a grant agency—the actual work was done by the Jewish Agency emissaries and the Kulturamt, the cultural department of the ZK. UNRRA was supposed to have provided basic materials for education, but while it had indeed provided such materials for Polish and Baltic DPs, it refused to do anything for the Jews until February 1946. Even after that they were glad to have JDC shoulder the burden, though they helped out with some allocations of paper, and the like. By the end of 1946 seven out of a planned fifty textbook and belles-lettres publications, largely in Yiddish, had been printed. A joint education committee was established in March 1947, with two people from JDC, two from the Jewish Agency, and three from the ZK, of whom one represented the orthodox American Va'adHahatzalah (Rescue Committee), which was interested in sponsoring orthodox education among the DPs. The commit-tee was to oversee the general area of education, but while JDC invested funds and tried to see to it that they were efficiently used, leadership in edu-cation remained with the Jewish Agency. By June 1947, 150,000 copies of textbooks and readers had been distributed, and the plan was for a "national, nonpartisan program," with emphasis on Hebrew. In other words, it was Zionist-oriented, and that was the will of the people. There were voices

u Mankowitz, op. cit., pp. 117, ff.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 211

within JDC such as that of the historian Koppel S. Pinson who was opposed to the concentration on Zionism. However, that was what the DPs wanted, emphatically and vocally, even those who did not plan to go to Palestine.29

Relations between the ZK and the teachers were far from smooth. In the charged, tense atmosphere of the camps, teachers demanded pay in kind, which was promised them by the ZK, but the ZK did not always live up to its promises. Teachers' strikes resulted, a serious affair in a society of basically unemployed people in which schooling took pride of place. JDC found itself in the middle between the teachers and the ZK. Dr Philip Friedman, the historian who was to make a pioneering contribution to the studies of the Holocaust and who was JDC's man in charge of education, usually took the side of the teachers. The situation seemed to improve in the summer, as JDC enabled the Agency to bring in teachers from Palestine. In expectation of the new school year, 180 teachers underwent a seminar financed by JDC, where the use of15,000 Hebrew textbooks brought from Palestine was intro-duced for the 79 schools in the Zone. JDC and Agency cooperated with the education department of the ZK to make this a success.30

In addition to primary and secondary education, 570 DP students were enrolled at German universities: 170 of them were studying medicine.31

The arts were not neglected. A Writers' and Artists' Society was founded in these difficult conditions and by early 1947 was doing important work in bringing literature and art to the camps in poetry and prose readings, as well as vocal concerts. A very special place was occupied by the Historical Commission of the ZK, organized by Israel Kaplan in November 1945. Kaplan set up local commissions in each camp, and began collecting testi-monies on the Holocaust from large numbers of people. In a way, this was a continuation of the great work that had been performed in the Warsaw ghetto by the historian Emmanuel Ringelblum. To bring the work to public attention, and in order to stimulate discussion about the Holocaust, Kaplan in the fall of 1946 began publishing a historical journal of very high standard, called Fun Letztn Churbn (Of the Recent Catastrophe). At that stage, the later phenomena of withdrawal and attempts to repress the experiences of the Holocaust were not in evidence. People told their stories, wrote pieces discussing their views on why it had happened, analyzing their own past in a

29 Mankowitz, op. cit., pp. 227-28. 30 Excom, 10/15/47. 31 Some of the stories of these students are fascinating examples of Jewish fate during and

after the Holocaust. One of them was Hillel Klein, who had been a member of the fighting Jewish underground in Cracow. He then went through the concentration camp at Plaszow, was sent to Auschwitz, and was liberated as a walking corpse in Theresienstadt, after a death march in the last stages of the war. He recuperated, and became a madrich [counselor] of chil-dren in a children's center in Bavaria, and began reading psychology. He studied for an MD, then underwent psychoanalysis in order to become a clinical psychoanalyst. He went to Israel in the 1950s, from Germany, and became a revered figure as a social psychologist, a professor of clinical psychology at Hebrew University, and head of a mental hospital in Jerusalem. He died in 1985. Cf. also JDC/Germany, DPs 1947/48, "Report on the US Zone," 6/10/47, p. 8.

212 Out of the Ashes

remarkably dispassionate and objective way. In fact, there was a tremendous desire to tell the story: 120 articles dealing with historical interpretations of the Holocaust in 10 DP newspapers in 1946 alone.32

In Munich, the Mikt Theatre group of professional actors, originally from Poland, offered performances of a high quality. Among the professionals, the Engineers' Society conducted a professional forum of importance. It is quite amazing how, in the chaos of postwar Germany, in camps haunted by cold and overcrowding, such activities could be engaged in. I t was the other side of the coin to the danger of deteriorating morale. American Jews pro-vided the funding, but the spirit and the guidance were those of the people themselves, and the Palestine emissaries in whom they t rusted. Relations in matters of education between JDC and the Agency mission, it must be emphasized, were of the best.

rReligious life also flourished in the camps. At the beginning of the process, Rabbi Samuel A. Snieg, formerly Jewish Chaplain of the Li thuanian Army and alumnus of the famous Slobodka Yeshiva in Kovno, became chairman of the Religious Council of the ZK. In time, Rabbi Alexander S. Rosenberg was sent from the United States by JDC to take over its religious department in the US Zone. The relations between the two bodies were not always easy (Rosenberg was a Conservative rabbi, and had his problems with the ortho-dox rabbinate). Just as in some other departments, the survivors sometimes resented the influence of the Americans, but there were important common interests that helped to bridge the differences.33 The rabbis not only looked to the establishment of schools andyeshivot, but also attempted to influence the life oiShe'eritHapletah in a religious sense. On the first count , they were reasonably successful. By early 1947 more than 100 talmudei tora (children's schools teaching mainly religious subjects) were active in the camps, and \0yeshivotwcK catering to the different religious groups and sects within Orthodoxy. Nevertheless, facilities were still inadequate, despite great

r efforts by JDC to supply religious needs. The problem was that , as every-\ where in the Jewish world, religion was a divisive as well as a uniting factor. J Religious Zionists (.Mizrahi) vied with the non-Zionist ultra-orthodox Agu-\ dat Israel for the support of the religiously inclined. Within these groups

) again, different hassidic and mitnagdic (antihassidic) elements were fighting ( each other. One of these were the Lubavicher hassidim, 630 of whom lived

in two camps in Bavaria. The problem with them from Rabbi Rosenberg's point of view, was that "they are ardently religious and abstain from food acceptable to other religious groups and insist on a school system of their

" Mankowitz, op. cit.,pp. 313-14. " Occasionally, Snieg also clashed with the ZK. In August 1947, a clash of this kind almost

led to a request by the DP rabbinate to General Clay to recognize the rabbinate as an auton-omous body independent of the ZK. Adviser Judge Levinthal narrowly averted this. Zionist Archives, New York, Levinthal to Grossman, 8/19/47.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 213

own."3 4 Each of these sects was absolutely certain that its way was the only one leading to glory and looked down on all the others.

On the issue of the impact of religion on the life of the people, the represen-tatives of the Aguda even walked out of the Second Congress when their more extreme demands were not met. However, the Second Congress yielded to religious demands to a considerable extent: Shahhat and Kashrut (dietary laws) were to be observed at all public functions, and a resolution was passed against recognizing so-called "mixed" marriages. This latter problem was quite important to an admittedly unknown number of people who had married non-Jewish spouses. These non-Jews had then decided to share the fate of their Jewish partners, but because they had for the most part not been practicing Christians in the first place, saw no reason to become practicing Jews now. They refused to undergo conversion, and the religious elements demanded that they be treated differently from the rest of the camp population.

One must remember that Rabbi Rosenberg's claims to the contrary not-withstanding, the proportion of orthodox people among the DPs was quite small. Traditionalists, or people who maintained some kind of traditional observance of customs considered to be religious, were probably in a large majority, but they did not consider their religious views as any barrier to supporting political parties that were not specifically religious. To most people in the camps, religion was a private matter, and religious groups had no real answers to their burning social and political problems. Yet they were willing to make concessions to religious observance, out of traditionalism, remembrance of their original religious homes, and memories of their dear ones who had perished in the Holocaust.

JDC felt its way very gingerly in all matters pertaining to organized religious life. There was a practical side to it as well: the American-based Va'ad Hahatzalah, which had campaigned for separate funds during the war and had maintained an independent policy aimed at rescue during the Holocaust, was a thorn in the side of JDC-UJA. Its appeal for funds in the United States competed with efforts to raise money from the orthodox com-munity. In 1946, the Va'ad was trying to gain greater influence over life in the DP camps. J D C was not unwilling to have an organized and centralized orthodox body that would be in direct contact with the orthodox elements in the D P countries. After long negotiations, an agreement was signed in July 1947, which established a ' J ewi sh Central Orthodox Committee." The new body was to survey the Jewish communities in Europe, stimulate and strengthen orthodox observances and aid in their rehabilitation. Its main task, from JDC's point of view, was to represent all orthodox elements vis-&-vis JDC, who would recognize only the new committee for that purpose. Further fund-raising by the Va'ad in the United States would be limited solely to support ofyeshivot. Apart from that, no more separate fund-raising

34 See above, note 10.

214 Out of the Ashes

would take place in the States. The new agreement strengthened the hand of Rabbi Nathan Baruch, the Va'ad's representative in Munich since Sep-tember 1946, whose main concern was education (he was a member of the central education committee in the Zone).35

There was a large concentration of orthodox people at Feldafing and Fohrenwald, and a number of important schools and yeshivot were estab-lished there. Fohrenwald was the camp where Rabbi Yehezkiel Yehuda Hal-berstamm, the "SanzerRebbe ," the only hassidic leader to emerge in the DP camps, founded hisyeshiva. The Va'ad supported all these efforts.

The baby boom and the influx of thousands of children with or without their families from the East has been mentioned already. By early 1947, 21,000 children in families and 6,000 unaccompanied children were concen-trated in the US Zone. For the latter, a first children's center was established at Struth in January 1946. But the great exodus brought another 13,878 chil-dren to the Zone to make up the figure of 27,000, and of these 2,458 were unaccompanied. They arrived in well-organized groups, usually from Pol-ish children's homes, complete with their counselors (madrichim), and often alreadyidentifiedwithayouthmovementorapoliticalgroup. Insomecases, these were genuine orphans. In others, one or two parents had sent them to the children's homes in the hope that the children would reach the haven of the US Zone first, would receive sympathetic and understanding treatment, and then the parents would follow and reclaim them. This in fact is what happened. JDC was apprehensive lest children be claimed by people who were not their parents, because of the widespread belief that people with children would be the first to receive permits to go to Palestine. UNRRA was involved in the care for these unaccompanied children, and in late 1946 managed to get more food for them. JDC actually entered the operational field only very late. Not until early 1947 were JDC specialists sent to look after children's centers. Even then they definitely took second place to Jew-ish Agency people, many of them experienced educators who looked after the children and helped to give content to their lives. But in the end it was the madrichim j members of youth movements, whose influence over the chil-dren was the most important. The children trusted these young men and women, usually in their late teens or early twenties, and the Agency person-nel who were looked up to by the madrichim as the representatives of Pale-stine, their future homeland.36

An important service that J DC provided for the DPs was the Tracing Ser-vice. Literally tens of thousands of requests came in for relatives and friends in Germany and all over the globe. In March 1947, JDC also set up a Branch for Restitution of Jewish Property, which was working towards a general restitution law, which would be proclaimed later in the year.

" Adcom and Excomminutes,March-May 1947. Ibid.,7/29/47, Agreement between JDC and the Va'ad.

M See above, note 13.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 215 Altogether, 257 JDC workers were administering this vast program early

in 1947, devoted individuals who had decided to spend time in the service of the Jewish people. Even when they misunderstood the situation in which they found themselves, they did so with the best of intentions. But there were many of them who understood very well what their task was, and they devoted tremendous energy to fulfilling it. Many of them tied their lives, temporarily or permanently, to the fate of the DPs, and were appreciated as such by the people.

Rehabilitation and Employment

We have already seen that the changed perception of the permanency of the DPs' stay in the DP countries brought about a reorientation towards rehabilitation in Germany, Austria, and Italy. "The prospect is that emi-gration will not be any brighter than it is today . . . for the next few years . . . It means that we will have a large population in the US Zone of Germany for a long time to come."37 The unused energies of a very large number of people were crying out for some utilization that would benefit them ultimately wherever they finally went. The negotiations regarding supplies that were discussed in a previous chapter were directed in part to that end. Blumovicz and his friends were equal partners in initiating an ambitious works program in Germany and Austria. Their memorandum to JDC stated that they saw three main purposes in such a program: the educational value of labor (including the fight against demoralization); the practical value of providing training for people while they were still DPs; and the value their training would have for their ultimate emigration to Palestine. They had nothing with which to start the program: no raw materials, no machinery, no specialists to teach the people processes of production, not enough farms for agricultural training, no way to remuner-ate instructors, workers, and pupils. The schools and instructors they would get from ORT, but all the investment and all the payments would have to come from JDC. What they suggested was some form of payment in dollars. But Moses W. Beckelman, Schwartz's second-in command in Paris, demurred. Dollar payments would be impossible because of the financial stringency and because of opposition by the Army and UNRRA. However, JDC was interested, and payment in kind through some accept-able system was possible.38 This meant that JDC would cease its sup-plementary allocations to the general Jewish DP population, and would continue to supply only the special categories of children, pregnant women, the sick, and so on. The supplies thus freed would be made available to stores set up in each camp where the scheme operated, and 37 JDC/Country Directors Conference, L. W. Schwarz, 2/3/47.

31 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947, ZK memo of 1/3/47; Beckelman to New York, 1/27/47.

216 Out of the Ashes

people would receive scrips issued by JDC for which they could receive the goods of their choice insofar as they were available in the stores. Leo Schwarz, who was among the enthusiastic initiators of the project, dreamt of selling goods to the Army, and even exporting goods to Palestine and the United States, thereby avoiding violating the taboo on having anything to do with the German economy. The first tentative steps in starting these projects were made in January 1947.39 They did not get very far. JDC had first to settle its quarrel with the ZK, and then the goods for the stores were not available. It took time.

However, in the spring, machinery was set up to start an ambitious works project for 30,000 workers. A tripartite committee of JDC, the Jewish Agency, and ZK was created to run the project, with the Agency taking over responsibility for farm and fishery employment and training programs. At that stage, however, production of textiles and furniture were the main lines evisaged. From the point of view of the ZK the situ-ation had become urgent because of the increasing willingness of DPs to open up businesses among the German population, thus contravening the ban issued by the ZK on all economic relations with Germans. By June, Schwartz could report progress on the employment scheme in Austria, but not much to speak of in Germany. Only 21 projects employing 625 workers were established. He blamed it on Passman's absence from Germany, on the difficulties with the ZK, and on the complexity and size of the problem in Germany. The real reason seems to have been the cost—$3 million in additional funds—required to stock canteens and stores to provide the "pay" to the workers. The Army forbade JDC to use cigarettes as pay, because they wanted to eliminate that currency from the German market. In addition, there was, as one report put it, "an almost complete lack of raw materials, machinery, and tools." No productive apparatus existed, nor was there specialized personnel to plan and activate the program. The possibilities seemed to be great: about 64 percent of the DPs were deemed employable. About 44 percent of these were actually working already, inside the camps, as teachers, ORT trainees, members of hachsharot (by then, about 4000), and about 1000 members of production cooperatives working on a very small scale.40

A major bugbear was the fact that the canteens were still not in place by midyear, and people were being paid with cigarettes, against all plans and in spite of the Army. It was very difficult to organize these stores with the necessary goods that DPs would want to buy with their scrips.

In the meantime, Rabbi Klausner had managed to receive an Army assignment to get back to Germany. So as not to clash with JDC, who were less than happy with his return to the scene, he was assigned to

" JDC/ Country Directors Conference, Schwarz address, 2/8/47. 40 JDC/DPs 1947-48, "Description and Definition of the AJDC Operations—US Zone,

Germany," 6/10/47.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 217

Kassel, where he plunged into work with his accustomed enthusiasm and verve. On July 1, he addressed a letter to Leavitt alleging that JDC pub-licity in America spoke of a working scrip program, with canteens that had been supplied with $800,000 worth of goods. "This paragraph," he said, "is perfect in that there is not a single item of truth in it. There are no canteens . . . I have not seen nor heard of JDC scrip and can assure your office that it does not exist." Apart from blasting JDC with misin-forming the public, Klausner stated that classes in his areas had no chalk, no copybooks, or textbooks. Babies had no layettes at all, despite claims that these had been sent from New York. He ended by saying: "Forgive me for again making a nuisance of myself. The force that compels me to remain here in Germany with my people compels me to cry out when injustice is heaped upon injustice." JDC had to answer these charges, especially since Klausner repeated them to the UJA on July 7.41 Leavitt's answer on July 16 is worth quoting, because it provides a suitable back-ground to understanding JDC's problems. Leavitt said that the article quoted by Klausner referred to both Germany and Austria, and in Austria by that time scrip and canteens were in existence. This was not quite true, because the paragraph quoted by Klausner referred to Germany only. Goods and supplies had been shipped to Germany, Leavitt said, but he acknowledged that the work program was going very slowly in Germany. Whether all the supplies had gone into the hands of the people for whom they were intended was another matter—an allusion to the charges that it was the ZK and the committees that had appropriated at least part of the goods. All in all, Klausner's letter helped to shake up a lax system of supervision and appears to have aided in getting some at least of the deficiencies corrected.

The truth of the matter lay in the fact that Klausner had gone to the most neglected part of the Zone, Kassel. There were 16,000 Jews there, and indeed, as late as November, the Adviser's office complained that JDC had failed to send to Kassel supplies that had been provided for other areas. Kassel had a much larger proportion of sick and aged persons than other areas, and some of the camps there were definitely substandard. It was only at the end of the year that redress was provided.42

Those were the days when JDC was faced with another, external crisis, that of the fading away of UNRRA. In a way, the demise of UNRRA and the expected appearance of IRO marked the transition from the expec-tation of an early solution to the DP problem to planning on a more permanent basis. UNRRA planned to leave only 700 of its workers in Germany and Austria, to be taken over by IRO, which meant that IRO would not have representatives in each camp, but these would roam over

41 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947-1, Klausner to Leavitt, 7/1/47; and Klausner to Montor, 7/7/47.

42 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947-2, Leavitt to Klausner, 7/16/47.

218 Out of the Ashes

a larger area. Everyone seemed to hope that German and DP basic radons would be equalized at 1800 calories. Half of these would come from the German economy, half from stocks imported by IRO. But IRO took a long time to organize itself. The result was that the Army undertook to continue supplying the DPs with the 2000 calories it was giving them in early 1947, for another three months, after the expected takeover by IRO on July l.43

When IRO (or PCIRO) actually took over, on July 1, some of the fears that had been expressed were found to be unwarranted. The transition was fairly smooth, due to the fact that both the Army and IRO simply agreed to leave the status quo unchanged for three months—and after three months they agreed to carry on for another three months—until IRO had worked itself in. This meant that the standards of care remained essentially the same, especially the basic rations. The Army gave food from its stocks to supplement whatever IRO could afford to provide, and though there were fewer people to do the job, because only 17 IRO teams were operating in the whole Zone, and there was inevitable penny-pinch-ing on fuel, travel, canteens for staff, and so on, work went on very much as before. Relations between JDC and IRO were very good, and JDC readily agreed—and managed to persuade the ZK—to close down smaller camps and concentrate the people in larger units, thereby saving expenses.

Towards a Solution in Palestine

In August, after 15 months of service in Germany, Rabbi Bernstein returned to Rochester, New York. The fact that he had stayed four times longer than he had originally planned redounded to the benefit of the DPs. He had established a rapport with the commanding officers and they respected his judgement and sagacity/General Joseph T. McNarney had in the meantime been recalled, and since March, General Lucius D. Clay had taken his place. Now, after Bernstein, the five Jewish organizations that had proposed him for the post of Adviser, informed the Adminis-tration in Washington that their candidate was Judge Louis E. Levinthal, formerly the head of the American Zionist Organization. The fact that JDC was one of the groups that gave their assent to that choice shows how far the agency had travelled since its decidely non-Zionist days.

As difficulties mounted in 1947, two more worrisome aspects of the situation intruded upon the minds of American Jews working in Germany: German antisemitism on the one hand, and the increasing friction with the lower echelons of the Army, especially the Military Police, on the other. Quite unanimously, all reports from early 1947 on emphasized the increasing fear of German antisemitism. The bitterness of the Germans, it was said, in their present depressed state was directed:

43 JDC/DPs, 1947-48, Bernstein to Schwartz, 4/3/47.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 219 . . . against the Jewish DPs upon whom the Germans cast the blame for shortages in housing, food, fuel, clothing. Jews are abused in public places, stones are thown in the windows of Jewish homes, antisemitic songs are heard on the streets . . . The Army . . . cannot extirpate the hatred which would move six Germans out of ten, according to a recent study, to condone overt acts against Jews. There is no doubt but that the with-drawal of the U.S. Army would be followed by pogroms.

This was no statement by an unbalanced observer, but a part of Rabbi Bernstein's final report on the situation in Germany. The 60-40 percent figure was widely accepted among Jewish leaders and Germans themselves. The 40 percent minority also made themselves heard. When the "Exodus" affair occurred (see below) anti-Nazi Germans contributed funds to help the "Exodus" people and there were other expressions of opposition to antisemitism.44

JDC workers were increasingly alarmed. "In the railroad station," they reported, "the MP says: 'Hey, you Jew, stand aside and let these Germans get on' . . . The Jew is singled out to have his package or his litde suitcase searched, while the German stands by laughing."45 At a meeting arranged by Judge Levinthal between General Clay and the ZK leaders, they asked for a law prohibiting antisemitism to be promulgated by the Americans, but the General hesitated: a law would proclaim the American failure to eradicate antisemitism by other means, and it would not be effective.

In the autumn the situation seemed to worsen. A monument at Landsberg in memory of the Jewish victims of the Holocaust was des-ecrated, a Jewish policeman murdered and another seriously injured; and there was pressure to evict those Jews who had settled in German com-munities. The difficulties in the supply of food in the coming winter, and the mounting tensions, Haber reported, might well culminate in serious clashes.46

The other major problem was the incidents between DPs and GIs. The average young GI, Bernstein said, is not equipped to understand the problems of "these Jews." Their language was foreign, their experiences were totally alien to him. The tasks heaped upon the shoulders of a decreas-ing number of soldiers made them irritable and edgy. Also the influence of German women, Bernstein argued, was making for increased antisemi-tism. This was one of the problems facing General Clay, and he meant to deal with it. But of course, Bernstein concluded, so long as Jews remained in camps on German soil, the problem would remain. A case in point was an incident that occurred at Ansbach DP camp, where MPs insulted a Jewish DP, whereupon Jewish camp inmates "arrested" the MP, after some blows had been exchanged. A number of Jewish DPs and the GIs faced a trial. The way the Army dealt with the incident was indicative

44 JDC/DPs, 1947-48, Bernstein Report to the Five Organizations, for May 1946 to August 1947.

45 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947-2, 8/15/47 report. 44 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947-2, Haber Report, 10/15/47.

220 Out of the Ashes

of the increased tensions. Official Army investigation revealed extreme provocation on the part of the soldiers who were beating up Jews outside the camps, and the retaliatory action of the DPs involved only a "slight" beating up. Despite this, however, two Jewish DPs were sentenced to six months in jail, whereas the GIs were let off with a reprimand. JDC was approached by Major Abraham Hyman, assistant to the Adviser, to pro-vide lawyers, but did not.47 On the other hand, the Army had to deal with the political problem of DPs' disturbances in connection with the developments in and around Palestine.

The combined Palestine-DP problem had indeed been handed over to the UNO by the British, in February. By April, a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) had been appointed, which started hearings in America, and then in Europe. Obviously, the problem of the Jewish DPs was at the center of its concerns. The question was who should testify about the DPs, apart from the DPs themselves and the Jewish Agency. In view of the close alliance that had developed between JDC and the Agency, the Agency's "Foreign Secretary," Moshe Shertok (Sharett) asked Schwartz to testify to UNSCOP. After a short discussion, JDC agreed to have Schwartz testify. There can be no doubt that Schwartz's testimony made a great impression on the members of UNSCOP. One must emphasize that in this matter the interests of the Agency, the Army, the DPs and JDC converged: for their own reasons, each of these factors was vitally interested in finding a solution to Palestine which would enable the DPs to leave Germany as speedily as possible.

In the midst of UNSCOP's deliberations, in fact while they were in Pale-stine, the "Exodus" affair broke. The "Exodus" was an old American boat (previously the "President Garfield") bought by the Mossad and brought to France, anchored at Sete near Marseilles. Brichah brought4700people from Germany to the ship—1700 openly, with French visas, and 3000 illegally— and of these, 4200 boarded the ship on July 9. By July 18 the "Exodus" had reached Palestine, accompanied by British Navy ships. After a brutal attack on the ship's unarmed crew, in which a crew member was killed, and a boarding during which there were more casualties from among the refugees armed with tin cans and the like, the ship was brought in to Haifa harbor. In full view of the disgusted and deeply disturbed members of UNSCOP who happened to be in Palestine at the time, the refugees were forcibly trans-ferred to three caged transport ships. The British shipped the refugees back to France, but at Port-de-Bouc, where the ships had arrived on August 2, the French refused to disembark them forcibly. Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin then committed what was from his own point of view a most serious blunder by ordering the ships back to Germany.

UNSCOP in the meantime convened in Geneva, and on August 8, in the 47 Ibid.; also, Zionist Archives, Levinthal-Grossman, 8/19/47; JDC/DPs, 1947/48, meet-

ing of the Five Agencies with Major A. Hyman, 9/18/47.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 221

midst of the "Exodus" affair, a subcommittee arrived in Munich in order to investigate the DP situation in Germany. The hearings in Munich consisted of a testimony by Rabbi Bernstein, who claimed that 90 percent of the people would go to Palestine if that country's gates were opened. If, he said, at the same time the United States accepted Jewish DPs as well, 70 percent would go to Palestine, and 30 percent to the States: a most accurate prediction of what was to happen within the next three years. And if, he said, the United States were to open and Palestine remain closed, 50 percent would go to America, and the other half would fight their way into Palestine. The com-missioners then went to see for themselves, first to a children's center, then to Landsberg and Bad Reichenhall; a testimony of ZK members was also heard. There is little doubt but that their witnessing the disembarkation of the "Exodus" at Haifa and their visit to the camps were behind the recom-mendation in their final report that "approximately 150,000 [Jews in camps and centers] be dealt with as a matter of extreme urgency for the alleviation of their plight and of the Palestine problem."48

The "Exodus" passengers, in the meantime, had been waiting, incarcer-ated in their cages on the three deportation ships, in the sweltering heat of the Riviera, off Port-de-Bouc. On August 22, the ships lifted anchor for their journey to Hamburg, where they arrived on September 7. Disembar-kation began on the following day; at first, the weak and the sick left the first of the ships (the "Ocean Vigour"), and then the rest had to be brought down with truncheons and fire hoses. The same scenes were repeated later, especially with the third ship. The leader of the ships, Mordechai Rosman, came off last, and was prompdy arrested by the British police. But there was not much they could do with him, and he was soon "released" into the concentration camps that the British had established for the "Exodus" people, at Am Stau and Poppendorf in their Zone.49

Back in US Zone, the Army was faced with the problem of possible 48 UNSCOP Report, July, 1947, UN, New York. 49 Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 247-60. Mordechai Rosman was a member of the Hashomer

Hatzair's Executive in 1939, after he and many of his comrades had fled to then neutral Lithuania. Driven underground by the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in June 1940, he was active in reorganizing his movement in illegality. When the Nazis came in June 1941, Rosman and many others fled into the Russian interior, ultimately landing in Soviet Central Asia. With two others, he formed the leadership of his movement's underground in that area, comprising some 400 members. The secret police found them out, and Rosman was tortured by the police to reveal where his comrades were hiding. Pretending collaboration, he was let out under supervision into the streets of Tashkent, and managed to escape from his captors. For a year he hid from the police with the help of his friends until, under an assumed identity, he volunteered for the Polish Army set up by the Soviets. He got back to liberated Lublin in early 194S and became the first commander of Brichah in Poland after the founders of the organization, under Kovner, had left. In mid-1945 he, too, left, and went to Budapest, where he became responsible for Brichah operations. He then moved to Austria and Germany, where he was active in his youth movement, and then assumed responsibilities in Brichah in Germany. He emerged as the natural leader of the DPs on the "Exodus" by the sheer force of his personality. Mordechai Rosman now lives on Kibbutz Ha'ogen in Israel. Cf. his testimony, OHD.

222 Out of the Ashes

Jewish demonstrations against the Americans' allies, the British. While it appears that the upper echelons at least of the Army were sympathetic to the Jewish position, they decreed that any statement made in the Zone against an Allied nation would be punished by court-martial. No demon-strations were permitted in large cities. Nevertheless, in August, an impressive demonstration took place in Munich, at which some 8000 people participated and which was permitted, after long and tense nego-tiations with the American commander, to present a protest to the local British Consulate. In a real sense, however, these demonstrations were expressions of despair rather than of defiance. The DPs had of course been aware of the disappearance of 4700 refugees from their midst, and had been filled with hope. When the people were turned back from Palestine, these hopes were dashed. The leadership—ZK, Agency emissaries, under-ground Haganah and Brichah commanders—organized demonstrations and protests in order to channel the despair into morale-building action, but they did not try to do too much. It is impossible to gauge their success, because the events that followed completely changed the situation once again within a few months of the "Exodus" affair.

The autumn of 1947 brought renewed hopes to JDC, and after a short while to the DPs as well. "If the recommendation of admitting 150,000 Jews to Palestine in the next year is adopted and carried out, one may look forward to the liquidation of the camps of displaced Jews in Germany, Austria, and Italy."50 The rest of the DPs would most likely find other places to emigrate to. The reaction of the DPs to the UNSCOP report appears to have been one of hope mixed with cynicism—they had been disappointed too many times already. Contrary to Army fears, but in line with Leavitt's observations in the spring, disappointment would have prevented any explosion in the camps. Despite renewed enthusiasm of a minority, the great threat was still apathy, though the leadership did everything in its power to fight that. The enthusiasm of the dedicated Zionists itself, however, sparked another problem for the ZK, with which both the Adviser's office and JDC had to concern themselves. The struggle, which had begun in earnest in late 1946 between the Revisionist supporters of the IZL and the majority of the Left-Center, which sup-ported the Haganah, had led to serious incidents in a number of camps. The bitterness and desperation in the camps had exploded in internecine fights. On September 27, 1947, a young Haganah man was killed by IZL supporters in the French Zone of Austria. The shock of that murder cooled the fury somewhat.

In the meantime, the weaknesses of IRO and its limited budget had to be faced, as well as the most disastrous drought to have hit Europe in decades, which sent prices rocketing, and threatened to reduce even fur-ther the rations to the DPs. The IRO's and the Army's problems were

50 Excom, 9/17/47.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 223

reflected in day-to-day operations: three nutrition centers for underfed children were to be supported by Army allocations, but JDC found itself supporting these places alone, as the Army had to renege on its promises. There were other examples.51 In December, IRO again cut its allocations by 15 percent. Chiefly affected were the medical services, and the so-called Class II employees, that is, about 2000 DPs who were employed by JDC and whose pay in kind, provided up till then from IRO allocations, was to be drastically cut. Again, standards of care were diminished, and JDC had to fill gaps. Had it not been for the drastic political change that occurred just then, there would have been a very serious problem.

JDC as well as the other agencies were carrying on these "ordinary" activities, such as the first 20 nurses finishing their training in the Zone, or the expansion of synagogue space in expectation of the Jewish High Holidays in September, the extension of legal aid in view of the increased tensions with the Army, and the like. The area of medical aid was very important to the DPs; by late 1947, JDC had established 23 hospitals, 15 maternity wards, and 47 dental station clinics. Perhaps even more impor-tant was the fact that JDC set up examination boards—with the ZK's agreement—where the credentials of people claiming to be doctors, nurses, and dentists were checked. These people had lost their diplomas or other papers in the war, and their claims had to be rechecked, and some had to be directed to refresher courses. In some cases again, false claims had to be exposed. This procedure was to prove of real value to some of these professionals in their future careers.

The medical area was the last in which JDC and the ZK coordinated their efforts. It was not until December 1947, that a coordinating central medical committee was established, in which Dr Boris Pliskin represented the ZK, and Dr Henry Neuwirth the JDC (and the OSE). By then the medical program had reached a peak: the committee was responsible for about 200 doctors, 60 dentists, and 400 nurses.52

Another area of JDC activity was the training of women to cope with the difficult conditions of camp life. Camps were housed in former German military barracks (.Kasernen), or in small housing units set up by the Ger-mans for civilians working for the military, or similar accommodations. Because of the great number of DPs, the rule was that one family would occupy one room, and kitchen facilities would in some way be shared. It was extremely difficult to live for any length of time in such conditions, and the brunt of the problem fell on the women. Under these conditions, too, looking after children was a most difficult task. JDC and the Agency detailed some of their women workers to this most essential assignment.53

On what was considered the main area of effort, the employment 51 See above, note 50. 52 Wetzel, op. cit., p. 90. " JDC/Haber Interview, 12/15/80.

224 Out of the Ashes

scheme, progress remained slow, now mainly because the Army and IRO had not kept the promises to supply machinery and raw materials—against payment, in large part—and thus had stymied all progress. It was Bernstein, now back in America, whose pessimistic assessment was that the scheme was hopeless:

because of the attitude of the Jews themselves and because of the total situation . . . On the other hand . . . it was important to remember that a large number of people are already engaged in camp administration and the various existing work projects in and out of camps. Though much of this . . . was inefficient and unnecessary and hardly of a rehabilitative effect on the DPs, a considerable number of DPs nevertheless were not idle.

