bastian lücke, thomas kessler, amélie mummendey, anne berthold

“They shouldn´t” or “Thou shalt not”:The impact of minimal or maximal

goal-type on explicit negative

intergroup behaviour

Bastian Lücke, Thomas Kessler,

Amélie Mummendey, Anne Berthold

Explicit negative behavior towards outgroups

Intro Theory Paradigm Study I Study II Study III Summary Prospect

Aims of the research:

1. Distinction between minimal and maximal goals (goal-type) as factor affecting explicit negative behavior towards

outgroups.

2. Experimental study of explicit negative behavior towards outgroups (research paradigm).

Introduction



Theory: Minimal and maximal goals

Goal: No deception in experimental studies (e.g. Cook & Yamagishi, 2008; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2002)

Minimal goal: NO DECEPTION whatsoever (dichotomous evaluation).

Maximal goal: As little deception as possible (graded evaluation).

The distinction between minimal and maximal goals:(Kessler, Neumann, Mummendey, Berthold, Schubert & Waldzus, submitted; Fritsche, Kessler, Mummendey & Neumann, 2009;Berthold, Mummendey, Kessler & Lücke, submitted)

Groups: Economists and Social Psychologists

Example



Deception Example:

additional information

no deception

some deception

Minimal goal Maximal goal

massive deception



Definition goal-types

Maximal goal: Goal that should be achieved as much as possible → graded evaluation.

Minimal goal: Goal that can either be achieved or not → dichotomous evaluation.

Minmax Hypothesis (H1)

More explicit negative behavior is shown by members of an IG if a goal is violated by the OG that is represented by a members of theIG as a minimal goal, less negative behavior is shown if the violated goal is represented as a maximal goal.

Moral Outrage Hypothesis (H2)

The impact of goal-type on negative behavior by members of an IG towards the deviant OG is mediated by moral outrage towards theOG.



100 %

60 %

50 %


Manipulation of goal-type

0 %

Contribution rate

Public Good Game



Study I

Maximal goal condition: Gradual Public Good Game Contribute as much as possible.

Minimal goal condition: Step level Public Good Game Threshold: 60 %.

IG OG

Entire OG contributes less

than 60 %

Other 2 IG playerscontribute more

than 60 %

- Exact same contributions of other 5 co-players in both conditions!- Exact amount of the initial endowment uncertain

- Goal: Making money by contributing a share of the initial endowment

- Minimal groups:



Study I

Contributions:

New DV: The „lottery item“

Minimal goal condition: 62 %; SD=22,98

Maximal goal condition: 77 %; SD=14,26

→ Generalized social exclusion

Identification: M=5.29; SD=1.03 (Cronbachs α=.94)

Monetary punishment / identification r=.233, n.s.

Moral outrage / identification: r=.360, p=.012

Exclusion (lottery item) / identification r=.394, p=.006



Study I: Results

Moral outrage towards OG (Cronbachs α=.92)

F (1, 46) = 4.055, p = .025, η2 = .08

Minimal goalM = 3.19 SD = 2.06

Maximal goalM = 2.15 SD = 1.84

Monetary punishment of OG-members

Minimal goalM = 4.46 SD = 2.00


F (1, 46) = 3.124, p = .042, η2 = 0.06



Study I: Results

Exclusion (from future rounds)

F (1, 46) = 5.411, p = .012, η2 = .11

Minimal goalM = 4.54

SD = 2.34


Social Exclusion (lottery-item)

Minimal goalM = 5.69

SD = 1.67


F (1, 46) = 3.133, p = .042, η2 = .06

Monetary punishment / exclusion (future rounds): r=.692, p<.001Monetary punishment / exclusion (lottery item): r=.320, p=.026Exclusion (future rounds) / exclusion (lottery item): r=.320, p=.026



Study I: Criticism

Conceptual differences between payoff matrices in agradual public good game and a step-level public good game

step-level gradual

average contribution

rate

average contribution

rate

Payoffs from Public Good

Individual payoff

Individual payoff

Δ p1

Δ p1

Δ p2

Conceptual difference, even if payoffs and Δ p1 are kept constant!



