based on cshapes (weidmann, kuse , gleditzsch 2010)
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10 Years after the ‘Big Bang’ EU Enlargement – An assessment of the causes and consequences of Eastern enlargement and an outlook during times of multiple crises
Baltisch-Deutsches HochschulkontorUniversity of Latvia, Faculty of Economics and Management, Room 504
31/03/2014
Dirk Leuffen ([email protected])
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9Based on CShapes (Weidmann, Kuse, Gleditzsch 2010).
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Traditionalist Scientistic Rationalist Constructivist
Causes
DemandNugent (2004)…
Mattli & Plümper (2002)Moravcsik (1998)…
Gstöhl (2002)Sundlisaeter Skinner (2012)Friis (1998a)…
Supply Moravcsik (1998)Schneider (2009)…
Tewes (1998)Sedelmeier (2002)Friis (1998b)Schimmelfennig (2003)…
Consequences
EUZielonka (2006)…
Thomson (2011)Hertz & Leuffen (2011)Naurin & Lindahl (2008)…
Bailer et al. (2009)Thomas (2006)…
Candidates/MS
Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier (2004)Trauner (2009)…
Grabbe (2001)Freyburg & Richter (2010)…
DEEPENING VS. WIDENING…?
EU Enlargement Research (selection)
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Group Size (Public Choice)
THEORY MECHANISM EXPECTATION
Club Theory
Collective action
Non-cooperative game theoryTransaction cost approaches
Spatial Models
A-priori Voting Power Theory
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Group Size (Public Choice)
THEORY MECHANISM EXPECTATION
Club Theory Crowding costs Fewer public goods produced (-)
Collective action Freeriding Fewer public goods produced (-)
Non-cooperative game theory
Informational deficits Less cooperative behavior (-)
Transaction cost approaches Growing complexity Loss of efficiency; slowing down of decision-making (-)
Spatial Models Growing heterogeneity Increase of policy stability (-)
A-priori Voting Power Theory
Reduction of passage probability
Status quo bias (-)
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Club Theory (Buchanan 1965)
Increase of group size-> Crowding costs
-> Fewer incentives to contribute to production of public goods
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Collective Action (Olson 1965)
Increase of group size-> More incentives for freeriding
-> Fewer incentives to contribute to production of public goods
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Non-cooperative Game Theory
(cf. z.B. Hardin 1971; Bonacich et al. 1976)
Increase of group size-> Less information about other players
-> Less cooperative behavior
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Transaction Cost Approaches(cf. Buchanon & Tullock 1962)
Source: Jensen, Hertz & Leuffen (2009)
Increase of group size-> Growing complexity
-> Growing transaction costs-> Efficiency is diminished
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Veto Player Theory (Tsebelis 2002)
SQ
Increase of group size-> Growing heterogeneity (per assumption)
-> Increase of polciy stability
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Group Size (Public Choice)
THEORY MECHANISM EXPECTATION
Club Theory Crowding costs Fewer public goods produced (-)
Collective action Freeriding Fewer public goods produced (-)
Non-cooperative game theory
Informational deficits Less cooperative behavior (-)
Transaction cost approaches Growing complexity Loss of efficiency; slowing down of decision-making (-)
Spatial Models Growing heterogeneity Increase of policy stability (-)
A-priori Voting Power Theory
Reduction of passage probability
Status quo bias (-)
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Expectations Eastern Enlargement• Kerremans (1998)/Dobbins et al. (2004): SQ-bias due to growing
heterogeneity at least in specific policy areas• Zimmer et al. (2005): Growing conflict between net contributors
and net receivers• König & Bräuninger (2000): reduced decision-making capacities,
depending on MS preferences• König & Bräuninger (2004): Growing cores in the agricultural sector• Tsebelis & Yatanagas (2000): Increase of policy-stability• König & Schulz (2000): Rise of transaction costs leads to slowing
down of decision-making• Scharpf (2006): More of the joint-decision-trap• Exception Steunenberg (2002): Enlargement resistant property
under QMV
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Generel Expectation
More Gridlock:Growing policy-stability after enlargement!
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Empirical Findings
Results on the policy-making process• No more negative votes (cf. Mattila 2009;
Hagemann 2008)• Only partial re-ordering of actor constellations
(cf. Thomson 2009, 2011; Veen 2011; Naurin & Lindahl 2008; Plechanovova 2011)
• Slowing down effects (cf. König & Schulz 2000; Hertz & Leuffen 2011; ≠ Golub 2007)
• Continuity in EP and Commission (cf. Hix & Noury 2009; Peterson & Birdsall 2009)
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System Production (Hertz & Leuffen)
• Analysis of EU legislative output (count models)• PreLex 1976-2009 (EUR-Lex; Council summaries) • No general reduction of legislative output after
enlargement rounds (not even in CAP and CFP)• But: slight reduction of directives!
OVERALL: WHY SO MUCH CONTINUITY?
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Group Size in Sociology
THEORY MECHANISM RESULTOligarchization
Formalization
Adaptation
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Group Size in Sociology
THEORY MECHANISM RESULTOligarchization Growing difference
between actors; more hierarachy
Concentration of power
Formalization Inefficiency leads actors to reform institutions
Institutional response
Adaptation Social mechanism of influence (Johnston 2001); Contract by convention (Hardin 1982)
Cooperative behavior is continued after enlargement
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Oligarchization
• Network analyses show slight increase in concentration
• Link to outputs, however, rather unclear• Models show that the influence of big states is
rather limited
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Formalization
• No strong evidence for formalization; e.g. increasing use of „trilogues“
• But: institutional response; e.g. reform treaties & reform of Council Rules of Procedure (abolishment of tour de table)
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Adaptation
• Newcomers adopt existing decision-making behavior
• Mechanisms of social influence (Johnston 2001)?