Bernstein in effect suggested playing up the administrative employment by the ZK, ORT schools, and the few projects that had actually started, with 2500 workers in November, in order to avoid what he saw as a danger emanating from Washington: the inclination of the Administration to settle the overall, not just the Jewish, DP problem once and for all and force the DPs to enter the German economy. Beckelman had a similar fear: that those DPs who were able to emigrate could be directed to do so, and the rest absorbed in Germany.54

JDC's financial situation of course impinged on the German program. Overall expenditure in 1947 came to some $75 million, the largest sum ever spent, and yet JDC was in debt and was trying to see where money could be saved. The money had been spent to a large extent on supplies: 41.5 million pounds of food, 6.8 million pounds of clothes, and 6.4 million pounds of medical, educational, religious, and other supplies. SOS (Sup-plies to Overseas Survivors), the service set up early in 1946 to collect clothing from individuals to be sent abroad, had supplied another 12 million pounds to Europe though, as we have seen, most of the bitter complaints from Europe about the quality of the clothing supplied by JDC were related to the SOS shipments.55

There was progress on another front, which the Adviser's office and JDC had dealt with ever since early 1946. On November 10,1947, General Clay enacted Military Law No. 59, "Restitution of Identifiable Property." The first drafts had been made public as far back as July 1946, and both the Adviser, especially Major Hyman, his legal aide, and JDC, had had repeated conferences in Germany and in America to iron out the difficult-ies. The law provided for the return of German Jewish property to indivi-duals and organizations. The British and the French did not join in the American step, but it was to serve as a precedent for future restitution proceedings in their Zones as well.56 As a result of the American action, a Jewish Restitution Commission was established, which organized the Jew-ish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO) for the US Zone in early

54 See above, note 47,9/18/47; Excom, 10/15/47. " See the Introduction for a discussion of SOS. 54 Excom, 11/19/47.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 225

1947. A Jewish Trust Corporation was established in the British Zone. JRSO was to receive unclaimed or heirless Jewish property and utilize it for restitution, and for the support of welfare organizations. It was recog-nized by the State Department as the only body entitled to receive such restitution payments in Germany. Dr Ernst Katzenstein became the guid-ing spirit of this very important group in Germany, representing the main Jewish organizations in the United States, Britain, and Germany (the future Zentralrat, or Central Committee of German Jewish communities). JRSO also set up a subsidiary group, the Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, Inc., which undertook to deal with heirless cultural properties, such as the 80,000 books assembled by the Nazis and stored at Offenbach in Germany. Most of these ultimately found their way to the Israeli National Library at the Hebrew University.57

At the same time as JDC was both spending huge amounts of money and looking how to pay its debts, it was approached by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, the charismatic Zionist leader, with the request somehow to raise $6 million for the Haganah in Palestine, now faced with the prospect of serious fighting with the Arabs (though Silver tried both to downplay the danger and ask for the money to face it). JDC was not averse to supporting the Haganah campaign, but it could not provide the money, and it rejected the idea of having a separate campaign to raise it; it would ruin the chances of the regular UJA campaign for 1948. The upshot was that pledges that had not been paid up yet should be followed up energetically: if UJA received more money, the $6 million would become available. But behind this practical argument there lurked the inevitable turning-point in the relations between the two rival groups that had become such close partners in recent years, the Jewish Agency and JDC. With the approaching struggle for Palestine and the attendant prospect of mass immigration, the balance had to shift. If, in the past, JDC had been entitled to a lion's share of the UJA collections because of the plight of European Jewry, Palestine-Israel was to become the main consumer of American Jewish money because the development and safety of the Jewish Homeland now took pride of place.58

Rabbi Bernstein had been Adviser for 15 months, Judge Levinthal for less than six (August 1947 to January 1948). The lack of stability hampered the development of intimate relations between the Adviser and the Amer-ican Army and IRO in the Zone. This contrasted with the situation of JDC, which in 1947 overcame the bane of instability. It will be remembered that in March 1947 Charles Passman became Zone Director. On April 26 Samuel L. Haber, the new Associate Director, arrived in Munich. But Haber immediately became the Director in fact, though not in name, because Passman was troubled with health problems and did not spend

57 Wetzel, op. cit., pp. 94-97. " Adcom, 10/20/47.

226 Out of the Ashes

more than a few weeks in Germany before he finally resigned in November. From the spring of 1947 until 1954, that is until the final liquidation of the DP problem, Haber was JDC in Germany, responsible for Berlin and the French Zone from late 1947 on. His personality is therefore of importance to the DP story.

Haber had served with the State Department before the war, and had joined up in 1943, to become a captain, then a major, in US Military Government in Germany. In 1946, he was discharged and returned to Washington. He was an expert in labor relations (as indeed was his brother, Professor William Haber), and was slated to become the head of the Department of Labor in McArthur's army in Japan. Instead, he was recruited for JDC by Leavitt and Schwartz, having been told that there was an impossible job to do in Germany, and would he take it. He did.

On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly of the UN decided that Palestine should be partitioned and a Jewish State established in the area allotted to the Jews. At first there was an emotional outburst picturesquely described by Haber in a report, which gives the flavor of the occasion as felt in Munich:

The last day of the month was one of happiness and gay excitement among the Jewish DPs in Germany, such as had not been experienced since liberation . . . For the first time they feel that they have a country of their own, that they no longer are strangers, foreigners, outcasts, as they have been until now . . . It was the general feeling despite the good news that a great responsibility has been placed upon the Jews by the decision, and that there remains a hard and long road to be travelled.

On December 2, a festive meeting was held in Munich, with Levinthal, Army and IRO dignitaries in attendance. But Haber added a paragraph that showed the radical identification of some, if not all, of JDC workers with the DPs and the Zionist position of most of them:

Though this reporter does not generally permit himself to indulge in sentiment when submitting his monthly report, it is felt that it would not be out of place here to state that the pride shining in the face of every Jew on this memorable November 30th, the way heads were carried a little higher and shoulders, bent by the burden of life in hostile Europe, thrust back—that all this went a long way towards compensating the foreign service staff for the hardships and heartaches, die frustrations and disappointments, the long hours of hard work and desperate effort to get things done despite the handicaps and obstacles. I think I can speak in the name of all of us if I say that we are grateful to have been permitted to be here when it finally became known that Eretz Israel had been returned to the Jewish people.59

JDC had come a very long way indeed.

Berlin and the British Zone Berlin became part of the area controlled by the JDC Zone Director in 1947, after the great movements of infiltrees from Poland into the city had been stopped by Russian intervention. Eli Rock, who had been responsible

59 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947-2, Haber Report, n.d. (December 1947).

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 227

for JDC operations, left the city in early 1947. Rabbi Herbert Friedman, who had been a central figure in helping the Brichah accomplish its task, had left before then, and his place was taken by Rabbi Meyer Abramowitz. After late 1946, the Jewish population became stabilized. The Gemeinde, the Jewish Community, officially numbered 7807 members in March 1947. It was an ageing population, to whom were added some people who had come from Poland and had decided not to move on but to try and settle in the ruined city, ruled by an uneasy government of the four Powers. There were few children, there was little hope, and many of the German Jews were either emigrating or thinking of emigration. The Gemeinde was not recognized by the city government, and had to be more or less fully sup-ported by JDC. A hospital, two homes for the aged, and other similar institutions were kept alive by American Jewish support; it was, on the whole, a sorry sight when one thinks of the great prewar Jewish community of Berlin.

There were three DP camps, two of them with UNRRA directors and under UNRRA auspices. One of these was the Schlachtensee-Duppel center, run by Harold Fishbein, a very popular and successful manager, though with a very marked ego. The other was the newer, smaller camp at Mariendorf (Tempelhof); together they accounted for some 6300 people. Throughout 1947 there was a slow drain of people into the US Zone, and Henry Levy, the JDC man in Berlin, saw it as his task to maintain stan-dards of care until emigration became possible. The Army (the two camps were in the US Zone) was not too friendly, and JDC had difficulties in looking after the DPs. Nevertheless, a central committee existed, and education and even some sparks of cultural life existed in Berlin. Apart from the fact that everything was a bit more difficult in Berlin, the picture was no different from the one in the US Zone. The third camp, at Wittenau in the French Zone, the only camp in Germany run by JDC alone until 1947, was a very small operation that had been set up to provide a transit point for infiltrees coming in from the Soviet Zone to the camps in the US Zone. In 1947, when there was no movement to speak of, the camp became superfluous, and in time was liquidated.60

According to official figures, there were 10,852 persons at Bergen-Belsen in November 1947, and another 10,662 Jews scattered in the rest of the

60 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1947-1, JDC Activities in Berlin, January -March 1947; Country Directors' Conference, 2/3/47, Report by Henry Levy. Wittenau was used, inter alia, to take care of a particularly pathetic group of returnees from the Soviet Union: 69 German Jews who came back from the Soviet slave labor camp of Kok-Uzek, near Karaganda, in March 1947. They had been refugees in the Baltic States or had escaped from the Nazis in 1938-39 from Austria. In 1941, with the outbreak of the German-Soviet war, they were transported, together with real Nazis, to Siberia, where they had slaved away until 1947. Many had died there. The sorry remnants were clothed, received medical treatment, and disappeared into what was left of the German Jewish community (ibid, report of Lariy Lubetsky).

228 Out of the Ashes

British Zone.61 However, it is safe to assume that of the Bergen-Belsen figure about 15-20 percent must be discounted as malochim. American Jewish presence in the British Zone was especially important because of the unsympathetic attitude of the British authorities: JDC and ORT were not just Jews, they were American Jews, and that helped. Cooperation between Samuel J. Dallob, JDC's representative (a Canadian), the Central Committee at Belsen run by Yossele Rosensaft, the Jewish Agency rep-resentatives, and the British-Jewish JRU (Jewish Relief Unit) was of the best. As in the South, every DP received a monthly allocation of food and amenities; in Belsen, this was designed to supplement the 1550 calories supplied by the British up to medically approved standards, for the various categories of people (children, pregnant women, invalids, workers, and so on). In the German communities, Jews were actually receiving less than the 1550 calories officially provided. Since much of the German ration disappeared into the German black market (there were not enough Jews in the Zone for the Germans to blame the black market on them), people usually received only about 800 calories. Victims of fascism, including Jews, received 200 calories more. JDC's supplies were essential.

In addition to Belsen, there were some small camps in the Zone, especially for infiltrees. In 1947, the British authorities would not recog-nize the infiltrees from the East and Berlin as DPs, and some German offices went one better and said that unless these people worked in the German economy, they would not get any rations at all. The camps were primitive and substandard to an appalling degree. Fortunately, Brichah usually cleared these places after a while and transported the people to the more hospitable US Zone.

Belsen had developed, by 1947, into a well-organized community. Officially, there were three areas designated as II, IV, and V, but among the people they were known as the Russian Zone, the British Zone, and the American Zone. Camp V, the "American Zone," consisted largely of those who had been liberated in Belsen and who had managed to accumu-late some possessions; the other two areas were populated by those who came later, and by lately-arrived infiltrees. JRU personnel, with the help of the Central Committee, had improved even the poorer areas consider-ably in the winter. On the whole, though, the winter months had been very difficult, especially as much of the supplies promised by JDC did not arrive, causing much bitterness. The situation improved as spring and summer set in. JDC set up a kindergarten, a nursery, and a children's clinic. The internal problems of the Jewish population dividing into fac-tions can be clearly seen from the make-up of the school system: there were six schools at Belsen, secular elementary and secondary Hebrew-Yiddish schools, three religious schools (elementary for boys and girls, secondary for boys only), and an ORT vocational school. A library with

J DC/Research Department Report No. 39, November 1947.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 229

3000 volumes, a monthly camp newspaper, a Historical Commission paral-lelling the one in Munich, a dramatic studio, and various lecture programs in the several collectives (kibbutzim) in the camp completed a picture in which JDC fulfilled a certain role, but which was in essence the work of the Central Committee and the people of the camp, with some outside help. On the other hand, the Glynn Hughes Hospital at Belsen, named for the British medical officer who had saved thousands of lives when the British Army liberated Bergen-Belsen, was headed by a JDC doctor. Much to the chagrin of many DPs, many of the staff in the hospital were Ger-mans, but as time went on, their correct and friendly behavior overcame some at least of the reserve with which they were met.

Into a relatively peaceful, though tense, atmosphere there burst in Sep-tember the "Exodus" affair. It will be recalled that the British returned the prospective immigrants on three prison ships to Hamburg. Among the 4200 or so refugees there were 1000 children and 150 pregnant women. When the ships arrived, the people were transferred, by force, to two temporary camps: Poppendorf, a former POW camp, and Am Stau, a former transit barracks for British soldiers, where they were initially kept under strict military guard. JDC, as the only American Jewish agency in the field, was in quite a dilemma, because while it did not wish to refuse its help, it could not do so under the conditions that the British set. IRO, too, was in a quandary, and refused to do anything until British military restrictions were removed. The British reaction to JDC's hesitations was to threaten JDC with expulsion from the Zone. Under Rosensaft's leader-ship, a meeting was held on September 5, before the ships arrived, and the decision was reached by all Jewish bodies to adopt what in fact was already the position of IRO.

The disembarkation itself (September 7-8) was a propagandists success for the refugees and their supporters; they were supported by a press corps which was almost unanimously on their side. The first to visit the detention camps was the head of the Jewish Agency team, Dr Kurt Lewin, the famous social psychologist. But the British position soon began to crumble. The leaders of the group who had been arrested were released, the Jewish Voluntary agencies permitted to enter the camps, and from the US Zone JDC sent its chief nurse to look after the sick. The Munich Central Committee sent some of the supplementary food it was receiving from JDC on a regular basis as its contribution to the detainees.

Poppendorf was the worse camp. There were Nissen huts and tents, but the inclement weather made housing in tents impossible, and as a result there was serious overcrowding in the Nissen huts. Most people slept two in a bed, in three or four-tiered bunks, the latrines were on the outskirts of the camp, without partitions or cubicles. In other words, the British were apparently taking their revenge on the hapless refugees. The medical staff supplied by the British was purely German—another touch of genteel

230 Out of the Ashes

cruelty. There was, of course, no heating, and the water facilities were inadequate. When the refugees were finally counted, there were 2717 at Poppendorf, and 1484 at Am Stau.

Food was totally inadequate, and from October 1 the British supplied 1800 calories, mosdy starch. Clothing was poor as well, because the refu-gees had taken with them summer clothing only for the trip through the Mediterranean in July. JDC and the other agencies did their best to remedy these situations, constantly fighting against a stubbon British bureaucracy. By late October, the two camps became uninhabitable and the British, fearing public reactions and political repercussions, moved the people to two camps that were supposed to be better: Sengwarden near Wilhelms-haven, and Emden. The agencies' representatives who visited the two places prior to the move of the people there, reported that at Sengwarden essential repairs to the plumbing, the electrical installations, and other repairs were necessary. Sanitary installations and the plumbing at Emden were in a worse state of repair. From November 2, the people were shipped to the new camps, where it was found that the British had done nothing at all to prepare for the newcomers. The usual reply of the British officers to complaints was that British people had also suffered during the bom-bardment of London.

However, the situation began improving as the British guards at the camps reduced their vigilance. Not only were supplies introduced, but refugees were gradually extruded into the American Zone. They had pri-ority in both legal and illegal immigration to Palestine. The Exodus Com-mittee, led by Mordechai Rosman, managed to smuggle a good proportion of the people out of the British Zone; many reached Palestine even before the establishment of the State of Israel. On November 9, Rosman wrote a letter to Sam Haber, JDC Director for Germany. JDC had shown:

the . . . humane and comradely bonds between you and the Exodus people. I am sure this is not just a fleeting impression, but a fact. You work not just as people with a "Joint" job to do. It is your Jewish and brotherly approach that stirs me. In you I have again found that true pinteleyid [the Jewish point], and humanity in man . . . I have not exaggerated in my judgment. On the contrary, I may not have said all I should.62

Austria

Postwar Austria lived by the fiction of being a liberated country. While it is true that there were Austrians fighting against Nazism, and a considerable number of them had paid with their lives for resistance against the Reich, the great majority of the population certainly had identified with the Hitler regime, and given it their support, especially in the first years after Austria's annexation by Germany. For practical reasons, the fiction was useful to all four Powers who in fact ruled Austria until 1948-49. Within

62 Ibid.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 231

a few short years, Austrians began ruling themselves again, and by early 1947 the Austrian parliament was free to pass its laws (unless the Powers unanimously vetoed a bill within 31 days). An analysis in early 1947 presented Austrian antisemitism as a live force. Foreigners, it was said, were eating up what little supplies there were, despite the fact that the food supplied by the Austrians actually came from UNRRA, and later from IRO, that is, it was imported from abroad.63

The Jews very definitely posed a problem, both to the Austrians, and to the occupation forces. There were the Austrian citizens, most of whom, some 9400 in number, lived in Vienna. Then there were the DPs properly so called, who had been liberated in 1945 and who enjoyed a higher status than the refugees who had arrived with the great exodus in 1946. The latter were the third group, and the most numerous.

The first group, the Austrian group, were made up largely of so-called Mischlinge, half-bloods in Nazi terminology, or of people who had lived in mixed marriages, with a small number who had returned from the Nazi camps. Most of the 9400 in Vienna, approximately 7000, were Jews by religion and/or identification. Apart from these Austrian Jews there were 3000 "free-living" Jewish DPs in the city, whom JDC had to look after as well. Communal life was regulated by the Kultusgeneinde, a Jewish community which in 1947 was still governed by a communist-dominated group which had little attachment to Jewish life. The Community was totally dependent on JDC, because of a lopsided occupational and age structure: there was a very large proportion of older people, and very few children. Their basic rations were provided by the Austrians, but these were utterly insufficient. Austrians often had relatives in the countryside, who could supply them with food and had not suffered the deprivations that the Jews had. JDC had to supply the rest.

The permanent DPs, of whom there were about 5500, received 2000 calories from the Army, whereas the third group, the refugees, received the same amount of food from the Austrians. The amount of calories was reduced to 1550 by early 1947. Special categories received more, but JDC guaranteed that every Jew should get a minimum of2200 calorics. In actual fact, the situation was easier because the Army gave out its rations for 27,400 Jews in the US Zone of Austria, whereas the number was probably 15-20 percent smaller, so that the food situation was reasonably good. In effect, however, JDC was feeding all the Jews in the country, and it was also clothing them. This applied not only to Vienna and the US Zone, but to the British Zone, where there were 1721 DPs in mid-1947, and the French Zone (Tirol and Vorarlberg), where there were 1200. Until the end of 1946, the clothing situation was very poor, and it was not until 1947 that JDC was able to supply at least some decent clothing to most people. The winter was very grim, too, with very litde coal, and all rail transport

" J DC/Country Directors, February 7, 1947, statement by Joseph Siiber. OOA—I

232 Out of the Ashes

for Austrians was stopped, except for the International Express trains. JDC had a hard time getting some coal from Czechoslovakia to give to shivering DPs and Viennese Jews.,

Medical services were provided by JDC, either through the use of Aus-trian hospitals, or by establishing hospitals in Jewish camps. There were old age homes (in Vienna) and sanatoria and rest homes, mainly for the many TB cases that had arrived from the East. The way things operated can be seen from the way people were employed to administer the program: there was the country medical director, three doctors, one public health nurse, two nurses and a nutritionist—all of whom were foreign, mostly Americans; but in each camp, JDC reported, there were three or four physicians and four to six nurses. Advice and material help was certainly needed and welcomed, but the people had their own personnel as well, and without it no outside agency could have performed a task such as that of JDC.64

The main problem, in Austria, as in Germany, was the low morale. Silber did not intervene in the movements of the refugees, but he was eager to look after them while they were in his area. In early 1947, JDC tried a new experiment: it called for volunteers to staff the camp at Wells, near Linz, where people would work—not for the Austrian economy, but for Jewish DPs. The fact that there was voluntary enlistment for Wells was a first encouraging sign. Work in tailoring, knitting, shoemaking, and carpentry was started, and despite initial difficulties, proceeded very satisfactorily. The workers were paid 15 percent in Austrian money, and 85 percent in scrip. The main item the workers asked for were bedsheets, a clear sign of their yearning for regulated, solid conditions that would enable them to create homes for their families. In addition, they received extra food from JDC. A second camp, Hallein, was then set up in the same way, and there were volunteers even from Bad Gastein, the hotel area where the "permanent" DPs had been lodged by General Mark Clark and JDC's James P. Rice back in 1945. Vocational training was set up at Hallein by ORT and JDC. Silber then tried, in part successfully, to intro-duce a similar system in the other 14 camps of the US Zone. By September 1947, close to 3000 people were employed in these workshops, a marked contrast to the relatively unsuccessful efforts to start similar programs in Germany.65

JDC was preparing, in Austria as in Germany, for semi-permanent exist-ence. It was into that situation that the Romanian refugee crisis exploded, in the spring.

Romania had become a hunger-stricken country. Bad harvests, for whatever reason, would cause immediate emergencies. Jews were not peas-

64 J DC/Austria, 1947-50, Medical report, Research Department, Paris, 1/2/48. M J DC/Austria, 1947-1950, Silber Report, 5/7/47; see also ibid., General Report, 3/24/47;

and Excom, 4/16/47, and 3/5/46, for the preceding passages.

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 233

ants, and they had no reserves, and this applied especially to people who had returned to Romania from the Transnistrian camps, or who had been repatriated from the Soviet Union. These people had no roots in the country, and the threat of starvation caused some of them to decide to move again. In early 1947, a small movement of Romanian refugees started to pass through a hostile Hungary, towards Vienna and the American Zones in the West. There was no ideology behind this infiltration, and it was not organized. In fact, the Romanian Brichah tried at first to stop it, but there was no stopping desperate, panic-stricken people. Brichah commanders in Slovakia, Austria, and elsewhere argued that the refugees should be directed to Romanian ports, whence they might embark on illegal immigrant ships for Palestine, rather than coming to Austria. But all this was of no avail. In the end Sneh, the Haganah commander who was in Europe at the time, said that while the primary objective of the Brichah was to bring people nearer to the shores of Palestine, its other task was to save Jews from whatever disasters befell them, and not to ask questions about where they wanted to go. Leavitt, who visited Hungary later in the spring, related how he had asked the Romanian girl why she had left her home. The answer was: because of the pogroms. When the JDC vice-chairman pointed out that there were no pogroms in Romania, the girl retorted that she did not mean the pogroms that had occurred, but those that would, in the future.66

Measured by the standards of the Polish Brichah, the Romanian influx was a minor affair. It started early in the year, and there were about 3000 DPs in Vienna in March. Some 800 refugees came in April. The numbers rose to 900 in May, 1697 in June, 4238 in July, and 4186 in August. They slowly declined after that. The total was close to 19,000. The people arrived in Budapest, where they had to be hidden at first, though of course the Hungarian police knew about them. Later, the Hungarians allowed them to stay for 10 days, but if they did not leave they would be returned by force to Romania. In fact, in May, 1000 refugees were returned in this way.67 Obviously, therefore, the refugees had to be smuggled on to Vienna as quickly as possible. If they had brought any pitiful possessions with them from Romania, these were taken off them by police, border guards, and unscrupulous passeurs. When they got to Vienna, they were housed in the Rothschild Hospital, where Teicholz was trying his best to provide food and lodging in impossibly crowded conditions.

At first, whenever 1800 refugees had assembled at the Rothschild Hospi-tal, they were moved on to the US Zone. However, it soon became obvious ^ 64 Interview with M. A. Leavitt, OHD, 1962; cf. also Bauer, Flight and Rescue, pp. 297,

67 J DC/Romania, 1947, Schwartz cable from Paris, 5/19/47: The 1000 "are now concen-trated in Satumare Romanian Transylvania. These people have sold all their belongings and given up their residences and cannot return to Moldavia from where they came because of acute famine conditions in that area and because they no longer have homes to return to."

234 Out of the Ashes

that the US Army had begun to view the situation with considerable alarm. There were hundreds of thousands of Jews in Romania. What if all these suddenly picked themselves up and invaded the US Zones in Austria and Italy? The Army was winding up its programs of direct aid to DPs. The last thing it wanted was to have to deal with another influx like the post-Kielce one from Poland. General Clay took a drastic step: on April 16, he announced that refugees arriving in the American Zones after April 21 would not be admitted to DP centers, nor would they receive food from American sources. The new policy did not close Zonal borders as such, but as a matter of practical policy, refugees arriving in Vienna were refused entry into the American Zone in Austria. The numbers in Vienna swelled, and starvation and epidemics were not too far away. Army officials tried to persuade the originators of the movement, whoever they were, to stop bringing in people, by simply shutting down the Rothschild Hospital in June. But that did not help, and after a few weeks they had to hand the buildings back to Teicholz. By the end of August there were 6897 persons in the hospital, so that each had only eight square feet of space.

The situation was untenable. JDC had to assume full responsibility for feeding and looking after some 12,000 refugees, and it could not carry on because it simply was not capable of doing it for any length of time. Hectic discussions took place among the five Jewish organizations: with Judge Levinthal, the new Adviser, in Washington; and between JDC, the Army, and IRO in Europe. After some initial opposition to the very idea of assuming any responsibility towards the new refugees, the State Depart-ment's General John H. Hildring, who was very friendly to Jewish con-cerns, wanted to move the 2400 refugees then (June) in Vienna to the US Zone, but the War Department objected. The new commander in Austria, General Geoffrey Keyes, was asked for his view, and when he agreed with the State Department position, he was in effect overruled. The Jews would stay in Vienna.

In the end, American resistance to the entry of the Romanian refugees was broken by Brichah. From late July, transports organized by the Aus-trian Brichah went to the US Zone, and the only way to have stopped them would have been by shooting. Keyes had no intention of reaching that impasse. What finally convinced the Americans to accept the refugees was the fact that in most cases, the newcomers were absorbed into the existing camps without demanding additional food—they took the places of the malochim. Only in some instances were the Romanian r e f u g e e s treated separately by the Americans; in some cases they were then put into Dachau, together with Germans expelled from the East. The Army's pol-icy was actually in line with the Jewish interest. As General Keyes explained to Judge Levinthal in November, it was his intention to move all DPs, not just the Jews, from Austria into Germany, because the

The DP Camps in Germany and A ustria—1947 235

intention was to hand over Austria to the Austrians, and who knew what would then happen to the DPs.68

On August 19, IRO and the Austrians decided to allocate the basic Austrian ration to the refugees, and with the JDC supplement the Roman-ians were getting 2100 calories at the end of the year. It had cost JDC a very large sum of money, but the situation eased off with the approach of winter, though there were still 7000 Romanian Jews in Vienna in November. However, at the end of 1947, illegal immigration by sea from Romania to Palestine restarted in a quite a large way, and people in flight could use the route to Palestine rather than risk the hazardous journey through Hungary to another bout of difficulties in Vienna. Also,- winter itself was a great obstacle to wandering. The Romanian episode was at an end, after some very scary months.

Internal organization was much less marked in Austria than in the US Zone of Germany. There was a Central Committee in Salzburg, led by Dr Strauch, but it was rather tame and not self-asserting, and was, in fact, approved and in a way nominated by the Brichah. In Austria, as we have seen, Brichah actually controlled the running of the camps. JDC workers, especially Joseph C. Silber, whose relations with Brichah were a bit strained, were kept in the dark about the internal working of the system. But as Brichah had every reason to be accommodating to JDC, the camp committees were friendly too. It is this that seems to explain also why the employment programs worked in Austria better than they did in Germany. In Austria, Brichah's very energetic leadership ensured collaboration on programs that the Brichah people thought were conducive to an improve-ment of morale, and they gave support to the schemes in the different camps. The people themselves did not just respond to directives: Brichah was represented in the camps by young refugees from Poland, themselves part of the people, who were capable of arousing the kind of response that was needed.

Within that framework, cultural and educational activities, as well as social activities of the usual kind, took place. Several hundred Jewish students enlisted in the reopened Austrian universities in the US Zone; two theatrical groups were set up in the Linz area; the Jewish Agency teachers were supplied with schooling materials; ORT opened a number of vocational schools, and so on.

As the winter of 1947-48 was approaching, and the Army was experienc-ing a growing lack of resources as a result of Congressional policies, there was pressure by the General—parallel to what we have seen in Germany— to consolidate the camps. Some of the older camps were closed and new camps, with better housing, opened, to save expenses. This was met with some, but not too much, opposition, again in marked contrast to the situation in Germany.

61 JDC/DPs, 1047/48, Lcvinthal to Grossman, 11/19/47.

236 Out of the Ashes

The situation in the two main DP countries, at the end of 1947, suddenly turned from despair to renewed hope. A Jewish State was now in the offing. The DPs were called to respond to that challenge: JDC, ORT, HIAS, the Adviser, the chaplains—they all had to switch positions and face a new situation, that would eliminate the vast DP program in a rela-tively short time.

CHAPTER 10

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai

France and the Low Countries When in 1946 Laura L. Margolis was sent to France to run JDC's Office for France, she found a bewildering assortment of agencies and groups competing for JDC subvendons. For two years she claimed, subvendons had been handed out without proper supervision, and the result was that there was a great deal of duplication and a grim competition between the agencies. Furthermore, and even more bewildering to the American Jew-ish observer, each group either seemed to be identified with a political trend that had litde to do with its stated aim, or it was a coalition of such groups, in which case the political wrangles were engaged in within one agency. This was certainly true of the COJASOR (see Chapter 1, above), which had been constituted by JDC in order to avoid such infighting in the first place. The differences between the "old" French Jews and the East Europeans, between the returned deportees and the others, between Zionists and non-Zionists, between all these and the Communists, between the different Zionist factions may have seemed superfluous. Yet was it?

As in Poland and the DP camps, political parties or groups, were among other things, substitute homes for the disoriented, the marginal, the home-less, those deprived of families. Also, the frustrations and tragedies of the past years were, in a way, sublimated in endless political discussions. However, there was also a Jewish tradition involved, one that had litde to do with topical situations—the tradition of factiousness, of hair-splitting politics. Insofar as these were applied outside, in the Gentile world, they had at least some basis in the social reality of the host cultures. Applied to the Jewish sphere they had no recognizable reality to relate to, except in the case of the argument about a Jewish State in Palestine, which was real enough, and which led to practical consequences for some: the attempt to go to Palestine, or to help with the various illegal activities connected with Zionism.

Realistically speaking, however, the existential problems of Jews in 237

238 Out of the Ashes

France, about 200,000 of them in 1947, were hardly political. By mid-1947, the Jews were part of an economy rising from Nazi destruction, and JDC and the other agencies really had little work to do among French Jewry—that is among those who had been in France prior to 1939, or their children, whom the government saw as belonging to France one way or another. The only exception was, perhaps, the old age homes, which had to be revamped in 1947 when Laura Margolis found some of them to be little short of scandalous. Some of the old people in them had undergone harrowing experiences in hiding during the war, including efforts at con-verting them, and needed the attention they were now promised.1

Generally, however, the problems French Jews faced could not be solved by money or social services as they existed in the troubled postwar world: there were the people who had lost their loved ones in the ovens of Auschwitz or the slave-labor camps of Germany; children who found themselves in a strange world bereft of family care; in other words, the basic problem was one of memory. They would deal, and fail to deal, with it for decades. No American Jewish intervention helped—with perhaps one exception. The exception was a wonderful man by the name of Isaac Shneersohn, who decided that the Holocaust in France should be dealt with in the way Ringelblum dealt with it in Poland, and Israel Kaplan dealt with it in the DP camps (see above, Chapter 9)—by creating a histori-cal archive and a permanent memorial. That was the program of the CDJC (Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine), which became the main repository of material documenting the Holocaust in France, and of con-temporary French Jewry generally. JDC's help was essential in setting it up, and help was given. In the initial stages there was some participation by American Jews in its activities, but this was temporary only .

The main problem faced by JDC, HIAS, ORT and other American Jews was the influx of displaced persons from the East. French policies had become diametrically opposed to those of Vichy or pre-1940 France, because there was practically no limit set to immigration, and when French visas were not obtained, people came in illegally and were not expelled. "Although France does not say: 'We have opened our borders to the Jews,' they have, in effect, done so. People who come in without visas, without papers, are legalized in 24-48 hours. They get residence permits and are given the right to work."2 JDC estimated that people came in at a rate of 1000-1500 a month. By mid-1947, 40,000 Jews who had not lived in France prior to 1945 were estimated to be among the 200,000 mentioned above. The influx of some 1500-2000 people a month continued well into 1948, though at that time it was largely replaced by another, this time truly temporary and transient problem: how to care for the immigrants to Israel who, on their way, passed through France and stayed there for a

1 J DC/France, France, 194^47, Margolis Report, 11/17/47. 2 Leavitt at Excom, 7/15/47.

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 239

short time. JDC could deal with this latter issue relatively easily, but the problem of infiltrees was much more taxing, because French Jews had no means to deal with it on their own, though they could and did help.

The main financial burden of dealing with these new immigrants fell on JDC, though the human response had naturally to be that of local Jews and their organizations. In May 1947, Schwartz became alarmed at the size of the influx, and in a way at the readiness of the French government to allow more people, especially children, in—at JDC's expense, of course. The problem was one of priorities. These people were not threatened in Poland or Germany. It would be, he said, impossible to assume heavy financial responsibilities, because if JDC entered into obligations towards the French government, this would mean "loss of opportunity [to] relieve situation in [DP] camps where morale [is] deteriorating daily."3 The people needless to say, paid no attention; they just continued to come.