Study II

Framing of goaltype

Exact same – gradual – payoff matrix in both goaltype-conditions.

Only difference: Group goal that participants are supposed to suggest is either framed as minimal or maximal.



Study II: Results

F (1, 46) = 4.991, p = .015, η2 = .10

Min M = 3.43SD = 1.76

MaxM = 2.41SD = 1.35


Participants contributions: Minimal goal condition: 63 % (SD=19.84)

Maximal goal condition: 75 % (SD=14.10)



Study II: Results

F (1,46) = 5.422, p = .012, η2 = .11

Min M = 5.38SD = 1.38

MaxM = 4.35SD = 1.64

Monetary punishment of OG-members

Min M = 4.79SD = 1.79

MaxM = 3.57SD = 1.95

Social exclusion of OG-members

F (1,46) = 5.044, p = .015, η2 = .10

Monetary punishment & social exclusion: r = .487, p = .001



Studies I – III: Summary

Combined sample

Similar experimental design and the same hypotheses and dv

- No significant differences over the 3 studies with regard to level of identification, negative emotions towards OG, social exclusion, contribution; (exception: punishment)

- No interactions between the factors „study“ and „goal-type“



Studies I – III: Summary

Effect of goal-type on moral outrage towards OG:

F (1, 153) = 14.27, p < .001, η2 = .09

Effect of goal-type on social exclusion of members of the OG:

F (1, 153) = 10.20, p = .002, η2 = .08

Effect of goal-type on monetary punishment of the OG:

F (1, 153) = 14.25, p < .001, η2 = .09

Behavioral measures: „Monetary punishment“ and „social exclusion“:r = .577, p < .001



Studies I - III: Summary

goal-type

outrage towards OG

social exclusion

β = -.251 **

β = .582 **β = -.293 **

Test of the indirect effect:Bootstrapping (N=2000) b=-.68, p=.0006, BCa(95%)=[-1.0523,-.3257].

(-.088 n.s.)



Studies I - III: Summary

goal-type

outrage towards OG

monetary punishment

β = -.293 **

β = .534 **β = -.293 **

Test of the indirect effect:Bootstrapping (N=2000) b=-.56, p=.0009, BCa(95%)=[-1.0583,-.3182].

(-.149 *)



VII Summary

- H1: Minimal goal-representation leads to more explicit negative behavior towards the OG than a maximal goal-representation

H2 : This relation is mediated by moral outrage towards the outgroup.

- Working experimental paradigm to research explicit negative behavior towards OG-members

- Several replications of these results, excluding possible influence of the research paradigm



Thank You!



Study I

Contributions: Minimal goal condition: 71 %; SD=14,37

Maximal goal condition: 76 %; SD=21,61

Identification: M=5.25; SD=1.40,

Monetary punishment / identification with IG: r=.279, p=.037

Moral outrage / identification with IG: r=.457, p=.001

Cronbachs α=.91



Study I - Results

Monetary punishment

F (1, 59) = 5.61, p = .011, η2 = .09


M = 4.53 SD = 2.06

M = 3.30SD = 1.97

No effect of relative difference in payoff on behavior and emotion!


M = 3.77 SD = 1.53

M = 2.92 SD = 1.50

F (1, 59) = 4.67, p = .018, η2 = .08




Study IISelf selection of group-goal

New DVs: The „lottery item“ – Generalized social exclusion Exclusion from future rounds

Study I - Criticism

In minimal goal condition, goal level was given, in maximal goal condition not.

→ Possible influence of authority/ justification/ attribution.

Goal selection: Participants were allegedly randomly selected to suggest a contribution between 10% and 100% as group goal.

bastian lücke, thomas kessler, amélie mummendey, anne berthold

Documents

maximal goaltype

violated goal

maximal goals goaltype

impact of minimal

maximal goalsgoal

membersminimal goalm

og cronbachs

moral outrage identification