• Consensual decision-making is still the rule after enlargement
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Heterogeneity
• Assumption of growing heterogeneity of MS preferences after enlargement…
• Structural-variables (GDP, occupational structure, history…) suggest more tensions…
Preferences in the enlarged EU
„DEU II“ (with R. Thomson & J. Arregui)
• Expert interviews to measure preferences and saliences of EU member states
• 152 controversial issues / 56 legislative proposals after enlargement
• „low politics“• Scale ranging from 0 to 100
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Counterfactual Analysis
What if…?How would the EU have decided in the
„good old days“?
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Model
• Model as approximation of reality in order to „rerun history“
• Compromise-model (van den Bos 1991; Achen 2006)
(= inst. Realism; approximation of Nash bargaining solution)
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Example
0 50 100
COM (2006) 373 (2006/0132/COD)
ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)
Issue 11. Areal spraying of crops (cf. art. 9 of COM-proposal)
Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive
Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions
Prohibit spraying throughout Europe
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AUT BEL BUL CYP CZ
DK EE FI FR DE
EL ES HU IE IT
LT LU LV MT NL
PL POR RO SI SK
SE UK
Compromise-ModelISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe
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AUT0
BEL50
BUL0
CYP100
CZ100
DK100
EE100
FI100
FR50
DE50
EL50
ES100
HU0
IE50
IT0
LT100
LU50
LV100
MT50
NL100
PL100
POR50
RO0
SI50
SK50
SE100
UK50
Compromise-ModelISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe
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AUT0
BEL50
DK100
FI100
FR50
DE50
EL50
ES100
IE50
IT0
LU50
NL100
POR50
SE100
UK50
Counterfactual EU 15 ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe
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BEL50
DK100
FR50
DE50
EL50
ES100
IE50
IT0
LU50
NL100
POR50
UK50
Counterfactual EU 12 ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe
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BEL50
DK100
FR50
DE50
EL50
IE50
IT0
LU50
NL100
UK50
Counterfactual EU 10 ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe
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BEL50
DK100
FR50
DE50
IE50
IT0
LU50
NL100
UK50
Counterfactual EU 9 ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe
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BEL50
FR50
DE50
IT0
LU50
NL100
Counterfactual EU 6 ISSUE 71Proposal for a directive establishing a framework for Community action to achieve a sustainable use of pesticides (COD/2006/132)1. Areal spraying of crops 0: Permit spraying throughout Europe under certain conditions specified in the directive50: Prohibit spraying but allow member states to derogate under certain conditions100: Prohibit spraying throughout Europe
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Procedure counterfactual analysis1. Per issue: 6 predictions generated (EU27 to EU6)
2. Comparison of prediction and actual measured outcome
3. Average difference for EU6 to EU27 over ALL issues
3b. Disaggregation into policy areas (Harm., Reg., Redistr.)
4. Comparison of distance between model predictions and reference point (mostly SQ) over different group sizes
QUESTION: Do enlargement rounds lead to SQ-bias?
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All acts Fin. Sub. Reg. Harmon.
EU25/27
EU15
EU12
EU10
EU9
EU6
N 152
Mean Absolute Errors (=average errors of model predictions to measured output)
Performance
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All acts Fin. Sub. Reg. Harmon.
EU25/27 24.22
EU15 25.03
EU12 25.25
EU10 25.33
EU9 25.39
EU6 26.89
N 152
Performance
Mean Absolute Errors (=mean errors of model predictions to measured output)
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All acts Fin. Sub. Reg. Harmon.
EU25/27 24.22 24.65 23.13 28.01
EU15 25.03 25.59 23.17 29.40
EU12 25.25 26.37 23.93 29.25
EU10 25.33 25.18 23.59 29.27
EU9 25.39 25.74 23.11 29.01
EU6 26.89 27.56 25.31 30.78
N 152 18 69 52
Performance
Mean Absolute Errors (=average errors of model predictions to measured output)
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SQ Bias?
Average distance of model prediction to reference point;N = 152.
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SQ Bias?
Average distance of model prediction to reference point
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SQ Bias?
Average distance of model prediction to reference point
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Boxplots: distance to RP0
2040
6080
100
Dis
tanc
e to
Ref
eren
ce P
oint
EU25/27 EU15 EU12 EU10 EU9 EU6 Outcome
All Issues
020
4060
8010
0D
ista
nce
to R
efer
ence
Poi
nt
EU25/27 EU15 EU12 EU10 EU9 EU6 Outcome
Financial Subsidies Issues
020
4060
8010
0D
ista
nce
to R
efer
ence
Poi
nt
EU25/27 EU15 EU12 EU10 EU9 EU6 Outcome
Harmonization Issues
020
4060
8010
0D
ista
nce
to R
efer
ence
Poi
nt
EU25/27 EU15 EU12 EU10 EU9 EU6 Outcome
Regulation Issues
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Caveats
• Measurement of ideal points?• Anticipation of Commission? Enlarged
orchestra plays a different tune…• Validity of compromise model: is predictive
capacity sufficiently strong?
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Administrative capacity?
Overall salience means and predicted values for each country based on DEU II (source Leuffen, Malang & Woerle 2014).
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Current Challenges
• Compliance• Euro Crisis• EU – Russia Relations• Public Opinion – Support for EU – Legitimacy• …
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Conclusion
• Eastern enlargment no watershed!• Institutional response + preference structure
can explain the high degree of continuity• Eastern enlargement overall a success story