Many of these newcomers required very little help. They were accom-modated in low-class hotels for a few weeks, and then they found jobs, or moved on with or without the help of HIAS to other continents, or went on illegal immigration to Palestine, or joined relatives who were already living in France. The fact that JDC's caseload did not diminish during two years was due to the constant influx and outflow of people. Some did require help, and a plethora of agencies with overlapping programs were trying to look after them. COJASOR had a service for immigrants (SSI— Service Sociale des Immigres), which looked after 5500 people a month in 1947, in addition to a welfare case load of 4000 which was handled by COJASOR itself, the difference lying in the length of stay of the people in France.4

The main French Jewish youth movement was the Scouting Movement (Eclaireurs), with a proud resistance and child rescue record during the war. It also ran a service (SSJ—Service Sociale des Jeunes) for transients, directed towards young people. So did the MJS (Mouvement de lajeunesse Sioniste), which was a coalition of small Zionist socialist youth movements. But MJS was really too small to be able to contribute significantly to the solution of problems, and JDC supported the Eclaireurs, despite a great deal of criticism. In fact, it sent three American Jewish counselors to the youth homes of the Scouts, and reported that the Scouts were very satisfied with them. On the whole, the training seminars for youth counselors of the Eclaireurs, and their homes throughout the country, were run efficiently, aided by the cooperation with JDC. Of course, in 1947, by no means all transient young people went to the Eclaireurs. Some of them (around 1800 on average) belonged to Hechalutz, the umbrella organization of Zionist youth for older age groups (over 17-18), who had hachsharot in

J Ibid., Paris cable, 5/19/47. 4 JDC/France, 1944-47, Research Department Report No. 29, 5/12/47; ibid., Memor-

andum on Investigation of COJASOR, 4/21/47. OOA—1»

240 Out of the Ashes

France as elsewhere. Smaller numbers (around 500) belonged to the paral-lel religious Zionist groups training for their future life in Palestine. In June 1948, the SSJ was separated from the Eclaireurs, and became an independent agency dealing with transient young people. JDC began to run the agency almost directly, and separated it again into a section dealing with local, homeless young people, and one dealing with transients proper. A year later, when both parts were running well, they were reunited, their case load slowly diminished, and then they in effect went out of action. JDC had accomplished another job.

By 1947, too, close contacts were developing between French and North African Jews, and the Eclaireurs, for instance, trained a fair number of North African Jewish young people in their seminars and camps. This was a portent of things to come, when North African Jewry would play a major role in the history of the Jews of France.5

The problem of how to deal with orthodox groups was especially compli-cated in France. The agreement between JDC and the Va'ad Hahatzalah, establishing a Central Orthodox Committee, has already been referred to (above, Chapter 8). The help of this committee was indeed necessary, in order to avoid complications. Professor Samuel L. Sar, Dean of Yeshiva University, helped the non-Orthodox JDC social workers to sort out the different groups in France. There were 1765 "religious functionaries" in France, in late 1948, wholly dependent on JDC. They were divided into a number of groups, with the Lubavitcher hassidim in a plurality (638 people). Pro-Zionist and anti-Zionist groups, hassidic and antihassidic elements, were all included, and of course these different groups did not work together and had to be dealt with separately. Their special needs required much greater investment of funds and effort than those of others. The main problem was to find countries of immigration for them, and in the end, in 1949-50, about a third went to Israel, and the other two thirds finally found their way into the United States and Britain, or stayed in France.6

A special organization was set up by JDC to support its employment and child care programs, the HEFUD (Habillement des Enfants des Fusilles etDeportes), which employed transients in the traditional Jewish trades in order to produce clothes and sheets and the like for the use of children's homes in France, thereby both training the transients and providing much-needed equipment for the children. Started in 1947, and run by a consor-tium of 24 child care organizations, this program trained several hundred people a year. JDC's relations with the CGT, the French Trade Union Federation controlled by communists and socialists were of the best, and Margolis's talent for Jewish diplomacy made conservative and religious

J Ibid., Research Department, Paris, 4/22/47; ibid., Welfare Department Report No. 4, SSJ, 11/10/49.

6 J DC/France, 1948-49; Excom, 10/21/48.

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 241

Jewish groups collaborate on such unlikely boards as the one that ran HEFUD with the CGT. It seems that HEFUD was not in competition with ORT, which in France ran a successful operation of its own and which had signed an agreement with JDC in January 1947, setting out fairly exactly what it was supposed to do in France. At the end of 1947, there were 62 ORT courses going on in France, and 1850 persons were being trained at any time. Contrary to other places, in France ORT and JDC were mutually satisfied.

The major problem regarding transients was their accommodauon. Despite efforts to provide semi-permanent housing, in the end JDC-sub-ventioned organizations had to fall back on the 7-800 hotel rooms in some 225 hotels in the Paris area it rented to provide essential living space for these people.

Who were the transients? Some came into France with Brichah from the DP camps, and their aim was to reach the Marseilles area whence illegal immigration boats of the Mossad would take them towards Palestine. Some were people who came in on their own, mostly illegally, again from the DP camps. The large majority had come via Poland from the Soviet Union in 1946, and were escaping the atmosphere of the DP camps in Germany. Others came directly from Poland, when the French government gave official permission to bring 9-10,000 Jews to France. Slowly, throughout 1947, these people began arriving in organized convoys from Poland, sent by the emigration department of JDC there. The quota was never filled, and we do not know the exact figure of these legal migrants who actually arrived in France; their destination was either Palestine or the Americas. Jewish groups in France established an interagency Council (Conseil Inter-oeuvre)} with JDC participation, which dealt with these transients, many of whom hoped to stay in France. In early 1948, there were 9500 Jewish transients with permanent residence permits and 7500 without, excluding unaccompanied children. In October 1948, JDC withdrew from the Coun-cil, because it decided—or hoped—that the French government would no longer provide entry permits from Poland. JDC stayed away from the Council, although entry of these people into France continued until 1949.

Jewish transients also arrived from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania, some with legal permits, some without. To the social workers in France it did not really matter; the people were there, and they had to be looked after, temporarily at least, until they either left or disappeared into the Jewish tenements of Paris or, to a much lesser extent, to the provinces.

After the establishment of Israel, the opening of legal immigration by Israeli Consuls who were immediately nominated for that purpose, sharply divided the transients. On the one hand, those destined for Israel now entered France by prior arrangement with newly established Israeli rep-resentatives in the countries to the east of France. While the influx was

242 Out of the Ashes

massive, it was temporary, and JDC's Office for France was soon relieved from carrying this burden, which was handed over to a separate JDC body. On the other hand, there were the largely unorganized movements into France of people who did not intend to go to Israel, and who had to be kept fed and housed until they could emigrate to other countries. Some of these, as before, stayed on in France, but many had to be helped in arrang-ing their applications for visas and other formalities.

A major factor in absorbing these people was the Federation des Societes Juives, led by Marc Jarblum (who was to become Laura Margolis's hus-band), the organization of Jews of East European origin in France. Their societies (amicales) and social services eased the absorption of the new East European wave of immigration. In 1947, UJRE (Union des Juifs pour la Resistance), the communist social agency that had emerged from the under-ground of World War II, also applied for and received JDC help. After some wrangling over the right of JDC to make an audit of UJRE's work, this support was renewed in 1949. In the light of the anti-communist hysteria just then beginning to grip the United States, it was a courageous step to support a communist agency in a Western country such as France.7

In all European countries, including France, JDC supported students. From the point of view of long-term development, this was one of the most far-sighted policies the American Jewish agency undertook. In France, the students' group, the Union des Etudiants Juifs de France, received 8000 francs per student per month. It was not exactly designed to enable comfortable living, but it helped a great deal, and was responsible there, and in other countries, for the rise of a new generation of Jewish intellec-tuals and professionals, many of whom would later become leaders in their communities.

For the American Jewish agency, the chief question was how to organize in such a way that ultimately the local community would take over. In other words, it was a question of coordination. As early as the fall of 1946, JDC initiated a general meeting at the CRIF, the central organization of French Jews, to coordinate actions on behalf of the transients. It took a year to iron out the most persistent differences between the bickering organizations, and only in September 1947 did an advisory committee come into existence, that JDC hoped would take over in the end.8

On the reconstruction front, the usual loan kassas were used effectively to help people establish themselves in trade and industry, and even in agriculture. Several groups dealt with intellectuals and students, not only from among the recent arrivals but also from among the older-established groups. A special effort was made—parallel to that in Berlin and Prague--to reunite families and find more distant relatives and friends. For this purpose, there existed in Paris the Service Europeen des Recherches, which

7 JDC/France, 1948-49; J DC/DPs, 1947-48, Beckelman to Cohen (IRO), 1/8/48. ' JDC/France, 1944-47, Report by Laura Margolis, 11/17/47.

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 243

dealt with thousands of inquiries and, sometimes, managed to alleviate great mental suffering; too often it could not. Also, it was the SER that first began putting together lists of deportees and issued death certificates for those who were known to have died. This was especially important for the religious element, because it enabled the survivors to remarry in accordance with halacha, the Jewish religious law.

As elsewhere, special emphasis was placed on children's programs. Youth Aliyah, charged with educating children to go to Palestine, dealt with large numbers. Of the quota of legal migrants from Poland, Youth Aliyah was responsible for 2000. The first group of youngsters, 341 strong, arrived on November 25,1947. OSE, the old-established child care organi-zation which, like the Eclaireurs, had a proud record of underground res-cue operations in France during the war, became the chief child care agency after the war as well. By 1947, they accounted for most of the 61 children's homes supported by JDC, with 3128 children, many of them no longer orphans and war victims, but children of the transients who were streaming into France. The numbers of these children grew steadily, as did the standard of care. Apart from them, close to 9000 children were cared for in foster homes, with additional supplies and material help from JDC through the various child care groups. In this as in other areas, under Laura Margolis, JDC saw it as its task not just to supply money and goods, but to train experts in the various welfare fields. This applied to the child care agencies as well, and up-to-date methods were introduced in seminars and study sessions with agencies such as OSE, itself the French branch of World OSE, which also had a group in the United States. In France, a specifically Zionist organization (OPEJ, Oeuvre de Protection des Enfants Juifs) also opened children's homes, designed to prepare especially infil-tree's children for Palestine-Israel. They, too, collaborated with and benefited from JDC's expertise in the field.9

Health care, not only for the transients, was another traditional area of JDC activity. In the chaos that reigned in France during these first years of reconstruction, an initiative such as that of JDC to screen all Paris Jews for TB was an important exercise in prophylactic treatment.10

American Jews were involved in illegal immigration to Palestine; they had crewed and sailed the ship that was to become "Exodus 1947" to Europe. In France, as the saga of the immigrants unfolded (see above, Chapter 9), 165 tons of food were brought down to Port-de-Bouc, where the British prison ships brought the immigrants back in the withering August heat, and the people were fed by Laura Margolis and her workers. As in other countries, collaboration with the Jewish Agency and with

9 Excom, 4/12/47; JDC/France, 1948-49 for the details. 10 JDC/France, 1944-47 contains a large quantity of relevant materials, such as the reports

from the Country Directors' meeting in Paris, February 1947, and Laura Margolis' six-monthly reports. The text is based on these.

244 Out of the Ashes

Mossad and Brichah was close. Margolis was personally well aware of the illegal activities of the Zionist groups before the declaration of Israel's independence, and fully supported them. Before and after May 1948, collaboration between JDC and JA and the Israeli government was close. The policy of mass immigration pursued by Israel eased JDC's work in France, too, by reducing the number of legal and illegal DPs in the country. In 1949, 1000-1500 persons, DPs and French Jews, were immi-grating to Israel every month.

In France, JDC acted as a unifying force in a Jewish society that was threatened by very strong centrifugal forces. In 1948, a united fund-raising organization developed at last among French Jews, the Fond Social Juif Unifie (FSJU). From then on, the American Jewish organizations could hand over to the French Jews, first all the work with French Jewry, and then have them participate in the work for North African Jews. The Euro-pean transient problem had resolved itself by then.

However, the transition from care for Holocaust survivors in Europe to care of North African Jews was not sudden, though it was undoubtedly dramatic. JDC's leaders were well aware of the change in emphasis as 1948 wore on, and became even more aware of this in 1949 and 1950. North African Jews were being torn out of their traditional lives—in those years primarily to Israel—by the combined force of Moroccan enmity to the Jewish State and their own messianic hopes. The problem, from the point of view of the American Jewish agency, was that the urban middle-class elite of Moroccan Jewry did not leave for Israel, in their majority. The people who left were the inhabitants of the Moroccan mellahs (more or less segregated Jewish quarters in towns) and of the villages in the Atlas mountains and other provincial areas. They were very poor, many of them were carriers of diseases (chiefly trachoma), and had to be cured some-where before Israel could take them. JDC, separating their problem from problems of French and Western immigrant Jews, took over some of the former Mossad immigrants' camps near Marseilles and set up health centers (run by OSE) and feeding and clothing centers. After a period of time, most of the people were cured and healthy enough to be able to go to Israel. Tunisian Jews came later, and there many of the better-placed social groups came as well, so that the problems were quite different.

In 1949 and 1950 the JDC program in France for local Jews was winding down, and handed over to local agencies. There were about 5000 welfare cases left, and soon French Jewry would take these over, despite the initial inefficiency of the FSJU. The transients who could emigrate to Israel were helped to do so. Emigration to other countries could be dealt with by HIAS, and ORT would carry on their vocational training programs. Soon, massive North African Jewish immigration to both Israel and France would change the picture, but that would not have any direct relationship to the post-Holocaust situations described here.

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 245 From the long-term point of view, France was a JDC success story, set

as it was in the context of a Western-type democracy which gave the surviving Jewish community a chance of meaningful survival which it managed to seize. The JDC slogan of "helping the indigenous Jewish community to become self-reliant and self-sufficient" was largely achieved.11

The same policies and the same problems that we have seen in France can also be seen in the Low Countries. The amounts of money spent there by JDC were not inconsiderable. Basically, in 1946-47 JDC was helping to rebuild what was left of the local communities, and by 1948 these were in a large measure self-sufficient. The community in Holland was a sorry remnant: just a few thousand people remained out of a once prosperous population of 140,000. But economically, after a period of adjustment, they managed, and even established in 1948 a fund-raising organization of their own. JDC had to look after transients, for instance a group of 500 Romanian children who were on their way to Israel and elsewhere, and it also supported hachsharot of young people who finally emigrated to Palesti-ne-Israel. In Belgium, a higher percentage of the Jewish population had survived, but there, too, the question was that of large numbers (probably about 10,000) of transients, who came to Belgium in the same way as they did to France. Of these, by early 1948, 3500 were still in the country. There and in Sweden, the same issues were faced: an orthodox element that was difficult to handle, social workers not used to dealing with East European Jews, and disunity among local Jewish groups. The Scandinav-ian country accepted some of the difficult cases—people with medical and psychological problems—and Norway in particular, which started in 1947-48 with 600 refugees, did rather well in absorbing these people, despite tremendous obstacles.12

Italy

Italy was considered to be one of the three DP countries in the war's aftermath. There, as in Germany and Austria, JDC was involved directly in servicing the DP camps. But unlike Germany and Austria, Italy had a native community which, while it had suffered gravely during the Holo-caust (losing some 8000 of its 45,000 members through Nazi murder actions, 8000 by conversions, and about another 5000 by emigration), had yet survived the war as a community. The traditions had not been broken, the leadership was still there, old-established ways of dealing with problems had not entirely been lost. In addition to the 24,000 or so local Jews (including 2000 pre-1940 refugees), there was the influx of displaced

" Excom, 4/12/49. 12 Excom, 3/16/48; JDC/DPs, 1947-48, Beckelman to Cohen (IRO), 1/8/48.

246 Out of the Ashes

persons. In addition, there were some 4000 "free-living" DPs who in effect became part of the Jewish community set-up. In this, Italy was more like France, though the proportions between local and foreign Jews were different. Italian Jewry did not have the means to even start looking after the Jewish refugees streaming into Italy. Equally, many Italian Jews were entirely out of sympathy with the East European Jews. Their community was acculturated in Italy, there was a high and growing percentage of marriages with Gentiles, and JDC was unable to bridge these gaps. There were a few Italian Jews who identified with the Zionist urge of the DPs, but they were in a minority—though it must be said that some of them, in crucial positions of influence in the Italian administration, were of great importance in the negotiations JDC conducted in Italy to ease the DPs' lot. "They may not have been strong in numbers or in organizational skills. . . any time you had a meeting with the Italian Jewish community, you reckoned eight hours of talk, and then you wondered what happened. But by God, when it came to something like [getting things from the Italian administration], they knew sources. They knew where to go."13

Support for the local community by JDC was almost 100 percent in the first three postwar years (1944-47), but after that the community slowly became independent.

The first JDC representatives in Italy, in 1944—45, were dependent on the help provided by the (British) Jewish Relief Units and the Palestine Jewish soldiers. "JDC representatives carrying food and supplies in three-ton trucks followed the liberating Allied Armies into the North of Italy," but "it is only due to the fact that the trucks were put at our disposal by the JRU and the members of the unit . . . have driven the trucks through-out Italy that it has been possible to supply the refugees and communi-ties."14

In 1945-46, the DPs who had entered Italy illegally numbered officially about 25,000. The number of those who remained in Italy was much smaller. They were settled in UNRRA camps in several regions: near harbors at the heel of the boot-shaped Italian peninsula, near Rome, and in the north, in the neighborhood of the center of Jewish life, which was at Milan.15 In the fall of 1946, there were an estimated 14,000 Jewish DPs in the country, and in November UNRRA declared that a ceiling on the Jewish camp population it had fixed earlier—12,500 at the most—had been reached, and no more Jews would be accepted. This remained largely theoretical as Jews found ways of circumventing such orders. In addition, the people who had been infiltrated by Brichah also founded hachsharot, of which there were 55 in March 1946, with—officially—5379 members.

" JDC/Katzki interviews, Dr. Benjamin N. Brook, 1983. 14 JDC/Italy, 1945, Melvin S. Goldstein, 5/19 and 5/23/45. 15 In 1946 there were nine camps: Santa Maria di Bagni, Santa Maria di Senca, Santa

Cesarea, Tricase, Cremona, Turin, Cinecitta, Genoa, Milan, and Greigliasco. 16 Excom, 3/8/46.

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 247 There seems to have been pressure by the British to move the Jewish DPs from the southern camps, because illegal immigration to Palestine was easier from there. 4000 people were therefore moved in February 1947, mainly to the north. This also made administration cheaper and easier, but it did not stop immigration to Palestine.

The mass exodus from Eastern Europe in 1946 caused a renewed infil-tration into Italy; in that year, Brichah brought in 13,282 persons. At the same time, however, illegal immigration took 7451 people out of Italy on the boats sailing towards Palestine. Estimates for Brichah infiltration in 1947 range as high as 15,000, but the real number is probably appreciably less. Close to that number were taken out by illegal immigration to Palestine. The balance that remained was about 25-26,000, according to official JDC figures, though exact numbers were impossible to come by because of the practice of drawing food supplies for malochim, there no less than in Germany or Austria. "Trying to establish the population figure is a pretty impossible task. In the hachsharot there are perhaps 50 percent or 70 percent living under aliases. . . . They move for internal purposes and they choose not to announce their departure or their arrival and they transfer cards of identity and the right to reside in the country as so many negotiable instruments."17 If one reduces the official numbers by about 15-20 percent, a 20,000 figure would be valid. In late 1947 and early 1948, some of the Romanian refugees who had gone through Vienna to the US Zone in Austria infiltrated into Italy as part of a continuing Brichah effort to intrude Jewish DPs.

The relationship of JDC in Italy to Brichah and Mossad was not always very easy. Whereas excellent and very close relations had developed with Harold Trobe, who was in Italy for JDC in 1946, his brother, Jacob L. Trobe, JDC's man in 1947, referred to them as "political commissars" and was perturbed by the fact that no control whatsoever could be estab-lished by an outside agency like JDC which, after all, was there to help. The central organization of the DPs—Merkaz Lagolah—set up in 1944 by Palestinian soldiers in the British Army, was run by emissaries from Palestine, and Trobe was wondering whether JDC could claim to be non-political, when it supported the Merkaz fully. The few people who wanted to emigrate to the United States did not see the Merkaz as their representa-tive, understandably enough. The Palestinian emissaries' attitude was of course totally different; in their view it was the task of the American Jews to help, and leave politics, including infiltration and illegal immigration, to them. It is worth mentioning, by the way, that in the memoirs of both groups these rather strong divergencies in attitudes and behavior are totally forgotten, and only the collaboration is remembered on both sides. •. 17 J DC/Directors' Meeting, Paris, 2/3/47, Jacob L. Trobe Report. Trobe estimated 11,000 in camps, 7500 on hachsharot, 2400 "free-living" DPs in towns, and about 5000 unregistered people.

248 Out of the Ashes

The problem of the camps was similar to that in Germany and Austria, though the problem of separate Jewish camps did not really arise, as such. Jews concentrated in certain camps and the others were moved out. Where this did not happen, trouble was likely to occur, as in an incident on May 1, 1946. Jews at Reggio Emilia had a May Day parade, and were attacked by Ukrainian DPs—two Jews were killed and fifteen wounded, and the Jews were moved out to another camp.18 UNRRA was supplying a basic ration of 2450 calories,and JDC was looking after all the supplements.19

In October 1947, IRO rations were cut to 2017 calories, and JDC was faced with the grim reality of having to supply, immediately, large quantities of food to the DPs, in order to avoid a veritable uprising. Moreover, the IRO ration was very poor in quality, and the clothing supplied by the new agency was deplorable and quantitatively insufficient by IRO's own stan-dards. The new camps into which infiltrees were now sent were not prop-erly winterized, and in a very poor condition generally. JDC established its own camp for infiltrees at Chiari near Milan, because Jewish infiltrees refused point-blank to go to the general IRO camps. Nor was IRO very popular with the Italian administration, because whereas UNRRA had shipped in supplies for Italy as well as for the DPs, IRO's responsibility was to the DPs alone.

The winter of 1947-48 was very bad for the refugees in the camps. In early 1948 the situation became even worse, when IRO was forced to reduce its rations to 1600 calories because of lack of funds, and JDC had to supplement that to a minimally adequate level. In addition, infiltrees were accepted by IRO as their wards only after places in IRO's permanent camps had been freed by emigration, usually of non-Jewish DPs. Until then, JDC had to care for the newcomers in transit camps which, except for Chiari, were really quite unsuited for the winter conditions of 1947-48. Had it not been for the boost in morale as a result of the United Nations decision on Palestine in late November which opened a prospect for speedy immigration to the Land of Israel, the situation might well have become disastrous.20

Nevertheless, relations with IRO were rather friendly: no one accused IRO of lack of good will, it was a matter of lack of money. But IRO's support was very important to JDC: IRO assured free transportation of supplies, provided liaison to Italian authorities, enabled JDC to import goods without paying customs, provided petrol for JDC cars, and so on.

The relationship with the Italian government has already been touched upon. As time went on, Italy, which like the other European countries

" JDC/Italy, Trobe Report, 5/6/46. n Though Trobe complained to the US Embassy in Rome (JDC/Italy, Trobe, 9/6/46)

that in fact UNRRA was supplying only 1990 calories. 20 Adcom, 12/23/47, JDC/Italy, Paris Research Department Report No. 43, by Louis

Horowitz, 3/15/48. Louis Horowitz, later to become one of JDC's most important adminis-trators, was Acting Director for Italy at that time.

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 249

was in the throes of serious economic troubles, did not wish to accept any more refugees, Jewish or others. As the overwhelming majority of the 30,000 DPs in Italy were Jews, this became a real problem when UNRRA pulled out in June 1947. The Italian government declared that it would close its borders, but though this was tried, the carabinieri were no match for the Brichah passeurs. Beyond orders, however, there was the almost total absence of any antisemitism on the part of the Italian populauon, and the real desire to help the Jewish refugees, which conflicted with political attitudes dictated by overall economic considerations on a high govern-mental level. At the end of 1947, after the UN resolution declaring a Jewish State in Palestine had been passed, Trobe approached Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, to ask him for further Italian hospitality for Jews. Sforza responded positively, provided no more Jews would try to enter the country. There were two million unemployed, and despite the

-Marshall Plan which was just then about to begin its operations, Italy could not do more than she was doing already.

A special feature of DP life in Italy was the hachsharot. Unlike in Ger-many and Austria, there was a large number of these training places in Italy in 1947-73 with, officially, 7500 people—separate from the camps. These hachsharot were actually run by the Merkaz, and more accurately, by Mossad. They were in fact collecting points for illegal immigration.

They were jumping off points to get [refugees selected by Brichah for boarding the boats] out of the camps which were under British control. The UNRRA camps in Italy were all under the charge of former British army o f f i ce r s . . . . We provided ample quantities of food so that the food could be put on the ships which were moving the people out. . . . When the British asked me about feeding the refugees . . . about mov-ing across the border illegally, I said we do not move the people . . . we feed them. The JDC in Austria takes care of a Jewish refugee when he is in Austria and the JDC in Italy takes care of a refugee when he's in Italy. How he gets across the border is not my business, but the minute he comes across he is. If he came across illegally, that's also not my concern. I am not the police.21

Hachsharot were not only Brichah and Mossad camps; many of them were also training places for children and young people, where a tremen-dous job was done in educating young persons to be able to integrate into normal society. In addition, there were 10 children's homes. The teachers and counselors were either Palestinians, or members of youth movements from Poland, or both, and their task was to prepare their charges for the move to Palestine when the time came. Some of them, such as the chil-dren's home at Solvino, became model homes. JDC had the responsibility for the material aspects of these hachsharot, and contrary to its practice elsewhere, had to be directly involved in the day-to-day management of these points. The result was that some 175 people were employed by JDC for its Italian program, much to Schwartz's displeasure.22

21 JDC/Katzki interviews, Harold Trobe, 1983. 22 JDC/Brichah, 1946-47, Meeting of 10/3/46.

250 Out of the Ashes

There were two Boards of Education in Italy, one in Rome and one in Milan. The pattern of Germany and Austria repeated itself: the Boards were composed of Palestinian teachers, DP representatives, and JDC. As everywhere else in post-Holocaust Jewish Europe, education received pride of place and children received schooling under the most improbable conditions.

JDC could rightly take pride in a complete medical program for the DPs. As in Germany and Austria, it utilized medical personnel from among the DPs, under American supervision, to keep the population healthy. At Merano, in the north of Italy, a central TB sanatorium was set up, which accepted patients from all of central Europe, and which acquired an excel-lent name. It was also used as a Brichah transit point, but that was not really known to JDC in Rome. Educational and cultural activities of the Merkaz were also supported, including a high school in Rome and a central newspaper for the Merkaz.

As elsewhere, work and employment programs became a central part of the agency's activities in Italy. Apart from the hachsharot, various employ-ment programs on the Austrian model were established. Tool-making, carpentry, textile production on a small scale were all tried, and a maritime hachshara group near Rome supported. Some of the hachsharot were pro-ducing vegetables. As winter approached, bedding and warm garments were produced in a number of places, easing the demand on shipments from abroad. All this was done in cooperation with the Merkaz, but although IRO did in the end supply 15,000 blankets and 800 cots, JDC still had to ship in large amounts of clothing for the winter—effectively the last winter for many of the people in Italy, but that of course lay in the future. Yet all these attempts at supplying work were necessarily tempor-ary; after all, Italy was the country from which people hoped to leave very soon, legally or illegally, and any employment program was really built on quicksand.

Evacuation of Jewish DPs from Italy began very soon after the declar-ation of independence in Israel. It proceeded faster there than elsewhere: according to a rough estimate, 15,000 DPs from camps in Italy were shipped to Israel between May 1948 and October 1949. 30,000 more were serviced by JDC as they passed through Italy on their way to Israel from all over Europe, North Africa, and even Shanghai, besides 11,000 who had been helped to emigrate from Italian camps to other countries between May 1946 and October 1949.23 The main task of JDC in 1948-50 was therefore to help with emigration. That meant that the camps were emptied rather quickly. With the help of a poor but friendly IRO adminis-tration, the worst camps were liquidated first, and the good camps,

21 JDC Country Directors' Conference, October 1949, Report (No. 11) by Louis Horo-witz. The massive transit emigration from Europe to Israel via Italy rather than via France occurred mainly after May 1949.

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 251

especially the ones on the southern Adriatic coast, were left to the end. By the end of 1948, only 27 of the original 72 hachsharot were left, and about 8000-9000 DPs altogether. There, as in Germany and Austria, there were DPs (probably about 3000) who preferred to integrate into the Italian economy rather than seek emigration. Some, too, were waiting for visas to the United States, but it was only in 1949 that about 3000 DPs had been processed for the United States and began to depart from Italy. By July 1949, there were only 3150 DPs left in Italian camps and hachsharot, and another 2500 in towns.24

In mid-1949, Louis Horowitz, JDC's director for Italy at the time, could look to the establishment of a permanent program for Italy. A local fund-raising organization was set up, educational programs aimed at preventing assimilation of Italian Jews were prepared with the help of Israeli and local experts, and because of the medical establishments at Merano and elsewhere, Italy became a center for medical rehabilitation. As in France OSE was asked to take over these programs, with about 80 percent funding from JDC. Other JDC programs were scaled down, but were kept elastic enough to deal with emergencies. One of these occurred right at the begin-ning of the post-1948 period, when about 3000 Jews of Tripolitania (Libya) began arriving en route for Israel—much as Moroccan Jews were arriving at Marseilles. A special camp had to be set up for them, and a medical program devised to enable them to leave for Israel.

Marshall Plan monies helped in providing transport facilities, IRO began funding part of the JDC's emigration expenses, and with the reduction of funds accruing to JDC from UJA, these sources became very important indeed, in Italy as elsewhere. By 1950, the DP phase in Italy had ended: there was a residue of 3100 DPs left there, of whom 869 were the "hard core" medical cases and their family members. JDC could turn to other tasks.

Greece

Greece was another story altogether. Before the Holocaust, there had been 75,000 Jews in Greece. Of these, the 56,000 Jews of Saloniki were shipped to Auschwitz in the spring of 1943, as were the Jews of the Greek islands of Corfu, Rhodes, and others. The Jews of Athens and other areas occupied by the Italians until September 1943, however, had a greater chance of escaping the German net; also 600-700 of them fought in the mountains against the Germans. The total number of survivors who had gathered in Greece up till early 1947 was about 8500, including a sorry remnant of 1600 in the once populous Jewish city of Saloniki. There was no way in which the destroyed community could be rebuilt with any hope of a perspective for the future. Only very slowly did the number of people

24 Excom, 10/26/48; 12/14/48; 8/17/49.

252 Out of the Ashes

directly supported in the war-torn country plagued by civil strife diminish, from about 40 percent of the community to a quarter by the end of 1947. JDC helped with loan kassas and producers' co-ops, and some lower middle class and middle class existences began to be built up. The few surviving children had to be looked after, the many TB cases sent to hospitals. There were only a handful of old people to be accommodated in old age homes.

In 1947, though, a breakthrough seemed to have been achieved. The government assigned Jewish heirless property to the use of the Jews. How-ever, after the passage of some months, it became clear that the govern-ment would not implement its own laws. "The properties are still in the hands of the people to whom the Germans had turned them over," and there was to be little change in this situation for years to come, although by 1949 the Greek community managed to set up a foundation to receive payments for heirless property.25

One of the problems of this shattered community was that the largest surviving group, in Athens, was incapable of organizing a viable communal structure. Without strong internal organization, Greek Jews were in a weak position vis-a-vis the government. It was precisely this sense of impo-tence that caused animosity between JDC representatives and local Jews. Their organizations, fully supported by JDC, demanded that they should be given control over the funds JDC was spending in Greece. Marvin Goldfine, one of the JDC people there, asked some agonizing questions: should he or should he not use the fact that he was providing the funds in order to determine policy? He was reluctant to do that; and in fact, there never was a clear policy enunciated by New York or Paris on this central question.26

As 1947 progressed, JDC began to import machinery and tools to enable artisans to reopen their shops. JDC also mediated in the search for a new chief rabbi, and Rabbi Moses Schreiber, formerly the Rabbi of Corfu, was persuaded to leave Palestine and take over the thankless task in Greece.

The basic problem in Greece was that of a totally destroyed community. Nevertheless, with the help of some of the young people, JDC tried its best to rebuild social and administrative structures, in the face of rising inflation and, in Saloniki at least, the growing resentment of local traders and artisans against the reappearance of a few of their old Jewish competi-tors. Also, the problem of UNRRA's withdrawal from Greece in mid-1947 was grim, because the whole burden of supporting the community now fell on the shoulders of JDC. The orphanages, the medical program, homes for the aged, a shelter for homeless girls, aid to pregnant women and nursing mothers, all this had now to be carried by the agency. Many were still on relief rolls, and anyone earning more than $20 a month was cut

25 Excom, 10/15/47. 24 JDC/Dircctors' Meeting, Paris, 2/3/47, Marvin Goldfine Report.

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 253

f r o m t h e m , t h o u g h i t w a s r e c o g n i z e d t h a t n o o n e c o u l d e x i s t o n $20 a m o n t h . 2 7

B y 1 9 4 9 , e m i g r a t i o n t o I s r a e l h a d r e d u c e d t h e c o m m u n i t y t o s o m e 7 0 0 0 p e o p l e , b u t h a d n o t s o l v e d t h e i n t e r n a l p r o b l e m s , t h e d e m o r a l i z a t i o n a n d l a c k o f c o m m u n i t y s p i r i t t h a t w a s s o u n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f t h e p r e - H o I o c a u s t G r e e k J e w r y . R e p e a t e d a t t e m p t s o f J D C r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o e s t a b l i s h a l o c a l f u n d - r a i s i n g a g e n c y w e r e f r u i t l e s s , a n d u n t i l w e l l i n t o t h e 1 9 5 0 s , J D C h a d t o m a i n t a i n a l i m i t e d , b u t e s s e n t i a l p r e s e n c e t h e r e . I t w a s p e r h a p s t h e m o s t t r a g i c o f a l l J D C ' s e n t e r p r i s e s i n t h e p o s t w a r e r a . T h e p h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e o f t h e c o m m u n i t y a n d i t s s o c i a l w e l f a r e n e e d s w e r e l o o k e d a f t e r . T h e r e w a s n o w a y , i t s e e m e d , t o r e c a l l t o l i f e t h e s p i r i t o f t h i s o n c e - p r o u d c o m m u n i t y .

Shanghai

Shanghai had a Jewish population prior to 1937, when the Japanese invaded China. There were approximately 600 Sephardic Jews there, who had come from Iraq and Iran. Many of them became very wealthy bankers and merchants—the Kadoories, Hardoons, and Abrahams among them. In the 1920s and 1930s, Russian and Polish Jews began arriving, refugees from the Russian Revolution and from Polish economic crises. In 1932, the Ashkenazi Jewish Communal Association was founded, headed by the saintly figure of Rabbi Meir Ashkenazi, and comprised 4000 members. They provided the 200-250 members of the Jewish Volunteer Corps, part of the police in the International Settlement, which itself was an extraterri-torial part of the Chinese city of Shanghai, ruled by an International Municipality. No visas were needed to enter the international part of the city, not even after its effective occupation by Japan in 1938, which now provided five of the fourteen councilors of the municipality. Between the spring of 1938 and October 1941, 18,124 Jewish refugees from Germany and Austria were registered by the Nazis as having left for Shanghai. In addition, well over a thousand Polish Jewish refugees arrived in 1940-41 via Lithuania, Russia, and Japan. The figures are very unclear, because in 1939, 15,030 had been counted by the JDC-supported local welfare organization. In March 1946, only 13,475 persons registered with JDC, and it is very unlikely that 5000-6000 lived in Shanghai without JDC being in touch with them. The best estimate is that there were around 16,500 refugees there, perhaps slightly more, and JDC estimated that of these, in 1943-44, 11,000 were living in Hongkew, a half-destroyed section of the city where the Japanese set up a ghetto for the Jews, at Nazi instigation; 4000 had found quarters in the French Concession, a small section which

254 Out of the Ashes

was not part of the international district, 1500 in the International Settle-ment, and "the rest," whatever it was, elsewhere.28

JDC sent funds to Shanghai, because most of the Jewish refugees had no way of earning any money in a situation where the Chinese standard of living was so low that the refugees could not subsist on it at all. About $846,000 had been sent to Shanghai by the end of 1941, but the adminis-tration of the funds and the control over the refugees was hotly disputed as between different sections and groups among the settled Jewish groups in the city. Things were so bad that JDC sent one of its most reliable trouble-shooters, Laura Margolis, to sort out the problems. She arrived in the summer of 1941, was evacuated because of the war scare to Manila, and returned to Shanghai in the late autumn only to be taken by surprise by the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States. In the mean-time, JDC had sent Manuel Siegel to help her, and the two tried their best to establish a modus for local fund-raising "apres." It took a long time before Leavitt's strictly legalistic approach enabled them, already in internment by the Japanese, to activate such a procedure. Even that was only of limited use simply because of the lack of local Jewish funds of any kind that were available—not that the Sephardi bankers would have been unable to provide the money, but that they were disinclined to do so. In the end, through the IRC, Mayer in Switzerland sent Treasury approved sums to Shanghai, where refugees that JDC could rely on were fighting people accused of collaborating with the Japanese over the distribution of the funds. Throughout this whole period, most refugees were getting up to 1300 calories a day, but often much less than that, and real starvation stared them in the eyes often enough in 1943-45. Between 1942 and 1945, JDC sent just over $2 million to Shanghai, to feed a population of some 13,000-15,000 people.29 •

Margolis had left Shanghai in late 1943 on a civilian exchange ship, but Siegel fled from a Japanese internment camp just after the Japanese surrender on August 10, 1945, and resumed operations in the city. JDC-supported refugees immediately fired their opponents in the refugee administration and Joseph Bitker, in whom Siegel had confidence, took over.

It was perfectly clear that there was no future for Jews in Shanghai,and they would have to emigrate. JDC set up an emigration department, and immediately entered into sharp competition with a parallel office opened by HIAS. In a way, the competition between the two agencies redounded to the benefit of the people: each group wanted to show that they had managed to take out a larger number of refugees. During 1945, the first refugees got out, although Palestine was closed as was to all intents and

" Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust, pp. 302-16, and the bibliography mentioned there, especially David Kranzler, Japanese, Nazis and Jews, New York (1976), passim.

29 Ibid.

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 255 purposes, the United States. There was some emigration to Canada and South America, but the real move started in 1946. Charles H. Jordan was sent there, and he quickly assumed undisputed leadership. He was entrusted by consular officials of both the United States and Britain to pass on candidates seeking admission to these countries or their possessions. He also represented private organizations: the Jewish United Service for New Americans (See above, Chapter 8), JDC's ally, and the Church World Service—about 1000 of the refugees were either converts to Christianity or Christian children of such converts. Between May 1, 1946 and April 1947, 3600 people emigrated, largely to the United States under the Truman directive. But then the emigration became difficult, as did the living conditions in China.

A peculiar phenomenon in Shanghai was the unanimous reporting of increasing antisemitism among the Chinese. "Refugee doctors who volun-teered to go into the interior to help the Chinese people, have returned with a sense of defeat and frustration because of the rising antisemitism and antiforeignism."30 Jordan was sure that that was the result of the spread of Japanese and German propaganda.

The large majority of the refugees still had to be fully maintained, though a minority received jobs with the occupying United States forces at first. But, as the Americans pulled out and the Chiang Kai-shek govern-ment took over, these people were thrown back again on the dole. Luckily for JDC, UNRRA entered the field and recognized the Jews as DPs, moreover as DPs who had to receive more rations than Chinese DPs. The basic ration of 1500 calories had to be supplemented by JDC in the same way as in the DP camps in Europe. A rampant inflation, again parallel to that in many parts of Europe, hampered activities. In mid-1947, IRO took over, but UNRRA had left a six-months' supply in its warehouses, so that the refugees weathered the period until IRO became reasonably well organized.

When Jordan left Shanghai in early 1948, Adolph "Cook" Glassgold took his place. By that time, Jordan estimated, 6300 DPs had left, and 6300 remained, but the prospects of speedy emigration to the United States had waned, the entries under the Truman initiative were petering out, and Palestine was still closed. Jordan had predicted demoralization if that occurred, and that indeed was what happened. "They were living on the direct assistance of the JDC. They got a monthly stipend. They were given issues of clothing, they were given housing accommodation, provided medical services . . . nursery schools, primary schools . . . recreational programs and programs for the elderly. It was an uphill battle to fight the essentially apathetic atmosphere of people who felt hopeless, forlorn, and neglected."31

30 Excom, 4/17/47, report by Jordan. 31 JDC/Katzki interviews, Adolph Glassgold, 1983; Adcom, 2/24/48.

256 Out of the Ashes

In 1948, the civil war between the Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang and Mao Zedong's Communist Army was becoming grimmer and grimmer. As the threat of a communist takeover was nearing, the Kuomintang auth-orities became more and more corrupt, and insecurity in Shanghai mounted. Refugees were being attacked in the streets and Jews wanted desperately to get out. This time not only the DPs wanted to leave, but the 7000 Jewish non-DPs as well. The establishment of the State of Israel in May 1948 provided an opportunity, and soon afterwards the DP Act in the United States was to open the chance of immigration to the States. Israel was asked, in November, to provide 7000 visas on an emergency basis, and Australia was asked to accept 600 people. The United States and Canada were also approached.

In December 1948, there were still 5300 DPs there; by February 1949, only 2660 remained. In addition, of the local Jews another 2100 had remained, but all of these were to leave soon. Finally, on May 25, 1949, Mao's army entered Shanghai. The city was now being unmercifully bombed by the Kuomintang air force, and the refugees were in danger from that source. The new authorities were polite, efficient, and friendly. It was clear that they wanted these European refugees out, but they had nothing against them, and helped wherever possible. Most of the people went to Israel, some to the United States and Australia and elsewhere. 1700 people were still left. By early 1950, 900 remained, and a year later there were some 250 "hard core" cases that were later absorbed into vari-ous countries. Glassgold was asked to continue his work; in fact, the com-munist authorities insisted on his staying until practically all the refugees had left, and would not give him his exit visa till his task had been fully accomplished. They never had anyone follow him, or control him, as was done in communist countries in Europe. But when he left, in early 1951, they put their hands on all the JDC records, and they have been there ever since.32

"Illegal Immigration"

We have seen the pragmatic attitude taken by JDC towards Brichah. There were some direct subventions by Schwartz, but in the main JDC help consisted in feeding, clothing, and housing the people moved by Brichah, and occasionally smoothing their path by political intervention. This of course strained the self-image of JDC as a non-political organization, but there was in fact nothing else it could have done without being rejected by the people it had dedicated itself to help.

However, the more serious political problem was that of illegal immi-gration (Aliyah Bet in Hebrew, or "Immigration Two": the Hebrew term

" JDC/Katzki interviews, Adolph Glassgold, 1983; JDC/Shanghai, Reports 1949, Rita L. Stein; ibid., Reports, 3/6/50.

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 257

was usually used by JDC people). The Jewish Agency had asked JDC to give direct support to the Mossad, the Agency organ dealing with illegal immigration, under Shaul Avigur. JDC was interested in this from a prag-matic point of view: fewer Jewish DPs in Europe would mean less expense for JDC. One may assume, however, that Schwartz, who used this argu-ment to great effect in the New York discussions on this point, was moti-vated by a real sympathy for the aims of Mossad. The rather odd argument was used in New York that the British had allocated 1500 monthly certifi-cates for Palestine, so they were not totally opposed to Jewish immigration there; and illegal immigrants who were caught were then interned in Palestine and later released against the 1500 quota. As, it was argued, the British could have stopped this movement easily, but did not, it was assumed that there was tacit British approval of illegal immigration.

JDC therefore agreed to subvention—a part of this immigration—at first 6600 persons at $150 per head, or close to $1 million, then—10,000 persons at $100 per head. This more or less covered Mossad expenses, but then the British shattered JDC's convoluted self-justifications by deport-ing the refugees to Cyprus, from August 1946 on. Theoretically, 3000 refugees paid for by JDC were so deported. As a result, JDC leaders became convinced that the British really did not want this migration to take place, and stopped the subventions.

All this of course took place in secret, and outside bodies had no inkling of it. When towards the end of 1946, the British decided to give 750 of the 1500 monthly permits to the internees at Cyprus, the Agency, well aware of JDC reasoning, again approached Schwartz for financial support, and Schwartz saw an opportunity of doing what he wanted to do in any case, namely support illegal immigration in the face of British policies. He used several arguments at a crucial meeting of JDC's Administration Committee held in New York on March 11, 1947. First, he said, this kind of immi-gration had to be kept in the hands of the Agency, rather than in the hands of Irgun supporters (who, in the guise of the Hebrew Committee for National Liberation, were also asking JDC for support). As long as the Agency was in charge, moderate opinion and policies would be encouraged. Second, he repeated the argument regarding the easing of JDC's situation in the camps if people were to leave them. Third, he said the only, way of exerting pressure on the British to release the people on Cyprus was to organize more illegal immigration.

There were problems with some of these arguments. Harold Linder, of the non-Zionist group, argued that if people were taken out of the camps, the Agency (that is, Brichah) was sure to push more people into them from Poland and elsewhere. Also, facts had shown that many of the people did not come from the DP countries, but from places like Romania, where JDC was trying to re-establish the Jewish community without moving it. In addition, it was clear that the monies would be used on top of funds the

258 Out of the Ashes

Agency was receiving from UJA, and they would be used for political propaganda and buying of land in Palestine. Linder especially was eager not to do anything against Britain, America's ally in the war. He was not the only opponent of the scheme, but in the end, under Warburg's careful management, the meeting voted to approve the request of the Agency to the tune of another $1 million. Yet another million was approved in May-June. It can be safely assumed, though there is no documentary evidence, that this policy was continued throughout the period until May 1948.33

This, however, was not the end of it. In May 1947, a meeting took place in New York between JDC representatives and Mossad people. The Mossad representatives—Pino Ginzburg and Danny Szind—openly argued for JDC support of illegal immigration from , Romania as well, because of the terrible economic situation there. They said that the Romanian government had given them the opportunity of taking 50,000 people out; this would mean that the incentive for leaving Romania to go to Vienna, where JDC had to feed them, would be removed. Also, the Romanians had agreed that a proportion of the refugees could come from Germany, and there would then be a move of Jewish DPs from Germany to Romania. Louis H. Sobel, JDC's able deputy secretary, refused: the Administration Committee would only agree to people taken out from the camps emigrating; but within a few months, JDC would come round to the Agency's point of view.

However, the most interesting insight was offered by Edward Warburg, in a comment taken down on June 11: "Mr Warburg advises me [Evelyn M. Morrissey, Leavitt's non-Jewish secretary and one of the most influen-tial people in JDC's set-up] that the view of the State Department was secured informally and in view of the attitude of the Department, the following voted in favor of the additional million for AB (Aliyah Bet)."34

There is here a clear hint that the Administration was quietly trying to undermine the British position, no doubt motivated by some of the same arguments that had moved JDC: primarily, the idea that if Jews left the DP camps, there would be less trouble for the American Army. In effect, JDC became an executor of State Department policies favoring, not necessarily Zionist political aspirations as such, but the move of Jewish refugees from Europe to Palestine.

This did not calm down the non- and anti-Zionist opposition in JDC's ranks, however. A rare indication of that thinking was contained in a memorandum of June 6, 1947 probably by Jonah B. Wise, whose views were close to those of the American Council for Judaism. In his memo, Wise saw the Zionists as an "enforced partner" of JDC—enforced because of pressure by the CJFWF—who was much better organized and could rely on "force of numbers," resorting to "indirections and evasions—to

" Adcom, 3/11/47. M JDC/Brichah, 1946-47, Morrissey to Sobel, 6/11/47. i

Non-Communist Europe and Shanghai 259

put it mildly. . . . We on the other hand are outspoken and frank, and particularly outspoken in our desire to do everything possible to make Palestine a success for those Jews who are there or who may come there. On the other hand, we insist on the right of those Jews who so elect to reconstruct their lives in Europe." This of course was official JDC policy, and Wise emphasized his reservations regarding a possible Jewish State. The Zionists, he said, devoted themselves exclusively to Palestine, and "because of the small number of Jews available for settlement in Palestine" (in 1947, when Palestine was closed) this represented "an irreconcilable conflict between JDC and UPA."35 Between these views, and the outright support of Zionism advocated by some of the members of the Adminis-tration Committee (such as Louis Broido, and indeed Joseph Schwartz himself)} Warburg steered a course closer to Schwartz than to the other side.

Ever since the British decision in August 1946, to deport illegal immi-grants to Cyprus, a Jewish community behind bars had developed there— one must say, with considerable sympathy from local British officials, who interpreted the orders from London in as lenient a way they could, consistent with the fact that these were not DP camps, but detenuon centers. JDC sent there one of its best trouble-shooters, Morris Laub. Laub spoke fluent Hebrew and Yiddish, and was in sympathy with the aims of the detainees. Under his directorship JDC, as the sole American Jewish agency operating in Cyprus, developed a social, medical, edu-cational, and child care program that was to be favorably remembered decades afterwards. By April 1948, there were, officially, 28,000 Jews in the Cyprus camps. More than half came from Romania, not from the DP countries, because illegal immigration in late 1947 and early 1948 came largely from Romania. Laub was actually the only American; all the other 59 JDC workers were Palestinians. The content of education, for instance, was provided by the Palestinian teachers, the funding and the adminis-tration by JDC. The same applied to the other areas of work. JDC also supplemented the food given by the British with bread, vegetables, and fruit. Each month 284 tons of food were bought in Palestine and brought to Cyprus. Clothing was brought in as well, and JDC was also the agent transferring CARE packages from relatives to the detainees. Workshops organized by the people in their politicized groups were supported by JDC, and produced a variety of goods (for example, trunks, furniture, blackboards, lamps and other items were produced from the tins in which the British supplied food).36

From February 1948, evacuation of the Cyprus camps began. In the summer months, due to the decision of the UN Mediator (Count Folke Bernadotte) not to allow men of military age to Israel, this was held up by

" Ibid., Memorandum, 6/6/47. Excom, 4/22/48.

260 Out of the Ashes

the British, but emigration of the other categories proceeded, and a certain amount of illegal emigration to Israel even from the camps at Cyprus was effected. At the end of the year there were still some 12,000 people in the Cyprus camps, mostly men of military age and their families. A severe decline in morale took place and was accompanied by a veritable rebellion against the British, the representatives of the Israeli government, and against JDC. In the scuffle, a British soldier shot dead one of the refugees, and that made the situation even worse. Laub decided to go to the Governor of Cyprus and told him that he could no longer control the internees and would have to resign. The Governor suggested that Laub should go to London to report the situation to the Foreign Office.37

Finally, on January 18, 1949, the British decided to lift the ban on emigration of men of military age, and at the end of the month, with the departure of almost all of the remaining people for Israel, JDC closed its office. Morris Laub received a special award from the camps' ex-residents for the outstanding job he had done in looking after them.

How can one summarize the impact of American Jews on West European and Shanghai Jewry, and on the people en route for Israel? Undoubtedly, the central effort of American Jewry, largely through JDC, to help rebuild the Jewish communities in post-Holocaust Europe, concerned Germany and Austria, Poland, Hungary and Romania. Yet the other countries we have mentioned, in southern and western Europe, were by no means neglected. In some, such as Greece, there was no real hope to re-establish a viable community. In others, such as Italy and France, the DP problem caused by massive infiltration was the core of the issue that JDC was facing. Cyprus was a case apart. But the amazing thing is how an American Jewish agency, far removed from the life and problems of the Jewish populations in these countries, adjusted so rapidly to answer needs whose existence it had never even suspected. That it made mistakes was inevi-table; the fact that so few mistakes were made is another reason for amaze-ment.

" Excom, 9/5/49.

CHAPTER 11

The Dissolution of the DP Camps

In and Out of the Doldrums—November 1947 to May 1948 The overriding Jewish problem in Europe today is the problem of the 250,000 displaced persons in the camps of Germany, Austria, and Italy. There must be a solution to this problem. No one will question the statement that they cannot remain in these countries. Antisemitism in Germany and Austria is still rife . . . The final solution [sic] of the displaced persons problem remains only in emigration, and the goal of the overwhelming majority of them remains Palestine. Many thousands, however, would emigrate to the United States and South America if they had the opportunity.1

The statement was clear enough, and the JDC budget planners' agenda was in reality simple, too: until emigration became possible, JDC—and other American Jewish organizations—would have to continue with their efforts to help wherever they could. Only the emigration of DPs would finally ease the burden. However, in late 1947, prospects seemed to vanish, and after the euphoria created by the United Nations Palestine Partition Resolution of November 29, 1947, the beginning of the war in Palestine caused a wave of despair in the DP camps. Palestine would not be a safe haven, but a place of strife and war, and the Jewish State would have to be achieved with great sacrifice, if at all. As the winter months passed on, and the news about the hard struggle of the Jews of Palestine flowed into the camps, despondency became still deeper. By March 1948, it seemed that the Jews in Palestine were fighting a losing battle against the Arabs, who were in effect supported by the British Army still in Palestine. Many thought that there was little chance that the Jews would survive the crisis. In March, too, the United States suddenly retreated from its support of partition in Palestine, and at the United Nations proposed a trusteeship plan for the country which went a long way towards the British proposals of 1946 and would have killed the prospects for an independent Jewish State. Most importantly from the DPs' point of view, it would have cut immigration prospects. Only the communist countries led by the Soviet Union held steadfast to partition, obviously trying to utilize the Jews in order to force the British out of a strategic position in the Middle East.

The Jewish Agency, the incipient future Jewish government, obtained its first important arms from Czechoslovakia in March and April, but this

1J DC/Budget proposal for 1948. 261

262 Out of the Ashes

of course was secret, and the DPs could only read about the great fight that was going on between the outnumbered and outgunned Jewish forces and their Arab foes. Unanimously, the reports from Europe spoke about the deepest crisis in morale yet:

The DPs in Germany are terribly frustrated by the events [at the UN and in Palestine.] They are demoralized, discouraged, there is a nasty increase in the black market activities and the general feeling of "don't give a damn." Strikes are taking place on work projects and in ORT schools . . . Unless some DPs are moved it might be even worse. There is practically no leadership. The Central Committee does not control the situation.2

In the midst of this, Judge Levinthal, the Adviser to General Clay, returned to the United States, and a new Adviser took his place. This was Professor William Haber, of the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor, the brother of Samuel L. Haber, the JDC US Zone Director. Professor Haber was an expert in economics and labor relations, who had held a number of important positions in the US government, and brought to his new job a thorough knowledge of the workings of civilian and military administration. He also knew General Clay personally, and this undoubt-edly helped. Haber arrived in Germany in January 1948, and was immedi-ately received by Clay for a series of meetings. There could be no doubt about the sympathy of the General himself towards the Jewish DPs, though he had a rather low opinion of the ZK and thought that McNarney had erred in recognizing it as the spokesman for the DPs.3 1

Yet in many ways the ZK was a true reflection of the Jewish DP popu-lation. There was no hint or suggestion of any personal corruption or abuse of their position, and they would have compared quite favorably with any political committee anywhere in Western Europe at the time. Most of them were dedicated men, and Samuel Haber's original impression of them as hard, but proud people, was undoubtedly correct. They rep-resented a population split into warring political factions, and were sub-jected to criticism and control from their constituency. The last Congress of the She'erit Hapletah had taken place in February 1947, and a new Congress was to elect a new ZK. Elections were held on February 29, 1948, and the result was disconcerting to advocates of moderation. The left-wing bloc (Hashomer Hatzair, Left Poale Zioti, and Pakhakh4, the organization of ex-Partisans and soldiers) gained a plurality of 30 percent;

2 Adcom, 3/9/48. " ~~ * 3 JDC/DPs, 1947/48, Haber-Clay talks, 1/14-15/48. Haber shared Clay's view of the ZK.

At his first meeting with them they presented him with what they considered to be "the major problems and 'demands'. Some of their demands strike me as being fantastic and are in no way related to their mission as conceived by the Army or, I assume, by those who brought the Committees into being [probably a reference to Klausner—Y. B.]. I also have the sense that the Committees are so busily occupied with building 'empires' that they are neglecting fields in which they could exercise real leadership."—ibid., Haber to Grossman. 2/24/48. ; - . .

4 Pakhakh—Hebrew acronym: Partizanum, Khayalim, Halutzim (partisans, soldiers, pioneers).

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 263 the Revisionists (supporters of the Irgun in Palestine) got 21 percent, the two orthodox groups (Mizrahi and Agudat Israel) together got 20 percent, and the Centrist General Zionists and the moderate Labor party (Mapai) together got 28 percent.

The Congress itself took place at Bad Reichenhall between March 30 and April 2,1948. Some of the main figures of the ZK had by then disappeared. Among them was Samuel Gringauz, a typical case of the Zionist speaker who continued to support the Jewish State from the United States where he had emigrated. Blumovicz and others were to leave for Palestine immediately after it. The Congress was addressed by General Thomas Harrold, Clay's representative, who inveighed against the black market and in fact accused the Jewish DPs of being a negative element in Ger-many. William Haber talked of the need to regain the sympathy of the Army. Practically, Haber said, in view of the lack of prospects for emi-gration to the United States, the Jews had the choice of either staying in Germany indefinitely, or going to Palestine to fight there for the establish-ment of the State. But the spokesmen for the DPs replied to these state-ments: Blumovicz argued that in fact criminality among the Jews was lower than either among the other DPs or among the Germans. By impli-cation, he accused the Army of unfairly picking on the Jews. Treger made it clear that the Jews were unalterably opposed to any involvement of the German administration in their affairs. Finally, Yahil's call for resolutions strengthening the recruitment for the Haganah, for donation of funds to the new State's treasury and for the transference of all property acquired in Germany to Palestine, was adopted.

A new ZK was elected. Treger remained chairman, and the ruling coalition was composed of the leftist bloc, Mapai and Mizrahi, together controlling nine out of fourteen seats on the ZK. However, for the first time, the opposition representatives remained on ZK as well. Only AgudaV Israel, represented by Rabbi Snieg, refused to take its seat. It was not a happy Congress, and it could have led to a confrontation with the Army and the German administration. Luckily, the declaration of Israel's inde-pendence prevented that.5

The new Adviser made another innovation by asking all the agencies, including the Jewish Agency mission, the ZK, and JDC, to participate at a meeting which he called for March 15. The minutes of that informal discussion make fascinating and instructive reading, because despite some disagreement, a consensus was reached there—unusual for a group of Jewish organizations. William Haber thought that even with emigration, there would still be about the same number of Jewish DPs in Germany at the end of the year as there were at its beginning. Hence the necessity for long-term planning. Haim Yahil of the Jewish Agency deplored the apathy of the camp population, analyzed the new attitude of the Army and thought

5 JDC/DPS, 1948-1, Reich and Lukaczer to Sapir, 5/25/48; Schwarz, op. cit., pp. 278-79. OOA—J

264 Out of the Ashes

that the negative stance towards refugees from communist countries in 1948 as compared with the Army's positive attitude towards Polish Jews in 1946 was due to it suspecting every new Jewish refugee of being a communist infiltrator. Army publications had suggested that Jews were unreliable, had smuggled dollars into communist countries, and that the Soviets were arming revolutionary movements in the West with these dollars. The more fanciful the stories were, the more echo they created. Yahil was probably right; the concomitant conclusion was that emigration had to be pushed as much as possible, which of course, in March 1948, seemed just a pious hope, though Yahil said he was certain that a Jewish State would come into existence in May.

Were the Jewish DPs apathetic? Treger did not think so, and he pointed to the fact that in the elections for camp committees and the Congress about 90 percent of those eligible had voted. He ignored the interpretation that this could have been an expression of despair, of lack of any alterna-tive, rather than of a lasting revival of spirits. The contribution to this discussion of the representative of the orthodox Va'ad Hahatzalah was typical. He argued that "a religious spirit must be breathed into the bodies of the DPs. It is the religious Jew who is the bulwark of the movement toward Palestine. The religious Jew never fails to mention in his prayers the ultimate return to Palestine." (At this juncture Mr Treger very casually observed, "Yes, and they migrate to America"). Rabbi Baruch, of course, was an American citizen, and Treger himself was to leave Israel.

But Yahil's concern was more immediate: the struggle in Palestine had caused Haganah, the Jewish armed force in Palestine, soon to become the Israeli Army, to call for recruits from the DP camps to fight for indepen-dence. There was a Haganah delegation, secret of course, in Germany. It was headed by Nahum Shadmi, and had begun to engage seriously in the training of volunteers in 1947. By March 1948, the grim situation in Palestine caused Haganah to demand that young childless people, men and women, be sent to Palestine immediately. Yahil wanted to expedite matters, and demanded that employment projects should not be concerned with able-bodied young people: he needed them for the fighting. William Haber agreed; and the Army, not surprisingly, agreed as well, unofficially of course, because that would ultimately remove a number of families to whom these young people belonged.6

The process of recruitment, which at first seemed to be fairly straight-forward, soon caused a great deal of trouble. Enthusiastic recruiters from among the DPs moved from persuasion to forceful persuasion to force, in their attempts to get the largest number of recruits possible. While the majority really were volunteers, others were persuaded by social pressure. There were many who had no intention of going to Palestine in the first place, despite the propaganda of which they themselves had often been a

6 JDC/DPs, 1947-48, Meeting at the Adviser's Office, 3/15/48.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 265

very willing part. Ugly scenes occurred, and camp committees refused to give such people the JDC supplementary rations to which they were entitled. American Jewish contributors to UJA began to protest, when letters from such relatives reached them from the camps. It was not only JDC who were powerless to prevent this, despite repeated attempts at intervention; even the ZK was helpless, because the camp committees were really a law unto themselves, and did not care what the people in Munich were saying. Yet at the same ume, there were scenes of mass support for the drive, and even a few former manipulators and black marketeers were smitten with enthusiasm to go and fight. It was really the only way of escaping Germany: recruits had priority on illegal immigrant ships, and those who could not be accommodated on the ships and had to wait for an opportunity, were prepared to join the Jewish forces in Palestine the moment this became possible.

Yet Yahil and the Haganah emissaries, in their reports to Palestine, did not wax enthusiastic about the response of the people. Their attitude was reflected, in a rather extreme way, admittedly, in the form of a letter to the five organizations in the States, which Rabbi Klausner sent off on May 2, 1948. It acted as a bombshell. Klausner accused the DPs of being a

^ parasitic element engaged in black marketeering and other reprehensible activities, decried the loss of the idealistic spirit among them, and proposed that JDC should deny rations to all those who did not volunteer to go to fight in Palestine. The only chance for the Jewish DPs, he argued, was to recapture the Zionist spirit with which they had started off on liberation.

William Haber was asked to comment on Klausner's accusations and proposals. He was not as condemnatory of them as Leavitt, Klausner's old foe, would have liked him to be, but he had to reject the proposals. He lauded Klausner as a charismatic leader of the DPs in the first period after liberation, and praised him for his volunteering spirit which he had shown by going back to Germany, under very difficult personal conditions, to work in the most crisis-ridden area of the camps at Kassel. He then described Klausner as a man for whom "militant Zionism is a religion, an all-consuming passion. He is impatient to see the Jews in Israel." While one has to reserve judgment as to the accuracy of this characterization (I doubt whether Klausner was a militant Zionist himself—I think he was the supporter of militant Zionism because he believed that to be the displaced Jewish people's only way out of their dilemma), Haber's conclusion that Klausner was exaggerating was undoubtedly true. The situation of the DP was bad enough, one did not have to describe it as being even worse. To deprive the DPs of JDC food would have been an improper sanction, and would probably have achieved the opposite effect—that of a rebellion against the Zionist groups that had been consistently elected as the rep-resentatives of the DPs. The fear of Klausner was that if nothing were done, the Jews would sink into a moral morass and, with the reconstitution

266 Out of the Ashes

of an independent Germany, would be singled out for physical destruction. Haber argued that this apocalyptic vision was overly pessimistic and unre-alistic. While there was decline in standards, it was not general, and Klausner had ignored positive aspects of camp life, including the consid-erable voluntary response to the call for recruits. In this sense, Haber actually agreed with Klausner—he had been, and he was to continue to be, an ardent supporter of the recruitment drive for the Haganah and, later, the Israeli Army.7

The problem of recruitment brought to the fore the basic issue of the direction in which Jewish emigration would turn. Were the protestations of the desire to go to Palestine to be taken seriously? The fighting in Palestine, and the business deals in which many DPs were engaging, were factors operating against the desire to go there. The high hopes for a massive immigration to Palestine from the camps, Haber thought, might have been misplaced. Haber saw no chance of an opening up of the United States for Jewish DPs, and if Palestine were to remain closed, it would spell disaster.8

As Yahil had rightly pointed out, any discussion with the American military had to take into account the fact that in the meantime, the Cold War between West and East had developed in earnest. Ever since Secretary of State James F. Byrnes had made his speech at Stuttgart in September 1946, announcing what was in effect a new American policy of establishing a West German bulwark against the spread of communism from the East in response to the clearly stated communist aim of conquering Western Europe from within, relations between the great powers became increas-ingly strained. Accompanied by a growing anti-communist hysteria in the United States, to parallel a much greater and more dangerous hysteria of anti-American activity from the East, new American policies were emerg-ing in Central Europe. They were leading, quite clearly, to the re-establish-ment of German sovereignty under American tutelage; they would have to rebuild the economies of Western Europe to provide a guarantee against communist take-over bids; and they would have to de-emphasize anti-Nazi policies so as to establish a popular basis for anti-communism.

One of the ways to handle the real or imagined communist menace was ; 1JDC/DPs, 1948-2, Haber to Grossman, 5/26/48; Leavitt to Haber, 6/10/48! While the raids on Jewish camps ceased in 1948, they were briefly renewed in early 1949, when three camps were raided. Not much was found, but Hyman made some incisive comments about the black market operations in their final stage, as the Jewish DPs were leaving Germany. He said "that the Jewish DPs are amongst the most conspicuous black market offenders . . • and the brazen form of their operations has had a substantial bearing on the growth of anti-Semitism . . . the most prominent element behind the recently uncovered smuggling ring . . . were Jewish DPs." The departure of most Jewish DPs would not make much of a difference, because "the biggest operators are established in the large cities" (JDC/Ger-many, 1949-1, Hyman Report, 2/28/49).

' J DC/DPs 1947-48, Haber to Grossman, 4/1/48. Harold Trobe, the director in Austria, declared that "under no circumstances will [the DPs] go to Palestine in the near future. I would be reluctant to take my family into that kind of situation too." (Excom, 4/5/48).

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 267

to inject the European economies with monies from the United States. The Marshall Plan was conceived in 1947 to do that, and also to guarantee a healthier development of world trade by building up solvent partners for the American economy. The influx of money into Europe might mean, the Jewish organization hoped, some small relief for the desperate situation in the camps. But it soon became clear that only limited help would come from that quarter. The Germans were, on paper at least, still receiving fewer calories than the DPs, and the aim of the Marshall Plan was to raise the standards of living of the indigenous population. The DPs' problems would have to be solved in other ways. Some benefits did accrue from the Marshall Plan fund, but that was to come much later.

Not all DPs were in the way of these new policies, but the Jews obviously were. Baltic DPs, many of them former Nazi collaborators; former Ukrain-ian soldiers in the Nazi army and police forces; anti-Nazi but also anti-communist Polish DPs—all these could easily fit into the new frameworks. Even anti-Nazi Baits and Ukrainians could easily accept the new line because their opposition to the Soviet regime was bitter and determined. The Jews had also had more than enough of the Soviet paradise; most of them had fled from it to seek refuge in the West. It was not the anti-communism that bothered them so much—though there was an impor-tant, pro-Soviet, socialist-Zionist component in the German camps especially—but what was repugnant to all Jews was the new pro-German policy of the Truman Administration.

The Army had its own attitude, which of course reflected the new poli-cies of the Administration, but gave them a special tinge. The upper echelons—the Commander-in-Chief in Germany, and his immediate entourage—were still rather friendly to the Jewish DPs, though even there sympathy was beginning to wear rather thin. This was reflected in the positive, though critical, attitude of Colonel George R. Scithers, the Army liaison to the ZK, whose unenviable task it was to mediate between the Army and the DPs. The lower one went, the more hostile to the Jewish DPs the American officers and soldiers were. Dislike was based on a num-ber of factors. There was the simple fact that the Jews stood in the way of rapprochement with a new Germany because of their anti-German hos-tility. The Jews were a nuisance, and interfered with the more important work of the military authorities in their view. An American General declared that this applied not only to the military. "In fact, this is our attitude from top to bottom. The people [the Jews] have been here for a long time, and we are tired of them."9

Another important factor in Army hostility was the black market; this ' JDC/DPs, 1947-48, Haber to Grossman, 4/1/48. General Clark denied there was a

worsening of the Army's attitude to the Jewish DPs:"Recently, I was terribly shocked to read an article indicating a change in policy and feeling towards the Jewish displaced per-sons. How it came to be written, I do not know, but it is without foundation." JDC/DPs, 1948-1, Clay to Bernstein, 5/10/48.

268 Out of the Ashes

has been dealt with above (Chapter 9), but in 1947-48 it again became a major issue, not because more Jews were involved in it than before, but because the Germans now accused the Jews of being the chief black marketeers.

There were in fact two non-official markets, a grey one and a black one. Practically everyone in Germany engaged in grey market operations: bartering rationed items, hoarding quantities of food or other things to exchange for larger things like houses, apartments, and so on. Most of the so-called black marketeering of Jewish DPs came under that category. The very shabbiness of the DPs, and their obvious desire for slightly better food and clothing were evidence of that. But there was of course real black marketeering as well: large-scale trading in rationed or forbidden goods. Again, as we have seen, this was largely German, and US military person-nel were certainly not innocent either. However, the Army responded to that percentage of Jews who engaged in large-scale business deals on the black market with increasing hostility and, in a sense, fear. Clay put this clearly in his discussions with Haber: he was afraid that the Congressmen's delegations arriving in Germany and receiving military information about the involvement of Jews in the black market would report unfavorably about the Jews and this would prevent the passage of legislation to permit Jewish DPs to enter the United States. From the General's point of view, this would mean that the Army would continue to be "stuck" with the Jews in Germany. Equally, Congressional appropriations for IRO would suffer, and the situation in Germany would deteriorate.

Fighting the black market was one of the major tasks that Haber under-took, aided and supported by Major Abraham S. Hyman, who he per-suaded to stay in Germany as his assistant. Hyman knew the DP situation extremely well, was popular among the Jews, and with his legal and mili-tary training was of invaluable help to Haber. Both Habers were extremely concerned about the effect Jewish black market activities might have on the morale and the morals of the DPs. A corruption of the social structure might well lead to these people becoming unacceptable to any society, including a Jewish one in Palestine. Idleness, lack of perspectives, the lure of easy profits in a war-torn Germany—all these were corrupting factors, and the question was how to fight them. In addition, the ZK proved to be less than helpful; they did not believe it to be their task to ease the Germans' economic situation or the problems of the US military by inform-ing on Jewish black market operators. JDC leaders also took quite an extreme line. In New York, the view was expressed that "unless the camps are liquidated soon, or some drastic change occurs, the people, after another year, will not be worth saving."10

The Army instituted another spate of "search and seizure" operations designed to catch the suspected big Jewish speculators in the camps. On

10 JDC/DPS 1947-48, Haber-Clay talks, 1/14-15/48; Adcom, 7/11/47.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 269

January 29, 1948, a search operation took place at the Heidenheim camp (the so-called Voith Settlement). A camp committee member was seriously injured by a bayonet charge of a GI, without any provocation, the GI yelling at him in German, "Gehst du, gehst du, du Hund?" (Are you going, are you going, you dog?). The man died because the military curfew prevented the camp doctor from treating him in time. Contrary to the evidence, Major Hyman, who investigated the incident, concluded, prob-ably for diplomatic reasons, that the fatal wound had been "either acciden-tally inflicted or was caused by the soldier in line of duty." But the interesting thing was Hyman's finding that "the death has left no rancor in the hearts of the camp population towards the US military authorities." Whether this was also part of the diplomacy or perhaps reflected the real feelings in the camps, it is clear that neither the ZK nor the camp's popu-lation generally made an issue out of something that would have created the greatest uproar only a few months previously. It would seem that morale had reached a very low point indeed for the people to accept a murder without any real protest. As for black marketeers, a grand total of seven suspects was apprehended, who were soon released. The troops behaved rather badly: "One of the rooms . . . was searched in the absence of the owner. The soldiers left this room in a state that only a violent tornado could duplicate." And so on.11

Similar raids occurred elsewhere, for instance on March 2 at Eschwege. In the living quarters there were only "the usual complaints of looting and insulting remarks of an antisemitic nature," but these were not serious, in Major Hyman's view. However, in the administration building, the camp theater, and the schools there were "marks of vandalism, if not of sheer vindictiveness." Hyman addressed the camp residents, who were "discon-solate and depressed . . . these [were] things they could not associate with American troops." Neither could Hyman, in the report that was handed over to the Chief of Staff of the US forces. Again, what strikes one most is the subdued and despondent attitude of the Jewish camp inmates. Need-less to say, no major black marketeers were apprehended, and very little in the way of contraband goods confiscated. Germans stood at the per-imeter of the camp during the search, watching the spectacle, and obviously enjoying it.12 Equally telling was another report, this time of a search at Zeilsheim camp (March 24). Again the results were quite ridicu-lous, but this time the search, conducted by 1200 troops, was watched by Hyman who had been invited to do so by the military. The troops' behavior was orderly and disciplined, and the camp inmates, according to Hyman, were full of praise. This time, too, all the German inhabitants of the place (the camp was part of a German town) were being searched as well, and

" JDC/DPS 1947-48, William Haber memo to Chief of Staff, EUCOM, n.d. (2/24/48). JDC/DPs 1947-48, Hyman to W. Haber, 3/5/48.

OOA-J*

270 Out of the Ashes

that was a source of satisfaction to the Jews.13 Clearly, the military had learnt a lesson. The undisciplined, antisemitic behavior of the troops did not redound to the credit of the Army and might produce very unpleasant reactions back home. Also, no very impressive results were achieved. Sear-ches were now conducted with tight discipline, by officers who were detailed to do a job but who were not hostile to the people searched, and who realized that they were looking for some bad eggs among generally quiescent and reasonably law-abiding families—given the conditions of Germany at the time.

The British Army introduced a parallel policy in their Zone. The only camp of any importance was, of course, Bergen-Belsen, and the presence of the charismatic figure of Yossele Rosensaft made a difference there. On February 18, at 1 a.m., armed German police encircled the camp. Rosen-saft immediately informed the British that if the Germans entered the camp he would refuse "responsibility for any bloodshed." The British promised no Germans would enter the camp. In the morning, the British explained that a German driver, arrested with an illegal truckload of ciga-rettes, had informed them that there were large quantities of cigarettes at the Belsen camp (cigarettes, it will be remembered, were the real currency at the time). British soldiers would accompany the searchers to ensure their safety. Rosensaft objected—there was no need to protect British officials in a Jewish camp, though this might be true for a Polish or Baltic camp, and he would vouch for their safety. The British agreed. Rosensaft then offered to have a Jewish policeman accompany each search party, and the British accepted that, and agreed to an observers' committee com-posed of Rosensaft, Samuel Dallob of JDC, and the two British officers responsible for the operation. The search then proceeded and, apart from a quantity of cigarettes found in an Agudat Israel compound—which prob-ably had been planted on them by real black marketeers—nothing was found, and nobody arrested. The usual cow (in previous searches an illegal cow had always figured: the Jews had no permit to have cows) was found. The local lore had it that on one of these occasions Yossele Rosensaft remarked that the British were quite right: the cow did not have a DP card and had no business being there. From the British point of view, these searches were as much of a debacle as in the US Zone.14 The searches petered out in both Zones and were not repeated until 1949.

In the American Zone, it was with the greatest difficulty that Haber persuaded Clay and the top brass to stick to the original United States policy of not permitting German police to enter the camps. Had he not succeeded, there would undoubtedly have occurred serious clashes with the danger of bloodshed.

The problem was what to do about all this. Apart from pep talks no real " Ibid., Hyman to Director of Civil Affairs Division, 3/24/48. 14 J DC/DPs, 1948-1, Dallob to Katzki, 3/3/48.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 271 proposals emerged. William Haber concluded, wisely but pessimistically, that "the difficulties are likely to increase if emigration does not get under way within the next six months," which of course is exactly what did happen in the end.15

Unknown to most Jewish DPs, the Truman Administration was playing with the idea of withdrawing the Army from all civilian affairs in Germany and handing over the responsibility for Germany, including the DPs, to the State Department. The changeover was planned for July 1948, and naturally William Haber was opposed to the idea. The Jewish organi-zations, whose heads in Germany were advised by him of the impending danger, agreed with him that despite Army hostility, it was still preferable to have to deal with the Army than with an inexperienced and even more hostile State Department. This was the opinion also of the ZK leaders, and while it was not due to Jewish input that the government withdrew this plan, the five Jewish organizations in America, who had sent the Adviser to Germany, did agitate strongly against the planned move. In the end, the Army, and General Clay, stayed on and in their jobs.16

How many Jewish DPs were there in Germany in early 1948? The official IRO count of those receiving its care, including the "free-living" Jewish DPs, for September 30, 1947, was as follows:

TABLE 4 .Jews in Germany, Austria, and Italy, 1947-1948 (IRO)

GERMANY: US Zone British Zone French Zone AUSTRIA ITALY Total

1947 (9/30) 1948 (8/15)* 1948 (10/16)

113,962 110,000 74,419

, 9 6 7 2 11,500 (DP camps only)

1833 22,638 1200 18,950

19,417 22,000

167,52217

164,950

* Official IRO figures as reported by Major A. Hyman, 9/15/48. All figures relate to DPs only.

However, not all Jews were receiving IRO care, and Rabbi Bernstein estimated the numbers of Jews, DPs and non-DPs, in the summer of 1947 at 157,000 for the US Zone in Germany, 15,000 for the British Zone, 2000 for the French Zone, 10,000 for Berlin, and 44,000 for Austria (including 20,000 for the US Zone, 11,000 for the British Zone, 12,000 for Vienna, and 1000 for the French Zone); he thought that there were 19,000 DPs in Italy.

An internal JDC document put the number of Jews in the US Zone in January 1948, including local Jews, at 91,653. This tallied with JDC's estimate for only the Jewish DPs in the Zone of 85,000.18 For reasons

IJ JDC/DPs 1947-48, Haber to Grossman, 2/24/48. ! 16 JDC/DPs, 1947-48, Haber-Clay talks, 1/14-15/48.

17 Malcolm J. Proudfoot, European Refugees, London (1957). 11 Vital Statistics of the Jewish Population in the U.S. Zone of Germany for the Year 1948,

Munich, n.d. (1949), p. 6.

272 Out of the Ashes

already stated, it was impossible to arrive at an accurate number, but the JDC internal report was close to the mark. The discrepancy between that and the figures for 1947 can in part be explained by emigration, including illegal immigration to Palestine, and of course by the existence of the malochim.

Faced with the decline in morale, JDC decided to tighten its supply procedures yet again. Here, in late 1947, Charles Passman's intervention was decisive. We have already described the system which he instituted, after long negotiations with the ZK. It was based on the institution of categories of workers, recipients of special rations such as the sick, chil-dren, pregnant women, nursing mothers, and so on, and finally, the basic category, all the rest. The workers were graded into categories by the difficulty of their jobs and in accordance with pressures the ZK brought to bear on JDC. Passman, and Haber after him, established the necessary committees to go over the arrangements and see to it that the decisions were carried out. JDC had control over the supplies as they came into Germany, but at the camp level the distribution, that is the actual implementation of the program, was in the hands of the local committees. While the ZK tried to implement the agreements as best it could, it was not always easy to control the local committees. Favoritism, pressures of the various political parties and other extraneous factors tended to inter-vene. Passman had managed to reduce the number of "workers" suppos-edly doing administrative jobs in the camps. In the end, a certain percentage was fixed in each camp that would be considered to be workers, according to different sizes of camps; the maximum percentage of workers was 19 percent. The total number of these workers was not to exceed 15,000. They included really devoted public servants at all levels, but also people who did phantom jobs or none at all.

The minimum basic ration, composed of the IRO allocation and the basic JDC supplement, continued at 2500 calories. The categories were in addition. 600 tons of supplies were needed monthly to keep up the system. This included supplies for an estimated 2300 (2673 by mid-May) people employed in 50 work projects, who however were outside the maximum 19 percent limit, as were ORT instructors and personnel and, significantly, leaders in the camps of various political parties, youth organizations, and the like. The system applied to the communities as well, as it did to the hachsharot (1396 persons at the end of 1947). JDC reckoned at the end of 1947 with 30,000 who were to receive workers' rations, about half of them as committee workers, and the rest as ORT employment project participants, and other minor categories. In early 1948, JDC could estab-lish that there were 51,204 non-workers who were getting either the basic supplement or were in one of the relief categories. Equally, the statistical picture according to the ZK was that there were 20,000 children, and 7000 sick and invalids. The figures seemed to show that there were 16,000

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 273

employables who were unemployed.19 The Passman scheme was realistic: it assumed that some people were doing shadow jobs and that statistics were unreliable. The amazing thing is that this top-heavy, complicated system actually worked, and worked quite well. It was "eliminating many of the inequalities of the past and provide[d] assurance that every Jew . . . [would] receive assistance in accordance with his needs."20

The results of the low morale were evident also in the fact that the results of the employment program notwithstanding, a considerable proportion of the actual work performed in the camps was done by hired German help. Thus, the matzot factory run by JDC at Frankfurt employed, with the exception of the Jewish ritual overseers, only Germans. William Haber added that this may turn out to be of only historical importance, but only "if emigration actually gets under way soon." Otherwise, it would be just another indication of unsuitability to lead a productive life wherever the DPs went. Haber even doubted whether it would be possible to raise a construction company of 200-300 men for the Army from among the Jewish DPs; but that proved surprisingly easy, once the Army provided material incentives.21 -

Clothing, medical, educational, and religious supplies in Germany were distributed according to a plan worked out by Passman and Haber, and the ZK's various departments had the same role there as with the food. Of course, beyond providing supplies, JDC and ORT were developing their own programs, which usually were received with gratefulness by the DPs. The medical program especially was of great importance. By early 1948, JDC was capable of a greatly improved prophylactic campaign against TB and other contagious and serious diseases. The whole camp population was checked for these ailments, and cures were prescribed and provided for those in need of them. Training of nurses proceeded apace, and the DP doctors were enabled to gather experience through their work with the American organization.

There were occasional problems, especially with the religious groups such as the Va'ad Hahatzalah, who were looking for a platform to establish their claim of providing for needs that JDC could not take care of. Samuel Haber complained that JDC had arranged for the baking o(matzot in 1948 with the approval of the board of rabbis of the ZK, including the most orthodox ones. The Va'ad then appealed in the States for matzot to be sent to Germany through them. Irritations of this sort were not uncommon in the religious sphere.22 JDC did a great deal to satisfy the demands of the religious segment, as did the ZK. At the 1948 Congress mentioned above, the sanctity of the shabbat in public and the provision for kosher food were

" JDC/DPs, 1947-48, Meeting at the Adviser's Office, 3/15/48. 20 Excom, 2/17-48. 21 JDC/DPs, 1947-48, Haber to Grossman, 2/24/48; 4/1/48. 22 JDC/DPs, 1948-1, S. Haber Report for March-April.

274 Out of the Ashes

reiterated. Religious schools were opened, and religious books provided. A seminar for religious teachers was organized, and so on. Elevenyeshivot with 24 rabbis and 420 pupils completed the picture.

Education, on the other hand, was in somewhat of a crisis. Religious students who belonged to the extreme Agudat Israel would not serve in the Jewish fighting forces in any case, but teachers in secular schools were called up and often were the first to volunteer to go to Palestine. In the hectic atmosphere of recruitment ordinary schooling was difficult, and the disappearance of experienced teachers threw the educational network into disarray. An increasing number of replacements were unqualified, and had to be trained in the middle of the school year, and then often went to Palestine themselves. Jewish children in the camps in 1948 did not learn very much. Cultural programs other than education continued as best they could. An orchestra was organized in Munich which gave a number of concerts; just as the State of Israel was born, Leonard Bernstein conducted two concerts with the orchestra. The existing theater companies, aided by visiting performers from the States, performed. Literary work was published in Yiddish, and the Historical Commission under Kaplan con-tinued its work, transferring most of its material to the newly established Yad Vashem organization in Palestine.23

The mutual recriminations and other problems that had accompanied vocational training and the employment program had disappeared by 1948. ORT claimed 8000 students in its schools in Germany, and while this was exaggerated, the thousands who did receive a vocational education, as well as outside observers, praised the ORT staff for their excellent work. Students at ORT schools received additional supplies within one of Passman's categories, which served as a powerful incentive to take on courses. The problem that arose was that those who had taken ORT's courses had nothing to do with their skills afterwards. They just had to join the army of lisdess DPs waiting for a general solution to their situation.24

The emphasis on rehabilitation and reconstruction led JDC to support the enrollment of Jewish students in German universities; this actually stood in contradiction to the official ideology of the ZK, not to have any contact with German culture. Over one thousand students were studying in early 1948, mostly in the natural sciences and medicine, fully supported by JDC. This was indeed an investment for the future: many of these people were to become leaders in their fields wherever they ultimately went.

JDC and ZK were faced with Army plans to close some of the camps, in the midst of the crisis in morale. The reason for this move was in a few cases to get better accommodation for American servicemen's families or,

» ]DC/DPs, 1948-1, Report by S. Haber, March-April. 24 Excom, 1/21/48.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 275

more usually, to hand the facilities over to the Germans. The best camps were chosen for this purpose. The Jews would get inferior accommodation in existing camps, where the overcrowding would be a bit worse than before. The first camp to be threatened with closure was Zeilsheim, near Frankfurt. At first, however, Clay was opposed to the move because he would not move DPs against their will. After Israel's declaration of inde-pendence the idea was resuscitated, and Zeilsheim was to be closed, but Haber managed to postpone this until the autumn. With the increasing tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, there was no disagreement on one move: that of the 5446 Jews in three camps in Berlin to the US Zone. It took place in July 1948. There was no future for the Berlin camps in a beleaguered city, and all sides thought it would be best to remove the Jewish DPs.25;

Another sign of the increasing friction with the Army was its decision to implement Clay's order not to accept any infiltree into the DP camps after April 21, 1947. This had been directed against the Romanian infil-trees, of whom some 6000 had crossed the border into Germany in 1948. In February, the Army announced that every person entitled to IRO care would receive an identity card containing a picture, fingerprints and full data. This then enabled the Army to conduct search operations in Jewish DP camps where they uncovered some of these "illegals," evicted them, men, women and children, from the Jewish camps and placed them in the harsh conditions of the German Fluchtlingslager (refugee camps), with 1500 calories a day, no winterized barracks, and no prospects for the future. They were supposed to be taken out of these camps by the German administration and given available housing. Naturally, the Germans pre-ferred their own refugees from the East when it came to housing, and the Jews stayed in the camps. Samuel Haber reported that this took place although "the Army had consistently ignored its own directive and infil-tration into the [DP] camps actually occurred subsequent to the effective date of the above [4/21/47] directive." The results were evident from a report of a JDC worker at Bindlach, one of these German camps. He had met:

A totally disheartened, discouraged, disorganised, underfed, underclothed and bewil-dered group of men, women and children . . . "why," they were yelling, "were we brought here?". . . " R a c h e m ( h a v e mercy) one woman, about 45 years of age, kept repeating, with tears rolling down her worn-out and haggard face . . . the barracks they are billeted in are temporary type wooden structures, miles away from Bayreuth (the nearest city). There is no transportation to that city.

Two or three families were forced together into the rooms, there were only 25 Excom, 9/21/48. The move took place between 7/23/48 and 8/1/48. William Haber had

estimated the number of people in the three camps at 6500, and then 5446 arrived in Frankfurt. 150 remained. That meant that the Berlin camp population had been overesti-mated by about 14 percent, which indicates the proportion of malochim, perhaps not only for Berlin.

276 Out of the Ashes

two blankets per person in unheated billets, and there was no hot water nor any bathing facilities available (there were 40 children there). Toilet facilities were, of course, outside the barracks. The rather embarassed German authorities did try to help, but they had little means. William Haber contacted Clay and pleaded with him to rescind the eviction orders. But Clay stood firm—he had warned refugees that that was what would happen. The Army and IRO did not have the food necessary to feed these people. He was not going to evict them from his Zone, and they could live in the German refugee camps, but he would not treat them as DPs.26

After a while, JDC got organized, had the barracks repaired, supplied the necessary essentials, and the situation eased somewhat.27

One may ask, perhaps, why Brichah bothered to bring in the Roman-ian refugees from Austria, if the conditions in Germany were so difficult. The answer was that the conditions in Austria were even worse, although IRO did include many of the Romanian refugees in its program (IRO also increased its basic food ration from 1550 to 1800, and JDC supplied another 600, but that did not do much to alleviate the misery in some of the refugee camps). The two camps near Linz that housed most of these infiltrees were substandard. Conditions in Austria, except for the "old" DPs, were worse than those in Germany generally. But the spirit in those camps of the "new" refugees (of 1946 vintage) was apparendy better. An interesting sidelight on this is the decision of the US Army in Austria on January 14, 1948, to remove the exemption of Jewish DPs from doing compulsory labor. The purpose of this regulation was to help in the rebuilding of the Austrian economy. This was the essential point in the Army's program for Austria, and it was clear to everyone that these priorities clashed with the interests of the DPs. We have referred to the fiction of Austria being treated as a liberated Allied country, and the Allied DPs were being asked to contribute to this newfound Ally. JDC "deemed it inadvisable" to oppose the order outright, and instead intervened with the Army. In February 1948 in Washington, JDC, together with IRO, intervened to prevent Jews being forced to work for Nazis. JDC projects were to be considered suitable employment, an effort was to be made to employ the Jews in their professions, unskilled labor for the Austrian government was to be avoided, and Austrian employers were to be vetted for pro-Nazi tendenc-ies. The Austrian government accepted these conditions; William Haber went to Austria to speak to the Central Committee in Salzburg, and they, too, accepted them. The result was that everything remained as before: Jews were registered for employment with JDC, the camp

26 J DC/DPs, 1948-1, Haber to Katzki, 3/1/48; ibid., Haber Report, 3/15/48; ibid., Lipian to S. Haber, 3/8/48; DPs 1947-48, W. Haber to Clay, 2/25/48; Clay to W. Haber, 3/2/48.

1 1 J DC/DPs, 1948-1, Haber to Beckelman, 3/18/48.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 277

committees, IRO, or the Army, and a few chose of their own volition to do work for pay in some sector of the Austrian economy.28

William Haber criticized ZK, in Munich and in Salzburg, for "empire-building" and unreasonable demands. In addition, the Salzburg commit-tee tried to emulate their colleagues and lay their hands on JDC supplies. However, the Austrian group was much less powerful, and Harold Trobe, the JDC director for Austria in early 1948, prevented any such develop-ment. Again, the moderating influence of Brichah came to be felt in Austria, anything that diverted attention from Palestine-centered activities was discouraged. Haber was under no such restraints, and in a vigorous memorandum to General Geoffrey Keyes he complained of the bad living conditions in the US Zone. Thirty-six square feet were supposed to be provided per person, and even that was difficult to attain in Austria. No privacy was possible, and the overcrowding affected morale. The transient camp at Wegscheid near Linz was terrible, and the Army's plan to evacuate the New Palestine camp (one of the better ones) should be reconsidered, Haber said. In early 1948, according to Haber, morale in Austria slackened just as it did in Germany. The effects of the JDC employment program were apparently no longer felt (in May, there were 4654 people employed, but only 996 of these in shops), and even Brichah control did not help. The news from Palestine and the apparent hopelessness of the situation took their toll.29 However, as in Germany, with the declaration of the State, the situation changed markedly.

In Austria, just as in Germany, the closure of camps affected the best camps: obviously, they were the ones the Austrian government was most eager to lay its hands on. The policy of closure was adopted early in the year, when emigration to Palestine-Israel had not yet started, and there was a great deal of bitterness, but fortunately this was soon forgotten, as emigration began.

Relations with IRO developed better in Austria than they did in Ger-many. Early in 1948, IRO assumed the task of mediating between JDC and the Army, and coordinated medical and other programs. IRO did not, of course, help with the local Jews which, in the case of Austria, in fact meant the Vienna IKG. There, it will be remembered, the 9000 Jews had elected a communist-controlled Council.30 The reason was that many Jews who returned from the camps had been radicalized by their experience. David Brill, the head of the community, could point an accusing finger

28 Excom, 2/17/48; JDC/DPs, 1947-48, Joffe to Leavitt, 2/20/48; and Haber to Gen. Wood, 2/17/48. Austrian instructors were used to guide the employment projects in many places.

29 JDC/DPs, 1947-48, Haber to Keyes, 3/16 and 3/26/48. 30 JTA Special Report on Austria, 5/15/48. According to JTA, 2139 Jews had survived

the Nazi regime legally in Vienna; 295 had hidden (the U-Booie), and 1276 had returned from the camps. The majority were either Alischlinge, or had returned from all countries of the globe to postliberation Vienna.

278 Out of the Ashes

at Austrian antisemitism, at the refusal of the conservative and socialist partners in the government coalition to implement the restitution laws; but in April 1948, a second election took place which placed 13 Zionists and socialists on the Council, as against 11 communists. A new president was elected.31 Slowly, the make-up of the community changed, partly also due to the fact that the Austrian Communist Party had left the coalition government in December 1947, and could no longer exercise the kind of influence it had had until then.

In Germany, the trouble with IRO did not cease. IRO's budget was contracting all the time, and their teams withered away as a consequence. In the spring of 1948, only seven out of the original twenty IRO teams remained in Germany, and their personnel was cut drastically. This affected especially their medical section, which placed additional burdens on the JDC staff. At that time, JDC had a total staff of 545 in Germany, 40 less than IRO, who had to deal with all DPs, not only the Jews.32 IRO, however, not only cut its personnel; after May, they also withdrew all support from the "free-living" DPs, throwing them onto the German economy, or giving them the option of returning to the camps. Contrary to expectations, a majority of these people preferred to stay in the German communities despite the difficulties of food supplies and providing for rent payments, rather than return to the shelter of the DP camps. IRO's sup-port of hospitals also dwindled, so that JDC would have been faced with a very serious crisis, had not the establishment of the State of Israel caused the beginning of the exodus from the camps.

In addition, IRO now refused to pay for legal immigration to Palestine because of the fighting that was going on there. This was to continue to be a major problem until well after the establishment of the State, because JDC could not see how it could pay for this migration out of its funds which, though large, were still very much limited.

The overall responsibility of Samuel Haber extended over Berlin and the French Zone. The French Zone was just an annex to the American, but the British Zone had problems of its own, because of the anti-Zionist policy of the British, and also because the DPs were concentrated in Bergen-Belsen and the two "Exodus" camps. On a day-to-day basis, how-ever, relations with the British were good. Samuel Dallob, reporting in April, gave a rare and graphic picture of the situation. The population in Bergen-Belsen, stated to be 9500, was in fact 6000—the proportion of malochim may have been greater there than in the US Zone, but if the malochim made up 38 percent of the figure claimed, one can understand the statistical discrepancies elsewhere. The "Exodus" camps, supposedly containing 4200 people, in fact had 1500 by April 1948. The rest had already been smuggled into the American Zone on their way to Palestine,

" Dr David Schapira, a Zionist. " Excom, 1/21/48.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 279

or received legal permits to go there. The economic situation in the British Zone was even more chaotic than in the American. The Zone head doctor received a weekly salary of 12 packs of cigarettes, a new Volkswagen cost 30 cartons and a typewriter cost 5 cartons. A JDC ambulance had cost 9 cartons. This goes a long way towards explaining the situation in which the raid on Bergen-Belsen, described above, took place.

Belsen, in Dallob's view, was in danger of becoming a permanent Jewish settlement in Germany. Cases of marriage with German Gentiles began to occur, people were getting used to the life there. Unlike in the American Zone, there were few volunteers for Haganah (though money was contrib-uted), and a growing antisocial tendency manifested itself in reluctance to participate in communal activities such as cultural events, sports, and so on. All this took place in an atmosphere of growing German antisemitism. Legal migrants to Palestine took with them baggage that contained modern appliances and equipment—17 carriages for 300 people. Clearly, the DPs had improved their situation considerably in the past year. Dallob in effect suggested that JDC reduce its feeding programs, and concentrate on cul-tural and religious issues, where its input was much more needed. He was full of praise for the Central Committee in the Zone, under Rosensaft's leadership: "They are honest and mature."33

The New State

On May 14, David Ben-Gurion declared Israel's independence in a brief ceremony in the Tel-Aviv museum, amidst the first rumblings of the invasion of Palestine by Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, with the active assistance of Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The problems were not quite under-stood in the DP camps, but the enthusiasm which greeted the new develop-ment was overwhelming. The mood switched suddenly and completely. The basically unstable mental condition of the inmates of the camps was evidenced by the tremendous enthusiasm that gripped them, and which brought forth a wave of voluntary actions which even a couple of weeks before that would have been thought impossible. But the reason for this is not hard to find. The announcement in Tel-Aviv was a catharsis, a release from the oppressive fact of a lack of solution: now, at last, there was somewhere to go. Not everyone would go there, not by a long way, but there was an aim, an open possibility. People were called upon to defend that possibility. Not that the very realistic DPs ignored the fact that Israel was an insecure country engaged in a war. The children and most women would have to wait, and many of the men would have to wait with them—and there were undoubtedly people who welcomed postpone-ment—but there was something to wait for, at last. By September, not only was the period of frighteningly low morale of just a few months

" JDC, Country Directors Conference, April 1, 1948, Samuel Dallob Report.

280 Out of the Ashes

previously, completely forgotten, but an astute observer such as Abraham Hyman could write, almost panegyrically:

The three years of vegetating in the camps have not broken their spirit. The people are resilient, despite the grimness of their surroundings, their crowded quarters, their lack of privacy, their general idleness and their endless waiting for the chance at normal living . . . it is to the everlasting credit of the people, to the U.S. Army, to IRO, to the AJDC and other voluntary agencies that have served them, that the Jewish DPs are emerging from their o rdea l s . . . with a mental outlook that promises a rapid adjustment to normal living in Israel or in any other country to which they might migrate.

Hyman summed it up with a piece of interesting self-criticism: Jewish DPs had been overly criticized in the past, whereas in fact their morals and their morale had both stood the test of time rather well.34

Yahil's teams registered those who wanted to go to the new State. This was no longer a demonstration; now it was "for real." The response was better than anyone had imagined: 70 percent registered. William Haber attributed much of it to the fact that there simply seemed to be no other choice, as all the other countries, especially the United States remained closed. Among the Army personnel, too, there was a change of mood. The Jewish DPs might have been regarded with distaste, but the fighters of the new Israel evoked sympathy, which then colored the approach in Germany as well. After all, the Israel with which they now sympathized was the aim of these DPs. A massive demonstration of identification with Israel was held on May 18 in Munich, with Army brass in attendance. Clay himself thought that Israel might well defeat the Arabs at first blush, but would succumb to a war of attrition. However, he was all sympathy. The Army's support for immigration to Israel was now crucial, because the new State had to introduce fighting men and women in opposition to resolutions of the United Nations, where anti-Israeli sentiment was strong. Officially, the Army put a stop to the introduction of fighting men into Israel in August, but this was not to be taken too seriously, and in fact the Army was glad of every Jewish DP it got rid of.

This was true not only in Germany, but of Austria as well. In June, Hyman made a tour of Austria, addressing about 8000 DPs in a number of camps, and explaining that the only hope of emigration would be Israel, not the United States or anywhere else. With full Army encouragement, the Adviser's office and the Agency pushed the idea of immediate emi-gration to the new State.35 With the change in mood, JDC's Austrian work projects again began to show gratifying results despite the contraction of the Jewish population due to emigration to Israel. The range of goods people could buy with their scrip was enlarged, and JDC could now use the products of the shops to supplement clothing and other supplies. At this late stage of the camps' existence, something of a cultural renaissance was taking place: two orchestras began functioning in 1948, educational

M JDC/DPs, 1948-2, Hyman and Greenstein Report, 9/15/48. \ » JDC/DPs, 1948, Haber Report, 6/10/48.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 281 facilities were improved, and kindergarten children received new locally-produced picture books.36 The other side of the coin was that there were in Austria many more people than in Germany who either could not or did not want to go to Israel. Some of them wanted to stay in Austria; the Austrian currency had been revalued, and people who could enter the Austrian economy and were paid in shillings had an advantage over those who were just given their rations as DPs or received JDC scrip. The Army was not averse to these people entering the Austrian economy, as long as they ceased being the Army's wards through their DP status.

The Americans agreed to the opening of official diplomatic missions in Germany, who were granting visas to Jews. The recruitment campaign for the Israeli Army increased in intensity, and JDC had a hard time protecting those who refused to go—and there were quite a number of them, in fact they were the other 30 percent of the Jewish population who did not register to go to Israel. Yahil himself and a number of other, now Israeli, officials, supported JDC and tried to restrain their followers.

In the course of the recruitment campaign, all the hachsharot were closed, as all their members went to the new State, thereby depriving the DP population of its most constructive and idealistic element. Equally, all ORT schools were affected, and most of them were gradually closing: their students were in the 17-35 age range, and were just the type of person needed by Israel. There was another problem, too: the machines of ORT were in great demand in Israel, and Yahil suggested that they be shipped there, as part of the equipment needed to set up an ORT system. JDC objected at first: the tools and machines had been bought with JDC money for European Jews, and Israel should get its equipment from elsewhere. But then the pressure became too insistent, and JDC relented. ORT schools were transferred to Israel, and were the beginning of a most impor-tant development there, namely the creation of an ORT vocational school system.

The school system, too, continued to suffer badly from the immigration to Israel on the one hand, and the German currency reform on the other hand. Teachers' seminars were held in the summer, to which the new State fighting for its survival sent 15 Israeli teachers to avoid leaving Jewish DP children without proper educational care! But many of the DP teachers could not afford the new railway fares from their camps to the place where the seminars were held, and JDC had no cash to pay for them. The new school year opened in late August 1948, with 660 teachers and 8609 pupils. Only an unknown proportion of these finished the year in the summer of 1949.37 But one must say that the educational system which reached its high point of achievement in the summer of 1948 had fulfilled its purpose. The majority of schools were secular, Hebrew,'with an emphasis on Jewish

36 Excom, 6/15/48. 37 Excom, 10/21/48.

282 Out of the Ashes

civilization, but well rounded in general science subjects. Almost all the textbooks had been printed or reprinted with JDC funds, but the main contribution was of course that of the Palestine teachers already men-tioned. Minority schools, whether religious schools of the Mizrahi or Agu-dat Israel persuasion, or Yiddish secular schools, were equally supported by JDC and ZK.38 All of them had provided reasonably adequate schooling for a large number of Jewish children under the most difficult circum-stances.

The whole welfare program was thrown out of joint. The JRU's from Britain dissolved their association with JDC in the US Zone in September, because JDC now emphasized groups rather than individuals, and the British Jewish organization was geared to individual welfare. The healthy and productive part of the DP population was emigrating, with their chil-dren, and the people who were left behind had among them a dispro-portionate percentage of sick, elderly, and disabled persons, the so-called "hard core." JDC-OSE medical teams now surveyed the camps for these hard core cases in order to find out what the ailments and other problems were, and how best to treat them.

The immediate effect of the political change was to create new head-aches. The effect on the educational system of the recruitment of teachers has been described already. Now, the best and most popular camp leaders were departing for Palestine, especially medical staff, who were needed in the Israeli armed forces (Dr Avraham Blumovicz himself was to become General Atzmon, the Chief Surgeon of the Israeli Air Force).

Another problem that resurfaced was that of the closing of camps. The Army demanded, and this time with a great deal of justification, that as the Jewish camp population was declining, some facilities should be closed. After the closing of Zeilsheim on November 15, other camps were also closed.

The closing of camps was part of a general American policy in Germany, of which the next step was to be a drastic economic reform, a change of currency accompanied with effective radical devaluation. William Haber knew about this change well before it happened, and tried to prepare the Jewish population for it. Goods were imported in large quantities to undercut the black market once and for all, and other goods emerged from the underground market to be sold and brought with the new currency. The change occurred on June 21, the Deutschmark was introduced instead of the valueless Reichsmark, and JDC expenses jumped up considerably • The "free-living" people in the communities with their fixed expenses for rent, utilities, food, and so on, and no permanent jobs in the German economy, were hard hit, and JDC did not have the means to support them; some had to return to the camps. On the positive side, IRO now paid workers in the JDC employment project in Deutschmarks, which resulted

31 Ibid., Alexander Duskin's Report.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 283

in a flow of DPs into the projects. However, IRO again had to cut its overall budget for the camps, and JDC had to pay its employees in the new currency—it did not have the sums needed, and New York could not supply the difference. Again, it was saved by the mass emigration that was beginning to take place.

After a few months, the effect of the currency reform began to wear off, as the ZK, JDC, the Israeli mission and ORT adjusted to its effects. The employment projects, which had had an influx of people in the summer, lost them again in the autumn as workers emigrated—naturally, people with skills were the best prospective emigrants.

The Army had to engage in a policy of retrenchment, which was dictated to it by the progressive cuts in military spending decreed by Congress. In the course of this development, the chaplains program of the Army was also cut, and Jewish chaplains who for two years now had had official permision to work in DP camps were recalled. They had, however, done a tremendous amount of work, and it was in no small measure due to them that the most positive parts of the DP story had developed.

As the DPs were in their period of greatest ecstasy, their relations with the surrounding population did not improve. Acts of antisemitism were common, usually in the form of desecration of Jewish cemeteries, which became a veritable epidemic. In addition, there were violent incidents of beatings, and JDC's legal department was overworked. In many cases, especially when military judges were blatantly anti-Jewish, JDC's attorneys obtained reversals of sentences in Courts of Appeal. However, the very process of defence of DPs' rights showed how essential it was to get the people out of Germany.

West Germany was moving towards self-government, and whether the DPs liked it or not, relations with the German authorities became more and more important. In Bavaria, with its great concentration of Jewish DPs, such relations had in fact existed from the very beginning, when a particularly friendly and sensitive mayor of Munich, Karl ScharnagI, attempted to improve relations with the Jews. In January 1946, the "Bavarian Aid Society for those Affected by the Nuremberg Laws" (Hilf-swerk, in short)39 came into existence and opened its offices in the same Moehlstrasse where most of the Jewish groups had their headquarters. It dealt mainly with converted Jews and Christian partners of mixed mar-riages who had remained loyal to their Jewish spouses; it also tried to help the Romanies. From November 1946, the head of this outfit was Dr Philipp Auerbach. JDC supported the Hilfswerk, but when the emphasis on the non-Jewish aspects were increased, it withdrew its support in July 1948. Significantly, when the Hilfswerk disbanded in 1956, its assets were

39 Bayerisches Hilfswerk fur die von den Niirenberger Gesetzen Betroffenen.

284 Out of the Ashes

divided between the Jewish old age home in Munich and the Christian Mission to the Jews!40

The Bavarian government also established a State Commissariat for Care for Jews (Staatskommissariat fur die Betreuung derjuden) in the autumn of 1945. This was the overarching and mediating German organization for dealing with the Jewish communities as well as with the free-living DPs. Its main task was to find accommodations and furniture for both categor-ies. From October 1946, the Staatskommissar was the same Auerbach already mentioned. Philipp Auerbach was a German Jew from an Ortho-dox background, who had been in Auschwitz and Gross-Rosen camps and had been liberated in Buchenwald. At first he was active in the British Zone in aid for Jews and other persecutees, and then received the nomination to be Staatskommissar in Bavaria. He was also active in the Jewish community in Bavaria, of which he served as President between 1949 and 1952. He established a number of homes for "racial persecutees," and received considerable help from JDC in his work. He also tried to obtain work for both the 18,000 members of communities and the 29,000 free-living DPs. The Staatskommissariat was abolished in November 1948, when the resti-tution laws enacted a year previously began to affect day-to-day policies. Auerbach took over that task, and became head of the Restitution Office (.Landesamt fur Wiedergutmachung, which became the Landesentschadigung-samt a year later). There is no doubt that Auerbach did a tremendous deal for the local communities, and also for the DPs, with whom he was in much greater sympathy than other German Jews. When he abolished his Kommissariat post in 1948, a host of very practical problems arose regard-ing accommodation, permission to enter German cities, minor payments for doctors' bills, and so on, which had been handled by him and now fell on JDC's shoulders.41

The Adviser and JDC were very worried by another development that lay outside their sphere of influence: the communist take-over in Czecho-slovakia, which occurred in February 1948. As a result of the conquest of power by the communist party, a stream of refugees entered West Germany. There was fear that the whole Jewish community might be among the refugees, and JDC began preparing for that eventuality. How-ever, the majority of the refugees turned out to be non-Jews, mainly Czechs of course, and the number of Jews was less than a thousand. JDC could handle such a figure relatively easily.42

By July 1948, the Stratton Bill on DPs was signed by a reluctant Truman and went into effect. The impact of the bill was quite different from the one expected by the Jewish organizations. The wording of the bill, which provided for over 200,000 DPs to enter the United States, as well as the

40 Wetzel, op. cit., pp. 37-41. 41 Wetzel, op. cit., pp. 53-59. 42 JDC/DPs, 1948-2, Haber Report, 6/27/48.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 285 discussions leading up to its enactment, made it perfectly clear that it was designed to let in Baltics and Germans (Volksdeutsche, expelled from their homes in the East), and keep Jews out. There was a provision for letting in a high percentage of agriculturists, and another providing for a cut-off date of December 22, 1945, by which time a prospective immigrant was to have been in Germany. On the face of it, Jews had no chance. William Haber wrote that "it is the most antisemitic Bill in U.S. history."43 Jewish organizations were up in arms about the discriminatory nature of the bill, and Truman was very reluctant about signing it. But then a major loophole appeared in the very loose wording: what did "Germany" mean? If Jews could prove that they had been in the general area of Germany, including Eastern Germany, by the end of 1945, they were eligible. Hyman pointed this out in a memo he wrote as early as July 13.44

The loopholes actually went beyond that. 40 percent of the immigrants had to be from "annexed areas" of Eastern Europe, that is, the Baltic States, Eastern Poland, Bessarabia and Bukovina. This of course fitted the Jewish case, quite unintentionally. The nomination by Truman of commissioners friendly to the DPs to administer the program was the decisive factor, and by the end of 1949 about 120,000 persons had been admitted to the United States. In 1950, the Democratic Congress elected in 1948 enacted another apparently restrictive DP bill (McCarran Act) which allowed for another 301,500 DPs to enter the United States. The bill provided for a large number of and-Jewish people to enter, and was weighed heavily in favor of anti-communist groups. Nevertheless, because of loopholes such as the ones mentioned for the first bill, a total of 68,000 Jews are estimated by Leonard Dinnerstein to have entered the United States under the two bills between 1948 and 1952, in addition to the total of28,000 estimated to have entered under the Truman directive. Of these, however, between July and December 1948, only 2499 Jewish DPs entered the States, but in the course of 1949, another 30,839 did so.45 In the first months after Israel's independence, therefore, the road to America still seemed closed, while the road to Israel appeared more and more open. This indeed was William Haber's conclusion, in August: the new law "has at least served the useful purpose of clearing the air by removing any

4J Dinnerstein, op. cit., p. 176. See his Chapter 7, pp. 163-82, for a detailed discussion of the events leading up to the enactment of the bill and the aftermath. Dinnerstein points out that 23,000 DPs who had registered for entry into the United States under

. the Truman directive, lost their entry numbers when the new Bill was enacted. Abra-ham Duker, in a series of publications, showed how pro-Nazi DPs could easily enter the United States under the bill, whereas the victims of Nazism would be barred.

44 J DC/DPs, 1948-2, Hyman to Liverhant, 7/13/48. 45 Dinnerstein, op. cit., pp. 251-52. According to JDC figures, 42,513 Jews entered the

States between 1948 and 1950: 833 in 1948, 31,592 in 1949, 10,088 in 1950. There is wide discrepancy between the two sets of figures as regards 1948, and according to the JDC figures the total including 1952 would probably be greater than the figures Dinnerstein quotes. The discrepancies are unresolved.

286 Out of the Ashes

shadow of doubt that Israel must be considered as the only real hope for the solution of the DP problem . . . Our Congress did for many what they could not do for themselves. It made them make up their minds."46

It took some time before it became clear that assessments such as these were erroneous. In the meantime it indeed appeared that only relatively few would be able to emigrate to the goldene medine ("the gilded country," as the United States was known).

Emigration to Israel proceeded apace in the DP countries, and with IRO still refusing to pay for it, JDC had to shoulder the burden. Schwartz went to Israel in August and agreed with Israeli government officials that the rate of immigration would be 10,000 a month for which JDC would pay $1,250,000. Immigrants from the DP camps would make up 50-60 per-cent, and most of the rest would be from Eastern Europe. This would ease JDC's burden in those countries. In fact, after a slow start in May and June (902 immigrants), about 20,000 DPs reached Israel between July and the end of September. Many of these came from Italy, of course, because of the proximity to the harbors and the fact that Mossad had concentrated there, in the main, people who it wanted to bring to Israel soon in any case. In October and November, another 23,500 emigrated to Israel, of whom 14,500 came from the DP countries. The estimated emigration from the DP countries, May 1948 to the end of January 1949, was 54,000. From the US Zone alone, 24,220 left for Palestine-Israel in 1948 (13,552 between October and December alone), and 11,352 for other countries. But Hyman estimated in September 1948, that a total of 115,000 would have to emi-grate to Israel from the DP countries.47 The new State could not really absorb these multitudes comfortably. The young people went into the Army, and the others were housed in very temporary, makeshift accommo-dation that was to cause a great deal of suffering when the rainy season descended on Israel in late November. The monthly quota of 10,000 proved insufficient to meet the needs, as the communist takeover in Czechoslovakia caused great pressure to emigrate; Poland, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia opened their gates for Jews to exit; and thousands of North African Jews, many of them sick, began arriving in Marseilles to await transportation to Israel.

In the light of these developments, JDC as the most important American Jewish relief organization, had to make very quick adjustments. The sums budgeted for emigration in August had to be increased in the autumn and winter, to $2.5-3 million monthly, and that meant that all the other expenses had to be cut to the bone, especially as no one was sure how much money UJA would raise in 1949. Expenditure in the DP countries, especially in Germany and Austria, was cut. In Germany, for instance,

46 JDC/DPs, 1948-2, Haber Memo, 8/31/48. 47 See Excom and Adcom for 1949, and also Undzer Weg, No. 242, 3/1949, "Interview

with Dr William Haber."

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 287 between May and September 1948, practically the whole child care pro-gram disappeared, except for two nutrition centers, because most of the orphans and the children's homes had gone to Israel, and others went to other countries.

Other issues arose that were of great concern to American Jewish rep-resentatives. In Germany—and in Austria as well, but not in Bergen-Belsen—the central figures among the DPs were leaving. ZK stalwarts such as Treger and others were preparing to go to Israel (some of them, as it turned out, temporarily), and the ZK and its regional and local com-mittees were shorn of their best people.48 JDC especially was worried that the general level of administration and care in the camps would be disastrously reduced. A general disintegration began to be felt. "Liqui-dation is not only a word employed to convey the discontinuance of instal-lations. It is a state of mind."49 A strike occurred at Feldafing of workers of the employment program. JDC was seen as the capitalist employer, and demands were made for transfer into higher categories of the Passman scheme, and of severance pay when people left the camps to emigrate. The whole purpose of JDC to provide incenuves for people to occupy themselves by productive work was being vitiated. Sam Haber walked the tightrope of negotiating with the workers, and holding the line on the principle that the category system was not intended to be a wage system at all. Other strikes occurred, and in some cases, as with the students who demanded scholarships, groups of strikers actually occupied JDC premises. To call the German police was of course out of the question, and the situation had to be handled with infinite padence and tact.50

In the wake of these developments, the whole employment project had to be dismantled, and by 1949 it was well on the way to dissolution. The category system went with it. JDC returned to a system of providing supplementary supplies when needed. Nobody objected too strongly. From JDC's point of view there was the problem of how much supplies should be shipped to Germany in a year when an undetermined number of people would leave it. Contrary to the view of David Weingard, Schwartz decided that the same amount of supplies, approximately, as before should be shipped to Germany. As a result, "when the camps emptied out, we had $3 million worth of supplies in Germany. Those supplies went to Israel, and they supported the old age homes until the Israelis could get their own mechanism working. It was a fortunate thing."51

Another, perhaps more basic, issue arose as the JA took over the major task of emigration to Israel. JDC, HIAS, and to an extent, the Va'ad, were

48 A special farewell ceremony was held for Treger on 11/1/48, at which he was inscribed into the Golden Book of the Jewish National Fund (Schwarz, op. cit., p. 285). Present were General Clay, Ambassador Robert Murphy and many others.

49 JDC/DPs, 1948-2, Haber Memo of 9/20/48. 50 JDC/Germany, DPs, 1948-2, Haber Reports 9/29/48,2/27/49. 51 JDC/Katzki interviews, David Weingard, 3/10/81.

288 Out of the Ashes

relegated to a minor role: they had to care only for all those who remained, and JDC's sole contribution to the heroic task of helping Jews to go to Israel was to hand out food and pay for transport. JDC workers wondered whether there was not something more direct they could do, but there really was nothing that could satisfy their desire to be part of a major historical event.52 JDC workers had to come to terms with the fact that theirs was an all-Jewish organization, aiding Jews wherever they lived and whatever their oudooks, and that of course was both a source of strength and also of obvious weakness.

New problems suddenly arose. North Africa had been on JDC's horizon since 1943, but now it seemed that a very large mass of Jews would move as a result of Israel's emergence. People especially in the villages and smaller towns were being "terrorized and feel in danger for their very lives." In Egypt, Jews were experiencing serious harassment by the auth-orities and wanted to get out. "The condition of Jews in Syria and Iraq is even worse. Jews are being deprived of their property; they are persecuted and terrorized." They congregated in larger cities and 3000 of them reached Israel in late 1948, illegally of course. JDC funds were funnelled there through various places, in order to provide medical treatment and

s, try and alleviate the worst suffering.53 . Suddenly, the whole outlook had changed. American Jews were sup-

porting Israel to the best of their ability, and former opponents or luke-warm supporters became enthusiastic pro-Israelis. Schwartz, who had been thinking in terms of a semi-permanent Jewish DP population only a few months previously, was now talking about a hard core of perhaps 4000-5000 medical and social cases in Germany who would remain and would have to be taken care of.

It was perhaps fitting that in February 1949, as the Israeli War of Inde-pendence was drawing to its close, there should have been a change of guards in Germany: William Haber left, after a year of most efficient and successful work, and the last official Adviser took his place. Harry Greenstein was a Baltimore Jewish activist, a social worker and a well-regarded Jewish leader. He had visited Germany and Austria in 1948, for the four54 Jewish agencies that nominated the Advisers, and presented a most important report. In mid-February, he came to Germany to fill the post as Adviser to General Lucius D. Clay. But the United States were handing over responsibility for Germany to the new Federal German government, and the Americans abolished military supervision and replaced it with a High Commission. In May, Clay returned to the States, and John J. McCloy became the US High Commissioner. Greenstein was

52 JDC/DPs, 1948—2, report by Maurice Lipian, 9/13/48. " Excom, 12/28/48, statement by Joseph J. Schwartz. 54 Four rather than five, because the American Jewish Conference had been dissolved.

The four remaining ones were the World Jewish Congress, the American Jewish Com-mittee, the Jewish Agency, and the JDC.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 289 to stay until October, and when he finally left, an Acting Adviser was nominated—Major Abraham S. Hyman, who had been the main helper and expert of the three previous Advisers—to serve until the the end of the year. With all these changes, only JDC remained, as before, under Samuel L. Haber. As the operations in the British Zone diminished, Haber became responsible for all JDC operations in Germany.

The End of the DP Camps

The mass emigration to Israel, and the much larger number of Jews going to the United States than was originally predicted, cleared out the camps much faster than the pessimists had expected. Theoretically at least, even the US Army opposed the emigration to Israel of men of military age— the British were deadly serious about that—though in fact men had already emigrated to Israel from the US Zones illegally, courtesy of the Mossad. But early in 1949, with the talks about a truce in the Israeli War of Indepen-dence being negotiated, both the United States and Britain rescinded their previous objections, and emigration to Israel could proceed unhampered.

On January 1,1949, there were 64,269 Jews in 48 camps in the US Zone and still quite a large number out of them. By November, there were 15,000 in nine camps and the same number out of camps. In Bergen-Belsen, there were another one thousand, and the total number of all Jews in Germany was estimated at 44,000. JDC closed its office at Belsen in November 1949, although there had been a slight increase in the number of people there (to about 1100—the Central Committee claimed 1450) because of renewed infiltration especially of Orthodox people from Eastern Europe to the camp. However, JDC maintained a skeleton operation in the British Zone. In Austria, 9953 in thirteen camps in January had dimin-ished to 7000 in seven camps (including two in Vienna) and 2500 in Vienna out of camps. Army pressure to close camps was greater in Austria than in Germany, because General Geoffrey Keyes was eager to move DPs out, if necessary even to Germany. He wanted to terminate American responsibility for the DPs, and was afraid of what the Austrians would do to the DPs once the Americans withdrew. In some of the Austrian installations (such as the New Palestine camp at Salzburg) most DPs no longer received JDC supplementation; the reason was that they had become self-sufficient, wealthy, and reluctant to go to Israel.55 This did not of course mean that there, as well as in the other DP areas, JDC's main concern was not emigration. By the end of 1949, JDC had spent the vast sum—in the circumstances of 1949—of $24 million to move 240,000 Jews

55 JDC/Austria, 1947-50, Greenstein Report, 3/22/49. In 1949, representatives of the American Jewish Committee complained that JDC was trying to "influence the people to go to Israel." (JDC/DP Reports, 1949-54, Conference at the Adviser's Office, 3/13-14/49).

290 Out of the Ashes

to new lands, of whom 215,000 went to Israel from the DP countries, from Eastern Europe and the Moslem world.56

The consolidation of the camps had been the major responsibility of the Adviser vis-a-vis the Army and then the American High Commission. Acting through the Agency, the ZK, and JDC, the Adviser managed to coordinate a policy that terminated a large number of camps with only token protests. The problem was that unless people were threatened with constant moves from one location to the other, their willingness to emigrate was paralyzed, despite vocal protestations to the contrary. Or, as Sam Haber put it, "I don't like to say it, but the more people are moved from one camp to another . . . the better chance we have of getting people off to Israel. If they have a chance to make themselves comfortable in Germany in the camps, they'll never get out."57 DP life was "both artificial and sordid," to be sure; but that was what people had become accustomed to in years of DP existence, and the strange lands and foreign conditions that awaited them were frightening to at least some.58

While mass emigration was proceeding from both DP countries, another unexpected influx came into Vienna from the East, this time from Hun-gary. We have mentioned that the Hungarians refused to agree to massive, orderly emigration to Israel, and in 1949, as communism increased its stranglehold over Hungary, thousands of Jews began leaving clan-destinely. By mid-1949, some 8000 people had arrived in Vienna. In the latter half of the year, increased border vigilance by the Hungarians pre-vented further mass movements. IRO refused to deal with these people, and the burden again fell on JDC. Only about a third of these wanted to go to Israel, and the rest became candidates for emigration elsewhere.

Not much could be done for the remaining Jews of Berlin, many elderly among them, who became a small part of the population that was suffering under the Berlin Blockade, instituted by the Russians in order to force the Western powers out of the city. Within the general food and other consignments sent to the beleaguered city, there were small quantities sent by JDC for the Jewish community there.

When one considers the problem of emigration to Israel, one must remember that conditions in Israel in 1949 were indeed not conducive to excessive enthusiasm. People had to be accommodated in transition camps (ma'abarot), in tents or huts. While medical care was good, and ultimately work was obtained, the conditions were harsh and not better—often much worse—than in the DP camps in Europe. It was all right for those who had made up their minds; and European immigrants fared better than the masses of North African and other Middle Eastern Jews who came in at

54 Adcom, 11/15/49, report by Beckelman. 57 J DC/DP Reports 1949,6/13/49. SI Harry Greenstein, Final Report, November 1, 1949. The report can be found at the

American Jewish Committee, JDC, and in libraries.

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 291

the same time. European Jews often had relatives and friends amongst the old established populadon, and they adapted quicker than the others to a society where norms to which they had been accustomed in Europe still operated. Nevertheless, many people feared these pangs of adjustment, and the insecurity of a country which had just repelled a military attack of superior forces on its very existence.

One of the problems facing emigrants to Israel was the question of baggage. People, especially the ones who did not go in the first few months, had accumulated property. Often, this was equipment which they would use in Israel to establish an economic footing: tools, dentists' chairs, X-ray equipment, and so on. At first, US Army regulations forbade the export of such items, and that was one of the reasons that kept people from emigrating. But, due to Greenstein's efforts, the Army changed its policies in July 1949, and people could take this kind of baggage with them.

As far as emigration to the United States was concerned, the pangs of adjustment were of a different nature. DPs had to learn a new language, and they were living in a non-Jewish environment which was, in its own way, no less harsh than the one in Israel. But the fact was that many more Jews could get to America due to factors already discussed. Canada, too, accepted small numbers of Jews, and a whole group of furriers and tailors who had been part of the successful JDC effort at employment in Austria emigrated to that country.

With all the importance of alternative emigration oudets, however, Israel nevertheless was the main one:

TABLE 5. Emigration to Israel

Country May 15-Dec 31 1948

1949 1950 Total

Austria 4892 10,000 1415 16,307 Germany 28,224 35,476 1938 65,638 Italy 11,147 4006 215 15,368 Total DP Area 44,263 ' 49,482 3568 97,313 Eastern Europe 26,603 48,210 75,110 149,923 Western Europe 5008 12,604 4883 22,495 China (mainly Shanghai) - 4 3002 ' 1258 4264

The figures are taken from the JDC Statistical Abstract, 1950, and refer to JDC-assisted emigration (p. 9). Almost all emigration to Israel from the DP camps came though JDC. A statistical research is needed to clarify the many discrepancies that arise. Thus, the total number of emigrants to Palestine-Israel between 1946 and 1950 would be about 100,000, because the people in the Cyprus camps are included in the figures. Even if we add a high figure for emigration elsewhere and for those who were still in the OOA-K

292 Out of the Ashes

DP countries in 1950, we are still far removed from what, according to the lowest estimates, was the number of DPs.5?

What remained in Germany and Austria were, largely, the undecided, and the medical hard core. The undecided would finally be persuaded or pushed, or would go with a sigh of relief when their papers came through. But the medical hard core, estimated in Germany at about 4150 (with their families) in late 1949, and perhaps half that number in Austria, were a real problem. Israel was willing to receive them, after proper treatment, at IRO's expense (according to the IRO charter, this indeed was their duty). But many of the TB and other seriously ill persons did not like the idea of going to Israel at all. Then there was the problem of the invalids who were awaiting rehabilitation. There were some 500 of these people in Germany at the end of 1949. In the end, American Jewry had to provide for all these, though JDC.

Another issue that arose out of the post-Holocaust situation in Germany was the problem of a general German Claims Law, that would establish the rights of DPs and German Jews to compensation for their sufferings, in line with General Clay's directive of November 1947. This time it was up to the Germans to declare their readiness to recompense the Jews (and others). However, their proposals, as submitted to Clay in September 1948, excluded in-camp DPs, provided for no successor organization to claim heirless property, and provided rather puny sums as compensation. The Adviser's office objected to the German draft, and a better, though not completely satisfactory German proposal was submitted in April 1949. It provided for a compensation of DM150 to be paid to every ex-inmate of a concentration camp or a ghetto for every month spent there; it also provided for payments to widows and dependents of people who had been murdered, and recognized JRSO, the Jewish successor organization, as the authority that could claim compensation for damage done to heirless Jewish property. But this time the military brass objected. Apparently, they prized a future alliance with Germany above all, and these minor compensation problems were an irritant. Clay left Germany before a decision was reached either way, and it was left to McCloy to deal with the problem. At a decisive meeting on July 18, all the military advisers of McCloy opposed the approval of the law; Greenstein supported it, and apparently Washington decided that the law should be approved, as it was on August 4.

There were no longer too many DPs on German soil to take advantage of the provisions of this law. Some of them remained behind so that they could claim their compensation, but for many the few thousand marks that some of them could get were not really the decisive point in their

59 According to Abraham Hyman, the number who emigrated to Palestine prior to May 1948 was 53,000, and the total to the end of 1949 was 145,000 (letter to Gordon Gray, Secretary at the Department of the Army, JDC/DPs, 1/27/50).

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 293

calculations. Others again bacame part of a small and struggling German Jewish community. In Austria, the situation was somewhat different. Whereas in Germany there was at least recognition that something should be done for the Jewish victims of Nazism, the Austrians, because of the fiction of being a liberated anti-Nazi country, saw no reason to give additional compensation to Jews. However, a restitution law in 1946 had in fact caused some of the property to be returned, and there was no way back from that.60 In fact, in June 1948, an amnesty had been proclaimed in Austria for all the minor Nazis—500,000 of them—and the Austrian political parties began to woo these voters. A compensation law for Jews was not exactly the kind of thing that would make a political party popular with these Nazis. Yet, while Zionist elements in Germany were in principle against the rebuilding of Jewish communities, because the argument was that no Jews should live on German soil in the future, in Austria the Zionists argued that because of the mostly elderly and dispirited Jews, they had better not go to Israel.61

The ZK no longer held its conferences. It slowly disintegrated, and several times attempts were made to shut it down. In June 1949, under the leadership of Pesach Piekatch, it declared it would dissolve only when the last DP left Germany. At the end of March 1950, it finally decided to liquidate itself, but the ZK Council rejected this decision.62 Finally, in December, it closed, and a solemn ceremony was held at the Deutsches Museum in Munich, where the ZK had been founded, with Rabbi Snieg, the only one of its original members still in Germany, officiating. But that was not the end of it. A rump ZK, under one Maurice Weinberger, with the cooperation of Snieg, continued its existence, and in December 1950 joined forces with local German Jews to establish a Coordinating Council of Jewish Organizations in the US Zone. The rump ZK disintegrated quickly, however, and in March 1951, a group set itself up that was denied recognition by JDC.

In 1950, JDC still had to look after DPs in Germany , many of them now the "hard core" medical cases. In 1950, JDC was still looking after a few camps, and the withdrawal of IRO help meant that "housing conditions in camps at Fohrenwald and Feldafing are worse now than they were in 1946."63 By November 1950, there were 9000 persons in four camps, of which one, the Landsberg camp, was closed on October 15 of that year.64

60 "The Austrians made a terrible mistake. In 1946 they completely misassessed the -political situation and forgot their principles and did what was right: they enacted a

decent restitution law and now they are very sorry." Harold Trobe at the Country Directors'meeting, Paris, October 1950.

61 Greenstein, Ioc. cit. 62 "I hope to see them all pack up and go within a short time. Even among the so-called

activist Zionists there is a resistance to cope with the problems which exist in Israel." JDC/Germany 1950/58, Haber to Leavitt, 2/6/50.

"Excom, 10/15/50. M J DC/DPs 1948-2, Eife toMcCloy, 11/10/50.

294 Out of the Ashes

A new and unexpected problem arose, however, when people who had emigrated, mainly to Israel, began returning. The numbers grew slowly, to 3500. The phenomenon itself should not have surprised anyone: every large migratory move had always caused a return movement, small or big. Israel, as has been pointed out, was no easy place to live in, and a number of people who were disappointed or did not make an adjustment, also some half-criminal or criminal elements, thought it might be easier to live as DPs in Germany. JDC had to look after at least some of these.

It was hardly surprising that the relationship with the US Army grew worse as the enthusiasm of Army officers for Israel waned and the dissatis-faction with the remaining Jewish DPs increased. They were simply a thorn in the side of American-German relations and Haber, in 1951, was struggling against US Army raids on the remaining camps. On Passover in 1951 a particularly vicious raid took place on Fohrenwald, supposedly against the black market, with a grand total of three persons arrested. Haber wrote a sharp letter to the Army, calling the raid "unwarranted, unjustified," and stating that it had "heaped indignities upon people who have suffered long enough."65 The people remembered that the Nazis used to pick Jewish holidays for their murder actions and wondered why the Americans had chosen a Jewish holiday for their raid.

IRO was going out of business. It still paid for much of JDC's emigration bill, and with its demise emigration would again have to become JDC's responsibility.66 By April 1950, IRO handed over all its operations in Germany to the German authorities, with the exception of the Rehabili-tation Centers for invalids.

The liquidation of the DP camps and the emigration and integration of the DPs took much longer than anticipated. In 1952, there were still 15,500 former DPs in Germany, Austria, and Italy, and camps still existed. Feldafing had been closed in May 1951, but Fohrenwald and Jever were open. By the end of 1952, only Fohrenwald remained, a source of irritation and embarrassment for JDC, the Agency, the Americans, and the Ger-mans. There was a population of genuinely ill people there, but there were also returnees from Israel who demanded rations without working, and people who could not make up their minds where to emigrate. Criminal types, who were refused admission to countries of immigration, also lived there, despite the fact that JDC handed over responsibility for the camp to the Germans in December 1951. There were 2700 inmates in July 1951, and 1950 in May 1952. In Austria, too, two camps remained, at Hallein and Asten. By January 1953, there were 2100 people in Fohrenwald, of whom 700 were returnees from Israel. A JDC commission was sent to Fohrenwald in 1954, after the last Austrian camps had closed, and Fohren-

65 JDC/Germany, File 1949-54, Haber to George G. Shuster, 5/7/51. 66 By the end of December 1949,30,465 Jews had left from Germany for the United States

on the DP bills (JDC/Germany, DPs, 1949-2, Haber Report, December, 1949).

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 295 wald had been called in an internal JDC report "a corrupt and outlaw society. Its methods of getting what it wants is organized blackmail." In February 1954, demonstrations took place against JDC in the camp, and JDC's offices were moved to Munich. A determined effort was now made, in conjunction with a sympathetic German administration, to find places of emigration, or to integrate the remaining people into German society.67

Even that took a long time. In 1956, there were still 416 people in the camp, supported by JDC and the Bavarian government. Finally, on February 28, 1957, Fohrenwald closed its gates. The DP chapter had ended.

From 1948 on, JDC, ORT, HIAS and OSE were emphasizing their work in non-European areas. A central JDC worker had stated, only three days after the establishment of Israel, that the DP problem was going to be liquidated by 1950, and attention would perforce switch to the Moslem countries. The 900,000 Jews there would have to come and fill the abyss left by the 5.8 millions who had been murdered in Europe. Most likely, he said, "the position of Jews may become untenable to a point where evacuation and resettlement in Palestine would be the only rational sol-ution."68

As a majority of Holocaust survivors were emigrating to Israel, welfare problems arose in that country in relation to old people, chronically ill people, sufferers from psychological disorders, and a very large load of welfare cases also among the immigrants from North African and Asian countries. In a sense, American Jewry saw to it, through JDC, that from a material point of view at least the former DPs and other Holocaust survivors should not be abandoned. In the United States, it was the task of USNA to look after new arrivals. In Israel, while the final responsibility rested with the new government, JDC signed an agreement (12/28/49 and 1/11/50) with it to set up Malben69 for old and sick persons. JDC would shoulder the major burden of looking after these people. Already in 1950, JDC spent $6,023,333 on Malben, compared to $1,686,592 for the DP countries and $15,590,617 for emigration.

The DP chapter in Jewish history did not end with a bang; there was a bang, with the massive emigration of 1948-49, but then it ended with a whimper, with the continued existence of camp Fohrenwald and its "hard core" inmates. A few thousand people stayed in Germany and Austria, a few even in Italy. Others came back from Israel, England, and even from the United States. But these were remnants indeed. Most of the DPs, about 50,000 Jews originally liberated in Austria and Germany and prob-ably around 250,000 who came from Poland, the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries between 1945 and 1949, left Germany,

67 JDXC/Germany 1949-54, Report of 12/31/53. 61 Nathan Reich, 5/17/48, talk to the National Council of Jewish Social Welfare,

JDC/1948, general. 69 Mosad Meuchad Letipul Be'Olim Nechshalim (United Institution For Care Of Needy

Immigrants).

296 Out of the Ashes

Austria, Italy, and France for Israel and the Americas. Roughly speaking, two thirds went to Israel, and the rest elsewhere.

While in Europe, the DPs had established self-governing institutions on a high level, had developed educational, cultural, and religious facili-ties, and had in the process turned into ardculate political communities. Their East European background was the main cause for this amazing resilience. But the American Jewish impact on them cannot be ignored. Many of them developed a basic understanding of the language and men-tality of the American Jews who came to help them. Concepts and ideas, modes of operation, that the Advisers, JDC, and the others, brought with them, were absorbed and accepted. The main point, despite all the criti-cism, was that the Jews of Europe realized that they were not alone. Indeed, they took it for granted that that should be so. The work of JDC was a "natural" expression of the identification with them of the Jews of America, so they thought. But it was not like that at all. That identification had to be aroused and channelled, and UJA, of which JDC was a part, was the main instrument for accomplishing that task. JDC then took over, as the largest rescue agency, and sent many hundreds of workers to Europe. The DPs were their greatest challenge. In adverse, often imposs-ible conditions, as has been demonstrated here, these American Jews stood the test of loyalty to their fellow-Jews in the camps. In the process, they themselves were transformed. They realized that America was not the only world, certainly not the only Jewish world. They received a hint of what their fellow Jews had gone through. They identified, in some measure and often totally, with the yearning of most of them for a homeland of their own. They emerged from Europe different from the way they had come. They would go back to Topeka, Kansas, or Brooklyn, or Canton, Ohio, or the suburbs of Los Angeles. Many DPs would follow them, and become almost as Americanized as they. But they, and American Jewry as a result of it, changed. For the better, it seems.

Epilogue

The European Jewish survivors of the Holocaust can be categorized into survivors of camps, people emerging from hiding, and armed resisters. To them one can add the survivors of the Budapest ghetto, Romanian and Bulgarian Jews who had lived through the fascist regimes of their countries but had been spared the deportations to death camps, and the returnees from the Soviet Union. They had different fates, were very different from each other, and their personalities and attitudes belie the often very glib statements about "the survivors." They were people, each of them more or less different from others, who resisted the unified approach that many of the liberators wanted to adopt towards them. Amazingly, the camp survivors rose from their traumatic experience to organize a society with

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 297 political aims, a social organization, education, culture, and self-govern-ment. They were joined by returnees from the Soviet Union and by others. Survivors in France, in Romania, in Poland, reorganized their rump com-munities, developed forms of organizations that in part were built on prewar models and in part were new departures. Psychologists and psycho-analysts would later deal with the clinical cases among them, and the impression would be gained that these people had become mental health patients. This is not so. The marks of the Holocaust would be printed on their souls indelibly and permanently; they would indeed suffer from it, and in a measure transfer their sufferings to future generations. But they did not become mental health cases: in their vast majority, they continued and still continue to live with their trauma, as wounded and yet healthy people, becoming workers, farmers (in Israel), professionals, businessmen and women, parents, politicians, and scientists.

American Jewry came out of the Holocaust with a guilt complex which many would argue was perfecdy justified. But it did not reject the responsi-bility to the survivors. This was not a question of dollars and cents, though those were the necessary means. People back in the United States gave more and more money as time went on; but hundreds of young American Jews volunteered to go to Europe and share their efforts and time to help. In so doing they made a great many mistakes, no doubt. But they not only did an amount of good that was incomparably more important—they proved to those whom they came to help that they understood their Jewish responsibility to help Jews to help themselves. They were naive; they had no idea of what had really happened in Europe under the Nazis; but most of them learnt, and learnt well and quickly. Many had an unconsciously supercilious attitude to those whom they came to help, but with most of them that disappeared soon enough.

Organized American Jewry helped through JDC and, to a lesser extent and in defined areas, through HIAS, ORT, OSE, and the Va'adHahatza-lah. Politically, it was the Advisers on Jewish Affairs to the US Com-manders in Europe who wielded a clout that was tremendously important. What was revolutionary and new was the fact that these Advisers had been sent by a coalition of American Jewish organizations who would never have thought they could unite on anything at all. All the Advisers were powerful, immensely committed personalities without whose help the situ-ation of the survivors would have been dismal indeed. It was due to them that the American Army became an ally—sometimes reluctant, often insensitive in its lower ranks, sometimes even unjust and even brutal. But the Army as a whole was not only, overall, an ally, but a savior and even a welfare organization. The American propensity for simple human decency, sympathy, and understanding of fellow humans was in the end the decisive factor in its behavior. The Advisers did not create this: it was

298 Out of the Ashes

something that the Americans came to Europe with, but they helped to bring it forth.

The Rabbis in the American Army were a second factor—chronolog-ically the first—in American Jewish involvement with the survivors. They brought the first message of hope, they were the first organizers, they demanded further, massive help from the folks back home. Many of them stayed on to continue to help. Many of them, upon their return, became leaders in their communities and would carry on the message of identifi-cation with Jews everywhere to the next generation.

JDC, as the main organization of American Jewry for work overseas, also bore the main brunt of the work in Europe. It, too, made mistakes— who doesn't? On the whole, it was due to JDC, der Joint in Yiddish, that the survivors were enabled to rebuild their lives, that immigration to Palestine-Israel could take place before and after 1948, that hope and a measure of trust in Jewish solidarity was again instilled into the surviving communities. In Hungary and Romania, large numbers of Jews were saved from starvation by JDC. To only a slighdy lesser extent this is also true of the camps in Austria. Lives were made significantly more livable in Germany and Poland and Greece. One must emphasize again and again, that the help was not just material, though that was a precondition; morale was saved, and that made for meaningful survival. Children were fed, clothed, and taught, old people had a chance of living out their lives in reasonably comfortable surroundings, and finally people were moved to the places where they could hope to restart their lives. Nobody forced American Jewry to do that; it was done from an inner compulsion, a mixture perhaps of Jewish solidarity and tradition, guilt feelings, ideolog-ies of different types, and simple compassion. The main thing is that it worked. As an organization, JDC stood the test: it proved to be one of the great successes of Jewish ingenuity and fellow feeling.

Politically, the survivors made a great difference. Historians will argue about the relative weight of their contribution to the establishment of Israel, but there can hardly be any doubt that the very fact of their concen-tration in large numbers in Germany, Austria, and Italy propelled the American government to press for their immigration into Palestine, thus forcing the British, in the end, to hand over the Palestine Mandate to the United Nations in February 1947. Their enthusiastic and voluntary recruitment for unsafe sea voyages on rickety boats in order to enter Palestine illegally was one of the main factors in defeating British plans to hand over Palestine, in effect, to the Arabs. Their political organization was an important supportive factor in the Jewish struggle for Palestine. Without American Jewish help this would never have been achieved.

The Nazis tried to annihilate the Jewish people. They almost succeeded, and the results of that attempt are with us today; it is not quite certain yet that they failed. The Jews are a people declining in numbers, split into

The Dissolution of the DP Camps 299

warring factions, a traumatized community. But there are also countervai-ling factors, attempts to resuscitate, unify, emerge with a pluralistic, democratically orientated culture, continuing the existence of the Jewish people on lines of regeneration and rebuilding. The overall experience of the survivors, and of the American Jews who went out to help them, may serve as an example of the latter alternative.

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302 Name Index Eisenberg, David J. 58 Eisenhower, General Dwight D. 23 ,24 ,37 ,

47 ,50-51 ,53-54 ,60 ,61 ,69 ,87 ,89 Emerson, Sir Herbert xix Eskenazi, Lydia 19, 21

Fackenheim, Emil xxv Felix, Kersten 56 Filderman, Dr Wilhelm xvi, 5 , 6 , 7 , 8 , 9 ,

10,11, 14, 15,16-17,21, 105, 148, 149, 150, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158

Fischer, Dr Wilhelm 6 , 7 Fishbein, Harold 227 Fishzohn, Arthur 178,179 Fleischmann, Gizi xvi Francez, Izak 177-178 Frank, Ephraim 91,98 Freidenberg, Harry A. 56 Frieder, Rabbi Armin 107 Friedl, Rafi 12 Friedman, Rabbi Herbert 75, 114, 132,

196,227 Friedman, Dr Philip 211 Frischer, Arnost 104

Garel, Georges 32 Geyer, Albert 17 Gibbons, Mary 108 Gilman, Blanche xxi Ginzburg, Pino 258 Gitermann, Isaac xvi Gitler-Barski 78 Glassgold, Adolph 255, 256 Glazer, Israel 74 Gluck, Denise v Goering, Hermann 27 Goeroeg, Dr Frigyes 16-18,21, 133, 134,

135, 136-137, 138, 139, 142 Goldberg, Ben-Zion 77 Goldman, Nahum 46,121,195 Goldman, Dr Ralph v Goldsmith, Herman 199 Gottfarb, Inga 56 Gottfarb, Ragnar 56 Gottwald, Klement 117,174 Greenleigh, Arthur 26,31, 33,96, 102 Greenstein, Harry 288-289,291, 292 Grew, Joseph C. 47 Grinberg, Dr Zalman 39,88 ,92 ,95 ,98 ,

99 Gringauz, Dr Samuel 53,88,95, 120, 200,

263 Gromyko, Andrej 4 Grossman, Chaika 80 Grossman, Szandor 141 Groza, Dr Petru 152

Guzik, David xvi, 7 6 , 7 7 Gyulai, Lieutenant Colonel 14

Haber , Samuel L . v , xxi, 125-126 ,189 , 200, 219, 225-226, 230, 262, 275, 278, 287, 289 ,290 , 294

Haber, William 226, 262, 263, 264, 265-266,268, 270, 271, 272, 273, 275, 276 ,277 ,280 , 282, 285-286, 288

Haimoff, Vitali 177 Halberstamm, Rabbi Yehezkiel Yehuda 214 Halmay, Captain 14 Harrison, Earl G. 4 7 , 4 8 , 5 1 , 6 9 , 8 6 Harrold, General Thomas 263 Heathcote-Smith, Sir Clifford 25 Heitan, D r Henry 52, 53 Heitan, Ruth 52 Held, Adolph xiv Helvarg, Max 56 Henriques, Lady 62 Herman, Abraham 182 Herzog, Rabbi Yitzhak Helevi 110 Heymont, Major Irving 53, 84, 86, 89 Hildring, General John H . 97, 115, 234 Hider, Adolf xxv, 42, 82, 8 5 , 9 2 , 230 Hlond, Cardinal August 81-82 Hoffman, Haim (Yahil) 9 8 , 1 1 3 Horowitz, Louis 251 Horthy, Nicholas 1 1 , 1 6 Hoter-Yishai, Captain Aharon 4 3 , 1 0 6 Huebner, General Clarence R . . 121 Hughes, Glynn 229 Hume, General 69 Hyman, Major Abraham S. 220, 224, 268,

269, 280, 285, 286, 289 Hyman, Joseph C. 94

Iancu, Dr Cornel 1 1 , 1 5 1 , 1 5 3 Iancu, Mela 11,151

Jacobson, Florence 142, 143 Jacobson, Israel G. (Gaynor) 19, 25, 26, 37,

107-108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115, 116, 141-143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 170, 171, 174

Jacobson, S. Bertrand 6 , 7 , 1 4 8 Jarblum, Marc 242 Jaretzki xiv Jeffroykin, Dyka (Jules) xvi, 27 Jochelson, Dr Israel 197 Jordan, Charles H . xxi, 186, 255 Jospa, Abraham Ghert 28 Jung, Rabbi Leo xiv

Name Index 303 Kahan-Frankl, Samuel 17 Kahane, Rabbi David 73, 81, 82 Kahn, Alexander xiv Kaminska, Ida 167 Kaplan, Israel 211, 238, 274 Kastner, D r Reszoe Rudolf xvi, 15-16, 63 Katzenstein, D r Ernst 225 Katzki, Herber t v , xxi, 21, 47, 120, 121,

126,133 Katzman, Sergeant Jack 67 Kenen, 1 .1 . 130 Keyes, General Geoffrey 234-235, 277, 289 Kisselev, Consul-General 3 Klausner, Rabbi Abraham J . v , 39-40 , 43,

4 4 , 4 7 , 4 8 , 54, 60, 61, 92, 94 , 95, 96-97 , 98, 120, 122, 132, 187, 200, 216-217, 265-266

Klepfisz, Rose v Kluger, Ruth 7 5 , 8 3 Kolb, Charles 6 Komoly, Otto 14, 1 5 , 1 6 Kovner, Abba 2 , 2 1 , 4 2 , 5 7 Krane, Jay B. 90-91 Kraus, Miklos 15 Krumey, Hermann 63 Kwasnik, Irving 198

La Guardia, Fiorello 202 Landau, Bubu 106, 107 Lane, Bliss 78 Laporte, Raymond 78 Laub, Morris 259, 260 Leavitt, Moses A. xv, 61, 70, 94, 109, 117,

121, 125, 127, 133, 135-136, 140, 141, 149, 170, 171, 183, 206, 216-217, 222, 226, 233, 254, 265

Leclerc, Marc 17, 6 3 , 6 4 , 134, 135 Lehman, Herbert 90 Leidesdorf xiv Levin, Dov 1 Levine, Joseph 93, 127 Levine, Julius 174

Levinthal, Judge Louis E. 171, 218, 219, 225, 226, 234, 262

Levy, Henry L . 175, 178, 179, 227 Lewin, Dr Kur t 229 Lieberman xiv Liepah, Ann 112 Linder, Commander Harold F . xiv, xxiii,

30, 257-258 Lipman, Rabbi Eugene J . 40, 75, 93, 106 Littman, Dr Robert J . vi Loewenherz, Dr Josef 62, 63 Lubetsky, Larry 58 Luca, Vasile 157 Lutz, Charles 12, 15 Lvovitch, Dr David 187, 190

MacClelland, Roswell, D . xii Maimon, Rabbi Yehuda L. 194 Maitland Wilson, Field Marshal Sir

Henry 23 Malin, Patrick S. 25, 47 Mao, Zedong 256 Marcus, Maurice 178 Margolis, Laura L. 29, 30, 237, 238,

240-241,242, 243, 244,254 Mark , Ber 78, 167 Marton, D r Erno 6, 10, 1 4 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 105,

149 Masaryk, Jan 106, 108, 170, 174, 175 Masaryk, Thomas Garrigue 170 Mayer, Saly xvi, xvii, xx, 6, 7 - 8 , 9 , 1 3 , 1 5 ,

16-17, 20, 22 ,42 , 51, 55 ,63 ,64 , 66, 105, 134, 135, 144, 148-149, 178, 254

McCloy, John J . 288, 292 McNarney, General Joseph T . 87, 91,97,

98, 99, 108, 113, 114, 115, 116, 121, 127, 171, 203 ,205 ,218 , 262

Meir , Golda xxiii Meiri, Moshe (Ben) 57, 74,91 Michael, King of Romania 7 Mickelson, Colonel Stanley R. 86, 87 Mikhailov, Pavel P. 4 Montor , Henry 113-114,120 Morgan, Lieutenant General Sir Frederick

E. 2 4 , 9 0 , 9 1 , 9 5 , 123 Morgenthau, J r . , Henry xxiii, 46-47 Morrissey, Evelyn M. 258 Murmelstein, Rabbi Benjamin 62

Nadich, Rabbi Judah P. 40 ,60-61 ,83 ,84 Neikrug, Lewis 182, 186 Nejedly, ZdenSk 108 Netzer, Zvi 91 ,113 Neulander, Sylvia 51-52, 75, 106 Neustadt, Leib xvi Neuwirth, Dr Henry 223 Newman, Emmanuel 195 Niles, David 114-115 Nowinski, Stanley K. 67 ,68 ,93 , 101, 103

Offenbach 17 Ohrenstein, Dr Aron 55 Oleiski, Jacob 92, 187, 188, 192

Passman, Charles 10, 125, 126, 200,216, 225, 272, 273

Pat, Jacob 80 Patterson, Dr David vi Patterson, Robert P. 97 Patton, General George 43,46,51,53-54,

55

304 Name Index

Pearlman, Max S. 25 Pehle, John W. xii, 47 Petoe, Emoe 15 Piekatch, Pesach 293 Pinsky, Gertrude 77 Pinson, Koppel S. 93,211 Pliskin, Dr Boris 99, 120, 124, 125, 130,

223 Polk, Colonel 54 Popper, Dr Maximilian 155 Prochnik, Robert 197-198

Rackman, Rabbi Emmanuel 121 Rajk, Laszlo 142,147 Rakosi, Matyas (Matthias) 18,147 Ram, Yitzhak 59,91,128 Rattner, Yitzhak 39 Rees, Dr Elfan 106,107 Reich, Josef 105 Rettner, Leon (Aryeh) 125,200 Revesz, Dr Juraj 105 Reznik, Reuben B. 26 ,66 ,67 ,68 Rice, James P. 66,68-69,92,93,100, 101,

102,232 Rice-Barth, Roxanne vi Rifkind, Judge Simon H. 61,84, 89,96,

97,184 Rinehart, General 67 Ringelblum, Emmanuel xvi, 211,238 Rock, Eli 52-55, 88, 128, 226 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 46 Rosen, Irwin 184 Rosenberg, Rabbi Alexander S. 96,212

213 Rosenberg, James N. xiv, 3 Rosensaft, Yossele 39,41,43,62,99-100

130,228,229,270 Rosenwald xiv Rosman, Mordechai 221, 230 Rothenberg, Morris xiv Rothschild, Lord Victor 28 Ruby, Philip 107,111 Rufer, Gideon (Raphael) 85

Safran, Rabbi Abraham 153 Saks, Dr J.Benson 101,102 Salomon, Mihaly 16 Sapir, Meir 145 Sar, Samuel L. 240 Saraga, Fred 6 Schacter, Rabbi Herschel 40 Scharnagl, Karl 283 Schumacher, Kurt 63 Schmetterer, Yaakov 10 Schmidt, Dr William M. 136 Schmolka, Marie xvi

Schreiber, Rabbi Moses 252 Schur, Heinr ich 64 Schwartz, D r Joseph J . xv , xvi , xvii , xxiii,

4 , 6 , 10, 15, 1 7 , 2 1 , 25 , 2 7 , 2 9 , 3 0 , 4 1 , 4 7 , 4 8 , 6 2 , 7 6 , 77, 7 8 , 7 9 , 9 0 , 9 2 , 9 4 , 101, 102, 105, 108, 109, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121-123, 124, 125, 126, 132, 136, 137, 138, 139-141, 142, 145, 147, 149, 151, 152, 155, 156, 157, 158, 167, 178, 183, 184, 188, 197-198, 201, 203 , 215 , 216, 220 ,226 , 2 3 9 , 2 5 0 , 2 5 6 , 257 , 259 , 286, 287, 288

Schwartz, Leo W . 88, 120, 121, 126, 188, 1 9 7 , 2 0 0 , 2 1 6

Schwarz, D r Vik tor 65 Schweiger, Moshe xx Scithers, Colonel George R . 267 Segalman, Ralph 66 Segalson, Moses 1 2 4 , 1 2 5 Sforza, Count 249 Shadmi, N a h u m 264 Shapiro, L . S. B. 90 Sherman, Irving H . 70 Shertok, Moshe 220 Shiloah, Zvi 58 Shneersohn, Isaac 238 Siegel, Manuel 20, 179, 254 Silber, Joseph S. 131, 232, 235 Silver, Rabbi Abba Hillel 195, 196, 225 Skorneck, Phil ip S. 58 -59 , 60 , 61 Smith, Lieutenant I rving 39 , 52, 54 Sneh, D r Moshe 49 , 194, 233 Snieg, Rabbi Samuel A . 96 , 212, 263, 293 Sobel, Louis H . 1 2 1 , 2 5 8 Soltez, Jan 106 ,108

Sommerstein, D r Emil 2 , 4 , 73 , 74 , 76-77 , 80

Spychalski, Marshal Mar ian 113 Srole, D r Leo 85, 88, 89 Stalin Josef 146 Stern, Samuel 1 5 , 1 6 Stimson, Henry L . 47 Stoeckler, Lajos 17, 139 Strauch, D r 235 Syngalowski, D r Aaron 187 ,190 Szalasi, Ferenc 11 Szind, Danny 258 Szumacher, Josef 167

Tadjer , Colonel Avram P . 178 Takacsy, Constantin 134 ,135 Tate, General Foster 102, 116 Taylor, Charles J . 56 Teicher, Efra 12 Teicholz, Bronislaw 65-66 , 93 , 101, 131,

233,234 Telsey, Samuel A. 182 Templer, Major General 38

Name Index 305 Tennenbaum, D r Joseph 81 Tito, Marshall (Josip Broz) 176 Toman, D r Zoltan 1 0 8 , 1 0 9 Treger, David 8 8 , 9 5 , 125, 126, 196, 200,

263,264 Trobe, Harold 105, 107, 247, 277 Trobe, Jacob L . 61, 87, 8 8 , 9 0 , 9 6 , 123,

247,249 Troper, Morris C . xv Trujillo, Rafael xxii Truman, Harry S. 46, 4 7 , 4 8 , 4 9 , 5 0 , 6 0 ,

69 ,84, 85, 8 7 , 1 1 4 , 1 1 7 , 194, 195, 196, 197,255,284, 285

Truscott, General Lucian 89 Tuchmann, D r Emil 62 , 63, 64, 65 , 101 Tuwim, Julian 164

Varszanyi, Geza 136 Vas, Zoltan 142, 145-146 Viteles, Harry 100, 105, 106 Vogler, Robert 147

WachteJ, Hyman (Hy) 122 Walinski, Louis J . 188, 189 Wallenberg, Raul 1 2 , 1 4 Warburg, Edward M . M . xiv, xv, 27, 28,

30, 62, 98, 125, 136, 148, 183, 258, 259

W a r b u r g , Eric 27-28 W a r b u r g , Max 2 7 , 2 8 W a r b u r g , Felix M . xiv W a r r e n , George 46, 47 Wei l , Shraga 12 Weinberger , Maurice 293 Weingard , David 157, 208-209,287 Wcinste in , Aba (Gefen) 6 7 - 6 8 , 9 3 , 101, 103 Weisgall , Meyer 46 Weizmann , Chaim 46, 80, 196 Weye rmann , Hans 15 ,17 Whi t e , Frederick 176 Whi t ing , Jack 202 Wilhelm, Karol 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7 Winest ine , Norman 66 Wise , Rabbi Stephen S. xii, 4 6 , 1 1 5 , 1 2 1 ,

194, 195 Wise, Jonah B. 258-259 Wodlinger , David B. 6 1 , 9 9 , 1 0 0 Wollheim, Norber t 4 4 , 9 9 , 122, 130

Yahil, Ha im 263-264, 265, 266,281 Yant ian, Hyman 4 0 , 6 6 Yezernitzky, Yitzhak (Shamir) 50

Zuckermann , Yitzhak (Antek) 2 , 7 4 , 80, 82 ,112 -113

Subject Index Agencies, American Jewish, overseas 40-44

international struggles 32-33 -^Agudat Israel 110, 151, 154, 212, 263, 270,

274,282 Ahdut Ha'avodah party 209 AID see Association des Israelites Pratiquants Ainring 92, 93 AJ see Armeejuive Aliyah Bet (illegal immigration)

243,256-260 see also Mossad

Am Stau 221,229 American Council for judaism 258 American Federation of Polish Jews 81 American Jewish Committee 60, 97 American Jewish Conference 60, 125 American Jewish Joint Distribution

Committee (JDC) xiv-xxv, 16, 146-147, 295, 297

Branch for Restitution of Jewish Property 214

in DP camps 51-56, 58-62, 89-90, 92-100,208-215

and DP leadership 197, 199-200 funding of xvii-xx and illegal immigration 256-260 Location and Search Service 119, 163 policies in Germany and Austria 201-208 policy towards Eastern and Central

Europe 139-140 relations with HIAS 181-186 relations with ORT 187-192 role immediately after liberation 40-42 struggle with ZK 120-126 Tracing Service 61,214 see also countries in which operative

American Jewry xiii-xiv, 296-297 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry 85,

86,94,97, 124, 139, 193, 206 Anglo-American Mission, in Bulgaria 20 Ansbach 219 Anti-Titoist campaign 146, 158 Antisemitism

Austria 231, 278 Belgium 30 Bulgaria 177 China 255 Czechoslovakia 172, 173

East Europe 170 Germany 198,204,218, 279,283 Hungary 18 North Africa xi Poland 1, 57, 71, 81-82, 90-91, 160, 164,

168 Romania 7, 154-155 Stalinist 146-148

"Apres" method of transferring funds 6, 13, 76, 254

Arabs, in Palestine xxiii, 85, 193, 195,215, 225,261,280,298

Ardennes offensive 33 Armeejuive (A J) 27 Armenians 36, 177 Armia Krajowa 72 Arrow Cross 11,12,14 AS 106, 108, 116 Ashkenazi Jewish Communal

Association 253 Association des Israelites Pratiquants

(AID) 32 Asten 294 Athens 18, 19,251,252 Atlas mountains 244 Atlith 49 Auschwitz 10, 11, 18, 51,62, 104, 144,

173, 251,284 evacuation of 34, 35 liberation of 36 protocols xi-xii

Australia 77, 199, 256 Austria 215, 260, 280, 289, 298

DP camps (1945-1946) 62, 100-103 (1947) 230-236 closure 276,277

infiltrees into 130-132 JDC in 64, 66, 69-70, 100-101, 103,

231-232,234-236 Jews remaining in 292 liberation of 33-44 post-liberation 87-103 transit route 115-116

Upper 62, 66 Austrian Communist Party 278 Austrian universities 235

307

308 Subject Index "Autonomous Assistance Committee" see

Union of Jewish Communities

Bad Gastein 68,69, 101, 130, 232 Bad Reichenhall 125, 188, 199, 221,

263 BadTutzing 52 Baltic States 1,285 Bamberg 92,95, 198 Bank for Rehabilitation, Poland 161,168 Ban 26 Basle 196 Bavaria 35, 38,48, 55-56, 87, 88,94,95,

103, 106, 116, 119, 190,212,283-284 Becher deposit xx Belgium 24, 131, 189,245

JDC in 29 liberation of 28-30

Bergen-Belsen xi, 35,38,41,43,48,51, 52,61,86,94,99, 100, 129-130, 227-229,270,278-279,289

liberauon of 36 Berlin 48,76, 82, 88, 112, 187,200,

226-227,275,290 DP camps in 56-61 JDC in 58-61, 128-129

Bermuda Conference (1943) xix Bessarabia 4, 8, 286 Betar 50,209 Bialystok xvi, 162 Biberach 128 Bindermichi 68-69, 101, 130 Bindlach 275 Birthrate, increase in DP 207 Black market 83,92,100,204,267-270 Blankensee 130 B'nai B'rith 60 Board of Deputies of British Jews 40 Bohemia 35,58, 104, 106, 172, 173 Bolivia xxii Bratislava 91, 105, 106, 108, 109, 111, 131,

173 Bremen 100,200,208 Brichah ("Flight") xix, 42,59,61,98,206,

256,276,277 in Austria 65-66,93, 101-103, 131-132,

235 in Berlin 128 in Czechoslovakia 105, 107, 110-111 in France 241,244 in Hungary 137, 140-141, 145, 146 in Italy 247,249 organization of 2,91 in Poland 57-58,73-76, 82, 112-113,

119,160 and Romanian refugees 233-235 "wild" 74,82

Britain anti-Zionist policy 24 deportation of illegal immigrants to

Cyprus 257, 259-260 in Greece 18 Jewish demonstrations against 83-87,

221-222 policy in Palestine 47-51, 193-197, 298 relations with Poland

112-115,160 unawareness of Nazi horrors 38

British Army Palestinian Jewish soldiers in 103, 246,

247 search and seizure policy 270

British Chief Rabbi's Office 62 British Foreign Office xii British Jewish Relief Units see Jewish Relief

Units (JRUs) British Labour Party 80, 83 British Zone

Austria 101, 102,231 Germany 40-41, 61-62, 88, 99, 129-130,

228-230,278-279,289 Brno 109 Broumov 112, 113 Bucharest 7 ,9, 10, 14,42, 105, 148, 149,

156,158 Buchenwald xi, 35, 37,41,45-46, 51,

284 liberation of 36, 37

Budapest xx, 14, 15, 16,65, 133, 135, 136, 138, 140, 144, 149,233

ghetto 11, 296 "glass house" 12 liberation of 13

Bukinova 4, 5, 286 Bulgaria 21, 175, 189, 296

communist 176-180 JDC in 20, 178-180 liberation of 19-20

Bund (Allgemener Yiddisher

Arbeter-Bund) 2,27,159 Byelorussia 1,72

"Camp 55" 68 Camp Riedenburg 67 Camps, DP, all-Jewish 39

see also Concentration camps; DP camps; Labour camps

Canada 199,255,256,291 CAR see Comiti d'Assistance aux Refugits CARE packages 259 Catholic Church, France 51-52 Catholic welfare organizations,

Washington 97 CC see Central Committee for Polish Jewry

Subject Index 3 0 9

CDJ see Comiti de Defense des Juifs CDJC see Centre de Documentation Juive

Contemporaine Center for the Diaspora see Merkaz Lagolah Central Asia 78 Central Committee of Libera ted Jews

in Bavaria 39 for the US Zone, Germany and

Austria 39 Central Committee for Polish J e w r y

(CC) 7 4 , 7 6 - 7 8 , 118, 119, 159, 161-165, 167-169

Central Orthodox Commit tee 240 Central Union of Cooperatives

(CZS) 165-166 Centrala Evreilor, Romania 5, 149 Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine

(CDJC) 238 Cernauti 5 CGD see Comiti Generate de Difense CGT 240-241 Cham 92 ,98 , 127 Chaplains, Jewish, in US A r m y 3 8 - 4 0 , 56 ,

75-76,92, 100, 192, 283, 298 Chiari 248 Chicago Tribune 37 Child care

Belgium 28-29 Bulgaria 179-180 France 31-32, 243 Germany 214 Poland 118-119, 164-165 Romania 8

China 253 Christianity, converts to 1 8 , 1 0 4 , 213,

255 Church World Service 255 CIC (Counter Intelligence Corps) 5 9 , 6 8 CJFWF see Council of Jewish Federa t ions

and Welfare Funds COJASOR see Comiti Juif d'Action Sociale et

de Reconstruction Cold War 168,266 Collaborators 32, 45 Comiti d'Assistance aux Refugiis (CAR) 27,

33 Comiti de Difense des J uifs (CDJ) 29 Comiti Ginirale de Difense (CGD) 27, 33 Comiti Juif d'Action Sociale et de

Reconstruction (COJASOR) 33, 237, 239

Comiti Social des Oeuvres de la Risistance (COSOR) 3 1 , 3 2

Communism, spread of 266-267

Communist Army, China 256 Communist Party

Austria 63-64

P o l a n d 165-169 C o m m u n i s t r eg imes , an t i semi t ic

tact ics 2 1 - 2 2 C o m m u n i s t s

in Czechoslovakia 105, 109 in F r a n c e 2 7 in Greece 18 in H u n g a r y 17-18 in Po l and 7 4 - 7 5 , 118, 165-169 in R o m a n i a 7 - 1 1 , 154, 155-158

C o m p e n s a t i o n f o r su f fe r ings 292 Concen t ra t ion c a m p s , n u m b e r of inmates

( J anua ry 1945) 34 , 36 " C o n f i d e n c e C o m m i t t e e " , J D C Budapes t see

C o u n t r y Relief C o m m i t t e e f o r J ews (Orszagos Zsido Segitor Bizottsag), H u n g a r y

Congress , U S 46 , 114 Congress of Jewish D P s in U S Z o n e

Aus t r ia 103 G e r m a n y 9 4 - 9 5

Conservat ive Jews xiv, 15, 39 , 142 Consis toi re 32, 177 Conver ted Jews 134-135 Coopera t ives

Bulgaria 179 Czechoslovakia 173 Greece 252 H u n g a r y 137, 141 Po land 118, 161, 163, 165-166 see also Credi t cooperat ives; P roducers '

cooperat ives Coordina t ing Counci l of Jewish

Organiza t ions , U S Z one , Germany 293 Cor fu 18, 251, 252 COSOR see Comiti Social des Oeuvres de la

Risistance Counci l of Jewish Federa t ions and Welfare

F u n d s ( C J F W F ) xvii, 185, 186, 258-259

Count ry Relief Commit tee for Jews (Orszagos Zsido Segitor Bizottsag), Hungary 135

Cracow 71, 73, 79 Credi t cooperatives 144, 156, 157 C R I F (Conseil Representat if des Israelites de

France) (central organization of F rench Jews) 242

Cr imea , Jewish colonies in the 3 - 4 Cul tural p rograms 274, 280-281 Currency

re fo rm 2 8 1 , 2 8 2 Romanian 154 stabilization, Hungary 139

Cyprus camps 196, 257, 259-260, 291 Czech border 58, 75, 116-117 Czech National Council 104 Czechoslovakia 21, 62, 65, 82, 85, 101,

104-111 ,261

310 Subject Index communist takeover (1948) 173-175,

284,286 and JDC 107,109, 110, 111, 169-175 routes through 105-109,111

CZS see Central Union of Cooperatives, Poland

D-Day (1944) xi Dachau 38,39,41,67, 187,234

liberation xi, 36 Daily Mail, London 38,115 Danube 11,12 Death marches 34-36, 62 Debrecen 14,15 DEFAB 10 Deggendorf 75, 95, 210 DELASEM 26 Demoralization 8,83, 190, 193-197,

204-205,232,253,262,269-273 Denmark 208 DerTog 77 Deutsches Museum, Munich 39,293 Dgvinska Nov5 Ves 107 "Displaced persons problem" see DPs

(displaced persons) Dominican Republic xxii Dorohoi district 5 DP Act (1948, US 186, 191, 256 DP camps

(1945-1946) 45-70 (1947) 193-236 dissolution of xxi, 261-299 end of 289-296 Germany and Austria (1947) 193-236 help to 208-215 influx into 87-100 investigation by US mission 47-48 report 50-51

DPs (displaced persons) definition of 23-24 "free living" 207-208,231,246,282 leadership 197-201 legal defense of 96 numbers 203-204 rights of 283

Drancy camp 32 Dror movement 58 Drought, Romania 140, 150, 152,

222 Dutch Jews 62

Eastern Europe American Jewish agencies expelled

(1949) 191 communist 21,159-180 liberation 1-22

Eclaireurs (Scouts, France) 27, 32, 239, 240 Economic Center (Centrala Gospodarcza),

Poland 118, 161, 166 Education

in DP camps 209-212 ,274 Italy 249-250, 251 Poland 162-163, 167

Egypt 279, 288 Eisiskes 1 ELAS/EAM forces 19 Elders of Zion 147 Emden 230 Emigdirect 181 Emigration

to Israel 167, 174, 176, 178, 179, 283, 286

from Poland 82 from Romania 157 to United States 86-87, 129, 181, 199,

251, 289, 291 Employment programs 215-218 ,223-224 ,

232, 235, 250, 273 Engineers' Society 212 Erno Vincze leather factory, Hungary xix Eschwege 95, 269 Europe xx, xxii, xxiv

non-Communist 237-260 Evian Conference (1938) xix Exchange rates 118, 134, 138, 156, 159 Exodus, the great 104-132 "Exodus" affair 219, 220-222, 229-230,

243-244, 278 Expenditure, JDC xvii-xix

by countries xviii (Table 3), 132, 224

Falticeni 8 "Family camps" 1 Fatherland Front , Bulgaria 177 Fidiralion des Societis Juives (FSJ) 27, 33,

242 Federation of the Unions of Jewish

Communities, Romanian Jewry 5 Feldafing 39, 51, 52, 53-54, 87, 210, 214,

287, 293, 294 Ferramonti xi, 25 FFI (Lohamey Herut Yisrael or Israel

Freedom Fighters) 49-50 Finland 73, 170 Flak-Kaserne, Munich 43 Flossenbiirg 35 Fliichtlingslager (refugee camps) 275 Fohrenwald 46, 53, 87, 92, 214, 293,

294-295 Fonds Social Juif Unifii (FSJU) 244 France xi, 23-24, 80, 110, 131, 171, 196,

260, 297 agencies in 181, 182, 189, 237-245

Subject Index 3 1 1

JDC in xvi, 2 6 - 2 8 , 3 0 - 3 3 , 2 3 7 - 2 4 5 refugees in 26-28

Frankfurt 42-43, 84, 121, 186, 202, 273 "Free living" DPs 208, 2 3 1 , 2 4 6 , 282 French Concession, Shanghai 253 French Zone

Austria 101, 222, 231 Germany 200 ,278

FSJ see Federation des Societes Juives FSJU see Fonds Social J uif Unifie Furth 92 ,95 Fun Letztn Churbn 211

Galatz 153 Gemeinde, Berlin 227 General Zionist Party 2, 263 Geneva 75, 137, 187, 220 German Claims Law 292 German Jews, status of 96 German universities 211, 274 Germany xi, 2 0 , 2 1 5 , 260, 278, 281, 298

agencies in 181, 184, 186, 187-188, 189 ban on economic relations wi th 216 DP camps (1945-1946) 45-62

(1947) 193-236 dissolution of 262-277

economic reform 282 infiltrees into 119-132 JDC in 89-90, 92-100, 119-126 Jews remaining in 292 liberation of 33-44 post-liberation 83-87 surrender of 23-44 see also British Zone; F rench Zone ; U S

Zone

Glynn Hughes Hospital, Belsen 229 Gold, Polish, in Britain 160 "Gold train", Hungarian xx Graz 57, 102, 131 Greece 21 ,30 , 1 9 6 , 2 5 1 - 2 5 3 , 2 6 0 , 298

JDC in 19, 252-253 liberation of 18-19

Greek Islands 18 Greeks 18, 177 Grey market 268 Gross-Rosen 35, 284

Hal le in 2 3 2 , 2 9 4 H a m b u r g 221,229 H a n a u 208 Har r i son Repo r t 48 , 50 -51 , 53, 60 H a r t 68 Hashomer Hatzair 209, 262 Hassid ic e lements 212 H e a l t h care see Medica l p rograms H e b r e w 1 6 2 , 2 1 0 H e b r e w C o m m i t t e e for Nat ional

L ibera t ion 257 H e b r e w Shel ter ing and Immigran t Aid

Society ( H I A S ) xiii, xiv, xxv, 3 - 4 , 76, 92 , 287, 295, 297

in F r a n c e 2 3 8 , 2 3 9 , 2 4 4 a n d J D C 148-149, 181-186, 254

H e b r e w Univers i ty 225 Hecha lu tz 151, 156, 239-240 HEFUD see Habillement des Enfants des

Fusilles et Depones Heide lberg 202 H e i d e n h e i m 269 He i lb ronn 127 H I A S see H e b r e w Sheltering and Immigrant

Aid Society H I C E M ( H I A S - I C A - E m i g d i r e c t ) 7, 148,

181, 183 Hilfswerk (Bavarian Aid Society for those

Affected by the N u r e m b e r g Laws) 283 H I S H (militia of Haganah) 49 Historical Commission 1 6 7 , 2 1 1 , 2 7 4 Hoechs t 61 Hofbraeuke l l e r , Mun ich 43 Hol land 28, 245 Holocaust

effects of xi-xii wri t ing of history of 167, 211

H o n g k e w 253 Hungar ian Jews xix-xx, 36, 62, 63, 65 Hungar ian National Bank 134, 138 Hungar ian Red Cross 65 H u n g a r y 5, 10, 21, 22, 80, 111, 149, 169,

260, 290, 298 deportat ions f rom 12 exodus f rom 131 J D C in xvi, 13, 14-15, 18 liberation of 1 1 - 1 8 , 3 3 starvation in 133-148

Hunge r str ike, Cham 98

Haag 68 Habillement des Enfants des FusilUs et Diportis

(HEFUD) 189, 240-241 ICA see Jewish Colonization Association Hachsharot (vocational training farms) 17, Identi ty cards 275

78, 107, 119, 137, 173, 209, 239, IGC see Intergovernmental Committee on 249-250,281 Refugees

Haganah ("Defense") 42, 49-50 , 83, 91, I K see International Committee for Transient 193-194, 222, 225, 263, 264, 279 Concentration Camp Victims and

Haifa 49, 220, 221 Refugees

312 Subject Index IKG see Israelitische Kultusgemeinde "Illegal immigration" xxii, 256-260 "Immigration Two" 256-260 Imports, raw materials 159 India 85 Infiltrees 101-103, 275 Information/knowledge gap 35-38 Innsbruck 68,101 Interagency Council (Conseil

Interoeuvre) 241 Interagency problems 181-192 Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees

(IGC) xix, xx, 25 International Committee for Transient

Concentration Camp Victims and Refugees (IK), Vienna 65 ,66

International Red Cross (IRC) 5 , 6 3 , 134, 254

Committee for Repatriation of Italians and Greeks 67

in Hungary 12 ,13 ,14 ,15-17 in Romania 6 , 7 , 9 , 1 4 9 , 1 5 0

International Refugee Organization (IRO) xix, xx, 186, 202 ,203 ,222 ,229 , 235, 255, 271, 272, 276, 277-278, 282, 286.290.292.294

in Germany and Austria 217-218 in Italy 248-249,250,251

International Settlement, Shanghai 253-254

Iran xxii, 253 Iraq 253, 279, 288 IRC see International Red Cross Irgun (IZL) 49-50, 193-194, 196, 198, 209,

222 ,257 ,263 IRO see International Refugee Organization Israel

conditions in xxii, xxiii-xxiv, 290-291, 295, 298

diplomatic relations 143,175 illegal immigration to 256-260, 291 New State 279-289 returnees from 294 State established (1948) 42 ,49 , 166, 185,

256 see also Palestine

Israel Freedom Fighters (FFI) 49-50 Israeli Army, recruitment for 264-266, 281 Israeli National Library 225 Israelitische Kultusgemeinde (IKG) 62-66,

101,277 Istanbul 6 , 1 0 Italy xi, 1 8 - 1 9 , 2 3 , 5 7 , 6 6 , 101, 131, 196,

2 0 8 . 2 1 5 . 2 8 6 . 2 9 5 J D C in 25-26, 245-251 refugees in 24-26 ,245-251 ,260

I Z L see Irgun

JA see Jewish Agency Japan xii, 253 ,254 Jar 165 Jasi (Jassy) pogrom (1941) 6 , 1 5 1 JDC see American Jewish Joint Distribution

Committee Jerusalem 75, 83 Jever 294 Jewish Agency 4 8 , 6 0 , 83, 124-125, 130,

132, 158, 181, 186, 188, 216, 235, 257, 261-262,287

in Bulgaria 20 Palestine 2 , 1 9 3 - 1 9 7 , 2 0 9 - 2 1 0 , 2 1 4 Rescue Committee 75, 98

Jewish Brigade, Palestinian 4 2 - 4 4 , 6 6 - 6 7 Jewish Central Orthodox Commit tee 213 Jewish Colonization Association (ICA) 181,

182,184 Jewish Cultural Reconstruction Inc . 225 Jewish Democratic Commit tee ,

Romania 158 Jewish Historical Inst i tute, Poland 167 Jewish Memorial Hospital , Sofia 179 Jewish National F u n d 174 Jewish Relief Units (JRUs) , British 40, 62,

66, 100, 132, 228, 246, 282 Jewish Restitution Successor Organization

(JRSO) 224, 292 Jewish Theater Chaplain 40 Jewish Trus t Corporation 224 Jewish Volunteer Corps 253 Jewish Welfare Board 38 Jordan 279 JRSO see Jewish Restitution Successor

Organization JRUs see Jewish Relief Uni ts Judenrat

France 26 Hungary 14-15

Judenzentrale (Centrala Evreilor), Romania 5, 149

Judeo-Bolshevik conspiracy propaganda 72

Kashrut (observance of dietary laws) 110, 213

Kassel 2 1 7 , 2 6 5 Katowice 73 Kaunas (Kovno) 1, 212 Kehilot 159, 162, 164 KGB (Komitet Gosudarstvennoi

Bezopasnosti) 3 Kibbutzim 73-74,77, 117, 119, 162 Kielce, ritual murder pogrom 8 1 - 8 2 , 9 8 ,

103,112 Kommandatura (Allied City Council) ,

Berlin 59 Koordinatzia 118

Subject Index 313 Kovno (Kaunas) 1, 212 Kulturamt 210 Kultusgeheinde 231 Kuomintang 2SS Kyustendil 20

Labor, forced 6, 20, 176, 276 Labor battalions, Hungarian Jewish 10,11,

34 Labor camps xi, 8, 10, 34, 45, 62 Lampertheim 93 Land Salzburg 67 Latidesamt fur Wiedergutmachung (Restitution

Office) 284 Landesentschadigungsamt 284 Landsberg 46, 53, 55, 84, 85, 86, 87,

88-89, 92, 95, 187, 188, 221, 293 monument 219

Landsmannschaftn 77, 163 Latin America xix, 129, 160, 181, 182, 192 Lautersheim 95 Lebanon 279 Leitheim 95 Lemberg (Lwow) 65 Lend-Lease Supplies 4 Leningrad 147 Liberation, Eastern Europe 1-22 Libya (Tripolitania) 251 Linz 67, 68-69, 93, 100, 102, 235, 276 Lisbon xvii, 21 Literature 209 Lithuania 1, 2, 38, 68, 187,200 Loankassas 118, 150,252 Loan societies, free, Hungary 144 Lodz 71, 79, 82, 167 London 2 9 , 7 6 , 8 0 , 136'. London Jewish Committee for Relief

Abroad 100 London talks between Jewish Agency and the

British (January 1947) 196-197 Low Countries 245 Lubavitcher Hassidim 32, 110-111, 212,

240 Lublin 2 , 4 , 34, 73, 167 Luebeck 128 Lwow (Lviv, Lemberg) 65 Lyon 31

McCarranAct 285 Madrichim (counsellors) 214 Maidanek 34 Malben 295 Malochim 99, 127, 131, 204 Manfred Weiss combine, Hungary xix Manila 254 Mapai (Labor Party), Palestine 198, 263

Marches, forced, Hungarian Jews 11 Mariendorf (Tempelhof) 128,227 Marriages

mixed 213 regularizing of 96

Marseilles 241, 244, 286 Marshall Plan xxii, 249, 251, 267 Mauthausen xx, 34, 37,62 Medical programs 136-137, 165,223,250,

273 Merano 250, 251 Merkaz Lagolah (Center for the

Diaspora) 25, 247, 249, 250 MERRA (Middle East UNRRA) 19 Middle East xx, 85 Mikt Theatre group 211 Milan 246,250 Military Government Law 161, Germany 89 Miskolc 14 Mizrahi 212.263,282 MJS see Mouvement de lajeunesse Sionisie Moldavia 6, 152,153 Moravia 104,173 Morocco 244 Morrison-Grady Plan 193 Moscow 2 ,146 ,147 Moslem countries 290, 295 Mossad (Mossad Le'Aliyah Bet) 9,42, 51,

66, 75, 83, 91, 106, 145, 176, 220,241, 249, 257-258, 286

Mouvement de la Jeunesse Sioniste (MJS) 239 Mulln 103 Munich 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 2 , 5 2 - 5 5 , 8 7 , 8 8 , 9 2 , 9 5 ,

124, 187-188, 198, 211, 220, 222, 226, 274, 277, 280

Murder campaigns, Nazi xi, 36-38 Romania 5 Poland 111

Nachod 82, 101, 106, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113

Nadich Report 60-61 National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW),

US xxi, 182, 184, 185 National Refugee Service (NRS), US 182,

183-184, 185 Nationality/citizenship confusion 43 Nationalization

Czechoslovakia 172, 174, 175 health services, Poland 167 Hungary 141, 144 Romania 156, 157

Nazi camps, former ex-block leaden 204-205

Nazism xvi, 230,298 NCJW see National Council for Jewish

Women, US

314 Subject Index Neologue (conservative liberal) religious

communities IS, 142 Neusalz (Nowa Sol) 35 Neustadt 35 Neutrality, political of JDC xvii New Palestine camp 68, 101,277, 289 New York JDC xvi, xxi, 2 ,21-22, 29, 124,

135, 138, 145,257,268 New York Times 3,37,90 New Zealand 199 Nitzotz (Glimmer) 39 NKVD 3 Noham 209 North Africa xi, xxii, xxiv, 20, 191, 288,

295 North African Jews 240,244,286 North America 250 North Transylvanian Refugees'

Committee 10 Norway 245 Nowa Sol (Neusalz) 35 NRS see National Refugee Service, US NSZ (Narodowe Sily Zbrojne) 72 Nyrsko 36

Oberammingen 92 Oeuvre de Protection des Enfants J uifs

(OPEJ) 243 Oeuvre de Secours Sud-Est Europe et

Centrale 16-17 Oeuvre Secours pour Enfants (OSE) 27,32,

33, 174,243,251,295,297 in Romania 151,157

Offenbach 225 OGPU 3 Ohrdruf camp xi OPEJ see Oeuvre de Protection des Enfants

Ms "Organization for Immigration" 42 Organisation J uive de Combat see Armeejuive Organisation for Rehabilitation and Training

(ORT) xiii, xiv, xxv, 92, 124, 145, 151, 157,215,235,272,274,295,297

Congress for the DP countries (1947) 188

in France 238,241,244 Poland 164 relations with JDC 187-192 schools 281

ORT see Organization for Rehabilitation an< Training

Orthodox religious communities 15, 39,77, 212,213,214

OSE see Oeuvre Secours pour Enfants

Pakhakh 162

Palestine xiii, xvii, 2 , 42, 44, 129, 160 British policy in 49-50 , 176 delayed entry to 193-197 Jewish proposals (100,000 to be

admitted) 48, 50, 84-85 , 97 , 193, 206 partition of 185, 194-197, 226, 261 problem of , and German D P camps

83-87 towards a solution in 218-226 war (1948) xxiii, 185, 191, 261-262 , 288 see also Israel

Palestine Mandate 24, 298 Palestinian Jewish part ies 198 Palestinography 162 P A L M A C H (striking force of H a g a n a h ) 49 Papal Nunc ia tu re 12 Parcel post 3 - 4

see also Red Cross parcels Paris 3 2 , 7 0 , 7 5 , 120, 121, 124, 125, 194,

203, 207, 241, 243 liberation (1944) 27

Pascani 8 P C I R O see P repara tory C o m m i s s i o n of t h e

I R O People 's Universi t ies 210 Peretz-Heim 2 Phil ippines, t h e xxii P i t t sburgh 186 P K W N see Pol ish C o m m i t t e e of N a t i o n a l

Liberation Plovdiv 177 ,180 Plzen 35 Poale Zion 2 6 2 Pocking 95 Poland 1 0 , 2 1 , 4 8 , 6 3 , 1 8 7 , 2 6 0 , 2 8 5 , 297 ,

298 communis t 159-169 exodus f r o m 1 1 1 - 1 1 9 , 2 0 6 J D C in 7 6 - 8 0 , 116-119 , 159-169 liberation of 1 - 4 , 33 post-l iberation of 7 1 - 8 2 refugees f r o m in Ber l in 5 7 - 5 8 and the Soviet U n i o n 1 - 4

Polish Commi t t ee of N a t i o n a l L i b e r a t i o n ( P K W N ) 2

Polish Fore ign Off ice 1 1 2 , 1 6 0 Polish Jewish Sta te T h e a t e r 167 Polish Repa t r i a t ion C o m m i t t e e ( P U R ) 112 ,

128 P o p e P i u s X I I 117 P o p p e n d o r f 2 2 1 , 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 Por t -de-Bouc 2 2 0 , 2 2 1 , 243 Por tuguese 12 P O W s 3 4 , 3 6 P rague xv i , 1 0 4 - 1 0 5 , 106 , 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 , 1 1 2 ,

116, 170, 171, 172 , 175 P repa ra to ry C o m m i s s i o n of t h e I R O

( P C I R O ) 202

Press reports of concentration camp horrors xviii, 34, 36-38

Producers ' cooperatives 144 ,146 ,156 ,161 , 165-166, 179

Property confiscation 2 0 , 7 9 transfer to Palestine 263

Property restitution 104, 214, 224-225 Austria 2 7 8 , 2 9 3 Bavaria 284

Czechoslovakia 172-173 Greece 19,252 Hungary 134, 137 Poland 71, 79, 163

Protection papers (Hungary) 12 Protestant welfare organizations,

Washington 97 P U R see Polish Repatriation Committee

Rabbis 1, 171, 212, 298 letters f rom 40

Rada (Centra Jewish Community Council, Czechoslovakia) 173, 174

Radom 71 Reconstruction Credit Cooperative,

Hungary 144 Reconstruction programs 150, 206 Recruitment for Israeli Army 264-266, 274,

281 Red Army 78 Red Cross parcels 41, 54-55, 87, 101 Reform Jews xiv, 39 Refugees 24

see also DPs (displaced persons) Regal (Moldavia and Wallachia) 6 Regensburg 35, 93, 127 Reggio Emilia 248 Rehabilitation programs 89, 159-160, 206,

215-218 Religious life, in D P camps 212-214 Repatriation 45

to Poland 78-80, 106 Resistance factions, French 31 "Restitution of Identifiable Property",

Military Law No. 59 224-225 Restitution laws see Property restitution Retraining program 145 Revisionists 263 Rhodes 18, 251 Romania 2, 17, 21, 22, 57, 74, 80, 111,

187, 189, 257-258, 260, 297 during the Holocaust 4-11 JDC in xvi, 6, 7-10, 148-158 refugee crisis 171, 232-235 revolution (1944) 7 starvation in 148-158

Romanian Jews 65, 140, 296

Index 315 Rome 26,246,250

liberation (1944) 25 Roosevelt administration 12 Rosenheim 127 Rothschild Hospital, Vienna 64,93,101

131, 233, 234 Rudniki 2 Russia see Soviet Union

Sahara xi StOttilien 39,42 Saloniki 18, 19, 251 Salzburg 6 6 , 6 8 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 101, 103,131,235,

277 Saudi Arabia 279 Scandinavia 208, 245 Schlachtensee-Duppel center 60, 128,227 Schleissheim 120, 208 Schmetterer, Ya'akov 74 Scouts (Eclaireurs) 27, 32,239,240 Sejm (parliament), Bulgaria 20 Self-government, Jewish tradition 94 Sengwarden 230 Sephardic Jews 253 Service Europeen des Recherches (SER) 242 Service Sociale des Immigres (SSI) 239 Service Sociale des Jeunes (SSJ) 239,240 Sete 220 Shabbat 212 SHAEF see Supreme Headquarters Allied

Expeditionary Force Shanghai xxii, xxiv, xx, 250, 253-256 She'erit Hapletah v, xxv, 40,94

2nd Congress (1947) 125, 19&-199, 212-213, 262-263

Siberia 128 Sicily, invasion (1943) xi, 24 Silesia 35, 79, 82, 114

Lower 160-161, 163, 168 Slobodka Yeshiva 212 Slovakia xvi, 10, 104, 105, 173 Smallholders Party, Hungary 141 Sofia 20, 176, 177, 178, 180 Solidarnoii (Polish Economic Center) 166,

167 Solvino 249 SOS see Supplies for Overseas Survivors Sosua settlement, Dominican Republic xxii South Africa 77, 192 South African Jewish Appeal xix South America 77, 255 Soviet Army, war relief 3,13 Soviet Union 33, 78, 111, 146, 170, 187,

261 JDC in 2-4 and Poland 1-4 returnees from 18, 57, 159, 163, 296

316 Subject Index Soviets

in Austria 63 in Bulgaria 20 in the Crimea 3 in Hungary 13, 14, 17-18, 134, 142-148 negotiations with J D C 2-4 in Poland 71-82 takeover of Romania 7-10

Spain 12,18 SS

death marches by 35 ransom paid by Hungarian Jews to (1944)

see Becher deposit SSI see Service Sociale des Immigres SSJ see Service Sociale desjeunes Staatskommissariat fur die Betreuung der Juden

(State Commissariat for Care for Jews) 284

Stalingrad 20 Stalinism

Bulgaria 179-180 Czechoslovakia 175 Hungary 142-148 Poland 166-169

Star of David 44 Stars and Stripes 89 Starvation

in Hungary 13, 133-148,201 in Romania 7 - 8 , 1 0 , 1 4 8 - 1 5 8 , 201 ,233 ,

298 State Department 114,258 Stern Group see F F I Stettin see Szczecin Strasshof 6 3 , 6 5 Stratton Bill on DPs (July 1948) 284-286 Strikes 190, 287 Struth 214 Stut tgan 92, 9 7 , 2 6 6 Stutthof 35 Subcarpathian Russia 104, 111, 149,171 "Submarines" 64 Sudeten area 171 Supplies for Overseas Survivors (SOS) xxi,

123, 224 Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary

Force (SHAEF) 2 3 , 2 8 , 4 1 , 4 3 Survivors 38-40, 296-299

see also She'erit Hapletah Svaz (Jewish Community Council,

Czechoslovakia) 173, 175 Sweden xii, xx, 12, 5 5 , 5 6 , 7 3 , 8 0 , 2 4 5 Swedish Pavilion, Berlin 59 Swedish protection papers (Schutzbriefe) 12 Swiss, in Hungary 12 Swiss seals 16 Switzerland xii, xvi, xx, 6 , 1 8 , 2 0 , 3 1 , 51,

5 5 , 6 3 , 134, 148, 1 4 9 , 2 0 8 , 2 5 4 Syria 279, 288

Szczecin (Stet t in) 58, 74 , 79 , 82 , 112, 128

Talmudai lor ah 163,212 Tarbut schools 163 Targu F r u m o s 8 Targu N e a m t 8 Tarvisio 42, 57 Ta t ra moun ta ins 174, 175 Teachers , f r o m Palest ine 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 , 282 Tehe ran 3 - 4 , 80 , 125 Tempelhof (Mar i endor f ) 1 2 8 , 2 2 7 Ter ro r i sm 50 Thea te r s 167, 210 , 235 Theres iens tad t (Te rez in ) 6 3 , 6 4 , 7 5 , 9 5 ,

1 0 4 , 1 7 2 l iberation of 36

T h i r d A r m y Area , D P s in 8 7 - 8 8 Thur ing ia 35 Timisoara 16 Ti ro l 231 Topolc iany p o g r o m 105 TOZ (Towarzystwo Ochrony Zdrowia) 159,

1 6 4 , 1 6 5 Trans i en t s , p r o b l e m of 175 , 241 Transnis t r ia 5 , 8 , 149, 2 3 3 Transy lvania , N o r t h e r n 5 , 1 0 , 1 4 9 , 1 5 1 Treb l inka 18 Tripol i tania ( L i b y a ) 251 T r u m a n admin i s t r a t ion xxi i i , 1 8 2 - 1 8 3 , 185,

195, 2 5 5 , 2 6 7 , 2 7 1 Tun i s i an J ew s 244 T u r k e y 1 2 , 3 5

U B (Polish security) 112 U G 1 F see Union Generate des Israelites de

France UJA see Uni ted Jewish Appea l U J R E see Union desjuifs pour la Risistance et

I'Ent'Aide Ukraine 1 , 4 Ukrainians 72 , 267 Unemploymen t , Jewish 8 , 139 Union des Etudiants J uifs de France 2 4 2 Union desjuifs pour la Risistance et I'Ent'Aide

( U J R E ) 32, 242 Union Ginerale des Israilites de France

( U G I F ) 27 Union of Jewish C o m m u n i t i e s 148 Union of R o m a n i a n Jews 155 Uni ted Israel Appea l ( U I A ) xxii Uni ted Jewish Appea l ( U J A ) xv i i , xxi i , 1 H ,

1 8 1 - 1 8 2 , 2 2 5 , 2 5 1 , 2 5 8 , 2 6 5 , 2 9 6 Conference (1945) 99

Uni t ed N a t i o n s 1 8 5 , 2 0 2 , 280 , 298 Uni t ed N a t i o n s Relief a n d Rehab i l i t a t i on

Agency ( U N R R A ) 19, 2 3 , 4 1 , 4 5 , 53 ,

Subject Index 317 59, 60 , 68 , 70 , 85, 88, 98, 130, 210, 214, 252, 255

Czech 106-110 demise of 201-202 , 203, 217 in G e r m a n y 89-90 , 93, 95-96 , 120, 124,

193

in Italy 2 4 6 , 2 4 8 , 249 Uni ted Na t ions Special Commit tee on

Palest ine ( U N S C O P ) 220-222 Uni t ed Palest ine Appeal (UPA) xvii,

xxi i-xxii i , 259 Un i t ed Service for N e w Americans

( U S N A ) xxiii, 185-186, 255, 295 Uni ted States 77, 152, 2 0 8 , 2 5 4

an t i - communism 266-267 emigrat ion to 86 -87 , 129, 181, 199, 251,

289, 291 en t ry of D P s to 284-286 and Palest ine 84-86 , 261 recept ion of immigrants in 183-184,

185-186, 187 Red Cross 152 unawareness of Nazi horrors 37-38

Uni ted States Forces European Theater ( U S F E T ) xxiv, 116

U N R R A see Uni ted Nat ions Relief and Rehabil i tat ion Agency

U N R R A - P C I R O (Preparatory Commission of the Internat ional Organization for Refugees) 190

U N S C O P see Uni ted Nat ions Special Commi t t ee on Palestine

U P A see Uni ted Palestine Appeal Uruguay 86 U S A r m y 41, 75-76 , 113-114, 217, 297

in Austr ia xxiv, 233-234, 235 and D P camps 90, 91-92, 95

closure of 274-276 in Germany xxiv, 55, 87-88, 120, 121,

124 Jewish chaplains in 38-40, 56, 75-76, 92,

100, 192, 283, 298 relations with D P s 23-24, 206-207,

218-220, 221-222, 267-270 US Commanding General in the European

Thea te r , Jewish Advisers to 40 US High Commission 288-289, 290 US Zone

Austria 67, 88, 231, 277 Germany 41, 45-62, 88, 113, 126-127,

289 U S F E T see United States Forces European

Theater USNA see United Service for New Americans USSR see Soviet Union

Va'ad Hahaizalah xii, 62,110, 210, 214, 240, 264, 273, 287, 297

Varna 176 Vestnik 105 Vichy government 24 Vienna 48, 56, 88 ,92-93 , 101, 108, 140,

171, 184, 231, 233, 234, 258, 277, 289, 290

liberation 62 Villach 42 Vilna 2 Voith Settlement 269 Voluntary agencies, American Jewish 40-44 Vorarlberg 231

Walbrzych 165 Wallachia 6 Wannsee 59 War Department 114 War Refugee Board 12, 46 Warsaw 71, 77, 79, 112,116,159, 164 Warsaw ghetto rebellion xvi, 2, 76

history of 167,211 Washington 4, 97 Wegscheid 277 Wells 232 Western Europe, liberation of 23-44 Wittenau 59, 129, 227 Wolfratshausen 53 Women 11,71, 144,223 World conspiracy, Jewish, propaganda 72,

90, 147, 180 World Jewish Congress xiii, 10, 37 ,60 ,

125, 126, 150 World O R T Union 188, 189 Writers ' and Artists' Society 211

Yad Vashem 274 Yemen xxii, xxiv Yeshivoi (talmudic academies) xii, 214 Yiddish Bukh 167 Yiddish language xiii, 39, 55, 162, 210 Yiddish secular schools 282 Yishuv (Palestine Jewish

community) 49-50, 91 Youth Aliyah 243 Youth movements 2 ,65 , 174,208 Yugoslavia 21, 26, 146, 149, 175, 196

communist 176 J D C in 20, 176

Zehlendorf 56 Zeilsheim 269, 275 Zentralrat (Central committee of German

Jewish communities) 225

318 Subject Index Zionism 40,44,60,83, 125, 142, 146-147,

212,258-259,293 Zionist Conference, 22nd (1946) 196 Zionist movement, American guilt 194-195 Zionist Organization 95 Zionist Rescue Committee (Va'adah le'Exrah

Ve'Hatzalah), Hungary 14,15-16 Zionist World Conference (1945) 80 Zionists

in Bulgaria 177,179 in Eastern Europe 21-22 in Hungary 11-13

JDC's relationship with xvii, xxii-xxiv in Poland 2 ,77 ,78 , 159, 160, 162-163,

164 in Romania 7,149,158

ZK (Central Committee), Munich 52, 54, 61, 88, 94,95-99, 119, 187-188, 192, 198, 200, 216, 262-263, 268, 272, 274, 277,282,287,293

help to DP camps 208,209-212 Historical Commission 211 Religious Council 212 struggle with JDC 120-126

About the Author

Y e h u d a B a u e r is J o n a h M . Machover Professor of Holocaust Studies and C h a i r m a n of t h e Vida l Sassoon Internat ional Center for the Study of Anti-s e m i t i s m at t h e H e b r e w Univers i ty , Jerusalem. Born in Prague in 1926, h e e m i g r a t e d to H a i f a , in wha t was then Palestine, in 1939. H e attended t h e H e b r e w Univers i ty where h e received a P h D on his dissertation " T h e P a l m a c h Aga ins t t h e Backg round of Zionist Policies, 1939-1945**. Having jo ined t h e Univers i ty ' s Ins t i tu te of Contemporary Jewry in 1961, he b e c a m e i ts A c a d e m i c C h a i r m a n in 1982. Professor Bauer 's distinguished a c a d e m i c career as b o t h a lec turer and researcher has led him to become a p r e - e m i n e n t a n d respected author i ty in the field of Jewish Studies with m a n y b o o k s a n d learned articles to his credit .

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